Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. With the Doctor in 2. dist. 1. q. 2. n. 8., that creation is the production of the whole thing into being, with no part of it presupposed, or the production of a thing from nothing of subject and terminus: for creation is made from nothing not only of the terminus to be produced, because this likewise befits generation, but it is also made from nothing of subject: so that, as in generation there is made a transit from the non-being of the form to its being dependently upon a subject, so in creation there is made a transit from the non-being of form and matter to their being, or rather to the being of the whole composite, if the whole composite is produced; or to the being of matter, if matter alone is made; or to the being of form independently of a subject, if form alone is formed by creation.

Note 2. That eduction is a species of action opposed to creation; for as the formal ratio constituting creation is to be made independently of a subject, and from nothing, so the formal ratio constituting eduction is to be made out of something as out of a pre-existing subject. Hence three things are conceived in eduction: first, that from which eduction is made: second, that whose eduction is made: third, that out of which eduction is made. The first is the agent, the second is the form, the third is the subject. Hence two causes concur to eduction, namely efficient and material, or agent and subject; the former indeed as active and productive principle; the latter as passive and receptive principle: the one producing, the other sustaining, and thus influencing the production of the form, so that without such influx the form can neither be made nor conserved naturally.

Note 3. Here we are treating of the connatural production of grace, or of the mode whereby its nature demands it be produced. For it is beyond controversy that God by absolute power could create grace, and produce it independently of a subject: because although it be an accident, and for this reason seem to be made with some dependence on the subject in which it is received, nevertheless God could produce and conserve it independently of every subject; just as he conserves accidents independently of every subject; but the difficulty is whether grace by its nature demands rather to be created from nothing than educed from a subject. Concerning which question there is a threefold opinion: the first of the Thomists teaching grace to be educed from the power of the soul: the second of Paludanus, Ferrariensis, and Soto, and others asserting habitual grace not to be created absolutely, but concreated at the creation of man the just: the third is that of the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 17. q. 6. num. 5. and in 2. dist. 1. num. 14. most especially however in 4. dist. 1. quaest. 1. et 2. and also of Alexander of Hales 2. part. quaest. 1. and St. Bonaventure in 2. dist. 26. art. 1. q. 2.; which opinion as truer, and safer, that it may appear more evidently, let it be

Single Conclusion. — Sanctifying grace is produced by true creation properly so called.

Proof 1. from holy Scripture, which as often as it makes mention of the production of grace, so often declares it created. Thus Psal. 50. Create a clean heart in me, O God. And the Apostle ad Gal. 6. calls the just man a new creature. And ad Ephes. 2. the faithful are said to be created in Christ Jesus: and cap. 4. he admonishes them to put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth: all which texts would have no true signification if grace were not properly created: therefore it must truly be said to be created.

The Thomists reply, grace is said to be created, not because according to its natural and physical esse it is produced from nothing, which is required for the ratio of perfect creation; but because it is infused by God with no merits of ours preceding, which has a certain similitude with creation, and may be called moral creation. They confirm this from the fact that in Scripture the just man is said to be generated by grace, according to that of Paul, first ad Corinth. 4. In Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the Gospel. And this, first Peter 2. As newborn babes: but all generation, human excepted, is made by eduction of the form, not indeed by creation: presently therefore also in holy Scripture grace is said to be educed. — Against, the words of Scripture are to be understood according to the literal sense, as St. Augustine teaches in many places, when no repugnancy appears thence, nor does anything emerge against piety and truth: but that the aforesaid texts of Scripture are understood of true creation, nothing emerges conflicting with reason nor with truth or piety: presently they are to be understood of true creation. Add that their reason is altogether nothing; since man a sinner can remotely at least dispose himself toward receiving habitual grace, and merit it de congruo, and accordingly absolutely it is not made from any previous moral disposition. Moreover the Thomists concede there is no moral cause of habitual grace: therefore much more ought they to admit that there is none physical, material, and subjective cause of it; since physical causality after the mode of matter is far greater than moral: therefore if this is denied to the production of grace, that it may be judged a pure benefit of God, with better right must subjective causality be denied, that namely the production and conferral of grace be reduced to the sole liberality of God and his supconditionem retundatur ⟦illegible: raw OCR "cmnditatem retundatur"; page opens mid-sentence⟧. To the confirmation I say neither text of Scripture cited by the Thomists helps them ⟦uncertain reading: raw OCR "ip-is lavere"; sense requires "iuvare/iuvari"⟧: since St. Paul speaks of the ministry of Gospel preaching, whereby he had begotten the faithful Corinthians to Christ, that is, had illustrated those already formed into new men by baptismal grace with the Gospel truths: for the office of the Apostle himself was not to bestow on them sanctifying grace, except ministerially only: whence he could not be named their father absolutely. Hence St. Peter declaring the matter more plainly, does not say men renewed by baptism to be begotten absolutely, but quasi-begotten.

