Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. The love of God is twofold, namely natural and voluntary. The former is the very propensity of nature toward God as the last end and highest good; for every creature inclines toward God as its author, moderator, and end with a certain weight of love — insensible things indeed by natural motion, brute animals by sensitive motion, but rational creatures by intellectual love, which is properly called dilection, because it is made with advertence and election: the latter, however, is the free and effective propensity of the rational creature toward God as the last end and highest good. — Again, voluntary dilection is twofold: one of friendship, the other of concupiscence. The former is that whereby we are said to love a friend for his own sake, willing his own good only on his account: the latter, when we love that which suits us; thus, with a love of concupiscence we are said to love God when we desire Him to be present to us or rejoice in Him. And this love of concupiscence is again constituted twofold: one licit, whereby God is loved by us as the last end; the other vicious, whereby God is loved by us in the manner of a certain means, on account of temporal goods, so that He may satisfy our cupidities. — Again, each love, both of benevolence and of concupiscence, is still further twofold, namely absolute and conditioned. The former proceeds from an absolute will of loving God, while a man thus establishes it in his mind: I will to love God: the latter, which is also called ineffective, proceeds from a merely conditioned will, e.g., while a man thus resolves in his heart: I would wish to love God with my whole heart and all my strength, if on that account pleasures, delights, and riches, as Christ the Lord indicates, did not have to be renounced. Finally, absolute love is still further twofold: one perfect, the other imperfect. Perfect is that whereby God is so loved that He is preferred to all things whatsoever, with the purpose of pleasing Him in all things, even at the loss of all other goods; such was the love of Paul thus resolving in his mind, Romans 8: I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor Angels, nor Principalities, nor Powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor might, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the charity of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord. Imperfect, however, is that whereby God is loved as the author of nature, or as the fountain and giver of justice, yet not above all things, nor preferred to others. The former is called the love of God above all things, the latter the love of God together with all things. — But each of these loves of God is again twofold, namely natural and supernatural. Natural is that which not only proceeds from a principle and will acting by their own forces alone, but also is borne toward God as the author of nature and the giver of all goods; thus we love God because He has granted us to be, to live, and the goods of life. Supernatural likewise is that which not only is exercised with the help of grace, but also tends toward God as the giver of grace itself and the munificent bestower of glory. Moreover, both dilection is divided into the dilection of God above all things and that which is not above all things. The former is that which prefers God to all things, so that one is rather prepared to suffer the loss of all goods whatsoever than to do anything displeasing to God. The latter, namely the natural dilection of God above all things in a qualified sense, is that whereby man is indeed affected toward God more than toward the rest, on account of His supreme clemency, but is not prepared to cast aside the rest for the keeping of the law of God on every occasion given. — Again, the natural dilection of God above all things is twofold: one indeed in a certain respect, the other simply. The former is that whereby God is loved by man precisely under the aspect of a common good, which as such ought rather to be loved than any creature whatever; for right reason prescribes that the whole and the common good be loved more than the part and the particular good; which dilection, moreover, is common to man with beasts and inanimate things, and even with demons and the damned; for every part operates by a certain natural inclination for the common good of the whole, even with peril or detriment to itself. It is manifest, however, that God is the common good of the whole Universe and of all its parts, whence every creature in its way loves God more than itself. But the natural dilection of God above all things simply is that whereby He is loved under every aspect and perfection that He has within the order of nature, so that the rational creature, on account of the integrity of all perfections which it discovers in God, loves Him more than every other created thing, in which it recognizes a lesser perfection. — Finally, the love of God, both natural and supernatural, is again twofold, namely affective and effective. Affective is the purpose of the will resolving to love God above all things, to please Him in all things, and to avoid all things that can displease Him. Effective, however, is that whereby man so prefers God to all things on whatever occasions, that he fulfills His commandments and precepts.

Note 2. That God can be loved above all things in three ways: namely either intensively, or extensively, or estimatively or appreciatively. Intensively indeed, when He is loved with the utmost effort of the will, and with an act more fervent and intense than is any love wherewith a creature is loved. Extensively, however, in respect of the duration and perseverance of love, while evidently the dilection lasts longer than that of any other good. Appreciatively, finally, and estimatively, when God is so loved that He is held of greater worth than the other goods and preferred to them; whether meanwhile He be compared with created goods in particular and preferred to them, or be loved absolutely as infinite good, and far excelling any other goods whatsoever. This love, however, can be exercised in two ways, namely either willing only that goodness and perfection reside in God; or furthermore willing that created goods be exhibited to Him, such as honor, worship, and reverence from all creatures, although He has no need of our goods. — Further, this is not the question here, whether by the forces of nature alone God can be loved above all things both intensively and extensively: partly because neither of those modes of loving God above all things is exacted of us; for the mode of intension or extension of an act does not fall under precept; partly because neither contributes anything to the determination of the present question; since the different manner of intension or extension does not induce diversity of order and species in the act; for a remisser act, or one of lighter duration, is of the same nature and order as the more intense or longer lasting, when all else is equal.

