Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Having explained, as far as possible, the nature of habitual grace, we must consequently treat in this Article of its causes, all of which the Tridentine Council openly declares in Session 6, chapter 7, in these words:

The final cause of this justification is the glory of God and of Christ, and life everlasting; the efficient cause is a merciful God, who washes and sanctifies gratuitously, signing and anointing with the holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance; but the meritorious cause is His most beloved only-begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, when we were enemies, for the exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, merited for us justification by His most holy Passion on the wood of the cross, and made satisfaction for us unto God the Father; the instrumental cause is likewise the sacrament of Baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, without which no man was ever justified. Finally, the sole formal cause is the justice of God: not that by which He Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just: namely, that justice which, bestowed on us by Him, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind: and not only are we reputed, but we are truly called and are just.

Although, as is clear from the foregoing words, there are many causes of grace, nevertheless our discussion here will be only of the Efficient cause, and of the Material cause, as well as of the subjective principle of habitual grace, which is the principal analogue under this name grace.

Note 1. That a productive cause is distinguished threefold by the Philosophers, namely principal, co-agent, and instrumental. The principal cause is that which is first, and independent of the concurrence of a superior cause of the same kind in the production of the effect; so that the other causes depend upon its influx. A co-agent, or less principal cause, is said to be that which indeed influences the effect efficiently, but with dependence upon the principal cause; so that without its concurrence it would not at all influence the effect. Finally, the instrumental cause is that by which the effect indeed attains its production, not so much through a proper virtue intrinsically inherent in it, as through the virtue of the principal agent, by whom it is moved and assumed for producing the effect.

Note 2. All Theologians agree with the Council of Trent, in the place soon to be cited, that the first and supreme efficient cause of grace is God, who washes and sanctifies gratuitously, signing and anointing with the spirit of promise, as the Council speaks after the Apostle, 1 Cor. 6. and ad Titum 3; but that the less principal and meritorious cause is Christ the Lord, who by the principal ministry is the executor of grace and glory, and the institutor of the sacraments, and who by his most holy passion merited justification for us, and satisfied God the Father for the sins of men. Finally, the instrumental efficient causes are the sacraments themselves instituted by Christ, which God uses as instruments for producing grace, not physically, as the Thomists will, but morally, as the Subtle Doctor and his Disciples affirm. But the difficulty is whether any creature also, by ordinary or extraordinary law, can have the ratio of a principal productive cause of grace.

Note 3. The controversy is moved especially concerning the humanity of Christ, which since it is the most excellent and most powerful of created things, inasmuch as all power in heaven and in earth was given to it, has also the most efficacious virtue of operating above the other creatures in the order of nature, grace, and glory; hence some Theologians will it to be not only the meritorious cause, but even the principal effective cause of grace; so that it truly concurs with physical concurrence toward its production. Thus hold Medina in 3. part. q. 13. dubio ultimo, and Cabrera there disp. 2., where they teach that the humanity of Christ, or Christ the Lord inasmuch as man, is the principal cause of sanctifying grace in all the just, yet secondary however, and subordinated to God. But how improbable their opinion is, the following will disclose.

Single Conclusion. — God is so alone the principal efficient cause of grace, that no agent creature can be given so perfect that it obtain the same principal productive virtue of grace. This is common to both the Angelic and the Subtle school.

Proof first: He alone can produce justifying grace as principal cause who alone can justify: but God alone can justify men, and cleanse from sin: therefore the production of justifying grace belongs to God alone, as principal cause. The major stands; for sanctifying grace is infusion, the forgiveness and absolution of sins. But the minor is proved from holy Scripture. Job 14. Who can make clean him that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who only art? Isaiah 1. I am he that blotteth out thy iniquities, tell if thou hast anything that thou mayst be justified. Rom. 3. For there is one God, that justifieth. And 8. God is he that justifieth; who is he that condemneth? From which words it is clearly gathered that habitual grace, which is the formal cause of justification and remission of sins, depends on God alone, as on the principal cause, so that the productive force of it can belong to no other. Whence deservedly St. August. book 1. De peccatorum meritis, cap. 11. says: Whosoever therefore shall have dared to say: I justify thee, (namely as principal cause) it follows that he say also: Believe in me: thence he concludes, that as we must believe in God alone, so must we judge that no creature, but God alone, as principal cause, can justify. The reason of this truth is, because the offense of God hangs absolutely upon his right, concerning which no other can dispose, except through a vicarial power delegated to himself as minister and dispenser by God himself.

