Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

§ I. On operating and cooperating grace. — Actual grace was meritoriously divided by St. Augustine, in book On Grace and Free Will, chapter 17, into Operating and Cooperating, in these words: « God by cooperating brings to perfection what He began by operating: for He operates by beginning, that we may will; He cooperates with those who will, by perfecting ». Wherefore the Apostle says to the Philippians 1: I am sure that he who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus. Therefore, that we may will, He works without us; but when we will, and so will as to act, He cooperates with us. Yet without Him either operating, that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we avail nothing toward the good works of piety. Of Him operating, that we may will, it was said to the Philippians 2: God... From these words one may infer, first, that grace is rightly divided

into operating and cooperating grace: for this division has its foundation in Sacred Scripture, which commends grace under both appellations, of operation and cooperation. For operating grace is commended in Isaiah 26, in these words: All our works thou hast wrought in us, O Lord; and Philippians 2: God it is who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish. And 1 Corinthians 12: Now all these things one and the same Spirit worketh.

But cooperating grace is praised in Romans 8: we know that to them that love God all things cooperate unto good. And at the end of Mark: the Lord cooperating, and confirming the word, etc. And 1 Corinthians 15: I have laboured more abundantly than all they: yet not I, but the grace of God with me. Both graces also are intimated by the Council of Orange, Canon 9, in these words: As often as we do good, God works in us, that what is ours, namely that we operate, He may operate. And the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 6, says that God prevents and stirs us up by His grace: then works with us that we may be converted to Him: of which the former

It is gathered 2. The definition of each grace: for operating grace, according to St. Augustine, is that whereby God works in us that we may will, by beginning: and of what sort that motion is which God works by beginning, he declares shortly after, saying: That we may will, he says, He works without us; hence one may conclude that operating grace is the first and undeliberated motion, whether of the intellect or of the will, which God effects in us without us, that we both will well and act. — This motion, however, is said to be made in us without us, not because the intellect and will contribute nothing at all to this motion; for (as we said in the Preludes) the vital act is produced in the ordinary way in a vital potency without a physical influx of that potency; but this motion is said to be made in us without us, because we do not freely concur in it, in that sense, namely, in which the evil of concupiscence, which the Apostle suffered unwillingly,

God cooperates with those willing, perfecting: or whereby God, when we will, and so will as to act, cooperates with what is ours. Whence it follows that cooperating grace is the supernatural concurrence of God, whereby He concurs toward all supernatural and free acts: whether they proceed from the will commanding or executing; or from other potencies acting supernaturally at the command of the will; whether the will still be weak, or strong and firm.

It is gathered 3. That although this division of grace into operating and cooperating can be extended to habitual grace, yet it is more properly and more commonly attributed to actual grace. The former part of this assertion is urged, namely that this division can be adapted to habitual grace, on account of its twofold effect, whereof one is to affect the subject and render it formally pleasing to God; the other, to be the efficient cause of the meritorious work. In respect of the former, habitual grace can be called operating; in respect of the latter, it can be called cooperating; because it produces the former effect by itself alone, not indeed effectively, but formally, in the manner in which whiteness is said to make a surface white. In respect of the latter it can be called cooperating, because grace does not produce the meritorious work by itself alone, but with free choice and the concurrence of the free will, which stands related to that meritorious work not only after the manner of what is moved, but also by the motion of a mover and an efficient cause. — Yet more properly, and more commonly, this division is attributed to actual grace; because St. Augustine himself (from whom that division is borrowed) as well as Sacred Scripture, in which it has its foundation, seem altogether to speak of actual grace; since St. Augustine treats of that grace about which his controversy was with the Pelagians: and this was none other than actual grace: for concerning habitual grace they were in agreement. To this belongs the fact that St. Augustine, in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 43, calls cooperating grace healing grace, which seems proper to habitual grace; for to heal belongs not only to habitual, but also to actual grace, at least inchoatively.

