Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. By the name of temptation is understood the provocation to sin, which is twofold: one indeed from without, the other from within. The former is that by which men are allured to sin by persuasion or wicked example or provocation. The latter is that by which a man, through one part of himself, namely the lower rebelling against the higher, is spurred toward what is forbidden: which temptations, by reason of their principle, are customarily called those of the flesh, the world, and the devil. Each of these temptations, moreover, is light or grave: light is called that which lightly solicits a man to sin; grave, however, that by which he is vehemently impelled to sin.

Note 2. Now the gravity or lightness of a temptation is not to be measured by the gravity or lightness of the sin to which it allures, but by the manner of alluring or drawing the will to consent, so that that temptation is grave which violently shakes the soul, and light which lightly allures. This, furthermore, must be understood relatively: for the same thing that lightly solicits a man in no way given over to avarice, gravely provokes the avaricious man. Finally, that gravity is to be measured not only by intensity but also by duration, on account of which temptations otherwise light and weak are wont to become grave because of their frequency and importunity; conversely, however, temptations however intense, if momentary, are not usually so grave and dangerous that they cannot be resisted without the greatest difficulty.

Note 3. A temptation can be overcome in three ways. First indeed by another sinful temptation, of which matter Saint Augustine adduces very many examples; whence in book 1 De Nuptiis, chapter 3, he affirms that this manner of overcoming temptations is frequent among infidels: And then, he says, it is not sins that are cured, but sins are overcome by other sins; and book 21 De Civitate, chapter 16: Not uncommonly manifest vices are overcome by hidden ones, which are thought to be virtues, in which pride reigns. Secondly, a temptation is overcome with victory when, namely, out of the love of God, either indwelling or at least moving, it is overcome. Whence Saint Augustine in the same lib. 21. De Civit. Dei: Then, he says, vices are to be reckoned conquered when they are conquered for the love of God; nor otherwise except through the mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ. Thirdly, finally, a temptation is overcome by resistance, when namely, the temptation impelling to sin, neither does the tempted one succumb nor does he profit in order to eternal life; but out of hatred of sin and love of what is right he does not sin, either by suspending his act, if such a suspension of the act be possible, or by doing a good moral work, from the doing of which he was distracted by the temptation. — All Theologians agree that grace is not required for overcoming a temptation in the first manner; for this victory over temptation is won only by sinning against another temptation; but God does not help unto sin. It is also certain that temptations cannot be overcome in the second manner without grace; because for this there is necessary the sincere and true love of God, which charity that is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit. Therefore the whole difficulty concerns the overcoming of temptation in the third manner, whether namely any temptation whatsoever, as well grave as light, can be overcome without the help of grace.

First Conclusion. — THE HELP OF GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR OVERCOMING AND ELIMINATING GRAVE TEMPTATIONS.

It is proved first by various oracles of Sacred Scripture, whereby it is signified that a man impelled by temptations cannot stand, but falls headlong into sin, unless he be sustained and protected by divine help. Thus Psalm 17: In thee I shall be delivered from temptation. Psal. 29. I said in my abundance, I shall never be moved; thou hast turned away thy face from me, and I became troubled. Psal. 117. I was pushed and overturned that I might fall, and the Lord upheld me. And in the Lord's Prayer Christ admonished among other things that the heavenly Father be prayed Lead us not into temptation. From all which oracles it openly appears that divine help is required for overcoming the temptations that press upon us from every side, especially where they grow heavy and sharply stimulate and drag the soul to sin; so that if God do not assist man through the help of grace, it is necessary that man slide into sin.

It is proved secondly from the decrees of Councils. First indeed in the Council of Diospolis, Canon 15, there are reproved and anathematized the words spoken by Pelagius, that our victory is not from the assistance of God but from free will. Secondly, the Fathers of the Carthaginian Council, in the Synodal Letter, which is the 19th among the Augustinian ones, teach that if grace were not necessary that we not succumb to temptation, we pray in vain:

Let your holiness consider, they say, addressing Pope Innocent the supreme Pontiff, and may he compassionate us with pastoral bowels, how pestiferous and deadly to the sheep of Christ it is that there follows necessarily from the disputations of these men (the Pelagians), that we ought not even to pray, lest we enter into temptation, which the Lord both admonished his disciples and placed in the prayer he taught; nor that our faith fail, which he himself attested he had asked for the Apostle Peter; for if these things are constituted in the power of the possibility of nature and the choice of the will, who does not see that they are asked of the Lord in vain, and supplicated fallaciously, since in praying they are demanded which are obtained by the now so conditioned forces of our nature, nor ought the Lord Jesus to have said, Watch ye, and pray: but only, watch ye, lest ye enter into temptation; nor that the most blessed Peter, first of the Apostles, be prayed for: but I warn thee, or I command and enjoin that thy faith fail not?