Note 3. That the natural love of God differs from the supernatural in many respects: First indeed by reason of the connection whereby supernatural love is tied to habitual grace, whether existent, or future, or possible, of which connection purely natural love is destitute. Secondly, because supernatural love, beyond the natural activity of free will, requires an infused habit of charity, as the efficient principle of it, with the aids of grace supernatural in entity: natural love, however, beyond the active powers of nature and the principles due to nature, requires no principle, neither efficient nor formal, which of its own nature be infused and supernatural. Thirdly, because supernatural knowledge necessarily precedes supernatural love: natural knowledge, however, precedes natural love. Fourthly finally, because supernatural love elicited by a sinner contributes to his justification, while elicited by a just man it contributes to a fuller beatitude: natural love, however, helps nothing positively either toward justification or toward glory, but only negatively, by removing obstacles and occasions of sin. Now the present controversy is not raised concerning that dilection which is a certain natural propensity toward God, for since this is common both to irrational and insensible creatures and to those using reason, it is most certain that it can be had without grace. Nor concerning the dilection of God as the author of grace: for no one doubts that grace's assistance is needed for that dilection, since it exceeds the forces of nature. Nor concerning the vicious love of concupiscence, whereby God is loved as a means for obtaining temporal goods, and because He is their giver; for this love is disorderly and culpable, as St. Augustine teaches in Psalm 70, where he says: They who seek God on account of earthly benefits seek not God, but themselves. Therefore only the other loves of God come into disputation, namely the appreciative and the intensive, of concupiscence and of benevolence. Here therefore three things especially must be solved: First, whether the precept of loving God can be fulfilled by the forces of nature. Second, with what perfect love God can be naturally loved. Third, whether equally the other precepts of the divine law pertaining to the neighbor can be fulfilled without any aid of grace.

First Conclusion. — GOD CAN BE LOVED WITH A NATURAL LOVE OF BENEVOLENCE WITHOUT ANY AID OF GRACE.

Proof is made first from Romans 1: The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness of men, who detain the truth of God in injustice; because that which is known of God is manifest in them: for God hath manifested it unto them: for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, his everlasting power also and Divinity, so that they are inexcusable. In which words St. Paul accuses the Gentiles, especially the Philosophers, of impiety and injustice, so that they are inexcusable, because they do not worship the true God, namely with love and observance, for worship consists especially in His love, according to that saying of St. Augustine, Epistle 120: Piety is the worship of God, nor is He worshipped save by loving. But if such worship and justice were impossible to them, they could rightly be excused, and would undeservedly be accused of having forsaken the love of justice and the true worship of God; for there is no greater ground of excuse than impossibility; therefore St. Paul manifestly supposes the Gentiles able to love God: but this power, which the Apostle supposes in them, is purely natural; since it arises from the natural notion of God, which they can borrow from visible creatures; but the love possible from a natural notion is purely natural, for a natural notion cannot move toward supernatural love: therefore, etc. — This our reasoning is confirmed by the testimony of St. Ambrose, who, weighing the foregoing passage, says: From the very fabric of heaven God is seen by them: for this reason He made the stars so beautiful, that from them how great and how admirable their Creator is may be acknowledged, and He alone adored; therefore by the natural law he renders the human race guilty: for they were able to apprehend this by the law of nature, the fabric of the world bearing witness, that God alone the author was to be loved, which Moses handed down in writing. By which words St. Augustine signifies that the infidel who does not worship God is therefore accused as guilty of injustice, because with a natural notion drawn from the fabric of creatures he could apprehend that God alone the author is to be loved, and he is bound by the natural law to such dilection and love of justice. — To him concurs St. Prosper, book 1. On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 2, writing: According to Scripture we believe and most piously confess that the care of divine Providence has never been wanting to the whole body of mankind. And though it directed the people set apart for itself by special institutes unto piety, yet it withheld the gifts of its goodness from no nation of men, that the prophetic voices and legal precepts might be shown to have received witness in the services and testimonies of the elements. They became vain and inexcusable, who made gods for themselves, and venerated unto worship what had been created for use. Therefore St. Prosper judges with St. Paul that infidels are inexcusable, who render to creatures the worship of the Creator, since from the natural testimony of creatures they have sufficient principles for the true worship and love of God and of justice, toward which the faithful people are promoted by the prophetic voices and oracles of the Scriptures. — The same truth is again intimated by the same Apostle in Acts 14, where, speaking of the Gentiles, he says: He left not himself without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness. Whereby by the testimony which God left to the Gentiles, inwardly moving hearts and sealing them to the obligation of prayer and dilection, he signifies reason, which gathers from creatures the truth and beneficence of the Creator, so that thence it may be spurred to His love and worship. To this pertains also that saying of Acts 17: Determining appointed times, and the bounds of their habitation, to seek God, if perhaps they may feel after him, or find him. By which St. Apostle declares that by the natural disposition of times and things the Gentiles can not only seek God, but also, as it were, feel after and find Him with love and worship; For, says St. Prosper, book 2. On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 1: They worship all celestial things, sea and earth, and all things that are in them, and with the harmonious concert of their kind and order proclaim the glory of God, and by perpetual preaching speak forth the majesty of their author.

