Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Since all the efficacy and operation of grace consist not only in illuminating the intellect in uncovering truth, but also in regulating the will in the effective pursuit of good and the aversion from evil, we proceed in due order from the operation of that grace concerning the knowledge of truth to investigate its necessity and efficacy with regard to the will in the pursuit of good. Now, since the good, which is the object of the will, is of one kind when it belongs to the supernatural order and conduces to the attainment of eternal life, and of another when it belongs to the natural order, which contributes toward a purely natural end; and moreover, since among the goods of the natural order one is good simply, which by nature befits the appetent subject — and this, according to the common state of things, is threefold: namely, purely natural, such as seeing, eating, sleeping, etc.; another artificial, such as building, painting, etc.; and finally another civil or political, such as the mutual cohabitation and association of citizens; and yet another moral, which accords with right reason and the honesty of morals — here there will be no discussion of what is naturally good simply, for it is certain that all those operations by which physical, artificial, and civil good is acquired can take place without any special help of grace. Therefore the present controversy concerns only moral good, both of the supernatural and even of the natural order, in resolving which heretics have varied most widely and contended in diverse ways. First indeed by Pelagius: for although his error was fickle and shifting, and on that account St. Prosper rightly called him the British Serpent because of his sinuous windings, since he could not be confined within any fixed opinion, even though he attempted with many verbal wrappings to veil and disguise his heresy; nevertheless all his evasions converged upon this one point, that he asserted free will to be of itself sufficient for performing every good that contributes to the establishment of salvation — although he did not ultimately refuse the benefit of grace, whereby each might live more easily uprightly and rightly and pursue the good, as St. Augustine relates at greater length, especially in Sermon 13 on the Words of the Apostle, chapter 12, where he says: Indeed (the Pelagians) say that the grace of God is an aid toward doing things more easily. These are their words: for this purpose, they say, God gave His grace to men, that what they are commanded to do by free will they may accomplish more easily through grace. More easily I desire, no one more difficultly, yet no one fails to arrive: by a beast of burden more easily, yet still on foot one arrives.

But Julian, a disciple of Pelagius, in order to evade the condemnation of his Master while not abandoning his heretical opinion, asserted that by the powers of nature the will of salutary good was present to us, but that the force and power of actually doing it resided only through the grace and help of God. Hence St. Augustine, in book 2 To Boniface, chapter 8, speaking of Julian and his followers, says: These men wish the desire of good in man to begin from man himself, so that the merit of this raised-up effort may attain also the grace of perfecting it. And in book 1 Against Julian, chapter 3, he says: You wish the striving for sanctity to proceed in the will of man without help, which God ought deservedly to assist not gratuitously. The Massilians, however, whom St. Prosper in his Epistle to St. Augustine calls the remnants of the Pelagians, and whom the theologians name Semi-Pelagians, because they refined in some part the heresy of the Pelagians, were chiefly involved in this error: that they asserted man could, without preventing grace, will to believe; but not that he could believe, or will or do any other good; and that by this natural affection of believing he would merit the help of healing grace.

To this threefold heretical sentence, proscribed by the Church, there extremely conflicts another triplex likewise condemned by the Church: the first is that of Luther, in the assertion of articles 6 and 36, of Calvin in book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, and of others whom Bellarmine records in book 5 On Grace and Free Will, chapter 4, affirming that man in the state of fallen nature cannot, not even with the grace and special help of God, do anything good, nor work anything however holy and just that is not sin; which, however, they say, is not imputed to the faithful who believe in Christ. The second is that of John Hus, among whose various errors related and condemned in the Council of Constance one was this: that he asserted no good work could be done without sanctifying grace, and consequently that all the works of a sinner are sins. Finally, the third was that of Michael Baius, who among the various propositions which we have set forth in the preliminaries as condemned by three supreme Pontiffs has this as number 25: All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of the philosophers are vices; and thereupon he judged that the grace of faith is so necessary that no moral good whatsoever can be done by infidels.

Therefore, that we may meet all these erroneous opinions that conflict extremely with Catholic truth and doctrine — since the principal dispute concerns the triple grace, actual, habitual, and of faith — five things must be established in this Article: first, whether actual grace is absolutely necessary for supernatural good conducing to the meriting of salvation. Second, whether sanctifying grace is necessary for every morally good work. Third, whether the grace of faith is prerequisite for the same work. Fourth, what grace is required for the love of God as Author of nature. Fifth, finally, what grace is necessary for keeping the commandments of God.

