Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Claude Frassen

Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Claude Frassen (1620–1711)


Tractatus I: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio

Praeludia I: Praeludia Theologica

Disputatio I: De Existentia et Necessitate Gratiae

Articulus I: De necessitate gratiae ad verum cognoscendum

Quaestio I: An possit homo in statu naturae lapsae, absque speciali divinae gratiae auxilio, omnes veritates naturales speculativas cognoscere.

Quaestio II: AN ET QUALITER GRATIA SIT NECESSARIA AD VERUM MORALE DETEGENDUM.

Quaestio III

Articulus II: De necessitate gratiae ad bonum faciendum

Quaestio I: UTRUM HOMO POSSIT SINE ULLA GRATIA VELLE ET OPERARI BONUM SUPERNATURALIS ORDINIS.

Quaestio II

Quaestio III

Quaestio IV: **AN ET QUOMODO GRATIA NECESSARIA SIT AD DILIGENDUM DEUM UT AUCTOREM NATURAE.**

Quaestio V

Articulus III: De necessitate gratiae ad malum vitandum

Quaestio I: **QUALITER OPUS SIT DIVINAE GRATIAE AUXILIO AD TENTATIONES SUPERANDAS.**

Quaestio II

Quaestio III: **AN. ET QUALI HOMO INDIGEAT GRATIA AD PERSEVERANDUM IN FUGA MALI, ET BONI PROSECUTIONE.**

Disputatio II: De Essentia, Causis, et variis Gratiae Divisionibus

Articulus I: De essentia gratiae

Quaestio I: An gratia sit quid increatum vel creatum, intrinsecum vel extrinsecum, substantia vel accidens.

Quaestio II: **UTRUM, ET QUALITER GRATIA HABITUALIS DISTINGUATUR A CHARITATE.**

Quaestio III: **AN, ET QUALITER GRATIA HABITUALIS AUGERI POSSIT ET MINUI, CORRUMPI ET DEPERDI.**

Articulus II: De causis gratiae

Quaestio I: An, et qualiter Deus sit causa efficiens gratiae.

Quaestio II: An gratia creetur, vel educatur de potentia animae.

Quaestio III: **AN GRATIA IMMEDIATE SUBIECTETUR IN SUBSTANTIA, AN VERO IN FACULTATIBUS ANIMAE.**

Articulus III: De divisione et multiplici specie gratiae

Sectio I

Sectio II

Sectio III

Sectio IV

Disputatio III: De effectibus et praeccellentiis Gratiae sanctificantis

Articulus I: De dispositionibus ad gratiam sanctificantem desiderandis

We are not here going to treat of the justification of infants, which takes place in baptism; for since they are not possessed of reason and liberty, it is plainly evident that they are justified without any motion of free will, and without any previous disposition on their part: nor do we dispute here concerning that justification insofar as it embraces all those motions by which we are stirred up by God, that we may be received unto better fruit; for with respect to those motions excited by God, it is certain that no disposition on the part of man is required, but that it depends solely upon the mere mercy of God and His gratuitous bounty. We treat, therefore, only of the justification of adults, which is wrought through an act of the intellect and of the will; for since these faculties are spiritual, and receptive of grace and of heavenly gifts, thence it comes to pass that for receiving those charisms adults must dispose themselves through certain acts of intellect and will. Three things therefore come chiefly to be determined here: First, whether man ought on his part to concur, and to dispose himself, for receiving the grace of justification. Second, what act of the intellect is required for justification. Third, what acts of the will, and which ones, are prerequisite thereto.

Quaestio I: An homo sese disponere debeat ad gratiam iustificationis.

NOTE 1. It is certain that man cannot by equal right prepare himself for sanctifying grace through the powers of nature alone; for this is clearly proved from Sacred Scripture against the Pelagians, especially in those texts in which it is asserted that God goes before us and allures and draws us to Himself by His divine motions. Thus Ps. 20: Thou hast prevented him with the blessings of sweetness. John 6: No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him. 1 Cor. 1: What hast thou that thou hast not received? Hence it is evident that man of himself and by his own powers contributes nothing at all toward salvation, and consequently neither toward sanctifying grace, which is the seed of eternal life. The same thing the Councils define, especially the Council of Diospolis, in which Pelagius was compelled to confess that grace is not given according to our merits; and the Council of Orange, Can. 4 and Can. 7, as may be seen in the Preface to this Treatise; but most clearly of all the Council of Trent, Session 6, Can. 3: If anyone shall say that, without the preventingly illumination of the Holy Spirit and His aid, man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be bestowed upon him, let him be anathema.

The same thing the Holy Fathers teach openly, most especially St. Augustine, who is wholly engaged in establishing that necessity of grace for justification in the books he published against the Pelagians; and indeed particularly chapter 21 of the first book to Boniface, where he says:

We deservedly pronounce anathema upon the Pelagians, who are so hostile to the grace of God which cometh through Jesus Christ our Lord, that they declare it to be given not gratuitously but according to our merits, as if grace were no longer grace; and who place so much in free will, into what an abyss man has been plunged, that they say man merits grace by using it well, whereas no one can use it well except through grace, which is rendered not according to debt, but is granted by God gratuitously in His mercy.

Nor does it stand in the way that Proverbs 17 says: The man's own is to prepare the soul: for, as St. Augustine most excellently says in book 2 to Boniface, chapter 9, It is man's own to prepare his soul, with the help of God touching the heart of man, through the assistance of grace; but not without any benefit of grace whatever, because from Proverbs 8: The will is prepared by the Lord. Whence there remains only this to be determined here, whether man prerrequires within himself certain physical and moral dispositions, which he himself, with the help of grace, can apply, that he may dispose himself unto grace.

NOTE 2. A twofold disposition is commonly distinguished: one on the part of the subject, the other on the part of the agent or efficient cause. The former prepares the subject for receiving a form, e.g. heat for the form of fire, the organization of the human body for the rational soul: the latter moves and determines the agent for inducing a form; and that either physically, in which way heat determines fire to inducing the form of fire in a subject ultimately disposed; or morally, in which way honest supernatural acts move God to communicating to men His supernatural gifts. It is further to be known that a form requires some disposition on the part of the subject in two ways: in one way for expelling a contrary form; in another way for preparing the subject, that it may be received in it fittingly. Now it is certain that sanctifying grace requires no disposition per se on the part of the subject, that it may be received connaturally in it: both because without such a disposition it is received in infants, and in those who are sanctified in the maternal womb, as in Jeremiah and John the Baptist; and because no such disposition can be assigned. For such a disposition would be either an act or a habit; if a habit, it would be either natural or supernatural: but a natural habit cannot be a physical disposition to a supernatural form, such as grace is; nor yet a supernatural one, otherwise, since this habit would be as disproportionate to nature as grace is, it would prerrequire another disposition of the same supernatural order, and thus one would proceed to infinity. Nor yet an act, because a physical disposition and the form ought to be in the same subject: but sanctifying grace is subjected in the will, as we have proved elsewhere: while the act of faith, which is instituted first among the dispositions to sanctifying grace, is formally in the intellect: therefore it cannot be a physical disposition for receiving sanctifying grace. This discourse therefore concerns only moral disposition, such as are acts morally good both of intellect and of will.

NOTE 3. That although before the infusion of sanctifying grace man is held to be a sinner and odious to God, nevertheless not all his works, even if they are not pleasing and acceptable to God de condigno for eternal life, are formal sins, nor worthy of divine chastisement and execration; for some can be altogether indifferent, that is, neither morally good nor morally bad; others however are at least meritorious de congruo, namely those which are elicited by the intellect and will with the help of actual grace, and which promote man, desiring to emerge from the filth of sins, toward God, and are like previous dispositions for receiving sanctifying grace. Hence the works of man still lying in sin are of a triple kind: some indeed sinful, others indifferent, others disposing unto grace; concerning which last ones alone inquiry is made here, whether man truly can dispose himself unto sanctifying grace. Which truth indeed the following will make plain:

Single Conclusion. — IT IS OF FAITH THAT AN ADULT MAN, BY HIS OWN FREE ACTS, WITH THE DIVINE AID SUFFRAGING, CAN DISPOSE HIMSELF UNTO THE GRACE OF JUSTIFICATION. Thus the Council of Trent defined, Session 6, canon 9, in these words: If anyone shall say that the impious is justified by faith alone, so as to understand that nothing else is required which cooperates toward obtaining the grace of justification, and that it is in no way necessary that he be prepared and disposed by the motion of his own will, let him be anathema.