Proof secondly from the authority of the Councils, which, while they define grace necessary for loving God, not without counsel but notably add these clauses (as is required for salvation, or for eternal life, or for justification); whereby they signify that a dilection of God is possible which contributes nothing to salvation, and which is purely natural and is made without any aid of grace. Thus speaks the Second Council of Orange, especially Can. 20. No one, it says, can love God as is fitting, or believe in God, or work for God that which is good, unless grace, or divine mercy, prevent him: in like manner speak the Fathers of the African Council in Prosper's Response to chapter 8 of the Gauls: so likewise the Tridentine, Session 6, Can. 3: If anyone shall say that without the preventing inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His aid man can believe, hope, love, or repent, as he ought, so that the grace of justification be conferred upon him, let him be anathema. From which it is lawful thus to argue: theological phrases found in the definitions of Councils are to be understood in that mode and that sense in which they are commonly received by theologians: but this phrase (as is fitting) is so received by theologians that it signifies possible morally good natural acts, which are not done as is fitting and require no grace, and from which salutary acts, which claim grace, are distinguished; therefore the Councils suppose possible acts of natural dilection of God.

Proof thirdly from the definition of the Supreme Pontiffs, who condemned these propositions of Baius, namely number 31: That distinction of a twofold love, namely natural, whereby God is loved as the author of nature, and gratuitous, whereby God is loved as beatifier, is vain and fictitious. Likewise proposition 37: Natural love, which arises from the forces of nature, is defended by some authors from Philosophy alone, by an elation of human presumption with injury to the cross of Christ. Again proposition 39: Every love of a rational creature is either a vicious cupidity, whereby the world is loved, or that laudable charity diffused through the Holy Spirit in the heart, whereby God is loved. It is evident therefore that some natural love of God, conceived by the forces of free will alone, must be admitted.

Fourthly this same truth is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers: for St. Basil, Homily 9, That God is not the author of evils, says: Whence is man wicked? From his own free will. Whence is the devil evil? From the same previously known cause; for he too had free will and a power implanted in himself, either of following God or of departing from the good. By which he signifies to us that the power of following God is implanted naturally: but we follow God by loving and worshipping Him. — To him concurs St. Gregory of Nyssa, Catechesis 5: It was altogether necessary, he says, for the construction of our nature, that by a power implanted in it it should know that which is supreme, that it should be held by the desire of divine eternity. By which he refers to the very construction of nature the power implanted in it of the notion of God and the desire of eternity. — To this truth most especially St. Augustine gives assent: For first he teaches that there resides in man a natural inclination and innate appetite toward the love of God: but an innate appetite cannot be borne toward supernatural love, and accordingly it busies itself about the natural love and dilection of God. This argument the adversaries admit. But the major is proved from that saying of book 1 of the Confessions, chapter 1: Thou hast made us for thee, and our heart is restless until it rest in thee. Which restlessness is born from the very creation and condition of rational nature, which, as it was created for loving God, so neither can it rest in the love of any created thing, no less than a stone outside its center. — Secondly, according to the doctrine of St. Augustine, it is natural for a rational creature to adhere to God through dilection: but it would not wish thus to adhere unless such love were natural to it: therefore, etc. The major lies hidden in all those places wherein he signifies that vice is therefore an evil of nature because it separates it from God, to whom it was fitting to adhere. Thus especially lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, c. 1. When it is said of the vice of a rational creature that it adheres not to God, hence is openly declared that it belongs to its nature to adhere to God. Therefore, since to depart from God is the vice of nature, to adhere to God through dilection is the perfection of nature itself. — Finally the mind of St. Augustine is detected most especially in this, that he proves the celebrated tenet of the Platonic Philosophers, who taught that the natural beatitude of man constituted in this life consists in the contemplation and love of God: but those Philosophers acknowledged no other love of God than natural, arising from the forces of nature alone: therefore with them St. Augustine supposes the love of God natural in entity, and possible from the principles of nature alone. The major is evident, for those Philosophers were ignorant of all faith infused and of grace supernatural in entity. The minor is proved from the same St. Augustine lib. 8. De Civit. Dei, c. 5. If then, he says, Plato said that the wise man is the imitator, knower, and lover of this God, by whose participation he is blessed, what need is there to sift the others? none of whom came nearer to us than these. And in book 10, chapter 1, speaking of the same Platonists, he says that they deny that anyone will be blessed who has not adhered with the purity of chaste love to that one supreme good, which is the unchangeable God. Therefore it is conformable to the mind and doctrine of St. Augustine that the love of God be possible naturally in entity.

