Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

The voice was one, but the error of the Pelagians was manifold: for since they judged the powers of free will to be sufficient and strong for exercising any good whatsoever, they likewise held them to be powerfully strong by their own force for repelling any evil whatever, and hence affirmed that grace was not needed for overcoming temptations and occasions of sin, taken not only singly but also collectively, as may be seen in St. Augustine, Epistle 99, where he says the Pelagians were accustomed to teach that for avoiding future sins and overcoming them, and for surmounting all temptations by virtue, the human will suffices without any subsequent help of the grace of God, by natural possibility; and for that reason they taught that God was not to be prayed to with the words Lead us not into temptation, seeing that it lay within man's power that he could conquer and overcome temptations however grave without any help from God; as the same holy Doctor testifies in book 1 of the unfinished work Against Julian, where he thus addresses the Pelagians: Nor do you ask the gift of God, that you enter not into temptation, that is, that you sin not; for you trust in your own strength. And when that clause of the Lord's Prayer, which Christ taught us to use — And lead us not into temptation — was objected to them, they replied that it pertained to averting bodily falls, as the same St. Augustine relates, Epistle 91. That which follows, he says — lead us not into temptation — they do not take in such a way that God must be prayed to that He help us overcome temptations unto sins, but rather lest anyone rushing upon us bodily, human mishap afflict us: because to conquer temptations lies so within our power and the possibility of nature, that we would think it vain to obtain this by prayers. Now against this erroneous opinion of the deviant heretics there extremely conflicts the opposite opinion of very many Catholic Doctors both ancient and modern: namely, that grace is so necessary for overcoming occasions and enticements of sin, whether grave or light, that not even slight and most light ones can be conquered and removed while that divine help is absent. But safer and more secure proceeds between these extremes a mediating opinion, by which the most faithful disciples of that subtle and Angelic Doctor contend that grace is indeed required for removing every grave occasion of sin, but not so for light ones, which are for the most part easily overcome by the powers of free will alone. Wherefore we propose the three following questions to be resolved: whether, and in what manner, grace is necessary: first, for overcoming the temptations and enticements of sin. Second, for rising again and abstaining from sin. Third, for persevering steadfastly in aversion from evil and pursuit of good.

Note 1. By the name of temptation is understood the provocation to sin, which is twofold: one indeed from without, the other from within. The former is that by which men are allured to sin by persuasion or wicked example or provocation. The latter is that by which a man, through one part of himself, namely the lower rebelling against the higher, is spurred toward what is forbidden: which temptations, by reason of their principle, are customarily called those of the flesh, the world, and the devil. Each of these temptations, moreover, is light or grave: light is called that which lightly solicits a man to sin; grave, however, that by which he is vehemently impelled to sin.

Note 2. Now the gravity or lightness of a temptation is not to be measured by the gravity or lightness of the sin to which it allures, but by the manner of alluring or drawing the will to consent, so that that temptation is grave which violently shakes the soul, and light which lightly allures. This, furthermore, must be understood relatively: for the same thing that lightly solicits a man in no way given over to avarice, gravely provokes the avaricious man. Finally, that gravity is to be measured not only by intensity but also by duration, on account of which temptations otherwise light and weak are wont to become grave because of their frequency and importunity; conversely, however, temptations however intense, if momentary, are not usually so grave and dangerous that they cannot be resisted without the greatest difficulty.

Note 3. A temptation can be overcome in three ways. First indeed by another sinful temptation, of which matter Saint Augustine adduces very many examples; whence in book 1 De Nuptiis, chapter 3, he affirms that this manner of overcoming temptations is frequent among infidels: And then, he says, it is not sins that are cured, but sins are overcome by other sins; and book 21 De Civitate, chapter 16: Not uncommonly manifest vices are overcome by hidden ones, which are thought to be virtues, in which pride reigns. Secondly, a temptation is overcome with victory when, namely, out of the love of God, either indwelling or at least moving, it is overcome. Whence Saint Augustine in the same lib. 21. De Civit. Dei: Then, he says, vices are to be reckoned conquered when they are conquered for the love of God; nor otherwise except through the mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ. Thirdly, finally, a temptation is overcome by resistance, when namely, the temptation impelling to sin, neither does the tempted one succumb nor does he profit in order to eternal life; but out of hatred of sin and love of what is right he does not sin, either by suspending his act, if such a suspension of the act be possible, or by doing a good moral work, from the doing of which he was distracted by the temptation. — All Theologians agree that grace is not required for overcoming a temptation in the first manner; for this victory over temptation is won only by sinning against another temptation; but God does not help unto sin. It is also certain that temptations cannot be overcome in the second manner without grace; because for this there is necessary the sincere and true love of God, which charity that is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit. Therefore the whole difficulty concerns the overcoming of temptation in the third manner, whether namely any temptation whatsoever, as well grave as light, can be overcome without the help of grace.

First Conclusion. — THE HELP OF GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR OVERCOMING AND ELIMINATING GRAVE TEMPTATIONS.

It is proved first by various oracles of Sacred Scripture, whereby it is signified that a man impelled by temptations cannot stand, but falls headlong into sin, unless he be sustained and protected by divine help. Thus Psalm 17: In thee I shall be delivered from temptation. Psal. 29. I said in my abundance, I shall never be moved; thou hast turned away thy face from me, and I became troubled. Psal. 117. I was pushed and overturned that I might fall, and the Lord upheld me. And in the Lord's Prayer Christ admonished among other things that the heavenly Father be prayed Lead us not into temptation. From all which oracles it openly appears that divine help is required for overcoming the temptations that press upon us from every side, especially where they grow heavy and sharply stimulate and drag the soul to sin; so that if God do not assist man through the help of grace, it is necessary that man slide into sin.

It is proved secondly from the decrees of Councils. First indeed in the Council of Diospolis, Canon 15, there are reproved and anathematized the words spoken by Pelagius, that our victory is not from the assistance of God but from free will. Secondly, the Fathers of the Carthaginian Council, in the Synodal Letter, which is the 19th among the Augustinian ones, teach that if grace were not necessary that we not succumb to temptation, we pray in vain:

Let your holiness consider, they say, addressing Pope Innocent the supreme Pontiff, and may he compassionate us with pastoral bowels, how pestiferous and deadly to the sheep of Christ it is that there follows necessarily from the disputations of these men (the Pelagians), that we ought not even to pray, lest we enter into temptation, which the Lord both admonished his disciples and placed in the prayer he taught; nor that our faith fail, which he himself attested he had asked for the Apostle Peter; for if these things are constituted in the power of the possibility of nature and the choice of the will, who does not see that they are asked of the Lord in vain, and supplicated fallaciously, since in praying they are demanded which are obtained by the now so conditioned forces of our nature, nor ought the Lord Jesus to have said, Watch ye, and pray: but only, watch ye, lest ye enter into temptation; nor that the most blessed Peter, first of the Apostles, be prayed for: but I warn thee, or I command and enjoin that thy faith fail not?

— With the same argument the Milevitan Fathers argue in the Synodal Letter to the same Innocent, which is number 22 among the Augustinian ones, where after thus complaining of the Pelagian heresy, in these words: a new heresy, they say, and one too pernicious, attempts to arise among the enemies of the grace of Christ, who even attempt to take from us by impious disputations the Lord's Prayer, they subjoin: lead us not into temptation is not so to be understood as though we ought to demand divine assistance lest, tempted, we fall into sin; but that this is placed within our own power, and that the will of man suffices for its fulfillment. — The same was determined in the Council of Orange, Canon 9, where it is decreed: It is a gift of God when we think rightly, and restrain our feet from falsehood and injustice. And Canon 11. No wretch is delivered from whatever misery unless he is anticipated by the mercy of God.

It is proved thirdly from the decrees of the supreme Pontiffs; first indeed the Letter of Innocent to the Council of Carthage, wherein among other things it has this: Unless by great prayers grace implored upon us descend, by no means do we strive to conquer the errors of earthly stain and of the worldly body, since only the help of God, and not free will, can make us equal to resisting. And further: Daily lie open those remedies with which, unless we strive relying and trusting in them, we shall by no means be able to conquer human errors. For it is necessary that he by whose assistance we conquer, again by his helping be ourselves conquered. — Zosimus, Epistle to all the Bishops of the world, has this: At what time would it intervene in which we should not need his help? In all acts therefore, and causes, thoughts, motions, he is to be prayed as helper and protector; for it is proud that human nature presume anything to itself, the Apostle crying out: our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, etc. — Celestine, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, affirms that no one, even renewed by the grace of baptism, is fit for overcoming the snares of the devil and for conquering the concupiscences of the flesh, unless he have received perseverance in good conduct through the daily assistance of God. — Gregory the Great, book 1 of the Moralia, chapter 7, expounding these words of Job: Thou bringest me back into dust, writes: He is said to be brought back into dust, because, abandoned to himself, he is swept away by the blast of any temptation whatever. And in the Exposition of Ps. 3, the Penitential, explaining these words: Forsake me not, O Lord my God, he says: Those undoubtedly the Lord forsakes to whom he does not grant constancy in tribulation; for it necessarily follows that he is subject to every temptation whoever has been forsaken by God.

