Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

The dignity and excellence of sanctifying grace scarcely can the keenest perspicacity of the human mind uncover, still less estimate sufficiently; for that it excels all nature itself, no one fails to acknowledge: for besides its native beauty placed above the sphere of nature, it likewise so excels in right of estimation and in price its own nature, that of it is deservedly said that word of Proverbs 8: She is more precious than all riches, and all things desirable are not to be compared with her. For the prerogative of grace beyond nature has this title of glory, that its lowest part outweighs all the goods of nature: Better is one who feareth God, saith Ecclesiastes, than a thousand ungodly sons. Nay, it is too little that it stands eminent above all nature, unless it be also superior to those things whatsoever God has wrought marvelously; seeing that God manifests above all, by pardoning and pitying, the glory of the divine omnipotence. Wherefore Theologians grant that sanctifying grace is the most excellent of all the works of God; for it stands above creation, and also above the raising of the dead: since when men cut off by grief for crimes their former life, and return seriously to fruitfulness, something certainly greater and more excellent is wrought than if they clothed a mortal body with immortal glory, raised the dead to life, or created man from nothing; for, saith St. Augustine, Sermon 15. De Verbis Apostoli: If God made thee a man, and thou makest thyself just, thou doest something better than God did. Wherefore St. Chrysostom, Homily 4, says that to restore anew a soul pierced by a deadly wound is something more excellent than to raise a dead body. And deservedly indeed, according to St. Augustine, Sermon 11. De Verbis Domini: Let the body be given back to life, which shall fall again; the soul shall never cease to be. Whence also St. Gregory affirms, book 3. Dialog. chapter 17, that the conversion of Paul persecuting Christ was worth more than the raising of Lazarus four days dead stinking in his sarcophagus. Hence Richard of St. Victor admirably, in Beniamin, chapter 41, denies that anything greater can be granted to men by God than that, unto a better life, they recall the guilty by their ministry, and translate them from the family of the devil into the sons of God: for greater surely it is not to restore flesh to frail life, to goods that perish, and pleasures, than to things eternal. But what far surpasses all the excellencies of grace is this, that grace itself bestows a participation of the uncreated nature of God; of which most excellent fellowship St. Peter first admonished us, when he said in commendation of grace: «God hath bestowed upon us great and most precious promises, that by these we may be made partakers of the divine nature.» Of the excellence of this gift the holy Doctors cannot preach enough. For blessed Areopagite holds that, the order and state of divinity being removed by force of grace, a divine life is breathed into us: St. Maximus, that divinity is given, grace pervading nature with heavenly light and bearing it beyond the class of its condition: St. Thomas, that through grace we are deified; For that which is substantially in God, he says, book 1. 2. quaest. 110. becomes accidentally in the soul participating the divine goodness.

That of this most excellent gift we may attain some knowledge according to our powers, we shall bring the present Disputation, as also the preceding ones, to completion in three Articles: the first of which will disclose what prior dispositions are to be desired for sanctifying grace. The second will declare the terminus a quo of justification, namely the remission of sins, and its conflict of grace with sins. The third finally will manifest the terminus ad quem of justification, namely sanctifying grace itself, and its outstanding gifts and excellencies.

We are not here going to treat of the justification of infants, which takes place in baptism; for since they are not possessed of reason and liberty, it is plainly evident that they are justified without any motion of free will, and without any previous disposition on their part: nor do we dispute here concerning that justification insofar as it embraces all those motions by which we are stirred up by God, that we may be received unto better fruit; for with respect to those motions excited by God, it is certain that no disposition on the part of man is required, but that it depends solely upon the mere mercy of God and His gratuitous bounty. We treat, therefore, only of the justification of adults, which is wrought through an act of the intellect and of the will; for since these faculties are spiritual, and receptive of grace and of heavenly gifts, thence it comes to pass that for receiving those charisms adults must dispose themselves through certain acts of intellect and will. Three things therefore come chiefly to be determined here: First, whether man ought on his part to concur, and to dispose himself, for receiving the grace of justification. Second, what act of the intellect is required for justification. Third, what acts of the will, and which ones, are prerequisite thereto.

NOTE 1. It is certain that man cannot by equal right prepare himself for sanctifying grace through the powers of nature alone; for this is clearly proved from Sacred Scripture against the Pelagians, especially in those texts in which it is asserted that God goes before us and allures and draws us to Himself by His divine motions. Thus Ps. 20: Thou hast prevented him with the blessings of sweetness. John 6: No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him. 1 Cor. 1: What hast thou that thou hast not received? Hence it is evident that man of himself and by his own powers contributes nothing at all toward salvation, and consequently neither toward sanctifying grace, which is the seed of eternal life. The same thing the Councils define, especially the Council of Diospolis, in which Pelagius was compelled to confess that grace is not given according to our merits; and the Council of Orange, Can. 4 and Can. 7, as may be seen in the Preface to this Treatise; but most clearly of all the Council of Trent, Session 6, Can. 3: If anyone shall say that, without the preventingly illumination of the Holy Spirit and His aid, man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be bestowed upon him, let him be anathema.

The same thing the Holy Fathers teach openly, most especially St. Augustine, who is wholly engaged in establishing that necessity of grace for justification in the books he published against the Pelagians; and indeed particularly chapter 21 of the first book to Boniface, where he says:

We deservedly pronounce anathema upon the Pelagians, who are so hostile to the grace of God which cometh through Jesus Christ our Lord, that they declare it to be given not gratuitously but according to our merits, as if grace were no longer grace; and who place so much in free will, into what an abyss man has been plunged, that they say man merits grace by using it well, whereas no one can use it well except through grace, which is rendered not according to debt, but is granted by God gratuitously in His mercy.

Nor does it stand in the way that Proverbs 17 says: The man's own is to prepare the soul: for, as St. Augustine most excellently says in book 2 to Boniface, chapter 9, It is man's own to prepare his soul, with the help of God touching the heart of man, through the assistance of grace; but not without any benefit of grace whatever, because from Proverbs 8: The will is prepared by the Lord. Whence there remains only this to be determined here, whether man prerrequires within himself certain physical and moral dispositions, which he himself, with the help of grace, can apply, that he may dispose himself unto grace.

NOTE 2. A twofold disposition is commonly distinguished: one on the part of the subject, the other on the part of the agent or efficient cause. The former prepares the subject for receiving a form, e.g. heat for the form of fire, the organization of the human body for the rational soul: the latter moves and determines the agent for inducing a form; and that either physically, in which way heat determines fire to inducing the form of fire in a subject ultimately disposed; or morally, in which way honest supernatural acts move God to communicating to men His supernatural gifts. It is further to be known that a form requires some disposition on the part of the subject in two ways: in one way for expelling a contrary form; in another way for preparing the subject, that it may be received in it fittingly. Now it is certain that sanctifying grace requires no disposition per se on the part of the subject, that it may be received connaturally in it: both because without such a disposition it is received in infants, and in those who are sanctified in the maternal womb, as in Jeremiah and John the Baptist; and because no such disposition can be assigned. For such a disposition would be either an act or a habit; if a habit, it would be either natural or supernatural: but a natural habit cannot be a physical disposition to a supernatural form, such as grace is; nor yet a supernatural one, otherwise, since this habit would be as disproportionate to nature as grace is, it would prerrequire another disposition of the same supernatural order, and thus one would proceed to infinity. Nor yet an act, because a physical disposition and the form ought to be in the same subject: but sanctifying grace is subjected in the will, as we have proved elsewhere: while the act of faith, which is instituted first among the dispositions to sanctifying grace, is formally in the intellect: therefore it cannot be a physical disposition for receiving sanctifying grace. This discourse therefore concerns only moral disposition, such as are acts morally good both of intellect and of will.

NOTE 3. That although before the infusion of sanctifying grace man is held to be a sinner and odious to God, nevertheless not all his works, even if they are not pleasing and acceptable to God de condigno for eternal life, are formal sins, nor worthy of divine chastisement and execration; for some can be altogether indifferent, that is, neither morally good nor morally bad; others however are at least meritorious de congruo, namely those which are elicited by the intellect and will with the help of actual grace, and which promote man, desiring to emerge from the filth of sins, toward God, and are like previous dispositions for receiving sanctifying grace. Hence the works of man still lying in sin are of a triple kind: some indeed sinful, others indifferent, others disposing unto grace; concerning which last ones alone inquiry is made here, whether man truly can dispose himself unto sanctifying grace. Which truth indeed the following will make plain:

Single Conclusion. — IT IS OF FAITH THAT AN ADULT MAN, BY HIS OWN FREE ACTS, WITH THE DIVINE AID SUFFRAGING, CAN DISPOSE HIMSELF UNTO THE GRACE OF JUSTIFICATION. Thus the Council of Trent defined, Session 6, canon 9, in these words: If anyone shall say that the impious is justified by faith alone, so as to understand that nothing else is required which cooperates toward obtaining the grace of justification, and that it is in no way necessary that he be prepared and disposed by the motion of his own will, let him be anathema.

Proof first. By all those oracles of Scripture in which men are invited to their conversion in God. Thus Isaiah 1: Be converted to me, and I will save you. Zechariah 1: Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you. Joel 3: Be converted to me with all your heart, etc. But that conversion cannot take place without a motion of free will: therefore it is prerrequired here unto sanctifying grace. Hence Proverbs 16: Man's own is to prepare the soul.

Proof second. By the authority of the holy Fathers, and indeed most of all of St. Augustine, who plainly teaches in many places that man ought necessarily to cooperate with God for his own justification. Thus tract. 72 on John: Christ, he says, works salvation in the impious man, but not without the impious man. And Sermon 3 On the words of the Apostle, chapter 11, expounding these words: Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God, says thus:

Someone says to me: therefore we are acted upon, and do not act: nay rather, both you act, and you are acted upon: and then you act well if you are acted upon by the Good: for the Spirit of God who acts upon you is a helper to those acting: the very name of helper prescribes to you that you yourself also do something: acknowledge what you ask, acknowledge what you confess, when you say: be Thou my helper, forsake me not. You invoke God assuredly as a helper: no one is aided unless something is done in him by God.

And again, expounding that word of the Apostle: We know that to them that love God all things cooperate unto good, he says: If you were not a worker, God would not be a co-worker. Hence Sermon 15 sets forth the celebrated sentence: He who made thee without thee will not justify thee without thee: He made thee unknowing; He justifies thee willing.

Theological reason also supports it: for as man is freely turned away from God through sin, so it is fitting also that he be converted freely to Him: but such conversion would not be free unless man were converted voluntarily to Him: therefore it ought to be so. — Next, in justification man is moved by God unto justice according to the condition of his nature: but man according to his own nature has it that he be possessed of free will: therefore in one who has the use of free will there is not made a motion from God unto justice without a motion of free will itself. — Finally, should anything stand in the way of man freely concurring unto justification, especially either because his liberty has been so worn away by sin that he nowise still has use of it; or because he is so moved efficaciously by actual grace unto justification as rather to be acted upon than to act: but neither can stand in the way. Not indeed the first, because by grace the will is healed, that being healed it may pursue that good which when infirm it could not pursue. Hence St. Augustine, book 1 of The Imperfect Work, says: Then is free will laudably free, when it shall have been set free by the grace of God. Nor yet the second, because, as the same St. Augustine says, Epist. 89: Free will will be so much freer as it is healthier; and healthier as it is more subject to divine mercy and grace. Hence in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 30: Do we, he says, make void free will through grace? Far be it: but we establish free will the more: for as the law through faith, so free will through grace is not made void, but established. For the law is not fulfilled except by free will; but through the law, knowledge of sin; through faith, the obtaining of grace against sin; through grace, the healing of the soul from the vice of sin; through the health of the soul, liberty of the will; through free will, love of justice; through love of justice, the doing of the law: and hence as the law is not made void, but established through faith, because faith obtains grace whereby the law may be fulfilled, so free will is not made void through grace, but established: because grace heals the will, whereby justice is freely loved.

You will say 1: Man cannot dispose himself unto sanctifying grace by that which is sinful: but all the acts of man the sinner, before sanctifying grace has been attained, are sinful; for an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit: therefore by his own acts man cannot dispose himself unto grace. — I distinguish the major: man cannot dispose himself unto sanctifying grace by acts which are sinful both as to state and as to affection: the acts of one still lying in sin can be distinguished as of a triple kind: for some are morally evil, proceeding from an affection falling short of the right dictate of reason, and those are formally sins; others are neither morally good nor bad, but indifferent; finally the rest can be morally good, those especially by which man, illumined and helped by divine grace, desires to rise again from sins unto grace; which acts indeed can be called sinful as to state, because they are done by a man lying in sin; but not as to affection, because they do not proceed from an affection toward sinning.

You will say 2: If man could dispose himself unto sanctifying grace by his own acts, this proposition would be true: Man justifies himself by his own acts: but very many Theologians judge this proposition false: therefore also that from which it follows. — I answer, distinguishing the major: that proposition would be true in the formal and total sense, that is, that man would justify himself by producing the form or justifying grace whereby he is formally justified, I deny: it would be true in the partial dispositional sense, that is, that man, aided on his part by divine grace, would even by his own acts dispose himself unto grace, I concede. For by this reasoning no Theologian can accuse that proposition of falsehood: for similar things are read in Scripture. Thus chap. 18 of Ezekiel: He himself shall vivify his own soul. Jeremiah iv.: Wash thy heart from wickedness. 2 Corinth. 7: Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of flesh and spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of the Lord. 1 John 3: Everyone who hath this hope in him sanctifies himself.

You will say 3: From the Second Council of Orange, chapter 1: That we may be cleansed from sin, God does not await our will: therefore one is not prepared unto justification by a motion of free will. — I distinguish the antecedent: God does not await the will, that His exciting and helping grace may go before it, I concede: that with the helping grace one prepares oneself unto sanctifying grace, I deny.

You will say 4: Adults are at times justified without any motion of free will; for St. Augustine narrates, book v. of Confessions, chapter 9, that a certain one of his friends, while he labored under fevers, and had long lain without sense in deadly sweat, and while he was despaired of as to the health of his mind and body, was baptized amid these straits, knowing it not, and was reborn: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the antecedent: insane adults, who never had any use of reason, are sanctified without any use of free will, I concede: for their case is the same as that of infants: adults who have at some time used reason, again I distinguish: to be justified without a motion of free will present, when they are baptized, I concede; before baptism intervenes, namely while they were of sound judgment, I deny. For even that some adult possessing reason be so baptized or absolved, it is necessary that before he fell into the mortal sickness which extinguishes reason, he have first prayed for baptism or sacramental absolution.

It is certain that faith is necessarily prerrequired for our justification; for this Sacred Scripture plainly attests, Matt. last chapter: He that believeth not shall be condemned. John 1: He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in his name. John 3: Whoever doth not believe is already judged. Hebrews 11: Without faith it is impossible to please God. And again: He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him. Hence the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 6, says: But they are disposed unto justice itself, when, excited and aided by divine grace, they conceive faith from hearing, and are moved freely toward God, believing those things to be true which have been divinely revealed and promised. Hence St. Augustine, book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 7, says: Now the Apostle says man is justified from faith, not from works, because faith itself leads the way, whereby the rest are obtained which are properly called works, by which the just man liveth. Wherefore he teaches in many places, especially in the book On the Origin of Sins, chap., that without faith in the Incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ not even the ancients could have been cleansed from sins so as to be just, and justified by the grace of God. The difficulty alone remains, what sort of act that of faith ought to be; that this may be perceived more clearly:

NOTE 1. The heretics of this time together with Calvin, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 2, as said elsewhere, distinguish a triple faith: one historical, whereby we believe that the things revealed by God are true, and whereby we believe those things contained in the Sacred Scriptures to be true, because we are certain they have been proposed and handed down by God, who is true: concerning which faith the Apostle speaks to the Heb. 11: By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word

of God. The second they call the faith of miracles, which Calvin in the place praised just now defines thus: the faculty of working miracles. It can be more truly defined as historical faith itself, insofar as it has annexed the virtue of working miracles, namely by believing that nothing is impossible for God to do. Concerning which faith the Apostle speaks 1 Corinth. chap. 13: If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains. The third they call the faith of promises, whereby we believe the promises of God concerning the gratuitous remission of sins through the merits of Christ to be true; of which faith indeed, or confidence or trust, which man has in the promise and mercy of God, as Calvin says, mention is made in Matthew's last chapter in these words: He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved. And they say these three species of faith answer to three properties in God: historical faith to truth; the faith of miracles to power; the faith of promises to the goodness and mercy of God. — They add, however, that unto justification there is necessary not only historical faith (as Catholics will), nor even the faith of miracles; but only the faith of promises; which again they distinguish into two: one general, whereby we believe the remission of sins has been promised to all those who believe in Christ: another particular, whereby each one, applying to himself the divine promise, believes or rather trusts that all his sins have been forgiven him through Christ; which faith alone, the special faith, they contend justifies men. Hence Calvin, in the place cited just now, num. 7, defines justifying faith thus:

Now a right definition of faith will stand firm for us if we say it is a firm and certain knowledge of divine benevolence toward us, which, founded upon the truth of the gratuitous promise in Christ, through the Holy Spirit, is both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts.

In which words although he wills faith to be a firm and certain knowledge, yet because he wills the object of this knowledge to be the benevolence of God, he understands nothing else by justifying faith than trust in God; which trust assuredly is not an act of intellect, but of will.

NOTE 2. As far as concerns the present difficulty, two acts of the intellect can be distinguished, of which the first is the very knowledge of truth certain and examined; the second however is the assent given to the truth proposed: which two acts are very much distinguished from each other; for the former connotes in the intellect itself cognition and understanding of what is affirmed or denied in the proposition; the latter however does not demand such penetration and understanding of what is affirmed or denied, but only signifies assent given to the proposition: which assent indeed is for the most part made without any disquisition of the truth proposed, as is plain in human faith, wherein for the most part on account of the great authority of the speaker we render assent to a thing otherwise unknown to us. Hence Calvin thinks this act of faith to be the knowledge of truths proposed in Scripture, but not assent; wherefore at num. 2 he inveighs against Catholic Doctors because they prerrequire only the assent of faith for justification. Hence at num. 5 he says this submission of judgment to be a preparation of faith, as it were adorned with the title of faith, of which nevertheless it is only the beginning; and therefore taken improperly with this word faith. He adds however:

docility with a desire of profiting stands far off from crass ignorance, in which those lie sluggish who are content with the faith implicit, such as is baptized by the Papists: for if Paul severely condemns those who, ever learning, never come to the knowledge of the truth; how much graver ignominy do they merit who deliberately affect to know nothing?

In which words Calvin feigns that we will that individual faithful men be held to have explicit faith and knowledge of no mystery; which indeed is an open lie; for there is no Catholic who does not hold that every adult ought explicitly to believe the two principal mysteries of faith, namely of the Trinity, and of the Incarnation, and therefore who is not held to acknowledge those mysteries with that knowledge which is prerrequired thereunto: but we deny that we ought to have perfect and examined knowledge of those mysteries which we believe explicitly, and that all the faithful are held to have such knowledge of every single mystery; and finally that justifying faith consists in apprehension and knowledge, but in the very assent which follows upon the authority of the proposer.

NOTE 3. That faith can be regarded in three ways in order to justification: first, as a previous disposition, whereby man, illumined by divine grace exciting and aiding, prepares himself unto the grace of justification: second, as the formal cause, so that the sense is: whether by faith alone apprehending the justice of Christ man is formally justified: thirdly finally, faith can be considered as something consequent for preserving justice, so that the sense is: whether faith alone without works suffices for forming justice and attaining salvation. But the heretics of this time will faith to be the cause of our justification, and to be prerrequired unto it as the instrument of receiving justice; not because it has not annexed other virtues, but because it alone justifies the impious. For as, says Calvin in the Antidote, the heat of the sun alone is that which warms the earth, yet heat itself is not alone in the Sun, but with its splendor: so faith must not be alone, but have companions, albeit those do not justify, but faith alone.

These things thus presupposed, three things especially are to be determined in this Question: First indeed, that the faith conducing to justification is not trust or the special faith of promises, but that faith or assent of the intellect whereby we believe those things to be true which have been divinely revealed and promised. Second, that that act of faith is not the very knowledge of the mysteries, but the assent which follows upon the authority of the proposer. Thirdly finally, that the other virtues and morally good acts, which are prerrequired unto justification together with faith, are also dispositions properly so called, no less than faith itself; nor are they less instruments of receiving justice than faith itself.

