Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. Concerning the resolution of the present Question, a most serious controversy once arose between St. Augustine and Julian, as is clear from chapter 3 of book 1 which that holy Doctor wrote against the same Julian. For Julian contended three things: first indeed that in infidels there had been true virtues by which they were rightly judged to live. This St. Augustine denied. For you are accustomed (says St. Augustine at the beginning of the chapter), denying the grace of God, to deny the virtues by which one lives rightly, and attributing them to nature and to human endowment, not to the grace of God, to use this as an argument — namely that infidels sometimes have them — so as to attempt to evacuate what we say, that no one lives rightly except by faith through Jesus Christ. Secondly, Julian wished the acts of those natural virtues to suffice for justifying infidels. That this is certainly false St. Augustine demonstrates there with several arguments; but especially with the argument ad hominem: for elsewhere Julian had taught that indeed the beginning of justice is in man, but its consummation from God: yet speaking of the works of infidels, departing from his own opinion, he attributes to man not only the affection of virtue but also its effect. While saying these things, says St. Augustine, behold, you have now even taken away that which you had attributed to the grace of God: namely the very effect of the will: for you did not say that they willed to be merciful, modest, chaste and sober, and were not such because they had not yet attained through grace the effect of this good will; but rather that if they willed to be such and are such, then in them both the will and the effect abound with virtues. Whence he concludes: Of course, far be it that true virtue be in anyone unless he be just: but far be it that anyone be just unless he live by faith, for the just man lives by faith. Moreover, who among those who wish to be regarded as Christians, except the Pelagians alone, or perhaps you yourself alone among them, would call an infidel just, call an impious man just, call one enslaved to the devil just? Finally, thirdly, Julian wished that to be true virtue from which any work whatsoever proceeds, whether meanwhile the end be vicious or honest: yet with this distinction, that where the end was honest, and the virtue tended toward eternal things, then the work was fruitful and meritorious; but where it looked to temporal things, and the end was vicious, then the work was sterile and useless unto salvation. That absurd opinion you thus carp at, St. Augustine: Therefore those virtues, so base and deformed by such an end, and therefore in no way true virtues, nevertheless seem so true and beautiful that, he says, they can sustain neither the loss of their name nor of their kind, but are frustrated only by the paltriness of the reward which they coveted, that is, by the fruit of earthly commodities, not of heavenly promises, etc.: from which it is clear that St. Augustine denies true virtues in infidels no otherwise than Julian was asserting them, namely that they suffice for the justification and beatitude of man.

Note 2. From the same St. Augustine in the same place, that true virtue, or a good moral work, can be called good in two ways, namely either by reason of duty or by reason of end. Duty, he says, is that which must be done: but the end is that for the sake of which it must be done. Whence a work is called good by reason of duty when it is good from its object; thus to give alms to a poor man is good by reason of duty; but to bestow it on account of God, or Christ morally existing in the poor man, is good not only by reason of duty but also by reason of end. Moreover the same holy Doctor observes there that for a work to be simply good, it does not suffice that it be such by reason of duty; but it is also required that it be such by reason of end: for if it be good only by reason of duty, it will truly be evil because of the discovered circumstance of an evil end; whence addressing Julian he says: Virtues ought to be discerned not by duties, but by ends... Whatever good is done by man, which true wisdom commands ought to be done, although it be judged good by reason of duty, yet by the very fact that the end is not right it is sin. Therefore some good things can be done by those not doing well, by whom they are done: for it is good that help be given to a man in peril, especially an innocent one: but he who does this, if he does it for worldly glory, for men more than for God, does not do well, nay he does not do a good thing, because he does it with a will that is not good. Which saying certainly accords with that common maxim of the Philosophers, good from an integral cause, evil from the least defect.

Note 3. Concerning the present Question there exists the greatest controversy: for all agree that some good work can be done without faith by reason of duty alone; but they dissent concerning a good work by reason of both duty and end together. Now the negative part is defended not only by Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Peter Martyr, and many other heretics; but also by some among Catholics, such as Gregory of Rimini on book 2, distinction 28, Capreolus in the same place, Marsilius on book 3, question 20, to whom certain more recent authors subscribe, asserting that the virtues of the Gentile philosophers are vices, and that the mere absence of faith suffices for all the works of infidels to be true sins. But since this Question has an affinity with that in which it is asked whether man in the state of fallen nature can produce some good moral work by his own powers and without the aid of actual grace, therefore I shall untangle both at once.

Single Conclusion. — The grace of faith is not so necessary for acting rightly that without it no good moral work could be done, and consequently all the works of infidels are not to be judged absolutely sins. This is the more common and safer assertion among Catholic Doctors. That its proofs may be made more evident and appear more efficacious, for the sake of clarity I choose to set them forth under diverse headings, together with the responses of the Adversaries, and weigh them.

It is proved first. — From Sacred Scripture. — Divine Scripture often exhorts sinners, even infidels, to fasting, prayer, and almsgiving: therefore it supposes those works can be rightly done by them. This is evident from what follows, for it would be impious to assert that Scripture exhorts them to some wicked work. The antecedent is proved from Daniel 4, where the Prophet addressing King Nabuchodonosor says: Let my counsel please thee, and redeem thou thy sins with alms: but sins are not redeemed by wicked works and other sins: therefore the alms of the King, though an infidel, were not sins; nay they could have been pleasing to God, and apt for obtaining His mercy and averting the imminent vengeance. — Likewise Ezechiel 29: Nabuchodonosor is said to be about to receive a reward for the service by which he served God in the assault upon Tyre. Therefore I, says God, will give Nabuchodonosor king of Babylon the land of Egypt: and he shall take her multitude, and spoil her booty, and rifle her spoils: and it shall be wages for his army, and for the service wherewith he served against her, for I have given him the land of Egypt because he hath laboured for me, saith the Lord God. From which one may argue: God remunerates no sins with wages: but some works of infidels are remunerated with wages, as is clear from the foregoing text, and also from others: for God repaid the benefit bestowed upon the Israelites by the Egyptian midwives by building them houses, because they feared God, as we read Exodus 21: and the kindness shown by Rahab to the spies of the Israelites was compensated by Josue, without doubt according to the will of God: therefore some works of infidels are not sins. And therefore deservedly St. Jerome reasons thus on chapter 29 of Ezechiel, verse 18: And from the fact, he says, that Nabuchodonosor receives the reward of a good work, we understand that even the Ethnic nations, if they have done anything good, are not passed over without reward by the judgment of God.

The Adversaries respond, that those infidels received the reward on account of works that were good indeed by reason of duty, but not by reason of end, and consequently it is not to be inferred from this that those works were not sinful. — On the contrary, the same force of argument always recurs and presses, namely that it is not credible that God praised and rewarded them for their sins: but if works of this kind were good only by reason of duty, yet evil from a perverse end, it would follow that they were praised and rewarded by God for their sins.

They urge: From chapter 1 of Exodus, the Egyptian midwives, who contrary to the command of the King preserved the male infants of the Hebrews, receive a reward on account of a lie, for they said to the King: The Hebrew women are not as the Egyptian women: for they themselves have the knowledge of midwifery, and before we come to them they give birth: which is certainly false, and yet it is added: God dealt well with the midwives. Therefore God can bestow some temporal reward upon a sinful action which has a certain species of virtue by reason of duty. — I deny the consequence: for a twofold action must be distinguished in those Egyptian midwives, one by which out of compassion and a sense of humanity, and fear of God, they saved the Hebrew children: another by which they lied to the King cruelly commanding: the former was good not only from the object but also from the end. For it is said there, verse 17, But the midwives feared God, and did not do according to the precept of the king of Egypt, but preserved the males. But the latter action, namely the lie, was intrinsically evil. Now God praised and rewarded the former action, but not the latter; whence it is written there, verse 21: Because the midwives feared God, he built them houses.

They respond secondly, that those works of infidels were from actual and supernatural grace, and therefore were good, and praised by God. — On the contrary, this is feigned gratuitously and without foundation, since there is sufficient proportion between the natural powers of man and the works of the natural order; especially when there is propensity and natural inclination toward such things; nor are there any impediments except slight ones, which can easily be overcome. Add that if this response availed, faith would no longer be the first grace, as the adversaries wish: forasmuch as the Gentiles, in whom there was no faith, would have had grace for eliciting good works of this kind.

Moreover it is proved from the Apostle to the Romans 2, verse 14, where the Apostle says that the Gentiles, who have not the law, do naturally the things that are of the law, that is, that by natural instinct and guidance they do certain things contained in the written law, and necessary by the force of the law of nature itself, and sufficiently known by the light of reason; for they prefer this sense, as Paul's words sound, especially joined with what follows: Who are a law to themselves, showing the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, etc. Which interpretation and exposition is proved from the Fathers: for Origen, book 2 on the Epistle to the Romans, has thus: But also the Greek, that is the gentile, who although he have not the law, is himself a law to himself, showing the work of the law in his heart, and acts by natural reason, as we see some among the nations hold justice, or chastity, or prudence, and keep temperance: this man, although he seem alien from eternal life because he believes not in Christ, and cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven because he has not been reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, seems, by those things which are said by the Apostle, to be able by no means wholly to lose the glory and honour and peace of good works. And from Tertullian, book On the Crown of the Soldier, chapter 6, where he thus says: The Apostle writing to the Romans, that the nations do by nature the things that are of the law, suggests both the natural law and legal nature. And Jerome in the place cited above: It is clear, he says, that we are despised in comparison with the Gentiles, if they by the natural law do what we neglect even though written, concerning which the Apostle Paul disputes most fully to the Romans.

The adversaries respond, that St. Augustine in book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapters 27 and 28, interprets the aforementioned text of the Apostle of those Gentiles which from the natural wild olive had been grafted into the good olive: that is, which had been transferred from gentility to the faith of Christ. Since they are disciples of that man, namely St. Prosper against the Collator chapter 22, and St. Fulgentius book On the Grace of Christ, chapters 25 and 26, therefore the exposition favouring our assertion cannot stand. — I deny the consequence: because texts of this kind can bear several Catholic senses, even literal ones, as the Theologians teach in the preliminaries of Theology: therefore St. Augustine himself, who reports the interpretation of the aforesaid Fathers in the same book chapter 27, does not disapprove it; nay he seems to approve it: for he says:

But if these, who do naturally the things that are of the law, are not to be reckoned among those whom the grace of Christ justifies, but rather among those, even of the impious, who most certainly worship not the true God justly, yet certain deeds of theirs, which we either read, or know, or hear of, we cannot according to the rule of justice not merely censure, but we also deservedly and rightly praise: although if they are examined with regard to the end for which they are done, they fall short of that which merits the due praise and defence of justice.

Therefore St. Augustine judges that even the nations persisting in unbelief sometimes elicit certain good works, which according to the rule of justice cannot be censured, nay which deservedly are praised.

