Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. That a productive cause is distinguished threefold by the Philosophers, namely principal, co-agent, and instrumental. The principal cause is that which is first, and independent of the concurrence of a superior cause of the same kind in the production of the effect; so that the other causes depend upon its influx. A co-agent, or less principal cause, is said to be that which indeed influences the effect efficiently, but with dependence upon the principal cause; so that without its concurrence it would not at all influence the effect. Finally, the instrumental cause is that by which the effect indeed attains its production, not so much through a proper virtue intrinsically inherent in it, as through the virtue of the principal agent, by whom it is moved and assumed for producing the effect.

Note 2. All Theologians agree with the Council of Trent, in the place soon to be cited, that the first and supreme efficient cause of grace is God, who washes and sanctifies gratuitously, signing and anointing with the spirit of promise, as the Council speaks after the Apostle, 1 Cor. 6. and ad Titum 3; but that the less principal and meritorious cause is Christ the Lord, who by the principal ministry is the executor of grace and glory, and the institutor of the sacraments, and who by his most holy passion merited justification for us, and satisfied God the Father for the sins of men. Finally, the instrumental efficient causes are the sacraments themselves instituted by Christ, which God uses as instruments for producing grace, not physically, as the Thomists will, but morally, as the Subtle Doctor and his Disciples affirm. But the difficulty is whether any creature also, by ordinary or extraordinary law, can have the ratio of a principal productive cause of grace.

Note 3. The controversy is moved especially concerning the humanity of Christ, which since it is the most excellent and most powerful of created things, inasmuch as all power in heaven and in earth was given to it, has also the most efficacious virtue of operating above the other creatures in the order of nature, grace, and glory; hence some Theologians will it to be not only the meritorious cause, but even the principal effective cause of grace; so that it truly concurs with physical concurrence toward its production. Thus hold Medina in 3. part. q. 13. dubio ultimo, and Cabrera there disp. 2., where they teach that the humanity of Christ, or Christ the Lord inasmuch as man, is the principal cause of sanctifying grace in all the just, yet secondary however, and subordinated to God. But how improbable their opinion is, the following will disclose.

Single Conclusion. — God is so alone the principal efficient cause of grace, that no agent creature can be given so perfect that it obtain the same principal productive virtue of grace. This is common to both the Angelic and the Subtle school.

Proof first: He alone can produce justifying grace as principal cause who alone can justify: but God alone can justify men, and cleanse from sin: therefore the production of justifying grace belongs to God alone, as principal cause. The major stands; for sanctifying grace is infusion, the forgiveness and absolution of sins. But the minor is proved from holy Scripture. Job 14. Who can make clean him that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who only art? Isaiah 1. I am he that blotteth out thy iniquities, tell if thou hast anything that thou mayst be justified. Rom. 3. For there is one God, that justifieth. And 8. God is he that justifieth; who is he that condemneth? From which words it is clearly gathered that habitual grace, which is the formal cause of justification and remission of sins, depends on God alone, as on the principal cause, so that the productive force of it can belong to no other. Whence deservedly St. August. book 1. De peccatorum meritis, cap. 11. says: Whosoever therefore shall have dared to say: I justify thee, (namely as principal cause) it follows that he say also: Believe in me: thence he concludes, that as we must believe in God alone, so must we judge that no creature, but God alone, as principal cause, can justify. The reason of this truth is, because the offense of God hangs absolutely upon his right, concerning which no other can dispose, except through a vicarial power delegated to himself as minister and dispenser by God himself.

Nor does it avail to reply, those testimonies are to be understood of the principal cause, which is first and independent of superior concurrence, but not of the secondary principal. — This reply, I say, is altogether nothing; because since it is proper to God to be the first cause and independent of every other superior, not only with respect to divine grace, but also in order to whatever effect whatsoever: it is evident that in those places Scripture would assert nothing special to the production of grace and the justification of sins, if it intended nothing else.

Proof second: He alone can be the principal cause of grace who alone can give the Holy Spirit, as chief cause: but no creature, even Christ the Lord inasmuch as man, has the physical and principal power of giving the Holy Spirit: therefore neither of conferring and producing habitual grace. The major is evident from that to Rom. 5. The charity of God is poured forth, etc. But the minor is proved: the gift must be in some way in the power of the giver himself, either by origin, or by possession: but in neither of these modes can the Holy Spirit be Christ's, as man, nor of any pure creature: therefore none besides God can give the Holy Spirit; and presently neither confer sanctifying grace. Hence deservedly St. Augustine, in the book De Trinitate, c. 12., distinguishing those things which befit Christ as God from those which befit him as man, teaches Christ the Lord, inasmuch as God, to have said to the Apostles, Ioan. 16., concerning the Holy Spirit: But if I go I will send him to you: but inasmuch as he was man, to have said, Ioan. 11.

I will ask the Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete: by which he would signify that he, as man, could not principally, and of his own authority give the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, but that inasmuch as he was man he ought to obtain him from God by prayers.