First Conclusion. — THE FAITH CONDUCING TO JUSTIFICATION IS NOT THAT SPECIAL TRUST WHEREBY EACH ONE IN PARTICULAR BELIEVES ALL HIS SINS TO HAVE BEEN FORGIVEN HIM ON ACCOUNT OF THE MERIT OF CHRIST. This was determined of faith in the Council of Trent, Session 6, Can. 12, in these words: If anyone shall say that justifying faith is nothing else than trust in the divine mercy which forgives sins for Christ's sake, or that it is that trust alone by which we are justified, let him be anathema.

Proof first from Sacred Scripture expressing justifying faith in words which signify that it pertains to the intellect, and that justification itself is attributed also to that faith which the heretics call historical and of miracles; thus Mark at the end: Preach the Gospel to every creature: he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved. John 6.: Thou hast the words of eternal life, and we have believed and have known that thou art Christ the Son of the living God, and that believing you may have life in his name. Rom. 10.: This is the word of faith which we preach, for if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved. Heb. 10., where having said: But my just one liveth by faith, he immediately signifies in the following chapter that this justifying faith pertains to the intellect, saying: By faith we believe that the worlds were framed by the word of God. And in the same place: without faith it is impossible to please God: for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him: hence Acts 8., when the Eunuch, asking for Baptism, said: Behold water: what doth hinder me from being baptized? Philip answered: If thou believest with thy whole heart, thou mayest: and he answering said: I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. From all which it is plain that the faith prerequisite to sanctifying grace pertains to the intellect, and therefore is not that confidence which the heretics strive to foist upon us.

The same truth the holy Fathers constantly teach, above all Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 5., where he acknowledges and distinguishes a twofold faith: one dogmatic, which he calls historical; the other which is grace freely given, through which miracles are wrought: and he affirms that by dogmatic faith formed the thief on the cross attained salvation, and that in the same place we are saved thereby. St. Augustine subscribes in many places, especially book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, where he demonstrates that faith, from which our salvation takes its origin, is a necessity and a gift of God: Although, he says, to believe itself is nothing else than to think with assent. For not everyone who thinks believes, since many think precisely so as not to believe, but everyone who believes thinks, and by believing thinks, and by thinking believes. St. Leo assents, Sermon ⟦illegible: sermon numeral⟧. On the Epiphany, in these words: This it is that justifies the impious, this it is that makes Saints out of sinners, if in one and the same our Lord Jesus Christ both true Divinity and true humanity be believed.

Proof finally by reason: The faith which is prerequisite to justification is that which Christ and the Apostles preached, and concerning which Catechumens must first be instructed before they approach baptism: but that faith pertains to the intellect: therefore the faith necessary for justification is an act of the intellect. Next, that confidence which each sinner has in the goodness and mercy of God is really distinguished from faith as something consequent upon it, or as cause from its effect, as the Apostle observes, Ephesians 3., in these words: In whom (namely Christ) we have confidence and access in confidence through his faith. For it sometimes happens that someone is justified by an act of formed faith before he has that confidence. Thus the woman with the issue of blood in Luke, chapter 8., declared she had had an act of formed faith, in these words: If I shall touch but his garment, I shall be healed; wherefore in the words following she is called daughter by Christ the Lord, because, as St. Jerome notes on that passage of the Gospel, by that act of formed faith she had been justified; afterwards however Christ exhorts her to have confidence, in these words: Be of good comfort, daughter, where confidence, or trust, presupposes the preceding justifying faith as a kind of cause of itself: therefore this confidence is not prerequisite to the grace of justification. Finally, that faith of special promise was fabricated gratuitously, since nowhere has God revealed to particular men that their sins are forgiven: let the heretics produce some texts of Scripture signifying that their own private sins have been forgiven by God; for they admit no other revelation besides Scripture itself; and nothing ought to be believed by divine and justifying faith except what God has revealed, since the object of faith is nothing other than truth revealed by God. I know indeed that when such insistence is made upon them, they produce testimonies of Scripture containing general promises, made to all rightly converted to God; or special ones, namely those made to Magdalene the penitent. Luc. i. the good thief. Luc. 23. The paralytic, Matth. 9. But these do not signify that the heretics themselves have been granted equal grace, nor can they prove by any text of Scripture that they have been rightly converted in particular and singly, nor does it follow that if God by special privilege revealed this to Magdalene, the Thief, and the Paralytic, he grants an equal grace also to Lutherans and Calvinists: therefore that confidence is altogether fabricated, and devised without any foundation.

The heretics reply, that they do not deny justifying faith to be an act of the intellect, but only that it does not include solely an act of the intellect, but also has an act of confidence, which pertains to the will. So Calvin in the places cited, where he speaks thus: We do not meanwhile deny that the office of faith is to subscribe to the truth of God, whenever, and whatever, and in whatsoever manner he speaks. — But this response does not prevent them from being truly in error; since they are unwilling for this act of the intellect to conduce to justification of itself, but only by reason of the confidence or trust joined to it, because they hold that only that faith is justifying which cannot coexist with mortal sin: but faith insofar as it precisely pertains to the intellect can coexist with mortal sin: therefore they hold that faith insofar as it precisely pertains to the intellect is not justifying. Next they wish justifying faith to be that by which we apprehend, receive, and apply justice to ourselves: yet they judge that we receive the offered promise of remission of sins by the will alone: therefore they are unwilling for faith regarded as pertaining to the intellect to conduce to justice. Finally, they are willing for faith pertaining to the intellect to conduce to justification no otherwise than the acts of hope and charity: but they teach that although the acts of hope and charity be joined to justifying faith, nevertheless these do not properly justify, but faith alone: therefore by parity they will that although justifying faith includes generally that faith insofar as it pertains to the intellect, namely insofar as it is taken for the assent given to things revealed by God, yet that very assent does not contribute to justification; which doctrine directly militates against the oracles of Sacred Scripture and of the holy Fathers praised by us above: therefore that response of the heretics does not vindicate them from error.

They object. 1. The heretics cite those texts of Scripture which seem to signify that justification follows upon faith, insofar as that signifies trust or confidence; thus Romans 4. Therefore by faith, that the promise might be firm to all seed according to grace, etc. — I answer, the text of the Apostle is not understood of a promise of justification made to this and that man severally and in particular, which promise the heretics wish to be included in confidence, which according to them is understood by the name of faith; but the Apostle speaks only of the promise of the calling of the Gentiles to faith, and of the coming of Christ the Lord, as is clear from what precedes; since he says it was promised Abraham that he would be the Father of all believers, not only in circumcision, that is of the Jews, but also in prepuce, that is of the Gentiles. Moreover St. Paul wills this promise to have been firm and stable on account of that dogmatic faith which Abraham had concerning the omnipotence of God; not however on account of the works of the Mosaic law; whence it comes about that this promise extends itself also to the Gentiles, for he subjoins: Therefore by faith, that the promise might be firm to all seed according to grace, that is, the promise might be fulfilled not only among the Jews, who according to the flesh are the sons of Abraham, but also among the Gentiles, who according to faith are the sons of Abraham: therefore the Apostle there speaks of faith insofar as it pertains to the intellect. Which moreover is established by the following words, for he says: He was confirmed (Abraham) in faith, giving glory to God: most fully knowing that whatsoever God hath promised, he is able also to perform: but the faith by which man knows that God is able to stand by his promises pertains to the intellect, for to know is an act of the intellect alone: therefore, etc.

They object. 2. That passage 1. John 5. These things I write to you, that believe in the Son of God, that you may know that you have eternal life. — I answer, the aforesaid text affords the heretics nothing at all, since the Apostle teaches there nothing except that whosoever believe as they ought have eternal life in hope, and will have the same in reality if they fall not away from the grace which they have attained through that faith. Next, even if they knew that, it would not follow that that justifying faith consisted in that confidence whereby each one trusts that his sins have been forgiven: since even if anyone knows that if he fall not away from the grace which he has attained he shall be saved, it does not follow that he is certain never to fall away from that same grace.

They object. 3. All those texts in which believers are bidden to be of good courage, and not to tremble about their salvation. Thus Psalm 26. The Lord is my light and my salvation, whom shall I fear? The Lord is the protector of my life, of whom shall I be afraid? Rom. 8. Who shall accuse against the elect of God? God that justifieth, who is he that condemneth? — I answer, all these texts are understood of firm hope in God which every believer ought to have in the goodness and mercy of God, but most especially the just, so that as long as God protects them they have nothing to fear; but this firm hope does not establish that false confidence with which the heretics cloak themselves: since from it does not follow that every believer certainly knows that he is in sanctifying grace, and that his sins have been forgiven him.

They object. 4. All those texts in which we are bidden to pray to God with certain confidence of obtaining those things for which we ask: thus Matth. 2. All things whatsoever you shall ask in prayer, believing, you shall receive. Mark 11. I say to you: all things whatsoever you ask when ye pray, believe that you shall receive them. James 1. If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God, and it shall be given him, but let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. — I answer, the aforesaid texts likewise do not establish the dogma of the heretics; for it can be understood in three ways that a man ought to have confidence that he shall obtain those things which he asks: first, that he doubt not that God is able to do what he asks of him; second, that God wills to grant what the man asks, provided his prayer be made as it ought; third, finally, that he shall certainly obtain in particular what he asks. But I confess that the first and second kinds of confidence ought to accompany our prayers, not however the third, because without special revelation it can be certain to no one that he fulfils all the conditions desired for praying aright.

Finally they object that passage of Hebrews 10. Having confidence in the blood of Christ, let us draw near with a true heart in fullness of faith. And ch. 11. Faith is defined as the substance of things to be hoped for: by which it seems to be signified that faith is the certain expectation of the promised mercy of God. —

I answer, in the former text the Apostle is not dealing with the faith required for first justification, but with the increase of grace and justice: for unto such an assent, to which he exhorts them, he demands that amendment from sins and the laying aside of an evil conscience go before: for he says: Let us draw near with a true heart in fullness of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and our bodies washed with clean water, let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering: therefore that text by no means favors the dogma of the heretics. To the second text I say that the Apostle by those words signifies only that faith is the foundation of all those things which are to be hoped for by us. That this faith pertains to the intellect, he indicates in the same place. For he says that it is the evidence of things that appear not: but evidence and conviction pertain to the intellect; and the other things he has in that chapter indicate the same: therefore it is false that faith there signifies the certain expectation of the promised mercy of God unto remission of sins.

Conclusion second. — THE ACT OF FAITH PREREQUISITE TO JUSTIFICATION IS NOT KNOWLEDGE, WHETHER PERFECT OR IMPERFECT, OF THE THINGS PROPOSED: BUT IT IS THE ASSENT WHICH THE INTELLECT RENDERS TO THE THINGS PROPOSED TO IT AND REVEALED.

The first part is proved, namely that the faith concurring unto justification is not perfect knowledge, by various texts of Scripture. First indeed from that passage Rom. 8. where the Apostle says that Abraham believed against hope in hope; for this manner of speaking signifies that the act of faith of Abraham was obscure and unevident, whereby he believed God saying that he, already advanced in age, would be the father of many nations: and accordingly that faith which contributed to the justification of Abraham was not perfect knowledge or understanding. — Likewise from that passage 2. Corinth. 1. bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of faith, and having in readiness to revenge all disobedience when your obedience shall be fulfilled. But if justifying faith obtained perfect knowledge or understanding, there would be no need to bring the understanding into captivity so that one might believe the things proposed: for the intellect easily apprehends evident things and without any captivity assents to them. — Finally, from that passage of Hebrews 11. where faith is called the evidence of things that appear not, that is, things which are neither perceived by sense nor known by the force and efficacy of arguments; by which particle the Apostle denotes that the formal object of faith is a certain obscure testimony, according to which the material object of faith is not made manifest. — To these add that no wayfarer has ever had evident understanding and perfect knowledge of the mysteries of our faith, especially of the Trinity and the Incarnation, unless perhaps by some special privilege of God this evident knowledge has been granted to outstanding men.

The second part is proved, namely that the faith contributing justification is not even imperfect knowledge, but simple assent to the things proposed. It is proved, I say, by those texts of Holy Scripture in which faith is distinguished from any knowledge and understanding whatsoever of the mysteries. Thus Isaiah i. If you will not believe, you shall not understand. By which words it is signified that the assent of faith is prerequisite for obtaining knowledge of the things to be believed. Thus likewise John chapter 20., Christ the Lord speaking of access unto justification, unto which eternal life follows, pronounces blessed those who have not seen and have believed, that is, who not on account of certain reasons and arguments by which some truth is made manifest, but out of prompt obedience of the will render an undoubted and firm assent to the things revealed by God and proposed to be believed. Thus finally 1. ad ⟦illegible: one OCR line lost here, likely "Corinth. 12. ..." introducing the following clause⟧ the gift both of wisdom and of knowledge, through which we understand the truths from that divine faith itself, through which we believe those truths, not on account of their evidence, but only on account of the authority and veracity of him who reveals.

It is proved also by the authority of the holy Fathers, but most especially St. Augustine, tractate 29. on John, where he teaches that understanding of the mysteries goes before faith. To whom St. Prosper subscribes, book I. De vita contemplativa, chapter 19., where expounding and citing the aforesaid words of Isaiah he says: It is given to be understood that not faith exists from understanding, but understanding from faith; nor he who understands believes, but he who believes understands.

Theological reason also concurs. For first experience establishes that many rustics believe the mysteries of our faith with firm and undoubted assent, yet do not penetrate them even lightly: but to deny in them the benefit of justification on account of the lack of that knowledge is to judge against the common conception of the holy Fathers, but most especially St. Augustine, tractate 10. on John, where he teaches that idiots seize heaven. Whence in the book against the Letter of Fundamentum, chapter ⟦illegible: chapter number⟧. he says: Not the curiosity of understanding, but the simplicity of believing makes the crowd most safe. — Next, in that does not consist the act of faith, with which posited faith is not posited, and which removed faith nevertheless no less exists: but imperfect knowledge of the mysteries being posited, sometimes faith is not posited; because a kind of knowledge and apprehension of the mysteries of faith can exist in infidels; and that being removed, sometimes faith no less exists; for there are many idiots, as we said just now, who do not at all penetrate the mysteries of faith, yet firmly believe them by submitting their judgment. Hence St. Augustine, tractate I. on John: What is faith, but to believe what thou seest not? And Sermon 119. De tempore: ⟦uncertain: Considera quod caecus es, fidelis, non rationalis⟧. And Epistle 102. If Christ were born for those alone who can determine these things with certain understanding, we labor almost in vain in the Church. — Finally, if faith were nothing else than the very penetration of the mysteries, it would follow that the greater the knowledge of the mysteries, the more excellent the faith: but the consequence is false: for Christ the Lord in the Gospel celebrates the faith of very many who had attained no knowledge of the Gospel, nor of the mysteries contained in it. Such was the woman of Chanaan, to whom Christ said: O woman, great is thy faith: such is the Centurion, of whom he says: I have not found so great faith in Israel.

The Heretics object: Theirs it is to have knowledge, whose it is to render a reason: but all believers are bound to render a reason of the faith, or of those things they believe, to everyone asking, according to that passage 1. Peter 3. Being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you. Therefore each of the true faithful is bound to know the mysteries. —

I answer first, in the aforesaid text according to the Vulgate and Greek edition mention is not made of faith, but only of Christian hope, concerning which alone also St. Peter there treats, for he there deals with the patience which Christians ought to have in bearing tribulations which are inflicted upon them on account of the Christian faith. For he had said before: If you suffer anything for justice' sake, blessed are ye: and be not afraid of their fear, and be not troubled: but sanctify the Lord Christ in your hearts, being ready always to satisfy, etc.

I answer second, believers indeed are bound to knowledge of the mysteries, but not in the same manner: for it suffices for most to have simple knowledge of the principal mysteries of the faith, which they are bound to believe explicitly. Since indeed by the Apostle 1. Corinth. chapter 12. not all in the Church are Doctors, and there are divisions of graces, and to others is given the word of wisdom, to others the word of knowledge, not all Christians are bound to have understanding of the mysteries of our faith, such that they may confute gainsayers; this the Apostle demands only from a Bishop, Titus chapter 1.

They object 2. We can only intimate those things to others and confess them with the mouth which we know, because confession of the mouth proceeds from the knowledge of the one confessing: but every Christian is bound to confess Christ the Lord and his promises: according to that passage Romans 10. For if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus Christ, and believe in thy heart that God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved: for with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation: therefore every believer is bound to have knowledge of the mysteries. —

I answer, that for Christians to profess the faith it suffices that by certain general reasons they be able to respond to infidels asking that the Christian faith is true, and all its mysteries most certain; namely that they were foretold before they existed, especially those which concern and follow upon the Incarnation of Christ the Lord; then that proclaimed by Christ the Lord and the Apostles they were confirmed by countless miracles, and propagated through various persecutions down even to us: which knowledge indeed ⟦uncertain: longe interior est ea⟧ that knowledge and understanding of the truths of the Gospel which the heretics require as prerequisite in the very men to be justified.

They object 3. The end and effect of justification, namely eternal life, is given only to those who know the true God and Jesus Christ, according to that passage John 17. Now this is life everlasting, that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent: but this knowledge cannot be had without penetration of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation: therefore that is prerequisite to true justifying faith. —

I deny the minor. For St. John does not intend that, nor does that particle may know stand for understanding and penetration of the divine Trinity and Incarnation, but for that knowledge which presupposes the assent of true faith, so that that particle may know sounds the same as may believe by divine faith: for what Christ the Lord there expresses by the word may know he shortly after explains by the word to believe: Thus speaking to his Father about his Apostles: and they have known truly that I went out from thee, and have believed that thou didst send me.

Conclusion third. — THE ACTS OF HOPE AND CHARITY ARE NOT RELATED MERELY CONCOMITANTLY TO JUSTIFICATION, BUT ARE TRULY DISPOSITIONS, AS IS FAITH ITSELF. This truth is evident from the Council of Trent, Session 6. chapter 6., where among the dispositions to sanctifying grace he enumerates not only faith but also fear: By which, he says, they are usefully shaken unto considering the mercy of God, and turning themselves are raised up in hope, etc.

It is proved from Sacred Scripture, in which justification is attributed not only to acts of faith, but also of hope and charity and fear. Thus Ecclesiasticus 1. The fear of the Lord driveth out sin. 1. John 3. He that loveth not abideth in death. Acts 3. Do penance, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out, etc. By which it is clear that what the heretics foist upon us is false, that Scripture makes mention only of faith when there is question of justification and remission of sins.

You will say 1: Sacred Scripture requires only faith for justification: therefore the other dispositions are superfluous. It is proved from that passage Luc. 8. Believe only, and she shall be safe. —

I deny the antecedent: and in proof I say that there is no question there of justification, but of the raising of the dead maiden; which benefit Christ granted to the parent on account of the confidence he had in his goodness and clemency toward raising the dead maiden.

You will say 2: From Sacred Scripture works are excluded from the dispositions of justification. Thus Rom. 6. Justified freely by his grace. And within: We account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law. And in the following chapter: If Abraham were justified by works, he hath glory, but not before God. And Ephesians 2. By grace you are saved through faith, and not of works, that no man may glory: therefore according to the Apostle works of fear, hope and love, penance, etc. are excluded from the dispositions required for justification, and only faith concurs thereto. —

I answer, that works are twofold: some precede faith, others follow it: the former the Apostle excludes, but not the latter, such as are the acts of hope, love and penance, which are founded in faith. That this is indeed the mind of the Apostle is evident, because he wishes to show that neither the Jews by the bare observance of the Mosaic law, nor the Gentiles through good works before faith in Christ received, could in fact have obtained justice from God; but from faith in Christ, which is the beginning of salvation and justification, and which is not given on account of preceding works, but is the gift of God. Wherefore the Apostle deservedly says that we are justified freely, because faith, which is the primary disposition and foundation of the dispositions unto justification, is given gratis.