— With the same argument the Milevitan Fathers argue in the Synodal Letter to the same Innocent, which is number 22 among the Augustinian ones, where after thus complaining of the Pelagian heresy, in these words: a new heresy, they say, and one too pernicious, attempts to arise among the enemies of the grace of Christ, who even attempt to take from us by impious disputations the Lord's Prayer, they subjoin: lead us not into temptation is not so to be understood as though we ought to demand divine assistance lest, tempted, we fall into sin; but that this is placed within our own power, and that the will of man suffices for its fulfillment. — The same was determined in the Council of Orange, Canon 9, where it is decreed: It is a gift of God when we think rightly, and restrain our feet from falsehood and injustice. And Canon 11. No wretch is delivered from whatever misery unless he is anticipated by the mercy of God.

It is proved thirdly from the decrees of the supreme Pontiffs; first indeed the Letter of Innocent to the Council of Carthage, wherein among other things it has this: Unless by great prayers grace implored upon us descend, by no means do we strive to conquer the errors of earthly stain and of the worldly body, since only the help of God, and not free will, can make us equal to resisting. And further: Daily lie open those remedies with which, unless we strive relying and trusting in them, we shall by no means be able to conquer human errors. For it is necessary that he by whose assistance we conquer, again by his helping be ourselves conquered. — Zosimus, Epistle to all the Bishops of the world, has this: At what time would it intervene in which we should not need his help? In all acts therefore, and causes, thoughts, motions, he is to be prayed as helper and protector; for it is proud that human nature presume anything to itself, the Apostle crying out: our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, etc. — Celestine, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, affirms that no one, even renewed by the grace of baptism, is fit for overcoming the snares of the devil and for conquering the concupiscences of the flesh, unless he have received perseverance in good conduct through the daily assistance of God. — Gregory the Great, book 1 of the Moralia, chapter 7, expounding these words of Job: Thou bringest me back into dust, writes: He is said to be brought back into dust, because, abandoned to himself, he is swept away by the blast of any temptation whatever. And in the Exposition of Ps. 3, the Penitential, explaining these words: Forsake me not, O Lord my God, he says: Those undoubtedly the Lord forsakes to whom he does not grant constancy in tribulation; for it necessarily follows that he is subject to every temptation whoever has been forsaken by God.

It is proved fourthly from the doctrine of the holy Fathers, who universally affirm and teach that the victory over our temptations is to be attributed to divine help; thus Saint Cyprian, Treatise on the Lord's Prayer: When we pray, he says, that we be not led into temptation, we are admonished of our weakness and frailty, while we thus ask, lest anyone insolently exalt himself. — Ambrose on Psal. 13. Who is so strong, he says, as to be moved by no temptation, unless the Lord stand by him as helper? — Chrysostom, Homily 21 on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, expounding these words of the Apostle: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, says: There are therefore temptations which cannot be borne: and which are these? All, once for all to say; for to be able to bear them is placed in the nod of God. — Jerome, book 2 Against the Pelagians, when he had opposed to them those words of Christ the Lord: Rise, watch, and pray, lest ye enter into temptation, subjoins: According to you he ought to have said: rise, resist, for you have free will, and power once granted to you by the Lord, you need the help of no other. — Augustine uses this weighty argument to evince against the Pelagians the necessity of grace, thus in the book On the Perfection of Justice, near the end, he says: Whoever denies that we ought to pray, lest we enter into temptation (but he denies this who contends that the assistance of the grace of God is not necessary to man in order not to sin, but that human will suffices with the law alone accepted), I doubt not that he is to be removed from the ears of all, and anathematized by the mouth of all. Illustrious also is that passage which he has in book 50, Homily 28, where he thus writes: If thou hast not been an adulterer, this the Lord thy God says to thee: I ruled thee for myself, I kept thee for myself, that thou mightest not commit adultery: the persuader was absent, and that the persuader was absent I did it: place and time were absent, and that these were absent I did it: the persuader was present, place was not absent, time was not absent; that thou mightest not consent, I terrified thee. Acknowledge therefore his grace, to whom thou owest that thou hast not lost thyself. — Saint Prosper, chapter 35 Against the Collator: Whoever therefore, he says, fails not in tribulation, let him not doubt that he is helped by him, to whom daily the hearts of all the faithful cry out: lead us not into temptation. — Saint Fulgentius, Epistle 1 to Proba, chapter 1, says: Nor is there any time of this life in which the enemy does not spread a snare for men, whose nooses no one can escape by his own strength.