They urge: St. Fulgentius book On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ, chapter 25, says that those contradict the grace of God who assign the aforesaid text of the Apostle to unbelieving Gentiles: therefore the Apostle speaks only of Gentiles converted to the faith. — I distinguish the antecedent: St. Fulgentius thinks those contradict grace who assign this passage of the Apostle to unbelieving Gentiles, according to the sense of the Pelagians, who used this passage of the Apostle both to show that by the powers of nature the nations could fulfil the whole law, and to prove that the nations could be justified without faith in Christ — I concede; according to the sense of the orthodox Fathers using that passage, so as to persuade that some morally good works could exist in infidels — I deny. For the same St. Fulgentius in the following chapter of the same book says: Those men of whom mention is made by the Apostle can indeed do certain good works which pertain to the equity of human society: but because they are not done in the charity of God, they cannot profit unto salvation, namely and eternal life. — To these add that this 21st proposition of Baius has been condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs: They think with the Pelagians who interpret the text of the Apostle to the Romans 2, Those who have not the law do naturally the things that are of the law: as speaking of the Gentiles not having the grace of faith. — This same assertion of ours can also be confirmed by those words of Christ in which He supposes some good moral work can be done by ethnic nations and infidels, for instance when He says Matthew 5: If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this? and if you salute your brethren only, what more do you? do not even the Ethnic nations this? where Christ speaks of love and salutation morally good; for no one is so foolish as to hope for reward from God for an evil thing: and Luke 11: If you then being evil know how to give good gifts to your children, namely from a good affection; for otherwise it would be no wonder that an evil gift should proceed from evil men.

It is proved secondly. — From the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs. — For Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Urban VIII in the Bull published against Michael Baius condemn this proposition number 25: All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of the philosophers are vices.

The adversaries respond, that that proposition was not condemned in the sense in which it is asserted; since five other senses of the aforesaid proposition can be discovered, on account of which it deservedly ought to have been condemned: The first is, that Baius would say all works of infidels are sins, even those with which reason does not consent, and which man suffers unwillingly, such are all the motions of first-first concupiscence. The second is, that he would assert all works of infidels to be sins, even of those who have not distinct and explicit faith in Christ, however much they may have some faith in God, and consequently implicit faith concerning Christ. The third is, that according to the mind of Baius all works of infidels not having faith perfectly formed by charity are sins. The fourth is, that all works of infidels who have not the infused habit of theological faith are sins. The fifth is, that in the opinion of Baius all works of infidels are sins not only by reason of end but also by reason of object and duty. Therefore that proposition 25 was not condemned because it asserted all works of infidels to be sins on account of the absence of faith, from whose defect it comes about that those works are always done with evil intention and from the perverse end of the one acting. — On the contrary: although the aforesaid proposition could deservedly have been condemned according to the five senses proposed, yet this does not prevent its having been condemned also in the sense we intend. First, because it is established that that proposition of Baius, put forward by him universally and without any explanation, was condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs also generally, and without any explanation or limitation, and consequently in the sense intended by us. Secondly, because it is certain that the aforesaid proposition was asserted by Baius in the sense intended by us. Thirdly, because that sense which we intend is the natural and genuine sense of the aforesaid proposition. But the others, although they can perhaps be accommodated to it, are nevertheless less natural. Now it is certain that when any proposition is condemned, it must always be expounded in the more natural and genuine sense: therefore, etc.

It is proved thirdly. — From the holy Fathers. — In the first place St. Clement appears, book 1 of the Apostolic Constitutions, chapter 31, where he says: Abraham our progenitor taking up the way of truth from the very faculty of nature, when Thou didst appear to him, Thou didst lead him forth as a Leader: and when Thou hadst given him to understand what this world at last was, knowledge went before unto his faith, and faith followed upon knowledge, and upon faith the covenant. Therefore Abraham took up the way of truth from the very faculty of nature, and before supernatural faith infused by God through nature's Author, and despised the world: he therefore wrought good by his own powers of nature before receiving the gift of supernatural faith. — Irenaeus book 1 against heresies chapter 72: All men are of the same nature, able to retain and work good, and again able to lose it and not do it. By which words he affirms that in man's nature there is a power of working good, and therefore he pronounces it common to all men, even infidels; which power he certainly confirms throughout as natural to man: but the adversaries do not concede grace to be common to individual men: consequently also in their opinion Irenaeus does not speak of a power of doing good proceeding from grace, inasmuch as he pronounces it common to men. — Tertullian in the book against the Jews: Before the law of Moses written on stone Tablets, he says, I contend there was an unwritten law, which was understood naturally and kept by the Fathers. For whence was Noe found just, unless natural justice of the law preceded him? And so before the written law, as the natural law was understood by all by their alone inborn light, so it was kept by the Fathers with a natural affection, which made natural justice. — Athanasius in the Oration against Idols: The mind occupies its own liberties, he says, and abuses itself toward those pleasures which it has contrived, because it is free and of its own arbitrium: for it can incline itself toward good, and likewise resist goods: therefore to the human mind, under the title ⟦illegible⟧ There are among us, he says, the very virtues according to nature: for having these seems to be inherent in the soul by an affinity, not from human doctrine but from nature herself.* — Nazianzen in Oration 19 in praise of his deceased Father commends him excellently because before faith he had most excellently pursued moral natural virtues, prudence, temperance, from the instruction of nature alone: but especially justice so incorrupt that although, he says, he was engaged in great offices and administrations of the Republic, he did not increase his means by a single farthing. Which he had premised also of many others removed from the illumination of faith: As, he says, many of our own are not with us, whom of course a scandalous life separated from the common body: so on the contrary many of the rest stand among ours, because they evidently prefer faith in conduct, and while caring to be Christians in name alone, possess the thing itself, among whom my own father also was: alien indeed, but otherwise inclining toward us by the honesty of his morals. He therefore admits true virtues in infidels. — Nyssenus in the book On the Fifth Beatitude says: He who made man according to His image laid up in his nature the materials and supports of all goods, so that nothing good and honest should thrust itself into us from without and insinuate itself, but it should be within our power to have what we will, drawing forth the whole good from nature out of that certain store: he therefore concedes that the faculty of every virtue and honesty is implanted in nature itself, so that we draw forth good from nature herself as from our own storehouse. — Jerome explaining that text to the Galatians 1, That He might reveal His Son in me, says: Let it be clear that the knowledge of God is in all by nature, and that they have in themselves the seeds of justice and of the other virtues: whence many without the faith and Gospel of Christ have been either wise or holy, so as to obey their parents. Thence concerning those infidels he gathers: Thou art damned by a greater judgment, that having in thyself the principles of virtues and the seeds of God thou believest not in Him without whom thou canst not be. But if the powers of nature availed only unto sinning, how would it be clear that the seeds of justice and of all virtues are in all by nature? How would infidels having the seeds of virtues be guiltless by not producing their fruits, if they had not the powers for it? — Chrysostom Homily 22 on 1 Corinthians: Whoever wishes to become good, he says, nothing impedes him, even though he was previously among the worst of men: and that happens to us even more opportunely, that virtue is according to nature for us, malice beyond nature, not otherwise than good and adverse health. But how is virtue according to nature if it is not natural? how is malice beyond nature if its inclination and faculty avail only unto sinning? how finally is nothing an impediment to the worst men and infidels that they become good, if grace is wanting to them, nor are the powers of nature present that they attain goodness? — Damascene book 3 On the Faith, chapter 14: Natural are the virtues, he says, and naturally, and without labour, are they present in all, although we do not all equally exercise those things that are of nature: for from the fact that we have fallen from what is according to nature into what is beyond nature by transgression. By which he plainly confesses that there is inherent in us a natural faculty for pursuing and attaining virtues. Therefore the sentence of the holy Fathers is concordant, and there are in us natural powers for moral good, nor are they in infidels so worn away and scattered that they cannot break out into act and fruit.

It is proved fourthly. — From St. Augustine and his Disciples. — Countless things can be gathered from St. Augustine to demonstrate that God has granted men so much a natural faculty for pursuing good and taking up moral virtues that they flourish even in infidels; but from these I bring forward the choicer ones. First indeed book 3 On Free Choice, chapter 23, has thus: Advancement in the best studies, and piety, for which the capacity has not been denied him, if he neglect it of his own will, justly precipitates him into a graver ignorance than exists in others, and difficulty. Now that the capacity granted to nature for advancing in the best studies is natural he demonstrates there for this reason: For that which she knows not naturally, and cannot naturally, to this she did not devote the facility of the soul for comparing itself toward doing rightly. He judges therefore that neglected study of virtue cannot be imputed as guilt to the soul, if she cannot naturally pursue it either with knowledge or with love, yet has a natural capacity, which indeed he proves by this example: For to speak, or to know, or not to be able, is natural to the infant, which difficulty and ignorance of speech is not only blameless, but also pleasing and welcome to human affections. Therefore since the desertion of virtue is not blameless in man, it follows that he has a natural potency for pursuing it. Hence so often against the Manichaeans he demonstrates nature to be good, from this, that vices are against nature. The vices themselves too, he says, book 1 Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, chapter 5, bear testimony to the goodness of nature, for because evil is through vice, surely good is through nature: for vice is against nature, because nature harms, nor would it harm unless it diminished its own good: therefore evil is nothing but privation of good: but the goods from which vices deprive souls are the moral perfections of virtues: therefore virtues are natural. He has similar things in the Enchiridion chapter 11, and book 1 against Julian chapter 8, and the book On Two Souls, chapter 14. — More openly he declares this truth in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 27, where treating of the works of infidels he has thus:

But if those who do naturally the things that are of the law are not yet to be reckoned in the number of those whom the grace of Christ justifies, but rather in that of those, even of the impious, who worship not the true God most certainly and justly, yet certain deeds of theirs, which we either read, or know, or hear of, we cannot according to the rule of justice not merely censure, but we also deserve to praise rightly. Although if it be examined with what end they are done, none will be found who merit the due justice and defence.

In which place the particle or evidently proves that in the mind of the holy Doctor, although rarely, yet sometimes infidels can do good works, both by duty and by end. Wherefore in chapter 28 he adds: Not so utterly has the image of God been worn away in the soul of man by the stain of earthly affections that there have remained in it no last lineaments as it were, whence it can deservedly be said that even in impiety itself it can do some things of law and nature. Wherefore again in the same chapter he says: So just as certain venial sins do not impede eternal life, without which this life is not led, so certain good works profit the impious nothing unto eternal salvation, without which most difficultly is the life of any man passed, even the worst. — To these especially gives support that which he has in Epistle 150, where he says:

You recall Polemo, as you write, and we too from his letters remember that disputing concerning the fruit of temperance he converted suddenly to other manners one not only drunken but drunk at the time. Since therefore he, as you have wisely and truthfully understood, was not acquired to God, but only freed from the dominion of luxury: yet lest we should attribute to human operation that same thing which was made better in him, rather to divine. For of the body itself, which is for our sake, whatever goods there are, as beauty, and strength, and health, and if anything of this kind, are only from God creator and perfecter of nature. How much more can none other bestow the gifts of the soul? For what can human memory conceive more proud or more ungrateful than if it thought God makes man beautiful in flesh, chaste in soul to be made by man? This in the book of Wisdom is thus written: When they knew, he says, that no one can be continent unless God give it. If therefore Polemo, having become continent from luxurious, knew so whose this gift was, and worshipped Him piously, casting aside the superstitions of the Gentiles, he would be not only continent, but also truly wise and wholesomely religious, which would avail him not only for the honesty of the present life but also for future immortality.