THE ADVERSARIES RESPOND that that love toward which the Philosophers referred the beatitude of this life is judged by the same Augustine to be supernatural: indeed he recalls it to grace itself, for in book 11, chapter 25, according to Plato's mind he proclaims God the inspirer of the love whereby one lives well and blessedly, and the giver of intimate sweetness. And in book 22, chapter 22, he relates from Tully that no greater gift had been given by the gods, nor could be given, than this love. — On the contrary, the benefit to which the Philosophers recalled this love is not of the supernatural order, but natural, pertaining to the grace of creation and to God as the author and provider of nature; which is gathered first, because the Platonists spoke in the same manner of the wisdom and knowledge of God as of His love; but the wisdom and knowledge of God which they had was natural in entity, being acquired from creatures either by the connatural light or by a natural discourse. Secondly, this very thing St. Augustine teaches in the same chapter 25, where he says: Because our nature, that it might be, has God for its author, doubtless, that we may wisely understand, we owe to have Him Himself for Doctor; Him also, that we may be blessed, the giver of intimate sweetness. By which he signifies that we receive from God His love and knowledge in the same manner in which we received nature: but nature was conferred by God as the author of nature: therefore from the same proceeds that love which the Platonics required for beatitude. — To the most holy Doctor subscribe his disciples, for St. Fulgentius, book On Faith, chapter 3: God, he says, implanted the faculty of knowing and loving Himself in none but Angels and men... And because of the liberty of will, which was chiefly to be conferred on intellectual creatures, He so endowed them with the faculty and will of knowing and loving Himself, that each one could both have it and lose it. By which words he declares that the power conceded by God of loving Him is of the same manner as that which had been conceded of knowing Himself: but the power of knowing God belongs to the forces of nature alone: therefore also the power of loving Him. — St. Prosper concurs, book 2. On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 1, where he says: For heaven, and earth, and sea, and every creature that can be seen and understood is disposed chiefly unto this venerable utility of man, that rational nature from the contemplation of so many species, from the experience of so many gifts, and the perception of so many bounties, should be imbued with the worship and dilection of its author: therefore St. Prosper judges that the principal end of creating corporeal creatures is not the temporal utility of man, but spiritual and honest, which is perceived from the worship and dilection of the author of nature, which all created things provoke. — St. Anselm subscribes in the Monologion, chapter 66: Nothing is fitter, he says, than that the rational creature be made for this, that it love the supreme Essence and Good above all things, even as Itself is the supreme Good, nay, that it love nothing except It, or on account of It: therefore the love of God, and of creatures for God, is the natural end of the rational soul itself, and accordingly is to be obtained through natural love as a congruous medium.