You will say: Whatever grave temptation being posited, with the advertence of reason, a man consents and sins, and indeed mortally, when it is more grave and of great moment: therefore he can, both physically and morally, by force of free will not consent to the temptation, at least not sinning. The consequence is evident: For, says Richard of Saint Victor, book On the State of the First Man, chapter 4, free will does not suffer the Lord, nor can it suffer him, since to inflict violence upon him neither becomes the Creator nor can the creature do it: let the whole hell, the whole world, lastly the whole army of the heavenly militia come together into one, conspire in this one thing: one consent of free will in anything whatsoever cannot be extorted against its will. — It is confirmed, because temptation does not inflict necessity upon the will as to species, nor as to exercise: therefore it can either suspend the act of consent, or elicit an act contrary. — I answer to the antecedent; the help of grace is not indeed required that man may be able physically not to sin, but that de facto he sin not: for no one sins who is not free not to sin. And yet together with that physical potency there can be found a moral impotency for resisting, by reason of which man would succumb to a violent temptation, unless he were helped by a special assistance. Whence although resistance to temptation be not something supernatural as to substance, nor exceeds the physical power of the natural agent; yet because it surpasses the powers of the agent drawn forth from sin and concupiscence and infirm, therefore divine sustaining help is needed, lest weighed down under the weight of temptation he succumb. To the confirmation, I say that a grave temptation inflicts upon the will a certain moral necessity, in the mode already explained: namely, on account of the infirmity of fallen nature, and the inclination to sensible goods repugnant to right reason, and the great debility of the intellect in firmly apprehending the reasons persuading the good to be embraced, and of the will in following them against sense.

You will say 2: No greater nor ampler powers are required for resisting a grave temptation than for sustaining whatever things are more difficult on account of honors to be attained, riches to be acquired, and concupiscences to be satisfied; but these things men for the most part sustain, covetous, by their natural powers: therefore by equal reason we can resist any grave temptation whatsoever without any help of grace. — I deny the major, and the reason of the disparity is that sensible and human motives, by which men for the most part are incited to overcome grave difficulties for satisfying their own cupidities, are pleasing and delightful to sense and to cupidity itself; whence they move far more strongly than honest motives and those purely spiritual, which sometimes oppose the pleasure of the senses. Whence Saint Augustine, book On Patience, chapter 17, responding to a similar objection, says:

Those who say this do not understand that each of the wicked is so much the harder for enduring whatever evils as in him is greater the cupidity of the world, and that each of the just is so much the stronger for enduring whatever evils as in him is greater the charity of God. But the cupidity of the world has its beginning from the choice of the will, its progress from the delight of pleasure, its firmness from the bond of custom. But the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.

You will say 3: Good is more powerful than any evil: but free will in itself is a natural good; therefore it is more powerful than concupiscence and every temptation inclining to evil. — The Seraphic Doctor responds in 2 dist. 24 q. 2 ad 3 that good indeed is more powerful than evil in itself: not however when good subjects itself to the greater: the will, however free and powerful for resisting, nevertheless if it be allured by an alluring sensitive appetite into what is forbidden, then, the temptation pressing, voluntarily yields and subjects itself to evil, by reason of which subjection it is called servant and handmaid of sin, for whoever does sin is the servant of sin.