NOTE 1. By the name of grace nothing else is here signified than actual grace, or that actual assistance and aid by which man is aroused, helped, and promoted to elicit works conducing to the attainment of eternal life. Nor indeed is the present difficulty concerned with sanctifying grace: for it is certain that it is not necessary for every supernatural work conduceing to salvation: since without it we can will and perform many works of the supernatural order and conducing to salvation; such, namely, are all those works by which sinners dispose themselves for sanctifying grace itself, of which the Council of Trent treats, session 6, chapter 6; such especially are acts of faith, hope, and fear of God, while sinners, considering themselves, turning from the fear of divine justice, wherewith they are profitably shaken, to the consideration of God's mercy, raise themselves up in hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ, and begin to love him as the fountain of all justice: so that thereby they may be moved against sins by some hatred and detestation, etc. All which acts assuredly conduce to justification, and consequently to eternal salvation; nor consequently is justifying grace required beforehand for them, for which they are dispositions and preparations.

NOTE 2. That although eternal happiness is to be merited by good works on the part of adults, as appears from innumerable texts of Scripture, in which it is promised afresh as to be granted, either by way of a reward due to laborers laboring rightly and faithfully, or under the title of a crown laid up for those fighting and conquering, or lastly by way of an inheritance prepared by God for his adopted sons — for, says the Apostle, Rom. 8, if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and co-heirs of Christ — nevertheless, as St. Augustine rightly teaches, that eternal happiness is called grace by the same Apostle: because, says the same author, book 3, De gratia et libero arbitrio, chapter 7, if our life is nothing else than the grace of God, without doubt eternal life also, which shall be rendered for a good life, is the grace of God: and indeed it is given gratis, nay gratis it was given to him to whom it is given. But that which is given is merely grace; this, however, which is given to him, because it is its reward, is grace for grace, as wages for justice. Unfolding this truth, he says: But perhaps you ask whether we have read in the Holy Scriptures grace for grace: but you have the Gospel according to John, most clear in so great light; where John the Baptist says of the Lord Christ: we all have received of his fullness, and grace for grace. Of his fullness therefore we have received, according to our measure, as it were our portions, that we may live well: as God hath parted to every one the measure of faith, because each one hath his proper gift from God; one thus, another thus, and this itself is grace: but moreover we receive also grace for grace, when eternal life shall be rendered to us, of which the Apostle said: the grace of God is life everlasting in Christ Jesus our Lord: whereas he had said before: the wages of sin is death. Wages deservedly, because the service of diabolical death rendereth the debt of eternal death. Wherein although he could say, and say rightly: but the wages of justice is life everlasting, he preferred to say: but the grace of God is life everlasting, that from this we might understand that God leads us to eternal life not for our merits, but through his mercy. From which it will easily be gathered that that happiness can be merited only by the aid and benefit of grace.

NOTE 3. That although there be innate in us an appetite for happiness, and consequently it be certain that it can be obtained — for we would not (says St. Augustine, book 1, Contra Iulianum, chapter 3) by natural instinct wish to be immortal and blessed unless we could be so — nevertheless that natural appetite does not incite us, nor spur us on at least elicitedly, toward eternal beatitude, whereby we are borne toward the good proposed, unless it be revealed; seeing that neither by innate light nor by light acquired by our own powers does such happiness appear: for, says the Apostle, neither eye hath seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what God hath prepared for them that love him. And straightway it is necessary that this blessed felicity be made known through some supernatural light of revelation or illumination. But that this external and bare revelation does not suffice, but that beyond it some supernatural and divine aid is desired, whereby it may be attained, must here be determined against both Pelagians and Semipelagians.

First Conclusion. — MAN CANNOT, BY HIS OWN POWERS AND WITHOUT SUPERNATURAL AID, WILL OR ACCOMPLISH ANY GOOD WORK THAT CONDUCES TO ETERNAL SALVATION. This is of faith against the Pelagians.