These things St. Augustine. From which testimony two things especially confirm our present assertion: The first, that St. Augustine calls the works of Polemo good not only materially and from object, but also formally and from end: both because he names them simply goods of the soul and gifts of God, such as are not works only materially good and intrinsically evil from end: then because they are referred to God, to whom formally evil works ought not to be referred: then because he says they avail for the honesty of life, to which those things which are done from a perverse end can contribute nothing at all: finally because he teaches that if Polemo were converted wholly to God and worshipped Him piously, they would avail for the immortality of future life, unto which only formally good works can profit. — The second is, that those works of Polemo were not supernatural and elicited by aid of grace, but natural, performed with the sole general concurrence of God: both because St. Augustine refers that continence of Polemo to God as Creator and perfecter of nature, unto whom strength, fortitude, and other gifts of the body are referred; but supernatural works, and conceived by aid of grace, are not referred to God as author of nature, but to the giver of grace Himself: then because certain Adversaries deny that aids of grace are conceded to those who are outside the faith, such as Polemo was.

The adversaries respond, that good things indeed are done by infidels by the sole powers of nature, but by reason of the object, not by reason of circumstances and end. — On the contrary, St. Augustine in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 27, concedes that good works are sometimes done by infidels even by reason of end, although this happens most rarely, and this was observed p. 92. Moreover works which are done with evil end cannot be called simply good; but those works which infidels sometimes exercise are said there c. 28 by St. Augustine to be simply good: For as, he says, certain venial sins do not impede eternal life, without which this life is not led: so certain good works profit the impious nothing unto eternal salvation, without which most difficultly is the life of anyone passed, even the worst. But this opposition of venial sins in the just, and good works in infidels, would not be sound, if these works by reason of perverse end, or defect of due end, were venial sins, or, which is worse, mortal. Nor would Augustine say rightly that they do not profit the impious unto eternal life; for if they were evil and true sins, they would not only not profit unto eternal life, but would even harm, as is clear: therefore he judges those works of infidels were not evil from the end of the one acting, but are absolutely morally good.

His most faithful disciples subscribe to the holiest Doctor, above all St. Fulgentius in the book On the Incarnation, chapter 25, where he teaches that before faith there are morally good works which do not merit eternal glory: Which also those do, he says, who receive not the grace of faith, keeping by a certain natural law those things which pertain to honesty of morals and society of life: he therefore admits in infidels morally good works pertaining to the society of life; which indeed he confirms c. 26, where speaking of those who without the grace of faith have known God, says: In them indeed some good things can be found, which pertain to the equity of human society: but because they are done without the charity of God, they cannot profit. — Holy Prosper sings in harmony with him in the book against the Collator, chapter 26, where he teaches that although infidels exercise many acts morally good, agreeable to laws and reason, yet because they are not supernatural, nor proceed from grace, therefore they cannot lead to true life: For of human nature, whose Creator God remains even after its prevarication, substance, form, life, senses, and reason, and the other goods of body and soul, which are not wanting even to the wicked and vicious; but theirs is not the true perception of good, which can honour mortal life but cannot confer eternal. The same he sang elegantly in Epigram 81.

Although many things remain in man after the first wound, Which make this life have the ornament of praise: Yet if there be wanting the fountain of faith To bright intellect and love of probity… The useless germ of all fruits withers.

It is proved fifthly. — By Theological Reason. — If an infidel could not elicit any morally good act, this would be required either from the side of the person, because he is an infidel, or from the condition of the object, or from the circumstance of end: but it is impeded by none of these. Certainly not by the first head, because infidelity is related to the operation only materially and concomitantly: for the infidel is not bound, nor necessitated, to act as an infidel. Nor indeed by the second head, for nothing forbids why an infidel cannot be borne toward a thing good from its object: for to honour parents, to give alms to the poor, and others of this kind are goods from the object and by reason of duty, which truly can be exercised by infidels, and the histories of the nations report them performed by very many of them. Finally not by the third: for man destitute of the knowledge of faith can exercise some good work by reason of duty, for instance to honour parents, to give alms: which work indeed will be ordered to God virtually and implicitly from its nature: since a good act per se, and from its nature, unless vitiated from evil end by the one acting, has an essential order to right reason: which right reason says an essential order to God, and the divine reason, of which it is a certain participation. For as the stone tends by its nature to the centre, unless it be violently detained; so every work good and honest from object and from its nature tends into God, as into the light of reason and the fount of all good and honest things, unless it be violently referred by man to a perverse end: but an infidel can elicit such an act, which not be referred to an evil end, for instance to give alms from an affection of mercy, but not from an affection of vain glory. — But that this implicit and virtual relation of the work to God as to its last end suffices for its honesty, thence appears, for otherwise if it did not suffice, it would follow that some good work exercised by a man even faithful and just would be sin, which is absurd. The sequence is declared; for it can happen that a faithful and just man thinking nothing of God gives alms to a poor man from the sole motive of relieving his misery; in which case, since he does not think of God, he will not be able to refer the alms formally and expressly to Him; and consequently he would sin against Him, if the implicit relation did not suffice.

You will say: Then that man faithful and just refers such alms habitually to God through the habit of charity with which he is endowed. — But truly on the contrary, a habit contributes nothing to the act unless it concurs toward operating it; otherwise he who has the habit of justice, if afterwards he sins through intemperance, would also sin with the sin of injustice on account of such a habit of justice which he contracted. — Secondly, human nature through sin is not totally corrupted: therefore there remains in it a certain power, albeit slight, with respect to the good connatural to it. The antecedent is clear by the authority of the Council of Trent Session 6, chapter 1, asserting Free arbitrium was by no means extinguished: though attenuated in its powers, and weakened. The consequent is from St. Augustine book On the Perfection of Justice, chapter 2, where to the question whether sin is natural or accidental he responds that it is not of nature, but an accident of nature especially vitiated: whence we were made by nature children of wrath, and the arbitrium of the will avails little unto not sinning unless helped and healed by the grace of God. Where he concedes that free arbitrium has indeed a power, albeit modest, for not sinning: which is certainly illustrated by the similitude of an infirm man, who of himself can have some motion, yet cannot perfectly be moved with the motion of a sound man unless he be healed by the aid and benefit of medicine. — Thirdly, the light of natural reason can direct the intention with respect to some connatural good: therefore the rational appetite of man can follow such guidance of reason, especially where no temptation, or at least only a light one, impedes. The antecedent can be confirmed by the authority of St. Prosper against the Collator chapter 22, where he says: Who doubts that these remnants of wisdom for the utility of temporal life, issued from nature by God, survive in the human race? For if even for ordering these earthly things the ingenuity of reason's soul did not prevail, nature would be not vitious but extinct. The consequence also is clear: for the appetite can tend toward the good proportioned to it if it holds cognition, and encounters no impediment. — I add from St. Bonaventure on book 2, dist. 28, art. 3, q. 3, where he declares and luminously proves this truth. For after he premised that some work can be called good threefold: first meritoriously with respect to eternal beatitude; 2. Dispositively, namely inasmuch as it disposes congruously toward obtaining the good of grace and glory; 3. Honestly, namely inasmuch as the act is orderable to an honest end: finally he concludes this good of the last mode can be done without any aid of grace.

Free arbitrium, he says, by the operation of God alone without any gift of grace, although difficultly, can go forth into some moral good; yet by it it is neither disposed to grace nor to glory, because it is not ordered into the last end but only orderable: but that good which leads to perfect good, whether by merit of congruity or by merit of condignity, cannot be done without the aid of God, as the authorities of the Saints expressly say. And that they ought to be understood in this manner, is plain. For if free arbitrium be left in its own naturals alone; there will still remain to it the judgment of reason, by which it knows parents are to be honoured: and it stands that if it have this natural judgment, by that by which it can know parents are to be honoured, by that it can think; and since it has a natural instinct, it can also will it: and since it has exterior organs subservient, it can fulfil it in act: but as it makes that judgment of right reason, without the gift of grace, it is not directed toward obtaining the end, which is God, and the reward of eternal beatitude, which it cannot know unless God reveal. And therefore the Saints say that it can neither think nor will nor do good without the help of divine grace, because they speak of good according as it is ordered unto a certain possession of beatitude.

The aforesaid reasons will be confirmed, and at the same time our assertion solidified, by the solution of all those things which the Adversaries object, whose arguments and foundations we shall distribute under certain fixed heads, and weigh severally.

FIRST CAPITAL ARGUMENT of the adversaries drawn from the weakness of free arbitrium, and the uselessness of the law for good unless the subsidy of grace shine forth. — Therefore they object: If infidels could operate anything good, especially by the powers of free arbitrium: yet they cannot; forsooth man's free arbitrium in the state of fallen nature is held captive under the bonds of earthly cupidities in such wise that, unless it be helped by divine grace, it is utterly weak and invalid for pursuing good: therefore by the powers of nature no morally good work can be done. The antecedent is proved: First indeed from those words of Christ the Lord, John 8, If the Son shall make you free, then shall you be free indeed: therefore without the liberating grace of Christ there can be no liberty unto good. Secondly, from the Council of Orange Canon 13, The arbitrium of the will weakened in the first man, unless through the grace of baptism, cannot be repaired: what is lost, unless from Him who could give it, cannot be restored. Thirdly from St. Augustine affirming this same in several places: most truly however book 2 to Boniface, chapter 5, where he says: We do not say that by the sin of Adam free arbitrium perished from the nature of men, but that it avails for sinning in men subjected to the devil; but avails not for living well and piously unless the will of man itself be liberated by the grace of God, and aided unto every good of action, speech, thought. — I distinguish the antecedent: free arbitrium in the state of fallen nature by no powers can attain supernatural, salutary, and beatific good — I concede: that it is utterly invalid and infirm toward natural, moral good, and pertaining to the honesty of human society — I deny. For we said above from the Council of Trent, and St. Augustine, that free arbitrium in men is not altogether extinct, although attenuated and weakened. I say therefore indeed that free arbitrium was extinguished by the sin of Adam with respect to the good pertaining unto salvation, unless it be freed from the bonds of cupidities with which it is ensnared and pressed by grace vegetating and liberating: whence St. Augustine, book 1 to Boniface: Which of us, he says, would say that by the sin of the first man free arbitrium perished from the human race? Liberty indeed perished through sin, but that which was in Paradise, of having full justice with immortality: on account of which human nature needs divine grace, the Lord saying: if the Son shall make you free, then shall you be free indeed. But with respect to natural goods, although free arbitrium be weak and wounded, it is nevertheless not on that account judged extinct, and utterly impotent for pursuing that good, as was proven above.

They insist: St. Augustine openly confesses that free arbitrium avails for nothing except sinning: for in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 4, he says: Nor does free arbitrium avail for anything except sinning, if the way of truth lie hidden: therefore every work of free arbitrium left to itself is sin. — I distinguish: that it avails nothing whatsoever except sinning, that it avails little for pursuing good by its own powers — I concede: that it avails nothing at all — I deny: for the same St. Augustine in the same book, chapter 27, acknowledges that free arbitrium in infidels can operate some good. — Otherwise I distinguish: that free arbitrium avails nothing whatsoever except sinning insofar as sin is called everything which does not conduce to obtaining eternal life — I concede: that it is opposed to the dictate of right reason — I deny. That this is the mind of St. Augustine is clear in the same place, for he adds: Even that which must be done, and toward which we must strive ⟦running head stripped: AN INFIDELIUM OPERA SINT PECCATA⟧

…⟦illegible: est cupriit non latore⟧, unless it also delight and be loved, it is not done, not undertaken. ⟦illegible: mm brne riritur⟧: but that it be loved, the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, not through free arbitrium, which arises from us, but through the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.