You will say. — No temptation seems graver than the fear of death; for, as Tertullian says, book On the Soul, chapter 62, Although the issues of life be various, none is so light but that there it is at stake; yet from Saint Augustine, book On Patience, chapter 27, one separated from the Church can, not for the error which separated him, but for the truth of the sacrament, which remained with God, undergo punishment of whatever kind; but he would then sustain the punishment of death only by the powers of nature and human motives induced: therefore grave temptation can be overcome by the powers of nature. — I distinguish the minor: that one separated from the Church for some truth of faith can undergo death, through the gift of God, which Saint Augustine in the same book chapter 29 calls the gift of the disinherited, I concede: by the powers of nature, again I distinguish: if some vehementer passion dominate in that man's soul, e.g. zeal for preserving fame among his sectarians, I concede: if otherwise, I deny: thus the same holy Doctor calls the fortitude of the Gentiles, whereby they sought death for asserting the liberty and security of their fatherland, a gift of God: yet diverse from the gifts of the sons of the heavenly Jerusalem.

Second Conclusion. — FALLEN MAN CAN OVERCOME LIGHT TEMPTATIONS WITHOUT ANY HELP OF GRACE. This is the more common opinion among Theologians, and the Seraphic Doctor praised above plainly hands it down; where in his response to the arguments he first sets forth two extremely conflicting opinions: the first indeed of the Pelagians, asserting that man by the natural powers of free will can resist any temptation whatsoever; the other truly of those who say that free will cannot resist any temptation by its own powers; finally he concludes: > But because it seems very hard to say that free will in such a state cannot resist any temptation, since it has a natural judgment, and a certain natural instinct murmuring against evil, when it is not even confirmed in evil; therefore there is a third way holding the middle between these two extremes, that free will destitute of all grace can neither resist every temptation, nor has it necessity of succumbing to every temptation. < To him adhere very many both of the ancients and of the more recent Theologians, whom Suarez praises, book 1, chapter 23, n. 13.

The conclusion can first be proved from that text 1 Corinthians 10. God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able: because he runs to our aid exceedingly through grace where nature does not suffice: therefore Saint Paul judges that at least lesser and light temptations can be overcome by the powers of free will; for in vain would he have said above that which you are able, if truly we had no powers in us for resisting. Hence deservedly the Pontiffs Pius V. and Gregory XIII., among the proscribed propositions of Baius, condemned this thirtieth one: Not only those are false teachers and robbers who deny Christ to be the way and door of the city and of life, but also whosoever say that man cannot ascend by Christ the way of justice, that is, to some justice, or resist any temptation without the assistance of his grace, so that he fall not into it, or be conquered by it: therefore the aforesaid supreme Pontiffs judge that free will can resist some temptation without the help of grace, and that this assertion does not pertain to Pelagianism.

It can also be confirmed from the Holy Fathers; for Chrysostom, Homily 24 on 1 Corinthians, asking whether grace is necessary for some temptations, answers: for all, so to speak: which correction excepts certain ones, and intimates some exaggeration. And a little after, declaring the matter more openly, presupposing a distinction of temptations into grave and light, which with the Apostle he calls human, asserts concerning the former that they cannot be conquered without the help of grace: concerning the latter, however, he thus says: Human ones may indeed be borne easily without divine assistance; whereby he signifies that power is not lacking to free will for resisting sometimes light and human temptations; although resistance is not made so easily and quickly with the help of grace. — To him accords Saint Jerome, book 5 Against the Pelagians, who said that after sin there remained in man liberty whereby he could extend his hand to good and evil according to his liking, and responds thus: > This also we say, that man can sin for a time, for a place, for bodily infirmity, while the mind is attentive… the human condition, if it remits itself a little, declares its fragility, and knows not itself in many things. < He does not judge, therefore, that free will can do nothing at all. — For although it lack strength always to resist the most hostile enemy; yet for a time and place he grants it something light and accommodated to fragility; which he again signifies, saying within: > But this according to the measure, and time, and condition of human frailty, nor because that for a brief moment I can dost thou compel me, that I can continually. < As though he would say it is wrongly understood by the Pelagians from the fact that man can at some time resist certain temptations, that he can do that very thing continually against all temptations both grave and light. — Finally Saint Augustine, whom the adversaries claim wholly for themselves and devotedly, hands down and explains the truth not obscurely, book On the Perfection of Justice, chapter 2, saying: In corrupted nature the arbitration of the will avails little for not sinning; wherein by the particle little he seems to limit what elsewhere he had said, that the free will of fallen man avails only unto sinning: and to indicate that that proposition is not to be understood in its rigor concerning individual occasions, temptations, and acts of sinning: but that it is said to avail little because in not many acts can it conquer a light temptation so that it sin not.