Proof first. By all those oracles of Scripture in which men are invited to their conversion in God. Thus Isaiah 1: Be converted to me, and I will save you. Zechariah 1: Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you. Joel 3: Be converted to me with all your heart, etc. But that conversion cannot take place without a motion of free will: therefore it is prerrequired here unto sanctifying grace. Hence Proverbs 16: Man's own is to prepare the soul.

Proof second. By the authority of the holy Fathers, and indeed most of all of St. Augustine, who plainly teaches in many places that man ought necessarily to cooperate with God for his own justification. Thus tract. 72 on John: Christ, he says, works salvation in the impious man, but not without the impious man. And Sermon 3 On the words of the Apostle, chapter 11, expounding these words: Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God, says thus:

Someone says to me: therefore we are acted upon, and do not act: nay rather, both you act, and you are acted upon: and then you act well if you are acted upon by the Good: for the Spirit of God who acts upon you is a helper to those acting: the very name of helper prescribes to you that you yourself also do something: acknowledge what you ask, acknowledge what you confess, when you say: be Thou my helper, forsake me not. You invoke God assuredly as a helper: no one is aided unless something is done in him by God.

And again, expounding that word of the Apostle: We know that to them that love God all things cooperate unto good, he says: If you were not a worker, God would not be a co-worker. Hence Sermon 15 sets forth the celebrated sentence: He who made thee without thee will not justify thee without thee: He made thee unknowing; He justifies thee willing.

Theological reason also supports it: for as man is freely turned away from God through sin, so it is fitting also that he be converted freely to Him: but such conversion would not be free unless man were converted voluntarily to Him: therefore it ought to be so. — Next, in justification man is moved by God unto justice according to the condition of his nature: but man according to his own nature has it that he be possessed of free will: therefore in one who has the use of free will there is not made a motion from God unto justice without a motion of free will itself. — Finally, should anything stand in the way of man freely concurring unto justification, especially either because his liberty has been so worn away by sin that he nowise still has use of it; or because he is so moved efficaciously by actual grace unto justification as rather to be acted upon than to act: but neither can stand in the way. Not indeed the first, because by grace the will is healed, that being healed it may pursue that good which when infirm it could not pursue. Hence St. Augustine, book 1 of The Imperfect Work, says: Then is free will laudably free, when it shall have been set free by the grace of God. Nor yet the second, because, as the same St. Augustine says, Epist. 89: Free will will be so much freer as it is healthier; and healthier as it is more subject to divine mercy and grace. Hence in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 30: Do we, he says, make void free will through grace? Far be it: but we establish free will the more: for as the law through faith, so free will through grace is not made void, but established. For the law is not fulfilled except by free will; but through the law, knowledge of sin; through faith, the obtaining of grace against sin; through grace, the healing of the soul from the vice of sin; through the health of the soul, liberty of the will; through free will, love of justice; through love of justice, the doing of the law: and hence as the law is not made void, but established through faith, because faith obtains grace whereby the law may be fulfilled, so free will is not made void through grace, but established: because grace heals the will, whereby justice is freely loved.

You will say 1: Man cannot dispose himself unto sanctifying grace by that which is sinful: but all the acts of man the sinner, before sanctifying grace has been attained, are sinful; for an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit: therefore by his own acts man cannot dispose himself unto grace. — I distinguish the major: man cannot dispose himself unto sanctifying grace by acts which are sinful both as to state and as to affection: the acts of one still lying in sin can be distinguished as of a triple kind: for some are morally evil, proceeding from an affection falling short of the right dictate of reason, and those are formally sins; others are neither morally good nor bad, but indifferent; finally the rest can be morally good, those especially by which man, illumined and helped by divine grace, desires to rise again from sins unto grace; which acts indeed can be called sinful as to state, because they are done by a man lying in sin; but not as to affection, because they do not proceed from an affection toward sinning.

You will say 2: If man could dispose himself unto sanctifying grace by his own acts, this proposition would be true: Man justifies himself by his own acts: but very many Theologians judge this proposition false: therefore also that from which it follows. — I answer, distinguishing the major: that proposition would be true in the formal and total sense, that is, that man would justify himself by producing the form or justifying grace whereby he is formally justified, I deny: it would be true in the partial dispositional sense, that is, that man, aided on his part by divine grace, would even by his own acts dispose himself unto grace, I concede. For by this reasoning no Theologian can accuse that proposition of falsehood: for similar things are read in Scripture. Thus chap. 18 of Ezekiel: He himself shall vivify his own soul. Jeremiah iv.: Wash thy heart from wickedness. 2 Corinth. 7: Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of flesh and spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of the Lord. 1 John 3: Everyone who hath this hope in him sanctifies himself.

You will say 3: From the Second Council of Orange, chapter 1: That we may be cleansed from sin, God does not await our will: therefore one is not prepared unto justification by a motion of free will. — I distinguish the antecedent: God does not await the will, that His exciting and helping grace may go before it, I concede: that with the helping grace one prepares oneself unto sanctifying grace, I deny.

You will say 4: Adults are at times justified without any motion of free will; for St. Augustine narrates, book v. of Confessions, chapter 9, that a certain one of his friends, while he labored under fevers, and had long lain without sense in deadly sweat, and while he was despaired of as to the health of his mind and body, was baptized amid these straits, knowing it not, and was reborn: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the antecedent: insane adults, who never had any use of reason, are sanctified without any use of free will, I concede: for their case is the same as that of infants: adults who have at some time used reason, again I distinguish: to be justified without a motion of free will present, when they are baptized, I concede; before baptism intervenes, namely while they were of sound judgment, I deny. For even that some adult possessing reason be so baptized or absolved, it is necessary that before he fell into the mortal sickness which extinguishes reason, he have first prayed for baptism or sacramental absolution.

Quaestio II: An, et qualiter actus fidei concurrat ad iustificationem.

It is certain that faith is necessarily prerrequired for our justification; for this Sacred Scripture plainly attests, Matt. last chapter: He that believeth not shall be condemned. John 1: He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in his name. John 3: Whoever doth not believe is already judged. Hebrews 11: Without faith it is impossible to please God. And again: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. Hence the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 6, says: But they are disposed unto justice itself, when, excited and aided by divine grace, they conceive faith from hearing, and are moved freely toward God, believing those things to be true which have been divinely revealed and promised. Hence St. Augustine, book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 7, says: Now the Apostle says man is justified from faith, not from works, because faith itself leads the way, whereby the rest are obtained which are properly called works, by which the just man liveth. Wherefore he teaches in many places, especially in the book On the Origin of Sins, chap., that without faith in the Incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ not even the ancients could have been cleansed from sins so as to be just, and justified by the grace of God. The difficulty alone remains, what sort of act that of faith ought to be; that this may be perceived more clearly:

NOTE 1. The heretics of this time together with Calvin, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 2, as said elsewhere, distinguish a triple faith: one historical, whereby we believe that the things revealed by God are true, and whereby we believe those things contained in the Sacred Scriptures to be true, because we are certain they have been proposed and handed down by God, who is true: concerning which faith the Apostle speaks to the Heb. 11: By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word

of God. The second they call the faith of miracles, which Calvin in the place praised just now defines thus: the faculty of working miracles. It can be more truly defined as historical faith itself, insofar as it has annexed the virtue of working miracles, namely by believing that nothing is impossible for God to do. Concerning which faith the Apostle speaks 1 Corinth. chap. 13: If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains. The third they call the faith of promises, whereby we believe the promises of God concerning the gratuitous remission of sins through the merits of Christ to be true; of which faith indeed, or confidence or trust, which man has in the promise and mercy of God, as Calvin says, mention is made in Matthew's last chapter in these words: He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved. And they say these three species of faith answer to three properties in God: historical faith to truth; the faith of miracles to power; the faith of promises to the goodness and mercy of God. — They add, however, that unto justification there is necessary not only historical faith (as Catholics will), nor even the faith of miracles; but only the faith of promises; which again they distinguish into two: one general, whereby we believe the remission of sins has been promised to all those who believe in Christ: another particular, whereby each one, applying to himself the divine promise, believes or rather trusts that all his sins have been forgiven him through Christ; which faith alone, the special faith, they contend justifies men. Hence Calvin, in the place cited just now, num. 7, defines justifying faith thus:

Now a right definition of faith will stand firm for us if we say it is a firm and certain knowledge of divine benevolence toward us, which, founded upon the truth of the gratuitous promise in Christ, through the Holy Spirit, is both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts.

