Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

NOTES. 1. That it is beyond controversy that habitual grace is really distinguished from faith and hope, since they can exist separately; for those two virtues subsist in man stained by mortal sin, in such wise that that sin does not fall directly upon them through infidelity or despair and presumption: but habitual grace so abhors the fellowship of any mortal sin that it can nowise subsist with it, unless perhaps through an extraordinary power of God. Whence the difficulty is raised only concerning the distinction or identity of the same habitual grace with charity. Concerning whose resolution the opinion of Authors is manifold: for some with the Angelic Doctor, 2. q. 110. art. 3., and the Seraphic Doctor in 2. dist. 27. art. 1. qu. 2. will that grace and charity are habits really distinct: but very many with the Subtili Doctore in 2. dist. 20. num. 3. affirm both to be really undistinct. The rest however judge both opinions to be probable, since they seem to have no stable foundation in the sacred Scriptures, Councils, and Fathers, which however will be shown to be false below.

NOTES. 2. That all Catholic Doctors alike agree that sanctifying grace and charity are certain illustrious participations of the Divinity, by whose virtue we rise and are lifted up into the fellowship of God, according to that saying of St. Peter, 2. 1.: He hath given us most great and most precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature. But they differ in this, that some contend that habitual grace is indeed a participation of the Deity, but according to the reason of nature, and insofar as the divine nature and essence is the fount and origin of all the perfections of God: but that charity is a participation of the same Deity, not insofar as it is nature, but insofar as it is operating through will and love: so that the former refers and expresses the Deity subsisting, but the latter the Deity operating. But others contend that charity, and habitual grace considered according to entity and formal reason, are participations of the divine nature: but are said to participate the divine virtue and operation, insofar as they are operative and effective.

NOTES. 3. Finally, the Doctors also agree among themselves that habitual grace and charity are the most excellent gifts of God which he is wont to grant to creatures: so that they far excel and surpass first the substance of the intellectual and spiritual creature, as well human as Angelic, since they assimilate us to God in a more excellent manner than the other perfections of the natural order; whence deservedly August., book 2. ad Bonifacium, cap. 6., grace surpasses not only all the stars, and all the heavens, ⟦but?⟧ also all the Angels; and likewise far excel the other corporeal creatures however excellent; for, says the Wise Man, The possession thereof is better than gold, and chosen silver. Hence in the same place the Wise Man says: I have preferred her before kingdoms and thrones, and I esteemed riches nothing in comparison with her. Nay rather even both these most excellent gifts of God exceed the dignity of the maternity of God: for it is nobler to conceive God in mind than in womb: but through sanctifying grace and charity we conceive God in mind, nay rather the whole Trinity inhabits us, according to that saying of John 14.: We will come to him, and make our abode with him: hence sanctifying grace and charity appear more excellent than the very maternity of the Virgin Mother of God, if this be considered apart from those gifts of God: for, as Augustine says, l. 1. De Virginitate: Mary was more blessed in receiving the faith of Christ, than in conceiving the flesh of Christ: maternal kinship would have profited Mary nothing, unless she had more happily carried Christ in heart than in flesh.

These things thus premised, two things must here be especially established: First, that sanctifying grace and charity are not really distinguished from each other: Secondly, that neither are they formally distinguished, inasmuch as formal distinction imports diverse formalities and objective concepts, separately and adequately conceivable from each other.

First Conclusion. — CHARITY AND HABITUAL GRACE ARE ONE AND THE SAME REALLY HABIT. Thus the Doctor in the place cited.