It is proved fourthly from the doctrine of the holy Fathers, who universally affirm and teach that the victory over our temptations is to be attributed to divine help; thus Saint Cyprian, Treatise on the Lord's Prayer: When we pray, he says, that we be not led into temptation, we are admonished of our weakness and frailty, while we thus ask, lest anyone insolently exalt himself. — Ambrose on Psal. 13. Who is so strong, he says, as to be moved by no temptation, unless the Lord stand by him as helper? — Chrysostom, Homily 21 on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, expounding these words of the Apostle: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, says: There are therefore temptations which cannot be borne: and which are these? All, once for all to say; for to be able to bear them is placed in the nod of God. — Jerome, book 2 Against the Pelagians, when he had opposed to them those words of Christ the Lord: Rise, watch, and pray, lest ye enter into temptation, subjoins: According to you he ought to have said: rise, resist, for you have free will, and power once granted to you by the Lord, you need the help of no other. — Augustine uses this weighty argument to evince against the Pelagians the necessity of grace, thus in the book On the Perfection of Justice, near the end, he says: Whoever denies that we ought to pray, lest we enter into temptation (but he denies this who contends that the assistance of the grace of God is not necessary to man in order not to sin, but that human will suffices with the law alone accepted), I doubt not that he is to be removed from the ears of all, and anathematized by the mouth of all. Illustrious also is that passage which he has in book 50, Homily 28, where he thus writes: If thou hast not been an adulterer, this the Lord thy God says to thee: I ruled thee for myself, I kept thee for myself, that thou mightest not commit adultery: the persuader was absent, and that the persuader was absent I did it: place and time were absent, and that these were absent I did it: the persuader was present, place was not absent, time was not absent; that thou mightest not consent, I terrified thee. Acknowledge therefore his grace, to whom thou owest that thou hast not lost thyself. — Saint Prosper, chapter 35 Against the Collator: Whoever therefore, he says, fails not in tribulation, let him not doubt that he is helped by him, to whom daily the hearts of all the faithful cry out: lead us not into temptation. — Saint Fulgentius, Epistle 1 to Proba, chapter 1, says: Nor is there any time of this life in which the enemy does not spread a snare for men, whose nooses no one can escape by his own strength.

You will say: Whatever grave temptation being posited, with the advertence of reason, a man consents and sins, and indeed mortally, when it is more grave and of great moment: therefore he can, both physically and morally, by force of free will not consent to the temptation, at least not sinning. The consequence is evident: For, says Richard of Saint Victor, book On the State of the First Man, chapter 4, free will does not suffer the Lord, nor can it suffer him, since to inflict violence upon him neither becomes the Creator nor can the creature do it: let the whole hell, the whole world, lastly the whole army of the heavenly militia come together into one, conspire in this one thing: one consent of free will in anything whatsoever cannot be extorted against its will. — It is confirmed, because temptation does not inflict necessity upon the will as to species, nor as to exercise: therefore it can either suspend the act of consent, or elicit an act contrary. — I answer to the antecedent; the help of grace is not indeed required that man may be able physically not to sin, but that de facto he sin not: for no one sins who is not free not to sin. And yet together with that physical potency there can be found a moral impotency for resisting, by reason of which man would succumb to a violent temptation, unless he were helped by a special assistance. Whence although resistance to temptation be not something supernatural as to substance, nor exceeds the physical power of the natural agent; yet because it surpasses the powers of the agent drawn forth from sin and concupiscence and infirm, therefore divine sustaining help is needed, lest weighed down under the weight of temptation he succumb. To the confirmation, I say that a grave temptation inflicts upon the will a certain moral necessity, in the mode already explained: namely, on account of the infirmity of fallen nature, and the inclination to sensible goods repugnant to right reason, and the great debility of the intellect in firmly apprehending the reasons persuading the good to be embraced, and of the will in following them against sense.

You will say 2: No greater nor ampler powers are required for resisting a grave temptation than for sustaining whatever things are more difficult on account of honors to be attained, riches to be acquired, and concupiscences to be satisfied; but these things men for the most part sustain, covetous, by their natural powers: therefore by equal reason we can resist any grave temptation whatsoever without any help of grace. — I deny the major, and the reason of the disparity is that sensible and human motives, by which men for the most part are incited to overcome grave difficulties for satisfying their own cupidities, are pleasing and delightful to sense and to cupidity itself; whence they move far more strongly than honest motives and those purely spiritual, which sometimes oppose the pleasure of the senses. Whence Saint Augustine, book On Patience, chapter 17, responding to a similar objection, says:

Those who say this do not understand that each of the wicked is so much the harder for enduring whatever evils as in him is greater the cupidity of the world, and that each of the just is so much the stronger for enduring whatever evils as in him is greater the charity of God. But the cupidity of the world has its beginning from the choice of the will, its progress from the delight of pleasure, its firmness from the bond of custom. But the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.

You will say 3: Good is more powerful than any evil: but free will in itself is a natural good; therefore it is more powerful than concupiscence and every temptation inclining to evil. — The Seraphic Doctor responds in 2 dist. 24 q. 2 ad 3 that good indeed is more powerful than evil in itself: not however when good subjects itself to the greater: the will, however free and powerful for resisting, nevertheless if it be allured by an alluring sensitive appetite into what is forbidden, then, the temptation pressing, voluntarily yields and subjects itself to evil, by reason of which subjection it is called servant and handmaid of sin, for whoever does sin is the servant of sin.

You will say. — No temptation seems graver than the fear of death; for, as Tertullian says, book On the Soul, chapter 62, Although the issues of life be various, none is so light but that there it is at stake; yet from Saint Augustine, book On Patience, chapter 27, one separated from the Church can, not for the error which separated him, but for the truth of the sacrament, which remained with God, undergo punishment of whatever kind; but he would then sustain the punishment of death only by the powers of nature and human motives induced: therefore grave temptation can be overcome by the powers of nature. — I distinguish the minor: that one separated from the Church for some truth of faith can undergo death, through the gift of God, which Saint Augustine in the same book chapter 29 calls the gift of the disinherited, I concede: by the powers of nature, again I distinguish: if some vehementer passion dominate in that man's soul, e.g. zeal for preserving fame among his sectarians, I concede: if otherwise, I deny: thus the same holy Doctor calls the fortitude of the Gentiles, whereby they sought death for asserting the liberty and security of their fatherland, a gift of God: yet diverse from the gifts of the sons of the heavenly Jerusalem.

Second Conclusion. — FALLEN MAN CAN OVERCOME LIGHT TEMPTATIONS WITHOUT ANY HELP OF GRACE. This is the more common opinion among Theologians, and the Seraphic Doctor praised above plainly hands it down; where in his response to the arguments he first sets forth two extremely conflicting opinions: the first indeed of the Pelagians, asserting that man by the natural powers of free will can resist any temptation whatsoever; the other truly of those who say that free will cannot resist any temptation by its own powers; finally he concludes: > But because it seems very hard to say that free will in such a state cannot resist any temptation, since it has a natural judgment, and a certain natural instinct murmuring against evil, when it is not even confirmed in evil; therefore there is a third way holding the middle between these two extremes, that free will destitute of all grace can neither resist every temptation, nor has it necessity of succumbing to every temptation. < To him adhere very many both of the ancients and of the more recent Theologians, whom Suarez praises, book 1, chapter 23, n. 13.

The conclusion can first be proved from that text 1 Corinthians 10. God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able: because he runs to our aid exceedingly through grace where nature does not suffice: therefore Saint Paul judges that at least lesser and light temptations can be overcome by the powers of free will; for in vain would he have said above that which you are able, if truly we had no powers in us for resisting. Hence deservedly the Pontiffs Pius V. and Gregory XIII., among the proscribed propositions of Baius, condemned this thirtieth one: Not only those are false teachers and robbers who deny Christ to be the way and door of the city and of life, but also whosoever say that man cannot ascend by Christ the way of justice, that is, to some justice, or resist any temptation without the assistance of his grace, so that he fall not into it, or be conquered by it: therefore the aforesaid supreme Pontiffs judge that free will can resist some temptation without the help of grace, and that this assertion does not pertain to Pelagianism.

It can also be confirmed from the Holy Fathers; for Chrysostom, Homily 24 on 1 Corinthians, asking whether grace is necessary for some temptations, answers: for all, so to speak: which correction excepts certain ones, and intimates some exaggeration. And a little after, declaring the matter more openly, presupposing a distinction of temptations into grave and light, which with the Apostle he calls human, asserts concerning the former that they cannot be conquered without the help of grace: concerning the latter, however, he thus says: Human ones may indeed be borne easily without divine assistance; whereby he signifies that power is not lacking to free will for resisting sometimes light and human temptations; although resistance is not made so easily and quickly with the help of grace. — To him accords Saint Jerome, book 5 Against the Pelagians, who said that after sin there remained in man liberty whereby he could extend his hand to good and evil according to his liking, and responds thus: > This also we say, that man can sin for a time, for a place, for bodily infirmity, while the mind is attentive… the human condition, if it remits itself a little, declares its fragility, and knows not itself in many things. < He does not judge, therefore, that free will can do nothing at all. — For although it lack strength always to resist the most hostile enemy; yet for a time and place he grants it something light and accommodated to fragility; which he again signifies, saying within: > But this according to the measure, and time, and condition of human frailty, nor because that for a brief moment I can dost thou compel me, that I can continually. < As though he would say it is wrongly understood by the Pelagians from the fact that man can at some time resist certain temptations, that he can do that very thing continually against all temptations both grave and light. — Finally Saint Augustine, whom the adversaries claim wholly for themselves and devotedly, hands down and explains the truth not obscurely, book On the Perfection of Justice, chapter 2, saying: In corrupted nature the arbitration of the will avails little for not sinning; wherein by the particle little he seems to limit what elsewhere he had said, that the free will of fallen man avails only unto sinning: and to indicate that that proposition is not to be understood in its rigor concerning individual occasions, temptations, and acts of sinning: but that it is said to avail little because in not many acts can it conquer a light temptation so that it sin not.