It is gathered 4. Setting aside the various opinions of the Recent Writers, operating grace, according to St. Augustine, as Bellarmine rightly gathers in book 1, On Grace and Free Will, chapter 17, is that which alone produces in man the first good deliberated will, such as conversion, whether from infidelity to faith, or from other sins to penance: while cooperating grace is that which cooperates with man already willing and striving, by augmenting and strengthening the will, that he may effect and perfect what he wills and strives for: so that operating grace is that which alone produces a good will in men, or which God produces in us without us; whereas cooperating grace is that which produces something in us not by itself alone, but with us cooperating at the same time. — Now that operating grace acts alone in us means nothing else than that it acts without any preceding motion of our will, whereby we pray, seek, desire, knock; and thus without attributing anything of merit as a reward for that good will: not, however, as if man did not simultaneously influence that good will; for the vital act does not ordinarily occur except with the influx of the vital potency. And that cooperating grace does not act alone in us amounts to the same as its acting only upon the supposition of a preceding influx of the will, whereby we have knocked, desired, or done something similar.

In one word, grace is called operating which includes a previous, not a simultaneous, influx of the will; while cooperating grace is that which includes a simultaneous, and presupposes a previous influx of the will. — Hence all those supernatural motions which God effects in us without us, while we concur freely, belong to operating grace, whether by them we are stirred up toward the first good will by which we begin to be converted; or we are invited to a good will by which we either wish to persevere in grace already received, or actually persevere. — Nor should those Recent Writers be heeded who restrict operating grace to that actual grace alone whereby God produces the first good will in man: both because the definition brought forward by St. Augustine fits even those motions by which God invites the just man to works of piety; for these motions take place in us even while we are just; and because in the same chapter St. Augustine says: without God either operating that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we avail nothing toward the good works of piety: therefore no work of piety can be done by a just man unless God operate that he may will, and cooperate with him willing; and finally, because the same St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11, says: That there be in us through this grace of God (namely commanding) a beginning of good, and its persevering maintenance, not only that we can what we will, but also that we will what we can.

You ask: Whether operating grace is really distinguished from cooperating? — I answer, this seems more probable: First, because operating grace is nothing else than a sudden and undeliberated motion of the intellect and will, whereby man is stirred up to good; whereas cooperating grace is a divine motion whereby the will freely acquiesces in the prior motion: yet these motions are really distinct acts. Secondly, because operating is sometimes separated from cooperating, for instance when man resists the inspiration of God, as we shall show presently: therefore operating grace is really distinguished from cooperating. Thirdly, because cooperating grace is within our power; operating grace not at all.

§ II. On the division of grace into preventing and subsequent. — This division is commended by David, Psalm 58, saying: His mercy shall prevent me. And in the same place: His mercy shall follow me. The Church also makes mention of both in the Collect for the 16th Sunday after Pentecost, in these words: May Thy grace, we beseech Thee, O Lord, always prevent and follow us, and make us continually attentive to good works. The same doctrine St. Augustine hands down in the Enchiridion, chapter 32, where he says: It preventeth that we may be healed, it followeth that being healed we may be governed: it preventeth that we may be called, it followeth that we may be glorified. And in book 2 to Boniface, chapter 9: If without him, he says, we can do nothing, certainly neither begin nor perfect: because that we may begin it is said: his mercy shall prevent me; that we may perfect, it is said: his mercy shall follow me.