Proof 1. Habits are not to be really distinguished whose effects are entirely the same: but the effects of grace and charity are utterly the same from sacred Scripture: therefore, etc. The major appears; for the diversity of habits is gathered only from the diversity of acts, unto which they are designated and ordered. The minor is proved: six effects especially are attributed in divine Scripture to sanctifying grace, which there agree to charity: For first there is attributed to sanctifying grace the adoptive virtue of divine generation, whereby we are signed as adopted sons of God: but this same virtue is attributed to charity, 1. Joan. 3.: Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called and should be the sons of God. There the particle ut, importing a certain emphasis, denotes a certain causality of charity toward conferring upon us something spiritual and divine; hence chapter 4. of John: Every one that loveth is born of God. Whence St. Dionysius, book De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, cap. 1., says charity is that whereby we are regenerated and constituted in divine being. — Secondly there is attributed to sanctifying grace, that it makes man grateful and beloved to God: but this also befits charity: for John 15. Christ the Lord says: If anyone love me, he shall be loved by my Father. And chapter 14.: You are my friends, if you do the things that I command you. — A third effect of sanctifying grace is, that it confers spiritual life: but this also belongs to charity, for 1. John 3.: He that loveth not remaineth in death. And further: We know, that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. Whence St. Prosper, lib. 3. De vita contemplativa, c. 18., calls charity the death of crimes, the life of virtues, the soul of holy minds. — A fourth effect of sanctifying grace is, that it be the fount and origin of all virtues, and likewise the root of all good works: but this also belongs to charity, as the Apostle plainly teaches, 1. ad Cor. c. 13., where he attributes all the offices of the other virtues to charity, saying: Charity is patient, is kind, etc. Hence too he names charity the fulness of the law. Whence St. Gregory, Homil. 27.: A branch of good work has no greenness, if it does not abide in the root of charity.

A fifth effect of sanctifying grace is, that it join us intimately to God: but the same belongs to charity; for 1. John 1.: He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him: whence St. Bernard, Sermon 83. on the Canticles, says that by charity our soul is made one with God. — Lastly a sixth effect is, that sanctifying grace be the seed of eternal life: but the same is the prerogative of charity: since James 1.: God hath promised the crown of life to them that love him. Therefore all the effects which are attributed to sanctifying grace in sacred Scripture agree also to charity.

Proof 2. And at the same time this induction is confirmed from the Council of Trent, Session 6. cap. ⟦7?⟧ where it uses charity indiscriminately for sanctifying grace, and attributes even the force of sanctifying to charity itself: for assigning one sole formal cause of justification, it says it to be charity, in these words: For although no one can be just, unless the merits of the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ be communicated to him, yet in this justification of the sinner it takes place, while by the merit of the same most holy Passion the charity of God is poured forth by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them. In which words no one will doubt that sanctifying grace is understood by the name of charity; both because all Catholic Doctors gather from the words inheres, and is poured forth here placed, that sanctifying grace is an intrinsic form, and permanent: and because there the Council treats of the formal cause of justification, which is sanctifying grace itself. — Moreover, this very thing the Council confirms with the following words, for it adds: Thence in justification itself, together with remission of sins, man receives through Jesus Christ all these things infused at once, into whom he is ingrafted through faith, hope, and charity: for if some other form besides charity, faith, and hope ⟦were designated?⟧ for justification, doubtless the Council would not have been silent about it, especially since the purpose of that chapter was not to make mention of those three virtues, except insofar as either all three, or some one of them was the form justifying. Which chapter 10. opens more clearly, saying: Of this increase of justice the holy Church begs when she prays: Give unto us the increase of faith, hope, and charity. Where doubtless it speaks of the increase of the formal cause of justification; hence it uses faith, hope, and charity for sanctifying grace, inasmuch namely by faith, and hope we are vivified through charity. — Finally, the mind of the Council is plainly gathered from the eleventh Canon of the same Session, where, condemning him who says that men are justified, either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of grace, and charity, lest it might seem to distinguish grace from charity, it adds in the singular number: Which is poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Spirit, and inheres in them: by which words it signifies that it speaks of one and the same habit; for no Grammarian would say, Peter and John walks, but walk, because they are two really distinct persons: therefore since the Council speaks of grace and charity in the singular, it is a sign that it intends them not to be really distinct.