Proof third: If any creature could produce grace, it would best perform this either by creating it, or by educting it from the obediential power of the soul: but a creature can perform neither: therefore neither can it physically produce grace, as principal cause. The major stands: for grace cannot be produced, unless either from nothing by creation, or from the power of the subject by eduction. But the minor is proved: first as regards creation, because since creation is the production of being from nothing, he who creates must, as principal cause, have dominion over producible being as such, and consequently be Lord of all producible entity: but this, as is manifest, cannot belong to any creature: therefore, etc. It stands also as regards eduction: both because, as we shall prove in the following Question, grace is not educed but created; and also because even if it were educed, that educing virtue could not belong to a creature: for as natural educative virtue has dominion over the natural power of the subject from which it educes the form, so he who educes something from obediential power ought to have dominion over such a power: but no creature can have such dominion; since obediential power is that by which every creature is subjected to the absolute dominion of God so as to obey in all those things which involve no contradiction; and absolutely that dominion of God can be attributed to no creature: therefore neither that educative virtue of grace.

You will object 1. Those texts of Scripture, whereby Christ the Lord seems signified, as man, to be the physical principal cause of grace and of our justification: thus John 1. The law was given by Moses; grace and truth were made by Jesus Christ. And John 10., Christ the Lord himself says: I am the door; by me if any one enter in, he shall be saved: but principal authority is signified by the door: therefore Christ has principal authority and productive virtue of grace. — I distinguish the consequent: Christ has principal productive virtue of grace, either inasmuch as God, or inasmuch as man. I concede: inasmuch as man, I deny. For as in Christ there is a twofold nature, namely divine and human, so likewise in him there is a twofold virtue concerning the communication and production of grace. For inasmuch as man he has meritorious virtue with respect to the production of grace, and also the power of excellence, or of principal ministry, with respect to its communication, inasmuch namely as his humanity is an instrument conjoined personally to the divinity, by reason of which union he is head of the whole Church, influencing the life of grace into each of the faithful as members of that mystic head: but inasmuch as God, he has principal power of producing grace: whence the aforesaid texts of Scripture are to be understood of one or other of these powers; and presently they urge nothing against the Conclusion.

You will object 2. He who principally produces the ultimate disposition to some form can produce that form itself also: but man principally produces the ultimate disposition to grace: therefore he can produce that also as principal cause. The major stands, for indeed he who produces heat as eighth, and in the proximate degree for receiving the form of fire, produces that same form of fire. But the minor is proved: man principally elicits acts of contrition and charity: but those are ultimate dispositions to grace: therefore, etc. — I answer first by distinguishing the major: the agent, which principally produces the ultimate disposition to some form, can also produce that form itself, when it is educed from the natural power of the subject, I concede: when it is educed from its obediential power, I deny. For since obediential power is subject to God alone, nor does it lie under the dominion of any creature, it follows that no creature can produce that form, if it is truly educed: much less when it is created, as sanctifying grace in fact is created, as we shall soon prove. I answer secondly that the major is true when the productive form follows naturally and necessarily upon the production of the ultimate disposition: but otherwise when beyond the positing of the ultimate disposition some condition is required on the part of the extrinsic agent, which he who introduces the ultimate disposition cannot cause: but so it is in the present case: for beyond the act of charity and contrition, which is the disposition to grace, there is still required on the part of God special benevolence and acceptance and remission, whereby he may will to remit sin and accept man formerly hostile into his friendship: presently that remission of sin and conferral of sanctifying grace does not follow naturally and necessarily upon the positing of the ultimate disposition, or the act of love and contrition: as the form of fire follows the positing of the eighth and last degree of heat: but only sanctifying grace follows the act of charity and contrition from the mere good pleasure of God and his voluntary acceptance.

You will object 3. God can produce a quality of such perfection that it have the force of producing grace principally: therefore truly that virtue can belong to some creature. The antecedent is proved: if anything stood in the way why that quality should not be producible, especially because grace, since it is of supernatural order, requires a cause which has of itself and in itself an altogether supernatural activity: but this virtue conflicts not with a creature: for the light of glory by its proper and intrinsic virtue raises man to the supernatural state, and together with it efficiently concurs, as principal cause, toward the act of the vision of God, just as habitual grace itself concurs toward meritorious supernatural acts: therefore, etc. — I deny the antecedent: for that quality would either be more perfect than grace, or equal, or less perfect. If less perfect, without doubt it could not produce grace; for a less perfect cause cannot principally produce an effect more excellent than itself: since no one gives what he has not: presently that less perfect cause could not attribute to the effect that eminent perfection which itself has not. Nor equally perfect: otherwise also sanctifying grace could produce another sanctifying grace of the same degree and perfection, which none admits. Finally not more perfect, for grace is the most perfect quality of supernatural things, and the most noble participation of God, presently no other quality more excellent and more perfect than sanctifying grace itself is thinkable for this state. But to the proof of the objector I say there is no parity, for more things are required to produce a supernatural habit than an act, because a supernatural habit has more the ratio of power than habit, since it gives not only more easily but simply the ability to operate: but an act cannot produce a power, nor that which gives simply the ability to operate. For the act of vision neither produces nor augments the visual faculty: therefore sanctifying grace cannot be produced through any act of a creature. Whence it follows that sanctifying grace must be created, yet no creature can create.

You will object 1. Supernatural habits can de facto be generated from supernatural acts, as some Scotists judge probable: therefore by the absolute power of God, such acts could also produce a habit of grace. They prove the consequence, for acts are more perfect than habits: therefore if those acts are produced by a creature, de facto also habits could be produced by the absolute power of God through some creature. — I deny the consequence: for even if those habits were supernatural (as now I suppose gratuitously), nevertheless they are acquired through supernatural acts, which since they are vital require a created principle: but grace is an infused habit, and producible only through creation, and therefore cannot be produced except by another than God.