Nor does it avail to reply, those testimonies are to be understood of the principal cause, which is first and independent of superior concurrence, but not of the secondary principal. — This reply, I say, is altogether nothing; because since it is proper to God to be the first cause and independent of every other superior, not only with respect to divine grace, but also in order to whatever effect whatsoever: it is evident that in those places Scripture would assert nothing special to the production of grace and the justification of sins, if it intended nothing else.

Proof second: He alone can be the principal cause of grace who alone can give the Holy Spirit, as chief cause: but no creature, even Christ the Lord inasmuch as man, has the physical and principal power of giving the Holy Spirit: therefore neither of conferring and producing habitual grace. The major is evident from that to Rom. 5. The charity of God is poured forth, etc. But the minor is proved: the gift must be in some way in the power of the giver himself, either by origin, or by possession: but in neither of these modes can the Holy Spirit be Christ's, as man, nor of any pure creature: therefore none besides God can give the Holy Spirit; and presently neither confer sanctifying grace. Hence deservedly St. Augustine, in the book De Trinitate, c. 12., distinguishing those things which befit Christ as God from those which befit him as man, teaches Christ the Lord, inasmuch as God, to have said to the Apostles, Ioan. 16., concerning the Holy Spirit: But if I go I will send him to you: but inasmuch as he was man, to have said, Ioan. 11.

I will ask the Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete: by which he would signify that he, as man, could not principally, and of his own authority give the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, but that inasmuch as he was man he ought to obtain him from God by prayers.

Proof third: If any creature could produce grace, it would best perform this either by creating it, or by educting it from the obediential power of the soul: but a creature can perform neither: therefore neither can it physically produce grace, as principal cause. The major stands: for grace cannot be produced, unless either from nothing by creation, or from the power of the subject by eduction. But the minor is proved: first as regards creation, because since creation is the production of being from nothing, he who creates must, as principal cause, have dominion over producible being as such, and consequently be Lord of all producible entity: but this, as is manifest, cannot belong to any creature: therefore, etc. It stands also as regards eduction: both because, as we shall prove in the following Question, grace is not educed but created; and also because even if it were educed, that educing virtue could not belong to a creature: for as natural educative virtue has dominion over the natural power of the subject from which it educes the form, so he who educes something from obediential power ought to have dominion over such a power: but no creature can have such dominion; since obediential power is that by which every creature is subjected to the absolute dominion of God so as to obey in all those things which involve no contradiction; and absolutely that dominion of God can be attributed to no creature: therefore neither that educative virtue of grace.

You will object 1. Those texts of Scripture, whereby Christ the Lord seems signified, as man, to be the physical principal cause of grace and of our justification: thus John 1. The law was given by Moses; grace and truth were made by Jesus Christ. And John 10., Christ the Lord himself says: I am the door; by me if any one enter in, he shall be saved: but principal authority is signified by the door: therefore Christ has principal authority and productive virtue of grace. — I distinguish the consequent: Christ has principal productive virtue of grace, either inasmuch as God, or inasmuch as man. I concede: inasmuch as man, I deny. For as in Christ there is a twofold nature, namely divine and human, so likewise in him there is a twofold virtue concerning the communication and production of grace. For inasmuch as man he has meritorious virtue with respect to the production of grace, and also the power of excellence, or of principal ministry, with respect to its communication, inasmuch namely as his humanity is an instrument conjoined personally to the divinity, by reason of which union he is head of the whole Church, influencing the life of grace into each of the faithful as members of that mystic head: but inasmuch as God, he has principal power of producing grace: whence the aforesaid texts of Scripture are to be understood of one or other of these powers; and presently they urge nothing against the Conclusion.

