Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Here there will be no discussion of the essence of actual grace, because in the third Article, in explaining the various divisions of actual grace itself, we shall explain it: but the present dissertation deals only with habitual grace, which is the most noble species of grace. For it is, as St. Gregory says, the root of good works. Indeed, as St. Chrysostom says, it removes the rust of sins, restores to the soul its brightness and fire, makes it more beautiful than the rays of the sun, makes the deformed beautiful, and the infirm sound. For it is, as Augustine testifies, the beauty of the interior man, and the splendor of the human mind. Indeed, as Nazianzen says, it irradiates the soul and renders it like unto God. For, as St. Peter says, God has bestowed upon us the greatest and most precious promises, that through them we may be made partakers of the divine nature: and as Christ the Lord commended, we become perfect, as our heavenly Father is perfect: and through it we obtain the power of becoming sons of God, says St. John; for, adds St. Paul, the Spirit himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God. It is that by which the other divine charisms shine forth in us, faith radiates, hope is strengthened, charity blazes, and the whole illustrious crown of virtues is crowned with the fruits of good works. It is finally that by which, with it leading and shining, we walk secure, with it protecting we conquer, with it preserving we are crowned. — Therefore, in order that we may apprehend the essence of this most excellent and truly divine gift, so far as is granted to humanity, three things must be determined in this Article: First, whether grace is an uncreated or created something, a habit permanently abiding, or an act lightly and quickly passing away. Second, whether it is the same as charity, or something formally or really distinct from it. Third, whether and how it can be increased and diminished, preserved and corrupted.

NOTE 1. In the resolution of the present Question there were three erroneous opinions: the first is attributed to the Master of the Sentences in book 1, distinction 17, throughout, but especially in the last chapter, where he seems to assert that charity (which below we shall prove to be really identical with sanctifying grace) is not a created habit, but the very person of the Holy Spirit communicated to us substantially, which without any medium of a created habit is the immediate principle of that love by which we love God and neighbor; and this on account of the excellence of charity, which is properly predicated of God, according to that text of 1 John 4: God is charity. For we do not read the same of the other virtues; indeed nowhere has Scripture said: God is faith, God is hope; wherefore although these virtues are habits implanted in us by God, distinct, and thus immediate principles of supernatural acts, nevertheless charity does not seem to be a distinct habit infused by God, but God Himself inhabiting the soul of the just, who through Himself immediately is the principle of the act of charity in us. The second error was that of Calvin in book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 11, where he denies all interior justice in man, and admits indeed that man may be called just, but only by the extrinsic imputation of the justice of Christ or of God. Which error he certainly supports from that saying of Paul, 2 Corinthians 5: Him who knew no sin, He made sin for us, that we might be made the justice of God in Him. You see, says Calvin, that our justice is not in us but in Christ, and belongs to us only by that right because we are partakers of Christ? Finally, the third erroneous opinion was that of Osiander in his Evangelical Harmony, where he asserts sanctifying grace to be rather a substance than a quality; because, he says, grace is nothing other than the justice and holiness of God Himself, constituting man just and holy; just as sunlight is nothing other than the presence of the Sun itself over the whole hemisphere. This threefold erroneous assertion we undertake to refute in the three following Conclusions.

NOTE 2. All Catholics agree that justified man possesses a twofold grace: one created, by which he is formally justified; another uncreated, by which he is efficiently made just; which truth St. Paul clearly expounded, Romans 5, saying: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. For by these words he signifies that there is granted to the just not only charity, which is indeed created, but also the Holy Spirit, who dwells in the just as in a sanctuary: for although the three persons of the adorable Trinity at once illuminate and consecrate the just by their divine presence, according to that saying of Christ the Lord, John 14: If anyone love me, we will come to him, and will make our abode with him; nevertheless, by a special reason the Holy Spirit is called grace: > because, as our Alexian Doctor says, qu. 61, m. 2, art. 2, it is called grace inasmuch as it is called gift, and gift inasmuch as it is called love; for the Holy Spirit Himself, according to His proper property, is love, and as love proceeds from the Father and the Son: and therefore because He is a gift, therefore He is love, because nothing is a gift except by reason of love; for if something be given out of fear, it is not properly a gift, but rather redemption; likewise if it be given out of covetousness, it is not a gift but gain: but a gift properly is from love and liberality, and without coercion: so that in every gift love is first given; and thus the Holy Spirit is called grace because a gift, and a gift because love. < From which it is evident that the Holy Spirit in a peculiar manner inhabits and consecrates the soul of the just. But the difficulty is whether He accomplishes this by His divine presence immediately, or indeed through the mediation of some created gift.

NOTE 3. From the same Alexian Doctor, same book, art. 3, grace can be compared to the soul in two ways: namely, either to its first natural being, or to its second and supernatural being. Considered in the former way, grace is without doubt an accident, since it comes to the soul after its being is in every way perfect and complete. But the difficulty is whether, considered in relation to the soul as subsisting in the supernatural order, it can be called some substantial mode, or rather a pure accident. Which difficulty will be resolved in the following Conclusion.

First Conclusion. — HABITUAL GRACE IS NOT THAT UNCREATED THING, BUT CREATED.

This is common among Catholics; and it is Proved first from Sacred Scripture, namely from all those passages which signify that we are formally justified by a gift granted to us by God. Thus St. Paul, Romans 5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. These words St. Augustine weighs thus in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 32: > The charity of God is said to be poured forth in our hearts: not that by which He Himself loves us, but that by which He makes us His lovers: even as the justice of God, whereby by His gift we are made just. < To these accord those words of St. Peter, chapter 2 of his first Epistle: He has bestowed on us great and most precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature. For by these the Prince of the Apostles declares that we put on the divine likeness, while through the greatest and most precious gifts of grace granted to us by God we become partakers of the divine nature; and thereupon he judges that we are justified by something distinct from God: for the gift is customarily distinguished from the giver; although we do not impugn that the divine Word, and the Holy Spirit, gave themselves, while the latter was given to us by the Father, and the former by the Father together with the Son. The same truth all the other sacred texts illustrate and confirm, by which below we shall urge that habitual graces perpetually remain in us.

The Doctor proves the Conclusion in book 1, distinction 17, question 8, with eight arguments, which I reduce all to three heads. The first argument is drawn from the justification of a sinner, who before penance is called unjust; but after penance is called just, from which the Doctor argues thus, n. 18: > Injustice, since it is formally a privation, cannot be taken away except by the opposite habit; because a privation is not removed except by the form, which the subject lacked through the privation: therefore he who was justified, being changed from unjust to just, necessarily had to receive a habit opposed to that privation signified by the name injustice. < Which argument indeed presses according to the ordinary law, for in virtue of extraordinary and absolute power injustice could be taken away by mere extrinsic condonation, and without any positive habit infused, as we shall teach below with the same Doctor. — It confirms n. 19.: > If there is nothing else in the soul after penance than before, it does not appear that man in any other manner is related to God as just, nor God to him, than when he was unjust, because no diversity seems to exist on the part of God if God changes nothing in him and produces nothing: but it is false that man as just is not otherwise related to God, nor God to him, than when he was a sinner; since God loves the just, and hates the sinner: therefore it is necessary that that diversity be sought from the side of sanctifying grace and charity produced in the justified man. <

It is proved secondly: God accepts the just man and ordains him to eternal life: but that acceptance is not a will to beatify him at that time; for if God had such a will, He would in fact raise the just man to eternal felicity: therefore that will is nothing other than a judgment, namely by which God judges the just man worthy of beatitude, of which he was unworthy while he was unjust; yet God cannot have such a will unless some change intervene, either on the part of God, or on the part of the sinner. Not indeed on the part of God, because His will is intrinsically immutable: therefore it is necessary that that change be sought from the side of the sinner, and consequently it behooves that justified man receive some form which he lacked while he was a sinner. — It confirms that argument: > because, it says, the divine volition, since it is entirely one act in itself, does not have the character of opposed acts, or of distinguished ones without any distinction of objects; for to will and not to will divinely do not occur except on account of the diversity of objects; otherwise contradictories would be true without any distinction causing that truth: therefore since God wills to ordain the just man to beatitude, to which He likewise does not ordain the sinner, it is necessary that this mutation of the divine volition presuppose some diversity in the object; otherwise God would be related in the same manner toward the sinner as toward the just. <

It is proved thirdly, from the nature of the meritorious act, for which inhering charity is necessarily required: because nothing acts formally by any action unless the principle of that action be formally in the agent: but the will acts by a meritorious act de condigno: therefore it has in itself the form whereby it is the principle of that action: yet that form is neither faith nor hope, because otherwise a sinner having faith and hope could merit de condigno, which is absurd; moreover no action is in the power of the agent unless the agent have the form according to which it can act: for if it acted through something merely extrinsically co-assisting to it, over which it had no power, such an action would not be within its power: but the meritorious act ought to be within the power of the one meriting, inasmuch as it must be voluntary: therefore it is necessary that the agent meritoriously have in itself the form and principle of the meritorious act, whereby it can freely exercise such an act; and consequently the principle of such a meritorious act cannot be the Holy Spirit Himself assisting and concurring particularly with the will in the meritorious act: since that divine Spirit would not be in the free disposition of the will. Finally, the Holy Spirit does not move the will specially to a meritorious act except by producing something in it: but what He would produce in it would be either that meritorious act itself, and thus the will would not concur in producing it, but only in receiving it passively; or something else distinct from the act, and accordingly it would be charity, or grace, for nothing else can be devised.