In which words although he wills faith to be a firm and certain knowledge, yet because he wills the object of this knowledge to be the benevolence of God, he understands nothing else by justifying faith than trust in God; which trust assuredly is not an act of intellect, but of will.

NOTE 2. As far as concerns the present difficulty, two acts of the intellect can be distinguished, of which the first is the very knowledge of truth certain and examined; the second however is the assent given to the truth proposed: which two acts are very much distinguished from each other; for the former connotes in the intellect itself cognition and understanding of what is affirmed or denied in the proposition; the latter however does not demand such penetration and understanding of what is affirmed or denied, but only signifies assent given to the proposition: which assent indeed is for the most part made without any disquisition of the truth proposed, as is plain in human faith, wherein for the most part on account of the great authority of the speaker we render assent to a thing otherwise unknown to us. Hence Calvin thinks this act of faith to be the knowledge of truths proposed in Scripture, but not assent; wherefore at num. 2 he inveighs against Catholic Doctors because they prerrequire only the assent of faith for justification. Hence at num. 5 he says this submission of judgment to be a preparation of faith, as it were adorned with the title of faith, of which nevertheless it is only the beginning; and therefore taken improperly with this word faith. He adds however:

docility with a desire of profiting stands far off from crass ignorance, in which those lie sluggish who are content with the faith implicit, such as is baptized by the Papists: for if Paul severely condemns those who, ever learning, never come to the knowledge of the truth; how much graver ignominy do they merit who deliberately affect to know nothing?

In which words Calvin feigns that we will that individual faithful men be held to have explicit faith and knowledge of no mystery; which indeed is an open lie; for there is no Catholic who does not hold that every adult ought explicitly to believe the two principal mysteries of faith, namely of the Trinity, and of the Incarnation, and therefore who is not held to acknowledge those mysteries with that knowledge which is prerrequired thereunto: but we deny that we ought to have perfect and examined knowledge of those mysteries which we believe explicitly, and that all the faithful are held to have such knowledge of every single mystery; and finally that justifying faith consists in apprehension and knowledge, but in the very assent which follows upon the authority of the proposer.

NOTE 3. That faith can be regarded in three ways in order to justification: first, as a previous disposition, whereby man, illumined by divine grace exciting and aiding, prepares himself unto the grace of justification: second, as the formal cause, so that the sense is: whether by faith alone apprehending the justice of Christ man is formally justified: thirdly finally, faith can be considered as something consequent for preserving justice, so that the sense is: whether faith alone without works suffices for forming justice and attaining salvation. But the heretics of this time will faith to be the cause of our justification, and to be prerrequired unto it as the instrument of receiving justice; not because it has not annexed other virtues, but because it alone justifies the impious. For as, says Calvin in the Antidote, the heat of the sun alone is that which warms the earth, yet heat itself is not alone in the Sun, but with its splendor: so faith must not be alone, but have companions, albeit those do not justify, but faith alone.

These things thus presupposed, three things especially are to be determined in this Question: First indeed, that the faith conducing to justification is not trust or the special faith of promises, but that faith or assent of the intellect whereby we believe those things to be true which have been divinely revealed and promised. Second, that that act of faith is not the very knowledge of the mysteries, but the assent which follows upon the authority of the proposer. Thirdly finally, that the other virtues and morally good acts, which are prerrequired unto justification together with faith, are also dispositions properly so called, no less than faith itself; nor are they less instruments of receiving justice than faith itself.

First Conclusion. — THE FAITH CONDUCING TO JUSTIFICATION IS NOT THAT SPECIAL TRUST WHEREBY EACH ONE IN PARTICULAR BELIEVES ALL HIS SINS TO HAVE BEEN FORGIVEN HIM ON ACCOUNT OF THE MERIT OF CHRIST. This was determined of faith in the Council of Trent, Session 6, Can. 12, in these words: If anyone shall say that justifying faith is nothing else than trust in the divine mercy which forgives sins for Christ's sake, or that it is that trust alone by which we are justified, let him be anathema.

Proof first from Sacred Scripture expressing justifying faith in words which signify that it pertains to the intellect, and that justification itself is attributed also to that faith which the heretics call historical and of miracles; thus Mark at the end: Preach the Gospel to every creature: he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved. John 6.: Thou hast the words of eternal life, and we have believed and have known that thou art Christ the Son of the living God, and that believing you may have life in his name. Rom. 10.: This is the word of faith which we preach, for if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved. Heb. 10., where having said: But my just one liveth by faith, he immediately signifies in the following chapter that this justifying faith pertains to the intellect, saying: By faith we believe that the worlds were framed by the word of God. And in the same place: without faith it is impossible to please God: for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him: hence Acts 8., when the Eunuch, asking for Baptism, said: Behold water: what doth hinder me from being baptized? Philip answered: If thou believest with thy whole heart, thou mayest: and he answering said: I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. From all which it is plain that the faith prerequisite to sanctifying grace pertains to the intellect, and therefore is not that confidence which the heretics strive to foist upon us.

The same truth the holy Fathers constantly teach, above all Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 5., where he acknowledges and distinguishes a twofold faith: one dogmatic, which he calls historical; the other which is grace freely given, through which miracles are wrought: and he affirms that by dogmatic faith formed the thief on the cross attained salvation, and that in the same place we are saved thereby. St. Augustine subscribes in many places, especially book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, where he demonstrates that faith, from which our salvation takes its origin, is a necessity and a gift of God: Although, he says, to believe itself is nothing else than to think with assent. For not everyone who thinks believes, since many think precisely so as not to believe, but everyone who believes thinks, and by believing thinks, and by thinking believes. St. Leo assents, Sermon ⟦illegible: sermon numeral⟧. On the Epiphany, in these words: This it is that justifies the impious, this it is that makes Saints out of sinners, if in one and the same our Lord Jesus Christ both true Divinity and true humanity be believed.

Proof finally by reason: The faith which is prerequisite to justification is that which Christ and the Apostles preached, and concerning which Catechumens must first be instructed before they approach baptism: but that faith pertains to the intellect: therefore the faith necessary for justification is an act of the intellect. Next, that confidence which each sinner has in the goodness and mercy of God is really distinguished from faith as something consequent upon it, or as cause from its effect, as the Apostle observes, Ephesians 3., in these words: In whom (namely Christ) we have confidence and access in confidence through his faith. For it sometimes happens that someone is justified by an act of formed faith before he has that confidence. Thus the woman with the issue of blood in Luke, chapter 8., declared she had had an act of formed faith, in these words: If I shall touch but his garment, I shall be healed; wherefore in the words following she is called daughter by Christ the Lord, because, as St. Jerome notes on that passage of the Gospel, by that act of formed faith she had been justified; afterwards however Christ exhorts her to have confidence, in these words: Be of good comfort, daughter, where confidence, or trust, presupposes the preceding justifying faith as a kind of cause of itself: therefore this confidence is not prerequisite to the grace of justification. Finally, that faith of special promise was fabricated gratuitously, since nowhere has God revealed to particular men that their sins are forgiven: let the heretics produce some texts of Scripture signifying that their own private sins have been forgiven by God; for they admit no other revelation besides Scripture itself; and nothing ought to be believed by divine and justifying faith except what God has revealed, since the object of faith is nothing other than truth revealed by God. I know indeed that when such insistence is made upon them, they produce testimonies of Scripture containing general promises, made to all rightly converted to God; or special ones, namely those made to Magdalene the penitent. Luc. i. the good thief. Luc. 23. The paralytic, Matth. 9. But these do not signify that the heretics themselves have been granted equal grace, nor can they prove by any text of Scripture that they have been rightly converted in particular and singly, nor does it follow that if God by special privilege revealed this to Magdalene, the Thief, and the Paralytic, he grants an equal grace also to Lutherans and Calvinists: therefore that confidence is altogether fabricated, and devised without any foundation.