You will object 2. He who principally produces the ultimate disposition to some form can produce that form itself also: but man principally produces the ultimate disposition to grace: therefore he can produce that also as principal cause. The major stands, for indeed he who produces heat as eighth, and in the proximate degree for receiving the form of fire, produces that same form of fire. But the minor is proved: man principally elicits acts of contrition and charity: but those are ultimate dispositions to grace: therefore, etc. — I answer first by distinguishing the major: the agent, which principally produces the ultimate disposition to some form, can also produce that form itself, when it is educed from the natural power of the subject, I concede: when it is educed from its obediential power, I deny. For since obediential power is subject to God alone, nor does it lie under the dominion of any creature, it follows that no creature can produce that form, if it is truly educed: much less when it is created, as sanctifying grace in fact is created, as we shall soon prove. I answer secondly that the major is true when the productive form follows naturally and necessarily upon the production of the ultimate disposition: but otherwise when beyond the positing of the ultimate disposition some condition is required on the part of the extrinsic agent, which he who introduces the ultimate disposition cannot cause: but so it is in the present case: for beyond the act of charity and contrition, which is the disposition to grace, there is still required on the part of God special benevolence and acceptance and remission, whereby he may will to remit sin and accept man formerly hostile into his friendship: presently that remission of sin and conferral of sanctifying grace does not follow naturally and necessarily upon the positing of the ultimate disposition, or the act of love and contrition: as the form of fire follows the positing of the eighth and last degree of heat: but only sanctifying grace follows the act of charity and contrition from the mere good pleasure of God and his voluntary acceptance.

You will object 3. God can produce a quality of such perfection that it have the force of producing grace principally: therefore truly that virtue can belong to some creature. The antecedent is proved: if anything stood in the way why that quality should not be producible, especially because grace, since it is of supernatural order, requires a cause which has of itself and in itself an altogether supernatural activity: but this virtue conflicts not with a creature: for the light of glory by its proper and intrinsic virtue raises man to the supernatural state, and together with it efficiently concurs, as principal cause, toward the act of the vision of God, just as habitual grace itself concurs toward meritorious supernatural acts: therefore, etc. — I deny the antecedent: for that quality would either be more perfect than grace, or equal, or less perfect. If less perfect, without doubt it could not produce grace; for a less perfect cause cannot principally produce an effect more excellent than itself: since no one gives what he has not: presently that less perfect cause could not attribute to the effect that eminent perfection which itself has not. Nor equally perfect: otherwise also sanctifying grace could produce another sanctifying grace of the same degree and perfection, which none admits. Finally not more perfect, for grace is the most perfect quality of supernatural things, and the most noble participation of God, presently no other quality more excellent and more perfect than sanctifying grace itself is thinkable for this state. But to the proof of the objector I say there is no parity, for more things are required to produce a supernatural habit than an act, because a supernatural habit has more the ratio of power than habit, since it gives not only more easily but simply the ability to operate: but an act cannot produce a power, nor that which gives simply the ability to operate. For the act of vision neither produces nor augments the visual faculty: therefore sanctifying grace cannot be produced through any act of a creature. Whence it follows that sanctifying grace must be created, yet no creature can create.

You will object 1. Supernatural habits can de facto be generated from supernatural acts, as some Scotists judge probable: therefore by the absolute power of God, such acts could also produce a habit of grace. They prove the consequence, for acts are more perfect than habits: therefore if those acts are produced by a creature, de facto also habits could be produced by the absolute power of God through some creature. — I deny the consequence: for even if those habits were supernatural (as now I suppose gratuitously), nevertheless they are acquired through supernatural acts, which since they are vital require a created principle: but grace is an infused habit, and producible only through creation, and therefore cannot be produced except by another than God.

