Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

NOTE 1. Concerning the present Question, there are, as we have said, two contending opinions. The first indeed is that of Luther, Calvin, and other heretics of our time, who teach that man, however holy and just, can do nothing good in this state of nature fallen and repaired, even with the help of grace itself: nay, that all his works are defiled and are to be accounted true sins; yet these do not harm him, nor are they imputed to him unto damnation, if he firmly believe that they are forgiven him by God, nor are they reckoned unto punishment. The second, however, is that of John Hus, to which Michael Baius seems to have subscribed, teaching that sanctifying grace is so necessary for the exercise of any good that, in its absence, all the works of man would be sins: for among the erroneous propositions asserted in his writings or sayings, and proscribed and condemned by the supreme Pontiffs Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Urban VIII, is this, number 27: Free will without the aid of the grace of God avails only for sinning. There also is condemned that proposition number 39: Every love of a rational creature is either vicious concupiscence, by which the world is loved, which John forbids: or that laudable charity, by which God is loved through the Holy Spirit diffused in the heart. Likewise this one, number 39: In all his acts the sinner serves dominant concupiscence. From which it appears that he wished to hold not only that no one can avoid sin without sanctifying grace, and that all the works which can be done in its absence are sins, but also that whatever is not done from the principle and motive of charity is truly reckoned among sins: whence the proposition which is number 25 states: All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of the Philosophers are vices.

NOTE 2. The present difficulty is not raised about the actions of man, but about human actions, that is, about those which proceed from the judgment of reason and deliberate will; which actions (as we have proved in our moral Philosophy) are good, or indifferent, or vicious. They can indeed possess either goodness, namely moral and natural, or meritorious and supernatural. In this especially they are distinguished from one another: that the first is constituted by the sole conformity which the act has with right reason and prudence; but the second proceeds from the influx of grace and charity, referring our acts to a supernatural end. From the preceding Question it is clear that man cannot elicit any work of the supernatural order meritorious of eternal life without sanctifying grace: whether, however, in its absence he cannot exercise certain acts naturally and morally good — this must be determined here.

NOTE 3. The moral goodness of acts is drawn chiefly from a threefold source: namely, the object, the end, and the circumstances. From the object indeed, not as it is regarded in itself and according to its entity; but as it is conformable to right reason; for this is the distinction between the intellectual and the moral virtues, that the intellectual virtues consider the object inasmuch as it is in itself: but the moral virtues are concerned with the object inasmuch as it accords with right reason. From the end, moreover, while namely the act tends toward a congruous end, conformable to the right dictate of the conscience of reason; and this through licit and ordered means; for it can happen that an act tend toward an excellent end, which nonetheless will be vicious: suppose, if it be proposed as to be obtained through vitiated and perverse means: thus health to be acquired for the exercise of acts of charity, and for serving God more freely and easily, is an act good from the end; yet it can be most wicked, if namely that restoration of health were procured through sorceries and the aid of demons: whence, that any act may be accounted good from the end, it is necessary that it tend toward it through congruous means. Finally, from the circumstances an act is judged good when it is affected by those circumstances and conditions which right reason sees to be required on the part of person, place, time, etc.

These things having been premised, two things must be established in this Question: First, that the works of the faithful existing in sanctifying grace are not sins. Second, that the faithful defiled by mortal sin can sometimes elicit morally good works.

First Conclusion. — It is heretical to assert that all the works of a man who is just and existing in sanctifying grace are sins. The truth of this Conclusion is evident from the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 25, decreeing: If anyone shall say that in any good work the just man sins at least venially, or — what is more intolerable — mortally, etc., let him be anathema.

And it is proved first: Sacred Scripture very often exhorts us to the exercise of good works, and commends the works of just men: but it is impious to assert that it leads us to perpetrating vicious works, and extols the sins of men with praises: therefore, etc. The major is evident from various texts of that sacred Scripture. Thus Matthew 5, Christ the Lord addressing His disciples and followers says: Let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works. And to Titus 2: The grace of God hath appeared to all men, instructing us, that denying impiety and worldly desires, we should live soberly, justly, and godly in this world, etc. Similarly He commends the works of the just. For Job 2: In all these Job did not sin with his lips. Weighing which words Saint Gregory says: Of blessed Job testimony is borne both of his mouth and of his heart, who both checked fault from his tongue and cleansed it from his heart. So also 3 Kings, chapter 14, God rebuking the impiety of Jeroboam through an Angel, says: Thou hast not been as my servant David, who kept my commandments, and followed me with all his heart, doing that which was pleasing in my sight. And Matthew 26: Why do you trouble this woman? for she hath wrought a good work upon me. Whence Matthew 25 the just Judge calls the Elect to the heavenly kingdom: For I was hungry, and you gave me to eat, etc.; by which He signifies that they are given eternal reward because they exercised works of mercy. Whence Saint Peter admonished the faithful, chapter 2 of his second epistle, verse 1: Endeavour that by your good works you may make sure your calling. For in doing these things you will never sin.