This truth likewise our Alexian Doctor proves by this argument: > sanctity and uncreated grace, which is God, makes us pleasing to God, either through itself, or through something distinct from itself. Not through itself, because it is in the sinner just as in the just, by essence, presence, and power: therefore it is necessary that it make the soul pleasing to God by a grace distinct from itself. Moreover, when we become pleasing to God, whereas on account of sin we were unpleasing, either we receive something new, or we do not. If not: then it is the same in us to be pleasing or unpleasing to God. If so: then in justification we must receive something created. <

Finally, God is related to the soul in justifying it, as the soul to the body in animating it; for God is the life of the soul, as the soul is the life of the body: but the soul does not vivify the body except by imparting life: for if the soul held life in itself in such wise that it did not infuse some disposition into the body, the body would never live: therefore, just as there is some disposition and principle of life in the living body, so likewise there must be some vital disposition implanted in the soul itself by God, in order that it may be said to live the spiritual life.

You will object 1. That text of 1 John, chapter 4: God is charity, and he who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him. Whence St. Augustine, On the Trinity, chapter 1, infers that he who loves his neighbor, it follows that he loves chiefly that very love itself, namely God, who is love and charity. — The Doctor answers n. 13.: that St. Augustine speaks of efficient, not formal, love, in such wise that God is indeed called love, insofar as He produces in us supernatural dilection and love: but not that He Himself is formally our love: and thus the argument of St. Augustine rightly runs, that he who loves his neighbor ought also to love God, who is the author of that love, because he who in due order loves the lesser gift ought more to love another greater good, especially when in the lesser there is no reason of lovableness except from the greater good.

You will object 2. No good (according to St. Augustine, lib. 15. De Trinitate, chapter 18) is more excellent than the gift of God (namely charity): but no gift of God is more excellent than the Holy Spirit: therefore the Holy Spirit is charity; and consequently the grace whereby we are sanctified. — The Doctor answers by denying the ultimate consequence: for the Holy Spirit can indeed be called charity, not only effectively, as God is called my hope, or my patience, because He effects patience and hope in me, which He has not formally in Himself; but He is also called charity formally; because since charity is a perfection simply simple, it belongs to Him formally. Yet it does not follow from this that He is formally the charity and grace whereby we are justified; just as He is not formally the life whereby we live, although from elsewhere He has life formally in Himself, and produces it in us.

You will object 3. Every creature can be understood not to be good: but charity cannot be understood not to be good: therefore it is not something created. — The Doctor denies the minor; for in the sense in which any creature whatsoever can be understood not to be good, namely insofar as it is defectible and corruptible, charity also can be said not to be good, seeing that it can be diminished, and by mortal sin extinguished altogether.

You will object 4. It belongs to a more perfect virtue to produce an effect without a medium than with a medium: but the divine sanctifying virtue is most perfect: therefore it effects sanctification without any medium. — I distinguish the major: that it belongs to a more perfect virtue on the part of the agent, I concede: on the part of the recipient, I deny. An agent is indeed considered nobler while it produces its effect by its own proper and sole virtue; but otherwise is it with a cooperator and one receiving the act, since it is nobler to cooperate in the production of an act than merely to receive it passively as produced by another.

Finally you will object: Everything that acts upon another is nobler than that upon which it acts; for the agent has a certain dominion over the patient, and subjects it to its own virtue and activity: therefore since grace acts upon the created spirit, it ought to be nobler than the created spirit: but nothing is nobler than the created spirit except the uncreated Spirit: therefore sanctifying grace is something uncreated. — Our Alexander of Hales answers, in the place praised above, that grace is nobler than the created spirit, not indeed simply, but in a certain respect: > For, he says, inasmuch as grace is compared to the soul as an agent acting upon it, it is nobler; but insofar as it is compared to the soul as a disposition of the soul itself, thus it is ignobler; and it has the character of the ignobler, because a disposition is not nobler than the substance which it disposes, since it redounds into that substance; but insofar as it is moving, it is nobler. An example appears clearly in light; insofar as that light is in the air from the Sun itself, that light is a disposition of the air: but ex hypothesi, if the air were to see the Sun, then that light would be compared to the air under the character of a mover, or of one altering, because light alters the sight: but that character of altering would not hold from the side of the air in which it would be, but from the side of the Sun from which it would come. <

You ask. Did the Master of the Sentences really teach that sanctifying grace is not something created? — The Doctor answers, n. 30.: that this was not his opinion, since in dist. 37. he plainly teaches charity to be something created, inasmuch as it is in a child, whom God inhabits, and who yet can have no elicited act concerning God. Likewise in Book 2, dist. 26. he admits grace created in the soul. Hence he seems to want nothing else in the place praised above than that charity is attributed to the Holy Spirit by a special reason; to whom the other infused habits are not attributed, because through the habit of charity the Holy Spirit inhabits the soul of the just man, and at the same time through it flows into the act of love; which indeed he does not perform through the other habits of faith and hope; since through that habit whereby he inhabits the soul of the just man he does not flow into the acts of faith and hope and of the remaining virtues, but through distinct habits mediating.

Conclusion second. — HABITUAL GRACE IS A SUPERNATURAL GIFT CONTINUALLY AND PERMANENTLY PERSEVERING IN MAN.

It is proved: first indeed from the Council of Vienne, the Clementine De summo Trinitate et fide Catholica, in these words: > Attentive to the universal efficacy of the death of Christ, which is applied equally through baptism to all the baptized, we have deemed, with the approval of the sacred Council, that the second opinion should be chosen as more probable, which says that in baptism informing grace and virtues are conferred upon little ones as well as adults, as more consonant and harmonious with the sayings of the Saints and of the modern Doctors of Theology. < Item from the Council of Trent, Session 6. chapter 7.: > Receiving true and Christian justice, they are bidden, immediately reborn, to preserve it, the first stole granted them through Christ Jesus in place of that which Adam lost by his disobedience for himself and for us, white and immaculate, that they may bear it before the tribunal of Jesus Christ our Lord, and have life eternal. < Whence I dispute thus: the grace which infants receive in baptism, and which they ought to preserve and bear before the tribunal of Christ that they may have life eternal, is intrinsic and permanent: therefore, etc.

It is proved secondly by the authority of the holy Fathers. First indeed of St. Dionysius, book De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia chapter 2., where he says that by divine generation a divine state is wrought in us: but a state is something persevering and subsistent. Of St. Irenaeus, book 5. Adversus haereses, chapter 6., where he says that those are perfect who have the persevering Spirit of God. Of St. Cyprian, Epistle 2. ad Donatum, where he calls the grace conferred in baptism a second soul infused into us from heaven. — To these concurs St. Basil, book De Spiritu Sancto, chapter 26., where he compares sanctifying grace to the power of seeing existing in the eye, and to the habitual art existing in the craftsman: > Just as, he says, the power of discerning is in a sound eye, in a purged soul, etc. and just as art is in him who has acquired it: so the grace of the Holy Spirit is in him who has received it: always indeed present, though not perpetually operating. < — To these subscribe all those holy Fathers who teach that by sanctifying grace the divine image and beauty is sketched and delineated in us. Thus St. Ambrose, book 6. Hexaemeron, c. 8., after having said that justification takes place not in the body, but in the soul, which bears the image of the sanctity of God, says: > You are painted, then, O man, and painted by the Lord your God: you have a good craftsman and painter; do not erase the good picture, for it is fair, shining with truth; expressed not in wax, but in grace. < To him agrees St. Augustine in many places, especially Epist. 105. ad Consentium, not far from the end, saying: > What else is justice when it is in us, or any virtue whatever by which one lives rightly and wisely, than the beauty of the interior man? But beauty is something permanent, and likewise grace. < — That same heavenly image and divine beauty marvellously delineated in us through sanctifying grace St. Chrysostom thus elegantly commends, Homil. 1. on the Epistle to the Ephesians, where expounding those words: He has graced us in his beloved Son, he says: > He has made us gracious, that is, he has not only freed us from sins, but makes us beloved and friends: for just as if someone were to light upon one scabrous with pestilence, disease, old age, childhood alike and famine, and restore him a youth exceedingly beautiful, surpassing in every youthful vigour, emitting vehement splendour from his cheeks, and dimming with his reflections even the flashings of his eyes; whom then he establishes in the very flower of age, and besides clothes and adorns with purple and every kind of ornament: not otherwise did God make our soul beautiful, and wrought, desirable, and delightful: the Angels desire to behold it, and God himself, according to that saying: The King hath desired thy beauty. < In which words he manifestly signifies that man is established just through intrinsic and permanent forms, by which he is renewed and adorned, and his soul is marvellously illumined, and made pleasing and lovable alike to God and to the Angels.