Note 1. With the Doctor in 2. dist. 1. q. 2. n. 8., that creation is the production of the whole thing into being, with no part of it presupposed, or the production of a thing from nothing of subject and terminus: for creation is made from nothing not only of the terminus to be produced, because this likewise befits generation, but it is also made from nothing of subject: so that, as in generation there is made a transit from the non-being of the form to its being dependently upon a subject, so in creation there is made a transit from the non-being of form and matter to their being, or rather to the being of the whole composite, if the whole composite is produced; or to the being of matter, if matter alone is made; or to the being of form independently of a subject, if form alone is formed by creation.

Note 2. That eduction is a species of action opposed to creation; for as the formal ratio constituting creation is to be made independently of a subject, and from nothing, so the formal ratio constituting eduction is to be made out of something as out of a pre-existing subject. Hence three things are conceived in eduction: first, that from which eduction is made: second, that whose eduction is made: third, that out of which eduction is made. The first is the agent, the second is the form, the third is the subject. Hence two causes concur to eduction, namely efficient and material, or agent and subject; the former indeed as active and productive principle; the latter as passive and receptive principle: the one producing, the other sustaining, and thus influencing the production of the form, so that without such influx the form can neither be made nor conserved naturally.

Note 3. Here we are treating of the connatural production of grace, or of the mode whereby its nature demands it be produced. For it is beyond controversy that God by absolute power could create grace, and produce it independently of a subject: because although it be an accident, and for this reason seem to be made with some dependence on the subject in which it is received, nevertheless God could produce and conserve it independently of every subject; just as he conserves accidents independently of every subject; but the difficulty is whether grace by its nature demands rather to be created from nothing than educed from a subject. Concerning which question there is a threefold opinion: the first of the Thomists teaching grace to be educed from the power of the soul: the second of Paludanus, Ferrariensis, and Soto, and others asserting habitual grace not to be created absolutely, but concreated at the creation of man the just: the third is that of the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 17. q. 6. num. 5. and in 2. dist. 1. num. 14. most especially however in 4. dist. 1. quaest. 1. et 2. and also of Alexander of Hales 2. part. quaest. 1. and St. Bonaventure in 2. dist. 26. art. 1. q. 2.; which opinion as truer, and safer, that it may appear more evidently, let it be

Single Conclusion. — Sanctifying grace is produced by true creation properly so called.

Proof 1. from holy Scripture, which as often as it makes mention of the production of grace, so often declares it created. Thus Psal. 50. Create a clean heart in me, O God. And the Apostle ad Gal. 6. calls the just man a new creature. And ad Ephes. 2. the faithful are said to be created in Christ Jesus: and cap. 4. he admonishes them to put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth: all which texts would have no true signification if grace were not properly created: therefore it must truly be said to be created.

The Thomists reply, grace is said to be created, not because according to its natural and physical esse it is produced from nothing, which is required for the ratio of perfect creation; but because it is infused by God with no merits of ours preceding, which has a certain similitude with creation, and may be called moral creation. They confirm this from the fact that in Scripture the just man is said to be generated by grace, according to that of Paul, first ad Corinth. 4. In Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the Gospel. And this, first Peter 2. As newborn babes: but all generation, human excepted, is made by eduction of the form, not indeed by creation: presently therefore also in holy Scripture grace is said to be educed. — Against, the words of Scripture are to be understood according to the literal sense, as St. Augustine teaches in many places, when no repugnancy appears thence, nor does anything emerge against piety and truth: but that the aforesaid texts of Scripture are understood of true creation, nothing emerges conflicting with reason nor with truth or piety: presently they are to be understood of true creation. Add that their reason is altogether nothing; since man a sinner can remotely at least dispose himself toward receiving habitual grace, and merit it de congruo, and accordingly absolutely it is not made from any previous moral disposition. Moreover the Thomists concede there is no moral cause of habitual grace: therefore much more ought they to admit that there is none physical, material, and subjective cause of it; since physical causality after the mode of matter is far greater than moral: therefore if this is denied to the production of grace, that it may be judged a pure benefit of God, with better right must subjective causality be denied, that namely the production and conferral of grace be reduced to the sole liberality of God and his supconditionem retundatur ⟦illegible: raw OCR "cmnditatem retundatur"; page opens mid-sentence⟧. To the confirmation I say neither text of Scripture cited by the Thomists helps them ⟦uncertain reading: raw OCR "ip-is lavere"; sense requires "iuvare/iuvari"⟧: since St. Paul speaks of the ministry of Gospel preaching, whereby he had begotten the faithful Corinthians to Christ, that is, had illustrated those already formed into new men by baptismal grace with the Gospel truths: for the office of the Apostle himself was not to bestow on them sanctifying grace, except ministerially only: whence he could not be named their father absolutely. Hence St. Peter declaring the matter more plainly, does not say men renewed by baptism to be begotten absolutely, but quasi-begotten.

