Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Claude Frassen

Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Claude Frassen (1620–1711)


Tractatus I: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio

Praeludia I: Praeludia Theologica

Disputatio I: De Existentia et Necessitate Gratiae

Articulus I: De necessitate gratiae ad verum cognoscendum

Quaestio I: An possit homo in statu naturae lapsae, absque speciali divinae gratiae auxilio, omnes veritates naturales speculativas cognoscere.

Quaestio II: AN ET QUALITER GRATIA SIT NECESSARIA AD VERUM MORALE DETEGENDUM.

Quaestio III

Articulus II: De necessitate gratiae ad bonum faciendum

Quaestio I: UTRUM HOMO POSSIT SINE ULLA GRATIA VELLE ET OPERARI BONUM SUPERNATURALIS ORDINIS.

NOTE 1. By the name of grace nothing else is here signified than actual grace, or that actual assistance and aid by which man is aroused, helped, and promoted to elicit works conducing to the attainment of eternal life. Nor indeed is the present difficulty concerned with sanctifying grace: for it is certain that it is not necessary for every supernatural work conduceing to salvation: since without it we can will and perform many works of the supernatural order and conducing to salvation; such, namely, are all those works by which sinners dispose themselves for sanctifying grace itself, of which the Council of Trent treats, session 6, chapter 6; such especially are acts of faith, hope, and fear of God, while sinners, considering themselves, turning from the fear of divine justice, wherewith they are profitably shaken, to the consideration of God's mercy, raise themselves up in hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ, and begin to love him as the fountain of all justice: so that thereby they may be moved against sins by some hatred and detestation, etc. All which acts assuredly conduce to justification, and consequently to eternal salvation; nor consequently is justifying grace required beforehand for them, for which they are dispositions and preparations.

NOTE 2. That although eternal happiness is to be merited by good works on the part of adults, as appears from innumerable texts of Scripture, in which it is promised afresh as to be granted, either by way of a reward due to laborers laboring rightly and faithfully, or under the title of a crown laid up for those fighting and conquering, or lastly by way of an inheritance prepared by God for his adopted sons — for, says the Apostle, Rom. 8, if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and co-heirs of Christ — nevertheless, as St. Augustine rightly teaches, that eternal happiness is called grace by the same Apostle: because, says the same author, book 3, De gratia et libero arbitrio, chapter 7, if our life is nothing else than the grace of God, without doubt eternal life also, which shall be rendered for a good life, is the grace of God: and indeed it is given gratis, nay gratis it was given to him to whom it is given. But that which is given is merely grace; this, however, which is given to him, because it is its reward, is grace for grace, as wages for justice. Unfolding this truth, he says: But perhaps you ask whether we have read in the Holy Scriptures grace for grace: but you have the Gospel according to John, most clear in so great light; where John the Baptist says of the Lord Christ: we all have received of his fullness, and grace for grace. Of his fullness therefore we have received, according to our measure, as it were our portions, that we may live well: as God hath parted to every one the measure of faith, because each one hath his proper gift from God; one thus, another thus, and this itself is grace: but moreover we receive also grace for grace, when eternal life shall be rendered to us, of which the Apostle said: the grace of God is life everlasting in Christ Jesus our Lord: whereas he had said before: the wages of sin is death. Wages deservedly, because the service of diabolical death rendereth the debt of eternal death. Wherein although he could say, and say rightly: but the wages of justice is life everlasting, he preferred to say: but the grace of God is life everlasting, that from this we might understand that God leads us to eternal life not for our merits, but through his mercy. From which it will easily be gathered that that happiness can be merited only by the aid and benefit of grace.

NOTE 3. That although there be innate in us an appetite for happiness, and consequently it be certain that it can be obtained — for we would not (says St. Augustine, book 1, Contra Iulianum, chapter 3) by natural instinct wish to be immortal and blessed unless we could be so — nevertheless that natural appetite does not incite us, nor spur us on at least elicitedly, toward eternal beatitude, whereby we are borne toward the good proposed, unless it be revealed; seeing that neither by innate light nor by light acquired by our own powers does such happiness appear: for, says the Apostle, neither eye hath seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what God hath prepared for them that love him. And straightway it is necessary that this blessed felicity be made known through some supernatural light of revelation or illumination. But that this external and bare revelation does not suffice, but that beyond it some supernatural and divine aid is desired, whereby it may be attained, must here be determined against both Pelagians and Semipelagians.