Finally proof is made by theological reasoning: that which the intellect can know by the forces of nature the will can naturally love: but the intellect can know God by the forces of will alone: therefore the will also can love Him. The major stands by the authority of the holy Fathers, for St. Athanasius, in the treatise Of Definitions, column 3: Whatever it understands, he says, it is agreed is led by the will. St. Fulgentius to Monimus, chapter 18: Nor can reason reside therein in any wise, unless the dilection of the Creator could reside in it. St. Damascene On the Two Wills of Christ: Man, he says, inasmuch as he partakes of reason follows reason as his leader in appetiting. Therefore natural will is a certain appetite of reason, consentaneous with sense, which is accommodated only to naturals; but the wills of nature are first that we obey the laws of God: for by nature man is the servant of God. Therefore it stands that to the power of understanding there is annexed the natural power of willing the good understood. — Secondly, the natural law commands and counsels the dilection of God before all created goods, because God is made known by natural reason as worthy of love before them all: but the native law cannot command nor counsel an impossible love, such as the love of God would be, the benefit of grace excluded, if that love were not natural: therefore truly such a natural love of God must be conceded. — Thirdly, we pursue parents, benefactors, and friends with a natural love of benevolence: therefore with equal right we can love God. The consequence is evident; since purely natural reason can suggest motives to the will whereby it be more efficaciously excited to love God than to the love of parents, benefactors, and friends: whether you adduce natural benefits, or consider the communion of goods, or observe the bonds whereby we are bound to other men, far higher are those things which natural reason can investigate and attain in God for provoking His love. Therefore if human motives can obtain from a created will a love of benevolence so efficacious that sometimes we contemn temporal advantages, nay even life itself, for parents and benefactors, why shall we deny that divine motives proposed by natural reason can obtain the same love?

You will object. 1. Sacred Scripture makes mention of no love of God except that which is of charity, and which leads to eternal life: but that is not natural: therefore no natural love of God is to be admitted from sacred Scripture.

I answer. First, by denying the major; for from the first proof of this Conclusion it stands that the holy Apostle sufficiently designated a natural love of God, when he said the Gentiles were inexcusable because they had known God naturally, yet had not worshipped Him by adoring and loving. I answer secondly, by distinguishing the major: sacred Scripture makes no mention of that natural love of God explicitly, and expressly, I concede; implicitly, and virtually, I deny. Add that the end and principal scope of sacred Scripture is to commend to men the supernatural love of God, for the reason that He alone is worthy of God, and He alone leads to His possession and fruition, whence it makes express mention of that supernatural love alone.

You will object. 2. Various testimonies of St. Augustine, whereby he seems to establish five principal points: The first indeed is, that the love of benevolence toward God be pure and chaste, whereby God is loved gratuitously and without hope of any gain: but that love is impossible by the forces of nature alone, because for it St. Augustine desires the spirit of grace, as stands evident from the Commentary on Psalm 118, Sermon 3, and book 5 Against Julian, chapter 3. God Himself, he says, is present both by illuminating the mind, and by overcoming concupiscence, and by terrifying molestation; for all this is rightly done when it is done on account of Himself, that is, when He Himself is loved gratuitously; which love cannot be in us except from Himself. — The second is, because he who loves God loves truth and rectitude: for God is the rectitude and truth of every virtue, according to St. Augustine book 2 On Free Choice, chapter 10: but moral truth and rectitude cannot be loved without the spirit of grace, as the same teaches in many places, especially in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 2: When men do this as it ought to be done, that is, with dilection and delectation of justice, let them rejoice to have received the sweetness which the Lord gave. — The third is, that whatever is not done out of fear of punishment is done out of the love of justice and truth, which love is charity from God, as the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 14 teaches, where after he has said that the Holy Spirit is necessary to man, whereby there may be made in his soul the delectation and dilection of that supreme and unchangeable good, which God is, from whom he has it that he may be, he subjoins: For neither does free will avail anything except unto sinning if the way of truth lie hid; and even when that which is to be done, and whither we must strive, appears not hidden, unless it also delight and be loved, it is not done, it is not undertaken, it is not lived well. Afterwards he shows this love to be charity, which is from God: But that it may be loved, he says, the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, not through free will, which arises from us, but through the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. — The fourth is, that according to his doctrine every will is either good or evil: and every good will is from grace. Thus he teaches book 2 On the Merits of Sins, chapter 18: If then, he says, the will is either good or evil, and assuredly we have not an evil one from God, it remains that we have a good will from God. — The fifth, because one of the capital controversies between Pelagius and the Catholic Church was whether God can be loved above all things by the forces of nature alone; which indeed St. Augustine denied in the book On Grace and Free Will, chapter 18: Whence, he says, is in men the charity of God, and of neighbor, except from God Himself? for if it is not from God but from men, the Pelagians have conquered; but if from God, we conquer the Pelagians: therefore from St. Augustine there is no natural love of God.