Note, however (as we already admonished in the Preludes) that preventing and subsequent grace can be considered by St. Augustine, either with respect to the will, or with respect to themselves. With respect indeed to the will, or to the free consent of man; and this again in two ways: First, in such wise that preventing grace is called that which both precedes and accompanies the free will of man: subsequent, however, that which follows the same will of man. St. Augustine speaks of preventing and subsequent grace in this sense in many places: but most clearly in the Enchiridion, c. 34. Many goods of God, he says, precede the good will of man, but not all: but those which it itself does not precede, among these it itself also is, for both readings are found in the sacred writings, both his mercy shall prevent me, and his mercy shall follow me: it preventeth the unwilling that he may will, and followeth the willing lest he will in vain. Thus likewise both graces are employed by St. Fulgentius, book 1, To Monimus; « He Himself, he says, freely bestows grace upon the unworthy, that by preventing mercy he may begin to will the good, and by subsequent mercy may be able to do the good that he wills ». — Secondly, with respect to the same will, both graces are taken in another manner; so that preventing is said to be that which precedes the good will, although it is not yet itself the good will: thus the Council of Trent, Session 6, c. 16, employs it, where it says that the good virtue, which Christ Jesus continually infuses into the justified, always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works; hence antecedent or preventing grace is said not only with respect to the first good movement of the will, whereby sinners begin to be converted to God (as some Recent Writers hold), but also with respect to the first good will which the justified conceive concerning doing good works: whence St. Augustine, in book 2 against the 2nd Letter of Pelagius, says: May God turn away this madness of ours, that we would make ourselves prior to His gifts, and Him posterior: since his mercy shall prevent me, and He is He to whom it is faithfully and truly sung: Thou shalt prevent him with the blessings of sweetness. By which words he signifies that preventing grace is called that which precedes and stirs up the human will toward any good work whatsoever. — Preventing and subsequent grace is also taken with respect to themselves, so that preventing grace is the first grace, whereby we are stirred up to good: subsequent, however, any grace whatsoever that follows that first one. Thus St. Augustine took both graces in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 51 or 52. « His mercy, he says, preventeth us: it preventeth, moreover, that we may be healed, for this afterward followeth, that being healed we may also be raised up: it preventeth that we may be called, it followeth that we may be glorified: it preventeth that we may live piously, it followeth that we may live with Him forever ». Hence some gather that there are five effects of grace: The first is that the soul be healed from infirmity: the second that it will the good: the third that it efficaciously perform the good that it wills: the fourth that it persevere in good: the fifth that it happily attain eternal glory. Hence St. Bernard, in the book On Loving God, addressing Him, says: This is greatly wonderful, that no one is able to seek Thee unless he has first found Thee. Wilt Thou therefore be found that Thou mayest be sought, sought that Thou mayest be found: for Thou canst be sought and found, but not prevented.

You ask 2. Is that division adequate? — I answer first, if preventing and subsequent grace are considered with respect to themselves, the aforesaid division is adequate; because any actual grace whatsoever, either is that first grace, whereby God illuminates and piously affects the soul; or is the grace whereby that grace is followed. I answer secondly, that if grace be regarded, both as preventing, and as subsequent, insofar as each is distinguished from grace accompanying the will, the division of grace into preventing and subsequent is not adequate; for besides those there must also be admitted a concomitant grace, which assists the will already prevented by divine grace, that it may accomplish the work.

§ III. On the division of grace into exciting and assisting. — This division has its foundation in Sacred Scripture. Thus Apocalypse 3: I stand at the door, and knock. If any one shall hear my voice, and open to me the entrance, I will enter in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me. Ephesians 2: Rise thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall enlighten thee. And Psalm 118: Open to me, and I will enter. In the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 5: That they who through sin were turned away from God may be disposed to convert themselves by His exciting and assisting grace. The same is found in c. 6.