The heretics reply, that they do not deny justifying faith to be an act of the intellect, but only that it does not include solely an act of the intellect, but also has an act of confidence, which pertains to the will. So Calvin in the places cited, where he speaks thus: We do not meanwhile deny that the office of faith is to subscribe to the truth of God, whenever, and whatever, and in whatsoever manner he speaks. — But this response does not prevent them from being truly in error; since they are unwilling for this act of the intellect to conduce to justification of itself, but only by reason of the confidence or trust joined to it, because they hold that only that faith is justifying which cannot coexist with mortal sin: but faith insofar as it precisely pertains to the intellect can coexist with mortal sin: therefore they hold that faith insofar as it precisely pertains to the intellect is not justifying. Next they wish justifying faith to be that by which we apprehend, receive, and apply justice to ourselves: yet they judge that we receive the offered promise of remission of sins by the will alone: therefore they are unwilling for faith regarded as pertaining to the intellect to conduce to justice. Finally, they are willing for faith pertaining to the intellect to conduce to justification no otherwise than the acts of hope and charity: but they teach that although the acts of hope and charity be joined to justifying faith, nevertheless these do not properly justify, but faith alone: therefore by parity they will that although justifying faith includes generally that faith insofar as it pertains to the intellect, namely insofar as it is taken for the assent given to things revealed by God, yet that very assent does not contribute to justification; which doctrine directly militates against the oracles of Sacred Scripture and of the holy Fathers praised by us above: therefore that response of the heretics does not vindicate them from error.

They object. 1. The heretics cite those texts of Scripture which seem to signify that justification follows upon faith, insofar as that signifies trust or confidence; thus Romans 4. Therefore by faith, that the promise might be firm to all seed according to grace, etc. — I answer, the text of the Apostle is not understood of a promise of justification made to this and that man severally and in particular, which promise the heretics wish to be included in confidence, which according to them is understood by the name of faith; but the Apostle speaks only of the promise of the calling of the Gentiles to faith, and of the coming of Christ the Lord, as is clear from what precedes; since he says it was promised Abraham that he would be the Father of all believers, not only in circumcision, that is of the Jews, but also in prepuce, that is of the Gentiles. Moreover St. Paul wills this promise to have been firm and stable on account of that dogmatic faith which Abraham had concerning the omnipotence of God; not however on account of the works of the Mosaic law; whence it comes about that this promise extends itself also to the Gentiles, for he subjoins: Therefore by faith, that the promise might be firm to all seed according to grace, that is, the promise might be fulfilled not only among the Jews, who according to the flesh are the sons of Abraham, but also among the Gentiles, who according to faith are the sons of Abraham: therefore the Apostle there speaks of faith insofar as it pertains to the intellect. Which moreover is established by the following words, for he says: He was confirmed (Abraham) in faith, giving glory to God: most fully knowing that whatsoever God hath promised, he is able also to perform: but the faith by which man knows that God is able to stand by his promises pertains to the intellect, for to know is an act of the intellect alone: therefore, etc.

They object. 2. That passage 1. John 5. These things I write to you, that believe in the Son of God, that you may know that you have eternal life. — I answer, the aforesaid text affords the heretics nothing at all, since the Apostle teaches there nothing except that whosoever believe as they ought have eternal life in hope, and will have the same in reality if they fall not away from the grace which they have attained through that faith. Next, even if they knew that, it would not follow that that justifying faith consisted in that confidence whereby each one trusts that his sins have been forgiven: since even if anyone knows that if he fall not away from the grace which he has attained he shall be saved, it does not follow that he is certain never to fall away from that same grace.

They object. 3. All those texts in which believers are bidden to be of good courage, and not to tremble about their salvation. Thus Psalm 26. The Lord is my light and my salvation, whom shall I fear? The Lord is the protector of my life, of whom shall I be afraid? Rom. 8. Who shall accuse against the elect of God? God that justifieth, who is he that condemneth? — I answer, all these texts are understood of firm hope in God which every believer ought to have in the goodness and mercy of God, but most especially the just, so that as long as God protects them they have nothing to fear; but this firm hope does not establish that false confidence with which the heretics cloak themselves: since from it does not follow that every believer certainly knows that he is in sanctifying grace, and that his sins have been forgiven him.

They object. 4. All those texts in which we are bidden to pray to God with certain confidence of obtaining those things for which we ask: thus Matth. 2. All things whatsoever you shall ask in prayer, believing, you shall receive. Mark 11. I say to you: all things whatsoever you ask when ye pray, believe that you shall receive them. James 1. If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God, and it shall be given him, but let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. — I answer, the aforesaid texts likewise do not establish the dogma of the heretics; for it can be understood in three ways that a man ought to have confidence that he shall obtain those things which he asks: first, that he doubt not that God is able to do what he asks of him; second, that God wills to grant what the man asks, provided his prayer be made as it ought; third, finally, that he shall certainly obtain in particular what he asks. But I confess that the first and second kinds of confidence ought to accompany our prayers, not however the third, because without special revelation it can be certain to no one that he fulfils all the conditions desired for praying aright.

Finally they object that passage of Hebrews 10. Having confidence in the blood of Christ, let us draw near with a true heart in fullness of faith. And ch. 11. Faith is defined as the substance of things to be hoped for: by which it seems to be signified that faith is the certain expectation of the promised mercy of God. —

I answer, in the former text the Apostle is not dealing with the faith required for first justification, but with the increase of grace and justice: for unto such an assent, to which he exhorts them, he demands that amendment from sins and the laying aside of an evil conscience go before: for he says: Let us draw near with a true heart in fullness of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and our bodies washed with clean water, let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering: therefore that text by no means favors the dogma of the heretics. To the second text I say that the Apostle by those words signifies only that faith is the foundation of all those things which are to be hoped for by us. That this faith pertains to the intellect, he indicates in the same place. For he says that it is the evidence of things that appear not: but evidence and conviction pertain to the intellect; and the other things he has in that chapter indicate the same: therefore it is false that faith there signifies the certain expectation of the promised mercy of God unto remission of sins.

Conclusion second. — THE ACT OF FAITH PREREQUISITE TO JUSTIFICATION IS NOT KNOWLEDGE, WHETHER PERFECT OR IMPERFECT, OF THE THINGS PROPOSED: BUT IT IS THE ASSENT WHICH THE INTELLECT RENDERS TO THE THINGS PROPOSED TO IT AND REVEALED.

The first part is proved, namely that the faith concurring unto justification is not perfect knowledge, by various texts of Scripture. First indeed from that passage Rom. 8. where the Apostle says that Abraham believed against hope in hope; for this manner of speaking signifies that the act of faith of Abraham was obscure and unevident, whereby he believed God saying that he, already advanced in age, would be the father of many nations: and accordingly that faith which contributed to the justification of Abraham was not perfect knowledge or understanding. — Likewise from that passage 2. Corinth. 1. bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of faith, and having in readiness to revenge all disobedience when your obedience shall be fulfilled. But if justifying faith obtained perfect knowledge or understanding, there would be no need to bring the understanding into captivity so that one might believe the things proposed: for the intellect easily apprehends evident things and without any captivity assents to them. — Finally, from that passage of Hebrews 11. where faith is called the evidence of things that appear not, that is, things which are neither perceived by sense nor known by the force and efficacy of arguments; by which particle the Apostle denotes that the formal object of faith is a certain obscure testimony, according to which the material object of faith is not made manifest. — To these add that no wayfarer has ever had evident understanding and perfect knowledge of the mysteries of our faith, especially of the Trinity and the Incarnation, unless perhaps by some special privilege of God this evident knowledge has been granted to outstanding men.

The second part is proved, namely that the faith contributing justification is not even imperfect knowledge, but simple assent to the things proposed. It is proved, I say, by those texts of Holy Scripture in which faith is distinguished from any knowledge and understanding whatsoever of the mysteries. Thus Isaiah i. If you will not believe, you shall not understand. By which words it is signified that the assent of faith is prerequisite for obtaining knowledge of the things to be believed. Thus likewise John chapter 20., Christ the Lord speaking of access unto justification, unto which eternal life follows, pronounces blessed those who have not seen and have believed, that is, who not on account of certain reasons and arguments by which some truth is made manifest, but out of prompt obedience of the will render an undoubted and firm assent to the things revealed by God and proposed to be believed. Thus finally 1. ad ⟦illegible: one OCR line lost here, likely "Corinth. 12. ..." introducing the following clause⟧ the gift both of wisdom and of knowledge, through which we understand the truths from that divine faith itself, through which we believe those truths, not on account of their evidence, but only on account of the authority and veracity of him who reveals.