You will say 3: Scripture openly testifies that we are justified by faith alone: therefore the other dispositions are superfluous for justification. The antecedent is proved from that passage Acts 15. In this everyone who believeth is justified. And Rom. 10.¹ Whosoever believeth in him shall not be confounded. And ch. 4. To him that believeth in him who justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God: therefore only faith concurs unto justification. —

I deny the consequence; for by faith in the places cited is not understood bare faith, but with the other acts joined, which are understood to be necessary from elsewhere. For St. James chapter 2. openly teaches that man is justified by works, and not by faith only. — Nor should you reply together with the heretics that those acts indeed conduce to justification, but only by virtue of faith. For against this, rather does faith work by charity. Whence St. Augustine book 5. De Trinitate, chapter ⟦illegible: chapter number⟧, adds: charity itself makes faith useful: for without charity faith can indeed exist, but cannot profit. But mention of faith is made more often than of the other acts, because as the Council of Trent observes, Session 6. chapter 8. Faith is the beginning, foundation, and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God, and to come to the fellowship of his sons.

Finally you will say: Very many of the holy Fathers pronounce absolutely that faith alone justifies. For thus teach Origen on chapter 3. of Romans, Hilary 8. on Matthew, Aug. on Psalm 88. and Bernard, Epistle 1.; therefore it must be so believed. —

I answer, that by the name of faith the holy Fathers do not understand solitary faith distinct from the other acts of intellect and will, but faith formed by charity, and illuminated by the other acts of intellect and will, as we have said many times already.

The Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 6, enumerates besides faith five other dispositions unto justification: all of which are wrought by acts of the will, and are: first, fear of the divine justice; secondly, hope of pardon from the divine mercy; thirdly, begun love of God as of the fountain of all justice⟦uncertain reading: OCR "omnis iustitia tontis"; cf. Trent "tamquam omnium fontem iustitiae"⟧; fourthly, hatred and detestation of sin; finally fifthly, the purpose of receiving baptism, if he to be justified be not yet baptized, or of doing penance and receiving sacramental absolution, if a new life is to be renewed, if after baptism he has fallen into sin. The words of the Council are these:

While sinners understand themselves to be such, they turn themselves from the fear of the divine justice, by which they are usefully shaken unto considering the mercy of God, and are raised up in hope, believing that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ; and they begin to love Him as of the fountain of all justice; and therefore they are moved against sins with some hatred and detestation, that is, with that force of penance which must be exercised before baptism; finally, while they propose to receive baptism, to begin a new life, and to keep the divine commandments.

Since, however, it is not the business of the present undertaking to dispute profoundly concerning these five virtues, but only to examine and resolve whether and how they are dispositions unto justification, hence we shall propose a few things concerning these five dispositions severally.

How the fear of the divine justice is a disposition unto justification. — In the words written above the Council of Trent established two things concerning fear.

One is, that we understand ourselves to be sinners; the other truly, that sinners are usefully shaken by the fear of the divine justice. The first raises no difficulty, for sinners alone ought to dread the divine justice, because the just, as long as they remain such, have nothing whereof they should dread God as avenger, according to that of Genesis 18: Wilt thou destroy the just with the wicked! Far be it from thee to do this thing, and to slay the just with the wicked, and for the just to be as the wicked; this is not thy doing, who judgest all the earth. The latter, however, is controverted between Lutherans and Catholics: for Luther, as is evident from the Bull of Leo X condemning his errors, taught that the fear whereby one fears God as avenger is a sin, and makes sinners worse: which assertion indeed the Council of Trent condemns as heretical, Session 6, Canon 8, in these words: if anyone shall say that the fear of hell, whereby we take refuge through grieving for sins in the mercy of God, or whereby we abstain from sin, is a sin, or makes sinners worse, let him be anathema. The Catholic assertion therefore is, that fear of God the avenger is salutary; which indeed is proved by various texts of Scripture. Proverbs 14: The fear of the Lord is a fountain of life. Ecclesiasticus 1: The fear of the Lord expelleth sin, and he who is without fear shall not be justified. Isaiah 26, according to the interpretation of the Seventy Interpreters: Of thy fear have we conceived, and brought forth the spirit of salvation. Hence men of every sort most zealous for the salvation of souls exhorted sinners to penance with the threat of punishments. So Moses, Deuteronomy 30, provokes the children of Israel to penance by setting forth the various plagues wherewith God, the avenger of crimes, was bound to chastise their sins, unless they should repent. So book 2 of Kings, chapter 12, Nathan urges David to penance with the threat of immense calamities. So St. John the Baptist compelled the Pharisees and Sadducees coming to his baptism with these words: Brood of vipers, who hath shown you to flee from the wrath to come? Bring forth therefore fruits worthy of penance.... for now the axe is laid to the root: every tree therefore that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down, and cast into the fire. So Christ the Lord, Luke 12, says: I will show you whom you shall fear: fear him who, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell; and chapter 13: Except you do penance, you shall all likewise perish.

The same truth the holy Fathers constantly teach, first indeed St. Cyprian, who in the book ad Quirinum, chapter 2, says that fear is the foundation and firmament of hope and faith. To him the other Fathers subscribe, as elsewhere we have abundantly taught: most especially St. Augustine, who commends this fear in many places; particularly Epistle 120, where he says: Fear sent before into our heart drives out from it the habit of evil works, and preserves a place for charity, which when it comes like a mistress, fear withdraws that she may inhabit it. In the Tractate on the First Epistle of St. John, where after teaching that these words of the Apostle, Fear is not in charity, are not to be understood of charity begun, but of that of which the Apostle spoke immediately, Perfect charity casteth out fear, he subjoins: Therefore let fear begin, because the beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord. Fear prepares as it were a place for charity: but when charity begins to inhabit it, fear is driven out which prepared a place for her: for as much as she grows, so much does it decrease: and as much as she becomes interior, so much is fear driven without: greater charity, less fear; less charity, greater fear: but if there is no fear at all, there is not that whereby charity may enter, as we see linen introduced by the needle, when anything is sewn, the needle enters first: but unless it go out, the linen does not follow; so fear first occupies the mind: but fear does not remain there, because it entered precisely that it might introduce charity. Book De catechizandis rudibus, chapter 5: Even upon the very severity of God, by which the hearts of mortals are shaken with most wholesome fear, charity is to be built. And afterwards: For very rarely indeed does it happen, nay truly never, that anyone comes wishing to become a Christian who has not been struck with some fear. And Enarration on Psalm 127: That fear, not yet chaste, fears the presence of the Lord, and punishments: it makes whatever good it does, it does from fear, not of losing that good, but of suffering that evil: it fears not lest it lose the embrace of its most beautiful spouse, but it fears lest it be cast into hell: this fear is good, it is useful. The same holds in St. Prosper, book De vocatione Gentium, chapter 27, and Isidore, De summo bono, chapter 8.

It must be observed nevertheless that this fear is not absolutely necessary unto justification; for one can be justified without that servile fear, though he cannot be justified without filial fear, which coincides with the love of God: yet it is most useful thereto: for man, acknowledging himself a sinner and God a just judge, either implicitly or formally fears God: by which fear it comes about that he entreats the divine mercy, and the grace whereby he may renew his life and receive himself unto better fruit.

You will say: Every disposition unto justification ought to be morally good: but that servile fear is not such: therefore that fear is not useful unto justification. —

I distinguish the minor: Servile fear, qua servile merely, or whereby sin is avoided only on account of the fear of punishment, so that if no punishment were to be inflicted, sin would not be avoided, nor would God be held in any honor or worship, I concede: servile fear, qua fear simply, I deny. There are therefore two things in fear, namely fear and servility: fear indeed is good: servility however can be evil; for it is good to fear hell, because hell is an evil, and it is good to flee an evil: but it is evil to fear it with the exclusion of the love of justice. — Hence easily are reconciled the opinions of St. Augustine concerning servile fear, which seem to fight among themselves; for he sometimes says servile fear is good, wholesome, useful, the beginning of conversion, and necessary thereto: sometimes however he seems to condemn the same fear, as when he says Epistle 141. ⟦uncertain reading⟧ Vainly thinks he to be victor over sin who through fear of punishment sins not, because although outwardly the affair of evil concupiscence is not fulfilled, that concupiscence itself within is an enemy: and who is found innocent before God, who wishes to do what is desired, if what is feared be withdrawn? By this he is guilty in his very will, who wishes to do what is not permitted to be done: but he himself does it not, because what he desires cannot be done with impunity, if it could be accomplished without punishment. Which he declares more briefly in book 2 ad Bonifac., chapter 9: When good is done through fear of punishment, not through love of justice, the good is not yet well done; nor is what seems done in act done in heart: when man wishes not to do it if he could with impunity. I pass over other similar opinions, whereby St. Augustine seems to depress servile fear, not simply because it is servile, but whenever it happens that that fear recalls from sin only through the mere fear of hell; so that sin would not be avoided were such fear of hell absent, even though God forbids it from another quarter, inasmuch as it offends His divine majesty.

How hope of pardon is a disposition unto justification. — It is established from Sacred Scripture that hope disposes unto justification: thus Psalm 36: He shall rescue them out of the hands of sinners, and save them, because they have hoped in him. Proverbs 24: He that hopeth in the Lord shall be saved. Hence Christ the Lord frequently exhorted sinners to hope and confidence, as to a disposition necessarily prerequisite unto grace: thus Matthew 9: Be of good heart, son, thy sins are forgiven thee. Whence the Apostle Romans 8 says: by hope we are saved. The reason is because since justification is not a human work, it must be awaited from God: therefore man cannot firmly endeavor to obtain remission of sins, unless he firmly hope that he shall obtain it. Wherefore although the object of hope be broad, yet in the business of justification it regards only the pardon of sins, and grace through the merits of Christ, unto exercising penance.

Is hope simply necessary unto justification? — I affirm: both from the prefaced texts of Scripture, whereby it stands that men are saved and sanctified by hope: then because the Council of Trent, Session 6, Canon 1, intimates this truth by defining that man cannot, without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, that the grace of justification be conferred upon him; wherein it judges the act of hope to be of equal necessity unto justification with the act of faith and of charity, which no one doubts to be absolutely necessary: then finally, because Session 14, chapter 4, says that contrition, which was necessary at any time whatsoever for obtaining pardon of sins, includes trust in the divine mercy, which trust is most certainly an act of hope. Hence St. Ambrose, book 1. De poenitentia, chapter 1: No one can do penance unless he have hoped for indulgence.

What love of God is prerequisite unto justification. — Concerning the love of God necessary unto justification, the Council teaches three things: the first is, that they who are to be justified begin to love God; secondly, that they begin to love Him as of the fountain of all justice; finally thirdly, that therefore they are moved against sins with some hatred and detestation. Wherein it must first be observed that by these words, they begin to love, the Council signifies a begun love of God, abstracting from love perfect or imperfect, because outside the sacrament a begun imperfect love would not suffice: in the sacrament truly a begun perfect love is not absolutely necessary. The Council however speaks of a begun love of God, abstracting from justification which is wrought in the sacrament or outside the sacrament. — It must be observed secondly that that love of God is either the love of friendship, or of concupiscence. Indeed the love of friendship outside the sacrament, but of concupiscence or attrition together with the sacrament. For it is true that outside the sacrament an actual love of perfect friendship is required as a disposition unto justification: for the Council of Trent, Session 14,¹ chapter 1, speaking of contrition, which is the love of friendship, says: this motion of con-> trition was always at all times necessary for obtaining pardon of sins, and in man fallen after baptism it profits unto remission of sins only if it be joined with trust in the divine mercy, and with the purpose of performing the remaining things which are required for duly receiving this sacrament.

There the discourse is concerning perfect contrition, for this alone was at all times necessary unto justification, since attrition or imperfect contrition was not sufficient, nor consequently necessary at all times for obtaining pardon of sins; then because the same Council, Session 6, Can. 3, says, the motion of charity must be from the grace of God: therefore the motion of theological charity, like the motion of faith and hope, is a disposition unto the grace of justification. Finally because the same Council there in chapter ⟦illegible: chapter number⟧, declaring love to be necessary unto sanctifying grace, uses these words of Zachary to intimate this truth. Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you: but God outside the sacrament is not converted except to him who has perfect contrition: for those words were spoken to men at that time when attrition together with the sacrament was not a sufficient condition unto justification, because the sacraments were not yet instituted.

How penance disposes unto justification. — Concerning this disposition the Council teaches two things: the first indeed, that penance is hatred and detestation of sins on account of God, which indeed it defines against Luther, who asserted that penance is nothing else than a new life; the other, that this penance must be exercised by the infidel before he approach baptism, according to that of Acts 2: Do penance, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of your sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. That moreover this penance ought ordinarily to precede justification, speaking ordinarily, is gathered from Sacred Scripture. Thus Jeremias 18: If that nation shall have done penance from its evil which I have spoken against it, I also will repent over the evil which I thought to do to it. Ezechiel 18: When the wicked shall turn himself away from his impiety, he himself shall vivify his own soul. Ecclesiasticus 2: If we have not done penance, we shall fall into the hands of God. Luke 13: if you shall not have done penance, you shall all likewise perish. I said ordinarily, yet it can happen in some case, e. g. when someone is seized unto martyrdom, and sins do not occur to memory, who shall be justified by sole express love of God without formal, but only virtual contrition. For then he can think of the divine goodness, and love it, and then he does not expressly repent of his sins, because they do not occur to memory, as we said: therefore this one shall be justified without express contrition: it is evident, for God loves those who love Him. More on these things in the disputation concerning Charity.

How the purpose of receiving the Sacraments of baptism and penance, and of emending one's life and observing the precepts, is necessary unto justification. — I answer, that purpose indeed is necessary first with respect to baptism, because unless one be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Secondly with respect to the Sacrament of penance, because the same reason holds for penance for baptized sinners as for baptism for infidels: but the purpose of receiving baptism is necessary unto infidels that they may be justified: therefore, etc. Similarly with respect to a new life, and the observance of the commandments, according to that of Ezechiel 18. If the wicked shall do penance from all his sins which he hath wrought, and keep all my precepts, and do judgment and justice, living he shall live, and shall not die. Which words signify nothing else than an efficacious purpose of keeping the commandments and the observances thereof, unto which the wicked is bound while he exercises penance, and likewise the observance of laws and precepts, which are prescribed for acquiring or keeping justice. This purpose moreover ought not always to be explicit and express, but it suf- fices that sometimes it be virtual and implicit: namely while one elicits the act of the love of God above all things, whereby he is formally and proximately dispo- sed unto justification: for in that act there is contained only virtually the purpose of receiving the sacrament of baptism or of penance, and like- wise of keeping the commandments of God, and of avoiding all those things which can displease God.

You ask: whether upon the positing of those dispositions sanctifying grace always follows? — I answer, the dispositions assigned are in a twofold difference with respect to sanctifying grace: for some are remote, as faith, hope, fear; some proximate and ultimate, as the act of penitence and of perfect love of God. Of the remote there is no difficulty, for it is clear, that upon the positing of those dispositions sanctifying grace does not follow. Whence I answer 2., that upon the positing of the proximate and ultimate disposition it is probable that sanctifying grace be infused, both because the Council of Trent where, in the praised chapter 6, it explained the prepa- rations unto justification, begins the following chapter thus: This dispo- sition, or preparation, justification itself follows, etc. By which manner of speaking it seems to signify that immediately sanctifying grace is infused. Then because the same reason seems to hold of supernatural forms as of natural ones: but natural forms are induced into the subje- ct immediately once the ultimate disposition is posited: therefore the same must be said of sanctifying grace, qua supernatural form.

You ask 2. Whether the aforesaid dispositions ought to be actual, while an adult is justified? — I answer 1. That when a sinner is justi- fied outside the sacrament, the ultimate dispositions ought to be simultaneous, or in the same instant in which grace is infused, because while man is so justified no reason can be assigned why, once the ultimate disposition is posited, grace would not be infused; since, as we said just now, in the same way, proportion being preserved, one must reason of dispositions unto supernatural forms as unto natural ones: but natural forms are introduced in the same instant in which is the ultimate disposition unto them; otherwise for some instant the subject would exist without form; since the ultimate disposition, e. g. supreme heat unto the form of fire is incompatible with supreme cold, which is conservative of the form of water; and straightway once supreme heat is posited it is necessary that the form of water perish, and consequently the form of fire is induced; otherwise the subject would have no substantial form: therefore by equal reason, once the ultimate disposition unto sanctifying grace is posited, it is fitting that it be infused. I answer 2. That when an adult is justified through real reception of the sacrament, it is not necessary that the dispositions be actual in the same instant in which grace is infused, but it suffices that they have preceded and persevere virtually. Which indeed is proved: a virtual motion of free will is sufficient unto justification, which is wrought through real reception of the sacrament: therefore if the man to be justified shortly before the received Sacrament elicited the aforesaid acts of the dispositions, and did not revoke them, he will have been sufficiently prepared unto recei- ving the effect of the sacrament, namely sanctifying grace. Proof of the antecedent: that motion is sufficient unto justification, which from its nature suffices unto sin, and whereby man is understood to will something in human fashion, for no more liberty is required, that man be justified, than that he sin: but through the virtual motion of the will man is understood to will something in human fashion, and actually to sin through such virtual volition, if he first have done something whence sin follows infallibly and necessarily: therefore that virtual motion will be sufficient unto ju- stification. Next, man, while he receives the sacrament, can be distracted blamelessly, and quasi-naturally; but no reason appears why the sacrament would then not have its effect, since the recipient poses no obstacle. It stands moreover from the Council of Trent, Sess. b. Can. 6., that the sa- craments confer grace upon those not posing an obstacle: therefore he will receive that sanctifying grace. Finally, if it were necessary that those dispositions exist actually and persevere while grace is infused, it would fol- low that where the act of those dispositions was formed, if any distraction supervened, however slight, there would be mortal sin; for nothing impedes the effect of the sacrament, which is sanctifying grace, except mortal sin: since that grace is compatible with venial sin: but to assert this would be too harsh, and contrary to the frequent reception of the sacraments; for it would follow that all men would be anxious, while approaching the sacrament, whether they had received it rightly: since it is most quiet to have some wandering of mind supervene in the reception of the sacrament, wherein only so much diligence need be applied toward averting or repelling it as would be necessary. It is confirmed moreover from the common opinion of the Theologians teaching, that if any adult of sound reason shall have sought the sacrament of Baptism, and before its reception shall have fallen into insanity, nor does it stand that he revoked such a will, then Baptism ought to be administered to him, although he has no actual dispo- sition, but only a virtual one is presumed, just as also the sacrament of Extreme Unction is frequently administered to those who scarcely seem to have the use of reason.

You will say. God justifies no one, unless according to the condition of His nature: but the condition of man using reason is, that man concur actually unto his own justification through the motion of his free will: therefore the dispositions unto justifying grace ought to be in the same instant in which man is justi- fied. — I distinguish the minor: the condition of man using reason is, that he concur unto his justification, through an act, whether which is in the same instant, or which has preceded, and still perseveres virtually, I concede: which is ac- tual while that grace is infused, I deny: because man is held to concur unto the effect in his natural mode, when he concurs unto the preceding act not revo- ked, and still persevering virtually, as was said.

You will say. While man is justified outside the sacrament, it is necessary that the ultimate disposition be actual, while grace is infused: therefore the same must be said while he is justified through the reception of the sacrament. — I deny the consequence. and the reason of disparity is, that it does not appear why sanctifying grace would rather be infused after the positing of the ultimate disposition, while outside the sacrament man is justified, than that it be infused together with it: for then nothing else intervenes: but truly in the sacrament, after the ultimate disposition only persevering virtually, there supervenes the fecundity of the sacrament producing morally grace ex opere operato: therefore it is not the same reason.

Finally you ask: Whether the acts dispositional unto justification ought to be supernatural, and likewise proceed efficiently from the very habit of sanctifying grace itself? — I answer 1. All and singular the acts dispositional unto justification ought to be supernatural, and elicited from supernatural grace, which indeed is easily gathered from the Council of Trent, Session 6, Can. 3, where it is thus had: If anyone shall say that without the preceding inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and His aid, man can believe, hope, love, or repent, as he ought, that the grace of justification be conferred upon him, let him be anathema. Where these words, without the preceding inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and His aid, and as he ought, declare that those acts of disposition ought to proceed from supernatural preceding and ai- ding grace, in order that, those being posited, the grace of justification follow.