First Conclusion. — MAN CANNOT, BY HIS OWN POWERS AND WITHOUT SUPERNATURAL AID, WILL OR ACCOMPLISH ANY GOOD WORK THAT CONDUCES TO ETERNAL SALVATION. This is of faith against the Pelagians.

It is proved first from Sacred Scripture, namely from all those places which St. Augustine uses to uproot the erroneous dogma of the Pelagians. First indeed from the Old Testament, but especially from Psal. 24: my eyes are ever towards the Lord: for he shall pluck my feet out of the snare. And Psal. 20: In thy strength thou hast adorned my countenance with beauty. And Psal. 36: The steps of a man are directed by the Lord. And Psal. 126: Unless the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it. And Wisd. 8: I knew that I could not otherwise be continent except God gave it, etc. — But more openly and clearly this truth becomes known from the New Testament by almost innumerable oracles, and truly especially from these words, John 6: No man can come to me, except the Father who hath sent me draw him. And, No man can come to me, unless it were given him by my Father. Both texts St. Augustine weighs thus, book 1 ad Bonifacium, chapter 19: Whether this be given already to him willing to believe, on account of the merits of his good will, or rather that the will itself may believe, as Saul was excited from above, however bitter he might be against the faith, so as even to persecute believers… for why did the Lord command us to pray for them that persecute us? Do we pray for this, that the grace of God be requited to them for their good will, and not rather that their evil will be changed into good? — Likewise John 15: Without me you can do nothing. Which sentence St. Augustine weighs thus, Sermon 13 De Verbis Apostoli, chapter 12: The true Master, who flattereth no one, deceiveth no one, the truthful Doctor and likewise Savior, to whom led us that most troublesome Pelagian when he was speaking of good works, that is, of the fruits of branches and vine shoots; he does not say, without me you can indeed do something, but more easily through me: he does not say your fruit you can indeed do without me, but more abundant through me: he did not say this; read what he said…: without me you can do nothing. — Likewise Phil. 13: God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish. St. Augustine adds, book De Gratia Christi, chapter 5: Or as is read in other codices, and especially the Greek, both to will and to accomplish. See whether the Apostle did not long before cut off in holy spirit future adversaries of the grace of God, and these two, both to will and to accomplish, which he (Pelagius) willed to be ours in such wise that divine grace would not be aided by its own help, when he says God worketh in us. Let silence be granted to innumerable other texts of Sacred Scripture, which St. Augustine everywhere gathers most abundantly, and by which he roots out the Pelagian error.

It is proved secondly by the authority or decrees of all Councils in which the Pelagian heresy was proscribed and condemned. First indeed from the Council of Diospolis, in which, as was said in the first volume, twelve articles scattered by Pelagius and his followers were condemned, of which the seventh was this: that the grace of God, without its assistance, is not given for each single act, but that it belongs to free will, or to law and doctrine. Likewise in the Council of Milevis, or Carthage, chapter 4, it is enacted: both are gifts of God, both to know what we ought to do, and to love that we may do it. Further, from the Second Council of Orange, Canon 7: If anyone affirms that by the vigor of nature any good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life can be thought or chosen, or that it can be perceived without the illumination of the Holy Spirit, who bestows on all sweetness in consenting to and believing the truth, he is led astray by a heretical spirit. And Canon 9: It is a gift of God whenever we think rightly, and keep our feet from falsehood and injustice: for as often as we do good, God worketh in us and with us that we may work. Lastly from the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 3, it is enacted: If anyone shall say that without the preventing operation of the Holy Spirit and his assistance man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification be conferred upon him, let him be anathema.

It is proved thirdly from the holy Fathers, especially from St. Augustine in all those books which he published against the Pelagians; from which I judge that one or two sentences should be transcribed here. The first is taken from book 2, De Nuptiis et concupiscentia, chapter 3. If anyone, he says, says that in all men there is free will to worship God rightly without his help, he seems to be Caelestianus and Pelagius. The second is drawn from the book De Natura et gratia, chapter 1: if, he says, natural possibility suffices of itself through free will both for knowing how one ought to live and for living well, then Christ died gratuitously; then the offense of the cross is made void, etc. Which catholic and orthodox doctrine of St. Augustine the whole Church has embraced, which proscribed the dogma of the Pelagians as heretical under anathema.