Finally it is proved by reason: free will is not so broken in strength in the state of fallen nature that it cannot exercise some moral good without the help of grace: but a light temptation adds only a difficulty which can be conquered without divine supernatural help: therefore for victory over it help is not always required. The major stands from what was said in the preceding article. The minor is proved: for if there be proposed to someone that a father is to be honored, e.g. on account of benefits received from him, and simultaneously there occur a light temptation, e.g. the father angry little rebukes the Son, and threatens him with menaces and blows, by reason of which the son would seem deterred from bestowing the honor due to the parent: although the son suffer a light temptation and difficulty in that observance itself; nevertheless he will be able to conquer it by the sole powers of nature: considering namely that if he despise the parent, and repay not the obedience owed, he will sin against the laws of nature themselves, as a degenerate son he will be marked with infamy, and tormented by dire stings of conscience: that all these and other similar natural motives suffice of themselves for conquering that repugnance, no one is who does not see.

Then, the victory over temptation precisely, insofar as it is necessary for not sinning, is purely natural in itself: especially truly when the temptation is light, nor adds a morally insuperable difficulty; and straightaway it can be conquered even by the sole powers of nature, particularly when those light temptations suggest something nefarious and horrible to nature itself, as precipice, incest, and other things to which not even brutes break forth unless forced most violently: so much so that rather a certain assistance for consenting to a thing so nefarious would seem required than for dissenting. I add that sometimes certain passions conflict with other passions, and those light temptations, so that reason and will have within their power to choose what is right: thus for example where a light temptation of theft, or fornication stimulates, at times likewise the fear of punishment urges, and love of one person against hatred of another, so much so that one affection impels, another draws back; in which case the will can easily follow the dictate of right reason persuading that one ought neither to steal nor commit fornication. — Finally, if some assistance seemed necessary for conquering light temptations, at most (as Vazquez wills) congruous thought, but that thought neither is grace, nor is it always required in that manner in which Vazquez judges it to be desired: therefore no assistance of grace seems necessary for it. The major appears as to the first part, for where man negatively resists temptation by not giving it consent, he has that congruous thought, which nevertheless is not grace, as Vazquez himself concedes, who calls congruous thought grace only when it excites and promotes the will to act: therefore neither when he resists temptation by a positive act ought that thought to be reckoned a benefit of grace. The consequence is evident; for infidels indeed can resist a light temptation by the sole guidance of reason and nature: since indeed if, as we said, they can without any supernatural help of grace sometimes exercise some moral good, why by the same powers of free will could they not conquer light concupiscences repugnant to exercising this good?

They object, the adversaries, all those oracles, whether of Sacred Scripture, or of Councils, or of the Holy Fathers, in asserting and establishing the former conclusion praised by us, whereby divine assistance seems signified as absolutely necessary for overcoming even any temptations whatsoever, whose victory is to be ascribed to God alone. — I answer first, that in all those testimonies the victory over temptations is attributed to God, not because some lightest temptation cannot be surpassed by the powers of nature: but because the whole troop of temptations cannot be conquered without the special illumination and assistance of God. I answer secondly, that the Councils and Holy Fathers speak of that resistance which is made through victory proceeding from the affection of divine love and conducing to attaining eternal glory: not indeed of moral and natural resistance conducing to honesty alone. I answer thirdly, that all those texts are to be understood chiefly of grave temptations, for whose overcoming and elimination we freely confess divine assistance to be necessarily desired. Or if in them there be speech of light temptations, indeed it is evident that they cannot be resisted by the sole powers of nature, taken all together collectively and in mass: nay, nor can anyone resist any one of them distributively and singly continually without at least light sin, unless divine assistance be present.

You will urge. — Christ taught us to pray to God, lead us not into temptation: therefore every victory over temptations must be attributed to the benefit of God: for we do not pray for what is placed wholly in our own power. — I answer, no: rightly indeed do we pray to God, not only that we be able to resist temptations on account of moral honesty, but also that we may conquer temptations with profit in order to eternal life. For if anyone should ask of God the victory over temptations excluding that profit, he would not be judged to pray rightly. Secondly I say that we ask of God the victory over temptations congruously because we cannot long resist without his assistance: in which sense Saint Gregory on Psal. 5, the Penitential, near the end says: > Since the holy soul understands dangers to impend upon it at all times, not even a moment of time can it be secure: and therefore it prays God that he depart from it not even for an hour. <