It is evident also by reason. A just man is bound to keep the divine precepts prescribed to him, and to render this he has the powers necessary, divine aid shining forth upon him: for God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding He both admonishes thee to do what thou canst and to ask what thou canst not, and He aids thee that thou mayest be able to ask, as the Council of Trent teaches, session 6, chapter 11: but a man fulfilling the divine commandments cannot be judged to be doing anything evil: otherwise God would command what is evil, and would be accounted the author of sin: which assuredly it is impious to assert: therefore it must be confessed that a just man exercises good works.

The heretics will object that Psalm 13: There is none that doeth good, there is not even one: therefore there is no one in any state who executes some good work. Moreover Psalm 142 the royal Bard prays: Enter not into judgment with thy servant, O Lord, for in thy sight no man living shall be justified: therefore no one is free from sin and guilt, so that from his works he should not have that whereby he is condemned. Finally they object Isaiah 61: We are become all as unclean, and all our justices as a rag of a menstruous woman: therefore truly no man is free from guilt, and all the works of the just, however holy they appear, are truly sins. — I deny the consequence: for far different is the sense of the aforesaid texts of sacred Scripture from that intended by the heretics. For I say first, that the discourse there is concerning Atheists, of whom mention had been made in the preceding verse: The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God. Or if it be extended more broadly, it can be said that the Psalmist spoke not in the rigor of speech, but by metonymy, by which a few are accustomed to stand for all; which assuredly is not infrequent, nor unusual in Scripture: for thus Genesis 6 we read that All flesh had corrupted their way, when nevertheless it is said there that Noe was just and perfect in his generations, and walked with God, and found grace before the Lord. — To the second I say, that by those words is signified that man cannot appear just in every respect in the sight of God, that is, if he be compared with God: not that truly in himself he is not just, but that his justice, if compared with the divine, scarcely merits the name of justice, namely in that manner in which the stars, although most lucid in themselves, nevertheless when compared with the sun seem deprived of all light: in which sense Job said, chapter 1 (9): Can man be justified in comparison with God? — To the third I say then, that this was said of the most wicked Jews of that time, whose legal justices were not only empty of grace and merit, but stained with many sins. Nor does it stand in the way that Isaias speaks in the common voice, as though he counted his own justice depraved together with the rest of the Jews: for this he did after the manner of the Prophets, who, even though just, while they bewail the crimes of men, are wont to attribute them to themselves out of study for humility, or affection of charity, that thus they may bend God more easily and efficaciously to clemency.

Second Conclusion. — A sinner destitute of sanctifying grace can exercise some morally, or honestly good work. And accordingly not all his works before justification are sins. Thus Doctor Subtilis in 2. dist. 28. and the Seraphic Doctor, in the same place.

It is proved first by the authority of Councils, but especially of the Council of Constance, session 15, in which the errors of John

Hus are related and condemned, who in article 10 held: Without sanctifying grace no good work can be done, and consequently all the works of a sinner are sins. Similarly the Council of Trent, session 6, Canon 7, decrees: If anyone shall say that all the works which are done before justification... are truly sins, let him be anathema. And by Canon 6 he is condemned who says that the fear of hell is evil: but this fear is found in sinners before the attainment of the grace of justification: therefore the Council holds that whatever things are done by sinners before the attainment of justification are not sins.

It is proved also by the definition of the supreme Pontiffs Pius V, Gregory VIII, and Urban VIII, condemning the propositions of Nichaëlis Baius, as was said in the 1st Notable.

Thirdly, the truth of this assertion is evident from sacred Scripture; for Luke 11 Christ exhorts sinners to bestow alms and to exercise mercy toward the poor, saying: Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you: but He would exhort to something impious if alms could not be done by a sinful man without sin: therefore Christ the Lord holds that a sinner, before the attainment of the grace of justification, can elicit some morally good work. Similarly Daniel advised King Nabuchodonosor that he redeem his sins with alms: but sins can in no way be redeemed by wicked and sinful works: therefore alms done by a sinner, with the intention of relieving another's misery, is not a sinful work, but morally good and honest.

This same truth is confirmed by all those oracles of the Holy Fathers by which, as the following Question will make manifest, they teach that nature avails for good, and that infidels sometimes exercise moral good, and moreover possess true virtues: for if infidels can do this, much more sinners, who are enlightened by faith.

Moreover this truth is urged by reason: By natural and divine law the works of the virtues of justice, religion, mercy, etc. are commanded even to unjust men: but they would not be commanded unless men could execute them without admixture of sin, and unless they were honest in every respect: therefore it must be that those works elicited by a sinner are honest.

The Subtle Doctor adds, in 2. dist. 28, number 4, that he who asserts that a sinner can do no good does not seem to say anything other than to pervert all who have once committed mortal sin, so that afterward they do no good work of its kind; to which nevertheless they are elsewhere bound: when yet they ought to be persuaded and moved to the opposite, namely that they do good works of their kind, because these dispose them toward obtaining grace more quickly and easily.