Proof second by reason: Grace is the most excellent and most noble of all creatures: therefore it demands to be produced by the most perfect of all actions: but creation is the most excellent of all actions, and far more noble than eduction: therefore sanctifying grace is not educed but created. The major stands: both because grace is of supernatural order, presently transcending the whole perfection of all nature: and because it orders and conduces to a far more excellent end, namely to God, as author and bestower of glory: whereas other created things look upon God only as author of nature: finally because it is the most excellent participation of the Divinity, who illustrates men far more nobly than any created gifts whatsoever, inasmuch as he constitutes them adoptive sons of God and heirs of himself. Sequitur etiam maior patet ⟦uncertain: raw OCR "Sequeln etiam maioris patet"⟧, for on this account the rational soul is produced by creation, namely because it is most excellent among creatures of natural order: therefore by equal reason sanctifying grace, since it is the most excellent of all created things, demands rather to be produced by creation than by eduction.

Proof third: That begins through creation which ceases through annihilation: but grace ceases through annihilation: therefore it begins through creation. The major stands: for that which is annihilated is corrupted through its whole being, so that nothing of it remains, neither by reason of form, nor by reason of the matter out of which and in which, that is, by reason of the subject from which the form could be conceived and formed: and consequently, when it passes into nothing, it must also proceed from nothing. For if it were resolved into something, especially into a subject out of which it would arise, and consequently, since in its annihilation it is not resolved into something, also in its production it is not formed out of something. The minor also stands both by the authority of St. Thomas himself in 2. dist. 26. quaest. unica, art. 2. ad 5., where he expressly says that when grace is corrupted, it at the same time passes also into nothing; and by reason, because if grace when it ceases to be were resolved into something, especially into a substance, or faculties of the soul, in which it inheres: but that seems improbable; for a supernatural being, such as grace is, does not seem able to be resolved into a purely natural being, such as the faculty of the soul and substance.

You will say. Creation is of entities subsisting per se: but grace, since it is an accident depending on a subject, does not subsist per se: therefore neither is it produced by creation. — I distinguish the major: creation is of entities subsisting per se and independent from a subject from which they would be produced by eduction, I concede; independent from a subject in which they are received, once they have been produced, I deny. Therefore in the justification of man, as the Doctor observes in 1. dist. 17. quaest. 6. num. 6., a twofold action intervenes: one by which grace is created, another by which it is united to the subject, which union is formally called the justification or regeneration of man, just as the rational soul is created by one action and united to matter by another: which union is the generation of man. Whence the first action is properly called creation; for it is an action from the non-being of grace to its being: but the second is not properly called creation, though it could be called transmutation, because by it the soul is changed from being unpleasing to being pleasing to God; or, as the Doctor speaks, there is there a twofold change, one from non-being of charity or of grace to the being of grace, and this is that change which is creation, and is one change properly so called, because it presupposes nothing, neither nature nor its receptive subject. Another change is from a subject not beloved to being beloved, and thus the soul is changed from not being beloved to being beloved: and this change is not simply creation, because it presupposes a recipient, and hence this change in a certain respect can be called generation, and the whole composite is reckoned as generated such, and not simply: because the substance which is the terminus of generation, and was present or presupposed, is generated according to its grateful and accidental being in the infusion of grace.