Finally it is proved by reason: free will is not so broken in strength in the state of fallen nature that it cannot exercise some moral good without the help of grace: but a light temptation adds only a difficulty which can be conquered without divine supernatural help: therefore for victory over it help is not always required. The major stands from what was said in the preceding article. The minor is proved: for if there be proposed to someone that a father is to be honored, e.g. on account of benefits received from him, and simultaneously there occur a light temptation, e.g. the father angry little rebukes the Son, and threatens him with menaces and blows, by reason of which the son would seem deterred from bestowing the honor due to the parent: although the son suffer a light temptation and difficulty in that observance itself; nevertheless he will be able to conquer it by the sole powers of nature: considering namely that if he despise the parent, and repay not the obedience owed, he will sin against the laws of nature themselves, as a degenerate son he will be marked with infamy, and tormented by dire stings of conscience: that all these and other similar natural motives suffice of themselves for conquering that repugnance, no one is who does not see.

Then, the victory over temptation precisely, insofar as it is necessary for not sinning, is purely natural in itself: especially truly when the temptation is light, nor adds a morally insuperable difficulty; and straightaway it can be conquered even by the sole powers of nature, particularly when those light temptations suggest something nefarious and horrible to nature itself, as precipice, incest, and other things to which not even brutes break forth unless forced most violently: so much so that rather a certain assistance for consenting to a thing so nefarious would seem required than for dissenting. I add that sometimes certain passions conflict with other passions, and those light temptations, so that reason and will have within their power to choose what is right: thus for example where a light temptation of theft, or fornication stimulates, at times likewise the fear of punishment urges, and love of one person against hatred of another, so much so that one affection impels, another draws back; in which case the will can easily follow the dictate of right reason persuading that one ought neither to steal nor commit fornication. — Finally, if some assistance seemed necessary for conquering light temptations, at most (as Vazquez wills) congruous thought, but that thought neither is grace, nor is it always required in that manner in which Vazquez judges it to be desired: therefore no assistance of grace seems necessary for it. The major appears as to the first part, for where man negatively resists temptation by not giving it consent, he has that congruous thought, which nevertheless is not grace, as Vazquez himself concedes, who calls congruous thought grace only when it excites and promotes the will to act: therefore neither when he resists temptation by a positive act ought that thought to be reckoned a benefit of grace. The consequence is evident; for infidels indeed can resist a light temptation by the sole guidance of reason and nature: since indeed if, as we said, they can without any supernatural help of grace sometimes exercise some moral good, why by the same powers of free will could they not conquer light concupiscences repugnant to exercising this good?

They object, the adversaries, all those oracles, whether of Sacred Scripture, or of Councils, or of the Holy Fathers, in asserting and establishing the former conclusion praised by us, whereby divine assistance seems signified as absolutely necessary for overcoming even any temptations whatsoever, whose victory is to be ascribed to God alone. — I answer first, that in all those testimonies the victory over temptations is attributed to God, not because some lightest temptation cannot be surpassed by the powers of nature: but because the whole troop of temptations cannot be conquered without the special illumination and assistance of God. I answer secondly, that the Councils and Holy Fathers speak of that resistance which is made through victory proceeding from the affection of divine love and conducing to attaining eternal glory: not indeed of moral and natural resistance conducing to honesty alone. I answer thirdly, that all those texts are to be understood chiefly of grave temptations, for whose overcoming and elimination we freely confess divine assistance to be necessarily desired. Or if in them there be speech of light temptations, indeed it is evident that they cannot be resisted by the sole powers of nature, taken all together collectively and in mass: nay, nor can anyone resist any one of them distributively and singly continually without at least light sin, unless divine assistance be present.

You will urge. — Christ taught us to pray to God, lead us not into temptation: therefore every victory over temptations must be attributed to the benefit of God: for we do not pray for what is placed wholly in our own power. — I answer, no: rightly indeed do we pray to God, not only that we be able to resist temptations on account of moral honesty, but also that we may conquer temptations with profit in order to eternal life. For if anyone should ask of God the victory over temptations excluding that profit, he would not be judged to pray rightly. Secondly I say that we ask of God the victory over temptations congruously because we cannot long resist without his assistance: in which sense Saint Gregory on Psal. 5, the Penitential, near the end says: > Since the holy soul understands dangers to impend upon it at all times, not even a moment of time can it be secure: and therefore it prays God that he depart from it not even for an hour. <

WHETHER, AND IN WHAT MANNER, GRACE IS NECESSARY TO FALLEN MAN, THAT HE MAY RISE AGAIN AND ABSTAIN FROM SIN.

Note 1. From the Seraphic Doctor in 2 dist. 28 art. 10 q. 1. > that concerning the first part of the question Philosophers have thought one thing, Heretics another, Catholic Tractators another. For Philosophers, ignorant in what manner the divine majesty is offended by sin, and in what manner through it the aptitude of the powers is taken away, said that man could become just by exercise, as he had been made unjust by inordination from right reason. Whence also the Philosopher says that the perverse, led to better exercises, will profit much, or is perfectly restored to a contrary habit. Heretics indeed, having some light of faith, knew that the divine majesty is offended by sin, and that the will, or free will, is in some manner damaged. Blinded nevertheless they did not consider in what manner nature is infirmed by guilt: and therefore they said that for free will to rise again from guilt no curing grace is necessary to it, but the gratuitous mercy of God alone suffices, which inclines to remitting our sins on account of the satisfaction which Christ willed to make to himself when he offered himself on the cross for us: but this position not only falls short of truth, but even while it implies contraries destroys itself. For it says: for free will to rise from guilt it is necessary that God remit guilt to it, and yet it is not necessary that he bestow anything upon it, or do anything about it. For if God does not change, and he himself again is just judge, so that he accept nothing except only so much as avails for this, that guilt be remitted, there be bestowed upon it that whereby the disease of sin be healed. Catholics truly hold the offense of God to be real, and in some manner damaging, while man thus passes from the service of God to the servitude of the devil, and even of his disfiguring image. And therefore they said that for free will to rise again from guilt grace is necessary not only insofar as grace is called the gratuitous will of God, nor even insofar as it is called the liberal Passion of Christ, but also insofar as it is called a habit of the soul. For the gratuitous will of God concurs unto this, that remission of offense be made: for voluntarily he pardons us the offense: but the liberal Passion of Christ concurs unto this, that cure of the disease be made, and grace, that reformation of the image be made, and therefore for this, that man rise again from guilt, grace is exceedingly in every manner necessary to him. »

Note 2. Sin is generally distinguished as twofold, namely mortal and venial. Mortal is that which despoils man not only of all sanctifying grace, which is the life of the soul, but also of every title to beatitude and eternal life; Venial however is a light deviation from the divine commands with easy pardon. It is certain moreover that man cannot without divine help of grace avoid mortal sins: since indeed, as we said, for observing the whole natural law grace is necessary; and straightaway also for avoiding sins which arise from the transgression of that law itself. It is likewise certain that man through his whole life cannot by natural powers utterly avoid all sins, even venial ones; for as Saint Prosper rightly sang in the verse De Ingratis, chapter 9.

That man can run through life without sin If he will… as the first was able to offend in nothing By his own liberty, these things surely were condemned And from the hands of the councils.

Therefore controversy is instituted here only about venial sin: First, whether namely a just man through ordinary actual aids, which are wont to be conferred on just men, can throughout his whole life, or at least through a long or short time, avoid not only mortal but also venial sins, and this either collectively or distributively: Secondly, whether anyone besides Christ the Lord, the grace of God shining forth, has been immune from every venial sin.

Note 3. Concerning the resolution of the present question, threefold must justifying grace be distinguished: The first indeed is viewed together with actual aids, which are conceded by ordinary law to all justified adults: The second truly is considered together with certain more efficacious and more excellent aids, which are granted indeed not to all the just, but only to certain ones anticipated by a privilege of the love of God. Thirdly finally that is called such which is conceded together with certain actual aids so rarely that it seems granted to one, or very few: wherefore it is called a singular benefit.