I deny the consequence. And to all those foregoing passages I say that St. Augustine intends nothing else than that every love of God conducing to salvation can be had only with God conferring and inspiring it, for there he treats only of salutary love, as is to be gathered, partly because concerning the other acts of virtue, for which he desires assisting grace, he always disputed against the Pelagians in that acceptation; for they attributed acts of virtue to the forces of nature alone in no other sense than as salutary and meritorious of eternal life: therefore much more, speaking of divine love of benevolence, which is the most perfect of all, he must be judged to speak only of salutary love; partly because the Pelagians acknowledged no love of God that was not salutary and meritorious, however elicited by the forces of nature alone; but they professed even every natural love to be salutary, therefore the whole scope of Augustine was to establish the necessity of grace for every salutary and meritorious act; finally because St. Augustine speaks only of that love which sacred Scripture commends; but that is supernatural, as leading to the possession of God: whence the same Augustine, interpreter of himself, in book 1 Against Julian, chapter 3, says: the love whereby one arrives at God is only from God the Father, through Jesus Christ with the Holy Spirit.

You will urge. St. Augustine continually reciprocates infused charity and the love of God, defining charity solely by the love of God, as stands evident from Sermons 13 and 15 On the Words of the Apostle; but charity is supernatural love: therefore St. Augustine acknowledged no other. — I answer, that St. Augustine therefore defines charity by the love of God because evidently since he was disputing only of salutary love, he did not distinguish the love of God into natural and supernatural; but commended only the supernatural, which truly is not distinguished from charity, and accordingly they can deservedly be defined through one another.

You will object. 3. If the goodness of God could be loved with natural and supernatural love, then also the truth revealing God could be believed with natural and supernatural faith, since the account of each is parallel: but the truth of God revealing cannot be believed with natural faith: therefore neither can goodness be loved with natural love. — I deny the minor; for to the first revealing truth we can assent not only with supernatural assent, but also with natural; and heretics in fact thus assent to the mysteries of faith not controverted by them, which they believe; for they do not have the supernatural habit of faith, as we said in the treatise On Faith.

You will object. 4. If a natural love of God were possible, that love could be had without habitual justifying grace; since such grace is not the elicitive principle of natural love: but the consequent is false, because if there can be a natural love of benevolence of man toward God, then also a sinner remaining in sin could become the friend of God; but this is absurd; for God does not love sinners, but hates them. — I distinguish the minor: that man remaining in sin would be the friend of God in a certain respect, and imperfectly, insofar namely as God would love some natural good inasmuch as He is the author of nature, I concede: perfectly, and absolutely, so that God should will him His fruition and possession, I deny. ⟦Adde: num⟧ it be absurd for man to love God with a natural love, sufficient for a love of friendship with God, without man being loved back by God with the same love of friendship on account of the stain and foulness of sin; for not rarely among men it happens that he who gravely offends another loves the offended with a love of friendship, though the offended is unwilling to love him in return.

You will object 5. No love of friendship can exist between God and man, as Aristotle teaches 8 Ethics: but every love of benevolence is a love of friendship: therefore no love of benevolence can exist between God and men. — I answer first, by distinguishing the major: no love of friendship can exist between God and men if friendship be taken strictly, for mutual and manifest benevolence, and between equals, I concede: if it be taken in the broader signification for the love whereby one wishes well to another for his own sake, I deny. Indeed we can will to God all goods that are internal and natural to Him by complacency, and likewise desire for Him external goods, such as glory, praise, and worship. I answer secondly, that the minor can be denied: for although benevolence and friendship are sometimes used interchangeably for one and the same thing, still this distinction intervenes between them, that friendship includes a certain union of affection toward the beloved thing; whence the lover tends toward the beloved as toward something of himself and pertaining to himself, or as another self: hence that trite saying, A friend is another self; but benevolence says only a simple affection toward another, whereby we wish him some good: which certainly can happen even though between us and him there intervene no true love whereby we love him in himself; thus e.g., while we behold an actor better executing his part, we wish him a larger reward; although nevertheless we love him in himself with no true love; nay, we even hold the infamous man in contempt.

You will object 6. Nature inclines only toward the good suitable to itself, and proper to each thing, as Aristotle teaches in the place praised above: but the love we would have toward God would not be about our own proper good, but common: therefore that love is not natural to man. — I distinguish the major: nature inclines toward the good proper to each thing in this sense, that nothing be loved unless it be in some way conjoined to us and pertaining to us, I concede: as though it were particular to us and ought only to redound to our own use, I deny: for mothers pursue their sons with honest dilection even if they hope for or expect no utility from them.

You will object finally: If there could be a natural love of benevolence of man toward God, a sinner remaining in sin could be the friend of God: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. — I distinguish the major: he could be the friend of God in a certain respect, and imperfectly, inasmuch as God would love in him a certain natural good, I concede: the friend of God perfectly, and so that God wills him supernatural good, I deny: for no one has this perfect friendship of God except the just and holy.