It is objected 2. Various texts of Scripture by which it seems insinuated that men cannot operate anything good unless aided by the help of grace: thus John 17, Without me you can do nothing. 2 Corinthians 3, Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves … what have you that you have not received? ⟦restored: Agieureine Dei auxiio⟧ without the aid of God we cannot do anything good, nor will or accomplish any good. — I distinguish: unless divine ⟦attulerit? print: atlulgeat⟧ aid come to us we cannot perform anything good that pertains unto eternal salvation — I concede: that it be an honest moral good — I deny. But Christ the Lord and the Apostle wished to signify nothing else. For Christ the Lord had said shortly before: as the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it abide in the vine, so neither you, unless you abide in me: by which words He shows the disciples cannot make any fruit that profits unto salvation without His aid: in which manner also the Council of Orange in Canon seven uses the aforesaid Oracle, to insinuate that by the vigour of nature no good can be done which suffices unto salvation. The Apostle likewise signifies that we cannot do and accomplish anything good which pertains unto salvation, unless aided by God author of grace; but the Apostle does not deny that we can will and accomplish something which is moral and natural good, aided by God author and moderator of nature.

It is objected 3. Truly the powers of free arbitrium and of nature help not at all toward pursuing good, if the law itself and knowledge of doing good, where grace is absent, profit nothing toward avoiding sins, but rather toward sinning more gravely: but so it is: therefore, etc. The major is evident. The minor is proved from the Apostle everywhere, especially in the Epistle to the Romans, for he says chapter 4, For the law worketh wrath: and where there is no law, neither is there transgression. And chapter 5, The law crept in that sin might abound. And chapter 7, Without the law sin was dead. And 1 Corinthians 15 the law is called the strength of sin. And 2 Corinthians 3 the Law is called the killing letter, the ministry of death, and the ministry of damnation: now the law is said to work wrath, increase transgression, raise up sin, minister death, etc. on no other ground than because without grace it can by no means be directed toward good, but rather excites unto offending: therefore man by the powers of free arbitrium alone can in no way pursue good. — I distinguish the minor: the law without grace works wrath, increases transgression, etc. per se, and from its institution — I deny: per accidens, and occasionally as received by him upon whom it is imposed, namely by reason of resisting concupiscence, whereby ⟦fit?⟧ for the most part, but not always, man obeys not the mandate of the law — I concede. I say therefore all those evil effects which are ascribed to the law by the Apostle are not effected per se and from the institution of the law: first, because the same Apostle chapter 7 says: For the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good: secondly, because the same Apostle in the same chapter warns that care be taken lest good be made to be death or the cause of death: thirdly, because the end of the law is good, namely the knowledge of sin; …for verily by the law is the knowledge of sin, he says in the same place chapter 3. Whence St. Augustine in the book On the Spirit and the Letter says: The law shows to man his infirmity, that fleeing to the mercy of God through faith, he may be healed through faith. And book 13 On the Words of the Apostle, chapter 3, he says: Good, he says, is the law, if anyone use it lawfully. What then is it to use the law lawfully? to acknowledge by the law his disease, and seek health, and run to divine aid. — I say secondly, that the law is said to be the cause of wrath, death, sin, etc. per accidens, and by occasion taken, in that sense in which Christ the Lord Luke 2 is said to be set for the ruin and resurrection of many. And 2 Corinthians 6 the Apostles are said to be authors of death unto death, namely by occasion: but the law is said to be the cause of death, wrath, and sin by occasion and per accidens for three causes. First, because if there were not law there would be no transgression, since knowledge notifying obligation brings a greater penalty: whence St. Augustine in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 14 ⟦print: 1t⟧ The letter, he says, prohibiting sin does not justify man, but rather kills by increasing concupiscence, and heaping up iniquity by transgression. Secondly, because as the same St. Augustine teaches in the same place chapter 4, the law although good increases desire by prohibiting evil: as the rush of waters if it cease not to flow into that part becomes more vehement by the opposed dam, which mass when it has overcome, precipitated with greater accumulation, bursts forth more violently over the plains: for I know not in what manner this very thing which is coveted ⟦print: enneupiscitur⟧ becomes more pleasant while forbidden. Finally thirdly, the law is said to be occasionally the cause of sin, because for the most part from the law, men to whom it is given take occasion of pride, as St. Augustine testifies book 3 to Boniface, chapter 1(?): The letter, he says, cut in two, so as openly to make themselves guilty either by not doing what it commands, or by thinking they do what is spiritual, that is from God, they exercise not charity: so they remain either openly iniquitous or fallaciously just: prudent in open iniquity, humbled; foolishly proud in fallacious wisdom.

SECOND CAPITAL ARGUMENT, by which the Adversaries strive to prove that everything which proceeds not from charity is sin. — They object. No act is given midway between culpable cupidity and holy charity: therefore no good work morally good in all its circumstances is given without grace, and consequently without faith, which is the first grace: forsooth if such an act were given, it would be midway between charity and culpable cupidity. They prove the antecedent from St. Augustine in several places, especially book 9 On the Trinity chapter 8, where he says every word is conceived either by cupidity or by charity: No one loving, he says, does anything which he has not first spoken in his heart: which word is conceived by love, either of creature, or of Creator; that is, either of mutable nature, or of unchangeable truth. And on Ps. 18, Whoever will refuse to serve charity, must serve iniquity: and in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapter 11 ⟦print: 1i⟧ Reigns, he says, carnal cupidity where there is not the charity of God. — I answer first, distinguishing the antecedent: no act is given midway between holy charity and culpable cupidity concomitantly, and by reason of subject — I concede: because almost no act is done by man except one in which either cupidity or charity dominates: formally, and considering the sole reason of the act itself — I deny; for truly some act can be indifferent, nay even morally good, where charity is absent, that affection namely which orders and directs all things per se into God. — I answer secondly, that the antecedent can be denied: for St. Augustine himself acknowledges some act midway between charity and vitious cupidity which is not evil: for he says in the book On Patience, chapter 26, If anyone not having charity, and placed in some schism, lest he deny Christ, suffers tribulations, anguishes, hunger, etc., by no manner are those things culpable: nay truly even this patience is praiseworthy. And in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, he says the impious do some things which not only cannot be censured, but truly which deservedly are praised. Therefore he does not judge all acts which proceed not from charity to be derived from vitious cupidity. And lest he appear contrary to himself, it must be said he uses the name of cupidity here in a broader signification, for that affection which is not perfect charity, nor is ordered per se to God.

They insist: The same St. Augustine affirms first that without charity and love of God nothing can be done per se except sin; for he says in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 14, That is not good fruit which springs not from the root of charity. — I distinguish: that it is not good fruit without charity which is sufficient for obtaining salvation — I concede: that it be morally good and contribute to the honesty of human society — I deny. For as often as St. Augustine says charity is desired for a good act, so often it is understood of good work conducing unto eternal life: thus is to be understood what he says book 1 On the Grace of Christ, chapter 26, What good should we do unless we love? And a little after: Where love is not, no work is imputed, namely unto merit of eternal life.

Finally they urge from the same St. Augustine, book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 1, If the commandment is done through fear of punishment, not love of justice, it is done servilely, not liberally, and therefore it is not done: but from the same St. Augustine chapter 8, Whosoever (of the Jews) did what the law commanded, not aiding spirit of grace, did through fear of punishment, not love of justice: and hence before God it was not in the will which before men appeared in the work: rather they were accused from this, that in mind they wished rather to prefer that God, if it could be done, commit with impunity. Therefore no commandment can be fulfilled nor good done without grace and charity. — I distinguish the minor: that this happens for the most part — I concede: always and on every occasion given — I deny: for such is not the opinion of St. Augustine, that whatever is done through fear of punishment is vitious; for he himself commends fear of God even servile in many places, most truly however book 1 Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, chapter 16. Healthfully, he says, sacred scripture commends not only the goodness but also the severity of God: since God both is loved usefully and feared. And on Psalm 127 explaining those words: Blessed the man who feareth the Lord, he says: Me(?) whose fear is not yet chaste feareth the presence of the Lord, and punishments. Through fear he does whatever good he does. Not through fear of losing that good, but through fear of suffering that evil: he fears not lest he lose the embraces of the most beautiful spouse: but fears lest he be cast into gehenna: good is this fear too, useful is it. And in the book On Grace and Free Arbitrium, chapter 18, he calls that Spirit of fear a great gift of God: not that Peter denied Christ through fear, but of one the Lord Christ said: Fear him who hath power to send soul and body into gehenna. And in Tractate 1 on the Epistle of John he says the fear of the Lord occupies the mind first, that charity may enter afterward, and fear is the medicament of the soul, but charity its health. —

All the other holy Fathers agree with them: for St. Cyprian, in the book On the Praise of Martyrdom, says: You have been roused by the fear of things to come to this glorious title (of Martyrdom, that is): for they to whom greater things are promised, to them greater are those things which seem to be objects of fear. And St. Basil, expounding on Psalm 33 those words The rich man wanted and hungered, says: if ever you sense sin breaking out and springing up in any one thing, call back to your mind that dreadful judgment of Christ, which no mortal can endure. And there he affirms that fear to be salutary, a worker of holiness, and to curb the soul from sinning as it were with a certain bridle. And St. Chrysostom, Homily 15 To the People of Antioch, says: What? Is hell graver; but nothing is more useful than the fear of it: for the fear of hell brings us the race toward the kingdom: unless fear were good, Christ would not have devoted many sermons, and long ones, speaking about that punishment and torture. The like is found in St. Ambrose on Psalm 118, and Jerome on chapter 1 of Malachi.

THE THIRD CAPITAL ARGUMENT is drawn from this, that all the works of infidels are said to be sins, and their virtues false and counterfeit. — It is objected 1. The Apostle, Romans 14, saying: whatsoever is not from faith is sin: but the works of infidels cannot be derived from faith: therefore they are sins. — I distinguish the minor: that what is not from faith, as the rule of acting, is sin, I concede; that what is not from faith, as the principle or rule of believing, is sin, I deny. For faith is taken in two ways (for the present): first, for that by which someone judges something to be licit for himself; this is, for the dictate of conscience: in which sense we commonly say that we do a thing in good faith, which we carry out from conscience and the dictate of reason: thus the Fathers of the Lateran Council took the name of faith in Canon 41, where we read: Since all that is not from faith is sin, we shall hold by synodal judgment that no prescription at all without good faith, that is, without a good conscience. Second, the name of faith signifies the habit and act by which we believe some truth on account of the authority of the one saying it. But the Apostle here takes faith in the prior way: for he speaks of Jews converted to the faith, who through an erroneous conscience judged it not lawful to eat foods prohibited by the Mosaic law. When therefore they distinguish food from food, and nevertheless eat of that food which they judge illicit, they truly sin, because they act not from faith, that is, not from the dictate of conscience judging it licit. Moreover, everything that does not proceed from such faith, that is, what is not done according to that rule, is sin. So St. Chrysostom interprets it, Homily 26 on the Epistle to the Romans, saying: Here faith is understood not of dogmas, but of the argument of the proposed undertaking, that is, the persuasion concerning the matter at hand about doing it: with whom concur OEcumenius, Theophylactus, and several other more recent interpreters with Estius.