It is proved also by the authority of the holy Fathers, but most especially St. Augustine, tractate 29. on John, where he teaches that understanding of the mysteries goes before faith. To whom St. Prosper subscribes, book I. De vita contemplativa, chapter 19., where expounding and citing the aforesaid words of Isaiah he says: It is given to be understood that not faith exists from understanding, but understanding from faith; nor he who understands believes, but he who believes understands.

Theological reason also concurs. For first experience establishes that many rustics believe the mysteries of our faith with firm and undoubted assent, yet do not penetrate them even lightly: but to deny in them the benefit of justification on account of the lack of that knowledge is to judge against the common conception of the holy Fathers, but most especially St. Augustine, tractate 10. on John, where he teaches that idiots seize heaven. Whence in the book against the Letter of Fundamentum, chapter ⟦illegible: chapter number⟧. he says: Not the curiosity of understanding, but the simplicity of believing makes the crowd most safe. — Next, in that does not consist the act of faith, with which posited faith is not posited, and which removed faith nevertheless no less exists: but imperfect knowledge of the mysteries being posited, sometimes faith is not posited; because a kind of knowledge and apprehension of the mysteries of faith can exist in infidels; and that being removed, sometimes faith no less exists; for there are many idiots, as we said just now, who do not at all penetrate the mysteries of faith, yet firmly believe them by submitting their judgment. Hence St. Augustine, tractate I. on John: What is faith, but to believe what thou seest not? And Sermon 119. De tempore: ⟦uncertain: Considera quod caecus es, fidelis, non rationalis⟧. And Epistle 102. If Christ were born for those alone who can determine these things with certain understanding, we labor almost in vain in the Church. — Finally, if faith were nothing else than the very penetration of the mysteries, it would follow that the greater the knowledge of the mysteries, the more excellent the faith: but the consequence is false: for Christ the Lord in the Gospel celebrates the faith of very many who had attained no knowledge of the Gospel, nor of the mysteries contained in it. Such was the woman of Chanaan, to whom Christ said: O woman, great is thy faith: such is the Centurion, of whom he says: I have not found so great faith in Israel.

The Heretics object: Theirs it is to have knowledge, whose it is to render a reason: but all believers are bound to render a reason of the faith, or of those things they believe, to everyone asking, according to that passage 1. Peter 3. Being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you. Therefore each of the true faithful is bound to know the mysteries. —

I answer first, in the aforesaid text according to the Vulgate and Greek edition mention is not made of faith, but only of Christian hope, concerning which alone also St. Peter there treats, for he there deals with the patience which Christians ought to have in bearing tribulations which are inflicted upon them on account of the Christian faith. For he had said before: If you suffer anything for justice' sake, blessed are ye: and be not afraid of their fear, and be not troubled: but sanctify the Lord Christ in your hearts, being ready always to satisfy, etc.

I answer second, believers indeed are bound to knowledge of the mysteries, but not in the same manner: for it suffices for most to have simple knowledge of the principal mysteries of the faith, which they are bound to believe explicitly. Since indeed by the Apostle 1. Corinth. chapter 12. not all in the Church are Doctors, and there are divisions of graces, and to others is given the word of wisdom, to others the word of knowledge, not all Christians are bound to have understanding of the mysteries of our faith, such that they may confute gainsayers; this the Apostle demands only from a Bishop, Titus chapter 1.

They object 2. We can only intimate those things to others and confess them with the mouth which we know, because confession of the mouth proceeds from the knowledge of the one confessing: but every Christian is bound to confess Christ the Lord and his promises: according to that passage Romans 10. For if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus Christ, and believe in thy heart that God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved: for with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation: therefore every believer is bound to have knowledge of the mysteries. —

I answer, that for Christians to profess the faith it suffices that by certain general reasons they be able to respond to infidels asking that the Christian faith is true, and all its mysteries most certain; namely that they were foretold before they existed, especially those which concern and follow upon the Incarnation of Christ the Lord; then that proclaimed by Christ the Lord and the Apostles they were confirmed by countless miracles, and propagated through various persecutions down even to us: which knowledge indeed ⟦uncertain: longe interior est ea⟧ that knowledge and understanding of the truths of the Gospel which the heretics require as prerequisite in the very men to be justified.

They object 3. The end and effect of justification, namely eternal life, is given only to those who know the true God and Jesus Christ, according to that passage John 17. Now this is life everlasting, that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent: but this knowledge cannot be had without penetration of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation: therefore that is prerequisite to true justifying faith. —

I deny the minor. For St. John does not intend that, nor does that particle may know stand for understanding and penetration of the divine Trinity and Incarnation, but for that knowledge which presupposes the assent of true faith, so that that particle may know sounds the same as may believe by divine faith: for what Christ the Lord there expresses by the word may know he shortly after explains by the word to believe: Thus speaking to his Father about his Apostles: and they have known truly that I went out from thee, and have believed that thou didst send me.

Conclusion third. — THE ACTS OF HOPE AND CHARITY ARE NOT RELATED MERELY CONCOMITANTLY TO JUSTIFICATION, BUT ARE TRULY DISPOSITIONS, AS IS FAITH ITSELF. This truth is evident from the Council of Trent, Session 6. chapter 6., where among the dispositions to sanctifying grace he enumerates not only faith but also fear: By which, he says, they are usefully shaken unto considering the mercy of God, and turning themselves are raised up in hope, etc.

It is proved from Sacred Scripture, in which justification is attributed not only to acts of faith, but also of hope and charity and fear. Thus Ecclesiasticus 1. The fear of the Lord driveth out sin. 1. John 3. He that loveth not abideth in death. Acts 3. Do penance, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out, etc. By which it is clear that what the heretics foist upon us is false, that Scripture makes mention only of faith when there is question of justification and remission of sins.

You will say 1: Sacred Scripture requires only faith for justification: therefore the other dispositions are superfluous. It is proved from that passage Luc. 8. Believe only, and she shall be safe. —

I deny the antecedent: and in proof I say that there is no question there of justification, but of the raising of the dead maiden; which benefit Christ granted to the parent on account of the confidence he had in his goodness and clemency toward raising the dead maiden.

You will say 2: From Sacred Scripture works are excluded from the dispositions of justification. Thus Rom. 6. Justified freely by his grace. And within: We account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law. And in the following chapter: If Abraham were justified by works, he hath glory, but not before God. And Ephesians 2. By grace you are saved through faith, and not of works, that no man may glory: therefore according to the Apostle works of fear, hope and love, penance, etc. are excluded from the dispositions required for justification, and only faith concurs thereto. —

I answer, that works are twofold: some precede faith, others follow it: the former the Apostle excludes, but not the latter, such as are the acts of hope, love and penance, which are founded in faith. That this is indeed the mind of the Apostle is evident, because he wishes to show that neither the Jews by the bare observance of the Mosaic law, nor the Gentiles through good works before faith in Christ received, could in fact have obtained justice from God; but from faith in Christ, which is the beginning of salvation and justification, and which is not given on account of preceding works, but is the gift of God. Wherefore the Apostle deservedly says that we are justified freely, because faith, which is the primary disposition and foundation of the dispositions unto justification, is given gratis.

You will say 3: Scripture openly testifies that we are justified by faith alone: therefore the other dispositions are superfluous for justification. The antecedent is proved from that passage Acts 15. In this everyone who believeth is justified. And Rom. 10. Whosoever believeth in him shall not be confounded. And ch. 4. To him that believeth in him who justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God: therefore only faith concurs unto justification. —

I deny the consequence; for by faith in the places cited is not understood bare faith, but with the other acts joined, which are understood to be necessary from elsewhere. For St. James chapter 2. openly teaches that man is justified by works, and not by faith only. — Nor should you reply together with the heretics that those acts indeed conduce to justification, but only by virtue of faith. For against this, rather does faith work by charity. Whence St. Augustine book 5. De Trinitate, chapter ⟦illegible: chapter number⟧, adds: charity itself makes faith useful: for without charity faith can indeed exist, but cannot profit. But mention of faith is made more often than of the other acts, because as the Council of Trent observes, Session 6. chapter 8. Faith is the beginning, foundation, and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God, and to come to the fellowship of his sons.