It is proved first from Sacred Scripture, namely from all those places which St. Augustine uses to uproot the erroneous dogma of the Pelagians. First indeed from the Old Testament, but especially from Psal. 24: my eyes are ever towards the Lord: for he shall pluck my feet out of the snare. And Psal. 20: In thy strength thou hast adorned my countenance with beauty. And Psal. 36: The steps of a man are directed by the Lord. And Psal. 126: Unless the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it. And Wisd. 8: I knew that I could not otherwise be continent except God gave it, etc. — But more openly and clearly this truth becomes known from the New Testament by almost innumerable oracles, and truly especially from these words, John 6: No man can come to me, except the Father who hath sent me draw him. And, No man can come to me, unless it were given him by my Father. Both texts St. Augustine weighs thus, book 1 ad Bonifacium, chapter 19: Whether this be given already to him willing to believe, on account of the merits of his good will, or rather that the will itself may believe, as Saul was excited from above, however bitter he might be against the faith, so as even to persecute believers… for why did the Lord command us to pray for them that persecute us? Do we pray for this, that the grace of God be requited to them for their good will, and not rather that their evil will be changed into good? — Likewise John 15: Without me you can do nothing. Which sentence St. Augustine weighs thus, Sermon 13 De Verbis Apostoli, chapter 12: The true Master, who flattereth no one, deceiveth no one, the truthful Doctor and likewise Savior, to whom led us that most troublesome Pelagian when he was speaking of good works, that is, of the fruits of branches and vine shoots; he does not say, without me you can indeed do something, but more easily through me: he does not say your fruit you can indeed do without me, but more abundant through me: he did not say this; read what he said…: without me you can do nothing. — Likewise Phil. 13: God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish. St. Augustine adds, book De Gratia Christi, chapter 5: Or as is read in other codices, and especially the Greek, both to will and to accomplish. See whether the Apostle did not long before cut off in holy spirit future adversaries of the grace of God, and these two, both to will and to accomplish, which he (Pelagius) willed to be ours in such wise that divine grace would not be aided by its own help, when he says God worketh in us. Let silence be granted to innumerable other texts of Sacred Scripture, which St. Augustine everywhere gathers most abundantly, and by which he roots out the Pelagian error.

It is proved secondly by the authority or decrees of all Councils in which the Pelagian heresy was proscribed and condemned. First indeed from the Council of Diospolis, in which, as was said in the first volume, twelve articles scattered by Pelagius and his followers were condemned, of which the seventh was this: that the grace of God, without its assistance, is not given for each single act, but that it belongs to free will, or to law and doctrine. Likewise in the Council of Milevis, or Carthage, chapter 4, it is enacted: both are gifts of God, both to know what we ought to do, and to love that we may do it. Further, from the Second Council of Orange, Canon 7: If anyone affirms that by the vigor of nature any good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life can be thought or chosen, or that it can be perceived without the illumination of the Holy Spirit, who bestows on all sweetness in consenting to and believing the truth, he is led astray by a heretical spirit. And Canon 9: It is a gift of God whenever we think rightly, and keep our feet from falsehood and injustice: for as often as we do good, God worketh in us and with us that we may work. Lastly from the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 3, it is enacted: If anyone shall say that without the preventing operation of the Holy Spirit and his assistance man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification be conferred upon him, let him be anathema.

It is proved thirdly from the holy Fathers, especially from St. Augustine in all those books which he published against the Pelagians; from which I judge that one or two sentences should be transcribed here. The first is taken from book 2, De Nuptiis et concupiscentia, chapter 3. If anyone, he says, says that in all men there is free will to worship God rightly without his help, he seems to be Caelestianus and Pelagius. The second is drawn from the book De Natura et gratia, chapter 1: if, he says, natural possibility suffices of itself through free will both for knowing how one ought to live and for living well, then Christ died gratuitously; then the offense of the cross is made void, etc. Which catholic and orthodox doctrine of St. Augustine the whole Church has embraced, which proscribed the dogma of the Pelagians as heretical under anathema.

Finally it is proved by reason: No faculty can tend beyond its own powers unless it be quickened and strengthened by some form superadded; but every act tending to eternal life is beyond the powers and property of the created intellect and will; for it is a motion toward a supernatural end; therefore no act of either faculty tending to eternal life can be produced by man except through a form superadded, which is of the supernatural order, and which raises and uplifts man to that same supernatural state. Whence, for the same reason, proportion being observed, the Christian ought to be formed and to act in order to eternal life as Christ was formed and acted: but Christ the Lord was formed through the Holy Spirit: for what was born of the Virgin is of the Holy Spirit; and he emitted all his acts only from a supernatural and divine principle, namely from the personality of the Word, and an intellect informed by divine wisdom, and a will illumined with all the charisms of grace: therefore Christian man ought likewise to act (especially in those things which pertain to salvation) from a supernatural principle. Which reason St. Fulgentius confirms and weighs thus elegantly, in the book De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi, chapter 20: For the form, which preceded in the flesh of Christ, let us acknowledge spiritually in our faith: for Christ the Son of God was made and born according to the flesh of the Holy Spirit. Therefore so in the heart of man faith can neither be conceived nor increased unless the Holy Spirit infuse and nourish it: for of the same Spirit are we born again, of whom Christ was born, etc.