They urge: Most of the holy Fathers take faith here for the faith of believing. For so Augustine understands it in several places, especially book 4 Against Julian, chapter 3: therefore the solution given above is null. And presently, that what is done by one lacking the habit of infused faith is sin. — I distinguish the consequent: that what is not from faith contrarily, and positively, that is, what is done unfaithfully, and against what faith persuades should be done, is sin, I concede; that what is done negatively, that is, with faith absent, is sin per se, and precisely because it is done by one not having faith, I deny. Now in the former way (if he speaks of divine faith) the Apostle uses it: for he forms his proposition about the Jew, who judges that abstinence is owed from certain foods, and nevertheless against the faith he has eats those foods; whose action is doubtless sin, as being done against the light and dictate of conscience. That this is the Apostle's meaning is clear from the preceding words; for he says: But he that discerneth (that is, makes a certain discernment of foods, judging some clean, others unclean), if he eat, is condemned: because not from faith: for all that is not from faith is sin.

They insist: Yet the Apostle says not only the works done contrary to faith, but also those done negatively, are sins: therefore the solution is null. They prove the antecedent from that passage to the Hebrews 11: Without faith it is impossible to please God: therefore no work of infidels can be good and pleasing to God. — I deny the antecedent; and first I distinguish the text of the Apostle: without faith it is impossible to please God by reason of the agent, I concede; by reason of the work, I deny. I confess indeed that an infidel so long as he remains in infidelity cannot please God by reason of himself, although sometimes he may please by reason of the work; yet not with that complacency of which the Apostle treats there, and which proceeds from supernatural justice and sanctity, by which the Saints pleased God, of whom he goes on to treat throughout the whole chapter, consequently to what he had said at the end of the preceding chapter, My just one lives by faith.

Finally they urge: Not only by reason of the agent, but even by reason of the work all the works of infidels are sins, and unpleasing to God: therefore etc. The antecedent is proved from the same Apostle to Titus 1: Unto the defiled and unbelievers nothing is pure. — I distinguish the antecedent: unto the defiled and unbelieving nothing is pure with perfect and supernatural purity, I concede; with imperfect and moral purity, I deny. For there can be a twofold purity of a work: namely perfect, and of the supernatural order, which proceeds from sanctifying grace, whereby it comes to pass that all the works of the just are truly pure, pleasing to God, and acceptable for supernatural beatitude; but another is moral purity, and of the natural order, whereby it comes to pass that a work elicited about an honest good, and illustrated by the due moral circumstances, is judged pure, and the object of natural divine complacency, by which God approves all the offspring and fruits of nature which come forth according to the order prescribed by natural Providence. For if the shoots of trees and plants please God, as is gathered from these words of Genesis 1: The earth brought forth green herbs, and such as yield seed according to its own kind, and the tree that beareth fruit, having seed each one according to its kind: And God saw that it was good: much more can the acts and fruits of the will, in which there remain certain, though faintest, lineaments of the divine image, please God in a nobler manner. — And otherwise I distinguish: unto the defiled and unbelieving who either abuse the creatures of God through uncleanness of heart, or through infidelity treat them as though they were impure and use them not, nothing is pure, I concede; simply to infidels, and by reason only of their infidelity, I deny. Otherwise by an equal consequence it would follow that all the works even of the clean are pure; for the Apostle says: all things are pure to the pure. Which however is absolutely false; otherwise nowhere could anyone sin once justice had been attained. Thus St. Augustine in book 21 Against Faustus the Manichee, expounds this text of the Apostle both of believers and of unbelievers who abuse the creatures of God, e.g. foods, through impurity, keeping neither time, nor manner, nor measure; and he applies it both against the Jews, who after the abrogation of the law still judged foods unclean, and against the Manichees, who judged all foods altogether unclean and produced from an evil principle. — And finally I distinguish: the Apostle speaks of those impure ones who have a perverse and depraved conscience, whose works are therefore altogether impure because they have an evil intention in their works. This certainly seems the genuine mind of the Apostle; for he says: Unto the defiled and unbelievers nothing is pure, but both their mind and their conscience are defiled: they profess that they know God, but in their works they deny him: being abominable, and incredulous, and to every good work reprobate.

They object 2. St. Augustine, who declares and proves in many places that the works of infidels are sins, and that in them there are no true virtues, especially in book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 3: Let it be far off, then, that he be said truly chaste who does not hope in his wife through the true faith of marriage for the sake of God. And in the following chapter: Those who do not generate children with this intention, this will, this end, that they transfer them from the members of the first man to the members of Christ: but infidels wishing to glory in an infidel progeny, even if their observance be so great that they come together according to the rules of matrimony solely for the cause of begetting children, have not in them true conjugal chastity. Since chastity is a virtue, to which vice contrary is shamelessness, and since all virtues, even those which operate through the body, dwell in the soul, how is the body asserted to be truly of chastity when the very soul is not strengthened by the true God? Whereas that holy Psalmist accuses fornication, where he says: For behold they that go far from thee shall perish: thou hast destroyed all them that commit fornication against thee. True chastity therefore, whether conjugal, or widowed, or virginal, must not be called such except that which is enslaved to true faith. But above all he immediately treats and discusses the matter in book 4 Against Julian, chapter 3, writing thus: But you set before us examples of impious men most bitter enemies of this grace, whom you say, alien from the faith, are to be held to have virtues, in which without the aid of grace there is only the good of nature, though enslaved to superstition, who by the sole inborn forces of liberty are frequently found merciful, modest, chaste, and sober. Which error St. Augustine refuts chiefly with three arguments: First indeed by an argument ad hominem, because Julian elsewhere taught that the beginning of justice is indeed in man, but its consummation is from God: namely, that the will, or desire of good, is from us, but its effect from God; whereas speaking of the works of infidels he attributes to the forces of free will not only the willing, but even the effect of the good of the will: whence St. Augustine thus interrogates him: But if, as they were, and are, we now find in them the willing and the effect of the willing, what remains to be reserved for grace in those evidences in which you say they abound in virtues? Second he attacks him with an argument drawn from Proverbs 21: He that saith to the wicked man: Thou art just, shall be cursed among the people, and odious to the nations. Third he presses him with the authority of the Apostle to the Romans 1: The just lives by faith. Let it be far off, he says, that he be just who does not live by faith; for the just lives by faith. From these places the Adversaries argue thus: there cannot there be any good work where true virtue cannot be found; but St. Augustine openly confesses that in infidels no true virtue is found: therefore he denies equally that there is any good work in them. — I distinguish the minor: St. Augustine confesses that infidels do not possess true virtues, that is, no habit by which a man is judged to live rightly, and by which he obtains the grace of justification and eternal life, as Julian wished, as we noted in the third Notable; I concede: that there is no habit of virtue by which a man is inclined to any morally good work of the natural order, at least where grave temptation does not press, I deny. I confess therefore that in infidels there is no true virtue simply, by which a man is ordered to salvation: in which sense alone St. Augustine uses true virtue, as appears in the same third chapter. For he says: If therefore for attaining true beatitude, which immortal faith, which is in Christ, truly promises us, the virtues profit man nothing, then in no way can they be virtues. And thus he denies that infidels have virtues because no infidel can be just: because, as he repeats many times in the same place, the just lives by faith: Who moreover, he says, who wish themselves to be held Christians, unless the Pelagians alone, or perhaps you yourself alone among them, would call an infidel just? Would call impious just, would call him just who is enslaved to the devil? Let him be Fabricius, let him be Fabius, let him be Scipio, let him be Regulus, whose names you thought fit to use as terrors, as though we were speaking in the ancient Roman Curia. But in this cause, even if you appeal to the School of Pythagoras or of Plato, where most erudite and learned men, ennobled by Philosophy far excelling the rest, said that true virtues are none but those which are in a manner imprinted on the mind by that eternal and immutable substance, which is God: even there against you I shall cry out as much as He grants, who called us in the liberty of piety: neither in those is there true justice, because the just lives by faith: faith is by hearing, but hearing by the Word of Christ; the end of the law is Christ unto justice for everyone that believeth: how are they truly just, in whom the humility of the true Just One is cheap? For the nearer they approached by understanding, the further pride receded: because knowing God, they did not glorify him as God, etc. Whence he concludes: if justice is by nature and will: then Christ died gratuitously; if justice is by teachings of men of whatever sort: then Christ died gratuitously. For by that by which is true justice, by that also is the kingdom of God: for God himself would be unjust, which be far from us, if a true just one were not admitted to his kingdom, etc. Such are the words of St. Augustine, by which it abundantly appears that down to here St. Augustine denies that the virtues of infidels are true, inasmuch as those virtues of infidels cannot contribute anything to salvation.

He urges: If infidels had within them any true virtues, and only morally good ones, they could be called barren in respect of beatitude: but St. Augustine plainly denies that any virtues can be called barren; for thus about the middle of the same third chapter he carps at Julian: It cannot be said how much that opinion of yours supports you, because you said all virtues are fruitful, by which we are good either fruitfully or barrenly: It cannot be, that we are good barrenly. But we are not good whatever barrenly we are: For a good tree brings forth good fruit: far be it that, as God is good, from whose axe is prepared destruction for trees bringing forth no good fruit, good trees be cut down and cast into the fire. In no way therefore are men good barrenly: but those who are not good can be some less evil, others more evil. Therefore according to St. Augustine no virtue can be barren. — I distinguish the minor: no virtue can be barren in respect of a natural good to be attained, I concede; that no virtue can be fertile in respect of a natural good, and barren in respect of a supernatural good, I deny. For St. Augustine himself in book 5 Of the City of God, chapter 15, affirms that God gave to the Romans Empire over so many Nations and kingdoms in reward for their civil and moral virtues. He judges therefore that those moral virtues merit some temporal reward; and hence even though they appear barren in respect of eternal felicity, they can nevertheless truly be fertile in respect of a temporal good, which God promises and renders to them in reward.

They insist: St. Augustine there denies that men can be good barrenly. For there he charges Julian with having said that all virtues are certain affections, by which we are good either fruitfully or barrenly: It cannot be (says the holy Doctor) that we are good barrenly, but we are not good whatever barrenly we are. And a little later in the same place: in no way are men good barrenly. And still somewhat later he thus upbraids Julian: How therefore, I beseech thee, dost thou jest in these disputations, or rave, thou who praisest the fruits of barren trees, which certainly are either none; or if they are none, they are not to be praised; or if the fruits are good, surely the trees are not barren; nay rather they are good, since the fruits are good, and ought to please God, which good trees cannot fail to do: and finally at the end of the aforesaid chapter he declares that good is not that which is barren, in these words: According to thee, let such wills, he says, be called good trees; it suffices that they are barren before God, so that by this they are not good. From all which one may thus infer: if there were any morally good work in infidels, it would be barren, and not conducing to the end of eternal salvation: but from the aforesaid places of St. Augustine no barren good is given: therefore no morally good work is given in infidels. — I answer, distinguishing the minor: no barren good is given from which men are called good simply and perfectly, I concede; that no barren good is given from which men are called good secundum quid and less perfectly, I deny. Again I distinguish: no barren good is given in the sense of Julian, whom St. Augustine attacks there, I concede; in another sense, which Theologians commonly defend, I deny. For it is certain that there is some barren good, in that sense which Theologians commonly defend, namely that good which from object, end, and circumstances is morally good, yet profits nothing toward salvation, because it is done without grace. For the holy Fathers acknowledge such a barren good. Among others St. Ambrose in his Commentary on Psalm 1, on the verse: And his goodness faileth not: where such morally good...

He insists: From the place of St. Augustine just cited, the fruits of barren trees are not to be praised: but infidels are barren trees: therefore their fruits, that is, their acts, are not to be praised. — I answer, distinguishing the major: of barren trees operating barrenly and unfaithfully, I concede; otherwise, I deny.