I answer 2. Those acts of disposition do not proceed efficiently from the very habit of sanctifying grace itself: both because dispositions are prior by nature to the very form unto which they dispose: but what is prior by nature to another cannot be efficiently from that other, which is prior by nature: therefore, etc. Then because the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapters 5 and 6, where it described the manner, whereby the adult is disposed unto justification, and had enumerated all those acts of disposition, thus begins the seventh chapter: This disposition, or preparation, justification itself follows: therefore the Coun- cil signifies the infusion of habitual grace to be posterior in real existence to those acts of disposition. Finally because the habit of grace either exists in the will of man in that prior moment in which the act of the love of God above all things, and of contrition for sins, is elicited, or is only afterwards infused: if the first; therefore man is priorly formally just, and in fact justified, than he has the aforesaid acts of love and contrition, because this justification is the formal effect of inherent grace: but it is ab- surd to say, that an adult sinner, who is justified outside the sa- crament, is truly just before he elicited the aforesaid acts of love and contrition. If the second; therefore those aforesaid acts, since they already pre-exist, do not proceed efficiently from such a habit of justifying grace.

You will say. If these things were true, it would follow that an adult man loves God first with perfect love, than God loves him: but this consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The major is evident: for if that love does not proceed from the habit of charity, and is anterior thereto, since God does not love man with supernatural love, except on account of justice and charity, it follows that that man loves God supernaturally first, than he is so loved by God. The minor is proved from that of 1. John 4: God, but because He first loved us. — I deny the minor: for it does not follow that man loves God perfectly and simply with supernatural love prior to being loved by God with corresponding love; for that act of love of God, ultimately dispositional unto the grace of justification, although it pro- ceeds from actual grace, is nevertheless not simply perfect in the genus supernatural, since it is elicited by a person who in that sign is not yet held to have the habit of charity; and straightway not yet to be simply in the supernatural state.

The name of justification bears several significations in holy Scripture; for it is employed especially in four ways: First indeed for the divine law itself, which teaches justice and conduces to its attainment: thus Psalm 118: O that my ways may be directed to keep thy justifications. And further on: I will keep thy justifications; do not thou forsake me utterly. And again: In thy justifications I shall meditate; I will not forget thy words. Hence in Luke, chapter one, of Zachary and Elizabeth it is said: And they were both just, walking before God in all the commandments and justifications of the Lord without blame. — Second, for the declaration of justice or innocence made by judges in favor of someone in the external forum; by which reasoning to justify is the same as to make, or to esteem, pronounce, and declare someone to be just, whether meanwhile he be truly just or not: in which sense Proverbs 17 says: He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, both alike are an abomination to God. And Psalm 50: Judge the needy and the fatherless; do justice to the humble and the poor. Isaias 5: Woe to them that justify the wicked for rewards. This signification moreover extends even to a declaration of innocence made by private authority; by which reasoning Job, chapter 9, said: If I will justify myself, my own mouth shall condemn me: if I show myself innocent, he shall prove me wicked. And Luke 16: The Pharisees justified themselves. Wherefore the apology by which one defends and manifests one's innocence and justice is wont to be called a justification: thus Job 27: I will not desert my justification, which I have begun to hold. — Third, justification is taken for the acquisition and attainment of that justice and innocence whereby we are justified by God: thus Romans 3: Being justified freely by his grace, etc. And chapter 1: To him that believeth in him who justifieth the ungodly. And chapter 5: As by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation, so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life: and 1. Corinthians 6: Do not err: neither fornicators, nor effeminate, nor servers of idols shall possess the kingdom of God: and such indeed you were, but you are washed, but you are sanctified, but you are justified. — Fourth finally, this word is taken for the increase of the same justice: thus ⟦ref illegible⟧ Fear not to be justified even unto death. James 2. By works a man is justified, and not by faith only. Apocalypse, last chapter: He that is just, let him be justified still.

The first acceptance of justification does not pertain to our undertaking; the three others conduce to it. For the first of them the Lutherans and Calvinists employ for declaring that innocence which they wish ⟦illegible: …⟧ to be brought upon us through Christ by the imputation of his holiness; but the two latter significations are frequent among Catholics, who rightly contend that justification is wrought by something positive inhering in the souls of the just: by which reasoning justification can be considered either actively and efficiently, insofar as it signifies the action of God inwardly justifying man; or passively and subjectively, inasmuch as it designates the terminus of that action of the justifying God, namely the human soul enlightened and adorned by sanctifying grace.

But since justification is derived from justice, and to justify is the same as to make just, it must further be observed that justice is taken generically for the rectitude of any work whatever; for that is called just which is right, and measured, and congruent with its rules.

Wherefore the name of justice is employed especially in three ways: First indeed most generally, for the rectitude of any work whatsoever prescribed by law; in which sense Christ the Lord, Matthew 5, said: Unless your justice abound more than that of the scribes and Pharisees. — Second it is taken more specially for that rectitude which is in works toward another, in which sense justice is constituted a special virtue among the cardinal virtues. Third finally most specially, for that rectitude by which man is ordered to eternal life; in which sense the Apostle said, Romans 3: But the justice of God, by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe in him: and he calls it the justice of faith, because it begins from faith, and of God, because it is given by God; hence to the Philippians 3 he said: And may be found in him, not having my justice, which is of the law, but that which is of the faith of Christ Jesus, which is of God, justice founded on faith.

These things being thus premised, there must be determined in the present article: First, whether the justification of the impious is wrought by an inherent and intrinsic justice, or only by an imputative and external one. Second, whether in the justification of a sinner sins are so remitted that they are truly blotted out, and no longer subsist at all in the person justified. Third, whether habitual sanctifying grace can subsist, by the extraordinary power of God, together with mortal sin. Fourth, whether justice once possessed can be lost. Fifth finally, whether a man can be certain of his own justification.

Note 1. Among the innumerable errors of the heretics of this time, this one holds no last place, whereby they affirm that men are not justified formally by anything intrinsic, but only through the justice of Christ, by faith as it were grasped with the hand and applied to us: I say by that faith, which they call justifying, and wish to be distinct from historical faith, and from the faith of miracles; so that through that justifying faith man persuades himself with certainty that the justice of Christ pertains to him, and that on account of it his sins are not imputed to him by God. Thus above all teaches Calvin, book 3. Instit., chapter 11. n. 2. where he says: He shall be justified by faith, because the justice of works being excluded, he apprehends by faith the justice of Christ, clothed wherewith in the sight of the Lord he appears not as a sinner, but as it were as a just man. Hence in the Antidote to the Council of Trent, on Session 6. chapter 8. he boldly says: *I contend that it is false that any part of justice resides in a quality or habit residing in us. To this subscribe not only the Calvinists of France, article 20. of their confession of faith, but also those of Germany, as is evident from the Palatine Catechism approved in the Pseudo Synod of Dordrecht.

But how wretched and erroneous this opinion is, and how plainly it wars against Sacred Scripture itself, and likewise against the holy Fathers teaching us to be justified through inherent and intrinsic justice, will appear below.

Note 2. That we here institute discourse concerning the justification of the sinner, which according to the Council of Trent, Session 6. chapter 1. can rightly be described: Translation from the state of sin into the state of grace, and adoption of the Sons of God, through Jesus Christ our Savior: which translation indeed is not wrought by way of simple generation, or by way of simple motion from privation or negation of justice unto justice itself, such as was the justification of the Angels, and of the first parents in the instant of their creation, which therefore can be called motion, or change from lack of sanctifying grace unto sanctifying grace itself, but is wrought by motion from as it were a contrary into a contrary, or by a certain transmutation from the state of injustice unto the state of holiness and supernatural justice, according to which in the interior disposition of man the inferior powers of the soul are subjected to the superior, namely reason, while reason truly obeys God in all things perfectly and serves Him.

Note 3. The justice whereby we are named just can be called participatory justice of God, and of Christ: either by reason of origin, or by reason of imita- tion and similitude. Indeed by reason of origin it is called the justice of God, because God is He who justifieth, says the Apostle Romans 8. Similarly also the justice of Christ; not only because by His merit we are made just, but also because no one becomes just except through justice received from Him, for of His fullness we all have received: wherefore the Apostle to the Philip- pians 3 said: And be found in Christ not having my justice, but the justice which is of the faith of Jesus Christ. By reason truly of similitude it is called the justice of God, because namely through it we are assimilated to God. Hence Christ the Lord admonished us, Matthew 5: Be you therefore also perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect. By equal reason it is called the justice of Christ, because through sanctifying grace He who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, Himself shone in our hearts, unto the illumination of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ Jesus, says the Apostle 2. to the Corinthians 4. Hence most excellently he admonished the Ephesians chapter 4: Put on the new man, who ac- cording to God is created in justice, and holiness of truth. There remains therefore only this difficulty to be solved, whether also our justice is the very formal justice of Christ, which through merely external imputation is attributed to us; which difficulty, that it may be solved, let there be

One Conclusion. — THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE IMPIOUS CONSISTS FOR- MALLY IN INTRINSIC AND INHERENT JUSTICE.

This is determined by faith in the Council of Trent, Session 6. Can. 10.: If anyone shall say that me- n without the justice of Christ, whereby He merited for us justification, or through it He Himself formally just, let him be anathema. And Canon 11.: If anyone shall say that men are justified, either by the sole imputative justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, excluding grace and charity, which is poured forth in their hearts through the Holy Spirit, and inheres in them: or also that the grace whereby we are justified is only the favor of God, let him be anathema.

This truth is proved by all those texts of Scripture, in which first it is said that God abides in us. Thus John 14: If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him, and will make our abode with him. 1. Corinthians 3: Know you not, that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?

Secondly, from those in which it is said that man is regenerated and renewed, when he is sanctified. Ephesians 4: Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness. 1. Peter 1: Hath regenerated us unto a living hope: but the term of regene- ration ought to be something real, as also of generation.

Thirdly, from those in which grace is said to be the seed of God remaining in us.

1. John 3: Whosoever is born of God committeth not sin, for his seed abideth in him. Likewise, pledge of inheritance, as Ephesians 1. For all these things signify something created, and really inherent in man justified.

Fourthly, from those in which it is signified that the just have in themselves something, whereby they may be grateful and acceptable to God. Thus John 3: Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be named, and be, the sons of God; knowingly moreover he adds, and be, that he might evidently express that we are named sons of God not by mere external appellation, but truly are so.

— Proof similarly by those same oracles, in which it is clearly taught that grace, and the justice whereby we are just, are something derived into us from the justice of Christ: thus John 1. Of his fulness we all have received grace for grace. Eph. 4. To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the donation of Christ: and by this grace we are said, in Titus, chapter 3, to be renewed in the spirit of our mind: John 1, to be born again as sons of God: in Gal., 2, to be made alive in Christ. Rom. 5, to receive in ourselves the Holy Spirit, in whom we cry Abba, Father:

1. Cor. 6, by whom we are washed and justified. All of which things openly declare that man is justified before God through inherent grace; for to be renewed, born again, and made alive by something is for that thing to exist inwardly; for no one is renewed, born, and lives formally by that life whereby he may be in eternity, nor is anyone formally washed clean by the cleanness of another.

The same assertion is proved by those authorities of the holy Fathers praised in conclusion 1 of the first question of the preceding disputation. Which authorities being now omitted, I will bring forward a single one, Saint Augustine, whom the heretics falsely pretend to favor them: for that holy Doctor declares openly in very many places that we are justified by a justice not which is in God, or in Christ, but which inheres in us: so he speaks especially in book De Spiritu et littera, chapter 9, where, expounding this text of the Apostle, Romans 3, The justice of God was manifested, he says: He does not say the justice of man, or the justice of his own will, but the Justice of God, not that whereby God is just, but that wherewith he clothes man, when he justifies the ungodly. Which he plainly repeats in chapters 11, 18, and 32, where, expounding that passage of Romans 5, The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, he says: Not that whereby he himself loves us, but that whereby he makes us lovers of himself: as the justice of God, whereby by his gift we are made just; and the salvation of the Lord, whereby he makes us saved; and the faith of Jesus Christ, whereby he makes us faithful. This is the justice of God, which he not only teaches by the precept of the law, but also gives by the gift of the Spirit.

Finally it is proved by theological reason: by that same reason are we said to be justified through Christ by which we are defiled through Adam: yet we are not defiled only by the imputation of Adam's sin, but because we truly sinned all in him as in our head, whence it comes about that original sin inheres in each of Adam's posterity and affects them after the manner of a stain: therefore neither are we justified by the imputation of the justice of Christ. The major is evident from that celebrated antithesis which the Apostle instituted in Rom. 5 between the old man and the new, namely Adam and Christ. For as, he says, by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation, so by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life.

The major likewise appears true from what we have said concerning original sin in the fifth volume, wherein we proved that original sin truly inheres in each of Adam's posterity for no other reason than because all sinned in him, as in the head and stock of the whole human nature.

Secondly, no form denominates intrinsically and formally a subject in which it does not inhere. For whiteness, for example, cannot denominate a wall white in which it does not inhere: but that whereby we are said to be just is a form through which we are made formally just, for we are not said to be such only by extrinsic denomination; therefore we receive that appellation from some form inhering in us, and consequently we are not denominated such by that justice which resides in God, or in Christ.

Thirdly, finally, that justice whereby we are formally said to be just is capable of intension and remission, according to that saying of the second of Peter 3, Grow in grace: and of the Apocalypse at the end: He that is just, let him be justified still; which truth indeed we demonstrated openly in the preceding Disputation: but neither the justice of God nor the justice of Christ can admit of more and less: therefore it is necessary that we be justified by a justice inherent in us, which is capable of remission and intension.

They object 1. The heretics bring various texts of Scripture, which they falsely suppose to openly patronize their error. First indeed they produce that passage of Romans 4: But to him that believeth in him, who justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God, that is, his faith is accepted by God, whereby he believes the justice of Christ to pertain to himself, and to be imputed to him through divine mercy: which interpretation seems genuine and most conformable to the mind of the Apostle, who in that chapter eleven times calls justice imputation.

— I deny this to be the mind of the holy Apostle; nay, the contrary appears from the same chapter; for there he proves Abraham to have been justified not from works, but from a living and perfect faith in God, which was reputed, that is, deputed to him unto justice; because against hope he believed in hope, that he might be made the father of many nations: but no one would say that the faith of Abraham, whereby he was justified, was something external; and consequently the Apostle there excludes justification which would come about by the imputation of something external.

I answer 2. I distinguish the antecedent: that faith is reputed to the believer in God unto justice dispositively, I concede: formally, and actually, I deny. I confess indeed that, by means of actual faith, of which the Apostle there speaks, as by a certain disposition, a man can prepare himself unto justice: so that faith itself be deputed to him as a means of obtaining it; and the justice of Christ itself is imputed to him after the manner of a moral and meritorious cause of his justification; but it does not follow thence that anyone is justified by the mere imputation of the justice of Christ apprehended through faith.

They object 2. That passage of Rom. 5: As by the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so by the obedience of one man many are constituted just; therefore also just by the justice of Christ imputed to them. — I answer, the Apostle intends by those words nothing else than that as Adam by his actual disobedience was the meritorious cause that all who should be born of him would contract original sin, so Christ by his obedience was the meritorious cause that all who are brought to him as members to the head, and are born again of him, and adopted as sons of God, become just on account of his merits communicated to them. Wherefore with antecedent words the Apostle said: as by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation, so by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life. In which words the Apostle teaches that by the obedience of one man many are constituted just in the manner in which many are constituted sinners by the disobedience of one man: but when the Apostle says that by the disobedience of one man many are constituted sinners, the sense is not that they are sinners only extrinsically and imputatively, but intrinsically and inherently, especially in the opinion of the Calvinists, who constitute original sin in the rebellion of the flesh and concupiscence: therefore by parity, when many are said to be constituted just by the obedience of one man, the sense is not that they are just only by an imputative justice, but by an internal and inherent one.

They object 3. That passage of 1. Corinth. 1, Christ was made unto us wisdom of God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption, that, as it is written: he that glorieth, may glory in the Lord: therefore there is no other justification and sanctification for us than the very justice of Christ, otherwise it would be lawful to glory from another source than in the Lord. — I distinguish the antecedent: Christ has been made unto us justice and sanctification effectively and meritoriously, because of his fulness we have received, I concede: formally, I deny. For often in Scripture a cause is accustomed to be called by the name of its effect, in which manner of speaking Psal. 26 says: The Lord is my illumination and my salvation; because he is the cause of salvation and of illumination: therefore Christ is said to be our justice and redemption, for the reason that he is the cause of our justice and redemption. Which indeed is evident from the same text, because Christ is said to have been made justice for us just as he is said to have been made wisdom for us: but he is not our wisdom in that sense that we are wise through his formal wisdom imputed to us: therefore neither is he our justice in that sense that his justice is imputed to us.

They object 4. That passage of 2. ad Corinth. 1, God who had not known sin, made sin for us, that we might be made the justice of God in him: whence they argue thus: we are made the justice of God in the same manner in which Christ was made sin; yet Christ was made sin only by the imputation of our sin: therefore we are made the justice of God by the imputation only of the justice of Christ. — I distinguish the major of this argument: we are made the justice of God in the same manner in which Christ was made sin, as to something, I concede: as to all things, I deny. For the comparison does not hold in all respects; but the similitude holds only in this, that Christ was made sin, that is, a victim for our sins, for sin sometimes in Scripture signifies the victim for sin, according to that saying of Osee 1, where of the Priests it is said: They shall eat the sins of my people, that is, the oblations offered for sins: but we are made just through his justice meritoriously and effectively: the dissimilitude indeed lies in this, that Christ was made sin only extrinsically, since truly he could not be a sinner: but we are made just intrinsically, who otherwise could not be.

They object 5. That passage of Ephes. 4, Put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth: but to put on Christ is nothing else than to apply his very justice and merits to ourselves so as to cover our nakedness, that thence we may be reputed just, as Jacob put on the garments of Esau, that he might be reputed the firstborn. — I deny this to be the sense of the Apostle; for to put on Christ is nothing else than to become like unto Christ, and to participate in his grace and virtues, so that we be intrinsically just and holy, as he himself is intrinsically just and holy: for as no one is said to put on the garment of another unless that cloth be applied to his body in a manner suited to it, so do we not truly put on the justice of Christ unless it be applied truly and really to our soul. The truth of which interpretation is proved 1. from the same Apostle: for he says we put on the new man in the same manner in which we put off and strip ourselves of the old man, as he teaches ad Col. 3 in these words: Stripping yourselves of the old man with his acts, and putting on the new, etc. Yet to put off the old man is to lay aside the inward vices and sins with which we were stained and infected: therefore contrariwise, to put on the new is to put on the manners and virtues of Christ opposed to those vices and sins, as the holy Fathers expound, especially Chrysostom in Epist. ad Rom. ad cap. 13. n. 14, Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, where he says thus: To put on Christ is to have all virtue together in universality. And elsewhere he says that it is the same thing as for Christ to be conspicuous in us on every side by holiness and custom: for a clothed man seems to be that which he has put on: let Christ therefore appear in us. And Jerome in cap. 1. ad Ephes., n. 23, on those words: Put ye on the new man, has thus: Whoever therefore can imitate his conversation, and express in himself all his virtues, so as to be meek, as he was meek, and humble of heart: and to lay down his soul for his friends, as he laid it down for his sheep: when struck, let him not answer back; when cursed, let him not curse, but overcome pride by humility: such a one has put on the new man, and can say with the Apostle: I live, now not I: but Christ liveth in me. And similarly other Fathers and Interpreters say that to put on Christ is nothing else than to be adorned with the virtues of Christ, and to be such, both inwardly and also in outward life and profession, that all may acknowledge from it, as from the garment of Christ, that they are his servants: as the servants of magnates are distinguished by a certain kind of garments, or by colors proper and peculiar to them.

They object 6. Those words of the Apostle ad Philip. 3, I have counted all things loss, and do judge them to be dung, that I may gain Christ, and may be found in him, not having my justice, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Jesus Christ. Whence Calvin concludes that one's own justice must be held as guilt by him who wishes to obtain the justice of Christ. — I answer, by these words the justice of mine, which is of the law, is understood to mean the justice of the works of the law, which the Apostle therefore calls his own, because he was destined unto it through circumcision, as were the other Israelites. Thence there is opposed to it the justice which is of faith, which is ours not efficiently, that is, from ourselves, as if from ourselves, but from the gift of God, although it is certain that it is ours subjectively.

They object 1. Saint Ambrose, lib. 1. De Iacob et vita beata, where he explains our justification by the example of Jacob hiding himself in the habit and clothing of his brother: As there, he says, an alien person received the blessing for his own advantage; so we lie hid under the precious purity of Christ our firstborn brother, that we repeat the testimony of justice before the sight of God.