You will urge. In that first instant in which grace is formed, either it is produced outside the subject, or in the subject. Not the first, otherwise an accident would naturally be without a subject, which is absurd, since inherence is natural to it. If the second: therefore grace is not created, but educed, because the subject concurs to its production in the genus of material cause. — I answer. Grace in the instant of time in which it is created is in the subject ⟦uncertain: raw OCR gives no main verb here; construction elliptical⟧: but truly in the instant of nature it is neither in the subject nor outside the subject: because as such it is considered only according to its being of grace simply, and not according to the reason of inherence or of non-inherence: just as the essence of man is considered only as the essence of man, not indeed as visible, nor as invisible.

You will press. Therefore substantial forms other than the rational soul, and likewise accidents, are collected to be educed from the potency of matter, and not created: because in coming-to-be and in being conserved they depend on a subject: and therefore they are collected to depend thus, because they are not naturally produced nor conserved without a subject, unless a miracle intervene: therefore since grace is neither produced nor conserved except in a subject, short of a miracle, it is rightly inferred that it depends on a subject in being and in being conserved, and consequently that it is not created, but educed from the potency of the subject. — I deny the antecedent: for precisely for this reason those forms are collected to depend on a subject, not because they are produced in it, but either because they are its connatural perfections, forthwith ordered to its natural complement; or because they are products of a second efficient cause acting dependently upon the concurrence and influx of the subject: since since a second cause cannot create, it necessarily requires a subject with which, and in which, it may act: and forthwith those forms, both substantial and accidental, are necessarily educed from the potency of the subject, because the subject concurs and inflows toward their production. But it is otherwise concerning grace, which since it is produced immediately by God, does not necessarily require the influx of a subject: nevertheless it is not produced, nor conserved, outside the subject, because since it has no particular operations which it could exercise outside the subject, it would be produced and conserved outside the subject uselessly and in vain.

You will say 2. The soul is said to have a natural inclination toward grace: but for no other reason than because grace is educed from it: therefore, etc. —

I deny the minor: seeing that the body also has an inclination toward the rational soul: yet that soul is not educed from it, but created.

You will say 3. What is created cannot be corrupted by any second cause: for the rational soul, which is created, is naturally incorruptible: but grace is corrupted by the sinful action of a second cause: therefore it is not created, but educed. — I answer 1. by denying the major: for an accidental form, were it created, could be corrupted physically by a second cause, if that cause produced a form incompatible with the created form, and demanding connaturally its removal from the subject: for since whatever form, substantial or accidental, cannot be naturally conserved outside a subject, by that very fact whereby a second cause would introduce into the subject a form incompossible with the created form, this latter must necessarily be destroyed. I answer 2. by distinguishing the minor: some second cause destroys grace physically, and by a true corruptive action of it, I deny; morally, and by reason of the ordination of God, who decreed not to conserve grace in a soul stained by mortal sin, I concede.

You will say finally. Creation is the production of the whole entity: but in the justification of man the whole entity is not produced, since a subject is presupposed, namely man: therefore grace is not created. — I answer by distinguishing the minor: in the justification of man, which takes place through the union of grace with the subject, the whole entity is not produced, because indeed a subject is presupposed to which grace is united, I concede: the whole being of grace is not produced by that prior action by which grace is conceived to be produced in the instant antecedent to its union, I deny. For, as we said above from the Doctor, in the justification of man two actions concur really distinct: one which terminates at the very being of grace which is produced: another which terminates at its union with the subject, namely the soul or the will. The former is altogether independent of the subject, and thus is creation properly so called: the latter, however, necessarily connotes the subject, as also the grace, by which it is deemed to be united with that same subject.