They urge in the same St. Augustine: If the fruits are good, surely the trees are not barren: therefore if the works of infidels are good, infidels must not be called barren trees, which is against St. Augustine. — I answer, distinguishing the antecedent: if the fruits are good simply, I concede; if they are good only secundum quid, I deny.

He insists again from the same Augustine: a barren will is not good: therefore a barren work is not good. — I answer, distinguishing the antecedent: it is not good in every mode, I concede; that it is not good secundum quid, I deny; that is, it is not good in the order to salvation and the attainment of the kingdom, which is the supreme good of man; but it is good in the order to moral honesty, and to the right natural formation of man.

OBJECTION 3. Several other sayings of St. Augustine, by which he seems openly to confess that all the works of infidels are sins, because whatever good they sometimes seem to do, they carry it out with an evil end. And this he asserts especially in book one On Baptism and Concupiscence, chapter 3. When, he says, men do these things without faith which seem to pertain to conjugal chastity, whether seeking to please men, or themselves, or others, or avoiding human hardships in those things which they covet as necessary for life, or serving demons, sins are not thereby restrained, but by these sins other sins are overcome. Let it be far off, then, that he be called chaste otherwise who does not keep to his wife the sure faith of marriage for the sake of God. Similarly in book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, Julian asking: If a pagan covers the naked, is it sin because it is not from faith? he answers thus: Precisely insofar as it is not from faith, it is sin. And again at the end of the same chapter he addresses the same Julian thus: Understand, he says, what the Lord says: if thy eye is wicked, thy whole body shall be darksome: but if thy eye is simple, thy whole body shall be lightsome: and acknowledge this eye to be the intention with which each one does what he does, and learn that he who does not do good works with the good intention of faith, that is, of that faith which operates through love, has the whole body, so to speak, which consists of those works as members, darksome, that is, full of the blackness of sins. Or else, since you at least grant that the works of infidels which seem good to you do not however lead them to eternal salvation and the kingdom, know that we say that that good of men, that good will, that good work, cannot be conferred on anyone without the grace of God, which is given through the one Mediator of God and men, by which alone man can be brought to the eternal gift of God and the kingdom. All other things therefore, which seem among men to have something of praise, seem to thee true virtues, seem good works, and without any commission of sin. As for me, this I know, that it is not made by a good will. For the will of an infidel, and impious, is not good. It cannot be, as being done in a most evil state: nor does the name of sin apply here in the strict and proper signification, inasmuch as it signifies an act disagreeing with and contrary to the dictates of right reason and the prescriptions of the laws. I answer 2. For the most part indeed the works of infidels are sins, because it rarely happens that they are not truly acts disagreeing with the rules of right living and right reason; for they are accustomed to act from infidelity, which, since it is an erroneous rule, there is no doubt that whatever proceeds from it is vitiated and sinful. I answer 3. Therefore the works of infidels are for the most part sins, because rarely do they propose to themselves any right end in their works, that they might obey the mandates of God by rendering glory to Him: nay rather for the most part they act for a most evil end: because, as St. Augustine says in the words praised above, they seek either to please themselves or others. Whence in chapter 3 of book 4 against Julian, where he pronounced that covering the naked, insofar as it is not from faith, is sin, he straightway subjoins: Not because through the deed itself, which is covering the naked, it is sin: but to glory in such a work not in the Lord is sin: for to glory not in the Lord is something done unfaithfully, breathing of pride, that is, of presumption: whence in the same chapter, giving the reason why infidels do goods badly, he says: Because namely they do them not as a faithful, but as an unfaithful and evil cultivator. Finally, while in the same chapter he says: Where there is not the intention of good faith, which operates through love, the whole body is full of the blackness of sins: he wished only that sin reigns in infidels, and is present concomitantly, on account of the absence and defect of faith, which is the principle of justification.

He urges: Whatever infidels do from infidelity is sin formally, and not only concomitantly: but St. Augustine testifies that infidels, doing all even those things which seem good works, always act from infidelity, for in book 1 On Baptism and Concupiscence, chapter 1, he says: Infidels have the good of conjugal chastity, because they use it unfaithfully, turning it into evil and sin: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: whatever infidels do formally from infidelity is sin, I concede; because namely infidelity itself is the evil tree, which cannot bring forth good fruits: that whatever they do in the state of infidelity is formally sin, I deny. Nor did St. Augustine mean anything else: for in the same place he subjoins: But now truly they turn into the use of justice that concupiscence whereby the flesh concupisceth against the spirit, the marriages of the faithful: it is certain however that the marriages of the faithful do not convert it except while they act faithfully and from faith: whence he subjoins: For they have the intention of generating children to be regenerated: so that those who are born sons of this world may be reborn sons of God.

He urges: If what is not from faith were sin only concomitantly, and not formally, the reasoning of St. Augustine against Julian would be vain and useless: since Julian would without difficulty have admitted that indeed whatever proceeds formally from infidelity is sin: but otherwise concerning the other works of infidels, which are not formally acts of infidelity, but acts of virtue, or mercy, or justice, or temperance: therefore St. Augustine judges the works of infidels to be sins not only inasmuch as they proceed from infidelity itself, but also as they are done within infidelity itself. — I deny the antecedent: For Julian judged not only that the works of infidels are morally good; but also that they suffice for sanctifying grace, and for meriting eternal glory: he judged also that man, with the pursuit of holiness approaching, could by grace adhere so as to be unable to fall into sins, as St. Augustine testifies in the aforesaid chapter 3 of book 1. Against your persuasions, he says, and you grant, saying, therefore what God swears can be believed to be perfected by the pursuit of sanctity, once prayed for: this error he attacks with those words of the Apostle, Whatsoever is not from faith is sin. — Moreover Julian judged those works which are good from their object to be nevertheless good, even if done from a perverse end: which holy Augustine reproaches him there as a most evil dogma and utterly unworthy of Christian men. Whence, he says, lest I seem to calumniate your very words, I shall now set them down: The origin of all virtues, you say, is situated in the rational soul, and all the affections, by which we are good either fruitfully or barrenly, are in the subject of our mind: prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude. Since therefore the force of these affections is naturally in all, yet, you say, it does not hasten toward one end in all, but according to the judgment of the will, whose nod they serve, they are directed either to eternal things or to temporal ones. Which being in that which they are, not in that which they do, they vary only in that which they merit: and therefore they can sustain no loss, you say, either of their name or of their kind, but are enriched only by the magnitude of the reward they desired, or frustrated by its smallness. This opinion of Julian, as insipid, St. Augustine thus beats back: I know not when you learned these things: yet now you see, I judge, that it follows that the prudence of flies be true, whereby they devise kinds of little gains: and the justice of flies, whereby through fear of greater loss they more easily sometimes despise their own than usurp what belongs to another: and the temperance of flies, whereby they prohibit the appetite for luxury, because it is costly, and are content with necessary food alone and covering: and the fortitude of flies, whereby, as Horace says, book 1 Epist. 1, Through seas they flee poverty, through rocks, through fires: whereby finally we learn that by a certain barbaric irruption they could have been compelled under many terrors of enemies to betray what they had: whence he concludes: Therefore those virtues with such an end are shameful and deformed, and therefore in no way genuine and true virtues; yet they seem to you so true and beautiful that they could sustain no loss of their name or kind; but are enriched or frustrated only by the magnitude of the reward they desired, that is, by the fruit of earthly goods, not of heavenly rewards. Against this latter error moreover St. Augustine heaps up many other things, by which he signifies that that is evil which evil, noxious, and unfaithful will makes.

He insists again: By what was the mind of St. Augustine concerning the works of infidels cannot appear more clearly than from the doctrine of his Disciples, especially of St. Prosper: but St. Prosper openly confesses that the works of infidels, insofar as they are done in the state of infidelity, are sins: therefore, etc. The minor is proved from the book against the Collator, chapter 22. Nature, he says, uses its goods badly, in which without the worship of the true God it is conquered by impieties and impurities, and is accused from that very thing whence it thinks itself defended. And book 1 On the Vocation of the Nations, chapter 2. Without the worship of the true God, he says, even that wherein virtue seems to be is sin: nor can that

please God without God: but he who does not please God, by whom if not by vices and clamors does he please? Finally, in the book On the Ungrateful, chapter 16.

For every work of probity, unless it spring From the seed of true faith, is sin, and turns into guilt, And barren glory heaps up punishment for itself.

Now by the name of this barren glory, which heaps up punishment for itself, he signifies the works of infidels elicited in the state of infidelity: therefore, etc. — I answer, St. Prosper is to be explicated in the same way in which we expounded St. Augustine: namely of the morally good work, which is done unfaithfully, and with some presumption of obtaining grace through it. Indeed the Semipelagians, against whom St. Prosper militates, judged that man by natural pursuit and desire of faith could merit both faith itself and the other gifts of God, by which one arrives at eternal life. But St. Prosper teaches on the contrary that these works, conceived with that type and spirit of pride, are sins, are turned into guilt, and rather heap up punishment than merit grace, which he clearly explains in chapter 37 of the work praised above:

Yet if they think that anyone can grasp these By his own strength, whether that labor be worthy to be called Merited genius, they say, of one seeking true goods: They conceive growing, they are diminished; advancing, They fail; shining they fall: running they recede.

In exactly the same way must be explicated the other passage of the same St. Prosper from the book On the Contemplative Life, chapter 3, where he says: The Apostle, by saying that whatsoever is not from faith is sin, declared that all goods which are done from faith are virtues, or if they should have been done without faith, they are not to be believed any goods, but vices, which we ought not to stand approving, but condemning, and hurling away as hostile, and driving out from the bounds of eternal salvation. For St. Prosper speaks there of the intentions of infidels, which not the mere absence of faith, but the unfaithful and noxious will renders culpable. For St. Prosper sufficiently hinted that those works are elicited by a spirit of pride, while he says they are hurled down inflated: similarly while he adds that what he said of infidels could also be twisted against believers, who live not according to God but according to man. Finally his meaning appears more lucidly near the end of the chapter, where he intimates that he treats of the works of God which are done by infidels with an evil intention, while he says: Therefore if ever it has also shone forth clear, that they do not seem to have their virtues who feign: and those feign who not from faith, nor for the sake of God, but for the sake of men only operate some good, in fastings, and vigils, chastity, constancy, and the other goods to be sown. Not that they may become good, but that they fashion themselves as good before men, nor that they may receive the eternal reward, but for acquiring popular glory. It must be said therefore that by the name of that barren glory, which heaps up punishment for itself, he understands nothing else than vainglory, with which infidels abounded on every side, especially the Philosophers, whom Tertullian accordingly calls lovers of glory.