First Conclusion. — MAN CANNOT RISE FROM MORTAL SIN WITHOUT A SPECIAL ACTUAL GRACE. This is common among Catholics:

And it is proved first from Sacred Scripture, Psal. 40. Heal my soul, for I have sinned against thee. Jeremiah 30. Thy fracture is incurable: that is, by the powers of nature. John 8. If the Son shall make you free, then shall you be truly free. And Matthew 6. Forgive us our debts. But no one asks of another what he has within his own power, says Saint Bonaventure in the cited place. Romans 5. By the works of the law no flesh is justified. And in the same place: Justified freely by his grace: but he is not justified freely who by the sole powers of nature can rise from sin, and has in himself whereof to glory. To Titus 5. Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us. Finally to the Galatians 2. If justice be by the law: then Christ died gratis. For similarly we can gather: if justice and remission of sin be by the powers of nature: then Christ died gratis, which it is impious to assert, says the Seraphic Doctor.

It is proved secondly from Councils presupposing grace to be necessary for remission of sins, which even Pelagius himself did not deny. One above the rest I praise, the Council of Orange, Canon 19, which defines this present truth in these words: > No wretch is delivered from whatever misery unless he is anticipated by the mercy of God: < and Canon 19. > Since without the grace of God he cannot keep the salvation he has received, how without the grace of God shall he repair what he has lost? < To these adheres Trent, Session 6, Canon 1. > If anyone say that man can be justified before God by his own works, whether done by the powers of human nature, or by the doctrine of the law, without divine grace through Jesus Christ, let him be anathema. <

The supreme Pontiffs also support it, as many as proscribed the Pelagian dogma. Let Innocent the first be the pattern of all, in the rescript to the Council of Carthage, where he says: > Free will, formerly more perfect, while it used its goods more incautiously, falling into the abyss of prevarication, sank down, and found nothing whereby it might thereafter arise, and deceived in liberty would have lain oppressed in ruin forever, unless after its fall the coming of Christ had raised it up by his grace. <

This truth Holy Augustine hands down and commends in many places, especially book 1 of the Imperfect Work against Julian: > How does liberty remain in those who, that they may be freed from the servitude to which they are enslaved by the conquering devil, have need of divine grace? < And again in the same book: > Now in his ruin man is free with respect to justice and a slave to sin, nor can he be a servant of justice and free from sin dominating him, unless the Son shall have set him free. <

Finally it is proved by reason. Sin, says the Seraphic Doctor, is the privation of spiritual life and light: but spiritual life cannot be restored to the soul except from the fountain of life, nor light, except from the fountain of light: therefore it is impossible for the soul to rise again from guilt unless God, who is the fountain of life and everlasting light, quicken and illuminate it by his benignity. But this does not happen except through the gift of grace. — Moreover, says St. Thomas, by sinning man incurs a threefold detriment; namely, the stain, the corruption of natural good, and the guilt of punishment. He indeed incurs the stain inasmuch as he is deprived of the beauty of grace through the deformity of sin: but natural good is corrupted inasmuch as the nature of man is disordered by a will not subject to God: for this order being removed, it follows that the whole nature of sinful man remains inordinate. The guilt of punishment, however, is that by which man, by sinning mortally, merits eternal damnation. Now it is manifest concerning each of these three that they cannot be repaired except by God. For since the beauty of grace proceeds from the illumination of divine light, such beauty cannot be repaired in the soul except

by God illuminating it anew: hence there is required the habitual gift which is the light of grace. Likewise the order of nature cannot be repaired, so namely that the will of man be subjected to God, unless God draw the will of man, as was said. Likewise also the guilt of eternal punishment cannot be remitted except by him against whom the offense was committed, and who is the judge of men, and therefore the help of grace is required for this, that man rise again from sin, both as regards the habitual gift and as regards the motion of God.

You will say 1: The power of free choice is greater than nature; but nature, when it is weakened, can be healed without the help of medicine; therefore much more, when free choice is weakened through fault, it will be able to be healed without the help of grace. — The Seraphic Doctor answers by denying the parity. For, he says, bodily health is in the power of nature, but spiritual health is through something that is above nature. When something is weakened bodily, the whole virtue of nature, which is the principle of health, is not destroyed, and therefore from such an infirmity a return to health can naturally come about: but in sin the very grace of God and the justice in which spiritual health consisted are lost; for grievous sin is called mortal because it takes from man the principle of life; hence just as man cannot pass from death to life except by a wondrous virtue exceeding the powers of nature, so neither can the sinner become just naturally or voluntarily, but only through the benefit and miracle of grace.

You will say 2: It is easier for any thing to be moved according to nature than against nature: but from St. Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 30, sin is against nature, while virtue is according to nature: therefore if free choice can be moved by its own powers to sin against nature, likewise it will be able to return to virtue and rise again from sin according to the inclination of nature. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers that the major is true of that motion which is according to nature and through which neither the power of nature is corrupted nor diminished, as in the motion of a stone upward; for it easily slides downward because, while it is thrown upward, it does not lose its heaviness and weight; whence it happens that it easily slides downward: but it is not so in the matter at hand, both because to be moved toward justice is through a virtue above nature, and also because motion toward fault diminishes the aptitude and actuality of free choice; for by sin man is not only despoiled of graced gifts, but is also wounded in things natural.

You will say 3: Any sinner whatsoever, even while existing in mortal sin, can desire and will justice; but nothing more belongs to being just than to will justice, for justice is rectitude of the will, since then the will is right when it wills justice: therefore the sinner can be justified without grace gratum faciens. — The same Seraphic Doctor answers that willing something is twofold, either faintly and half-fully, as it is said: The sluggard wills, and wills not; or fully and sufficiently, as the Apostle says: God works in us to will and to accomplish. In the first mode it can be in the sinner: and such a will does not make anyone just: in the second mode it cannot be without grace preventing and assisting the will: but only in this second mode can there be a will of justice, and render the soul just.

Second conclusion. — A JUST MAN, SPEAKING ABSOLUTELY, WITH THE ORDINARY ACTUAL AIDS CAN OBTAIN GRACE, BY WHICH ALL SINS MAY BE AVOIDED, BOTH MORTAL AND VENIAL. This truth St. Augustine expressly teaches in many places, but especially book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 6, where he weighs the matter so accurately: > Those who say that man is able to be without sin in this life are not at once to be resisted with rashness of intemperance. For if we denied that it is possible, we would derogate both from the free choice of man, who desires it by cultivating it, and from the power or mercy of God, who brings it about by helping. And ours: if it be asked of me whether man can be without sin in this life, I confess that he can by the grace of God and free choice: and toward the end of the chapter: I cannot doubt either that God has commanded anything impossible to man, or that anything else is impossible to God toward aiding and assisting, that what he commands may come about: and by this man can, if he wills, be without sin, aided by God. < And in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 1: > I said that it can come about that man be without sin, if the will do not fail him, with the help of divine aid assisting: yet on account of the one sin in which all will be justified no one has been or will be, while living this life, in whom that perfection would exist. < — But since that doctrine of St. Augustine had seemed absurd to Marcellinus, to whom he had directed the three books On the Merits and Remission of Sins: for he thought it absurd that that could happen whose example nowhere appeared, St. Augustine, in the same chapter soon praised above, shows that many things are possible which nevertheless were never touched: > For it seems absurd to you (he says, addressing Marcellinus) that something can happen whose example is lacking, since, as I believe, you do not doubt that it never happened that a camel passed through the eye of a needle, and yet he said that even this is possible with God; you may read also that twelve thousand legions of Angels could have been prepared for Christ lest he suffer, yet it was not done; you may read that it could have happened that once the nations were rooted out of the land, which was given to the sons of Israel, yet God willed that this be done little by little: and six hundred other things might occur which we confess could have been done, or can be done, and yet we cannot bring forward examples of their having been done: therefore we ought not deny that it can happen that man be without sin because there is none of men, besides him who not only is man but also God by nature, in whom we can show this perfected. < Therefore according to the mind of St. Augustine the truth of our assertion stands.

Third conclusion — UNDER THE ORDINARY LAW, AND WITHOUT A SINGULAR PRIVILEGE OF GOD, NO ONE OF MEN INASMUCH AS HE IS JUST IS IMMUNE FROM ALL SINS. This is the doctrine of all Catholics together with St. Augustine in many places, most truly indeed in the book On Nature and Grace, and the book On the Spirit and the Letter, and likewise the book On the Merits and Remission of Sins, where he proves this truth with many texts of Sacred Scripture. First indeed from that text 3 Kings chapter 8: There is no man who sins not. Psalm 31: I said, I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord: and thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin. For this shall every one that is holy pray to thee in a due time. Hence St. Augustine book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 5: Not therefore everyone a sinner, but every Saint. And Psalm 142: Enter not into judgment with thy servant, O Lord, for in thy sight no man living shall be justified. Whence St. Augustine in the same place: Therefore the mercy of God is needed, which exalts itself above judgment. Proverbs 50: The just man is the first accuser of himself. St. Augustine adds in the same place: > Since at the beginning of his speech he is the accuser of himself, he certainly does not lie. < Ecclesiasticus 7: There is not a just man upon earth, that doth good, and sinneth not. Matthew 6: Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors. Which certainly the just also say not in vain, says St. Augustine in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 36. James 3: In many things we all offend. John 1: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. Hence the Council of Milevis or Carthage, Canon 2, defines: whoever shall have thought that what St. John the Apostle says, > If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves <, is to be so taken as to say that on account of humility we must say we have sin, not that it is truly so, let him be anathema. Similarly in the Council of Carthage chapters 7 and 8 those are struck with anathema who said that the Saints say in the Lord's prayer, Forgive us our debts, not for themselves, because that petition is not necessary for them, but for others, who are sinners in their people, not shamelessly but humbly: likewise from the Tridentine, Session 6, Canon 23: > If anyone shall say that a man once justified can during his whole life avoid even venial sins, except by a special privilege of God, as the Church holds regarding the blessed Virgin, let him be anathema. <