Likewise in the prayers of the Church: Our actions, we beseech Thee, O Lord, prevent by Thy inspiration, and further by Thy assistance. This division of grace St. Augustine likewise commends in book 2 On the Merits of Sinners, chapter 18: That we are converted to God, he says, unless He Himself excite and assist us, we cannot. Hence exciting grace, according to St. Augustine, is that which excites the sinner to rise, either from infidelity or from mortal sin, that he be changed from evil into good: or the just man not operating, that he gird himself to a good work. Assisting grace, however, is that which aids the will already converted and prepared for a good work, toward willing and doing. Which St. Fulgentius lucidly declares in book 2 On the Truth of Predestination: Mercy preventeth, he says, the free choice of man, while in him not yet willing well it alone produces the beginning of good will; it followeth, while to him willing well it ministers aid, that by operating well he may arrive at the affection of good will. Wherefore in the mind of St. Augustine and his disciples there is no difference between exciting and preventing, assisting and subsequent grace, except with respect to their different offices; so that the same grace, inasmuch as it prevents the will, is also called exciting: inasmuch as it assists the same toward the work, it is also called assisting. Whence St. Augustine on Psalm 52: Not of my own will did I rise to Thee, but Thou camest to stir me up: for his mercy shall prevent me. And in the book On Free Choice, c. 17, he embraces all these graces together, saying: Therefore, that we may will, He works without us; but when we will, and so will as to act, He cooperates with us. Which he also proves from that passage to the Philippians 2: God it is who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.

You ask: whether exciting grace is itself also divided? — Vazquez affirms this in book 2, disp. 185, and some Recent Writers side with him. But the other theologians cry out against it, and pronounce that opinion absolutely unworthy of Catholic Doctors. First, because it makes God cruel: furthermore, mocking sinners themselves: finally, it declares Him deceitful in the Sacred Scriptures.

The first is clear, because it seems open cruelty to threaten and inflict eternal torments upon those who are not converted, yet in whose power that conversion was not, since they had no congruous graces; whereas by congruous graces Vazquez understands those which God bestows on that occasion and at that time when He knows man will consent to them; otherwise concerning incongruous graces, which are not conferred with the same opportunity and disposition of the man: therefore that opinion plainly fights against the goodness of God and His paternal clemency, disposing all things justly and sweetly.

The second is also shown: because from various texts of Sacred Scripture it is established that God calls all to penance, and wills all men to be saved, etc., which would indeed be utterly illusory if God did not confer congruous grace, through which alone men can be converted and saved.

Finally, the third is plain; for Sacred Scripture introduces God speaking to the Israelites, and in their person addressing all transgressors, in these words of Isaiah: What is it that I ought to have done more to my vineyard, that I have not done? For I ask whether congruous grace was conferred upon them or not? If it was conferred, why were they not converted, seeing that congruous grace always attains its effect? If it was not conferred, certainly God did not do for His vineyard all that He owed, nor would He justly complain of their hostility; for they could reply that if He had given them congruous grace, as He gave others, they would without doubt have believed and done penance. Add to this that incongruous grace does not deserve to attain the name of grace; for what kind of grace is that which has no effect, offers no favor, and is granted solely for this, that men may resist it? It conflicts with the common sentiment of the Fathers, who refer the lack of the effect of conversion to the wicked will of the sinner himself, according to that word of Hosea 13: Thy perdition is of thee, O Israel. They teach besides that God deals most benignly with us, and offers to all grace whereby we can and ought to be converted: and they illustrate this by the example of the sun illuminating all men equally. So especially Origen, book 3, Periarchon, chapter 1; Chrysostom, Homily 7 on 1 John, chapter 1; Theodoret, qu. 12 on Exodus. — Therefore it must be asserted that there is no incongruous grace; but that every exciting grace whatsoever is most congruous on the part of God and of His intention, because for this reason He always calls us that we may consent, and calls in the more congruous manner that He can. For He stands at the door and knocks, and as it were awaits and explores the dispositions, temperaments, manners, and propensions of all, that according to the various dispositions and inclinations of each one of us He may likewise bestow various grace, whereby, if we will, we can be converted to Him. Yet it often happens that one hardens oneself against every mode of even the most congruous calling grace, as appears in the Jews, with whom Christ the Lord conversed so long, though He had been sent chiefly to the sheep who had perished of the house of Israel; nevertheless they were rebellious to the light, and resisted the Holy Spirit.