Note 1. That the soul is endowed chiefly with a threefold faculty, namely the intellectual, the volitive, and the memorative, which, as the Doctor teaches in 2. d. 17., are distinguished from it ⟦uncertain reading: raw OCR "ut decet"; sense and parallel require "docet"⟧ not really, as the Thomists contend, but formally, as the holy Fathers teach, especially saint Augustine, lib. 15. De Trinitate, cap. 11.: These three things, he says, memory, understanding, and will, since they are not three lives but one life, nor three minds but one mind, consequently assuredly are not three substances, but one substance. To this S. Bernard accords, Sermon 11. on the Canticles, where he says: Certain things I contemplate in the soul, memory, understanding, and will, and these three are the very soul itself. But this truth S. Isidore declares more clearly, lib. 11. Etymologiarum, cap. 1., and from him Hugh of Saint Victor, lib. De Spiritu et Anima, where he says: The soul is called by various names according to its operations: for it is called anima while it vivifies, sensus while it senses, animus while it is wise, mens while it understands: yet these do not differ in substance, as they do in names, since there is one essence, though indeed diverse properties. Hence arises the difficulty whether grace inheres in a faculty of the soul more immediately than in its very substance.

Note 2. In grace some distinguish two things, namely entity, and activity or virtue: for every grace, they say, even habitual, is ordered not only to the adornment and embellishment of the soul, but also to operation and act; nor is it deemed to adorn and illuminate the soul except insofar as it promotes it from the natural state to the supernatural, so that one who, powerful only by his own strength, can elicit only purely natural acts, by the benefit and virtue of grace elevated higher, and seconded with a greater and nobler activity, may also elicit acts of a superior order, whereby he may attain a supernatural end: but these two things, namely the entity of grace and its activity, differ only in name, seeing that the whole of grace is in itself active, and ordered to enlivening and elevating the virtue of the soul.

Note 3. Habitual grace, concerning which the question is here principally raised, confers upon the soul not so much a facility for exercising its acts favorably and more expeditiously, as a virtue and activity without which the soul could not elicit such acts. For, as we have said several times already, this difference intervenes between supernatural and natural habits: that the latter confer upon faculties merely a facility for exercising their acts through a certain habituation, whereby the obstacles that formerly impeded their prior actions are removed; but the former confer also a certain power, by elevating the soul and promoting it to a nobler state, in which it can elicit acts exceeding its natural powers in every way. These things having been set forth in brief, let there be

A single Conclusion. — GRACE INHERES IMMEDIATELY IN THE WILL, AND BY ITS MEDIACY IS SUBJECTATED IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL. So the Doctor in 2. dist. 26. quaest. unica, and likewise saint Bonaventure, same distinction, art. 1., q. 5., against the Thomists.

Proof first, from the authority of saint Augustine, Sermon 12. De Verbis Apostoli, cap. 12., where he says that grace is related to free choice as the rider to the horse: but free choice inheres immediately in the will: therefore also grace.

Proof second: A disposition to some form is subjectated in the subject of that form itself: but grace is a disposition to glory: therefore it inheres in the same subject in which glory and felicity ought to inhere: but beatitude and felicity inhere immediately in the will, and not in the very substance of the soul: therefore the same must be said of grace. He proves the major taken from the Doctor num. 1. ⟦uncertain reading: raw OCR "P'robat maiorem subsumpti Doctor num. t."⟧ Beatitude satiates the blessed: but it is impossible to conceive how he would be satiated unless he were joined to the beatific object by a vital act: nor could he be so joined unless by exercising such an act; and hence the soul is not joined to the beatific object by its substance, but by the operations of its faculties, and most truly by the operations of the will. — Then, if the soul were joined immediately through its substance to the beatific object, it would follow that if, per possible or per impossible, the powers of the soul were circumscribed from the soul itself, it could be beatified, and thus it would be blessed without any second act whereby the object would be attained: but this is absurd: therefore, etc. — Finally, if beatitude were immediately in the essence of the soul, then a true second act ⟦uncertain: raw OCR "non vern actus"; sentence continues on p210⟧ could be reckoned nothing other than habitual grace: but this cannot be said, otherwise the just in via would be blessed, because habitual charity and grace of the way and of the fatherland are of the same species, according to that word of saint Paul: Charity never falleth away: but this consequence is utterly absurd.