You will say 1: God turns away His face from the praises, prayers, and sacrifices which are made by sinners: therefore all the works of sinners are evil. The antecedent is evident from Psalm 4: But God hath said to the sinner: Why dost thou declare my justices, and take my covenant in thy mouth? And from Isaiah 1: To what purpose do you offer me the multitude of your victims? saith the Lord, etc. Offer sacrifice no more in vain. Incense is an abomination to me.... And when you stretch forth your hands I will turn away my eyes from you; for your hands are full of blood. — I distinguish the antecedent: God turns away from and execrates those things because they are done irreverently, and against the prescription of the law and the pleasure of God, this I concede: precisely because they are offered by sinners, this I deny. Or otherwise: things offered by sinners out of fear of punishment, with the intention of persevering in sins, are unpleasing to God, this I concede: simply and precisely because they are offered by men existing in sin, this I deny. To these add that the Prophet speaks especially of the Jews performing all these things not from affection of religion and honesty, but with a hypocritical and profane mind, and placing all the force of justice in that external worship; whence chapter 20 (29) he complains of them, saying: This people honoureth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me.

You will say 2: From St. Matthew chapter 7: An evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit: but that evil tree designates the sinner: therefore he cannot bring forth fruits of good works, — I distinguish the minor: the sinner acting from an evil intention and perverse will is designated, this I concede: simply and absolutely, because he is a sinner, this I deny: for thus St. Augustine interprets the aforesaid passage, book 1 Contra Iulianum, chapter 3: Therefore not insofar as he is man, which is the work of God; but insofar as anyone is of an evil will, he is an evil tree, and cannot bring forth good fruit.

You will insist: If by the evil tree be understood the sinner acting from an evil will, then the sinner will not be able to be discerned and known by his works, because a good thing by reason of its office can be done from an evil end and evil will: but the consequence conflicts with the intention of Christ saying by their fruits you shall know them: therefore by the evil tree the sinner is simply understood. — I deny the consequence of the major: for although a sinner can sometimes do certain works good by reason of the object with an evil will; nevertheless he rarely accomplishes this, and from his ordinary works he can easily be recognized for what sort he is, not only by intention and end, but also by object. This only, however, does Christ the Lord intend to signify, namely that from the daily conversation of each one his morals can easily be uncovered and recognized.

You will urge: As evil works contaminate the will from which they proceed, even if those works are substantially good in themselves; so conversely a perverse will defiles all works which arise from it, even if they are good in themselves from elsewhere: but the will of a sinner is perverse: therefore, etc. — I deny the parity: and the reason of the disparity is, that the will is therefore defiled by all its evil acts because it is per se their cause; but although the works of an evil will are its effects, they are not however defiled by it because they are its effects, just as the will is per se good, though per accidens evil. Thus while a proud man bestows alms, that act is per se the act of a merciful man, and per accidens of a proud man.

You will say 3: All the acts of a man existing in mortal sin are referred to an evil end on the part of the agent: therefore they are morally evil. The consequence is evident, for a perverse end vitiates and disorders the act. The antecedent is proved: a sinner orders all that he desires toward a private good; for the last end of a sinner is either the sinner himself, or the good of the sinner himself; but that end is perverse and vicious: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the antecedent: all evil acts which are truly mortal sins, this I concede: those which are either merely venial sins, or honest works, this I deny. For only by those works is the sinner judged to constitute and desire himself or his private good as a last end, through which grace and charity are destroyed and eliminated, which ought to direct all the works of man to Him as their last end: but these are destroyed only privatively by mortal sins: for venial sins, or honest works, elicited by a sinner, do not conflict privatively with charity and grace, but only cut themselves off from it, inasmuch namely as they are not referred to God as to a last end: therefore by these the sinner does not positively regard himself as a last end.

You will say 4: Whatever is done by man is done either from charity or from concupiscence, as St. Augustine teaches in many places, especially book 9 De Trinitate, chapters 7 and 8: but charity is not distinguished from sanctifying grace: therefore what is not done from sanctifying grace must needs be done from concupiscence, which St. Paul calls the root of all evils. — I distinguish the minor: perfect charity is not distinguished from sanctifying grace, this I concede: inchoate charity, this I deny. For charity is twofold according to St. Augustine in the book Natura et gratia, chapter 70: Charity, he says, inchoate, is justice inchoate: charity advanced, is justice advanced: charity perfect, is justice perfect. Moreover inchoate charity is twofold: one indeed by reason of motive, when God is indeed loved, but more for our utility than for His glory: the other by reason of degree, when namely God is loved for Himself, but more remissly and with lesser ardor. But charity imperfect in the former manner is not sanctifying grace, but only perfect charity at least by reason of motive, when namely God is loved for Himself.

You will urge: Therefore at least without this inchoate charity no good work can be done: but that is not in sinners: therefore they can exercise no good work. — I distinguish the minor: sinners do not have inchoate charity by reason of state, and such as is supernatural, this I concede: by reason of motive, and such as is purely natural and moral, this I deny. For, as will be proved below, men can love God above all things without any aid of supernatural order of grace, as the Author of nature, and their most liberal benefactor and preserver; which love seems to be a kind of initial natural charity. The remaining things which are wont to be objected against our assertion will solve