The Thomists are wont to prove this Conclusion with the Angelic Doctor by this twofold argument. First: it is not fitting that God provide less for those whom he ordains and directs to possess supernatural good, than for creatures which he loves and ordains to natural good: but for natural creatures he so provides that he not only moves them to natural acts, but even bestows upon them certain forms and virtues which are principles of acts, that through those forms they may be inclined to the production of such acts: therefore much more does he infuse into those whom he moves and ordains to attain eternal supernatural good certain supernatural forms or qualities, through which they may be moved by him sweetly and promptly to the attainment of eternal good. — Secondly: for man to be in the grace of God is for him to be loved by God, as even the heretics confess: but for man to be loved by God imports something intrinsic to him and permanent in him, by reason of which he becomes grateful and acceptable to God: therefore truly there must be admitted some gift permanently persevering in the just man, so long as he is just, through which he becomes grateful to God. The minor is proved; for since love is an affection by which one tends toward some object on account of its goodness, in this divine and human love agree, that each regards the goodness of the object; but they differ in this, that human love, since it is sterile and lowest, nor is effective but only affective, supposes in the object a goodness by which it is attracted and drawn; but the love of God, since it is most fruitful and most powerful, nor only affective but also effective, causes goodness in the object which it loves: therefore as God by loving creatures in the natural order bestows upon them natural perfections, whereby they are a congruous object of such love, so by loving an intellectual creature in order to the supernatural end, he confers upon it supernatural goodness and perfection, by reason of which he loves it: but that special goodness can emanate from nowhere else than from sanctifying grace: therefore since the just are loved by God with special love, there must necessarily be admitted in them some intrinsic gift, which may be the reason of that love.

Truly both these arguments seem weak: The first indeed, because God would sufficiently provide for just men in order to elicit supernatural acts by the actual help alone, which he would afford them on certain occasions. The second likewise fails: both because, as we shall say below, God can forgive sin, and constitute man friend out of enemy, without any conferring of an intrinsic gift; and hence to reconcile divine love to him it is not necessary that God confer anything intrinsic upon the creature itself: and because the hatred of God posits nothing in the man whom he hates, but suffices only unto this, that man have sin and live wickedly; and that God be so affected toward him as to will to punish him with eternal pain, nor is any intrinsic form required: therefore in order that God specially love the just man, nothing further is required than that man live well, and that God will to confer eternal life upon him: hence from the fact that God pursues the just man with special love it is not absolutely necessary that he confer upon him some intrinsic form and goodness.

Therefore it must be concluded with the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 17. question 3. number 21.: that by no argument can it be efficaciously proved that there is given in us a supernatural habit continually persevering: > For that, he says, cannot be gathered from the act which we experience, nor from the substance of the act, nor from the intensio ne of the act, nor from the delectation or facility in operating, nor from the moral goodness or rectitude of the act, can we conclude that such a supernatural habit inheres, because with any one of these given, someone possessing charity could know certitudinally that he is in charity: namely from this, that he would experience that act to inhere in himself, or that an act so intense inhered in him, or inhered so delectably or easily, or was consonant with right reason. — But the reason why such a habit cannot be concluded from the act, or from some condition of the act itself: is because either the act can have all the things premised from the sole potency, right reason concurring: or if some habit concurred on account of some condition of the premises, this could be some acquired habit; for acquired friendship could give such intension to the act, as a second cause together with the potency; it could also grant such facility and delectation; the habit could also be so consonant with right reason that the elicited act would have no evidently apparent condition, from which it would necessarily be concluded that it is elicited according to a supernatural habit. — But if you say: the will suddenly changes, so that it operates intensely and easily and delectably, and in this manner consonant with supernatural reason, that is, to the dictate of faith: and it cannot so suddenly acquire the habit of ordered friendship consonant with faith: therefore it has some non-acquired habit whereby it is inclined to act suddenly. I answer: The will can move quite suddenly as regards natural acts, which are wholly subject to its power, because as Augustine says, 1. Retractationum, cap. 22., Nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself: therefore from such suddenness the opposite cannot be conceded. <

Thence the Doctor infers, that if some argument prove desired in us some supernatural habit whereby we are formally made just, it must be sought chiefly from this, that God accept some acts unto glory as merits condign of a reward: > For in this manner, he says, we believe our nature beatifiable to be habitually accepted as just, that is, when it is not actually operating: because the divine will ordains it to eternal life, as worthy of so great a good > according to the disposition which it has habitually in itself, on account of this

habitual acceptance of the beatifiable nature, even when it does not operate; and on account of the actual acceptance of the act elicited from such a nature, there must be posited one supernatural habit, whereby the possessor is formally accepted by God, and whereby the act elicited by him is accepted as meritorious. »

But if you ask: how does that habit dignify the nature, and likewise the acts elicited through the mediation of that act? — The Doctor answers n. 23. that it dignifies the nature, inasmuch as it is a certain perfect form rendering it pleasing to God.

« For the reason, he says, of accepting the nature seems to be like a certain comeliness of the nature pleasing to the divine will, so that whether that habit be active or not active, from this alone that it is such a form decorating and adorning the soul, it can be a reason of accepting the nature; but for the acceptance of acts more is required, than that the agent have this spiritual comeliness; otherwise one having such a habit could not have any indifferent act, nor sin venially, because neither of these removes the comeliness of the operator; and thus either would be accepted, if the act were accepted from the sole comeliness of the operator. Therefore it is necessary to say that this habit, besides being a spiritual comeliness, is also inclining to determinate acts, that is, it concurs in a special manner effectively, namely by eliciting those very acts physically together with the potency, and morally instilling into them its comeliness. »

Thus the Doctor; and since these things contain an excellent doctrine, and are in themselves clear, therefore it was permitted to transcribe them more fully.

You will say. 1.: Man can be justified without habitual grace, doubtless through actual supernatural love of God: therefore habitual grace is not required. —

I distinguish the consequent: that habitual grace is not required simply, and absolutely, for justification, I concede: in a certain respect, and unto a better state, I deny. For although someone can be justified by actual grace alone, nevertheless to actual grace there is added justifying habitual grace, not from absolute necessity, but for the greater adornment of the soul, and that he may exercise all works of justice more connaturally.

You ask. Whether it is of faith that that grace whereby we are justified is something habitual and permanent?

I answer, that although it would be most rash to deny that the grace whereby adults are justified is habitual and permanent; nevertheless it does not seem plainly to be of faith as determined by the Church; which indeed I demonstrate thus: if the definition of this truth had been made as of faith, it would be gathered, chiefly either from Innocent III., chapter Maiores De Baptismo; or from Clement V. in the Council of Vienne in the place cited above; or from the Council of Trent in the words also praised above: but from neither chapter can it be gathered. — Not indeed from Innocent III., for he says that question to be controverted among Theologians, for his are these words:

But that which the objectors adduce, that faith, or charity, or other virtues are not infused into little ones, as not consenting, is not granted absolutely by most, since on account of this a question is disputed among Doctors of Theology, some asserting that through the virtue of Baptism guilt indeed is remitted to little ones, but grace not conferred; some saying that sin is forgiven and virtues infused, they having > having them as regards habit, not as regards use, until they attain adult age.

From which words it is evident that the question proceeds only concerning children, but not concerning all men simply. Which is also evident from the very reason touched there: for some judged that habits are not infused into children in Baptism because they saw them wholly unfit for acts of virtue; which, besides others who have held this opinion, the Angelic Doctor notes, Book 3, question 69. article 6., which passage is cited in the margin of the chapter cited above, Maiores. But who does not see that this reason has no place in adults, since they are able to exercise acts of virtue? — Nor yet from Clement V., because there he only says that the opinion of those who say that in Baptism informing grace is conferred upon little ones as well as adults should be chosen as more probable as consonant with the sayings of the Saints and modern Doctors of Theology, but does not decide absolutely as of faith. Nor from the Council of Trent, because it indeed defines that charity is poured forth in the hearts of those who are justified and inheres in them: but whether it inheres after the manner of an act, or after the manner of a habit or permanent quality, it does not define.