Lastly, there ought to be a certain proportion between the principle, the means, and the end to be attained: but eternal felicity far exceeds the powers of nature, since it does not come to mind unless divinely revealed, nor can it be attained unless the mind be raised heavenward: therefore in order to obtain it it is necessary that there be some proportion between the soul and beatitude itself: but none whatsoever can exist except through the benefit of grace, whereby namely the human mind is elevated to the supernatural state: therefore this is absolutely necessary for attaining salvation.

They objected. 1. The Pelagians cited the example of the Centurion Cornelius, who, Acts 10, is said to have been religious and fearing God with all his house, giving many alms to the people, and always praying to God; wherefore he deserved to see in vision and rapture the Angel of God coming in and saying: Thy prayers are ascended in memory in the sight of the Lord, etc. Hence they argued: religion, fear of God, alms, and prayers of Cornelius were acceptable to God, and consequently contributed something to his salvation; yet Cornelius was not yet a believer, and consequently not yet aided by divine grace: for Cornelius learned the faith from Peter, as St. Augustine testifies, book 1, De baptismo, chapter 8; but when the Angel spoke to him he had not yet been imbued by Peter with faith and the mysteries, as appears from that history; therefore he was pleasing to God without faith; therefore someone can perform some good work conducing to eternal life without the special benefit of the grace of God, whose primary effect is faith. — I deny the minor: for although Cornelius had not yet believed explicitly in Christ the Lord, nor been imbued with the mysteries of faith by St. Peter, nevertheless he was not devoid of all faith, as St. Augustine testifies, book De Praedest. Sanctorum, c. T., where he says: What can be said of Cornelius, whose alms were accepted and prayers heard before he believed in Christ: yet he was not endowed without some faith, and prayed: or how invoked he, in whom he had not believed? But if he could be saved without faith in Christ, the architect Apostle Peter would not be sent to build him up. Whence he concludes: Whatever therefore, both before he believed in Christ and when he had believed, Cornelius wrought well, must be attributed wholly to God, lest perhaps anyone be extolled. Whence when St. Augustine, in the place cited in the objection, says the Centurion learned the faith of Christ from Peter, he must be understood of explicit and perfect faith through Christ: but when in the words praised shortly after he says he prayed and was endowed not without some faith, he speaks of inchoate faith, which tends toward God, such as seems to have been in the first Gentiles: further, this faith is called implicit, because those who believe in God are prepared also to believe in Christ, when it shall be revealed to them.

You will object 2. The work by which we are prepared for sanctifying grace and for attaining eternal life is a supernatural work; but a work of that kind is from us, and not from God alone specially concurring through grace. It is proved from various texts of Scripture, for in Prov. 16 we read: It is man's to prepare the soul, and the Lord's to govern the tongue. Zacharias 1: Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you. Matth. 19: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. Therefore this work, by which we are prepared for attaining eternal salvation and for intimate union with God, which is effected through sanctifying grace, is from us and elicited by our own powers. — I deny the minor, and I answer each part of that proof: as to the first, it is truly man's to prepare his soul, because God calls no one to himself except one willing; yet this preparation cannot be made without the special aid of God; for man cannot prepare his soul without good thought, which is given only by God: for we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God, says the Apostle 2 Cor. 3. — As to the second I say that it is indeed man's to convert himself to the Lord: but this cannot be done without the aid of God preventing and spurring him to conversion; whence as it is said Zacharias 1: Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you: so also it is read Lamentations 5: Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted. Whence, says the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5: When in Sacred Scripture it is said: Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you, we are admonished of our liberty. And when we answer: Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted, we confess that we are prevented by the grace of God. — As to the third authority I say that the observance of the commandments depends indeed upon our will, but not without the guard of divine grace: for God is he who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, says the Apostle Phil. 2.

You will object 3. If a good work conducing to salvation depended on the grace of God, God would be said to be an accepter of persons, because he would give grace to one rather than to another. Next, that grace would be something fortuitous and casual, because it would be conferred on one meriting nothing of the kind; nay even often resisting: but those consequences are utterly absurd; therefore, etc. — I deny the sequel of the major: for then only is respect of persons committed when a debt intervenes, such that what is owed to one be conferred on another, or that what is owed be given to one and denied to another; but not when he who owes nothing liberally and gratuitously bestows something on one, which he does not likewise bestow on another. As to the second I say that although grace is conferred on one meriting nothing and often resisting, nevertheless it ought not to be called something fortuitous or casual, but a gratuitous gift bestowed wholly by the wise Administrator of things, who distributes his gifts to each one with his highest prudence, as he wills.