Proof second by reason: Grace is the most excellent and most noble of all creatures: therefore it demands to be produced by the most perfect of all actions: but creation is the most excellent of all actions, and far more noble than eduction: therefore sanctifying grace is not educed but created. The major stands: both because grace is of supernatural order, presently transcending the whole perfection of all nature: and because it orders and conduces to a far more excellent end, namely to God, as author and bestower of glory: whereas other created things look upon God only as author of nature: finally because it is the most excellent participation of the Divinity, who illustrates men far more nobly than any created gifts whatsoever, inasmuch as he constitutes them adoptive sons of God and heirs of himself. Sequitur etiam maior patet ⟦uncertain: raw OCR "Sequeln etiam maioris patet"⟧, for on this account the rational soul is produced by creation, namely because it is most excellent among creatures of natural order: therefore by equal reason sanctifying grace, since it is the most excellent of all created things, demands rather to be produced by creation than by eduction.

Proof third: That begins through creation which ceases through annihilation: but grace ceases through annihilation: therefore it begins through creation. The major stands: for that which is annihilated is corrupted through its whole being, so that nothing of it remains, neither by reason of form, nor by reason of the matter out of which and in which, that is, by reason of the subject from which the form could be conceived and formed: and consequently, when it passes into nothing, it must also proceed from nothing. For if it were resolved into something, especially into a subject out of which it would arise, and consequently, since in its annihilation it is not resolved into something, also in its production it is not formed out of something. The minor also stands both by the authority of St. Thomas himself in 2. dist. 26. quaest. unica, art. 2. ad 5., where he expressly says that when grace is corrupted, it at the same time passes also into nothing; and by reason, because if grace when it ceases to be were resolved into something, especially into a substance, or faculties of the soul, in which it inheres: but that seems improbable; for a supernatural being, such as grace is, does not seem able to be resolved into a purely natural being, such as the faculty of the soul and substance.

You will say. Creation is of entities subsisting per se: but grace, since it is an accident depending on a subject, does not subsist per se: therefore neither is it produced by creation. — I distinguish the major: creation is of entities subsisting per se and independent from a subject from which they would be produced by eduction, I concede; independent from a subject in which they are received, once they have been produced, I deny. Therefore in the justification of man, as the Doctor observes in 1. dist. 17. quaest. 6. num. 6., a twofold action intervenes: one by which grace is created, another by which it is united to the subject, which union is formally called the justification or regeneration of man, just as the rational soul is created by one action and united to matter by another: which union is the generation of man. Whence the first action is properly called creation; for it is an action from the non-being of grace to its being: but the second is not properly called creation, though it could be called transmutation, because by it the soul is changed from being unpleasing to being pleasing to God; or, as the Doctor speaks, there is there a twofold change, one from non-being of charity or of grace to the being of grace, and this is that change which is creation, and is one change properly so called, because it presupposes nothing, neither nature nor its receptive subject. Another change is from a subject not beloved to being beloved, and thus the soul is changed from not being beloved to being beloved: and this change is not simply creation, because it presupposes a recipient, and hence this change in a certain respect can be called generation, and the whole composite is reckoned as generated such, and not simply: because the substance which is the terminus of generation, and was present or presupposed, is generated according to its grateful and accidental being in the infusion of grace.