The Thomists answer, that all things proper to grace are indeed attributed to charity, but in a different manner; to grace indeed as to the formal cause, and root: but to charity as to the fruit of grace itself, and operative principle: and that this mutual attribution of properties takes place on account of the intimate and inseparable connexion which those two habits preserve between themselves. —

True, but against this: in the opinion of the Adversaries, grace is in the same way the root of the other supernatural virtues that are not theological, as it is the root of charity itself; and these virtues have an intimate connection with sanctifying grace according to the ordinary law of God; yet on account of that connection not all those effects which in Sacred Scripture are attributed to sanctifying grace are likewise said to belong to those virtues, just as they do not to hope and faith; therefore it is a sign that those effects are not attributed to charity on account of its mere connection with sanctifying grace. Add that even if at times the effect of one cause were attributed to another inseparably conjoined with it, speaking properly and by a certain metonymy, still this must never be thought to be done when the doctrine of things to be believed is being handed down: for the Church would commit no less a fault than the Philosophers if, while opening up the causes and properties of things, she were to assign others which belong to things most intimately conjoined with them. But the Council of Trent, in the passages cited above, gathering from Sacred Scripture the doctrine concerning the dispositions, causes, and effects of justification, explains that this is charity, and speaks of it, taken together with sanctifying grace, in the singular as of one habit; therefore the Council judges that charity and sanctifying grace truly have the same effects, not on account of their connection and inseparability, but on account of identity.

They answer 2, that the effects of grace are attributed to charity because charity is a partial form of justification; for they hold that the form of justification is not one simple quality. —

Against this, this proposition directly militates against the Council of Trent, session 7, praised above, where it says that there is one formal cause of our justification: One, it says, is the formal cause of the justification of man, the justice of God, not by which He Himself is just, but by which He makes us just; therefore the Council does not judge that there is a twofold distinct formal cause of justification; otherwise it would have assigned this twofold formal cause there, just as it assigns various final causes of the same justification there, namely the glory of God and of Christ, and eternal life. Add that also among partial formal causes of one effect, nothing is attributed to one distinct from the other, in the way the effects of sanctifying grace are assigned to charity; therefore, etc.

All these points are confirmed by the authority of St. Augustine, book De Natura et Gratia, chapter 62, where he not obscurely indicates that charity is the formal reason of justification, in these words: For charity itself is the truest, fullest, and most perfect justice. And Letter 113: Unto having a good will, wherein is this very thing, that we live justly, and charity itself, whereby it so excels in all the gifts of God that even God is said to be loved, whereby alone is fulfilled in us whatever we fulfill of the divine law and admonition, etc. By which words he designates charity as that whereby we live justly, and forthwith whereby we are just.

Finally our assertion is proved by reason: first indeed because, as the Subtle Doctor says, beings are not to be multiplied without urgent necessity; but no necessity appears for multiplying and distinguishing the habits of charity and sanctifying grace, seeing that all the effects attributed to the latter are also customarily attributed to the former, as we said in the first proof of the Conclusion; therefore, etc. — Then, if grace and charity were really distinguished, they could be separated from each other, at least by the extraordinary and absolute power of God; but this cannot be said; therefore neither can that. The major is evident from what the Philosophers commonly hand down about the sign of real distinction; for absolute beings, one of which is prior to the other and independent of it, such as sanctifying grace and charity would be if they were truly really distinguished, can exist and be preserved separately. The minor, however, is proved: if any man could have grace without charity, he would be grateful and acceptable to God, indeed His adopted son, and yet would not be His friend, which is absurd. — Moreover, if charity were infused into anyone without sanctifying grace, and he died in that state, he would not be damned, since he would have no sin, because every sin is impossible together with charity; nor would he be saved, because being without sanctifying grace he would not be the adopted Son of God, and consequently would be incapable of the inheritance promised solely to the sons of God; but both consequents are utterly unfitting; therefore also that from which they follow. Finally no sufficient reason at all appears for a real distinction between grace and charity, as will be evident from the solution of the objections.