Second Conclusion. — MAN CAN LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS BY NATURAL FORCES; NOT INDEED WITH EFFECTIVE AND EFFECTUOUS LOVE PERFECTLY AND ON EVERY OCCASION WHATEVER: BUT AFFECTIVELY, AND FOR SOME BRIEF INTERVAL OF TIME FREE FROM EVERY MOTION OF GRAVE PERTURBATIONS.

The first part is proved from the Doctor in 3. dist. 27. n. 13. First indeed, natural reason dictates that among lovable things there be one supremely lovable: and consequently lovable more than all others: but the same reason dictates that supremely lovable thing to be God: therefore the same reason dictates God to be loved above all things: but the will can naturally, and without any supernatural habit, love above all things that which by natural reason is proposed as supremely lovable: therefore the will can naturally love God above all things. The major of the argument stands: For since among lovable objects there is a certain order and degree of perfection, such that one be judged more perfectly lovable than another, lest there be a progress into infinity, some supremely lovable thing containing in itself all lovableness and perfection must be admitted. The minor also is evident; namely that that object which natural reason demonstrates to be supremely lovable is God: because otherwise it would follow that charity inclines toward supremely loving that which natural reason dictates is not to be supremely loved. But the subsumption is proved: if the will could not love whatever is proposed by the intellect as to be loved, in the manner wherein it is exhibited as to be loved, it would follow that it would not have liberty for forming that dilection, and consequently that it would not be evil if it naturally loved something else more than God: for sin would not be imputed to it for loving itself more than God, if it could not love God more than itself by the forces of nature.

It is proved secondly: If one could not love God above all things without an infused habit, it would follow that someone, where he experienced that he loved God more than other things, could detect that he had the habit of infused charity, and consequently that he was in the state of grace: but this openly militates against sacred Scripture, signifying in many places that no one knows whether he is worthy of himself; and therefore it is necessary that by natural dilection, and without any infused habit, the created will can love God above all things.

It is proved thirdly: Because according to the Philosopher 9 Ethics, chapter 9, the brave citizen ought to expose himself to death for the safety of the republic of which he is a member; and consequently ought to love the commonwealth more than himself; but right reason dictates no more that one ought to expose himself to death for the safety of the Republic, or that he ought to love it more than himself, than that he ought to expose himself to the peril of death for God, and love Him more than himself; therefore natural reason dictates God to be loved more than oneself. The sequence is evident: for neither will certain reason be able to dictate to the will that something be done which the will itself cannot do. The major also stands: for right reason persuades that a part ought to be exposed to peril for obtaining the safety of the whole, a member amputated for preserving the health of the other parts of the body: therefore it also stimulates the brave man that he steadfastly cast himself into death for preserving the republic, and safeguarding its peace and welfare.

It is proved fourthly: In two ways the help of grace can be feigned necessary for eliciting some act. First, as the physical principle of it; when the will does not have from itself intrinsically sufficient forces for such an act, but is disproportionate to it. Secondly, as the moral principle removing impediments: when indeed the will has sufficient natural forces from itself for that effect: yet as to the use, or exercise of the work, it cannot unfold them, as it were, because of impediments occurring, which, that they may be removed or overcome, it needs aid. But neither can here be said: partly because that act is in itself natural and does not exceed the internal faculty of free will; partly because in its use difficulties do not always occur which would require grace for overcoming them: as e.g., in the love of concupiscence, whereby God is loved as our good by the mode of simple complacency, or efficacious desire, or conditioned desire, without consideration of the difficulties that occur in the efficacious pursuit of that good; for this love has no difficulty requiring grace. And I say the same of the love of benevolence or friendship, whereby God is loved as good in Himself by reason of Himself, and also as supremely good, and excelling above all things: by complacencing ourselves in divine goods, and therefore willing His supreme excellence, and all goods internal and external expected confusedly, and abstracted from difficulties, and even somewhat willing to please Him in all things, with a certain weak and imperfect and tacitly limited will. With these inconveniences God can, as it were incidentally, be loved even somewhat above all things confusedly, without a naturally insuperable difficulty.

You will object 1. The will cannot efficaciously will by its natural forces that which it cannot perform by those same forces: but in effect the will cannot love God above all things, as author of nature, by proper forces in the state of fallen nature: therefore neither can it conceive by the forces of nature the purpose of loving God above all things. — I answer by denying the major: For as a certain king can efficaciously will, or have the efficacious purpose of gaining victory by himself, although he cannot truly obtain victory without the aid of his soldiers, or of some mightier Prince: so man can naturally will always to love God above all things according to affection, although he cannot in effect, without the grace of God, love God above all things, and prefer Him to all things on whatever occasions.