You will say. 1: The Roman Catechism published at the command of St. Pius V., conformably to the doctrine of the Council of Trent, p. 2. c. 2. De Baptismo, n. 50., where the second effect of Baptism is treated, says thus: But grace, as the Tridentine Synodus ⟦taught?, laying down? that all must believe?, decrees? under pain of anathema?⟧, is not only that whereby remission of sins takes place, but a diverse quality inhering in the soul, like a certain splendour and light, which blots out all the stains of our souls, and renders those souls more beautiful and more splendid. And the Fathers of the Council conclude this plainly from the sacred Scriptures, when they say grace is poured forth, and are wont to call it that of the Holy Spirit: therefore it is of faith that sanctifying grace is a certain quality. —

I answer first, that the Council of Trent did not use the name of quality, although it expressed the thing somewhat. I answer secondly, even if the Council had used the name of quality, still some doubt ⟦would arise?⟧, whether quality ought to be taken strictly for a distinct predicament apart from the rest, or broadly for every accident which is predicated in the accidental category of quality.

You will say. 2: The Council of Trent distinguishes the grace of justification from the acts by which man is disposed to justification: for in Session 6. cap. 10. it says thus: This disposition justification itself follows: therefore sanctifying grace is something besides the acts, and on that account permanent. —

I deny the consequence; because those acts by which we are disposed to justification can be followed by another act more perfect whereby we are justified.

NOTES. 1. That it is beyond controversy that habitual grace is really distinguished from faith and hope, since they can exist separately; for those two virtues subsist in man stained by mortal sin, in such wise that that sin does not fall directly upon them through infidelity or despair and presumption: but habitual grace so abhors the fellowship of any mortal sin that it can nowise subsist with it, unless perhaps through an extraordinary power of God. Whence the difficulty is raised only concerning the distinction or identity of the same habitual grace with charity. Concerning whose resolution the opinion of Authors is manifold: for some with the Angelic Doctor, 2. q. 110. art. 3., and the Seraphic Doctor in 2. dist. 27. art. 1. qu. 2. will that grace and charity are habits really distinct: but very many with the Subtili Doctore in 2. dist. 20. num. 3. affirm both to be really undistinct. The rest however judge both opinions to be probable, since they seem to have no stable foundation in the sacred Scriptures, Councils, and Fathers, which however will be shown to be false below.

NOTES. 2. That all Catholic Doctors alike agree that sanctifying grace and charity are certain illustrious participations of the Divinity, by whose virtue we rise and are lifted up into the fellowship of God, according to that saying of St. Peter, 2. 1.: He hath given us most great and most precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature. But they differ in this, that some contend that habitual grace is indeed a participation of the Deity, but according to the reason of nature, and insofar as the divine nature and essence is the fount and origin of all the perfections of God: but that charity is a participation of the same Deity, not insofar as it is nature, but insofar as it is operating through will and love: so that the former refers and expresses the Deity subsisting, but the latter the Deity operating. But others contend that charity, and habitual grace considered according to entity and formal reason, are participations of the divine nature: but are said to participate the divine virtue and operation, insofar as they are operative and effective.

NOTES. 3. Finally, the Doctors also agree among themselves that habitual grace and charity are the most excellent gifts of God which he is wont to grant to creatures: so that they far excel and surpass first the substance of the intellectual and spiritual creature, as well human as Angelic, since they assimilate us to God in a more excellent manner than the other perfections of the natural order; whence deservedly August., book 2. ad Bonifacium, cap. 6., grace surpasses not only all the stars, and all the heavens, ⟦but?⟧ also all the Angels; and likewise far excel the other corporeal creatures however excellent; for, says the Wise Man, The possession thereof is better than gold, and chosen silver. Hence in the same place the Wise Man says: I have preferred her before kingdoms and thrones, and I esteemed riches nothing in comparison with her. Nay rather even both these most excellent gifts of God exceed the dignity of the maternity of God: for it is nobler to conceive God in mind than in womb: but through sanctifying grace and charity we conceive God in mind, nay rather the whole Trinity inhabits us, according to that saying of John 14.: We will come to him, and make our abode with him: hence sanctifying grace and charity appear more excellent than the very maternity of the Virgin Mother of God, if this be considered apart from those gifts of God: for, as Augustine says, l. 1. De Virginitate: Mary was more blessed in receiving the faith of Christ, than in conceiving the flesh of Christ: maternal kinship would have profited Mary nothing, unless she had more happily carried Christ in heart than in flesh.

These things thus premised, two things must here be especially established: First, that sanctifying grace and charity are not really distinguished from each other: Secondly, that neither are they formally distinguished, inasmuch as formal distinction imports diverse formalities and objective concepts, separately and adequately conceivable from each other.

First Conclusion. — CHARITY AND HABITUAL GRACE ARE ONE AND THE SAME REALLY HABIT. Thus the Doctor in the place cited.

Proof 1. Habits are not to be really distinguished whose effects are entirely the same: but the effects of grace and charity are utterly the same from sacred Scripture: therefore, etc. The major appears; for the diversity of habits is gathered only from the diversity of acts, unto which they are designated and ordered. The minor is proved: six effects especially are attributed in divine Scripture to sanctifying grace, which there agree to charity: For first there is attributed to sanctifying grace the adoptive virtue of divine generation, whereby we are signed as adopted sons of God: but this same virtue is attributed to charity, 1. Joan. 3.: Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called and should be the sons of God. There the particle ut, importing a certain emphasis, denotes a certain causality of charity toward conferring upon us something spiritual and divine; hence chapter 4. of John: Every one that loveth is born of God. Whence St. Dionysius, book De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, cap. 1., says charity is that whereby we are regenerated and constituted in divine being. — Secondly there is attributed to sanctifying grace, that it makes man grateful and beloved to God: but this also befits charity: for John 15. Christ the Lord says: If anyone love me, he shall be loved by my Father. And chapter 14.: You are my friends, if you do the things that I command you. — A third effect of sanctifying grace is, that it confers spiritual life: but this also belongs to charity, for 1. John 3.: He that loveth not remaineth in death. And further: We know, that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. Whence St. Prosper, lib. 3. De vita contemplativa, c. 18., calls charity the death of crimes, the life of virtues, the soul of holy minds. — A fourth effect of sanctifying grace is, that it be the fount and origin of all virtues, and likewise the root of all good works: but this also belongs to charity, as the Apostle plainly teaches, 1. ad Cor. c. 13., where he attributes all the offices of the other virtues to charity, saying: Charity is patient, is kind, etc. Hence too he names charity the fulness of the law. Whence St. Gregory, Homil. 27.: A branch of good work has no greenness, if it does not abide in the root of charity.

A fifth effect of sanctifying grace is, that it join us intimately to God: but the same belongs to charity; for 1. John 1.: He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him: whence St. Bernard, Sermon 83. on the Canticles, says that by charity our soul is made one with God. — Lastly a sixth effect is, that sanctifying grace be the seed of eternal life: but the same is the prerogative of charity: since James 1.: God hath promised the crown of life to them that love him. Therefore all the effects which are attributed to sanctifying grace in sacred Scripture agree also to charity.

Proof 2. And at the same time this induction is confirmed from the Council of Trent, Session 6. cap. ⟦7?⟧ where it uses charity indiscriminately for sanctifying grace, and attributes even the force of sanctifying to charity itself: for assigning one sole formal cause of justification, it says it to be charity, in these words: For although no one can be just, unless the merits of the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ be communicated to him, yet in this justification of the sinner it takes place, while by the merit of the same most holy Passion the charity of God is poured forth by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them. In which words no one will doubt that sanctifying grace is understood by the name of charity; both because all Catholic Doctors gather from the words inheres, and is poured forth here placed, that sanctifying grace is an intrinsic form, and permanent: and because there the Council treats of the formal cause of justification, which is sanctifying grace itself. — Moreover, this very thing the Council confirms with the following words, for it adds: Thence in justification itself, together with remission of sins, man receives through Jesus Christ all these things infused at once, into whom he is ingrafted through faith, hope, and charity: for if some other form besides charity, faith, and hope ⟦were designated?⟧ for justification, doubtless the Council would not have been silent about it, especially since the purpose of that chapter was not to make mention of those three virtues, except insofar as either all three, or some one of them was the form justifying. Which chapter 10. opens more clearly, saying: Of this increase of justice the holy Church begs when she prays: Give unto us the increase of faith, hope, and charity. Where doubtless it speaks of the increase of the formal cause of justification; hence it uses faith, hope, and charity for sanctifying grace, inasmuch namely by faith, and hope we are vivified through charity. — Finally, the mind of the Council is plainly gathered from the eleventh Canon of the same Session, where, condemning him who says that men are justified, either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of grace, and charity, lest it might seem to distinguish grace from charity, it adds in the singular number: Which is poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Spirit, and inheres in them: by which words it signifies that it speaks of one and the same habit; for no Grammarian would say, Peter and John walks, but walk, because they are two really distinct persons: therefore since the Council speaks of grace and charity in the singular, it is a sign that it intends them not to be really distinct.

