Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. That the soul is endowed chiefly with a threefold faculty, namely the intellectual, the volitive, and the memorative, which, as the Doctor teaches in 2. d. 17., are distinguished from it ⟦uncertain reading: raw OCR "ut decet"; sense and parallel require "docet"⟧ not really, as the Thomists contend, but formally, as the holy Fathers teach, especially saint Augustine, lib. 15. De Trinitate, cap. 11.: These three things, he says, memory, understanding, and will, since they are not three lives but one life, nor three minds but one mind, consequently assuredly are not three substances, but one substance. To this S. Bernard accords, Sermon 11. on the Canticles, where he says: Certain things I contemplate in the soul, memory, understanding, and will, and these three are the very soul itself. But this truth S. Isidore declares more clearly, lib. 11. Etymologiarum, cap. 1., and from him Hugh of Saint Victor, lib. De Spiritu et Anima, where he says: The soul is called by various names according to its operations: for it is called anima while it vivifies, sensus while it senses, animus while it is wise, mens while it understands: yet these do not differ in substance, as they do in names, since there is one essence, though indeed diverse properties. Hence arises the difficulty whether grace inheres in a faculty of the soul more immediately than in its very substance.

Note 2. In grace some distinguish two things, namely entity, and activity or virtue: for every grace, they say, even habitual, is ordered not only to the adornment and embellishment of the soul, but also to operation and act; nor is it deemed to adorn and illuminate the soul except insofar as it promotes it from the natural state to the supernatural, so that one who, powerful only by his own strength, can elicit only purely natural acts, by the benefit and virtue of grace elevated higher, and seconded with a greater and nobler activity, may also elicit acts of a superior order, whereby he may attain a supernatural end: but these two things, namely the entity of grace and its activity, differ only in name, seeing that the whole of grace is in itself active, and ordered to enlivening and elevating the virtue of the soul.

Note 3. Habitual grace, concerning which the question is here principally raised, confers upon the soul not so much a facility for exercising its acts favorably and more expeditiously, as a virtue and activity without which the soul could not elicit such acts. For, as we have said several times already, this difference intervenes between supernatural and natural habits: that the latter confer upon faculties merely a facility for exercising their acts through a certain habituation, whereby the obstacles that formerly impeded their prior actions are removed; but the former confer also a certain power, by elevating the soul and promoting it to a nobler state, in which it can elicit acts exceeding its natural powers in every way. These things having been set forth in brief, let there be

A single Conclusion. — GRACE INHERES IMMEDIATELY IN THE WILL, AND BY ITS MEDIACY IS SUBJECTATED IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL. So the Doctor in 2. dist. 26. quaest. unica, and likewise saint Bonaventure, same distinction, art. 1., q. 5., against the Thomists.

Proof first, from the authority of saint Augustine, Sermon 12. De Verbis Apostoli, cap. 12., where he says that grace is related to free choice as the rider to the horse: but free choice inheres immediately in the will: therefore also grace.

Proof second: A disposition to some form is subjectated in the subject of that form itself: but grace is a disposition to glory: therefore it inheres in the same subject in which glory and felicity ought to inhere: but beatitude and felicity inhere immediately in the will, and not in the very substance of the soul: therefore the same must be said of grace. He proves the major taken from the Doctor num. 1. ⟦uncertain reading: raw OCR "P'robat maiorem subsumpti Doctor num. t."⟧ Beatitude satiates the blessed: but it is impossible to conceive how he would be satiated unless he were joined to the beatific object by a vital act: nor could he be so joined unless by exercising such an act; and hence the soul is not joined to the beatific object by its substance, but by the operations of its faculties, and most truly by the operations of the will. — Then, if the soul were joined immediately through its substance to the beatific object, it would follow that if, per possible or per impossible, the powers of the soul were circumscribed from the soul itself, it could be beatified, and thus it would be blessed without any second act whereby the object would be attained: but this is absurd: therefore, etc. — Finally, if beatitude were immediately in the essence of the soul, then a true second act ⟦uncertain: raw OCR "non vern actus"; sentence continues on p210⟧ could be reckoned nothing other than habitual grace: but this cannot be said, otherwise the just in via would be blessed, because habitual charity and grace of the way and of the fatherland are of the same species, according to that word of saint Paul: Charity never falleth away: but this consequence is utterly absurd.