— I answer 1. The aforesaid sentence is not found in that book, and consequently it was lied about and fabricated by the heretics themselves, who cite no chapter even of that book from which that sentence might be taken. I answer 2. That even if Saint Ambrose, or another of the holy Fathers, had uttered these words, nevertheless nothing against our assertion can be evinced from them: for a twofold justice can be distinguished in us: one whereby we are justified formally, and from sinners become just: another whereby we satisfy God for fault and the punishments due on account of it. Now when the holy Fathers say that the justice of Christ imputed to us is represented by Jacob lying hidden under the garments of his brother Esau, that he might receive the blessing of his Father, they speak of a justice not formal, but satisfactory; insofar namely as Christ the Lord, by satisfying for us to his Father, was our surety; so that his justice is applied to us by right of satisfaction, and is accounted in a certain manner ours, while we are reconciled to God formally through grace inhering in us; nor indeed do we satisfy God by our own works, however good, except inasmuch as they rest upon the satisfaction of Christ.

They object 2. Saint Bernard, Sermon 61. on the Canticles, speaking thus: Shall I sing my justices? Lord, I will remember thy justice alone: for it is also mine, namely thou hast been made unto me justice from God. Shall I then fear lest it should not suffice for both of us? It is not a short mantle which according to the Prophet cannot cover two.

— I answer, Saint Bernard calls the justice of Christ his own meritoriously, and not as though he were just by the formal justice of Christ imputed to himself. The solution is evident from the antecedents and consequents: for there S. Bernard teaches that our merit rests upon the merits of Christ the Lord: My merit therefore, he says, is the mercy of the Lord: plainly I am not destitute of merit so long as he be not wanting in mercies: but if the mercies of the Lord are many, therefore I am rich in many merits. And shortly after he subjoins the words set forth in the objection. Hence as according to S. Bernard there the merit of Christ the Lord is not ours formally, but something wholly distinct, yet it is called ours by reason of its effect and advantage, insofar as it redounds to our good, seeing that our merit rests upon it; so also, that all things with him may correspond in S. Bernard, the justice of Christ the Lord is ours, not indeed formally, but in effect; insofar as our formal justice rests upon it, and is some new meritorious effect. And certainly Bernard acknowledged inherent justice in most clear words, when in Sermon 5. on that text: Credidi, etc., he distinguishes a threefold justice: one of God, upright, pure, and firm; a second of the Angels, pure, upright, but not firm, because God found even in his Angels perversity: lastly a third of men after the fall, not pure on account of venial sins committed, not firm, because man can depart from it, but upright.

They object 3. That justice whereby we ought to be pleasing to God must be most perfect, and complete in all its numbers, but above all free from the admixture of any vice whatsoever: but a justice which would be from ourselves, whatever it might be, would always be mixed with vices and would labor under most many defects: for, says Isaias, chapter 64, We are all become as one unclean, and all our justices as the rag of a menstruous woman. Therefore that we may be acceptable to God through justice, we must be covered with the justice of Christ as with a most precious mantle.

— I answer 1. By denying the minor, for from very many contexts of sacred Scripture it is plain that just men, by their own works wrought with the help of grace, are pleasing and acceptable to God, and have found grace in the sight of the Lord; and consequently it is false that men are unpleasing and odious to God by their own justice. I answer 2. That a twofold perfection can be distinguished in justice itself: one essential, the other accidental. The former consists in the very essence of justification, namely in the adherence and information of sanctifying grace, which affects and illumines our soul: the latter consists in its intension, as regards more perfect accidental degrees; but he who has justice according to the former perfection, although he lack great intension of it and other accidental perfections, does not on that account cease to have it formally; as he who has heat in a lesser degree is truly hot, and has nothing of cold. As to the Prophet, ⟦illegible: …⟧ he must be understood either of legal justice, which among the Jews at that time was utterly undermined, or of justice lost through iniquities and the public and manifest crimes of the Jews, whose loss of justice indeed the Prophet mourns: but his sense is not that justices whereby men are truly just contain anything of iniquity.

Note 1. Concerning the resolution of the present Question, the error of the heretics of this time is twofold: for Calvin in lib. 3. Instit. cap. 11. n. 22. teaches that in justification sins are not truly taken away, but covered; not eradicated, but scraped; not blotted out, but covered over, on account of the justice of Christ imputed to us; so that sins are said to be covered, as if they were not seen by God, while he does not punish them: and scraped away, as if they did not appear. Thence, in lib. 4. cap. 15. he says: It is now perspicuous how false is what certain men taught long ago, that by baptism we are loosed and exempted from original sin. The same Luther had asserted, as is evident from the second article among those condemned by Leo X. Their second error is that sin is covered and not imputed in justification in such a way that nothing of punishment ever remains to be paid to God, but the guilt of the whole punishment is abolished together with the fault.

Note 2. A twofold non-imputation and covering of sins can be conceived. First, so that they truly subsist and are only hidden: secondly, so that they are utterly blotted out: just as ulcers of the body, from which this metaphor is taken, can be said to be covered in two ways: first, namely by only hiding them, that they may not appear, in which manner they are covered by the wounded man himself. Secondly, by curing and removing them, in which manner they are cut away by the physician. Which Saint Augustine indeed expressly explains in enarratione 2. in Psal. 31. saying:

God therefore covers the wounds, not thou; for if thou, being ashamed, shalt wish to cover them, the physician will not cure them. Let the physician cover and cure, for he covers with a plaster; under the covering of the physician the wound is healed, under the covering of the wounded man the wound is concealed.

Similarly twofold is non-imputation: one indeed whereby that which is is not imputed: the second truly whereby that which really is not is not imputed. The former covering, and non-imputation, is the figment of the heretics: the latter is the Catholic assertion.

Note 3. So great, and so infinitely perfect, is the sanctity and justice of God, that if any man among mortals, however just, be compared with God, he appears unjust, as the stars and any other heavenly bodies, although shining from elsewhere, are darkened by the presence of the Sun and lie hidden as though wrapped in darkness: not because they truly do not shine, but because their lesser splendor is as it were extinguished and swallowed up by the super-shining light of the sun. Hence the unanimous voice of the just was with Job: Verely I know it is so, and that man cannot be justified compared with God. And in the same place, chapter 4: Shall man be justified in comparison of God, or shall man be more pure than his maker? Behold, they that serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found perversity: how much more they who dwell in houses of clay, who have an earthly foundation, shall be consumed as by a moth? Wherefore the Royal Prophet prayed Psal. 130: Enter not into judgment with thy servant, for in thy sight no man living shall be justified. Yet it does not thence follow, as Calvin wills in lib. 3. Instit. cap. 12., that men, however just, are truly always defiled with sin, nor that there is anyone shining with whatsoever sanctity who is not sullied by the veiled darkness of the crime of his own admission, whereby he would appear deformed and most foul before God, unless he shone and were aspectable through the justice of Christ superinduced upon him as it were a royal and most precious mantle; which error indeed will be refuted

Single Conclusion. — IN THE JUSTIFICATION OF ANY SINNER WHATEVER MORTAL SINS ARE SO REMITTED THAT THEY ARE TRULY BLOTTED OUT AND WASHED AWAY.

This is of faith, determined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, Can. 5. If anyone denies that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in Baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts that everything having the true and proper nature of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only scraped, or not imputed, let him be anathema.

This Catholic truth is proved by all those oracles of sacred Scripture in which it is openly pronounced that God blots out and takes away sins: thus Psal. 50, Blot out my iniquity... blot out all my iniquities. Isaias 43, I am he that blots out thy iniquities for my own sake. Micheae 7, Who is a God like unto thee, who takes away iniquity? Zachariae 3, Behold I have taken away thy iniquity. And further: Behold I will engrave the graving thereof, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will take away the iniquity of that land in one day. — It is proved similarly from those sacred texts which teach that we are cleansed and washed from sins far more perfectly than bodies are washed by natural water and cleansed from filth: thus Psal. 50, Thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop, O Lord, and I shall be cleansed: thou shalt wash me, and I shall be made whiter than snow:

Ezech. 36, I will pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your filthiness. 1. Cor. 6, after the Apostle had recounted the grievous sins of the Gentiles, he subjoins: And such indeed some of you were; but you are washed, but you are sanctified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God. And 1. Ioan. 1, The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanses us from all sin. And further: If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just, to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all iniquity; yet these divine oracles would by no means stand, nor would they have a genuine and true, but a fallacious signification, if the filth of sins were not utterly taken away and washed away in justification: therefore it must be acknowledged that this is so done. — The same truth stands equally evident from those very texts in which the just are called immaculate in the sight of God. Thus Psal. 118, Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord. Ephes. 1, He chose us, that we should be holy and unspotted in his sight. 2. Petri 3, Endeavor to be found before him immaculate and inviolate in peace. To which add that passage of Ephes. 5, Christ loved the Church, and delivered himself up for it, that he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life, that he might present to himself a glorious Church not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing. From these I argue thus: he who is cleansed, washed, and made whiter than snow, does not remain truly filthy, foul, black, and covered with dirt. Similarly he whose iniquities are blotted out, taken away, and cast into the depth of the sea is neither again ⟦illegible: OCR "tirdatur"; fortasse "tingitur"⟧ nor stained. Finally, he who is without spot and without wrinkle must not be said to be infected with the stain and filth of sin. Yet in justification the sinner is cleansed, washed, and made whiter than snow, and his sin is removed, blotted out, and cast forth as far as possible, so that he remains immaculate in the sight of God: therefore the sinner justified is no longer defiled by sins truly subsisting in him.

Proof secondly, from the authority of the holy Fathers: and especially of St. Cyprian, Epistle 2, which is to Donatus, where he calls baptism the death of crimes, the life of virtues; of St. Chrysostom, book 3 On the Priesthood, chapter 6: To purge the leprosy of the body, he says, or to speak more certainly, to show it purged, was permitted to the Priests of the Jews: but to our priests it has been wholly granted not, I say, to prove the leprosy of the body purged, but the stains of the soul to purge. And book 2 On the Compunction of the Heart: The compunction of the heart like fire consumes and destroys every vice of the soul, and whatever stain has crept into the heart it wipes away entirely, and deletes utterly. Hence in Homily 1 on the first Epistle to the Corinthians he compares the man absolved by the King from his crime with the accused who is absolved from his sins by baptism. And he adds that the former still keeps and retains a downcast spirit; but the latter, whom baptism has washed, does not so, but possesses a mind purer than the rays of the sun. — St. Jerome, book 3 against Pelagius, says: What of man? Shall you now be made clean in the laver? and is it said of you: Who is this that goes up washed, leaning upon her kinsman, so that indeed you may be washed, but cannot keep your purity unless you are sustained by the Lord. — Above all others, however, St. Augustine confirms this truth, especially in the books against the Pelagians, who calumniated the Catholic Prelates as if they asserted that Baptism does not give the indulgence of sins, nor take away crimes, so that the roots of all sins may be held in evil flesh. Thus he beats back that calumny in book 1 On the Merits of Sins, chapter 1: Who but an infidel would affirm this against the Pelagians? For we say that baptism gives the indulgence of all sins, and takes away crimes, not shaves them, nor holds the roots of all sins in evil flesh, as if sins were to be cut back like hairs on a shaved head, whence they might grow again: for I have found that they employ even that similitude for their calumny, as though this were our sentiment and our speech. And in book 3 he relates...

Proof finally, by theological reason: if sins were not utterly deleted in the justified, but truly subsisted in them, it would follow that the soul neither truly rises again from sin, nor is perfectly healed by the vivifying and medicinal grace of Christ: but that consequent is openly false, and it militates against those texts of Scripture in which the soul is said through justification to rise again from the death of sin, and to be healed: thus 1 John 5: We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. From Psalm 30: Heal my soul, O Lord, for I have sinned against thee; for he would not rise from death who remained infected with mortal sin, nor would a member be called healthy whose wound were merely covered with a plaster: therefore, etc. It would follow, secondly, that the justified would nowhere enter the heavenly city, nor enter the kingdom of heaven, because there shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven anything defiled; for they ought not to be called clean, but stained, in whom the stain of mortal sin remains; since that stain could not be taken from them before death, in the judgment of the heretics; for it would be taken either by the act of faith which they would then elicit, or by death itself. Not the first, because it would follow that the justified prevented by sudden death are damned through defect of that act of faith, which they could not elicit. Nor can the second be asserted, since death, formally considered, being something natural, is altogether disproportionate to the stain of sin to be deleted. Finally, thirdly, it would follow that the justified still has something whereby he would be hateful to God, and to be condemned to eternal torments: but this is false, because, says the Apostle to the Romans 8: There is nothing of damnation to those who are in Christ Jesus: that is, says the Council of Trent, Session 5, Can. n, they who have been truly buried with Christ in baptism unto death: who have not walked according to the flesh, but putting off the old man, and putting on the new, which was created according to God, have been made innocent, immaculate, pure, harmless, and beloved of God: heirs indeed of God, but coheirs of Christ, so that nothing at all of...

They object, the Heretics. 1. All those texts of Scripture in which sins are said to be covered, and not imputed: thus Psalm 31 and Romans 4: Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered: blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin: where the three terms, to forgive, to cover, and not to impute, are set down to signify the same thing; so that one is explained by another: for sins to be forgiven by God, they say, is nothing else than to be so covered that they do not appear in the sight of God: and to be covered is nothing else than not to be imputed unto punishment and damnation, according to that of Ezekiel 33: If I say to the wicked, thou shalt surely die, and he doth penance for his sin, all his sins which he hath sinned shall not be imputed to him: in which sense the Apostle, 2 Corinthians 5, said: God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, not imputing to them their sins: therefore sins are not truly remitted in justification, but only covered. — I deny the consequence. For there is, as we said in the third Remarkable Point, a twofold covering of sins: one by which they are merely concealed, lest they appear: another by which they are cured, lest they remain. Now the aforesaid texts of Scripture are to be understood of the latter, not of the former. Hence St. Augustine in the preface to the aforesaid Psalm 31: Sins are covered, hidden, abolished: if God covers sins, he would not punish, he would not acknowledge, he chose rather to forgive. And afterwards he adds: Do not understand it so, that the said sins are covered as though there they exist and live, etc. — I answer 2. Gratuitously it is asserted that these words are placed to signify the same thing, and that one is explained by another: for they can be referred to diverse things, and signify distinct effects, of which the first augments the second, and the second the third, so that to forgive signifies only remission as regards fault and eternal punishment: but to cover denotes the abolishing of the memory of past sins, on account of acts of contrary virtues: finally, not to be imputed declares that they are not retained even as regards temporal punishment, but are so expunged and pardoned, that together with the guilt of fault, of the whole temporal...

They object, the Heretics. 2. That word of 1 Peter 4: Charity covereth a multitude of sins: therefore, since charity subsists, sins subsist, which are covered by it. Moreover that word of 1 John 1: if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. Finally these words of the Lord's Prayer: Forgive us our debts. Upon which words St. Epiphanius says: How necessarily, how wholesomely are we admonished that we are sinners, who are compelled to pray for our sins, that while indulgence is asked of God, each should remember his own conscience: lest anyone please himself as though innocent, and hoping more by extolling himself, he is instructed and taught that he sins daily, while daily he is commanded to pray for his sins. Therefore there is none so acceptable, so holy, who is not infected with sins, and consequently sins are not deleted in justification, but covered. — I deny the consequence. And to the first text I say, its sense is not that charity covers the multitude of the sins of him in whom it is: but that charity, whereby we love our neighbor, covers the sins of our neighbor, that is, it brings it about that we dissemble, relieve, and pardon all his sins: but that this is the mind of the Apostle is clear from the preceding words, in which, addressing the faithful, he says: But above all things having continual mutual charity among yourselves. As also from what follows, saying: Using hospitality one towards another without murmuring, every one as he hath received grace ministering the same one towards another: which, as is evident, concern charity to be exercised toward our neighbor. To the second and third I say, those texts are to be understood of venial sins, which we said subsist with sanctifying grace in the Treatise On Grace.

You insist. Venial sins, by concession, subsist with sanctifying grace, nor do they prevent men from being just in any true and real sense, since surely such sins are not imputed to them; why therefore may not the same be said of graver sins, which we call mortal? — I answer, that the disparity is very great, in that venial sin is a very slight and imperfect stain, and in moral matters little is reckoned as nothing: hence it is no wonder that notwithstanding it, the just, who at times fall into it, are said still to be immaculate, that is, pure from grave stain, which alone is wont simply and absolutely to be called stain in the common manner of speaking, just as mortal sin alone is most frequently called absolutely sin in Scripture, as Romans 6: The wages of sin is death. James 1: Concupiscence, when it hath conceived, begetteth sin: but sin, when it is completed, begetteth death. Ezekiel 18: The soul that sinneth, the same shall die. Nor is it a wonder if notwithstanding venial sin they are named just: because venial sin, being a light offense, does not dissolve friendship with God, nor deprive one of his grace, and the infused habits of virtue, whereby the just is formally constituted, that is, pleasing to God, and habitually furnished to act well supernaturally in every kind of virtue. But the same cannot be said of mortal sin; for he is no less stained who is truly infected with some grave mortal sin, although it be not imputed in the Calvinist sense, that is, only covered and dissembled. Nor is he less unjust, both by actual injustice, because he sins equally, and also by habitual, because he equally merits to be deprived of the grace of God and the infused virtues, and is in fact deprived of them by God as judge, who established this general law, Ezekiel 18: The soul that sinneth, the same shall die. And verse 26: When the just man turneth himself away from his justice, and committeth iniquity, he shall die,

They object 4. In the justified man concupiscence always remains: but that is sin: therefore this subsists with sanctifying grace. — I answer, that concupiscence can be distinguished threefold, of which the first is the inclination to sin, which, although it is not formally sin, is nevertheless called by this name in the scriptures, because it is from sin, and inclines to sin, as the Council of Trent teaches, Session 5, Canon 5. The second is the inordinate motion, which anticipates reason and as it were casts over it the shadows of sin, that it may the more easily entice the will to sin, reason not resisting with its dictate. The third finally is the inordinate and free motion, whereby the will, agitated by the allurements and goads of concupiscence, gives assent to the forbidden thing. Concupiscence taken in the first and second manner can remain in a just man, seeing that it is not formally sin, but only entices to it; otherwise however of concupiscence taken in the third manner, especially when the forbidden thing, to which the will gives consent, is of great weight, such that that consent has the character of mortal sin.

They object 5. No one, however just, is exempted from sin unless he perfectly fulfills the precept of charity; for he who loves not remains in death: but from St. Augustine, book On the Perfection of Justice, chapter 8, the precept of charity is not perfectly fulfilled except in future glory: therefore every just man in this life is always vitiated by some sin. — I distinguish the minor: that precept shall not be fulfilled perfectly, that is, appreciatively:

I deny: that is, intensively, namely with that intensity and perfection wherewith God ought to be loved by a creature. I concede the minor, and deny the consequence. For although in this mortal life we are bound to love God with the whole soul, with the whole heart, and with all our strength; yet we are not bound to execute it according to every kind of intensity and perfection wherewith that love can be exercised by creatures according to their state; for it is certain, proportion preserved, that the virtue of the blessed is far more excellent than that of wayfarers. But by the force of that precept we are only bound to love God appreciatively, in such wise that we esteem him above all other lovable objects whatsoever: which certainly every just man fulfills, while he perseveres in justice and in the observance of the divine commandments.

NOTE 1. That a twofold opposition of things is distinguished by Theologians: one indeed physical; the other truly moral and demeritorious. The prior is that which intervenes between natural positive physical entities fighting against each other, as between heat and cold, white and black. The other is found between extremes set apart from themselves, not by reason of physical entities, but by reason of dignity and indignity, or by reason of a superior ordination willing either extreme to subsist or to be preserved. Hence the controversy, whether grace and sin are opposed physically, and so exclude one another, whether positively, as cold heat, or at least privatively, as light darkness and darkness light: or only morally, and by ordination of God. The prior part is defended by Cajetan, 1.2 q. 93, and Vasquez, disp. 201, whom not a few Recentiores follow: but the latter part is defended, with the Subtle Doctor, by all the more illustrious Theologians.