The Thomists answer, that all things proper to grace are indeed attributed to charity, but in a different manner; to grace indeed as to the formal cause, and root: but to charity as to the fruit of grace itself, and operative principle: and that this mutual attribution of properties takes place on account of the intimate and inseparable connexion which those two habits preserve between themselves. —

True, but against this: in the opinion of the Adversaries, grace is in the same way the root of the other supernatural virtues that are not theological, as it is the root of charity itself; and these virtues have an intimate connection with sanctifying grace according to the ordinary law of God; yet on account of that connection not all those effects which in Sacred Scripture are attributed to sanctifying grace are likewise said to belong to those virtues, just as they do not to hope and faith; therefore it is a sign that those effects are not attributed to charity on account of its mere connection with sanctifying grace. Add that even if at times the effect of one cause were attributed to another inseparably conjoined with it, speaking properly and by a certain metonymy, still this must never be thought to be done when the doctrine of things to be believed is being handed down: for the Church would commit no less a fault than the Philosophers if, while opening up the causes and properties of things, she were to assign others which belong to things most intimately conjoined with them. But the Council of Trent, in the passages cited above, gathering from Sacred Scripture the doctrine concerning the dispositions, causes, and effects of justification, explains that this is charity, and speaks of it, taken together with sanctifying grace, in the singular as of one habit; therefore the Council judges that charity and sanctifying grace truly have the same effects, not on account of their connection and inseparability, but on account of identity.

They answer 2, that the effects of grace are attributed to charity because charity is a partial form of justification; for they hold that the form of justification is not one simple quality. —

Against this, this proposition directly militates against the Council of Trent, session 7, praised above, where it says that there is one formal cause of our justification: One, it says, is the formal cause of the justification of man, the justice of God, not by which He Himself is just, but by which He makes us just; therefore the Council does not judge that there is a twofold distinct formal cause of justification; otherwise it would have assigned this twofold formal cause there, just as it assigns various final causes of the same justification there, namely the glory of God and of Christ, and eternal life. Add that also among partial formal causes of one effect, nothing is attributed to one distinct from the other, in the way the effects of sanctifying grace are assigned to charity; therefore, etc.

All these points are confirmed by the authority of St. Augustine, book De Natura et Gratia, chapter 62, where he not obscurely indicates that charity is the formal reason of justification, in these words: For charity itself is the truest, fullest, and most perfect justice. And Letter 113: Unto having a good will, wherein is this very thing, that we live justly, and charity itself, whereby it so excels in all the gifts of God that even God is said to be loved, whereby alone is fulfilled in us whatever we fulfill of the divine law and admonition, etc. By which words he designates charity as that whereby we live justly, and forthwith whereby we are just.

Finally our assertion is proved by reason: first indeed because, as the Subtle Doctor says, beings are not to be multiplied without urgent necessity; but no necessity appears for multiplying and distinguishing the habits of charity and sanctifying grace, seeing that all the effects attributed to the latter are also customarily attributed to the former, as we said in the first proof of the Conclusion; therefore, etc. — Then, if grace and charity were really distinguished, they could be separated from each other, at least by the extraordinary and absolute power of God; but this cannot be said; therefore neither can that. The major is evident from what the Philosophers commonly hand down about the sign of real distinction; for absolute beings, one of which is prior to the other and independent of it, such as sanctifying grace and charity would be if they were truly really distinguished, can exist and be preserved separately. The minor, however, is proved: if any man could have grace without charity, he would be grateful and acceptable to God, indeed His adopted son, and yet would not be His friend, which is absurd. — Moreover, if charity were infused into anyone without sanctifying grace, and he died in that state, he would not be damned, since he would have no sin, because every sin is impossible together with charity; nor would he be saved, because being without sanctifying grace he would not be the adopted Son of God, and consequently would be incapable of the inheritance promised solely to the sons of God; but both consequents are utterly unfitting; therefore also that from which they follow. Finally no sufficient reason at all appears for a real distinction between grace and charity, as will be evident from the solution of the objections.

You will object. 1. The principle of being is really distinguished from the principle of operating; but sanctifying grace is the principle of being supernaturally, while charity is the principle of operating; therefore they are really distinguished. It is confirmed: God no less looks to the full and perfect fulfillment of nature, and to its perfection in the supernatural order, than in the natural order; but in the natural order He so perfects nature that He first gives it the substantial form, and then the powers and accidental forms, which are instruments of acting; therefore in the supernatural order He ought first to confer upon the soul the form by which it is constituted in supernatural being, before the active forms; but sanctifying grace is the form conferring supernatural being, while charity is the form conferring the mode of acting supernaturally; therefore the former is prior, the latter posterior. —

I answer first, that the major can be denied; since substantial forms are also active, as we taught in the Physics, indeed even accidental forms are; for heat produces heat; nor is it necessary that some prior form always be conferred which gives being before another is bestowed which gives the power of acting; for heat, itself demanding it, is produced by fire in water without any prior form, and thus produced it produces another heat in the hand touching the water; similarly whiteness is conferred on a subject and has the power of drawing away the sight without any prior form; therefore when a principle of acting supernaturally is conferred on something, there is no need that some prior form be conferred upon it which demands such a principle. Add that even if the form which is the principle of operating required another by which nature would be constituted first in the order of the absolute before being in the order of an active principle, it would not follow from this that both forms ought to be really distinguished; for in the more probable opinion intellect and will are not really distinguished from the soul, which is their principle and root as faculties; consequently although charity presupposed sanctifying grace, as its root and fountain from which it emanates, it would not follow that it is really distinguished from it, just as the properties flowing from the essence and presupposing it are not really distinguished from it.

You will object. 2. Charity supposes habitual grace in the soul; therefore it is really distinguished from it. The antecedent is proved: it belongs to the notion of virtue in common to dispose the subject to act fittingly in accordance with a preexisting nature; for virtue gives the power of acting well, that is, of exercising an operation fitting and proportionate to nature; hence Aristotle, Physics 7, chapter 3: Virtue is the disposition of the perfect toward the best. And he adds: But I call perfect that which is disposed according to its nature; but charity is a supernatural virtue; consequently it supposes nature in perfect supernatural being through some other form distinct from it; but that form is none other than sanctifying grace; therefore this is presupposed to charity. —

I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say that it is universally false, especially in the present difficulty; for if every virtue had to presuppose a nature proportionate to itself, it would follow that neither faith nor hope are true virtues in the faithful sinner, since in him they suppose no sanctifying grace, by which he would be constituted in supernatural being and state.

You will object. 3. Sacred Scripture and the Councils, which speak of grace and charity as of two distinct things; therefore they are truly distinct. The antecedent is proved from that passage to the Romans 5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us; where by the Holy Spirit sanctifying grace is understood, as St. Augustine explains, book De gratia Christi, chapter 20, through grace, he says, by which we are justified, the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts; consequently sanctifying grace is something other than charity. Similarly 1 Timothy 1: The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ superabounded with faith and love; and 2 Corinthians 13: The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God, and the communication of the Holy Spirit be with you all. In which words the Apostle distinguishes grace from charity, since he commemorates both, which he would by no means do if he judged them to be one and the same real habit. Similarly the Council of Vienne speaks of charity and sanctifying grace as of distinct things. For the Clementines, De summa Trinitate, says that grace and the virtues are poured forth in Baptism, where it understands by the virtues the three Theological ones, namely faith, hope, and charity. Trent concurs with it, Session 6, chapter 10, when it says that sanctification is the justification and renovation of the interior man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts. And Canon 11 expresses charity and grace separately, by which it plainly denotes them to be distinct; otherwise it would commit an inept tautology, taking many names to signify the same thing, when one alone would suffice. —

I deny the consequence, and to the first text of Scripture I say that the Spirit by whom the Apostle says charity is poured forth is the very person of the Holy Spirit, to whom the pouring forth of charity is specially attributed, because it is the chief effect of divine love toward men, and it is said to be given through charity because the divine Trinity dwells specially in the soul ablaze with charity, according to that oracle of Christ the Lord: If any one love me, we will come to him, etc. Nor does it matter that St. Augustine understands by the Spirit sanctifying grace. For besides that the other Fathers signify that by this name spirit there the person of the Holy Spirit is designated, it does not follow from there that they hold charity to be distinguished from sanctifying grace, since they teach, in the passages praised by us above, that charity is the formal cause of our justification; but perhaps he wished to indicate that one and the same quality is at once grace, insofar as it raises us to the supernatural state, and charity poured forth in our hearts, insofar as it orders and incites us actually to love God and neighbor. Add other contexts of the same Apostle; I say the Apostle by the name of love or charity either understands uncreated charity, whereby namely God the Father so loved us as to give His only-begotten Son, or actual love, or the act of love, whereby we in fact love God, which truly is not the same real thing as sanctifying grace, but an act distinct from it as from its principle. As for the Council of Vienne, I say it indeed speaks jointly of grace and the virtues being poured forth in Baptism, but does not say that charity is distinct from grace; hence by the name of virtues there it understands only the other virtues infused per se, such as faith and hope, which are not identified with sanctifying grace. In the same way the texts of the Council of Trent must be explained; for it does not express the names of grace and charity in order to designate them as mutually distinct — for that appears false from the proof of the Conclusion — but only in order to signify that what we call grace and charity is truly the cause of justification.