You will object 2. The most excellent act of human will cannot be done by its proper forces: but the dilection of God above all things is the most excellent act of the human will: therefore it cannot be done by its natural will. — I distinguish the minor: The dilection of God, as the author of grace and glory, is the most excellent act of the human will, I concede: as the author of nature, I deny: Or otherwise, it is the most excellent among natural acts, I concede: among all acts of the same will of whatever order they be, I deny.

You will insist: Most internal acts cannot be done without the dilection of God with grace: e.g., the act of a certain heroic fortitude, the love of enemies, etc.; therefore much less can the dilection of God be elicited without grace. — I distinguish the antecedent: Those acts cannot be done on account of the difficulties annexed to them, I concede: on account of the reason of the object, I deny: for the difficulties arising extrinsically removed, it is more natural, and accordingly easier, to love God than all other things; because the more a thing has of truth, if it pertain to us in any way, toward that the will tends with natural and greater impetus.

You will object 3. If one could love God by the forces of nature, then by the same virtue one could observe all His commandments: since observance of the commandments is an argument of dilection: but no one can observe all the divine precepts by the forces of nature: therefore neither thus to love God. — I distinguish the major: If he would love God above all things with love both affective and effective, constantly, perfectly, and on every occasion given, I concede: if only he loves God with affective love, and likewise effective love only imperfect, I deny: but God cannot be loved effectively, constantly, on whatever occasions, by the forces of nature, as the Second part of the Conclusion will prove: For that God be loved constantly and efficaciously, it is required that against every impediments and whatever difficulties that love be firmly held; so that the will be prepared absolutely and efficaciously, as far as lies in itself, to please God in all things, and avoid everything displeasing to Him: but such love cannot be had by the forces of nature: for as man in the state of corrupted nature has a moral impotence for long keeping the divine commandments, and temptations supernaturally to be avoided: so also for loving God efficaciously and constantly, and even with so perfect an affection that by the force of that affection he adheres to Him above all things; for so great perfection exceeds the fragility of corrupted nature and its propension toward sensible goods, from which it cannot recall its affection without the aid of grace. Therefore that effective love above all things must conquer all mortal sins, either in effect, if they occur while it is actual: or in affection, because it includes a purpose efficacious of itself for avoiding everything contrary to such love: but it is impossible for fallen man to conquer all sins, even those adverse to the natural law, without special assistance of grace: therefore it is also impossible that he have the dilection of God victorious over all such sins through that efficacious purpose of avoiding them.

Third Conclusion. — GOD CANNOT BE LOVED AS THE AUTHOR OF GRACE AND GLORY, WITH A PERFECT OR IMPERFECT BENEVOLENCE, WITHOUT A SPECIAL BENEFIT OF GRACE. This truth is evident sufficiently from what we have said,

And it is proved by all those texts of Scripture whereby the perfect love of God is reckoned a divine benefit. Thus Romans 5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. Ephesians 6: Peace to the Brethren, and charity with faith, from God the Father. 1 John 4: Charity is of God. Weighing which texts St. Augustine in the book On Grace, and Free Will, chapter 19, says: Great are these things, but they say all are from God, he says, the Father, and Lord Jesus Christ: Therefore these great goods are gifts of God.

It is proved likewise from the Councils, especially however the Milevitan decreeing Canon 1: When the Apostle says: Knowledge puffeth up, charity edifieth. it is most impious that we should believe that we have the grace of Christ unto that which puffeth us up, and not unto that which buildeth up, since each is a gift of God, both to know what we ought to do, and to love that we may do it. Similarly the Tridentine Council Session 6, Canon 3, thus decrees: if anyone shall say that without the preventing inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and His aid, man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification be conferred upon him, let him be anathema.

Reason also lends support. For since the love of God, as the author of grace, has for formal object the supernatural order, it is necessary that the love itself be of the same order; for acts are specified by the formal objects toward which they tend. Furthermore, the aforesaid love is the effect of perfect piety, for God is worshipped chiefly by love, as St. Augustine teaches Epistle 29. Piety, he says, is the worship of God, which is exhibited chiefly by loving. But the act of piety cannot be perfectly done without grace: therefore etc. Finally, the love of God above all things as the author of grace is the ultimate disposition unto justification, as we shall prove within: but it is heretical to assert that man can by his own forces dispose himself proximately unto justification, as St. Augustine teaches in book 1 to Boniface, last chapter: therefore with equal reason it is heretical to say that God, the giver of grace, can be loved above all things by fallen man by the virtue of free will alone. Which truth certainly we shall explain more fully and confirm more efficaciously in the disputation concerning divine charity.