You will object. 1. The principle of being is really distinguished from the principle of operating; but sanctifying grace is the principle of being supernaturally, while charity is the principle of operating; therefore they are really distinguished. It is confirmed: God no less looks to the full and perfect fulfillment of nature, and to its perfection in the supernatural order, than in the natural order; but in the natural order He so perfects nature that He first gives it the substantial form, and then the powers and accidental forms, which are instruments of acting; therefore in the supernatural order He ought first to confer upon the soul the form by which it is constituted in supernatural being, before the active forms; but sanctifying grace is the form conferring supernatural being, while charity is the form conferring the mode of acting supernaturally; therefore the former is prior, the latter posterior. —

I answer first, that the major can be denied; since substantial forms are also active, as we taught in the Physics, indeed even accidental forms are; for heat produces heat; nor is it necessary that some prior form always be conferred which gives being before another is bestowed which gives the power of acting; for heat, itself demanding it, is produced by fire in water without any prior form, and thus produced it produces another heat in the hand touching the water; similarly whiteness is conferred on a subject and has the power of drawing away the sight without any prior form; therefore when a principle of acting supernaturally is conferred on something, there is no need that some prior form be conferred upon it which demands such a principle. Add that even if the form which is the principle of operating required another by which nature would be constituted first in the order of the absolute before being in the order of an active principle, it would not follow from this that both forms ought to be really distinguished; for in the more probable opinion intellect and will are not really distinguished from the soul, which is their principle and root as faculties; consequently although charity presupposed sanctifying grace, as its root and fountain from which it emanates, it would not follow that it is really distinguished from it, just as the properties flowing from the essence and presupposing it are not really distinguished from it.

You will object. 2. Charity supposes habitual grace in the soul; therefore it is really distinguished from it. The antecedent is proved: it belongs to the notion of virtue in common to dispose the subject to act fittingly in accordance with a preexisting nature; for virtue gives the power of acting well, that is, of exercising an operation fitting and proportionate to nature; hence Aristotle, Physics 7, chapter 3: Virtue is the disposition of the perfect toward the best. And he adds: But I call perfect that which is disposed according to its nature; but charity is a supernatural virtue; consequently it supposes nature in perfect supernatural being through some other form distinct from it; but that form is none other than sanctifying grace; therefore this is presupposed to charity. —

I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say that it is universally false, especially in the present difficulty; for if every virtue had to presuppose a nature proportionate to itself, it would follow that neither faith nor hope are true virtues in the faithful sinner, since in him they suppose no sanctifying grace, by which he would be constituted in supernatural being and state.

You will object. 3. Sacred Scripture and the Councils, which speak of grace and charity as of two distinct things; therefore they are truly distinct. The antecedent is proved from that passage to the Romans 5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us; where by the Holy Spirit sanctifying grace is understood, as St. Augustine explains, book De gratia Christi, chapter 20, through grace, he says, by which we are justified, the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts; consequently sanctifying grace is something other than charity. Similarly 1 Timothy 1: The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ superabounded with faith and love; and 2 Corinthians 13: The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God, and the communication of the Holy Spirit be with you all. In which words the Apostle distinguishes grace from charity, since he commemorates both, which he would by no means do if he judged them to be one and the same real habit. Similarly the Council of Vienne speaks of charity and sanctifying grace as of distinct things. For the Clementines, De summa Trinitate, says that grace and the virtues are poured forth in Baptism, where it understands by the virtues the three Theological ones, namely faith, hope, and charity. Trent concurs with it, Session 6, chapter 10, when it says that sanctification is the justification and renovation of the interior man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts. And Canon 11 expresses charity and grace separately, by which it plainly denotes them to be distinct; otherwise it would commit an inept tautology, taking many names to signify the same thing, when one alone would suffice. —