Finally you will say: Very many of the holy Fathers pronounce absolutely that faith alone justifies. For thus teach Origen on chapter 3. of Romans, Hilary 8. on Matthew, Aug. on Psalm 88. and Bernard, Epistle 1.; therefore it must be so believed. —

I answer, that by the name of faith the holy Fathers do not understand solitary faith distinct from the other acts of intellect and will, but faith formed by charity, and illuminated by the other acts of intellect and will, as we have said many times already.

Quaestio III

The Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 6, enumerates besides faith five other dispositions unto justification: all of which are wrought by acts of the will, and are: first, fear of the divine justice; secondly, hope of pardon from the divine mercy; thirdly, begun love of God as of the fountain of all justice⟦uncertain reading: OCR "omnis iustitia tontis"; cf. Trent "tamquam omnium fontem iustitiae"⟧; fourthly, hatred and detestation of sin; finally fifthly, the purpose of receiving baptism, if he to be justified be not yet baptized, or of doing penance and receiving sacramental absolution, if a new life is to be renewed, if after baptism he has fallen into sin. The words of the Council are these:

While sinners understand themselves to be such, they turn themselves from the fear of the divine justice, by which they are usefully shaken unto considering the mercy of God, and are raised up in hope, believing that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ; and they begin to love Him as of the fountain of all justice; and therefore they are moved against sins with some hatred and detestation, that is, with that force of penance which must be exercised before baptism; finally, while they propose to receive baptism, to begin a new life, and to keep the divine commandments.

Since, however, it is not the business of the present undertaking to dispute profoundly concerning these five virtues, but only to examine and resolve whether and how they are dispositions unto justification, hence we shall propose a few things concerning these five dispositions severally.

How the fear of the divine justice is a disposition unto justification. — In the words written above the Council of Trent established two things concerning fear.

One is, that we understand ourselves to be sinners; the other truly, that sinners are usefully shaken by the fear of the divine justice. The first raises no difficulty, for sinners alone ought to dread the divine justice, because the just, as long as they remain such, have nothing whereof they should dread God as avenger, according to that of Genesis 18: Wilt thou destroy the just with the wicked! Far be it from thee to do this thing, and to slay the just with the wicked, and for the just to be as the wicked; this is not thy doing, who judgest all the earth. The latter, however, is controverted between Lutherans and Catholics: for Luther, as is evident from the Bull of Leo X condemning his errors, taught that the fear whereby one fears God as avenger is a sin, and makes sinners worse: which assertion indeed the Council of Trent condemns as heretical, Session 6, Canon 8, in these words: if anyone shall say that the fear of hell, whereby we take refuge through grieving for sins in the mercy of God, or whereby we abstain from sin, is a sin, or makes sinners worse, let him be anathema. The Catholic assertion therefore is, that fear of God the avenger is salutary; which indeed is proved by various texts of Scripture. Proverbs 14: The fear of the Lord is a fountain of life. Ecclesiasticus 1: The fear of the Lord expelleth sin, and he who is without fear shall not be justified. Isaiah 26, according to the interpretation of the Seventy Interpreters: Of thy fear have we conceived, and brought forth the spirit of salvation. Hence men of every sort most zealous for the salvation of souls exhorted sinners to penance with the threat of punishments. So Moses, Deuteronomy 30, provokes the children of Israel to penance by setting forth the various plagues wherewith God, the avenger of crimes, was bound to chastise their sins, unless they should repent. So book 2 of Kings, chapter 12, Nathan urges David to penance with the threat of immense calamities. So St. John the Baptist compelled the Pharisees and Sadducees coming to his baptism with these words: Brood of vipers, who hath shown you to flee from the wrath to come? Bring forth therefore fruits worthy of penance.... for now the axe is laid to the root: every tree therefore that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down, and cast into the fire. So Christ the Lord, Luke 12, says: I will show you whom you shall fear: fear him who, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell; and chapter 13: Except you do penance, you shall all likewise perish.

The same truth the holy Fathers constantly teach, first indeed St. Cyprian, who in the book ad Quirinum, chapter 2, says that fear is the foundation and firmament of hope and faith. To him the other Fathers subscribe, as elsewhere we have abundantly taught: most especially St. Augustine, who commends this fear in many places; particularly Epistle 120, where he says: Fear sent before into our heart drives out from it the habit of evil works, and preserves a place for charity, which when it comes like a mistress, fear withdraws that she may inhabit it. In the Tractate on the First Epistle of St. John, where after teaching that these words of the Apostle, Fear is not in charity, are not to be understood of charity begun, but of that of which the Apostle spoke immediately, Perfect charity casteth out fear, he subjoins: Therefore let fear begin, because the beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord. Fear prepares as it were a place for charity: but when charity begins to inhabit it, fear is driven out which prepared a place for her: for as much as she grows, so much does it decrease: and as much as she becomes interior, so much is fear driven without: greater charity, less fear; less charity, greater fear: but if there is no fear at all, there is not that whereby charity may enter, as we see linen introduced by the needle, when anything is sewn, the needle enters first: but unless it go out, the linen does not follow; so fear first occupies the mind: but fear does not remain there, because it entered precisely that it might introduce charity. Book De catechizandis rudibus, chapter 5: Even upon the very severity of God, by which the hearts of mortals are shaken with most wholesome fear, charity is to be built. And afterwards: For very rarely indeed does it happen, nay truly never, that anyone comes wishing to become a Christian who has not been struck with some fear. And Enarration on Psalm 127: That fear, not yet chaste, fears the presence of the Lord, and punishments: it makes whatever good it does, it does from fear, not of losing that good, but of suffering that evil: it fears not lest it lose the embrace of its most beautiful spouse, but it fears lest it be cast into hell: this fear is good, it is useful. The same holds in St. Prosper, book De vocatione Gentium, chapter 27, and Isidore, De summo bono, chapter 8.

It must be observed nevertheless that this fear is not absolutely necessary unto justification; for one can be justified without that servile fear, though he cannot be justified without filial fear, which coincides with the love of God: yet it is most useful thereto: for man, acknowledging himself a sinner and God a just judge, either implicitly or formally fears God: by which fear it comes about that he entreats the divine mercy, and the grace whereby he may renew his life and receive himself unto better fruit.

You will say: Every disposition unto justification ought to be morally good: but that servile fear is not such: therefore that fear is not useful unto justification. —

I distinguish the minor: Servile fear, qua servile merely, or whereby sin is avoided only on account of the fear of punishment, so that if no punishment were to be inflicted, sin would not be avoided, nor would God be held in any honor or worship, I concede: servile fear, qua fear simply, I deny. There are therefore two things in fear, namely fear and servility: fear indeed is good: servility however can be evil; for it is good to fear hell, because hell is an evil, and it is good to flee an evil: but it is evil to fear it with the exclusion of the love of justice. — Hence easily are reconciled the opinions of St. Augustine concerning servile fear, which seem to fight among themselves; for he sometimes says servile fear is good, wholesome, useful, the beginning of conversion, and necessary thereto: sometimes however he seems to condemn the same fear, as when he says Epistle 141. ⟦uncertain reading⟧ Vainly thinks he to be victor over sin who through fear of punishment sins not, because although outwardly the affair of evil concupiscence is not fulfilled, that concupiscence itself within is an enemy: and who is found innocent before God, who wishes to do what is desired, if what is feared be withdrawn? By this he is guilty in his very will, who wishes to do what is not permitted to be done: but he himself does it not, because what he desires cannot be done with impunity, if it could be accomplished without punishment. Which he declares more briefly in book 2 ad Bonifac., chapter 9: When good is done through fear of punishment, not through love of justice, the good is not yet well done; nor is what seems done in act done in heart: when man wishes not to do it if he could with impunity. I pass over other similar opinions, whereby St. Augustine seems to depress servile fear, not simply because it is servile, but whenever it happens that that fear recalls from sin only through the mere fear of hell; so that sin would not be avoided were such fear of hell absent, even though God forbids it from another quarter, inasmuch as it offends His divine majesty.