The Adversary heaps up various opinions of other disciples of St. Augustine, by which they strive to prove that truly the works of infidels are formally sins. First indeed St. Fulgentius seems to define the matter openly in the book On the Truth of Predestination, chapter 18, where he says: Before human will receives faith, by itself it can merit punishment, not faith: for every one that is not from faith is sin, and without faith it is impossible to please God. But he who does not please God, doubtless displeases God, not mitigating God, but rather exasperating him. And book 2, chapter 5: We do not please God unless we will; but from himself is granted to us that we will, by whom unless the will of man be changed so that it be good, it always desires evil, so that it never rightly desires good: and thus while it does not keep the right order in its own affairs, it in no way pleases the true and good God. — Primasius on these words, 1st chapter, of Romans: What is not from faith, says: Not from the faith which works through charity: but everything that is not from faith is sin; whatsoever builds not up is not from faith, and therefore is sin. — Bede on the cited chapter: All the life of infidels is sin; and nothing is good without the highest good; for where the acknowledgment of the true and immutable truth is lacking, even in the best morals virtue is false. — Prudentius in the book Against John Scotus, chapter 4, has: Man after that damnation has free will, by which he can incline by his own will, and is inclined to evil; he has free will by which he can rise again to good. But that he rise to good, is not of his own strength, but of the grace of God having mercy. He has free will that he can will well, that he can live well, that he can adhere to God: but that he will well, that he live well, that he adhere to God, is not of his own strength, but of the grace of God having mercy. — St. Remigius, and the Church of Lyon in the book On the Three Epistles, chapter 22: Truly dead are the works of infidels, not only when they openly serve vices and sins, but also when, instigated by the natural good which the omnipotent Creator grants, or imbued with natural law, they seem to have and exercise certain good works, and as it were certain virtues; because, ignorant or hating, or even persecuting, the faith of God and of his Christ, since they do not operate from that faith, altogether neither good work nor true virtue can there be, which does not proceed from the root of truth and goodness: for while those things which seem good works according to man are never referred by true faith to the Lord whom they know not, nor do they act for his sake, but for the sake of some honesty by which they may seem great among men, or for the desire of some temporal commodity, by the very impiety of infidelity, by the very inflation of elation, by the very perversity of cupidity, all things are so impure and defiled that before God they are not

Sermon one On Innovation: It is certain, he says, that all things tend toward their own origin as far as lies in them, and are ever more inclined toward it. So also we who were created from nothing, it is agreed that if we are left to ourselves we slip always into sin, which is nothing. — I answer, those holy Fathers are to be understood in that way in which we expounded St. Augustine, namely that in infidels there is no good, no true virtues, and their works are sins, either because weighed down and conquered by the weight of their concupiscences they most frequently rush into vices: or because, not acknowledging the true God, they do not operate for his glory, but for the desire of some temporal or empty vanity; whence it comes to pass, as the Church of Lyon presently argued, that by the very impiety of infidelity, by the very intention of their works, by the very perversity of cupidity, all things are so impure and defiled that before God they are judged not virtues but vices. Or finally, I say that the virtues and morally good works of infidels are called sins comparatively with respect to the theological and infused moral virtues: for the acquired moral virtues appear midway between those theological and infused moral virtues, and vices or sins. Whence since a medium compared to the more perfect extreme is judged imperfect; whereas on the contrary it seems perfect when compared with the other less perfect extreme: thus tepid compared to hot seems cold, and compared to cold, seems hot: similarly dark compared to black appears white, but appears black when placed next to white. Hence it is that the acquired moral virtues, by reason of order and comparison with the theological and infused moral ones, or those which operate from the principle of grace and charity, are called imperfect; whereas on the contrary they can be judged perfect, if they are compared with the vices to which they are opposed. Since therefore St. Augustine and his Disciples consider the virtues of infidels in order to the perfect virtues of Christians, and compare those with these: therefore they say that they are not true virtues, but counterfeit: and those truly sin...

THE FINAL ARGUMENT prevails by reason. — They object 1: No good work can be given without right and perfect intention: but in infidels there cannot be right intention: therefore neither any morally good work. The major is clear from that saying of St. Ambrose, book 1 On Duties, chapter 3: Your effect puts its name upon your work. The minor is proved: there cannot there be right intention where there is no faith, which is the eye of the mind directing intention. For, says St. Augustine on Psalm 31, let them reckon their works good before faith, where indeed faith was not, there was no good work: for a good work intention makes; faith directs the intention. — I answer, granting the major, distinguishing the minor: where there is no faith, there cannot be right intention, nor direction of the work to the ultimate supernatural end, I concede; to an honest subalternate natural and moral end, I deny. For as faith directs the intention of man with respect to the supernatural ultimate end, so also the light of reason can direct the intention with respect to some honest end connatural to man.

They insist: Every work which is referred to some created end, and is not directed to God, is sin: but where there is no true faith and knowledge of God, a work cannot be directed to God: therefore since in infidels there is no true faith and knowledge of God, it follows that their works are sins. They prove the major from St. Augustine, book 4 Against Julian, book 3. Whatever good is done by man, he says, and is not done for that for which true wisdom commands it ought to be done, although it may seem a duty, is by its very wrong end a sin. — I distinguish the major: that what is not referred to God either explicitly or implicitly: actually but virtually, or habitually, is sin, I concede; that what is referred implicitly, habitually, and virtually, namely by the intrinsic relation which is identified with, and as it were imbibed in, the very entity of the act, is sin, I deny. For an act can be referred to God in three ways, as St. Bonaventure notes in 2 dist. 41, namely actually, virtually, and habitudinally. First, when someone thinking of God loves him, and directs his work to his glory. Second, when someone refers some work to God having at the beginning of the work his glory as end, though he does not think of him during the course of the work. Third is when, without a preconsidered ultimate end, or God, from the sole nature of the good work there comes about its direction to God. But infidels, who in no way acknowledge God, cannot indeed explicitly and actually direct their work to his glory; this however they can implicitly: for since they act for the particular end of virtue, as truly they can act; for instance when they give alms because natural reason dictates it honest to help the needy, implicitly and virtually or habitually they refer that work to God: for they act for an end instituted by God.

They urge: If it were licit to act for some other end besides the glory of God, and if some act of a creature could be licitly referred to some created end, especially to the very honesty of virtue: yet from St. Augustine, lib. 19. De Civit. Dei, it is not licit to act for the sole end of virtue: For indeed they are thought by certain persons to be virtues with a fine and honest end, when they are referred to themselves; even then they are inflated or proud: and therefore they must be judged not virtues but vices: therefore by no means can an act be good which is referred to another end than to God. - I distinguish the minor: it is not licit to act for the honesty of virtue as for the ultimate end, I concede; as for a subalternate end ordainable to the ultimate end, whether virtually or habitudinally, I deny. Now St. Augustine says in the former sense that the virtues, when they are referred to themselves, are proud and inflated, such as were most often the virtues of many Gentiles, especially of the Philosophers, and likewise of the men of valor, who tasted in their own virtues or splendid deeds nothing but human and fleeting glory: whence St. Augustine, book 1 Of the Unfinished Work against Julian: Hear, and understand: the fortitude of the Gentiles worldly cupidity makes; but the fortitude of Christians the charity of God, which is poured forth in our hearts, not by the arbitrium of our will, which is from us, but by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. Or as he explains more lucidly in the book On True Religion, c. 38: Infidels seek, he says, threefold cupidity, either of pleasure, or of excellence, or of spectacle: thus knowing not how to love temporal things, that from them they expect beatitude. But to those things whereby each wishes to be made blessed he must serve whether he will or will not: for whithersoever they lead, thither follows also whoever has been seen to take them away, he is feared.

They object 2. If any act could be good without grace, it would follow that God concurs no otherwise to an evil and sinful act than to an act of virtue, because he would concur to each only with a general concourse, and as Author of nature: but the consequent is against orthodox and Catholic doctrine, which St. Augustine defends most sharply, book 2 On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 18, where he proves God to be the author of the good work in us, not of the evil: The will, he says, is either good or evil: and certainly we have not an evil one from God: there remains therefore, that we have a good will from God... wherefore what turns us away from God is ours, and this will is evil: but that we turn ourselves to God, we cannot unless he excite and help, and this will is good: therefore no morally good work can be done without grace. — I deny the sequel of the major: For God concurs to a good act per se, and intending it directly; because he offers his general concourse to creatures with this intention, that they use it well: whereas he in no way intends an evil act, but only his general concourse is determined to an evil end by the created will, which abuses that general concourse impressed on her by him, twisting it into a perverse end not intended by God; therefore God is to be said to concur to that evil act only per accidens.

You will urge: If these things were so, it would follow that demons can effect a morally good work, because the forces of nature are not less perfect in demons than in men: but the consequent is absurd: therefore also the antecedent. — I deny the sequel of the major, and toward its proof I say that natural forces are indeed not less perfect in demons than in men according to substance and physical principle, pass over that; according to the state of misery in which demons are, I deny. For that state prohibits them so that they cannot effect any moral good of the natural order in every respect, because in that state they are obstinate in evil; whence it comes to pass that they cannot elicit any act except it be done from some evil circumstance and from an affection of a perverse end.

Corollary I. From the three questions set forth above it follows first, that fallen man without any special actual aid of the supernatural order can exercise some moral good; and next that the opinion of Gregory of Rimini appears less probable, in 2 dist. 28. quest. 1. art. 1., where he teaches that beyond every thought and previous motion which can be made through natural causes, some special transient aid is necessary, by which the will be physically forced, so that it refer its act to God as ultimate end, without which relation and habitude that act cannot be morally good. - But from what has been said it abundantly appears that neither is that actual relation universally necessary for a morally good work, but sometimes virtual and habitual suffices; nor is any supernatural subsidy needed that the act be exercised. First, because however weak and infirm the forces of human arbitrium may be, they suffice for this. Because (as St. Augustine teaches in the book Of Spirit and Letter, c. 28.) the image of God in the human soul has not been so worn away by the defilement of earthly affections that there have not remained in it, as it were, remnants whence it can merit to be said that even amid the impiety of his life man does or savors somewhat of the law. And a little later speaking of the Nations, which although they have not the law naturally do the things that are of the law, he says: For they also were men, and there was inherent in them that of nature, by which the rational soul both perceives and does something lawful: but piety, which transfers to the other life, blessed and eternal, has the law immaculate converting souls. Whence the Author of the book Hypognosticon, which is woven entirely out of the sayings of St. Augustine, says, chapter 1: We confess that free arbitrium exists in all men, having indeed the judgment of reason, yet not by which it is fit to begin or certainly accomplish things pertaining to God (that is, eternal beatitude) without God; but only in the works of the present life, both good and evil; namely goods which arise from the goods of nature. — Add here that this proposition of Baius num. 61 was condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs: Without Pelagian error can be admitted some use of free arbitrium that is good or not bad: and he injures the grace of Christ who thinks and teaches thus. Whence Lessius meritedly in the book On Riches, chapter 10, num. 5, constantly affirms that the opinion of Gregory of Rimini together with the erroneous doctrine of Michael Baius was condemned by these Pontiffs. Add all those things by which in the second Question we proved that grace is not required for a morally good work of the natural order. Moreover, if for every good work there were desired a special antecedent aid beyond the motion which can be made through natural causes, such that without it no good act could be done, and it being posited, could not fail to be done, as the same Gregory teaches, it would follow first that the good act would not be done freely, because it would not be done with indifference and antecedent power toward appetite; since the will prevented by that aid cannot but operate. It would follow second that all who do not operate morally well are altogether impotent to operate rightly, because they lack something absolutely necessary and antecedent, which they have neither in reality, nor is it in their free power that they obtain it; for if they could have and merit it, especially through some morally good act: but such aid is prerequired for that good act, as Gregory contends. Wherefore either before every good act some good act ought to precede, which is contradictory; or such aid is not in the power of the operator, nor depends on any good act of him who is deprived of it. Finally, since such a morally good act is of the natural order, the physical force complete and sufficiently potent is undeservedly denied without that special transient aid, so that the will can exercise that act; for if anything rendered that act to the will, most especially moral goodness: but that does not hinder; nay rather it renders the act proportionate to the will, since its object, proportionate, is the moral good consonant with reason. Furthermore free arbitrium in fallen man is not utterly extinguished, but only infirm, as was said above from the Council of Trent: therefore just as in an infirm person some forces remain sufficient for an act, though imperfect, so also in the will of fallen man there remain sufficient forces for doing some morally good and honest work; e.g. to honor parents, to relieve the needy, etc. The foundations of Gregory together with those of Vazquez will be dissolved below.