It is proved also by the reason which St. Augustine sets forth in the book On the Merits of Sins, chapter 10. If any just men had lived in this life without sins, especially Noe, Job, Daniel: > For, says St. Augustine, Scripture does not easily bear so great testimony to anyone as to his three men, Noe, Daniel, and Job, whom Ezechiel the Prophet, chapter 14, says alone could be delivered from a certain imminent wrath of God: prefiguring in those three men certain three kinds of men to be delivered. In Noe, as I judge, the just set over the peoples, on account of the governance of the ark as it were of the Church: in Daniel the just continent: in Job the just married: and yet those three most praised men were not without sin: for Noe, as we read, was at some time drunk although he was not a drunkard; but Daniel, after the prayer which he poured forth to God concerning himself, declares, chapter 9, that he pronounces himself a sinner. <

You will object that which is said of the same Job, chapter 1: that there is none like him upon the earth, blameless, just, a true worshiper of God, abstaining himself from every evil work: therefore he was truly immune from sin. - St. Augustine answers in the same place, chapter 12: > That Job is praised in the first words by comparison with the men who are on the earth, accordingly he excelled all who then could be just on the earth: not therefore did he on that account have altogether no sin, but he preceded the others in the progress of justice. Next is added: Blameless: of whose life no one would justly complain. Just, who had professed with such probity of morals that none was to be equaled to him, a True Worshiper of God: indeed also a truthful and humble witness of his own sins. Abstaining himself from every evil work, a wonder if from every evil word also, and thought. < Such is St. Augustine.

You will object 2. That text of 1 John chapter 3: Whosoever abideth in God, sinneth not, and whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin: therefore there are some just without sins. — St. Augustine answers, Epistle 15, that that saying was made concerning the state of charity and perfect virtue, to which man can be raised through a singular privilege of God: > Because, he says there, although a man without sin is not found in this life, yet it is said that it can be done, through the help of grace and the Spirit of God: which, that it may come about, must be believed and sought… but for us it suffices that none is found in the Church of the faithful, in whatsoever excellence and progress of justice, who would dare say to himself that the prayer of the Lord's prayer, Forgive us our debts, is unnecessary. < And that this was the mind of St. the Evangelist appears sufficiently from this, that in chapter 1 of the same Epistle he openly confesses: if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. — Secondly he answers in the book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 21, that the Apostle by these words cuts off what Pelagius asserted, namely that he had in himself the principle of good and evil. That he might show this false, the Apostle teaches that only he does not sin who is of God, that is, who is illuminated and anticipated by his grace and charity. > For, says St. Augustine there, chapter 20, one and the same root is not that of goods and evils; for charity is one thing, the root of goods, covetousness another, the root of evils, and they differ so much from each other as virtue and vice; but plainly that possibility is capable of either root, because not only can man have charity, whereby he be a good tree, but he can also have covetousness, whereby he be an evil tree. But the covetousness of man, which is a vice, man has as its author, or the deceiver of man, not the creator of man. <

You will object 3. That text of Luke 1 where we read of St. Zachary and Elizabeth his wife: And they were both just before God, walking in all the commandments and justifications of the Lord without blame: therefore they lived without sin, and consequently others are able to live. — First answers St. Augustine book 2 On the Merits of Sins, chapter 13: > nothing else is signified in this place than that Zachary was eminent in justice among the princes of Priests with respect to offering the sacrifices pertaining to the Old Testament: for we read in Hebrews 7 that Christ alone is the Prince of Priests, who has not necessity, as had those who were called princes of priests, first to offer sacrifice daily for his own sins, then for the people. But that nothing of this sort is contained in this eulogy is taught by this, that there is not comprehended in it that which the Apostle writes of himself to the Philippians 3, saying that according to the justice which is in the law he was blameless, who nevertheless writes in the same Epistle that he esteems that justice not only detriments but even dung in comparison with justice. < — Secondly he answers in the book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 18: > That saying was made according to a certain conversation among men probable and laudable, which no man could justly call into complaint of accusation and elimination: which therefore Zachary and his wife are reported to have had in the sight of God; because in it men lived with no dissimulation, but as they appeared to men, so they were known to the eyes of God: but it was not said of this according to that perfection of justice, in which truly and in every manner we shall live immaculate and perfected: for the Apostle Paul also said, > that according to the justice which is of the law he was blameless; in which law also Zachary conversed blamelessly: but the Apostle reckoned this justice among dungs and detriments, in comparison with the justice which we hope for, and which we now ought to hunger and thirst for, that sometime we may be satiated with it in sight, which now is in faith, while the just liveth by faith <.

You will urge, that St. Ambrose book 1 on Luke from the aforementioned eulogy concerning Zachary and Elizabeth intends that a man can be without sin: therefore, etc. — The same St. Augustine answers, chapter 49 of the same book On the Grace of Christ, that a man can be without sin according to a certain probable mode; so that he cannot be called into complaint of accusation and crime by men: but not according to the mode more minutely examined, that is, so that man be exempt from every stain of sin however slight. St. Augustine adds that if such was then the mind of St. Ambrose, that he judged Zachary and Elizabeth to have been of the highest and altogether perfection of justice, that opinion was afterward corrected by him.

You will object 4. The Apostle writing 2 Timothy 4: I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith: as to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice: but he would not say this if he had any sin: therefore truly he was immune from sin. - St. Augustine answers, book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 6, that the Apostle spoke not according to his present state, in which he was, but according to his future state, which he foresaw from the mercy of God, and therefore rejoiced with such words certain and secure: > says St. Augustine, because he who had already revealed to him that same passion threatened, had already made him certain and secure concerning the victory of so great a coming combat: not in fullest reality, but in firmest hope he said these things, and indicated what he presumed would be, as if it had been done… by which most sure promise of the Lord he was in that end, which was still to come, already believing it accomplished, to have had no sin; for that I may pass over other things, I wonder whether, when he spoke those words through which he seemed to these men to have had no sin, that sting of the flesh had already been taken from him, concerning whose removal from himself he had asked the Lord, and had received answer: My grace is sufficient for thee. Power is made perfect in infirmity. It was necessary for the perfecting of so great a man that the Angel of satan not be taken from him, by whom on that account he was buffeted, lest he be exalted by the magnitude of revelations: and does anyone dare to think or to say that anyone placed under the burden of this life is altogether clean from every sin? <

You will object 5. That saying of Christ the Lord Matthew 5: Be you perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect; in which certainly perfection consists in general abstinence from every sin, but Christ would not command this if he did not know that what he commands could be done: therefore, etc. — I answer first indeed that men can be without sin not by their own powers, nor with the ordinary help of God, but by a special benefit of God, which certainly we do not deny, as will appear in the following conclusion. — Secondly St. Augustine answers in the same place, chapter 15, that by those words he commands us to be perfect in some species of perfection, but not in that genus in which the heavenly Father is perfect; for the same Apostle to the Philippians 3 says of himself: > Whosoever therefore are perfect, let us be so minded: and in the same place, chapter 12, he confesses he is not yet perfect: Not that I have already received, or am already perfect. > Which both things, says St. Augustine, unless he were perfect in some thing, but in another not; whence St. Augustine gathers, chapter 15, Not on that account is everyone understood to be altogether without sin, because he is said to be perfect in some thing. Although even in this it can be so said, that not because he no longer is that in which he might profit, but because he has profited in part, he be held worthy of that name <.

You will object 6. God does not command man what is morally speaking impossible; but that anyone cannot avoid all sins, will be at least morally impossible for man to avoid all sins: therefore God does not command that man abstain from all sins. — The Seraphic Doctor answers in Book 2, distinction 28, doubt 5: > that to avoid something, or to do something, is understood in two ways: in one way someone can do something because by himself, without the help of another, he can fulfill it: thus someone can eat when he is healthy and has food: in another way someone is said to be able to do something, not only because he can do it by himself and in himself, but because he can with another who is present to him: and taking ability in this way, everything God commands is in our power, because he who commands is present to bestow efficacious assisting grace, which any of the just can obtain <. Whence St. Augustine book 2 On the Merits of Sins, chapter 17, professes that it is the fault of men if they do not avoid sins. > Since, he says, with the human will assisted by divine grace man can be without sin in this life, why he is not, I can most easily and most truthfully answer, because men are unwilling: but if it be asked of me why they are unwilling, I shall say briefly, men are unwilling to do what is just, either because it lies hidden whether it be just, or because it does not delight: for the more certainly we know each thing to be good, so much more vehemently do we will it, and the more ardently do we delight in it <. — I answer secondly that there are two genera of morally impossible things. Some are such that, although absolutely they can be done, yet they will never be done, even with whatever powers of the will employed, as to describe a perfect circle with the finger: others are such that with the whole and greatest powers of the will employed they can be done, yet never will be done, for the reason that those great powers of the will are not employed. Those things which are morally impossible of the prior genus God nowhere commands: but those which are impossible of the latter genus he can command, such as abstinence even from venial sins: for man with ordinary aids, if he should consent to them, and employ all the powers of the will, would obtain more abundant aids, whereby he would be rendered immune from whatever sins: > but says St. Augustine book 2 On the Merits of Sins, chapter 3, for overcoming some things which are either badly coveted or badly feared, sometimes great and total powers of the will are needed, which he foresaw we would not perfectly employ in all things, who willed it to be said truthfully by the Prophet: no man living shall be justified in thy sight. The Lord therefore foreseeing that we should be such, deigned to give and make efficacious certain salutary remedies against the guilt and chains of sins even after baptism, namely works of mercy, when he says: Forgive, and it shall be forgiven you <.