How hope of pardon is a disposition unto justification. — It is established from Sacred Scripture that hope disposes unto justification: thus Psalm 36: He shall rescue them out of the hands of sinners, and save them, because they have hoped in him. Proverbs 24: He that hopeth in the Lord shall be saved. Hence Christ the Lord frequently exhorted sinners to hope and confidence, as to a disposition necessarily prerequisite unto grace: thus Matthew 9: Be of good heart, son, thy sins are forgiven thee. Whence the Apostle Romans 8 says: by hope we are saved. The reason is because since justification is not a human work, it must be awaited from God: therefore man cannot firmly endeavor to obtain remission of sins, unless he firmly hope that he shall obtain it. Wherefore although the object of hope be broad, yet in the business of justification it regards only the pardon of sins, and grace through the merits of Christ, unto exercising penance.

Is hope simply necessary unto justification? — I affirm: both from the prefaced texts of Scripture, whereby it stands that men are saved and sanctified by hope: then because the Council of Trent, Session 6, Canon 1, intimates this truth by defining that man cannot, without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, that the grace of justification be conferred upon him; wherein it judges the act of hope to be of equal necessity unto justification with the act of faith and of charity, which no one doubts to be absolutely necessary: then finally, because Session 14, chapter 4, says that contrition, which was necessary at any time whatsoever for obtaining pardon of sins, includes trust in the divine mercy, which trust is most certainly an act of hope. Hence St. Ambrose, book 1. De poenitentia, chapter 1: No one can do penance unless he have hoped for indulgence.

What love of God is prerequisite unto justification. — Concerning the love of God necessary unto justification, the Council teaches three things: the first is, that they who are to be justified begin to love God; secondly, that they begin to love Him as of the fountain of all justice; finally thirdly, that therefore they are moved against sins with some hatred and detestation. Wherein it must first be observed that by these words, they begin to love, the Council signifies a begun love of God, abstracting from love perfect or imperfect, because outside the sacrament a begun imperfect love would not suffice: in the sacrament truly a begun perfect love is not absolutely necessary. The Council however speaks of a begun love of God, abstracting from justification which is wrought in the sacrament or outside the sacrament. — It must be observed secondly that that love of God is either the love of friendship, or of concupiscence. Indeed the love of friendship outside the sacrament, but of concupiscence or attrition together with the sacrament. For it is true that outside the sacrament an actual love of perfect friendship is required as a disposition unto justification: for the Council of Trent, Session 14, chapter 1, speaking of contrition, which is the love of friendship, says: this motion of con-> trition was always at all times necessary for obtaining pardon of sins, and in man fallen after baptism it profits unto remission of sins only if it be joined with trust in the divine mercy, and with the purpose of performing the remaining things which are required for duly receiving this sacrament.

There the discourse is concerning perfect contrition, for this alone was at all times necessary unto justification, since attrition or imperfect contrition was not sufficient, nor consequently necessary at all times for obtaining pardon of sins; then because the same Council, Session 6, Can. 3, says, the motion of charity must be from the grace of God: therefore the motion of theological charity, like the motion of faith and hope, is a disposition unto the grace of justification. Finally because the same Council there in chapter ⟦illegible: chapter number⟧, declaring love to be necessary unto sanctifying grace, uses these words of Zachary to intimate this truth. Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you: but God outside the sacrament is not converted except to him who has perfect contrition: for those words were spoken to men at that time when attrition together with the sacrament was not a sufficient condition unto justification, because the sacraments were not yet instituted.

How penance disposes unto justification. — Concerning this disposition the Council teaches two things: the first indeed, that penance is hatred and detestation of sins on account of God, which indeed it defines against Luther, who asserted that penance is nothing else than a new life; the other, that this penance must be exercised by the infidel before he approach baptism, according to that of Acts 2: Do penance, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of your sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. That moreover this penance ought ordinarily to precede justification, speaking ordinarily, is gathered from Sacred Scripture. Thus Jeremias 18: If that nation shall have done penance from its evil which I have spoken against it, I also will repent over the evil which I thought to do to it. Ezechiel 18: When the wicked shall turn himself away from his impiety, he himself shall vivify his own soul. Ecclesiasticus 2: If we have not done penance, we shall fall into the hands of God. Luke 13: if you shall not have done penance, you shall all likewise perish. I said ordinarily, yet it can happen in some case, e. g. when someone is seized unto martyrdom, and sins do not occur to memory, who shall be justified by sole express love of God without formal, but only virtual contrition. For then he can think of the divine goodness, and love it, and then he does not expressly repent of his sins, because they do not occur to memory, as we said: therefore this one shall be justified without express contrition: it is evident, for God loves those who love Him. More on these things in the disputation concerning Charity.

How the purpose of receiving the Sacraments of baptism and penance, and of emending one's life and observing the precepts, is necessary unto justification. — I answer, that purpose indeed is necessary first with respect to baptism, because unless one be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Secondly with respect to the Sacrament of penance, because the same reason holds for penance for baptized sinners as for baptism for infidels: but the purpose of receiving baptism is necessary unto infidels that they may be justified: therefore, etc. Similarly with respect to a new life, and the observance of the commandments, according to that of Ezechiel 18. If the wicked shall do penance from all his sins which he hath wrought, and keep all my precepts, and do judgment and justice, living he shall live, and shall not die. Which words signify nothing else than an efficacious purpose of keeping the commandments and the observances thereof, unto which the wicked is bound while he exercises penance, and likewise the observance of laws and precepts, which are prescribed for acquiring or keeping justice. This purpose moreover ought not always to be explicit and express, but it suf- fices that sometimes it be virtual and implicit: namely while one elicits the act of the love of God above all things, whereby he is formally and proximately dispo- sed unto justification: for in that act there is contained only virtually the purpose of receiving the sacrament of baptism or of penance, and like- wise of keeping the commandments of God, and of avoiding all those things which can displease God.

You ask: whether upon the positing of those dispositions sanctifying grace always follows? — I answer, the dispositions assigned are in a twofold difference with respect to sanctifying grace: for some are remote, as faith, hope, fear; some proximate and ultimate, as the act of penitence and of perfect love of God. Of the remote there is no difficulty, for it is clear, that upon the positing of those dispositions sanctifying grace does not follow. Whence I answer 2., that upon the positing of the proximate and ultimate disposition it is probable that sanctifying grace be infused, both because the Council of Trent where, in the praised chapter 6, it explained the prepa- rations unto justification, begins the following chapter thus: This dispo- sition, or preparation, justification itself follows, etc. By which manner of speaking it seems to signify that immediately sanctifying grace is infused. Then because the same reason seems to hold of supernatural forms as of natural ones: but natural forms are induced into the subje- ct immediately once the ultimate disposition is posited: therefore the same must be said of sanctifying grace, qua supernatural form.

You ask 2. Whether the aforesaid dispositions ought to be actual, while an adult is justified? — I answer 1. That when a sinner is justi- fied outside the sacrament, the ultimate dispositions ought to be simultaneous, or in the same instant in which grace is infused, because while man is so justified no reason can be assigned why, once the ultimate disposition is posited, grace would not be infused; since, as we said just now, in the same way, proportion being preserved, one must reason of dispositions unto supernatural forms as unto natural ones: but natural forms are introduced in the same instant in which is the ultimate disposition unto them; otherwise for some instant the subject would exist without form; since the ultimate disposition, e. g. supreme heat unto the form of fire is incompatible with supreme cold, which is conservative of the form of water; and straightway once supreme heat is posited it is necessary that the form of water perish, and consequently the form of fire is induced; otherwise the subject would have no substantial form: therefore by equal reason, once the ultimate disposition unto sanctifying grace is posited, it is fitting that it be infused. I answer 2. That when an adult is justified through real reception of the sacrament, it is not necessary that the dispositions be actual in the same instant in which grace is infused, but it suffices that they have preceded and persevere virtually. Which indeed is proved: a virtual motion of free will is sufficient unto justification, which is wrought through real reception of the sacrament: therefore if the man to be justified shortly before the received Sacrament elicited the aforesaid acts of the dispositions, and did not revoke them, he will have been sufficiently prepared unto recei- ving the effect of the sacrament, namely sanctifying grace. Proof of the antecedent: that motion is sufficient unto justification, which from its nature suffices unto sin, and whereby man is understood to will something in human fashion, for no more liberty is required, that man be justified, than that he sin: but through the virtual motion of the will man is understood to will something in human fashion, and actually to sin through such virtual volition, if he first have done something whence sin follows infallibly and necessarily: therefore that virtual motion will be sufficient unto ju- stification. Next, man, while he receives the sacrament, can be distracted blamelessly, and quasi-naturally; but no reason appears why the sacrament would then not have its effect, since the recipient poses no obstacle. It stands moreover from the Council of Trent, Sess. b. Can. 6., that the sa- craments confer grace upon those not posing an obstacle: therefore he will receive that sanctifying grace. Finally, if it were necessary that those dispositions exist actually and persevere while grace is infused, it would fol- low that where the act of those dispositions was formed, if any distraction supervened, however slight, there would be mortal sin; for nothing impedes the effect of the sacrament, which is sanctifying grace, except mortal sin: since that grace is compatible with venial sin: but to assert this would be too harsh, and contrary to the frequent reception of the sacraments; for it would follow that all men would be anxious, while approaching the sacrament, whether they had received it rightly: since it is most quiet to have some wandering of mind supervene in the reception of the sacrament, wherein only so much diligence need be applied toward averting or repelling it as would be necessary. It is confirmed moreover from the common opinion of the Theologians teaching, that if any adult of sound reason shall have sought the sacrament of Baptism, and before its reception shall have fallen into insanity, nor does it stand that he revoked such a will, then Baptism ought to be administered to him, although he has no actual dispo- sition, but only a virtual one is presumed, just as also the sacrament of Extreme Unction is frequently administered to those who scarcely seem to have the use of reason.