Corollary II. — It follows second, that the opinion of Vazquez is also less probable, who in disputation 190 teaches that for a morally good work some aid is prerequired, not to give the power, but to actually act, and he judges it to consist in a certain honest and congruous thought, that is, tempered to the genius, complexion or temperament of the man, either infused by God in those circumstances and occasions in which he foresaw from eternity through middle knowledge that free arbitrium, excited by that pious thought, would consent to it. But this special aid he says is grace granted through Christ. That it is grace, he proves thus: every gift of God not owed by the force of creation is special favor and grace, or a gratuitous gift: but every congruous thought, with which one acts morally well, is thus not owed; because man by his nature demands one thought no more than another, nor does he more claim this true order from which that thought follows; otherwise whenever anyone acts badly, he would have been deprived connaturally of the congruous thought owed to him. Add that that congruous thought is not given to all, hence it is not connatural: but beyond the lot of nature. For what is owed to nature is granted to all; and therefore it is grace, inasmuch as grace signifies every gift of nature not owed, whether meanwhile that gift be above the order of nature, or not. Finally, if God gave man only a sufficient thought, he would satisfy the debt of nature; therefore where he prepares a congruous and efficacious one for exercising a morally honest good, he does beyond the debt of nature; and consequently that gift must be called a gratuitous benefit. — But that that special benefit tending to honesty is through Christ, he proves, because from the fall of Adam we were left in that state in which no congruous thought was owed; and moreover on account of original sin we all ought to be deprived of it; hence God grants it not except in view of the merits of Christ the Lord Redeemer. — But this opinion is attacked: First, because some practical thought about a morally good act can be had by the mere forces of nature, as was proved in the second Question of the first Article: therefore also a good affection. But whether the affection to which that pious thought leads follow or follow not, that depends on the will, which determines itself at pleasure to follow or not follow the dictate of reason: and therefore for that no special subsidy of divine grace is needed: for the forces of free arbitrium suffice for it. Second, that congruous thought about some honest act signifies two things only, namely that it be a thought of an honest good, and that it be congruous or efficacious: but from neither head is it necessary that it be a special grace of God: therefore, etc. The major stands. The minor indeed is proved as to each part: because that thought ought not to be judged grace precisely from this, that it is about an honest act and object; for human liberty and nature is not so vitiated that from phantasms it can abstract certain species of evil, and so also of moral and honest good; because not only delectable objects are proposed to the senses, but also honor toward parents and observance toward friends: for wherever man is educated, sustained, protected, and lives among men of the same nature, thence he can have more thoughts inducing to the cult of parents and observance of friends. That truly the thought about an honest good considered as congruous, or as efficacious, is not special grace, is also clear; partly because the same Vazquez judges sufficient knowledge about the honest act and object not to be special grace; therefore he ought to judge the same about the congruous or efficacious thought. The consequence is clear: for efficacious and sufficient aids are within the same order of grace: therefore if the sufficient thought about an honest act be not judged true grace, neither equally should the efficacious thought be placed within the order of grace. Third, original sin did not constitute men obstinate in evil and morally inflexible to good; nor does it entirely impede the general course and concourse of things and secondary causes both acting naturally and freely together with the general concourse of the first Cause; therefore notwithstanding it man can have the affection of a good thought; since it does not transcend its forces. — Nor does it stand in the way that original sin might have merited that men be deprived of natural goods, and perhaps also of congruous thoughts, and likewise of every honest action: since indeed it did not merit it in reality, thence it does not follow that every pious thought of ours is a gratuitous gift of God; otherwise also natural life and the other natural and ingrafted gifts ought equally to be called graces, because on account of original sin we could be deprived of them by God: therefore as those natural benefits are not properly called graces, in the sense in which Vazquez here uses grace, so neither ought that honest thought be judged grace, although on account of original sin we could deservedly be deprived of it as of life. - Nor does it matter either that the congruous thought follows here and now rather than at another time and place, or in this individual rather than in that; for this does not always arise from some special grace or causality of God, but sometimes proceeds also from the force of the order of secondary causes, their natural disposition being supposed, and the free use of human will conjoined, with the sole general concourse of God due to such causes naturally: but this benefit does not transcend the gift of creation, nor the natural disposition and state of things. Otherwise the benefit of grace would also be judged that any man whatever is not born blind, lame, etc.; for another disposition of causes was possible from which that would follow, as another series was possible from which those pious thoughts would not arise. Nay even the merely sufficient thought itself would have to be called grace, because another order of things was possible in which that thought would not occur to this and that man, to whom now de facto it happens. Similarly generation itself, and the natural complexion, and such or such an indoles would be reckoned grace, because another series of things was possible in which either this one would not be born, with complexion and indoles; and thus nothing at all...

They object 1. Those texts of Scripture by which it seems intimated that man in the state of fallen nature without special aid of God can effect no morally good work, nor have any congruous thought, of which kind is that John 15: Without me you can do nothing. And 2 Corinthians 3: Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God: whence St. Augustine in tractate 8 On John says: Whether therefore little or much, it cannot be done without him without whom nothing can be done. — I answer, these and similar texts of Scripture are to be understood (as we have already often said) of works pertaining to salvation, on account of which it is necessary that we adhere to Christ as branches to the vine of life, according to that which he says in the same chapter of John: I am the vine, you the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit unto life eternal; for without me you can do nothing, that namely which profits toward it.

They object 2. Certain oracles of Councils and holy Fathers: First indeed in the Diospolitan Council Pelagius was compelled to confess that the grace of God is given for individual acts. Similarly in the second Arausican Council, Canon nine: As often as we do good, God operates in us and with us that we may operate: that is, his grace precedes us, and induces us to operate well: and Canon 18: A reward is owed to good works if they be done, but grace precedes that they be done: and Canon 12: No one has of himself except falsehood and sin: but if anyone man has truth, it is from that fountain which we ought to thirst after. The same the holy Fathers openly teach: above all St. Ambrose, book 1 On the Vocation of the Nations, chapter 3, says: If God works not in us, we can be partakers of no virtue. St. Augustine, Sermon 13 On the Words of the Apostle, chapter 11, speaking of the aid of the Holy Spirit, which the Pelagians wished necessary only for operating more easily, says, if he pour it not out we can do nothing good at all: Thou dost indeed act (he says) without his helping, with free will, but badly. And further on: When I say to thee: without the aid of God thou doest nothing, I say nothing of good: for to do evil thou hast without the aid of God a free will. From these therefore it follows that we can work nothing whatsoever without the subsidy of God. — I distinguish the consequent: that we can do nothing whatsoever without the subsidy of God, either as author of nature, or as author of grace, I concede; that we can do nothing without the aid of God as author of grace, I deny. Or otherwise I distinguish: that we can do nothing without the subsidy of God as author of grace which profits toward eternal life, I concede; which profits toward the honesty of human society and rectitude of morals, I deny. Therefore while the Councils and holy Fathers require divine aid for the right and just operation of man, they speak of works conducing to salvation; for thus the Fathers of the Carthaginian Council express their mind in the Synodal letter which they write to Zosimus the supreme Pontiff, where among other things they have this: Let us say that the grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord, aids us through individual acts not only to know the truth, but also to do justice; so that without the grace of God we are able to have, think, say, and do nothing of true and holy piety. In like manner St. Prosper interpreted the mind of the Council in the eighth response to the Chapters of the Gauls: with two hundred and fourteen priests, whose constitution against the enemies of the grace of God the whole world embraced with truthful profession, as their discourse has it: let us say the grace of God, etc. — But to Canon 22 of the same Council we have already answered: that no one has of himself except falsehood and sin for the most part, because he can know little truth and do good, I concede; that he can do nothing at all, I deny.

They object 3. The Church persuades us to demand the grace of God for exercising individual good acts: therefore she judges it necessary for this. The antecedent appears from various prayers of the Church, in which the grace of God is sought for all our actions. Thus in the prayer of the 6th Sunday after Epiphany it is said: Grant, we beseech thee, O almighty God, that ever meditating on things reasonable, what are pleasing to thee we may carry out both in word and deed. And in the prayer of the Sunday after Pentecost: Grant to us, we beseech thee, O Lord, always the spirit of thinking what is right, etc. And in that celebrated Collect: Direct our actions, we beseech thee, O Lord, by thy inspiration, and further them by thy continual help. The same appears in the two Collects which are recited each day at the office of Prime. The consequence indeed is proved from the holy Fathers, who everywhere gather from the utility of prayer the necessity of grace, saying that we pray in vain if what we ask lies within our own power; for thus reason the Fathers of the Carthaginian Council, Epistle to Innocent or Zosimus; for against the Pelagians asserting that for operating, perfecting justice, and fulfilling the mandates of God human nature alone suffices of itself, they argued thus: if with the possibility of nature and the arbitrium of the will these things are constituted in our power, who does not see that they are vainly asked of the Lord and prayed for fruitlessly? — I answer first, therefore we implore divine aid for our individual acts not only that they be made morally good and honest, but also that they profit toward salvation, so that we decline toward no sin, but that our words ever proceed to do the justice of God, our thoughts and works be directed. - I answer second, that although some good works be done through nature, nevertheless we can beseech God to aid us in exercising them: first indeed, that they be done more perfectly within the order of nature: second, because it is not infallible that we shall act honestly and morally well: third, because neither shall we long persevere without sin by the mere forces of nature, and perhaps we shall sin lightly or gravely, unless God remove the occasions of sinning. Nor ought it seem wonderful that we pray God for a natural work; for the Church also admonishes us to beseech God, and prescribes certain prayers for obtaining the fruits of the earth, serenity of the air, and the removal of tempests; all which although they come to pass according to the course of natural providence, yet not so invariably that they could not happen otherwise.

Finally they object: We render thanksgivings to God for individual good works: but thanksgiving is the acknowledgment of received grace: therefore it supposes grace collaborating in all our good acts. — I distinguish the major: We render thanksgivings to God for every good work, either common ones, which are rendered for natural goods, as rain, serenity of weather, etc.; or special ones, which are owed to God for supernatural gifts, I concede; that special ones only, I deny.

Corollary III. — That all the aforesaid and similar objections may be dissolved the more easily, it must be known, that although we grant that free arbitrium sometimes suffices for exercising some morally good work, nevertheless our mind is not, that without the aid of God any morally good work whatever can be done singly and distributively: for many natural goods are beset by grave temptations, and seem arduous: but without some divine aid grave temptations cannot be overcome, as the following Article will prove, nor on account of the weakness and infirmity of free arbitrium can we attempt and undertake anything arduous unless God aiding and divinely assisting: hence even though free arbitrium sometimes prevails for pursuing some morally and naturally good work, it is not to be inferred that it can undertake and carry out any good work whatever; nor likewise long persevere in the exercise of some good, on account of the immense temptations and continual struggle of concupiscence, and of the senses declining to the depraved and perverse corruption.