NOTE 2. That although it be found and certain among Theologians that sanctifying grace and sin, according to the ordinary disposition of things and the usual ordination of divine providence, nowhere subsist together, yet among them there is no agreement whether, according to the extraordinary power of God and beyond the established laws, these opposite extremes can stand together in such wise that not only an actual sin, or a sinful act, can be elicited by a just man without on that account losing the justice which God has preserved by extraordinary virtue, but also that guilt of fault, or stain of sin remaining in the sinner after the act elicited, can subsist with that heavenly and divine quality of justifying grace. The negative part some Ancients and Recentiores defend; but the affirmative very many, with the Subtle Doctor, champion.

NOTE 3. Or rather to be recalled from the fifth volume, Treatise On Sins: that mortal sin remaining habitually is not merely the privation of grace taken away on account of sin, but is the very actual sin remaining morally, until it be remitted by God or deleted by condign satisfaction: just as among men offenses and injuries subsist morally until they are pardoned through grace, or extinguished through equal satisfaction or payment. Hence it comes about that the remission of sin is not precisely the infusion of grace, but, as the Doctor teaches in 1 dist. 16, question 2, that remission of sin and infusion of grace are truly two mutations, if not real, at least moral, as we demonstrated more fully within. Wherefore it does not absolutely follow that upon the infusion of grace the remission of sin ought necessarily to follow, as will appear within. Three things therefore principally come to be solved in this Question: First indeed, whether sin and grace expel one another physically and naturally: or only morally, and by divine ordination. Second, whether in the ordinary way they can subsist together, at least for some instant of time. Finally third, whether by the extraordinary ordination of God sin, both actual and habitual, can remain with sanctifying grace.

First Conclusion. — SANCTIFYING GRACE AND MORTAL SIN ARE NOT OPPOSED TO ONE ANOTHER NOR DO THEY EXPEL ONE ANOTHER PHYSICALLY, BUT ONLY MORALLY: AND THE SAME NOT FROM THE NATURE OF THE THING, BUT BY THAT DIVINE ORDINATION. This Conclusion consists chiefly of two parts: of which the first is that of the Doctor in 8 d. n ⟦illegible⟧ where he proves that hatred of neighbor does not fight with charity from the nature of the thing, nor destroy it naturally, but only demeritoriously: For the transgression of the precept, he says, does not corrupt the positive habit, nor the act of loving God: but merits that God withdraw himself, and thus neither habit nor act can inhere. The same must be said of sin with respect to grace, which is really distinct from charity, proved above from the Doctor himself. Which moreover he openly teaches in 1 d. 1 n. 33, where he says that grace and the infused virtues in us are corrupted by some act of ours, not as if by a nature of repugnance, but only by a demeritorious cause; for the soul sinning merits that grace not be conserved in it. And thus in the second instant of nature, on account of such a demerit as it were preceding, God does not conserve grace, and thus it is annihilated.

This truth is proved: physical opposition is either relative, between relations fighting diametrically against one another, or contrary, or contradictory, or privative: but in none of these modes do sin and sanctifying grace fight against one another: therefore they are not opposed to one another, nor do they expel one another physically. The major is certain. The minor likewise easily appears: For first it appears that grace and sin do not fight against one another, neither contrarily nor relatively: for these oppositions intervene only between positive forms in the same subject incompatible with respect to the same, as heat and cold in the same subject, paternity and filiation on the same foundation with respect to the same term: but sin is not something positive, as we have abundantly proved in the Disputation On Sins: consequently it does not militate with those oppositions against sanctifying grace. — Nor do they fight contradictorily: for this opposition intervenes only between being and non-being universally taken: but grace and sin do not have this general latitude of being and non-being: indeed they are within determined and special enclosures of being and special non-being. Finally they do not fight privatively: for sin is not formally the privation of sanctifying grace itself, but of rectitude and conformity, which ought to inhere in the sinful act. This reason will be confirmed from what is said below, and those things which are wont to be objected against this truth will at the same time be solved.

The second part is likewise that of the same Doctor in l. c. dist. 16 num. 18, where he says, that grace and sin are not opposed immediately simply from the nature of the extremes, but from divine institution: and the induction of one to the motion of the other does not follow except in opposites immediate in themselves: but whether the expulsion of fault follows upon grace is doubtful, since they are not formally opposed: which truth he proves thus ibidem num. ⟦illegible⟧.

In those things which are formally opposed to one another, the effective and productive cause of one of the opposites is destructive of the other: for an agent producing heat, e.g., destroys cold, and a form induced into a subject removes the privation of that same form from it: but the effective cause of sin is not destructive of grace; for the created will alone is the effective cause of sin, because from it are the fault and the depraved sinful act and the guilt: yet it cannot destroy grace, because grace is not destroyed unless annihilated: but a creature cannot annihilate anything physically, any more than create, especially by ordinary power, as all confess: therefore grace and sin do not fight formally from the nature of the thing, but only from the disposition and ordination of God.

Secondly. the donation of grace and the expulsion of sin are two distinct benefits, granted gratuitously by God: therefore one does not import the necessary consecution or presence of the other. The antecedent is clear from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 1, saying that justification is not the mere remission of sins, but also sanctification and renovation of the interior man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts. The same truth St. Augustine teaches tract. 72 on John, where he says: Let him judge who can, whether it be greater to create just Angels than to justify impious men: certainly if the power is equal on both sides, this belongs to greater mercy. There he expressly says that the expulsion of sin is a benefit distinct from the infusion of grace itself, which was granted to the Angels in their creation, as we taught with him in the treatise On the Angels. Therefore it is one thing to infuse grace, another to remit sin, and both are the gratuitous benefit of God; consequently he can confer one apart from the other: and consequently one does not naturally and necessarily follow upon the position of the other. It will appear more evidently, and moreover this truth will be confirmed, from what is said below.

You will say. If the infusion of grace did not import necessarily the remission of sin, and this were a certain benefit consequent upon it, it would follow that the application of the merits of Christ would be made not only in the infusion itself ⟦illegible: locus interruptus⟧ of our Lord Jesus Christ he communicates: yet this is done in this justification of the impious, when by the merit of his most holy Passion the charity of God is diffused through the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them: whence in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused at once through Jesus Christ, in whom he is ingrafted by faith, hope, and charity. By which words he signifies that there is one formal cause of justification, whereby there is not only the interior renovation of man, but also the remission of sins. The instance against the major is clear; for if the remission of sins does not necessarily and naturally follow upon the infusion of grace, it will be necessary that the merits of Christ applied in the very application of grace be applied anew, that in view of them the greatest gift, namely the remission of sins, may follow. — I answer, denying ⟦illegible⟧ major: for although the infusion of grace and the remission of sins is a twofold benefit, one of which does not naturally follow from the other, hence it is not consequent that the very application of the merits of Christ also ought to be twofold; for it suffices for that, that the merits of Christ be applied once through the infusion of grace, that they may avail equally for the remission of sins, which upon the infusion of sanctifying grace follows infallibly, in the ordinary way, according to the divine decree, not indeed physically and from the nature of the thing, but only morally and by divine ordination.

You will say 2°. Sin is a habitual aversion from God; but grace a habitual conversion to God: but aversion and conversion are opposed from the nature of the thing: therefore setting aside any ordination of God, sin and grace are opposed. — I distinguish the minor: aversion and conversion of the same character, and within the same line, are opposed to one another, I concede: otherwise, I deny: whence the consequence is denied. For aversion from God through sin is something moral and in the genus of morals: but conversion to God through grace is something physical and in the genus of being; whence one is not opposed to the other from the nature of the thing. To these add, that grace from the nature of the thing and by force of natural entity has not precisely that it be formally a conversion to God, but only by the ordination of God producing and ordaining such a quality, that it be the medium of the conversion of the soul to him, and the motive of its love toward him.

You will say 3°. While the sinner is justified, two formal effects occur, namely the renovation of his interior, and the remission and pardon of sin: but those two effects either proceed from one and the same form, or from two. If from one, that form is either intrinsic, namely grace, or extrinsic, namely the simple and gratuitous pardon and external favor of God merciful. If they proceed from grace; therefore grace expels sin from the nature of the thing and formally, and consequently the expulsion of sin naturally follows upon the infusion of grace. If from external favor, it is consequent that we are not justified by inhering grace, the contrary of which appears from the preceding Question. But if those two effects proceed formally from two causes, of which one be pure internal sanctifying grace, and the other truly the external favor of God, it follows that there is a twofold formal cause of our justification, the contrary of which appears from the Council of Trent praised above: it follows also that we are justified partly by something internal, partly by something external, whose falsity likewise is clear from what has been said. — I answer, that those two formal effects proceed from grace alone, not indeed from the nature of the thing, but only by divine ordination, for that external favor, that is, the mercy and goodness of God, is only the efficient cause, not truly the formal cause, of justification.

Second Conclusion. — GRACE AND MORTAL SIN CANNOT SUBSIST TOGETHER IN THE ORDINARY WAY FOR ANY INSTANT. Thus the Doctor in 2 dist. 5 question 1 n. 6, and in ⟦illegible: dist./q. reference garbled in OCR ("in t. dist. t. q.5.")⟧ where, responding to the third argument, he says that baptism expels every sin, not because in the same instant grace and sin inhere, etc. It is gathered from St. Augustine, book 3 On Free Will, chapter 15, where he says:

Lest for a point of time the beauty (namely of grace) be defiled, so that there should be ⟦perrati?⟧ disgrace in it.

Proof first. According to the law and providence established by God, habitual charity is infused into no one unless he be perfectly united to Christ, and a living member of him be elicited: but from the Council of Trent, Session VI, Canon 7, There is nothing of damnation in those who are truly partakers with Christ, nor can anyone be a living member of Christ and at the same time dead through sin. Moreover from 1 John IV, He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him. But no one can abide in God even for an instant, and at the same time for an instant be alienated from him through mortal sin: therefore grace and sin cannot be together.

Finally, grace expels sin demeritoriously: but there is no repugnance that in the same instant in which man merits punishment the same be inflicted: therefore in the same instant in which man sins grace is expelled, and consequently they do not subsist together even for an instant. The minor proves from a similar case. For while someone disposes himself lastly toward grace through confession, he merits de congruo grace, which is conferred upon him in the same instant of time: similarly the increase of grace is given in the same instant of time in which he merits by a more intense act of charity: therefore similarly the expulsion of grace, which is the punishment of sin, is caused in the same instant of time in which one sins.

You will say 1. The subtraction of grace is a punishment inflicted on account of the demerit of sin: therefore it behooves that sin first be consummated before grace be expelled; and consequently grace and sin are together for some instant of time. — I deny the consequence: for sin is consummated prior by priority, duitaxat of nature, but not by priority of time, than the expulsion of grace: just as the privation of a physical form ceases from a subject by priority of nature before a form is induced, but not by priority of time: otherwise for some instant of time the subject would exist stripped of every form.

You will say 2. Doctor Subtilis in 4. dist. 17|ordinatio:liber.4/distinctio.17. question 2. n. 13. says that in that instant in which sin is deleted, charity inheres: therefore he judges that sin and charity, which is really the same as sanctifying grace, can exist together for some instant. — I deny the consequence: for the Doctor indeed affirms, that the deletion of sin and grace are together, but not that sin and grace exist together.

You will urge. Actual remission of sin connotes actual sin existing: but by concession grace and the remission of actual sin can be together: therefore also sin and grace can subsist together. — I distinguish the major: actual remission of sin connotes actual sin which exists: I deny: that it ceases: I concede: just as equally illumination connotes darknesses not existing, but ceasing.

Third Conclusion. — BY THE EXTRAORDINARY POWER OF GOD SANCTIFYING GRACE AND MORTAL SIN NOT ONLY HABITUAL BUT ALSO ACTUAL CAN EXIST TOGETHER IN THE SAME SUBJECT.

Thus the Doctor in 4. dist. 16. question 2. with whom subscribe Ockam, q. 3. art. 1. Mayronius, in 2. dist. 21. Gabriel, in 1. dist. 11. Bellarmine, book 2 On Justification, chapter 16. Suarez book 4 On Grace. chapter 11, and the whole chapter 20, and the more celebrated five Recentiores.

And it is proved first: God, by His absolute power, can bring about whatever does not imply a contradiction and some manifest opposition: but no evident contradiction appears why sin and grace should not coexist simultaneously in the same subject: therefore by the absolute power of God this can be done. The major is self-evident. The minor is proved: first, because habitual grace and sin, as we said, are not opposed to one another — not contradictorily, since they do not clash like being and non-being; nor contrarily, since sin is not something positive; nor relatively, since relations are something positive, of which kind sin is not; nor even privatively, since sin does not consist formally in the physical privation of habitual grace, but in the privation of actual rectitude: therefore sin and grace do not conflict with each other by any opposition: and consequently God can preserve both at once in the same subject, such that He may not remit the sin of the one to whom He bestows sanctifying grace.

Second: habitual and sanctifying grace, since it can be produced physically by God alone, can also be destroyed by Him alone physically, and its conservation suspended: but given sin there is nothing that physically compels God to destroy grace and to suspend His conserving concurrence with it, just as, heat having been produced in water, God is not compelled to destroy and take away from it ⟦leg. ignem? raw: trigus⟧: therefore just as God can preserve heat and ⟦leg. ignem? raw: irigus⟧ in the same subject, by equal reason He will be able, by His absolute power, to preserve sanctifying grace together with sin in the same will.

Third: the formal effect of grace is to constitute man specially lovable to God and loved; but the formal effect of sin is to constitute the subject averse from God and converted to creatures: yet these two do not conflict simultaneously, for loving another and not being loved in return, or even being offended by him, do not imply a contradiction, as appears in human affairs; for the father most often pursues the son with love by whom he is not only not loved with reciprocal love, nay, is offended by disobedience and reluctance of spirit.

It is confirmed: if man, created in the pure state of nature, were to sin, God could refrain from annihilating him at once, but could preserve him in his natural being: yet by preserving him thus it would follow that He loved him with natural love: therefore God can preserve a man who does not love Him, nay, who is averse to Him. Therefore by similar reasoning, if man in the state of grace were to sin, God could preserve grace in him, and so, preserving him, love him with supernatural love: for as loving a person on account of the goodness of his nature, and hating his action, do not conflict with each other, so neither will loving a person on account of habitual grace, while at the same time having hatred of his depraved action, involve a contradiction.

You will object. 1. There cannot be at once mortal actual sin with the actual love of God above all things: therefore neither can habitual grace or charity and actual or habitual sin coexist.

I answer. With the antecedent granted, I deny the consequence: for it is one thing that two contrary vital acts including a contradiction in their objects cannot exist simultaneously, even by absolute power, because one destroys the object of the other, as assent and dissent concerning the same thing, or assent concerning contradictorily opposed objects: but the love of God above all things and actual mortal sin are of this kind: for the love of God above all things includes formally, or at least virtually, an efficacious displeasure at every mortal sin, and a nolition of it together with an absolute will and purpose of not sinning; with such purpose and nolition actual sin manifestly conflicts, because it is not committed without an actual will contrary to that purpose. It is otherwise, however, with habitual grace and mortal actual or habitual sin: because mortal sin does not consist formally in the physical absence of the habit of grace or charity, but in the privation of rectitude, with which remaining habitually, or even actually, it does not conflict for the habit of grace or charity to be preserved: for although the habit of grace by its nature demands morally that it not be preserved in a subject so perversely disposed and unworthy, this nevertheless does not import an absolute necessity on God's part of not preserving grace: for God can act according to the moral, and also the natural exigency of a created form, and preserve those things which would otherwise destroy themselves.

You will object. 2. It implies someone being at once just and unjust, pleasing and odious to God, worthy of His glory and at the same time unworthy, and doomed to eternal death and damnation: whereas by sanctifying grace man has that he be just, and pleasing to God, and worthy of eternal life; but by sin, that he be unjust, odious to God, and doomed to eternal death: therefore it implies someone having sin and grace at once.

Distinguo. I distinguish the minor: he who is in grace is just, pleasing to God, and worthy of eternal life, physically and from the nature of the thing, I deny: morally, from good pleasure, and from the ordination of God, I grant. Hence the consequentia must be denied: for this grace does not hold in justified man by its native virtue, but only by divine ordination, as we said: whereupon, notwithstanding this moral disposition and ordination, God could preserve grace physically together with sin. Hence add that being pleasing and odious to God, and what must be said of the others, are not effects of contradictories, but only of contraries, arising from distinct foundations. Hence as contraries can be preserved divinely: so, notwithstanding morally opposite effects, the principles from which they arise can subsist together: for one and the same man, by reason of a diverse principle, can be worthy and unworthy of the same thing: thus the son of a king, by right of birth and primogeniture, is worthy of the royal crown and kingdom; which however, on account of crimes, or conspiracy against his Father, he is judged unworthy; so likewise a man who would be created in pure naturals would, by virtue of his nature, be worthy of some natural beatitude, which however he could become unworthy of morally and demeritoriously on account of sin.

You will object. 3. By mortal sin man is habitually averse from God; by grace, however, habitually converted to Him: but the same cannot at once be converted and averse with respect to the same, just as neither can he be ⟦leg.? raw: unieus⟧ and distinct: therefore neither can anyone have sin and grace at once.

Distinguo maiorem. By mortal sin man is averse from God, and by grace converted wholly and totally, I deny: in a certain respect, I grant. For sin is not an aversion wholly and totally from God, but only in a certain respect, namely by way of offense and injury of one remaining habitual, until it be remitted by God. Likewise sanctifying grace and charity are not a conversion of every kind excluding all aversion whatsoever, but only that which would come about through hatred of God: whence it also tolerates vicious habits opposed to the love of and conversion to God: and consequently grace does not necessarily and absolutely exclude sin.

You will object. 4. God cannot at once hate and love the same man: but He hates the one having sin, and loves the one having grace: therefore the same man cannot have both.

Distinguo maiorem. With respect to the same thing, by reason of one and the same motive, I grant: by reason of a diverse one, I deny. For God both hates and loves all sinners; He hates indeed insofar as they oppose Him, but He loves them because they are the works of His hands: For you love all things that are, and hate nothing of the things which you have made. Wis. 2. Hence it does not conflict that the same thing, by diverse reason, be lovable in one respect, and odiable in another.

You will object. 5. If grace could subsist with sin, it would follow that the expulsion of sin is not the formal effect of grace, and while God should cease to will to preserve grace together with sin, then sin would not be driven out by grace, but by the mere will of God: but the consequent is against the common opinion of Theologians: therefore also that from which it follows.

I deny the sequel of the major. For since the expulsion of sin is only a secondary effect of grace, it does not follow that if it be impeded by God, it is on that account judged to be destroyed: just as by similar reasoning the expulsion of fire would no less be the formal effect of heat, although for a time it might be suspended by the absolute power of God, so that fire together with heat might be preserved in the same subject. Nor does it follow either, that when ⟦garbled in scan: raw "darium, quem antea suspendebat"⟧

You will object. 6. When God cannot preserve both opposite forms, e.g. sin and grace, there is no need of a special will of God to remove one of them, but it suffices that the opposite form be induced: as, because God cannot preserve at once in the same column the denominations of right and left with respect to one and the same animal, therefore, the denomination of right being posited, the denomination of left is excluded without any other special will of God: therefore because God cannot preserve grace and sin by the ordinary way, it will suffice that grace be granted to the soul, so that sin may depart from it.

I answer. The antecedent is ⟦leg. verum? raw: rerum⟧ when forms are opposed by the nature of the thing and repugnant, such as right and left; but otherwise if they are opposed only demeritoriously and morally, as sin and grace.

You will object lastly, citing the Subtle Doctor in 2 dist. 37 n. ⟦?⟧ saying that privation of grace is not sin except insofar as it is of justice owed. He judges, then, that sin is a privation of owed grace: but a form and the privation of a form cannot exist at once even by absolute power: therefore neither grace and sin.

I answer. Therefore the Doctor calls sin a privation of justice, because this privation is the effect of sin: but an effect is often called by the name of its cause, for which reason St. Paul calls concupiscence sin, not because it is such formally, as we have said several times already, but because it is from sin and leads into sin. Add that the Subtle Doctor does not prove this absolutely, but by supposition; for he adds afterward: that (namely grace) the will deprived itself of demeritoriously.