The Doctor proves third: Grace perfects the soul insofar as it is operative of an act meritorious: therefore it must inhere in the soul insofar as it is thus operative: but the soul is not operative of an act meritorious except insofar as it has a will: seeing that a meritorious act must necessarily be free: therefore, etc. He confirms it: wisdom must not be placed in the soul insofar as it is essence, but insofar as it has an intellect, because it is determinative with respect to acts of intellect: therefore by parity of reason grace, which is ordered to eliciting meritorious acts, must inhere in the soul insofar as it has a will, or inhere immediately in the will itself.

The Doctor proves finally: Grace and charity are not distinguished really: indeed, nor even formally adequately, as was proved above: therefore they must have the same subject immediately: but all confess that charity inheres immediately in the will: therefore they must concede the same concerning grace. He confirms it from the authority of S. Anselm, lib. De Conceptu virginali, cap. 3., where he says that justice and injustice too is formally in the will: but grace is justice; for through it we are formally made just: therefore it must reside immediately in the will. He confirms it 2. Grace and sin are formally opposed; if not by the nature of the thing and physically, at least morally and by divine ordination: therefore they pertain to the same subject; for opposites are about the same thing: but sin is in the will immediately: therefore also grace.

You will object 1. The essence is more indeterminate than the power: therefore it has more need of a determinant; and consequently grace, which is determinative, ought rather to be subjectated in the essence of the soul than in its power. — The Doctor distinguishes the antecedent num. 9. The essence is more ⟦illegible: reply continuation not captured by OCR on this faded leaf⟧

You will object 2. Grace is always in its act, and hence there must inhere in it that which is always in act: but a power is not always in act: therefore grace ought not to inhere in it immediately. The major is plain: for the act of grace is to render pleasing: but habitual grace, as long as it is in the soul, always renders it actually pleasing to God: therefore it is always in act. The minor also holds: for a power does not always elicit an act, nor is it in act, but is ordered to act: therefore what inheres in it cannot be always in act; for it cannot be in act unless the power were equally in act. — The Doctor distinguishes the major: grace is always in its act, which it produces effectively, he denies; in formal act, he concedes. And likewise his proof being distinguished, he denies the consequence: for the act of grace, which is to gratify, is not an act which grace produces effectively, but a formal act proceeding from its union with the soul.

You will object 3. A form whereby one determines to acting must rather be placed in the principal agent than in the instrument: but the essence is the principal agent; the power, however, is its instrument: therefore grace must rather inhere in the essence than in the power. — The Doctor distinguishes the major: that it must rather be in the essence than in an instrument separate, extrinsic, and really distinct, he concedes: than in an instrument joined, intrinsic, and only formally distinct from the essence, he denies: otherwise the habit of faith would rather have to inhere in the essence of the soul than in its intellect itself, nor would any habit of the virtues be placed in the will or appetite, but in the very essence of the soul, which certainly no one would admit.

You will object 4. Habits, which are received immediately in powers, are ordered only to acts of such powers: whereas grace is ordered not only to acts of the will, but also to acts of all the powers: therefore it is not received immediately in any power. — I distinguish the major: they are ordered only to eliciting and producing acts of such powers, I concede; to commanding and ordering them, I deny. For charity and grace are ordered only to eliciting those acts which customarily proceed from the will, and not from other faculties: seeing that they concur not effectively and formally to the act of faith, hope, etc., but only imperatively, namely admonishing the will, that it as mistress command the other faculties, insofar as they produce their acts.

Corollary. — From these gather that sanctifying grace can thus be defined: Habitual sanctifying grace is a supernatural quality of the soul infused by God, whereby we are made partakers of the divine nature, and are moved by God to honor and do that which conduces to the rite eternal ⟦uncertain: raw OCR "ad ritum cetri-nam conducit"; exact wording unsure⟧. Which definition that passage of S. Chrysostom, Homily De Baptismo, reported by S. Augustine, lib. 1. Contra Iulianum, cap. 6., most excellently illustrates, where he says:

That through this grace men become not only free, but also just; not only just, but also holy; not only holy, but also sons; not only sons, but also heirs; not only heirs, but also brethren: not only brethren, but also co-heirs: not only co-heirs, but also members; not only members, but also temple; not only temple, but also organs of the Holy Ghost.