Second Conclusion. — SANCTIFYING GRACE IS NOT EVEN FORMALLY DISTINGUISHED FROM CHARITY, THAT IS, BY THAT DISTINCTION WHICH INTERVENES BETWEEN DIVERS FORMALITIES SEPARATELY CONCEIVABLE; BUT THEY SEEM TO BE DISTINGUISHED ONLY IN RESPECT OF DIVERS OFFICES.

This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor in book two, distinction 26, number 3, where he proves that opinion which says: That grace formally is that virtue which is charity, and whatever excellences are attributed to grace are attributed to charity, and conversely; for each formally equally divides between the children of the kingdom and of perdition. And the Conclusion can be persuaded by the reason of the same Doctor; for just as entities are not to be multiplied without urgent necessity, so neither are formalities to be distinguished; but no necessity appears for distinguishing sanctifying grace and charity as divers formalities, seeing that, as we said, the effects attributed to one are also attributed to the other, and consequently they do not seem to be distinct formalities.

You will say: Charity is a simply simple perfection, for which reason it belongs to God: for God is charity; which assuredly does not befit grace, since it ill becomes God, nor is it attributed to Him; consequently it is not a simply simple perfection; and therefore grace is necessarily distinguished from charity, if not really, at least formally. —

The Doctor answers in the same place number 1, that charity can be considered either transcendently or categorically, that is, insofar as it signifies and embraces charity both created and uncreated, or insofar as it designates only created charity alone. In the former way he grants that sanctifying grace and charity are distinguished formally, as wisdom, as such, is distinguished from created wisdom, and as animal, as such, is distinguished formally from this rational thing; but created charity and grace are not so distinguished that created charity signifies some absolute formality which sanctifying grace does not signify, or vice versa; therefore when the Doctor, in number 1 praised above, says that grace is formally distinct from charity, he speaks only of charity taken transcendentally, which indeed he there grants to be formally distinguished from grace; but he does not compare created charity with sanctifying grace, wherefore he says there that every grace is charity, though not conversely. —

But that created charity and sanctifying grace are not distinguished by name alone, as Durandus holds, is evident from this, that things differing by name alone have only diverse appellations, not diverse offices, like knife and sword; but charity and grace connote diverse offices and distinct things. For grace signifies being grateful and acceptable to God, with supernatural acceptance into adopted sonship, and as such does not signify some supernatural principle of loving God connaturally, which nevertheless charity, taken with the concept of created charity cut away, signifies; therefore sanctifying grace and charity are distinguished more than by name.

NOTE. 1. Concerning the first part of this proposed Question, there have been three capital erroneous opinions of heretics. The first error was that of the Jovinians, who once taught that men, having received the grace of God, cannot grow, as St. Jerome testifies in book 2 against that same heretic. The second is attributed to Kemnitz, who although he taught that justice and holiness could receive some increase, nevertheless denied that this came from good works, but only from faith in the divine promises, and consequently rather from the good pleasure of God than from the merit of the one acting. The third error finally was that of the Beghards and Beguines, who judged that men could attain in this life to such a degree of sanctity and justice that they would not be permitted to advance to a further perfection. Against this threefold error the battle will be waged in the first Conclusion.

NOTE. 2. Among Catholics it is beyond controversy that habitual and sanctifying grace can be lost through mortal sin, the Lord saying through Ezekiel, chapter 18: But if the just man turn himself away from his justice, and do iniquity according to all the abominations which the wicked man useth to work, shall he live? All his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered: in the prevarication by which he hath prevaricated, and in his sin which he hath sinned, in them he shall die. But the difficulty is whether sanctifying grace — which has been proved above to be really the same as charity — can be destroyed and corrupted by each sinful act, or indeed only by an act of hatred and aversion from God directly opposed to charity; just as faith, hope, and the other virtues are not lost except by contrary and opposing acts.

NOTE. 3. Here the difficulty is not raised whether habitual grace can be increased and diminished by the extraordinary power and disposition of God, with respect to the intensification of the degrees which are in it, and that at will, and without any respect to meritorious or demeritorious works; but it is asked whether in fact, and according to the common law, sanctifying grace can be increased by any meritorious acts whatsoever, not only of charity but also of the other virtues, both supernatural and moral; and that not only through more intense, but also through more remiss acts of those virtues; and whether it is also diminished by every venial sin. Therefore three things come here chiefly to be resolved: First, whether habitual grace can be increased, so long as we live in this mortal state, by any good works whatsoever. Second, whether truly by every mortal sin habitual grace is destroyed. Third, finally, whether by each venial sin habitual grace is diminished.

First Conclusion. — HABITUAL GRACE CAN BY ITS NATURE BE INCREASED: AND IN FACT IT IS INCREASED IN MEN BY EACH OF THEIR GOOD WORKS, SO LONG AS THEY LIVE IN THIS MORTAL STATE: SO THAT THERE IS NO ONE SO HOLY AND PERFECT WHO CANNOT MAKE

A STILL HIGHER STEP IN SANCTITY, EVEN BY REMISS AND LESS INTENSE ACTS. This Conclusion contains four parts, against as many errors declared in the first Notable.

It is proved, first indeed from Sacred Scripture exhorting in many places to progress in justice and sanctity: thus Ecclesiasticus 18: Be not judged justified until death, that is, make progress in justice. Proverbs 4: The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forward, and increaseth even to perfect day. To the Philippians 1: And this I pray, that your charity may more and more abound. And Apocalypse 22: He that is just, let him be justified still; and he that is holy, let him be sanctified still. And 2 Corinthians 4: Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day.

The same truth was defined in the Council of Vienne, in the Clementine Ad nostrum, concerning heretics; and at Trent, Session 6, chapter 10, where it says: Being justified therefore, and made friends of God, and housed with Him, running from virtue to virtue they are renewed, as the Apostle says, day by day; that is, by mortifying the members of their flesh, and presenting them as instruments of justice unto sanctification, through the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church, in this justification received through the grace of Christ, their faith cooperating with good works, they grow and are justified more... which increase of justice holy Church begs when she prays: Give unto us an increase of faith, hope, and charity. Hence Canon 24 decrees thus: If anyone shall say that the justice received is not preserved and also increased before God through good works, but that those works are merely the fruits and signs of justification obtained, not the cause of its increase, let him be anathema.

To this truth assent all the holy Fathers, especially Jerome on chapter 1 to the Ephesians, explaining these words, Unto every one of us is given grace, etc.; Augustine, Letter 59 to Dardanus; Basil in his scholia on those words of Psalm 83, They shall go from virtue to virtue; Bernard, Sermon 9 on the Psalm Qui habitat, etc.

It is also urged by reason: Grace is a supernatural quality, and a certain participation of the divine nature; therefore it does not conflict with its being increased. The consequence is proved: that repugnance, if there were any, would be drawn either from its being a quality, or because it is supernatural, or finally because it is a participation of the divine nature. Not the first, for it is proper to a quality to be capable of intensification. Nor even the second, for from it there would follow that the act of charity, or of another infused virtue, since they are supernatural, cannot be increased, which is evidently absurd, seeing that we love God now more remissly, now more intensely, from a supernatural motive. Not finally the third, for since that participation of the divine nature is inadequate and imperfect, it does not conflict with its becoming more or less perfect with regard to degrees of intensity.

The second part is also proved, namely that sanctifying grace can be increased not only by the act of the love of God, but also by good works proceeding with the help of grace. For this truth the Apostle teaches in many places, especially Romans 6: As you have yielded your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity, so now yield your members to serve justice unto sanctification. By which words he exhorts the Roman faithful, that as before the reception of the grace of Baptism they had served iniquity by their evil works, so after receiving Baptism they should serve justice unto sanctification, that through good works they may become holier. But more openly he demonstrates this truth in Colossians 1, saying:

That you may walk worthy of God, pleasing him in all things, bearing fruit in every good work, and increasing in the knowledge of God, strengthened in all virtue.

It is confirmed from other passages of Scripture, in which an increase of glory, which is perfected justice, is promised to the good works of the just, and consequently an increase of grace or of initiated justice. Thus 1 Cor. 15: Abound in every good work, knowing that your labor is not in vain in the Lord: because clearly even the cup of cold water given in the name of Christ, or of his disciple, will receive the reward of eternal glory, as is signified in Matt. 10. Likewise 2 Cor. 2: This momentary and light tribulation of ours, above measure, works in us an eternal weight of glory in sublimity. To these add the doctrine and definition of the Council of Trent praised above, by which it openly signifies that grace is increased in us not only through acts of charity, but also through any good works whatsoever.