The Doctor proves third: Grace perfects the soul insofar as it is operative of an act meritorious: therefore it must inhere in the soul insofar as it is thus operative: but the soul is not operative of an act meritorious except insofar as it has a will: seeing that a meritorious act must necessarily be free: therefore, etc. He confirms it: wisdom must not be placed in the soul insofar as it is essence, but insofar as it has an intellect, because it is determinative with respect to acts of intellect: therefore by parity of reason grace, which is ordered to eliciting meritorious acts, must inhere in the soul insofar as it has a will, or inhere immediately in the will itself.

The Doctor proves finally: Grace and charity are not distinguished really: indeed, nor even formally adequately, as was proved above: therefore they must have the same subject immediately: but all confess that charity inheres immediately in the will: therefore they must concede the same concerning grace. He confirms it from the authority of S. Anselm, lib. De Conceptu virginali, cap. 3., where he says that justice and injustice too is formally in the will: but grace is justice; for through it we are formally made just: therefore it must reside immediately in the will. He confirms it 2. Grace and sin are formally opposed; if not by the nature of the thing and physically, at least morally and by divine ordination: therefore they pertain to the same subject; for opposites are about the same thing: but sin is in the will immediately: therefore also grace.

You will object 1. The essence is more indeterminate than the power: therefore it has more need of a determinant; and consequently grace, which is determinative, ought rather to be subjectated in the essence of the soul than in its power. — The Doctor distinguishes the antecedent num. 9. The essence is more ⟦illegible: reply continuation not captured by OCR on this faded leaf⟧

You will object 2. Grace is always in its act, and hence there must inhere in it that which is always in act: but a power is not always in act: therefore grace ought not to inhere in it immediately. The major is plain: for the act of grace is to render pleasing: but habitual grace, as long as it is in the soul, always renders it actually pleasing to God: therefore it is always in act. The minor also holds: for a power does not always elicit an act, nor is it in act, but is ordered to act: therefore what inheres in it cannot be always in act; for it cannot be in act unless the power were equally in act. — The Doctor distinguishes the major: grace is always in its act, which it produces effectively, he denies; in formal act, he concedes. And likewise his proof being distinguished, he denies the consequence: for the act of grace, which is to gratify, is not an act which grace produces effectively, but a formal act proceeding from its union with the soul.

You will object 3. A form whereby one determines to acting must rather be placed in the principal agent than in the instrument: but the essence is the principal agent; the power, however, is its instrument: therefore grace must rather inhere in the essence than in the power. — The Doctor distinguishes the major: that it must rather be in the essence than in an instrument separate, extrinsic, and really distinct, he concedes: than in an instrument joined, intrinsic, and only formally distinct from the essence, he denies: otherwise the habit of faith would rather have to inhere in the essence of the soul than in its intellect itself, nor would any habit of the virtues be placed in the will or appetite, but in the very essence of the soul, which certainly no one would admit.

You will object 4. Habits, which are received immediately in powers, are ordered only to acts of such powers: whereas grace is ordered not only to acts of the will, but also to acts of all the powers: therefore it is not received immediately in any power. — I distinguish the major: they are ordered only to eliciting and producing acts of such powers, I concede; to commanding and ordering them, I deny. For charity and grace are ordered only to eliciting those acts which customarily proceed from the will, and not from other faculties: seeing that they concur not effectively and formally to the act of faith, hope, etc., but only imperatively, namely admonishing the will, that it as mistress command the other faculties, insofar as they produce their acts.

Corollary. — From these gather that sanctifying grace can thus be defined: Habitual sanctifying grace is a supernatural quality of the soul infused by God, whereby we are made partakers of the divine nature, and are moved by God to honor and do that which conduces to the rite eternal ⟦uncertain: raw OCR "ad ritum cetri-nam conducit"; exact wording unsure⟧. Which definition that passage of S. Chrysostom, Homily De Baptismo, reported by S. Augustine, lib. 1. Contra Iulianum, cap. 6., most excellently illustrates, where he says:

That through this grace men become not only free, but also just; not only just, but also holy; not only holy, but also sons; not only sons, but also heirs; not only heirs, but also brethren: not only brethren, but also co-heirs: not only co-heirs, but also members; not only members, but also temple; not only temple, but also organs of the Holy Ghost.