Fourth conclusion. — THROUGH EXTRAORDINARY AIDS OF GRACE AND FROM A SINGULAR PRIVILEGE OF GOD A MERE CREATURE CAN AVOID ALL VENIAL SINS. This is common among Catholics piously judging that the Mother of God was endowed with this illustrious and singular privilege, as the Council of Trent delivers, Session 6, Canon 23, praised in the prior conclusion, where it pronounced anathema against him who should say that a justified man can during his whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, except by a special privilege of God, as the Church holds regarding the blessed Virgin. St. Augustine subscribes, book On Nature and Grace, chapter 36, where he says:

Excepting the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, on account of the honor of the Lord, I wish to have no question whatsoever when sins are treated of: for from her we know that more grace was bestowed upon her to overcome sin on every side, who merited to conceive and bear him who is known to have had no sin. This Virgin therefore excepted, if we could gather together all those Saints and holy women while they lived here, and ask them whether they were without sin, what do we think they would have answered? Whether this which Pelagius said, namely that they lived without sin and justly, or that of John the Apostle? I ask you: however great may have been the excellence of holiness in this body of ours, if they could have been asked this, would they not have cried out with one voice: if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us?

The present Conclusion can also be confirmed by reason. For God can confer such grace upon the human will in whatever occasions; such grace St. Augustine describes in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 12, in these words: It was taken away from the infirmity of the human will that divine grace move it infallibly and inseparably: and therefore although infirm, it would nevertheless not fail, nor be conquered by any adversity. But if such grace were conferred upon man in all occasions of sinning, he would nowhere sin, although he could sin, because his will would be moved infallibly and insuperably toward good and turned away from evil: therefore it could come about, by a singular privilege of God, that man avoid all sins.

NOTE 1. From St. Augustine, book On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 1, perseverance can be considered in two ways: First indeed absolutely, as St. Augustine defines it there: We decide, he says, that perseverance is a gift of God, by which one perseveres in Christ even to the end: but I call the end that by which this life is ended, in which alone there is danger lest one fall. Secondly perseverance is taken in a certain respect, whereby namely the just perseveres for some time in the prosecution of good and aversion from evil, but pressed by temptation lapses into sin; but this perseverance is said to be only in a certain respect, because it did not last to the very term of life: perseverance simply, however, is every perseverance that is crowned by death, however brief it may have been in time: Truly, says St. Augustine there, that perseverance by which one perseveres in Christ even unto the end must in no way be said to have been had by him who has not persevered unto the end; and rather he had the faith of one year faithfully lived, and as far as can be conceived below, if he should die after days, than of many years, if before death he fell from firm stability.

NOTE 2. Again in two ways someone perseveres even unto the end: First indeed undeliberately, when after receiving sanctifying grace, and before he exercises any free act, he dies; thus while infants die after receiving baptism before the use of reason: similarly, while adults after receiving the grace of justification close their last day before they exercise any free act. Secondly, perseverance even unto the end is free, when after receiving sanctifying grace the just lives for some time, and in the observance of the commandments of God, in victory over temptations, and in the exercise of virtues perseveres continually even unto death. It is asked therefore whether each of these two perseverances is a special gift of God distinct from habitual and sanctifying grace.

NOTE 3. The supernatural help granted by God to men that they turn aside from evil and do good is of two genera: for one is common, the other special. Common is that which God is accustomed to bestow on all, whenever some precept to be fulfilled or temptation to be overcome occurs: of which St. Augustine makes mention, book II On the Trinity, and the book On Free Choice, chapter 18. Free choice, he says, would be admonished altogether without its fruit, unless it first received something of love, that it might seek ⟦illegible: …⟧ for itself, whence it might fulfill what was commanded: the special help indeed is that through which, as the same St. Augustine speaks in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 11, there is given to us not only the power to do what we will in receiving good and holding it perseveringly: truly also to will what we can. Three things therefore are here to be determined: First indeed that the grace of justification does not suffice man for persevering, but moreover some actual supernatural help is required: Second that that help be either internal or external. Third whether, and how, we can merit that help.

First conclusion. — BESIDES SANCTIFYING GRACE SOME ACTUAL SUPERNATURAL GIFT OF GOD IS NECESSARY, WHEREBY MAN MAY SIMPLY PERSEVERE EVEN UNTO THE END.

It is proved first from Sacred Scripture by all those texts by which it is signified that just man needs divine help for persevering: thus Psalm 15: I have set the Lord in my sight for ever: because he is at my right hand, I shall not be moved. And Psalm 79: Let thy hand be upon the man of thy right hand: and upon the son of man whom thou hast confirmed to thyself, and we depart not from thee. Whence St. Augustine On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 2: > Therefore the hand of God is this, not ours, that we depart not from God: his hand, I say, is this which he who spoke Jeremiah 32 said: I will give my fear in their heart, that they may not depart from me. Psalm 126: Unless the Lord keep the city, he watcheth in vain that keepeth it. John 17: Father, keep them in thy name. < In which words Christ asks the Father that with his aid he guard and protect the Apostles already justified. 1 Peter 5: The God of all grace who hath called us into his eternal glory in Christ Jesus, after you have suffered a little, will himself perfect, confirm, and establish you.

St. Augustine gathers and proves this truth excellently, in the book On the Good of Perseverance, from the Lord's prayer: > For if other documents were not at hand, he says, chapter 1, this Lord's prayer alone would suffice us for the cause of grace which we defend; because it was permitted us wherein to glory as in our own <. And chapter 2: > But is there anyone of those who does not ask of himself from God that he persevere in it with that prayer which is called the Lord's; because when the same Lord taught it, being prayed to by the Saints, almost nothing else than perseverance can it be understood to signify? < — Which certainly he demonstrates from the exposition of blessed Cyprian upon the several parts of the same prayer: > For first, praying God: hallowed be thy name, this we seek and ask, says blessed Cyprian, that they who have been sanctified in baptism may persevere in that which they have begun to be. What, when we say, thy kingdom come? We ask nothing else, says St. Augustine, except that it come, and to us, which we doubt not is to come, to all the Saints: therefore these also who already are Saints, what do they pray for, except that they persevere in that holiness in which it was given to them? for otherwise the kingdom of God would not come to them, which is certain to come not to others, but to those who persevere even unto the end. Thy will be done. since it has now been done, says St. Augustine, chapter 3, in them (namely the Saints), why do they still ask that it be done, except that they persevere in that which they have begun to be? Give us this day our daily bread. These words, says St. Augustine, chapter 4, after he brought forth the exposition of St. Cyprian, indicate altogether that the Saints ask of the Lord perseverance, when with this intention they say, Give us this day our daily bread: lest they be separated from the body of Christ, but that they remain in that same holiness in which they admit no crime whereby they may deserve to be separated from it. Now indeed, says he in the same place chapter 5, when the Saints say, Lead us not into temptation, what else do they pray for than that they persevere in holiness? For certainly, this gift of God being conceded to them.... that they not be brought into temptation; there is no one of the Saints who does not hold unto the end the perseverance of holiness; nor does anyone cease to persevere in the purpose of Christianity, unless he be brought thoroughly into temptation: if therefore there be conceded to him what he asks, that he be not brought into temptation; in sanctification certainly, which he received by the gift of God, he persists by the gift of God <.

It is proved secondly from Councils; the Orange Canon 10: The help of God must always be implored even by the reborn and the Saints, that they may arrive at a good end, or be able to endure in good work. The Tridentine likewise, Session 6, chapter 13, says: Similarly concerning the gift of perseverance, of which it is written, He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved: which indeed cannot otherwise be had, except from him who is able to establish him who stands that he stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falls. Whence in Canon 16 it calls perseverance a great gift. And Canon 22 decrees thus: If anyone shall say that the justified either can without the special help of God persevere in the justice received, or cannot with it, let him be anathema.