You will object: Vazquez adduces certain sayings of St. Augustine, above all that which the most holy Doctor has in the book to Simplician, question 2, where, speaking of congruous grace, he thus says: Can it be that those who, called in this manner, do not consent could, called in another manner, accommodate their will to faith? And that it may be true that many are called but few chosen, although many are called in one manner, yet because not all are affected in one manner, only those follow the calling who are found fit for it by obeying. True it is that many are called, but few chosen; for those are elect who are congruously called: but those who did not fit the call, nor would despise the call, were not elected, because they did not follow it, though called. And presently: Wherefore although He calls many, He has mercy nevertheless upon those whom He so calls as it is fitting for them to be called that they follow. And again: But whom He hath mercy upon, He so calls him as He knows fits him, that he reject not Him calling. So says the holy Doctor. These are the principal testimonies which Vazquez brings forward for asserting congruous grace. But for non-congruous grace those things can be brought forward which St. Augustine says shortly afterward in the same place: Ask whether, if He wished, he says, to have mercy even upon them, He could so call them as would be fitting for them, that they should believe, understand, and follow. And much farther on: Here someone will say: Why then was Esau not so called that he wished to obey? After many things, answering, he adds: Who would dare to say that there was wanting to God a manner of calling whereby even Esau would apply his mind to faith in Him, and join his will, in which Jacob was justified? But if so great can be the obstinacy of the will that the aversion of the mind hardens against every mode: it is asked also whether that hardness itself be from divine punishment? For when God forsakes, not so calling him as he could be moved to faith, who shall say, even if he should say that the manner whereby he might be persuaded to believe was wanting even to the Omnipotent? Finally he concludes that it was not wanting; yet that He denied that very manner to Esau: because on whom He wills He hath mercy, and whom He wills He hardeneth: nor is there therefore iniquity with God. But who, he says, cannot see that no one can be accused of iniquity who exacts what is due to himself, nor certainly he who wills to bestow what is due to another? By which words he signifies that congruous grace is not unjustly denied to some, because we are all unworthy of it by reason of original sin. — I answer 1. That St. Augustine in the aforesaid words seems rather to debate the question than to define it; since he offers nothing resolutive and affirmative. I answer 2. That he speaks very obscurely, and does not seem to treat there of internal calling grace, of which we are treating, but of external: For we see, he says, that some are moved differently than others to believe when the same things are demonstrated or signified. Hence he adduces the miracles which Christ wrought after His resurrection, whereby some believed, others did not: he adduces also the scars whereby He reduced the unbelieving disciple, or at least one wavering in faith, back to faith; all of which, as appears, pertain not so much to internal as to external grace.

I answer 3. That St. Augustine there appears to refer rather to the obstinacy of the mind and the defect of the will than to God Himself the incongruity of grace: Many are called, he says, but few chosen: namely those who despised not Him calling, but followed Him believing. And below: Not elected, because they did not follow. And again: Esau therefore would not, and did not run; yet even if he had willed and run, he would have arrived by the help of God, who would grant him even to will and run by calling, unless by despising the call he became reprobate. By which words he clearly signifies that the defect of conversion and salvation must be attributed not to inefficacy of grace, but to the rebellion of the will.

To this I add that the intention of any Author must not be judged from some particle of his doctrine, but his mind is to be regarded especially from other passages in which he expressly treats the difficulty and question: now it is certain that St. Augustine holds something else elsewhere: especially in book 12 of the City of God, chapter 6, where he speaks thus: For if some, equally affected in mind and body, behold the beauty of one body, and one of them be moved to enjoy it unlawfully, while the other perseveres in chaste will, what thinkest thou to be the cause? Then he adduces various causes which various persons might allege, against whom nevertheless he concludes: What else appears, save that one willed, and another willed not, to fall away from chastity? And in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, discoursing of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, whose ends were diverse, he speaks thus: As regards nature, both were men: as regards condition, both were kings: as regards cause, both pursued the captive people of God; as regards punishment, both were mildly admonished by the scourges of God: what then made their ends diverse, save that the one, feeling the hand of God, groaned in remembrance of his own infirmity; the other contending with free will against the most merciful goodness? By which words he indicates that the cause of the ends of these things must be sought from their liberty.