Finally it is proved by reason: No faculty can tend beyond its own powers unless it be quickened and strengthened by some form superadded; but every act tending to eternal life is beyond the powers and property of the created intellect and will; for it is a motion toward a supernatural end; therefore no act of either faculty tending to eternal life can be produced by man except through a form superadded, which is of the supernatural order, and which raises and uplifts man to that same supernatural state. Whence, for the same reason, proportion being observed, the Christian ought to be formed and to act in order to eternal life as Christ was formed and acted: but Christ the Lord was formed through the Holy Spirit: for what was born of the Virgin is of the Holy Spirit; and he emitted all his acts only from a supernatural and divine principle, namely from the personality of the Word, and an intellect informed by divine wisdom, and a will illumined with all the charisms of grace: therefore Christian man ought likewise to act (especially in those things which pertain to salvation) from a supernatural principle. Which reason St. Fulgentius confirms and weighs thus elegantly, in the book De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi, chapter 20: For the form, which preceded in the flesh of Christ, let us acknowledge spiritually in our faith: for Christ the Son of God was made and born according to the flesh of the Holy Spirit. Therefore so in the heart of man faith can neither be conceived nor increased unless the Holy Spirit infuse and nourish it: for of the same Spirit are we born again, of whom Christ was born, etc.

Lastly, there ought to be a certain proportion between the principle, the means, and the end to be attained: but eternal felicity far exceeds the powers of nature, since it does not come to mind unless divinely revealed, nor can it be attained unless the mind be raised heavenward: therefore in order to obtain it it is necessary that there be some proportion between the soul and beatitude itself: but none whatsoever can exist except through the benefit of grace, whereby namely the human mind is elevated to the supernatural state: therefore this is absolutely necessary for attaining salvation.

They objected. 1. The Pelagians cited the example of the Centurion Cornelius, who, Acts 10, is said to have been religious and fearing God with all his house, giving many alms to the people, and always praying to God; wherefore he deserved to see in vision and rapture the Angel of God coming in and saying: Thy prayers are ascended in memory in the sight of the Lord, etc. Hence they argued: religion, fear of God, alms, and prayers of Cornelius were acceptable to God, and consequently contributed something to his salvation; yet Cornelius was not yet a believer, and consequently not yet aided by divine grace: for Cornelius learned the faith from Peter, as St. Augustine testifies, book 1, De baptismo, chapter 8; but when the Angel spoke to him he had not yet been imbued by Peter with faith and the mysteries, as appears from that history; therefore he was pleasing to God without faith; therefore someone can perform some good work conducing to eternal life without the special benefit of the grace of God, whose primary effect is faith. — I deny the minor: for although Cornelius had not yet believed explicitly in Christ the Lord, nor been imbued with the mysteries of faith by St. Peter, nevertheless he was not devoid of all faith, as St. Augustine testifies, book De Praedest. Sanctorum, c. T., where he says: What can be said of Cornelius, whose alms were accepted and prayers heard before he believed in Christ: yet he was not endowed without some faith, and prayed: or how invoked he, in whom he had not believed? But if he could be saved without faith in Christ, the architect Apostle Peter would not be sent to build him up. Whence he concludes: Whatever therefore, both before he believed in Christ and when he had believed, Cornelius wrought well, must be attributed wholly to God, lest perhaps anyone be extolled. Whence when St. Augustine, in the place cited in the objection, says the Centurion learned the faith of Christ from Peter, he must be understood of explicit and perfect faith through Christ: but when in the words praised shortly after he says he prayed and was endowed not without some faith, he speaks of inchoate faith, which tends toward God, such as seems to have been in the first Gentiles: further, this faith is called implicit, because those who believe in God are prepared also to believe in Christ, when it shall be revealed to them.