It is proved thirdly from the supreme Pontiffs; most truly indeed Innocent I, in his rescript to the Council of Carthage; in which he has this: Although he redeemed man from past sins, nevertheless knowing that he could sin again, toward his reparation, so that he could... after that correction he preserved many remedies, and daily supplies him with them, by which, unless we strive relying and trusting upon them, we shall by no means be able to overcome human errors. For it is necessary that, by whose aid we conquer, by him again not aiding we be conquered. Likewise from the Epistle of Celestine, chapter 6, where from the aforementioned words of Innocent he inserts ⟦illegible: intert? insertit?⟧, that no one, even reborn by the grace of baptism, is fit for overcoming the snares of the devil, and the concupiscences of the flesh, unless he receive through the daily help of God perseverance of good conduct.

You will say 1. A just man can avoid every evil by which he would lose the friendship of God: therefore the special gift whereby he persevere even unto the end is by no means required. — The antecedent lies hidden: for the just man has sanctifying grace, which constitutes him in the supernatural state and order: and forthwith renders him powerful for overcoming all temptations, and escaping all stumbling blocks of salvation. — I deny the antecedent: for habitual grace alone does not suffice for this, but actual aids are required besides, that he persevere in act even unto the end; for, that I may use the words of St. Augustine, chapter 1 On the Good of Perseverance: > We speak of that perseverance which will persevere unto the end, which if it is given, one has persevered even unto the end: but if he has not persevered unto the end, it was not given. Let men therefore not say that perseverance has been given to anyone even unto the end, unless the end itself shall have come, and he to whom it was given shall have been found by experience to have persevered even unto the end. <

You will say 2. It can happen that a just man dies immediately after receiving justification; but in that case he has no need of any actual aid distinct from habitual grace: therefore nothing besides that is required for perseverance. — I answer first, that we are not speaking here, as we have said, of that unreflective perseverance, but of voluntary perseverance, by which a man is prepared to overcome all temptations and to surmount every obstacle that would remove him from salvation. I answer second, that this premature death is not indeed another gift of actual grace, but at least it is another gift of external protection, by which one man is chosen before another and snatched away, lest wickedness change his understanding, or lest deceit deceive his soul: which is certainly a singular benefit of divine mercy, if not an internal one, at least an external one.

You will say 3. Christ the Lord abundantly restored all things that had been taken away through the sin of Adam; for with God there is abundant redemption, and where sin abounded, grace abounded the more: but if Adam had not sinned, perseverance would have been granted to his posterity through habitual grace alone: therefore it is now granted also to all the just. — I distinguish the major: more was restored to man through Christ than he had lost through Adam, inasmuch as man now has not only the power to persevere, which Adam had, but also the gift by which he in fact perseveres, which Adam did not have, as Saint Augustine teaches, book De Correptione et Gratia, chapter 11. I concede: more was restored in this sense, that it was granted to individual men that they should have all things necessary on the part of God for persevering. I deny: for this gift of perseverance, which perhaps would have been granted to all men in the state of innocence, is now bestowed upon fewer; for many are called, but few are chosen.

You will say 1. Grace is an excellent participation in the divine nature, which confers sufficient strength for exercising all the acts of the virtues: therefore with habitual grace and the general concurrence of God due to it, a man can persevere. The antecedent is confirmed by these words of the Council of Milevis, Canon 8. > If anyone shall say that the grace by which we are justified through Christ avails only for the remission of sins already committed, and not as an aid against committing them again, let him be anathema <. — I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: habitual grace, considered in itself and according to its proper power, is sufficient together with the general concurrence. I concede: it is sufficient on the part of the subject and of fallen man; I deny. For although habitual grace has sufficient efficacy to expel any sin and its occasions, yet in fallen man it is not sufficient for this unless it be supported and strengthened by special aid: for even though grace heals the soul by washing away guilt, it does not fully restore its health by taking away the infirmity that arises from concupiscence. But when I say that the Council means the grace by which we are justified avails as an aid so that sins be not committed, I mean where grave temptations and occasions of sin do not press. I concede: but where such enticements to sin are present, besides habitual grace special aids are necessary, by which the soul may be strengthened in turning away from evil and pursuing good.

You will say 2. Habitual grace confers a right to glory, which is contained virtually in grace as fruit in seed, according to that word of John: The seed of God abideth in him: therefore the continuation of grace into glory comes from debt, and not from special grace; and consequently the perseverance that makes the joining of grace with glory is not a special gift distinct from habitual grace. — I deny the consequence: for although a just man has a right to glory as long as he is illumined by habitual grace, he nevertheless has no right that he persevere in grace until death; since by reason of free will, as long as he lives, he can turn aside toward good or evil: hence when anyone is protected by God so liberally that he does not lose grace at the moment of death, this is the greatest and most singular benefit and the pre-eminent effect of predestination: just as, on the contrary, that anyone be permitted to die in sin, or that his sin be joined with death, is the last effect of reprobation, as Saint Augustine teaches, book De Bono Perseverantiae, chapter 9. > Of two devout men, he says, why to this one perseverance unto the end is given, while to that other it is not given, are judgments of God more to be searched into. Yet this must be most certain to the faithful, that this one is among the predestinate and that one is not: for if they had been of us, says one of the predestinate, who had drunk the secret from the breast of the Lord, they would no doubt have remained with us <.

You will say finally: God does not abandon those justified by His grace, unless He be first abandoned by them, as the Council of Trent teaches, Session 6, chapter 2, in these words: God does not abandon those once justified by His grace, unless He be first abandoned by them; which words are taken from St. Augustine, book De Natura et Gratia, chapter 26. But if the grace necessary for persevering unto the end of life were not given to all, God would abandon some who are justified before being abandoned by them: therefore the grace of persevering must necessarily be connected with habitual grace. — I deny the minor: for God denies the grace for persevering to no one, unless he has first abandoned Him, whether by a proper or an improper abandonment. A twofold abandonment of God can be distinguished, namely a proper one, by which God abandons the soul which He indwelt through sanctifying grace as His sanctuary and temple, according to that proclamation of Christ, John 14: If any one love me, he will be loved by my Father, and I ⟦illegible: …⟧, and we will make our abode with him: which temple He is said to abandon when on account of mortal sin He removes sanctifying grace from the soul: the other is called improper, by which God indeed neither dissolves the friendship He has with the just soul, nor takes away sanctifying grace from her, but on account of the just, though hidden, reasons of His providence, does not confer upon the soul He inhabits certain actual graces, which seem necessary for eliciting acts of virtue. This denial of aid is called abandonment, just as a friend is said to abandon a friend when he denies him the succor of which he stands in need. Such abandonment, however, is called improper, because God does not deprive the soul of His patience, friendship, and sanctifying grace, as long as she does not fall into mortal sin.

Therefore the forementioned words of the Council can be expounded of this twofold abandonment: for it is true that God does not remove sanctifying grace from the soul as long as the just man perseveres, nor does man abandon God through mortal sin. Similarly God never denies to man the special aids by which he could persevere unto the end, unless beforehand man seems to have abandoned God, either by not praying to Him, or by presuming upon himself: for the order of divine providence is that man attain perseverance through prayer and the assiduous performance of good works. Hence he who does not persevere unto the end in good, does not persevere for this reason, because he fails in prayer and humility, on account of which failure man abandons God sooner, by growing proud and ceasing from prayer, than God abandons man by withholding the special aids by which he might pursue good and turn away from evil.

Second Conclusion. — THE PERSEVERANCE OF THE LORD CONNOTES AND IMPORTS SOMETHING FROM GOD: NAMELY EITHER THE CONFERRAL OF AN INTERNAL EFFICACIOUS ACTUAL AID IN THOSE JUST WHO PERSEVERE FOR A LONG TIME; OR GOD'S EXTERNAL PROTECTION AND SINGULAR MERCY IN THOSE WHO DIE SOON. This Conclusion involves two parts, of which the first is defined by the Council of Trent, Session 6, Canon 27, where it says: if anyone shall say that one justified can persevere in the justice received either without the special aid of God or with it cannot, let him be anathema. By which words the Council not only signifies that some grace besides sanctifying and habitual grace is necessary for persevering, but also indicates that there is some actual aid by which a man perseveres in the justice received.

The same truth Saint Augustine expressly hands down in book De Correptione et Gratia, chapter 12. > If, he says, in so great an infirmity of this life — in which infirmity nonetheless, on account of the election to be kept, they had to be perfected in virtue — their own will were left to them, so that they would remain in the aid of God, without which they could not persevere, if they willed, and God did not work in them that they should will, amid so many and so great temptations their will would succumb in its infirmity, and therefore they could not persevere, > because failing through infirmity they would not will, or would not will so as to be able, their will being weakened. < — But he had said before that this is the difference between the grace given to Adam for persevering and that conceded to us: that to the first Man, he says, who had received from God the good by which he had been made upright, the power not to die, the power not to desert that good, there was given the aid of perseverance, not by which it would come about that he persevere, but without which he could not persevere by free will. Now, however, to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God and to the grace of God, not only is such an aid of perseverance given, but such that perseverance itself is given to them, not only so that without this gift they could not be persevering, but even so that by this gift they are none other than persevering. By which he plainly signifies not only that a special aid distinct from habitual grace is necessary for persevering in those who fight against temptations and the enticements of sin even unto death, but also that that aid is efficacious and bears effect.