You will urge. In that first instant in which grace is formed, either it is produced outside the subject, or in the subject. Not the first, otherwise an accident would naturally be without a subject, which is absurd, since inherence is natural to it. If the second: therefore grace is not created, but educed, because the subject concurs to its production in the genus of material cause. — I answer. Grace in the instant of time in which it is created is in the subject ⟦uncertain: raw OCR gives no main verb here; construction elliptical⟧: but truly in the instant of nature it is neither in the subject nor outside the subject: because as such it is considered only according to its being of grace simply, and not according to the reason of inherence or of non-inherence: just as the essence of man is considered only as the essence of man, not indeed as visible, nor as invisible.

You will press. Therefore substantial forms other than the rational soul, and likewise accidents, are collected to be educed from the potency of matter, and not created: because in coming-to-be and in being conserved they depend on a subject: and therefore they are collected to depend thus, because they are not naturally produced nor conserved without a subject, unless a miracle intervene: therefore since grace is neither produced nor conserved except in a subject, short of a miracle, it is rightly inferred that it depends on a subject in being and in being conserved, and consequently that it is not created, but educed from the potency of the subject. — I deny the antecedent: for precisely for this reason those forms are collected to depend on a subject, not because they are produced in it, but either because they are its connatural perfections, forthwith ordered to its natural complement; or because they are products of a second efficient cause acting dependently upon the concurrence and influx of the subject: since since a second cause cannot create, it necessarily requires a subject with which, and in which, it may act: and forthwith those forms, both substantial and accidental, are necessarily educed from the potency of the subject, because the subject concurs and inflows toward their production. But it is otherwise concerning grace, which since it is produced immediately by God, does not necessarily require the influx of a subject: nevertheless it is not produced, nor conserved, outside the subject, because since it has no particular operations which it could exercise outside the subject, it would be produced and conserved outside the subject uselessly and in vain.

You will say 2. The soul is said to have a natural inclination toward grace: but for no other reason than because grace is educed from it: therefore, etc. —

I deny the minor: seeing that the body also has an inclination toward the rational soul: yet that soul is not educed from it, but created.

You will say 3. What is created cannot be corrupted by any second cause: for the rational soul, which is created, is naturally incorruptible: but grace is corrupted by the sinful action of a second cause: therefore it is not created, but educed. — I answer 1. by denying the major: for an accidental form, were it created, could be corrupted physically by a second cause, if that cause produced a form incompatible with the created form, and demanding connaturally its removal from the subject: for since whatever form, substantial or accidental, cannot be naturally conserved outside a subject, by that very fact whereby a second cause would introduce into the subject a form incompossible with the created form, this latter must necessarily be destroyed. I answer 2. by distinguishing the minor: some second cause destroys grace physically, and by a true corruptive action of it, I deny; morally, and by reason of the ordination of God, who decreed not to conserve grace in a soul stained by mortal sin, I concede.

You will say finally. Creation is the production of the whole entity: but in the justification of man the whole entity is not produced, since a subject is presupposed, namely man: therefore grace is not created. — I answer by distinguishing the minor: in the justification of man, which takes place through the union of grace with the subject, the whole entity is not produced, because indeed a subject is presupposed to which grace is united, I concede: the whole being of grace is not produced by that prior action by which grace is conceived to be produced in the instant antecedent to its union, I deny. For, as we said above from the Doctor, in the justification of man two actions concur really distinct: one which terminates at the very being of grace which is produced: another which terminates at its union with the subject, namely the soul or the will. The former is altogether independent of the subject, and thus is creation properly so called: the latter, however, necessarily connotes the subject, as also the grace, by which it is deemed to be united with that same subject.