You will object 2. The work by which we are prepared for sanctifying grace and for attaining eternal life is a supernatural work; but a work of that kind is from us, and not from God alone specially concurring through grace. It is proved from various texts of Scripture, for in Prov. 16 we read: It is man's to prepare the soul, and the Lord's to govern the tongue. Zacharias 1: Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you. Matth. 19: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. Therefore this work, by which we are prepared for attaining eternal salvation and for intimate union with God, which is effected through sanctifying grace, is from us and elicited by our own powers. — I deny the minor, and I answer each part of that proof: as to the first, it is truly man's to prepare his soul, because God calls no one to himself except one willing; yet this preparation cannot be made without the special aid of God; for man cannot prepare his soul without good thought, which is given only by God: for we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God, says the Apostle 2 Cor. 3. — As to the second I say that it is indeed man's to convert himself to the Lord: but this cannot be done without the aid of God preventing and spurring him to conversion; whence as it is said Zacharias 1: Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you: so also it is read Lamentations 5: Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted. Whence, says the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5: When in Sacred Scripture it is said: Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you, we are admonished of our liberty. And when we answer: Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted, we confess that we are prevented by the grace of God. — As to the third authority I say that the observance of the commandments depends indeed upon our will, but not without the guard of divine grace: for God is he who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, says the Apostle Phil. 2.

You will object 3. If a good work conducing to salvation depended on the grace of God, God would be said to be an accepter of persons, because he would give grace to one rather than to another. Next, that grace would be something fortuitous and casual, because it would be conferred on one meriting nothing of the kind; nay even often resisting: but those consequences are utterly absurd; therefore, etc. — I deny the sequel of the major: for then only is respect of persons committed when a debt intervenes, such that what is owed to one be conferred on another, or that what is owed be given to one and denied to another; but not when he who owes nothing liberally and gratuitously bestows something on one, which he does not likewise bestow on another. As to the second I say that although grace is conferred on one meriting nothing and often resisting, nevertheless it ought not to be called something fortuitous or casual, but a gratuitous gift bestowed wholly by the wise Administrator of things, who distributes his gifts to each one with his highest prudence, as he wills.

You will object 4. There is no free will if it needs the aid of God; but there is free will; therefore it does not need the aid of God for performing those things which are necessary for salvation. — I deny the major: for grace, however fleeting, does not destroy free will but augments it, as will appear below, where we shall demonstrate the highest concord of human liberty with divine grace; whence St. Augustine, book 2, De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia, chapter 3, in order to remove from himself the reputation and injury wherewith Julian afflicted him, calling him a Manichaean because he believed he had said: If anyone shall say either that there is free will in men, or that God is the creator of them that are born, Caelestianus is called a Pelagian; and Julian afterwards subjoins: Therefore let them be called heretics, they become Manichaeans; and while they fear a false infamy, they incur true crime: like wild beasts, which are surrounded with wings that they may be driven into nets: that, I say, he might remove this injury from himself, he says: Therefore not as thou speakest, everywhere deceiving: If anyone shall say either that there is free will in men, or that God is the creator of them that are born, Caelestianus is called a Pelagian. For the Catholic faith does not say this, but says: If anyone shall say that there is free will in men to worship God rightly without his help: and whosoever thus speaks of God as the Creator of them that are born as to deny him as the Redeemer of little ones from the power of the devil: he himself is called Caelestianus and Pelagian. Therefore that free will is in men, and that God is the creator of them that are born, we shall assuredly say; hence you are not Caelestians and Pelagians: but that anyone is free to do good without the aid of God, and that little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness and so transferred into the kingdom of God, this you say: hence you are Caelestians and Pelagians. Other similar Pelagian objections they thrust forward, all of which St. Augustine diluted at length, and some of them he reported and repelled.

Second Conclusion. — Man cannot have any good supernatural affection, or beginning of faith, without the benefit of divine grace. This is against the Semipelagians,

It is proved by all those texts of Scripture by which in the preceding Question we declared faith to be a gift of God and grace properly so called. For St. Augustine uses them, in the books De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, to prove that the very beginning of faith is a benefit of grace, especially chapter 8, where he says: When the Gospel is preached, some believe, some do not believe: but they who believe hear inwardly and learn from the Father while the preacher sounds without; but they who do not believe hear without, hear not within, nor learn: that is, to these it is given to believe, to those it is not given; because no one, he says, cometh to me, except the Father who sent me draw him… Therefore to be drawn by the Father to Christ, and to hear and learn of the Father, that one come to Christ, is nothing else than to receive a gift from the Father, whereby he believe in Christ: for he was not distinguishing those hearing the Gospel from those not hearing it, but believers from unbelievers, who said: No man cometh to me, unless it were given him by my Father. Faith, therefore, both inchoate and perfect, is a gift of God: and that this gift is given to some and not given to others, let him not doubt at all who does not wish to contradict most manifest Holy Scriptures. Whence in chapter 2 he says that the opinion by which one asserts the beginning of faith not to be from God makes man compose with God, so that he vindicates to himself a part of faith, and leaves a part to God: and what is more lofty, he takes away the first himself, yields the second to God. If it pertains not, he says, to the grace of God that we began to believe, but rather that, for this reason, what is added to the good, that we believe more fully and more perfectly: then through this we give the beginnings of our faith first to God, that its supplement be rendered to us… Whoever therefore wishes to avoid this damnable opinion in every part, let him understand truly the saying of the Apostle: To you it is given for Christ, not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him. For he shows each to be the gift of God, because he said each was given. Nor does he say that ye may more fully and more perfectly believe in him, but to believe in him: nor did he say he had obtained mercy for himself that he might become more faithful, but that he might be faithful, because he knew that he had not offered to God the beginning of his faith as its prime mover, and received from him its increase, but that he had been made faithful by him, by whom also he was made Apostle.