Note 1. That since the justification of the sinner is a passage from the state of sin to the state of grace, and from the condition of a man odious to God to that of one loved, it is necessary that that passage be conceived as a motion from the term whence to the term whither, namely from sin, which is cast off and forsaken, to sanctifying grace, which is acquired and received: no otherwise than in natural generation there is made a motion from the privation of a form to the form itself. Thence the question is raised among Theologians, whether that casting off of sin and acquisition of grace are only one single thing, or rather a twofold mutation essentially distinct, each of which is truly real.

Note 2. That since it belongs to God alone by plenary and absolute authority to remit and absolve sin, and He has the supreme and full right thereto, and since a twofold remission of sin is customarily conceived and distinguished — one indeed by simple condonation, whereby the offended person freely and out of pure clemency remits the fault of the offender: the other by due satisfaction, whereby the guilty party, having merited punishment, satisfies exactly by enduring penalties the person offended according to the prescriptions of the law; so that a Judge could pronounce with equity that the guilty party has been absolved from all debt and guilt; hence it is disputed among Theologians whether God can, by full right, freely and out of pure clemency remit sin, not only without any satisfaction on the part of the sinner, but especially without the infusion of any sanctifying grace, and by mere external condonation alone.

Note 3. Sin can be thought to be remitted by external condonation alone, and without any condonation of grace, in three ways: namely first through supernatural acts as intermediary, in view of which God remits sin, as it were on account of dispositions fitting for remission and sufficient by divine ordination: second, speaking absolutely, and without any preceding supernatural act on the part of the sinner, but only by reason of certain purely natural acts, for instance natural penance, in view of which God, by His plenary authority, being content with such penance, although disproportionate to the remission of sin, would nevertheless will to condone and remit that sin: thirdly, finally, such remission can be thought to come about without any act of the sinner, whether natural or supernatural, and even without any physical mutation of the sinner himself.

Two points therefore come up for discussion in the present Question: First, whether the remission of sin and the infusion of grace are two mutations essentially distinct: Second, whether sin can be remitted by mere external and gratuitous condonation without any infusion of grace.

First Conclusion. — THE REMISSION OF SIN AND THE INFUSION OF GRACE ARE TWO MUTATIONS ESSENTIALLY DISTINCT. So the Doctor in I dist. 16 q. 2, to whom Suarez subscribes lib. T cap. 11, and also many other Moderns.

It is proved first from Concil. Trident., Sess. 6 cap. 7, where it says:

Iu> stification is not the sole remission of sins, but is renewal. And below: In justification itself, together with what is infused, man receives. Which enumerates as two distinct things the remission of sins and renewal: let that conjunction be noted, and. The same holds in St. Chrysostom, Homily 20 on Genesis, saying: Through contrition God not only bestows the cure of wounds, and shows men cleansed from sins, but also makes just him who is weighed down by innumerable burdens of sins. By which words two mutations are signified, no otherwise than when we say: through calefaction not only is heat produced, but cold is also expelled; which mode of speaking we certainly do not use when speech concerns a single and simple mutation: for we do not say that through illumination not only is light produced, but darkness is also driven away; for the diffusion of light is the very repulsion of the darkness itself. — The Council of Noguntinum, last, chapter i, also favors this, where treating of justification it says: Which justification, together with the remission of sins, confers also sanctification and the renewal of the interior man.

The Doctor proves the Conclusion at the place cited above num. 1 by four reasons: First indeed: one and the same simply cannot be multiplied and not multiplied, otherwise it would be one and not one: if the remission of sin is multiplied; but the infusion of grace is not multiplied; for there are more remissions of sins, for in that manner in which anyone is called a sinner through a transitory act of sin, so manifoldly is he called a sinner on account of many faults, when he committed them, each of which ought to have its own proper remission, inasmuch as one remission can exist along with another, for instance if the sinner had committed one sin and not another: but the infusion of grace is single, for it is not necessary that several sanctifying graces be infused in order that the sinner be justified. Nay it would even be superfluous, because through the infusion of only one grace the sinner is sufficiently justified: therefore the infusion of grace and the remission of sin are not only a single mutation. — Second, the same is not separated from itself: but the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt can be separated from each other: therefore they are two distinct mutations. The Doctor proves the minor: both because, as we shall say in the following Conclusion, a remission can take place by external condonation without any infusion of grace; and thus this remission can be separated from the infusion of grace: and because in fact God conferred grace upon the first parents without any remission of their preceding sin: therefore the infusion of grace and the remission of sin can exist separately, and consequently they are not one and the same. — Third, guilt and grace are not formally opposed, nor formally repugnant from the nature of the thing: otherwise the created will, which is the effectiva of sin and guilt, would also be effectively destructive of grace; for the productive cause of one of two formally opposed things is destructive of the other, seeing that fire, which produces heat in a subject, removes cold from it: but it is false that the created will could effectively destroy grace, otherwise it could annihilate it by natural and proper virtue: for as grace is not produced except by creation, so it can cease only by annihilation: but those things which are not formally opposed can exist without each other, nor does one necessarily infer the position of the other: therefore the infusion of grace and the remission of sin do not follow upon one another necessarily; and consequently they are not wrought by a single simple mutation. — Fourthly, finally: a mutation is not toward some positive form unless from that which is formally its privation: but sin, as we said, is not formally the privation of sanctifying grace; for a single form has only a single privation: but sin can be multiplied in the sinner who has already lost grace through the first sin, and therefore sin is not formally the privation of grace.

You will say 1°. Concil. Trident., Sess. 6 cap. 3 says justification is a translation from the state of sin to the state of grace. And chapter 7: Man, it says, through the grace received and gifts becomes from unjust just, and from enemy friend: therefore it judges that immediately and without a new mutation sin is formally remitted through the infusion of grace; and consequently that in the justification of the sinner there is only a single mutation. —

I deny the consequence, and to the antecedent I say that the Council says only that in the justification of the sinner there takes place a true motion from a contrary into a contrary term; so that there is an expulsion of sin and an introduction of grace; but the Council does not intend that that motion be only single and simple, but composed of a twofold motion, such as is found in the production of heat and the expulsion of cold, where there are two motions essentially distinct: one from the non-being of heat to its being; the other truly from the being of cold in the subject to its non-being.

You will say 2°. If a twofold mutation intervene in the justification of the sinner, it is necessary that a twofold form intervene; for a twofold formal effect is found, namely the renewal of man and the expulsion of sin: but that seems to be against the mind of the Council of Trent affirming that we are cleansed from sin and renewed by the same grace: therefore there cannot be a twofold mutation. —

I deny the sequel of the major; for although in the justification of a sinner there is a twofold effect, yet these can proceed from a single form: thus by one heat the subject is made hot and free from cold, and immediately thereafter it is not necessary that, although the change be twofold, a twofold form should also intervene.

You ask 1°. Whether those changes are real? — The Doctor answers in the same place, num. 64, that the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt are not two real changes; since the remission of guilt, as it is not unto any positive form, nor does it necessarily take away anything real and positive, cannot be a real and positive change: for it is not a real change except unto a really positive term or a real privation: therefore there is only one real change, namely the infusion of grace, because it is unto a real form: but the other is moral, which for that reason the Doctor calls in the same place a change of reason, because it is not unto any real term.

You ask 2°. Which of these changes does God intend more especially? — The Doctor answers in 1. dist. 1. quaest. 6., that God intends the infusion of grace more especially: For, he says at num. 9, an agent acting according to right reason principally intends perfection rather than the absence of defect or imperfection, because he intends that absence only on account of perfection: therefore God more principally intends positive perfection, namely the infusion of grace, than the absence of imperfection, namely the remission of sin.

You will say. From the first Epistle of John, cap. 5: For this purpose the Son of God appeared, that he might destroy the works of the devil: but the destruction of the works of the devil is nothing other than the remission of sin: therefore this is especially intended by God. Moreover St. Augustine lib. 22. De Civit. Dei, c. 27 says: Our justification consists rather in the remission of sins than in the pursuit of virtues: therefore the chief change is the remission of sins. Finally, grace is not infused except that sin be expelled: therefore such expulsion is first intended. —

I deny all these consequences, and to the first antecedent I say that Christ the Lord came chiefly for this end, that He might bestow upon us the life of grace, according to that word of John 10: I came that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly: which communication of celestial and divine life, since it is incompatible with sin, Christ is consequently reckoned to have come that He might undo sin. —

To the second I say that St. Augustine does not compare the infusion of grace with the expulsion of sin; but he only means that our justice, being frail and precipitate, and not persevering long — since man often rises again and again falls — hence it comes about that the state of sin seems of longer duration and more persevering than the state of grace and justice. —

To the third I say that indeed grace was intended that sin might be remitted, but not that the remission of sin is the primary effect of its infusion, but only secondary, and consequently it is not intended first, but only secondarily.

Second conclusion. — SIN CAN BE REMITTED BY THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD THROUGH THE MERE EXTRINSIC AND MERITORIOUS CONDONATION OF GOD.

So holds the Subtle Doctor in many places, especially in 1. dist. 16. quaest. 2. num. 1., where he says: Guilt can be remitted without the infusion of grace. For God can by His absolute power create man in pure natural state without guilt and without grace: therefore He can likewise repair him after the fall, and so remit guilt without the infusion of grace. The same is held by the Seraphic Doctor in 1. dist. ⟦illegible: dist. number illegible⟧ art. 1. quaest. 7., Ocham in the same place on 1. q. 3. art. 1., and the more celebrated of the Ancients. Among the Recentiors indeed Suarez lib. 7. De gratia, cap. 23.; Silvius l. 2. quaest. 113.; Martinezius disput. 11. q. 7.; and many others.

And it is proved first: the divine will is of no less power than the human: but a human will can remit an offense by mere and simple condonation and release: therefore much more can the divine accomplish this. —

It is confirmed, because God can release a vow without any production whatsoever of a quality in him to whom it is released, and solely by the extrinsic condonation of the vow: therefore by equal reason He can remit the offense. —

Nor does it matter that this release must be made known through revelation; otherwise the one vowing would not know that he was absolved, etc. For we shall say that it belongs only per accidens to the release of a vow that one knows himself to be absolved; for if then a man is held to fulfill the vow, this happens not by reason of the obligation of the vow, but by reason of an erroneous conscience, by which he judges the vow to bind, when in truth it does not bind: as he who fasts on Sunday thinking it to be a day of sacred fasting is bound to fasting not per se but per accidens, on account of an erroneous conscience: therefore truly a vow can be released even though that release and relaxation be not made known. —

Next, habitual grace is an effect of the divine will, whereby God freely loves man: therefore even with grace excluded God can love man: but in that case man so loved by God will not be in sin. For God hates sinners: therefore sin can be taken away without the conferral of grace. —

Finally, sin and grace are not immediate opposites: therefore one can be removed without the introduction of the other. The consequence is evident: for things which are not immediate opposites have some medium, and consequently the subject can exist without both. The antecedent likewise stands from the aforesaid reason of the Doctor; for God could from the beginning create man without sin and grace, and establish him in the purely natural state: but He can restore that same state after he has sinned: for such as He could create him from the beginning, such can He by His absolute power restore after sin. —

The Doctor adds, that once the act of sin has passed away, nothing remains in the sinner except the guilt of fault, which is chiefly explicated through the obligation to punishment which the sinner is bound to undergo: but God can remit this obligation to the sinner, and exempt him from any punishment, without conferring upon him grace or any other gift: therefore without any infusion of grace sin can be remitted by the mere external condonation.

You will say 1°. Sin cannot be remitted except by a form which expels that whereby the sinner is constituted hateful to God, and worthy of hatred and punishment: but such form is none other than habitual grace: therefore sin cannot be remitted without the infusion of that grace. —

I deny the major: for that which constitutes the sinner habitually and formally hateful to God is nothing other than sin remaining habitually until it is remitted: but for its remission there is not absolutely required another form, but only the divine release, by which the sinner is freed from the guilt of fault, no otherwise than a debtor is freed by the gratuitous remission of his creditor from the debt and obligation contracted by the loan.

You will say 2°. Man cannot be the object of the hatred of God without sin: therefore neither the object of love without grace. —

I deny the consequence: the reason of the disparity is, because the object of love is made by God, but is not presupposed: whereas the object of hatred is not made by God, but by the sinner, and so is presupposed to the divine hatred: wherefore God cannot fail to hate the sinner existing in sin, because that sin provokes the divine indignation: but He can love him without the infusion of grace, because He can constitute and render the object lovable in another manner than through the infusion of grace.

You will say 3°. So long is God understood to have hatred and indignation toward the sinner, until He infuse grace into him: therefore He cannot remit sin to him without the infusion of grace. The consequence stands: for sin remains habitually so long as the sinner is odious and hostile to God. The antecedent is proved, because God is understood to be hostile and angry against anyone so long as He repels him from His grace, or good will: but He repels the sinner from His grace or good will so long as He does not restore to him the grace taken away on account of sin: therefore, etc. —

I deny the antecedent: for in order to lay aside hatred and indignation it suffices that God no longer wish to have the reason of the sin committed, nor on account of it to be indignant against the sinner, but voluntarily renounce the right which He had of pursuing him with hatred and punishing him: which indeed He can accomplish by His absolute will.

To the proof I say that the good will of God, and grace accepted in this sense for any gratuitous favor whatever, is manifold; wherefore God can positively deny one of those gratuitous gifts and grant another; and thus if God were to remit sin to anyone without infusing sanctifying grace, He would not be reckoned to repel him from all His good will, or gratuitous favor: since that gratuitous remission of sin would be a great argument of the good will and favor of God, even if He did not wish to confer upon him further benefit: for the creditor is reckoned to bestow a great benefit upon the debtor while he releases the debt to him, even if he confer no new favor upon him.

We have said in the preceding pages that the formal cause of our justification is something intrinsic and inherent to it, and that constant and permanent; and forthwith sanctifying grace takes on the character and appellation of a habit, by which name also it is denominated by Theologians: nevertheless it is disputed by some, both Ancients and Moderns, whether that formal ratio of justification must so necessarily be something continually enduring after the manner of a habit, or rather sometimes through an act of contrition, or of the love of God above all things, such that one may be justified even formally without any infusion of supernatural habit. Which controversy, together with the others that concern formal justification, we shall weigh in the present Article, which will be resolved chiefly in three Questions: of which the First will disclose whether justifying grace is necessarily an act, or a habit, and whether that habit is simple and single, or multiple and composed from others. The Second, whether justice once possessed can be lost. The Third, what sort of justification it is, namely whether it is equal in all, and the greatest work of God.

Since the reason of an internal and inherent form belongs both to acts and to habits, and since it is certain among us Catholics that we are justified through an internal form, the question is rightly raised in the present place whether the internal formal cause of our justification consists in an act or in a habit.

Note 1°. Concerning the resolution of the present difficulty, Theologians agree among themselves: First, indeed, that it is certain from faith that infants are justified in baptism through an infused habit; for it must be believed with certain faith that every just man is justified by inhering justice, for this has been defined concerning infants as well as adults in the Council of Trent: concerning infants, Sess. 4. Can. 5.; but concerning adults, Sess. 6. cap. 7. Now this inhering justice cannot be any act; they are not capable of such a thing: therefore it must be some habit, since it can be nothing else than an accident. They agree secondly that all adults who are justified from sins by the virtue of the sacrament are also justified through a habit, because from the Council of Trent, Sess. 14. cap. 1., attrition or sorrow for sin committed, conceived from the consideration of the turpitude of sin or from fear of hell and punishments — which outside the sacrament would not suffice for blotting out sin nor have annexed to it grace whereby sin is formally blotted out — if joined with hope of pardon, suffices for the remission of sins with the sacrament: but with the sacrament added there does not appear what other grace and inhering justice should be infused into the penitent except habitual; for it cannot be said that an act of perfect contrition is infused, or of the love of God above all things, since of many who are justified from attrition through the sacrament scarcely one experiences that such an act is infused into him at that instant when the sacrament is completed. Therefore it must be certain among Catholics that upon an adult justified by the virtue of the sacrament some habit of grace and holiness is infused: but there remains the difficulty to be solved, whether that infusion of habit is so necessarily presupposed to the formal reason of justification that no man can be formally justified through any act of perfect contrition or charity.

Note 2°. From the Subtle Doctor, in 1. dist. 17. qu. 2. n. 18., that a human act can be conceived as necessary to the blotting out of sin in two ways; namely either by way of previous disposition, or by way of concomitance. In the first way, he says, an unformed act suffices, nay, it is always unformed, because the disposition preceding the blotting out of sin is always without grace and charity, by whose alone inherence and inclination toward the act the act is said to be formed. In the second way, I say that a formed act is required; for in that instant in which sin is blotted out, charity is present, and consequently if an act is required as concomitant, it is required as formed.

Note 3°. That it is certain that in justification together with sanctifying grace, and the habit of charity really distinct from it only conceptually, other supernatural habits also are infused, as the Council of Trent teaches, Sess. 6. cap. 7, in these words: In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things at once infused through Jesus Christ, into whom he is ingrafted, faith, hope, and charity: for faith, unless hope and charity be added to it, neither unites him perfectly with Christ, nor makes him a living member of His body. Hence arises the difficulty whether all those infused habits are reckoned by equal reason necessary to justification as grace itself and charity, so that the formal cause of our justification is not one simple habit, but a collection of several. Three things therefore must be determined in this Question: First, whether formal justification takes place so necessarily through a habit that no one can be formally justified through acts of perfect contrition and charity. Second, whether for this formal justification several infused habits are necessarily required. Third, whether justification takes place properly through the habit of sanctifying grace under the precise formal reason of grace, or rather insofar as it is formally charity.

First conclusion. — NEITHER THE ACT OF CHARITY NOR OF PERFECT CONTRITION JUSTIFIES FORMALLY, BUT ONLY DISPOSITIVELY.

It is proved 1. from holy Scripture, in all those texts in which the remission of sins is promised to penitents, as some gift of God proceeding from His pure mercy. Thus Psal. 50: A contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise. Proverbs 28: He who shall confess and forsake them (namely his crimes) shall obtain mercy. Ecclesiastes 17: With great mercy of His and propitiation toward those who turn to Him, etc. Therefore formal justification is not partly an effect of man, partly a gift of God, but is a gratuitous benefit of God. — Moreover holy Scripture in several places distinguishes contrition or the love of God above all things from the remission of sins, as from a diverse and new benefit obtained from it and promised to it, as a new grace and mercy. Thus Joel 2 it is said: Be converted to me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning: and rend your hearts, and not your garments: and be converted to the Lord your God, for he is gracious and merciful, patient and rich in mercy, and ready to forgive evil. By which former words, be converted to me with all your heart, perfect contrition is signified; but by these latter, for he is gracious and merciful, it is declared ⟦illegible: totum?⟧ that God may thus mercifully forgive the contrite: therefore that conversion through an act of love and contrition is not formally the remission of sins itself and justification, but something preparing for them and moving God to release sins and infuse the habit of sanctifying grace.

In the same manner speak the holy Fathers, who reckon and distinguish contrition and the remission of sins as two benefits; thus St. Chrysostom, Homil. 50. ad populum, says:

I have spent my whole life in sins, and if I do penance, I shall be saved; and especially hence it appears that this depends on the clemency of the Lord, lest you trust in your penance: for can your penance so blot out sins? If penance alone were sufficient, you might justly fear; but since into penance the mercy of God is mingled, take confidence.

St. Ambrose subscribes, lib. 1. De Paenitentia, cap. 1., where he says: He awaits our groans, but temporal ones, that He may remit eternal ones: He awaits our tears, that He may pour forth His piety: He awaits our conversion, that He Himself may return to grace: and he treats there of perfect contrition, of which alone that word of Isaiah 30 is generally true, which he expounds: When she shall have groaned, then shall she be saved. The same holds St. Augustine in Psal. 140, on those words, Gracious and merciful is the Lord, patient and very merciful, where he says thus: God has promised indulgence to your conversion: but He has not promised tomorrow to your delay. Now the conversion to which God promises pardon outside the sacrament is none other than perfect contrition, or the love of God above all things: therefore according to the mind of St. Augustine the pardon of sins is a new grace distinct from contrition.