I deny the consequence, and to the first text of Scripture I say that the Spirit by whom the Apostle says charity is poured forth is the very person of the Holy Spirit, to whom the pouring forth of charity is specially attributed, because it is the chief effect of divine love toward men, and it is said to be given through charity because the divine Trinity dwells specially in the soul ablaze with charity, according to that oracle of Christ the Lord: If any one love me, we will come to him, etc. Nor does it matter that St. Augustine understands by the Spirit sanctifying grace. For besides that the other Fathers signify that by this name spirit there the person of the Holy Spirit is designated, it does not follow from there that they hold charity to be distinguished from sanctifying grace, since they teach, in the passages praised by us above, that charity is the formal cause of our justification; but perhaps he wished to indicate that one and the same quality is at once grace, insofar as it raises us to the supernatural state, and charity poured forth in our hearts, insofar as it orders and incites us actually to love God and neighbor. Add other contexts of the same Apostle; I say the Apostle by the name of love or charity either understands uncreated charity, whereby namely God the Father so loved us as to give His only-begotten Son, or actual love, or the act of love, whereby we in fact love God, which truly is not the same real thing as sanctifying grace, but an act distinct from it as from its principle. As for the Council of Vienne, I say it indeed speaks jointly of grace and the virtues being poured forth in Baptism, but does not say that charity is distinct from grace; hence by the name of virtues there it understands only the other virtues infused per se, such as faith and hope, which are not identified with sanctifying grace. In the same way the texts of the Council of Trent must be explained; for it does not express the names of grace and charity in order to designate them as mutually distinct — for that appears false from the proof of the Conclusion — but only in order to signify that what we call grace and charity is truly the cause of justification.

Second Conclusion. — SANCTIFYING GRACE IS NOT EVEN FORMALLY DISTINGUISHED FROM CHARITY, THAT IS, BY THAT DISTINCTION WHICH INTERVENES BETWEEN DIVERS FORMALITIES SEPARATELY CONCEIVABLE; BUT THEY SEEM TO BE DISTINGUISHED ONLY IN RESPECT OF DIVERS OFFICES.

This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor in book two, distinction 26, number 3, where he proves that opinion which says: That grace formally is that virtue which is charity, and whatever excellences are attributed to grace are attributed to charity, and conversely; for each formally equally divides between the children of the kingdom and of perdition. And the Conclusion can be persuaded by the reason of the same Doctor; for just as entities are not to be multiplied without urgent necessity, so neither are formalities to be distinguished; but no necessity appears for distinguishing sanctifying grace and charity as divers formalities, seeing that, as we said, the effects attributed to one are also attributed to the other, and consequently they do not seem to be distinct formalities.

You will say: Charity is a simply simple perfection, for which reason it belongs to God: for God is charity; which assuredly does not befit grace, since it ill becomes God, nor is it attributed to Him; consequently it is not a simply simple perfection; and therefore grace is necessarily distinguished from charity, if not really, at least formally. —

The Doctor answers in the same place number 1, that charity can be considered either transcendently or categorically, that is, insofar as it signifies and embraces charity both created and uncreated, or insofar as it designates only created charity alone. In the former way he grants that sanctifying grace and charity are distinguished formally, as wisdom, as such, is distinguished from created wisdom, and as animal, as such, is distinguished formally from this rational thing; but created charity and grace are not so distinguished that created charity signifies some absolute formality which sanctifying grace does not signify, or vice versa; therefore when the Doctor, in number 1 praised above, says that grace is formally distinct from charity, he speaks only of charity taken transcendentally, which indeed he there grants to be formally distinguished from grace; but he does not compare created charity with sanctifying grace, wherefore he says there that every grace is charity, though not conversely. —

But that created charity and sanctifying grace are not distinguished by name alone, as Durandus holds, is evident from this, that things differing by name alone have only diverse appellations, not diverse offices, like knife and sword; but charity and grace connote diverse offices and distinct things. For grace signifies being grateful and acceptable to God, with supernatural acceptance into adopted sonship, and as such does not signify some supernatural principle of loving God connaturally, which nevertheless charity, taken with the concept of created charity cut away, signifies; therefore sanctifying grace and charity are distinguished more than by name.