It is proved secondly from the Council of Orange, Canon 5: If anyone says that the increase, as well as the beginning of faith, and the very affection of belief, whereby we believe in him who justifies the ungodly, and whereby we arrive at the regeneration of baptism, is not in us through the gift of grace, that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting our will from infidelity to faith, from impiety to piety, but that it is naturally in us, he is proved contrary to Apostolic doctrine, approving the blessed Apostle Peter saying: He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Reason also persuades the same thing; for the act by which the will moves the intellect efficaciously to assent to the things of faith is supernatural; therefore it cannot be possessed naturally. The consequence is plain: the antecedent is proved: the act of believing is an effect commanded by the will: for it moves the intellect efficaciously to assent to the revealed truth. Likewise its object is such: since the will loves the honesty and goodness found in such an act; but from the supernatural character of the effect and of the object is gathered the supernatural character of the act, which must bear upon them; for there is a necessary proportion between act and object: therefore the act of the will, whereby man is induced to believe, is supernatural, and consequently cannot be elicited without the aid of grace.

You will object 1. Cassianus on behalf of the Semipelagians: Zachaeus and the Thief anticipated the grace of God by their own desires and vows, and obtained it. For Zachaeus, Luke 19, when he sought to see Jesus who he was, merited to hear from him: Zachaeе, make haste and come down, for today I must abide in thy house: but the Thief, Luke 23, having said to Christ: Lord, remember me when thou shalt come into thy kingdom, merited to hear: This day shalt thou be with me in Paradise. Therefore one can naturally desire the grace of Christ and obtain it, and consequently perform some good work, or at least will it, which pertains thereto. — Zachaeus and the Thief were prevented by the grace of God, says St. Prosper against the Collator, chapter 15: for he who shone in the heart of the Publican Matthew, then persecuting the Church, and of Paul, himself also shone in the heart of Zachaeus and in the heart of the crucified Thief with the Lord: unless perchance the word of the Lord was idle when he deigned to address Zachaeus, who sought to see him who he was: Zachaeе, make haste and come down, for today I must abide in thy house, and did not prepare for himself the mind of him whose lodging he chose. In the justification of the Thief too, even though no signs of operating grace were understood, should we not receive even him with all believers as drawn, the Lord saying: when I shall be lifted up from the earth I will draw all things to myself? Thus St. Prosper.

You will object 2. Cassianus, cited by St. Prosper, chapter 8: The Apostle openly testifies, Romans 1, that sometimes beginnings of good wills arise through the good of nature, which however, unless directed by God, cannot arrive at the consummation of virtues; for he says: To will is present with me; but to accomplish that which is good I find not: therefore he truly holds that the beginning of faith implanted in us is innate from nature.

I deny the consequence: for, says St. Prosper in the same place, the blessed Apostle did indeed say: to will is present with me, but to accomplish I find not. But the same said 2 Cor. 3: Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God: and Phil. 2 the same said: For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will.

Therefore the Apostle is not contrary to himself, but since the good will to will has been given to us, we do not at once find and do, unless seeking, asking, and knocking; He who gave the desire bestows the effect. For that voice of one saying: to will indeed lies close to me, but to accomplish the good I find not, was spoken by those called and placed under grace, who indeed take delight in the law of God according to the inward man, but see another law in their members war against the law of their mind and captivating them in the law of sin: and although he had received knowledge of willing rightly, yet he does not find within himself the virtue of doing those things which stand in the way, until for the good will he has taken upon himself he merit to find what he should do.