You will say. God justifies no one, unless according to the condition of His nature: but the condition of man using reason is, that man concur actually unto his own justification through the motion of his free will: therefore the dispositions unto justifying grace ought to be in the same instant in which man is justi- fied. — I distinguish the minor: the condition of man using reason is, that he concur unto his justification, through an act, whether which is in the same instant, or which has preceded, and still perseveres virtually, I concede: which is ac- tual while that grace is infused, I deny: because man is held to concur unto the effect in his natural mode, when he concurs unto the preceding act not revo- ked, and still persevering virtually, as was said.

You will say. While man is justified outside the sacrament, it is necessary that the ultimate disposition be actual, while grace is infused: therefore the same must be said while he is justified through the reception of the sacrament. — I deny the consequence. and the reason of disparity is, that it does not appear why sanctifying grace would rather be infused after the positing of the ultimate disposition, while outside the sacrament man is justified, than that it be infused together with it: for then nothing else intervenes: but truly in the sacrament, after the ultimate disposition only persevering virtually, there supervenes the fecundity of the sacrament producing morally grace ex opere operato: therefore it is not the same reason.

Finally you ask: Whether the acts dispositional unto justification ought to be supernatural, and likewise proceed efficiently from the very habit of sanctifying grace itself? — I answer 1. All and singular the acts dispositional unto justification ought to be supernatural, and elicited from supernatural grace, which indeed is easily gathered from the Council of Trent, Session 6, Can. 3, where it is thus had: If anyone shall say that without the preceding inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and His aid, man can believe, hope, love, or repent, as he ought, that the grace of justification be conferred upon him, let him be anathema. Where these words, without the preceding inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and His aid, and as he ought, declare that those acts of disposition ought to proceed from supernatural preceding and ai- ding grace, in order that, those being posited, the grace of justification follow.

I answer 2. Those acts of disposition do not proceed efficiently from the very habit of sanctifying grace itself: both because dispositions are prior by nature to the very form unto which they dispose: but what is prior by nature to another cannot be efficiently from that other, which is prior by nature: therefore, etc. Then because the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapters 5 and 6, where it described the manner, whereby the adult is disposed unto justification, and had enumerated all those acts of disposition, thus begins the seventh chapter: This disposition, or preparation, justification itself follows: therefore the Coun- cil signifies the infusion of habitual grace to be posterior in real existence to those acts of disposition. Finally because the habit of grace either exists in the will of man in that prior moment in which the act of the love of God above all things, and of contrition for sins, is elicited, or is only afterwards infused: if the first; therefore man is priorly formally just, and in fact justified, than he has the aforesaid acts of love and contrition, because this justification is the formal effect of inherent grace: but it is ab- surd to say, that an adult sinner, who is justified outside the sa- crament, is truly just before he elicited the aforesaid acts of love and contrition. If the second; therefore those aforesaid acts, since they already pre-exist, do not proceed efficiently from such a habit of justifying grace.

You will say. If these things were true, it would follow that an adult man loves God first with perfect love, than God loves him: but this consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The major is evident: for if that love does not proceed from the habit of charity, and is anterior thereto, since God does not love man with supernatural love, except on account of justice and charity, it follows that that man loves God supernaturally first, than he is so loved by God. The minor is proved from that of 1. John 4: God, but because He first loved us. — I deny the minor: for it does not follow that man loves God perfectly and simply with supernatural love prior to being loved by God with corresponding love; for that act of love of God, ultimately dispositional unto the grace of justification, although it pro- ceeds from actual grace, is nevertheless not simply perfect in the genus supernatural, since it is elicited by a person who in that sign is not yet held to have the habit of charity; and straightway not yet to be simply in the supernatural state.

Articulus II: De ipsa justificatione formali

Quaestio I: AN IUSTIFICATIO IMPII FIAT PER IUSTITIAM INHAERENTEM ET INTRINSECAM, AN AUTEM PER IMPUTATIVAM ET EXTERNAM.

Quaestio II: UTRUM IN IUSTIFICATIONE IMPII FIAT VERE REMISSIO PECCATORUM.

Quaestio III

Quaestio IV: AN, QUOT, ET QUAENAM INTERVENIANT MUTATIONES IN IUSTIFICATIONE PECCATORIS.

Articulus III: De causa formali et foecunditate nostrae justificationis

Quaestio I: An gratia sanctificans sit actus vel habitus, isque unicus aut multiplex.

Quaestio II: An iustitia semel habita possit per peccatum amitti.

Quaestio III: An, et qualiter homo possit esse certus de statu suae iustificationis.

Quaestio IV: Quaestio Quarta. Quale et quantum sit iustificationis beneficii

Appendix I: De merito bonorum operum

Quaestio I

Quaestio II: QUOTUPLEX SIT MERITUM.

Quaestio III: QUOT, ET QUAE SINT CONDITIONES AD MERITUM.

Quaestio IV: **DE PRAEMIO ET OBIECTO MERITI.**

Tractatus II: De Virtutibus Theologicis

Disputatio I: De virtute fidei divinae

Articulus I: De objecto fidei

Quaestio I

Quaestio II: In quid fieri debeat nostrae fidei resolutio, tamquam in motivum certum et infallibile, tam propositionis credendorum, quam assensus nostri.

Quaestio III

Quaestio IV: An symbolum, quod dicitur Apostolicum, sit vera ab ipsis Apostolis editum.

Quaestio V

Quaestio VI: **UTRUM OBIECTUM FIDEI SIT ITA NECESSARIO VERUM, UT NULLATENUS EI FALSUM SUBESSE POSSIT.**

Articulus II: De habitu fidei

Quaestio I: Utrum detur habitus fidei infusae iugiter in nobis perseverans.

Quaestio II: **QUID, ET QUALIS SIT FIDES HABITUALIS.**

Quaestio III: IN QUIBUS SUBIECTIS INSIT FIDEI INFUSAE HABITUS.

Quaestio IV: A quo, et qualiter fidei habitus producatur.

Articulus III: De actu fidei divinae

Quaestio I: Quid et quotuplex sit actus fidei internus.

Quaestio II: **UTRUM ASSENSUS DIVINAE FIDEI SIT CERTIOR QUOLIBET ASSENSU SCIENTIAE VEL NOTITIAE NATURALIS.**

Quaestio III: An, et quomodo actus internus fidei sit necessarius ad salutem.

Quaestio IV: An, et qualis actus voluntatis praerequiratur ad actum fidei.

Quaestio V: An quomodo, et quando fides sit externa profitenda.

Disputatio II: De spe divinitus infusa

Quaestio I

Quaestio II

Quaestio III: Quodnam sit subiectum spei theologicae, seu in quibus illa reperiatur.

Disputatio III: De virtute charitatis

Quaestio I

Quaestio II

Quaestio III

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