The second part also holds: namely, that adults who die soon after receiving grace possess the gift of perseverance, by way of protection, distinct from habitual grace and the aids joined to it. For perseverance properly so called is a gift proceeding from the special mercy and providence of God: but those who die soon after receiving grace possess the gift of perseverance properly so called, if not internal, at least external, namely the protection of God who out of mercy snatches them from this mortal life in that state: therefore in them too perseverance is a gift distinct from habitual grace. The major is evident from the first Conclusion. The minor, however, Saint Augustine expressly hands down in chapter 1 of De bono perseverantia: > But this, he says, about which we are now treating, the perseverance by which one perseveres in Christ unto the end, he must in no way be said to have had, who has not persevered unto the end: rather he who was faithful one year, and as short a time below as can be conceived, if he lived faithfully until he died, had this more than he of many years, if he fell away from the steadfastness of faith a brief time before death. < By which he signifies that that perseverance, concerning which he disputes against the Semipelagians, who denied it to be a special gift of God, that perseverance, I say, consists in this, that one die faithfully, even though he be faithful of one year, or of one month, day, hour, or quarter of an hour, provided, that is, he underwent death in the state of sanctifying grace. Hence in chapter 17 of the same book he writes: > See how far from the truth it is to deny that perseverance unto the end of this life is a gift of God, since He Himself gives the end to this life when He wills, which if He gives before an imminent fall, He makes man persevere unto the end: but more marvelous, and more evident to the faithful, is the largess of the goodness of God, such as is given even to little children, to whom obedience of that age is not possible, that this grace be given. < By which he plainly teaches that the gift of final perseverance is conceded even to little children dying before the use of reason; not indeed internal and actually efficacious, of which they are incapable, but external, and flowing from the singular protection and providence of God disposing their death at the time when they are in grace, and not suffering them to live longer, lest, exposed to graver temptations and the enticements of sins and the changeableness of free will, they lose grace before death: according to that word of Wisdom 4: He was taken away, lest wickedness should change his understanding, or deceit should deceive his soul. Wherefore although that gift of perseverance is not something internal distinct from sanctifying grace, at least it is the gift of external protection and the singular mercy of God.

You will say. In that case in which someone dies immediately after receiving grace, he has no time for deliberating and eliciting voluntary acts; but only this is required, that grace be preserved, and that death arrive while it perseveres: but the certainty of death is something natural, nor can it be reckoned a gift of God; indeed rather it is the punishment of sin: since by sin death entered into the world, says the Apostle to the Romans 5; but the preservation of grace is a general benefit of the supernatural order: therefore the conjunction of the two ought not to be reckoned a singular grace. — I answer, that although the infusion of grace, considered in itself, is a common or general benefit: yet its infusion and preservation, unto this end, that it be joined with death, is a special benefit of God: because grace is infallibly annexed to this conjunction, and proceeds from His efficacious intention. Similarly also, if death be considered inasmuch as it is common to all men, it is not a gift of God but the punishment of sin; yet insofar as it is a certain condition required for possessing an immovable state in grace and for obtaining eternal glory, it is conceded out of the special grace of God and is His special benefit, just as is that blessedness to which it leads. This Saint Augustine explains most excellently lib. 13. De Civit. Dei: So much, he says, did God bestow the grace of faith, that death, which is acknowledged to be contrary to life, became the instrument by which one passes over to life.

Third Conclusion. — THE GIFT OF PERSEVERANCE IS SO GRATUITOUS THAT NO ONE CAN MERIT IT DE CONDIGNO, AND YET IT CAN BE MERITED DE CONGRUO.

The first part of the conclusion is evident from what has been said, whereby it has been sufficiently proved that perseverance is a special gift of the grace of God, and is conferred freely and not from merits; and Saint Augustine proves this throughout the whole book De dono perseverantiae, and likewise in the book De correptione et gratia, where he either confesses that he does not know the cause of the conferral of this outstanding gift upon one rather than another, or reduces it to the sole mercy and goodness of God. For thus he says in chapter 5: > If here too I am asked why God did not give perseverance to those to whom He gave love, that they might live Christianly, I answer that I do not know. < And further on: > It is indeed wonderful, and greatly to be wondered at, that God does not give perseverance to some of His sons whom He regenerated in Christ, to whom He gave faith, hope, and love: while He pardons such great crimes to the sons of others, and by imparting His grace makes them His sons. < And afterwards addressing the Pelagians he says: > Let those answer who ridicule us when we exclaim in matters of this kind: how unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out! for neither does God fail to give this to whom He wills, or does that Scripture lie which says of the death of a just man as though untimely: He was taken away lest wickedness should change his understanding, or lest deceit should deceive his soul. Why therefore does God give so great a benefit to some and not to others, with whom there is no iniquity nor respect of persons, and in whose power it is how long each one remains in this life, which is called temptation upon earth? Therefore as they are compelled to confess that it is a gift of God that man end this life before he be changed from good to evil: yet why it is given to some and not given to others, they are ignorant; > let them testify with us that perseverance in man is a gift of God according to the Scriptures, of which I have already adduced many testimonies; and let them deign to be ignorant with us why it is given to some and not to others, without murmuring against God. <

You will say. The Council of Trent, in Canon 22 cited above, anathematizes him who shall say that one justified cannot persevere in the justice received with the special aid of God: but this would be false if the justified man could not merit the grace of perseverance; since that would be beyond his grasp and powers: therefore he can merit it. — I distinguish the minor: if he could not merit it de condigno, I concede; if he could not merit it de congruo only, I deny. I confess therefore that one justified can, when divinely supplied with aids, so exhibit himself as a faithful servant and minister toward God as to receive new aids day by day, by which he proceeds from virtue to virtue, until God be seen as the God of gods in Sion; yet he cannot so act by his merits that God be bound by justice, or by fidelity, to supply him the grace for persevering.

The second part is proved, namely that we can merit de congruo that grace of perseverance; for this truth the Council of Trent expressly hands down, Session 6, chapter 13, where it has these words: > As touching the gift of perseverance, of which it is written: He that shall persevere unto the end, the same shall be saved; which thing indeed can be had from nothing else than from Him who is able to establish him who stands that he stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falls. < Shortly after: > Although all ought to place and repose their most firm hope in God's aid; for God, unless they be wanting to His grace, as He has begun the good work, so will He perfect it, working to will and to accomplish. Wherefore he who thinks himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall, and with fear and trembling work out his salvation; in labors, in watchings, in almsdeeds, in prayers and oblations, in fastings and chastity. <

This same truth Saint Augustine also commends in the book De bono perseverantia, chapter 6, where he affirms that it can be earned: > This is given to those who pray; but He willed to admonish us by our prayer from whom we receive these benefits. < And chapter 16: > Since it is established that God has prepared other things even for those who do not pray, as the beginning of faith, and other things only for those who pray, as for those persevering unto the end, certainly he who thinks he has this of himself does not pray that he may have it. < And chapter 20: > When prayer is made by the Saints, almost nothing else is understood to be asked than perseverance. < Therefore God is accustomed to bestow that immense benefit of final perseverance both upon the assiduous exercise of good works and upon continual and frequent prayer: it behooves each one of us then to be faithful even unto death, and that God may render to us the promised crown of life, let us hold that which we have, that no man take our crown.

Finally let us hear Saint Bernard admonishing us: > Hold what you hold, ⟦hosticaeque?⟧ join the tail to the cupid, and the tunic of the grace of God now woven through, ⟦cura fucare?⟧, and reaching to the heel, since to have begun will profit nothing, if, which God forbid, it should not fall to you to persevere: for perseverance alone gives form to merit, rewards the runner, crowns the combatant, and leads to port the ship> faring soul: it alone presents beforehand a certain semblance ⟦quandam⟧ of eternity: for it alone is ⟦aeternitas reddita⟧, or that which restores man to eternity. <

You will ask. Whether, and in what manner, the gift of final perseverance is distinguished from confirmation in grace? — I answer that it seems more probable that the two gifts do not differ essentially; both because the gift of confirmation in grace, like the gift of final perseverance, leads the man to whom it is granted to the harbor of eternity; and because Sacred Scripture uses both gifts indifferently for one and the same thing. Thus Psalm 36: But the Lord confirmeth the just. 2 Thessalonians 3: But the Lord is faithful, who shall confirm and keep you from evil. Hence Saint Augustine in book De correptione et gratia, chapters 11 and 12, uses the two gifts for one and the same thing, while he says that the Apostles had the gift of perseverance, although it is certain they were confirmed in grace. — Yet I distinguish accidentally, chiefly in this, that the gift of perseverance be common to all the predestinate: whereas the other is most special, granted to outstanding persons alone, as to the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, and a few others. Moreover the gift of confirmation adds above perseverance a certain singular excellence and abundance of aids: for although the temptations may be graver and more difficult, victory is easier and sweeter in the confirmed than in those merely persevering. Some add that one having the gift of perseverance can be tempted, so as in fact to be tempted unto mortal sin, even if nowhere succumbing to the temptation: but one confirmed in grace cannot be spurred on and assailed by such temptations: for this seems to have been the privilege of the Virgin Mother of God, that she was neither tempted nor incited unto mortal sin, indeed not even unto venial sin.