You will object 3. God, when He sees us inclining to will the good, comes to meet us, directs, and strengthens us. At the voice of thy cry (says Isaias, chapter 30) as soon as He shall hear, He will answer thee: and Psalm 29: Call upon me, He says, in the day of tribulation, and I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me. Therefore truly man of himself can have an affection for the good, which anticipates and attracts grace. — I deny the consequence, and to the antecedent Saint Prosper answers, chapter 7, that that proposition savors of Pelagianism.

For who, he says, does not see that this doctrine assigns merit to free will, whereby grace is anticipated, so that grace should serve it, rendering a debt, bestowing a gift? which definition was condemned even by Pelagius himself with anathema in the Synod of the Bishops of Palestine. For in him who begins to will the good, and desires to depart from iniquity and error, we profess that the grace of God works this very thing, since the steps of man are directed by the Lord, and He will well order his way.

You will object 1. Christ the Lord, rebuking the Pharisees, said Luke 12: And why even of yourselves do you not judge that which is just? But He would not have said this to them unless He had known from their natural judgment that they were able to discern what is just. Therefore He truly holds that men can by natural virtue know or do what is just. — I distinguish the minor: men can by natural judgment discern what is just by natural and moral equity, this I concede: by supernatural equity, conducing to salvation, and moreover to instituting Christian justice, this I deny. Whence Saint Prosper, chapter 23, responding to this objection, says: To attribute to free will, in the aforesaid objection, not only the will of good but also its possibility: as if intelligence, that is, justice, were required of them because they could produce these things from the goods of nature without the gifts of God. — By which he signifies that men cannot judge naturally concerning things pertaining to salvation to be instituted, and Evangelical justice to be formed.

Finally you will object Cassian's words, 3 Kings, chapter 6, by which Solomon declares to God how David, wishing to build a house to the name of the Lord God of Israel, was nevertheless forbidden by Him to fulfill his vow and desire. Whence he reasons thus: this thought and this design of King David — must it be said to be good and from God, or evil and from man? For if that thought was good and from God, why was he forbidden by Him by whom it was inspired to him? If and from man, why is he praised by the Lord? It remains therefore that it be believed to have been good and from man; after which manner we can also judge our own daily thoughts. For neither was it granted to David alone to think a good thing from himself, nor is it naturally denied to us that we should ever be able to know or think anything good. Thus Cassian. — Saint Prosper answers, chapter 25, that by this testimony and argument it is not proved that pious thoughts arise from free will alone, and not from the inspiration of God.

For the will of David, which was assuredly good, is not therefore to be believed not to have been from God, because the Lord willed that a temple not be built for Himself by him, but by his son.

For sometimes the Lord wills that things be not done which He had nonetheless inspired in men: for although the Lord commanded the Apostles to teach and baptize all nations, nevertheless Acts 16: They were forbidden by the Holy Ghost to speak the word of God in Asia. And again: when they attempted to go into Bithynia, they were forbidden by the Spirit of Jesus. Whence Saint Prosper subjoins:

Did they not have this will from God, namely that they desired to convert to the faith the hearts even of those whom God by a hidden judgment did not then wish to hear the Gospel? Or that the Church prays daily for her enemies, that is, for those who have not yet believed — does she not do this from the Spirit of God? Who would say this, unless one who does not do it, or who > thinks that faith is not a gift of God? And yet what is asked for all is not obtained for all: nor is there iniquity with God, who often does not grant what has been asked, though He gave the power to ask it.

Quaestio II

Quaestio III

Quaestio IV: **AN ET QUOMODO GRATIA NECESSARIA SIT AD DILIGENDUM DEUM UT AUCTOREM NATURAE.**

Quaestio V

Articulus III: De necessitate gratiae ad malum vitandum

Quaestio I: **QUALITER OPUS SIT DIVINAE GRATIAE AUXILIO AD TENTATIONES SUPERANDAS.**

Quaestio II

Quaestio III: **AN. ET QUALI HOMO INDIGEAT GRATIA AD PERSEVERANDUM IN FUGA MALI, ET BONI PROSECUTIONE.**

Disputatio II: De Essentia, Causis, et variis Gratiae Divisionibus

Articulus I: De essentia gratiae

Quaestio I: An gratia sit quid increatum vel creatum, intrinsecum vel extrinsecum, substantia vel accidens.