It is proved 2. from the Council of Trent, and that Sess. 6. cap. 6., where among the dispositions to justifying grace it enumerates the acts of penance and of love, whereby man begins to love God as the fountain of all justice; for it says: and begin to love Him (namely God) as the fountain of all justice, and are therefore moved against sins by some hatred and detestation. Then in the following chapter it calls this very love and detestation of sins, together with the other acts of the sinner described above, a disposition or preparation for justification itself: This, it says, disposition or preparation is followed by justification itself: since however penance abstracts from perfect and imperfect, as does likewise the incipient love of God, and the Council speaks in general of penance and love, it follows that it equally comprehends perfect penitence and love of God inclined and imperfect: but a disposition to justification cannot be formal justification itself: therefore the mind of the Council is not that we can be justified through acts of contrition or of the love of God. —

Secondly, cap. 1. of that session, the Council teaches that there is one formal cause of our justification: since however it equally teaches that we are justified through a habit, it follows that it holds formal justification not to take place through an act; otherwise not one only, but two formal causes of our justification would exist: for if those formal causes were truly several, doubtless the Council would have enumerated them, just as it enumerates several efficient causes, namely God as principal cause, and Baptism as instrumental cause: and just as it also retains several final causes, namely the glory of God and of Christ, and life eternal. —

Thirdly, the same is gathered from Can. 3 of the same session, where it says: If anyone shall say that without the preventing inspiration and help of the Holy Spirit man can believe, hope, love, or repent, as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema. By which words, as is apparent, the Council distinguishes the grace of sanctification from the acts of contrition and love, even as from the acts of faith and hope. —

Finally, the same Council, Session 14, chapter 4, teaches that the motion of contrition was necessary at any time whatsoever for obtaining the forgiveness of sins, and that in a man fallen after baptism it prepares him for the remission of sins only then: but who would say that a form prepares or obtains its own formal effect? Now that the discourse there concerns perfect contrition is evident: both because it declares the nature of this contrition by the example of David, whose contrition no one doubts was perfect: and because the Council in that chapter hands down not only the manner by which we can be justified through contrition within the Sacrament of Penance, but also outside the sacrament: finally because it teaches that it was necessary at any time whatsoever for obtaining the forgiveness of sins, where by the phrase at any time it signifies also the time of the law of nature and of Moses. But since in neither of those states did adults have sacraments by which grace would be conferred ex opere operato, it is certain that this motion of contrition, which for either state was necessary for restoring forgiveness, had to be perfect contrition; for according to the same Council in the same place, supernatural attrition outside the sacrament is insufficient for obtaining the forgiveness of sins: therefore since the Council says that that contrition, which at any time was necessary for obtaining forgiveness, was preparatory to the remission of sins, it judges that we are not formally justified by it.

It is proved thirdly by reason: First, the justification of an adult outside the sacrament with the vow of receiving it takes place in the same manner and through the same formal cause as his justification through the sacrament de facto received: but the justification of an impious adult in the really received sacrament takes place formally through the habit of grace, not however through acts of love and contrition: therefore this justification of an impious adult outside the sacrament does not take place through supernatural acts of love and perfect contrition, but through habitual grace itself infused by God. The minor is admitted by all, seeing that attrition suffices together with the sacrament for obtaining justification, which nevertheless can justify neither formally nor preparatorily outside the sacrament, and consequently the grace conferred through the sacrament is neither formally that act of attrition, nor its effect, but only the effect of the sacrament producing such grace ex opere operato. The major similarly holds: for the vow of the sacrament, beyond the real reception of it, adds to the act of contrition a tacit or express volition of receiving the sacrament, and an efficacious desire of the effect of such a sacrament: but such a volition, whether express or tacit, adds nothing of power and efficacy to the virtue of the act of contrition itself, nor does it bring it about that one who is not joined to the sacrament should come to the same justifying form outside the sacrament, for it confers nothing supernatural upon him: therefore just as that act of perfect contrition joined with the really received sacrament is not the formal cause of justification in the adult through the really received sacrament, but that cause is none other than habitual grace; so also that act of perfect contrition cannot be, together with the vow of the sacrament, the unformed cause of the justification of an adult outside the sacrament. —

Secondly, to forgive sin is the proper work and benefit of God, according to that of Isaiah 43: I am he that blots out your iniquities. And Mark 2: Who can forgive sins but God alone? Reason also supports these words: for to forgive sins belongs to him alone who is offended by them: but God alone is principally offended by sins: therefore it belongs to him alone to forgive sins: but if man could blot out his sins by contrition, not God alone, but man too would forgive himself his sins by effecting contrition. For the effect which the form formally bestows is effected efficiently by the efficient cause of the form.

Nor does it stand in the way that Priests also forgive sins, John 20: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them: for Priests forgive sins as Christ's Ministers; in what way would a man not thereby forgive himself his own sins through contrition elicited by himself?

Second reason: because according to the Tridentine Session 6, chapter 8, we are said to be justified freely: and this for the reason that, as the Council itself testifies, no works preceding justification merit the grace of justification itself, namely de condigno, as the Theologians explain. But if contrition formally sanctified, we would not be justified freely in the sense expounded by the Council, because contrition, according to the more probable opinion, precedes grace in nature: therefore it would merit that same grace de condigno: hence grace, as the Council says in the same place, would not be grace, but reward and wage. The consequence is proved: because if contrition of itself formally sanctified the subject, in that prior state of nature, in which it would precede grace, it would be the work of a subject already worthy and sanctified by that very contrition, as by a form formally sanctifying: and accordingly in that prior state it would be condignly meritorious of the grace by which it is infused in the subsequent instant of nature.

You will object 1°. Various texts of Sacred Scripture seem to ascribe to contrition and love the sanctity of the soul and purgation from sin: thus John 14: If anyone loves me, he will keep my commandments, and my Father will love him, etc. By which words the love of God toward us is ascribed to our love toward God: but in this mutual love consists the perfect sanctity of the soul. Hence to the Colossians 3 charity is called the bond of perfection. And 1 Timothy 1: The end of the commandment and of the law is consummation, charity.

And Romans 13: the fullness of the law. To the same act of charity the remission of sins is attributed: thus Luke 7: Many sins are forgiven him because he loved much. Proverbs 10: Charity covers all offenses. 1 Peter 4: Charity covers a multitude of sins. 1 John 3: We know that we are translated from death to life, because we love the brethren. There, moreover, Scripture speaks not of the habit, but of the act of charity: because in those places it exhorts us to the act of charity, not to the habit, and while commending charity itself, it commends likewise the very act of love. —

I answer, all these texts are to be understood of actual charity, which reconciles divine love to us, indeed not formally, but only efficiently, and meritoriously de congruo, or by way of proximate disposition, from which such an effect infallibly follows; and consequently from them it is not evinced that actual charity is the formal reason by which we are justified, and by which sins are loosed; but only that it merits de congruo, and infallibly disposes us for the reception of sanctifying grace, which God infallibly bestows when this ultimate disposition is posited.

You will object 2°. Those texts of Scripture by which adherence with God is attributed to the actual love of God: 1 John 4: God is charity, and he who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him: but from 1 Corinthians 6: He who is joined to God is one spirit: yet man cannot, while remaining in the state of mortal sin, either abide in God, or be one spirit with him: therefore since through charity he abides in God and adheres to him, it must be that man through it is justified and loosed from sin. —

I answer, these texts of Scripture are solved by the same reasoning as the preceding ones; for they need not necessarily be expounded in the formal sense, but can be excellently understood in the causal sense, namely that love is the cause why we abide in God, and are one spirit with him, insofar namely as it is the cause why we are in turn loved by God, and why his Spirit inhabits us. A cause, I say, either morally efficient, and meritorious de congruo, always inferring such an effect, or also proximately dispositional, and infallibly connected with such an effect, but not a cause formalizing justification. That however the Apostle did not wish to signify anything else is gathered from similar words of the same Apostle: for in the same chapter he says: Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God abides in him, and he in God: but the act of faith cannot be the formal reason, but only a dispositional one, why God abides in us: therefore the same must be said of the acts of charity, which concur to justification only dispositively, though in a more excellent and more infallible manner than the act of faith.

⟦Obiection opener and Augustinian citation illegible in the faded print; text resumes:⟧ He says: True charity is the fullest and most perfect justice: and in the last chapter: Charity begun is begun justice: charity advanced is advanced justice: charity great is great justice: charity perfect is perfect justice: therefore according to the mind of St. Augustine charity is the formal reason of our justification. St. Bernard subscribes, Sermon 83 on the Canticle, where expounding that word of Ephesians 5: Be imitators of God as most dear children, and walk in love, he speaks thus: The conformity of the whole marries the soul to the Word: since namely it is like him by nature, yet exhibits itself like to him by will, loving as she is chosen; therefore if she loves perfectly, she is united: therefore according to the mind of those holy Fathers, actual charity is the formal cause of our justification. —

I deny the consequence; for, as I have already said more than once, love and actual charity is called the justice and sanctity of the soul, not in the formal sense, but causal and meritorious, in that manner namely in which Christ is said 1 Corinthians 1 to be made for us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, that is, the cause of the justice and of the sanctification granted to us through him and on account of his merits. Nor does it matter that St. Bernard in the book De modo bene vivendi, Sermon 1, which concerns the fear of God, says: This fear is holy, because it introduces into the mind of man perfect charity, for perfect charity is perfect sanctity. For I answer that there is a twofold sanctity: one actual, consisting in acts; another habitual, consisting in habits; now perfect actual charity is called perfect actual sanctity; not because it is a form perfecting and sanctifying the soul primarily and principally, but only secondarily, insofar namely as it is the most perfect and most holy among the supernatural acts proceeding from that very habitual charity and sanctity, and augmenting and perfecting them meritoriously, insofar namely as it merits their increase.

You will object 4°. If anyone existing in mortal sin, before sin were forgiven him, were assumed to see God and to love him, without any habit of grace and charity, he would be blessed, and consequently justified; since indeed sin conflicts with perfect beatitude: but such a justification would not take place through a habit, which we suppose is not infused: therefore it would take place through an act of charity, and consequently that act can suffice ⟦illegible: a few words illegible here between "sufficere potest" and "hac in hypothesi"⟧ hac in hypothesi, if habitual mortal sin be not forgiven him: for beatitude is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods and the removal of all evils; and therefore with that state mortal sin, which is supreme misery, cannot subsist: but in that case that sin could remain unforgiven; because neither vision nor love is a condign satisfaction for mortal sin, nor equivalent to it: and even if it were such, still God could refuse to accept it.

You will object 5°. The love of God is more efficacious for converting the soul to God the ultimate end than was the will of the first man for turning away his posterity from God: therefore anyone existing in original sin can be justified and cleansed from it by love alone without a habit, and even from personal sin. The consequence is evident. But the antecedent is proved: for the posterity of Adam were turned away from God by another's will alone; but when they love God, they are converted to him by their own will, which surely seems a more efficacious manner of conversion. Similarly, although an adult has been converted by his own will through actual sin to a creature which he loved, nevertheless through the affection of contrition from his whole heart he turns away from it far more perfectly than he had been converted to it; since indeed he turns away from it expressly, insofar namely its love conflicts with love of God; but so he had not been converted to it. —

I deny the antecedent, and to the first part I say that the will of the first parent was far more efficacious for turning us away from God than our will is for converting us to God; for Adam's will turns us away from God by a habitual aversion; but the love of our will converts us to God only by an actual conversion. Now habitual aversion is greater, because it is the privation of habitual justice, which is more perfect than the very love which is an actual conversion. Nor does it matter that that was done by another's will, this by our own; for that only proves this to be more perfect in the order of free operation, not however in moral goodness and malice. —

To the second part of the antecedent I answer similarly, that the love of man is not so powerful for converting man to God, placating him, and perfectly satisfying him, as was mortal guilt powerful for offending him, and incurring his aversion and indignation; for habitual sin is a fault physically past remaining morally until gratuitous pardon, or perfect satisfaction, intervene, such as the very love or contrition of the sinner is not: for the offended party is not judged perfectly placated until he render back all that he had taken away by reason of the offense: therefore neither will God be judged placated toward the sinner until he render back to him the first robe, namely sanctifying grace.

You will object 6°. Justification which takes place through an act is more lasting than that which takes place through a habit; for when the habit is taken away habitual justice is removed: but truly even if the habit of justice were taken away from him who had exercised the act of contrition and love, he would always remain just and holy by virtue of that act, just as he always remains a sinner and unjust from the past act of sin: therefore contrition or love without a habit confers some sanctification distinct from habitual sanctification. —

I deny the subsumption; for, says the Friend, in the same way, once the habit of grace is removed, he who had been justified by habit and act together would cease to be holy and just no less than he who was so by habit alone; because since grace alone is the justifying form, once it is removed the formal effect of the just and holy would be taken away. Moreover, because such a habit would not cease demeritoriously and culpably, but only physically, and by the mere will of God, such cessation would induce no stain in the subject, but only a pure negation of grace, which would not constitute an object of hatred and uncleanness, but only of non-friendship, since the stain was already supposed to have been perfectly wiped away and pardoned through the past habit of grace, nor would it return through such a removal of grace: otherwise past stains already wiped away and pardoned would always return as new sins. But the case of the act of sin and of contrition is disparate, because the act of sin is able of itself alone formally to constitute the subject stained and unjust; but the act of contrition does not formally take away habitual sin, which is the foundation and object of our enmity toward God, but dispositively: whereas sin formally takes away grace, which is the foundation and object of our friendship toward God.

You will object 7°. The proper act of Penance is the intention of satisfying God for the offense or stain of the sin committed, whose intention's object is that form by which satisfaction is formally made to God; and consequently this cannot be a habit, but an act, because satisfaction is essentially an action; but no human action can be a true and formal satisfaction by the nature of the thing except that which formally of itself and by its own nature destroys that stain, because with that alone posited nothing further remains of right demanding satisfaction: but if any human action by its nature can destroy the stain of sin, most of all perfect contrition: therefore this is formally sanctifying and remissive of sin. —

I answer, denying the major: for the virtue of penance does not intend to exhibit to God condign satisfaction for a mortal offense, nor even for the eternal punishment which is remitted either through the sacrament or through the vow of the sacrament together with the guilt: but it intends to satisfy for the temporal punishment remaining after the guilt committed: and for the remission of the guilt itself, and the reparation of the divine right, as far as it is possible for a creature to repair the divine right.

It is urged. The act of contrition pleases God just as the offense morally displeases him: therefore satisfaction for the guilt is de condigno and equal by equal measure. The antecedent is proved: the act of contrition is as good as the act of sin was evil: for if anyone, for example, sinned mortally through omission of the act of love due from precept, the positing of this act is as good as its omission was evil. — I deny the antecedent: for the offense against God from a man so vile, and obligated to God by so many benefits, is far greater and graver than any satisfaction whatsoever owed to God could be: just as it is far less that a subject love the King than that he commit a capital offense against him, nor is he viler who judges that condign satisfaction be made to the King through the love and sorrow of the offender, so that the King should have nothing further which he might demand toward satisfaction from the offender.

Second Conclusion. — THE FORMAL RATIO OF JUSTIFICATION IS ONE AND SIMPLE REAL HABIT OF SANCTIFYING GRACE, REALLY INDISTINCT FROM CHARITY. This is the more common opinion.

It is proved first: if besides the real habit of sanctifying grace and of charity other habits were required, especially the habits of faith and hope: yet those habits do not formally contribute to sanctification, except by way of disposition and preparation: therefore the sanctifying form is not a collection of several habits. The major is evident. The minor is proved: both from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7, where although it declares that faith, hope, and charity are infused in justification, it nevertheless attributes the power of justifying to charity alone. For faith, unless hope and charity be added to it, neither unites one perfectly with Christ, nor makes him a living member of his body. It does not hold, then, that faith and hope of themselves formally contribute to justification, but only by benefit of charity. Next, by sanctifying grace we are made like Christ our Lord, according to that of Hebrews 2: Wherefore it behoved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren: but neither faith nor hope were in Christ, since he was always in possession: therefore those two virtues do not formally contribute to justification. Finally, at the instant of justification, in which man becomes from unjust just, and from impious holy, neither faith nor hope contribute anything to the expulsion of sin and the conciliation of the love of God: therefore that effect is attributed to sanctifying grace alone.

You will say: The Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7 says: «In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives through Christ, into whom he is ingrafted, all these infused at once — faith, hope, and charity»: therefore by the mind of the Council those three virtues equally contribute to justification. — I answer, that faith and hope are enumerated by the Council not indeed as partial justifying forms, but only as dispositions: faith indeed as foundation, and hope as buttress. Which Origen also admirably explains on chapter 1 of the Epistle to the Romans: The first beginnings of salvation, he says, and the very foundations are faith; the progress and increase of the building is hope; but the perfection and crown of the whole work is charity.

You will say 2. Of the nature of justice it is intrinsic that it formally accomplish two things in us: the first indeed, that it constitute us pleasing and friendly to God; the second, however, that it confer upon us the faculty of acting well: but it accomplishes the first through grace, and the second through the theological virtues: therefore both those virtues and grace alike are the form of justification. — I deny the consequence: for indeed if this were true, it would follow also that the intrinsic moral virtues, and likewise the gifts of the Holy Spirit, must be reckoned among the forms of justification, since they confer a principle of acting naturally: for just as man cannot be truly just unless he be truly faithful, so neither unless he be truly a worshipper of God, and truly penitent. Therefore just as penance and religion do not have the nature of the form of justification, so neither do the theological virtues: for just as it is said, 1 John 3, he who hath hope sanctifieth himself, so of the one doing penance it is said Ezekiel 18, He shall revive his own soul.

Third Conclusion. — GRACE UNDER ITS PROPER CONCEPT AS GRACE, AND NOT UNDER THE CONCEPT OF CHARITY, IS THE FORMAL RATIO OF JUSTIFICATION.

It is proved 1. From that passage of Titus 3: That, being justified by his grace, we may be heirs according to the hope of life everlasting. Where by the same grace he says we are justified by which we are heirs of life everlasting: but by grace, and not by charity, we are given such right of inheritance, since charity is only the principle of operation: therefore we are justified precisely by grace. — It is confirmed from the Council of Trent, Session 5, Canon ⟦illegible: canon number lost in OCR⟧, where it decrees that by the grace of Jesus Christ our Lord, conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted. The argument is also aided: that must be called the formal justifying ratio which constitutes us sharers of the divine nature, and confers upon us eternal inheritance: but this grace performs under its formal concept, and not under the concept of charity: for charity indeed makes us partakers of the divine attribute of love, but not of the divine nature: therefore we are sanctified by grace under its formal concept of grace.

You will object 1. Many texts of Scripture pour the power of sanctifying into charity itself. Thus 1 John 3: Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God. And chapter 4: Every one that loveth is born of God. And there again: God is charity: and he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him. Hence Romans 13: Love is the fulfilling of the law. — I answer, that all these things are indeed said truly of charity, not formally, but really, and inasmuch as it is one and the same real habit with sanctifying grace, as St Augustine also explains, book De Spiritu et Littera, c. 32, saying: The charity of God is said to be poured forth in our hearts, not whereby he himself loves us, but whereby he makes us lovers of himself: even as the justice of God, whereby by his gift we are made just. As if to say, we are made just by the gift of grace. Hence in Psalm 118: Who works justice in man, he says, but he who justifies the impious, that is, by the gift of grace he makes just the impious. Hence also the Apostle: being justified freely by his grace.

You will object 2. Sanctity, says Dionysius in De Coelesti Hierarchia, cap. 12. It is free from every crime, perfect, and on every side immaculate purity: but this belongs only to love and charity: for just as impurity is contracted from contact with an impure thing, so supreme purity is found from union with God, who is the fountain and origin of all purity. But that union is made only through love: therefore that purity and sanctity is also made through love. — I answer, that by these things is proved that love is a preparation for purity, which is grace; but not that it is itself formally purity, for if purity is born from adherence to God, which takes place through love, it follows that love is not purity itself, but a way leading to purity. Add that such conjunction of the soul to God takes place through actual love, not formally, but only dispositively; nor through the habit of charity formally, but only really, inasmuch namely as charity is really the same as sanctifying grace.

You will object 3. The Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7, where speaking of justification it says: This happens in justification, when by the merit of that most sacred passion the charity of God is poured forth through the Holy Spirit into the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them. Therefore it holds that charity justifies formally qua charity. — I deny the consequence: for as is clear, the Council does not say that the form of justification is charity, but that justification takes place through grace while charity is poured forth. Nor does it matter that there it does not name grace; for earlier it had designated it as the formal cause of our justification at the beginning of the chapter, saying: through the reception of grace: wherefore it judged it superfluous to name it again.