The third part is proven, namely that the just are able to advance throughout their whole life in the justice received; so that they never reach that point beyond which they cannot progress so long as they are on the way, and lead a mortal life; for thus Sacred Scripture clearly teaches, Ecclus. 18: Be not afraid to be justified even unto death, for the reward of God abides forever: as if to say: do not cease, while you live, to advance by new degrees in justice, because the holier you will be, the greater and more abundant glory you will receive. So likewise Ps. 83: They shall go from virtue to virtue, the God of gods shall be seen in Sion, that is, in virtue they shall grow until they attain the blessed vision. And Galatians 6: But let us not fail in doing good, for in due time we shall reap, not failing. By which words the Apostle signifies that the whole time of this life has been given for working well and for sowing, so that we may reap in the other life, namely the seed of eternal life.

The same truth the Holy Fathers defend with their authority, especially St. Jerome upon Ps. 83, expounding those words, he hath set his tabernacle in his heart, where he says: whoever is holy daily stretches forward to what lies before, and forgets what is behind. St. Augustine, Sermon 15 On the words of the Apostle: Always add, always walk, always advance, do not remain on the way. St. Leo, Sermon 2 On Quadragesima: This, he says, is the true justice of the perfect, that they never presume themselves to be perfect, lest, ceasing under the pretense of a journey not yet finished, they fall into the danger of failing, where they have laid aside the desire of advancing. St. Prosper in the Collection of sentences of St. Augustine, Sentence 102: In this life, which is wholly temptation, in the most sublime saints that perfection is not attained which leaves no ascent remaining. Hence in book of Epigrams, elegy 26, he sang elegantly:

For ever over the saints there remains wherewith they may grow, And the glory of the perfect is a beginning. Let virtue bear virtue; out of light let light Come forth, and let every palm make a step.

Reason also favors it: for so long as man is a wayfarer, he can merit; hence Christ the Lord exhorted his disciples: Walk while you have the Light, that the darkness comprehend you not. John 12. Therefore he can always attain a new degree of grace, which may be the seed of a new degree of glory. Next, so long as the wayfarer is not at his terminus he can tend toward it with continuous steps: but while men are in the world, they have not a permanent city, says St. Paul, but they seek one to come; and thereupon they can hasten unceasingly toward their fatherland by continual increase of good works. Finally, although the obediential capacity of man for grace is finite, nevertheless according to the ordination of divine providence it is never wholly filled by the means and aids ministered by God, nor will anyone ever attain that degree of grace which Christ the Lord had; wherefore it is fitting that, so long as he is a wayfarer, since his capacity cannot be wholly filled, he be at least in such wise promoted and aided divinely through the helps of grace, that he may always advance more and more, until he attain the end of his way.

Finally the fourth part is proven, namely that habitual grace can be increased even through remiss and less intense acts: Both because Sacred Scripture and the Council of Trent openly teach that our sanctity is increased through whatever good works: but remiss acts are good works: therefore through those acts sanctifying grace is increased. And because, says the Doctor in Book 4, distinction 2, question 1, if sanctifying grace were not increased through remiss acts, since it is the seed of glory, it would follow that the adult who exercised more remiss acts after Baptism would not be happier nor endowed with greater beatitude than the infant who dies immediately after Baptism: but the consequent fights against the very rewarding justice of God, which does not suffer even the least good work, say a cup of cold water, given out of mercy, to be without reward. It is confirmed, from this, that God suffers no evil works, however remiss, to remain unpunished; for venial sins of every kind are punished in Purgatory unless in this life they be discharged: therefore by equal reason he ought not to leave any good works whatsoever, however minute, unrewarded; for God is not more inclined to vengeance for evil than to the rewarding of good. Finally, the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 16, after it established the conditions desired for meriting, namely that it be a work honest, voluntary, proceeding from grace, says: Nothing further is wanting to the justified themselves, that they be held truly to have merited; therefore no more intense act is required, since those assigned conditions can also fall in the remiss mode.

You will object against the first part: All our grace and justice flows down from Christ the fountain of all grace, of whose fullness we all have received: but Christ distributes graces to each one as he wills, and not according to the merit of each, as St. Paul teaches in 1 Cor. 12: therefore if any increase of grace is made, it is not made through good works. — I distinguish the minor: divides to each one as he wills first grace, and sometimes its increase, I concede: divides always the increase of grace as he wills, that is, out of mere liberality, without regard to good works meriting that increase, I deny. For the contrary was proven above from Scripture: for in vain and delusively would it urge us to summon a new degree, ⟦illegible: verba inter «gradum» et «Christi» omissa videntur; sensu requiritur aliquid quale «si is ex sola»⟧ if it hung upon the mere liberality of Christ the Lord. Add that the Apostle, upon whose authority the objection relies, there speaks only of the distribution of graces freely given.

You will insist: Whatever grace is given gratis, and from pure liberality; for if from merits, now it is no longer grace, says the Apostle: therefore since the increase of grace has the true character of grace, it ought to be granted gratis, and not from merit, and in view of good works. — I distinguish the antecedent: every grace is given gratis, either by reason of itself, or by reason of its principle, I concede: always by reason of itself, I deny. A twofold free bestowal of grace, therefore, must be distinguished: one indeed simple, which takes place with no regard had to a meritorious work; another quoad sic, namely by reason of the principle, which is given gratis. Thus eternal glory, although it is the crown of victors, the reward of laborers, and the inheritance of sons, nevertheless is called grace, because certainly it is given on account of meritorious works, which were elicited through sanctifying grace freely granted. By equal reason the increase of grace is called grace, because it is granted only by reason of the meritorious work, which was elicited through actual and habitual grace granted simply gratis.

You will object against the second part: habits cannot be increased except through acts similar to those which they elicit: therefore sanctifying grace, since it is really identical with charity, cannot be increased through acts of other virtues, but only through an act of the love of God. — I distinguish the major: acquired and acquired-by-our-acts habits cannot be increased except through acts similar to those which they elicit, and through which they were produced, I concede: infused habits, and those granted through the sole liberality of God, such as is sanctifying grace, cannot be increased except through homogeneous acts, or acts similar to those which they elicit, I deny. For since meritorious acts concur to the increase of the habit not physically, but only morally, namely by moving God by way of merit to confer that increase, and since God is moved to recompense the service of a faithful servant on account of any observance and obedience of his whatsoever: thence it comes about that the increase of sanctifying grace can be made through any good work whatsoever. Add that charity is a general virtue, which embraces the other virtues as it were in its bosom; for the fullness of the law is love, says the Apostle; hence it is that it can easily be morally increased through any acts whatsoever of the other virtues.

You will object against the third part St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 121, saying: Here one comes to so great a magnitude of charity, than which greater cannot be: therefore St. Augustine holds that charity can have, in this mortal life, a limit and terminus of accession. — I deny the consequence, for there he is not treating of charity according to the intensification of the habit, but according to the exhibition of a work of the greatest kind in its genus, such as is to despise all things for God, and to undergo death for him; according to that of John 19: Greater love than this no man hath, that he lay down his life, etc. Which most excellent effect indeed a faithful man can exercise in this mortal life, as did the Martyrs, and very many Kings and rich men; and likewise innumerable Religious, who, having sold all that they possessed, and having distributed their abundant largess of alms to the poor, followed poor Christ.

Finally you will object against the last part, that passage of Apoc. 3 where the Bishop of Sardis is reproached because his works were not full before God: but works not full are none other than remiss works: therefore so far are they from being able to merit an increase of grace, that rather they provoke the anger and indignation of God. Next, according to St. Gregory, book Moral., chapter 16, not to advance on the way of the Lord is to go back: but through remiss works we do not advance: therefore we go backward. Finally, he who negligently uses received gifts does not merit to receive an increase of the gift: but he who works remissly uses the gifts negligently: therefore he does not merit an increase of that gift: therefore remiss works nowise conduce to the increase of grace. — I deny the consequence: and to the first argument I deny the minor: for by works not full are understood not remiss works, but those which were done out of vain glory, and are wholly empty of retribution and reward. — To the second I likewise deny the minor: for just as he who exercised an act of charity, which is the most excellent of all virtues, is not said to go back when afterward he exercises an act of another less perfect virtue: so neither ought he be said to go back, who after he has exercised a perfect and intense act of some virtue, afterward elicits a less perfect act of the same or of another virtue: for he is always said to walk who makes motion toward a terminus, although he may now walk more quickly, now more slowly. — To the third I distinguish the major: he who negligently, that is sinfully uses, or rather abuses goods, does not merit their increase, I concede: he who negligently, that is remissly uses such gifts, I deny. For since there is no precept whereby it is commanded that an act be done in an intense and perfect mode, thence one is not to be said to sin while acting remissly.