Quaestio II: **UTRUM, ET QUALITER GRATIA HABITUALIS DISTINGUATUR A CHARITATE.**

Quaestio III: **AN, ET QUALITER GRATIA HABITUALIS AUGERI POSSIT ET MINUI, CORRUMPI ET DEPERDI.**

Articulus II: De causis gratiae

Quaestio I: An, et qualiter Deus sit causa efficiens gratiae.

Quaestio II: An gratia creetur, vel educatur de potentia animae.

Quaestio III: **AN GRATIA IMMEDIATE SUBIECTETUR IN SUBSTANTIA, AN VERO IN FACULTATIBUS ANIMAE.**

Articulus III: De divisione et multiplici specie gratiae

Sectio I

Sectio II

Sectio III

Sectio IV

Disputatio III: De effectibus et praeccellentiis Gratiae sanctificantis

Articulus I: De dispositionibus ad gratiam sanctificantem desiderandis

Quaestio I: An homo sese disponere debeat ad gratiam iustificationis.

Quaestio II: An, et qualiter actus fidei concurrat ad iustificationem.

Quaestio III

Articulus II: De ipsa justificatione formali

Quaestio I: AN IUSTIFICATIO IMPII FIAT PER IUSTITIAM INHAERENTEM ET INTRINSECAM, AN AUTEM PER IMPUTATIVAM ET EXTERNAM.

Quaestio II: UTRUM IN IUSTIFICATIONE IMPII FIAT VERE REMISSIO PECCATORUM.

Quaestio III

Quaestio IV: AN, QUOT, ET QUAENAM INTERVENIANT MUTATIONES IN IUSTIFICATIONE PECCATORIS.

Articulus III: De causa formali et foecunditate nostrae justificationis

Quaestio I: An gratia sanctificans sit actus vel habitus, isque unicus aut multiplex.

Quaestio II: An iustitia semel habita possit per peccatum amitti.

Quaestio III: An, et qualiter homo possit esse certus de statu suae iustificationis.

Quaestio IV: Quaestio Quarta. Quale et quantum sit iustificationis beneficii

Appendix I: De merito bonorum operum

Quaestio I

Quaestio II: QUOTUPLEX SIT MERITUM.

Quaestio III: QUOT, ET QUAE SINT CONDITIONES AD MERITUM.

Quaestio IV: **DE PRAEMIO ET OBIECTO MERITI.**

Tractatus II: De Virtutibus Theologicis

Disputatio I: De virtute fidei divinae

Articulus I: De objecto fidei

Quaestio I

Quaestio II: In quid fieri debeat nostrae fidei resolutio, tamquam in motivum certum et infallibile, tam propositionis credendorum, quam assensus nostri.

Quaestio III

Quaestio IV: An symbolum, quod dicitur Apostolicum, sit vera ab ipsis Apostolis editum.

Quaestio V

Quaestio VI: **UTRUM OBIECTUM FIDEI SIT ITA NECESSARIO VERUM, UT NULLATENUS EI FALSUM SUBESSE POSSIT.**

Articulus II: De habitu fidei

Quaestio I: Utrum detur habitus fidei infusae iugiter in nobis perseverans.

Quaestio II: **QUID, ET QUALIS SIT FIDES HABITUALIS.**

Quaestio III: IN QUIBUS SUBIECTIS INSIT FIDEI INFUSAE HABITUS.

Quaestio IV: A quo, et qualiter fidei habitus producatur.

Articulus III: De actu fidei divinae

Quaestio I: Quid et quotuplex sit actus fidei internus.

Quaestio II: **UTRUM ASSENSUS DIVINAE FIDEI SIT CERTIOR QUOLIBET ASSENSU SCIENTIAE VEL NOTITIAE NATURALIS.**

Quaestio III: An, et quomodo actus internus fidei sit necessarius ad salutem.

Quaestio IV: An, et qualis actus voluntatis praerequiratur ad actum fidei.

Quaestio V: An quomodo, et quando fides sit externa profitenda.

Disputatio II: De spe divinitus infusa

Quaestio I

Quaestio II

Quaestio III: Quodnam sit subiectum spei theologicae, seu in quibus illa reperiatur.

Disputatio III: De virtute charitatis

Quaestio I

Quaestio II

Quaestio III

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