You will ask: when is such an increase of grace granted by God on account of remiss works? — I answer, Authors vary in resolving this doubt: for there are those who hold that that increase is granted immediately once the meritorious work was elicited. So Gabriel in Book 1, distinction 17, question, article 3. Vasquez disp. 220. Some judge with St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 114. art. 5. that such an increase is not given immediately, but only when man elicits a more intense act. The Cretan however with Subtili Doctore in 4. dist. 21. q. 1. teach that that increase is conferred chiefly at the instant of death: for since a remiss act does not of itself and physically increase the infused habit, but only dispositively and morally: it seems fitting that God, who keeps a gentle manner of acting, should not increase immediately, because there is not a sufficient disposition, but only at the last instant of life, lest namely he leave remiss acts without reward: and moreover the soul in that article, on account of perseverance in grace, is disposed so that such an increase be given to her.

You will say: The justified, according to the Council of Trent, through good works go from virtue to virtue, and from day to day grow in justice itself through good works, and are justified more and more: therefore they must receive an increase of their justice not only at the end of life, but also as soon as they have exercised good works, though remiss ones. — I answer, this indeed is true of intense works, but not of remiss ones; for it better suits that God keep a gentle manner of operating, namely bestowing the increase of grace according to disposition, which since it does not seem more apt than in the article of death, therefore in a more fitting order then only he confers the increase of grace for those remiss acts.

You will insist: There does not seem to be a greater disposition at the end of life than immediately after those acts were elicited: therefore the reason does not appear why that increase is deferred to the end of life. — I deny the antecedent: for ordinarily it happens that at the end of life charity is more intense. Next, on account of perseverance in grace even unto the last term of life there seems to be a greater disposition for receiving that increase of grace than there had been before. Finally, to him whose remiss merits ought not to remain without reward, that owed increase must be paid in that state, in which no disposition is required, just as on the way, which is the state of disposing oneself and meriting.

Second Conclusion. — Habitual grace can be destroyed by any mortal sin whatsoever, and not only by an act of hatred and aversion from God.

This assertion is proven by all those texts of Scripture in which it is declared that they are to be barred from the kingdom of heaven, not only those who pursue God with actual hatred, but also those who perpetrate any sin whatsoever. Thus Galatians: The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, etc. which things I foretell you as I have foretold, because they who do such things shall not possess the kingdom of God. Where he says absolutely that those who do such things shall not attain the kingdom of God: which he declares more openly in 1 Cor. 6 where he says: But you injure and defraud, and that your brethren? Know you not that the unjust shall not possess the kingdom of God? Be not deceived: neither fornicators, nor servers of idols, nor adulterers, etc. shall possess the kingdom of God: and these indeed you were, but you are washed, but you are sanctified, etc. Where it is manifest that he speaks of sins of any kind whatsoever. He has similar things in Eph. 5. Hence Philippians 2: With fear and trembling work out your salvation. To which accords that passage of Apoc. 3, where it is said to the just Bishop: Hold fast that which thou hast, that another take not thy crown.

Wherefore the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 15:

It must be asserted, he says, that the grace of justification once received is lost not only by infidelity, whereby faith itself also is lost, but by any other mortal sin whatever, though faith be not lost: because every mortal sin gravely offends God, adjudges man to eternal damnation, and renders him hateful and hostile to God: and thereupon expels sanctifying grace, by which we are friends of God, sons and heirs.

Those things that are wont to be objected against this truth by heretics are resolved below.

Third Conclusion. — Habitual grace is not destroyed, nor diminished, through venial sins.

The first part of this Conclusion is evident from Sacred Scripture, which calls those sinning venially just. Thus Proverbs 24: Lay not wait, nor seek impiety in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest: for a just man shall fall seven times, and shall rise again; as if it said: think not that you will find in him impiety or any grave fault and iniquity: for if he falls at some time, as happens to just men, nevertheless he falls only lightly, and rises again immediately. Hence the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 11:

Although in this mortal life, however holy and just, they sometimes fall into sins, at least light or daily, which are also called venial sins, they do not on this account cease to be just: for that voice of the just is both humble and truthful: forgive us our debts.

The latter part of the Conclusion, namely that habitual grace is not diminished through venial sins, is proven from this, that if venial sins diminished the intensification of grace, it would be chiefly because they were physically or morally repugnant to it; or because they merited its diminution: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because those things which mutually repugnate to each other physically or morally cannot subsist together according to the ordinary law: but a venial sin can subsist with even very intense grace, say when someone having most ardent charity commits the same venial sin as he who has only remiss charity. The second also cannot be said, namely that a venial sin moves God to take away some degrees of grace, because God does not punish lighter sins, such as venial ones are, with so grave a punishment as is the loss and privation of some part of grace and of the glory corresponding to it. Next, if a venial sin diminished grace, it would follow at length that, venial sins being multiplied, grace could be altogether lost: for since the degrees of that grace are finite, if every venial sin took away one degree or part of it, so many venial sins could be committed that at last all grace would perish and vanish: but it is absurd that grace could be lost through venial sins: otherwise man could be damned on account of a venial sin, being indeed deprived of sanctifying grace, which is absolutely necessary unto salvation.

You will say: Through venial sin a certain tepidity is contracted, and the vigor of the soul is dulled, especially when they are committed frequently and deliberately: But that tepidity and that weakness of soul arise from nothing other than from a diminution of habitual grace: therefore truly it is diminished through venial sin. — I deny the minor; for those do not arise from remission and diminution of sanctifying grace in itself; but from the subtraction of the helps of grace, which he becomes unworthy of who sins venially more freely or more frequently.

You will say 2. St. Augustine, Epistle to Seleucianus, affirms, that if venials shall have been gathered together, they will so oppress and weigh us down as would some one great sin: therefore venials multiplied can have the same effect which one mortal would have: but one mortal sin suffices not only to diminish, but even to destroy sanctifying grace: therefore likewise venial sins will be able to destroy that same grace, or at least diminish it. — I distinguish the antecedent: oppress and weigh down effectively and formally, as a mortal sin opposes and weighs down, I deny: dispositively and remotely, I concede. For venials multiplied dispose to the loss of grace and to the commission of mortal sin, inasmuch namely frequently and ordinarily it comes about that those who are very negligent in avoiding venials slip into some mortal sin, because they are deprived of greater helps of grace, with which the just were furnished; for while men, says St. Augustine, Sermon 58 On the seasons of the year, being negligent above all despise their sins because they are small, crimes are joined to the growing petty sins, and make a heap, and overwhelm.

You ask: how is sanctifying grace expelled by mortal sin, whether physically, and by reason of natural opposition: or truly morally only, and by reason of disposition and divine ordination?

I answer, that it is done not physically, but morally, because if mortal sin were the physical cause of the expulsion of grace, it would accomplish this either effectively, or formally, or positively. — The first cannot be said, because if mortal sin expelled grace effectively, it would have to produce in the soul some form physically opposed to grace itself and incompatible with it: but this it does not accomplish: for if it be a sin of pure omission, it effects nothing physically: but if it be a sin of commission, it produces no form which is physically opposed to grace; for a sin of commission produces nothing unless perhaps a vicious habit: but that neither physically nor morally conflicts with sanctifying grace, for vicious habits contracted through assiduous sin remain in the justified, and incline them to sin, as experience attests. — The second also cannot be said: both because what expels another as a form physically opposed and incompatible must have that incompatibility from its own nature: but mortal sin from its own physical nature has no such incompatibility; for the same act which is mortal sin, if it were not done freely, would be physically the same act, yet it would neither expel grace nor be sin: wherefore it has not that power of expelling from its own nature. — The third finally cannot likewise be affirmed; for a form which does not depend on physical dispositions, nor presupposes them in the subject, cannot be physically expelled through contrary dispositions, for these expel a form in no other way than by formally destroying the dispositions prerequisite to that form: but grace does not depend physically upon any dispositions, as is evident in infants, who without any disposition are justified through Baptism; but if in adults some acts are required whereby they may be disposed to sanctifying grace, those dispositions are only moral by reason of divine constitution and ordination, which prescribed that they should be had beforehand. There remains therefore, that mortal sin destroys grace only morally: either inasmuch as it moves God to the subtraction of grace, as to the infliction of other punishments: or because grace is a form ill-befitting mortal sin; seeing that the former makes man a friend of God: whereas the latter makes him an enemy: or lastly, inasmuch as sin turns man away from God and converts him to creatures: while grace on the contrary summons man away from creatures, that it may convert him to God. Here too it is wont to be asked, whether at least through an extraordinary disposition and power of God, sanctifying grace can subsist together with mortal sin. But this question will be resolved in a more fitting order in the Disputation on charity.