You will object 4. There is no free will if it needs the aid of God; but there is free will; therefore it does not need the aid of God for performing those things which are necessary for salvation. — I deny the major: for grace, however fleeting, does not destroy free will but augments it, as will appear below, where we shall demonstrate the highest concord of human liberty with divine grace; whence St. Augustine, book 2, De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia, chapter 3, in order to remove from himself the reputation and injury wherewith Julian afflicted him, calling him a Manichaean because he believed he had said: If anyone shall say either that there is free will in men, or that God is the creator of them that are born, Caelestianus is called a Pelagian; and Julian afterwards subjoins: Therefore let them be called heretics, they become Manichaeans; and while they fear a false infamy, they incur true crime: like wild beasts, which are surrounded with wings that they may be driven into nets: that, I say, he might remove this injury from himself, he says: Therefore not as thou speakest, everywhere deceiving: If anyone shall say either that there is free will in men, or that God is the creator of them that are born, Caelestianus is called a Pelagian. For the Catholic faith does not say this, but says: If anyone shall say that there is free will in men to worship God rightly without his help: and whosoever thus speaks of God as the Creator of them that are born as to deny him as the Redeemer of little ones from the power of the devil: he himself is called Caelestianus and Pelagian. Therefore that free will is in men, and that God is the creator of them that are born, we shall assuredly say; hence you are not Caelestians and Pelagians: but that anyone is free to do good without the aid of God, and that little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness and so transferred into the kingdom of God, this you say: hence you are Caelestians and Pelagians. Other similar Pelagian objections they thrust forward, all of which St. Augustine diluted at length, and some of them he reported and repelled.

Second Conclusion. — Man cannot have any good supernatural affection, or beginning of faith, without the benefit of divine grace. This is against the Semipelagians,

It is proved by all those texts of Scripture by which in the preceding Question we declared faith to be a gift of God and grace properly so called. For St. Augustine uses them, in the books De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, to prove that the very beginning of faith is a benefit of grace, especially chapter 8, where he says: When the Gospel is preached, some believe, some do not believe: but they who believe hear inwardly and learn from the Father while the preacher sounds without; but they who do not believe hear without, hear not within, nor learn: that is, to these it is given to believe, to those it is not given; because no one, he says, cometh to me, except the Father who sent me draw him… Therefore to be drawn by the Father to Christ, and to hear and learn of the Father, that one come to Christ, is nothing else than to receive a gift from the Father, whereby he believe in Christ: for he was not distinguishing those hearing the Gospel from those not hearing it, but believers from unbelievers, who said: No man cometh to me, unless it were given him by my Father. Faith, therefore, both inchoate and perfect, is a gift of God: and that this gift is given to some and not given to others, let him not doubt at all who does not wish to contradict most manifest Holy Scriptures. Whence in chapter 2 he says that the opinion by which one asserts the beginning of faith not to be from God makes man compose with God, so that he vindicates to himself a part of faith, and leaves a part to God: and what is more lofty, he takes away the first himself, yields the second to God. If it pertains not, he says, to the grace of God that we began to believe, but rather that, for this reason, what is added to the good, that we believe more fully and more perfectly: then through this we give the beginnings of our faith first to God, that its supplement be rendered to us… Whoever therefore wishes to avoid this damnable opinion in every part, let him understand truly the saying of the Apostle: To you it is given for Christ, not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him. For he shows each to be the gift of God, because he said each was given. Nor does he say that ye may more fully and more perfectly believe in him, but to believe in him: nor did he say he had obtained mercy for himself that he might become more faithful, but that he might be faithful, because he knew that he had not offered to God the beginning of his faith as its prime mover, and received from him its increase, but that he had been made faithful by him, by whom also he was made Apostle.

It is proved secondly from the Council of Orange, Canon 5: If anyone says that the increase, as well as the beginning of faith, and the very affection of belief, whereby we believe in him who justifies the ungodly, and whereby we arrive at the regeneration of baptism, is not in us through the gift of grace, that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting our will from infidelity to faith, from impiety to piety, but that it is naturally in us, he is proved contrary to Apostolic doctrine, approving the blessed Apostle Peter saying: He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Reason also persuades the same thing; for the act by which the will moves the intellect efficaciously to assent to the things of faith is supernatural; therefore it cannot be possessed naturally. The consequence is plain: the antecedent is proved: the act of believing is an effect commanded by the will: for it moves the intellect efficaciously to assent to the revealed truth. Likewise its object is such: since the will loves the honesty and goodness found in such an act; but from the supernatural character of the effect and of the object is gathered the supernatural character of the act, which must bear upon them; for there is a necessary proportion between act and object: therefore the act of the will, whereby man is induced to believe, is supernatural, and consequently cannot be elicited without the aid of grace.

You will object 1. Cassianus on behalf of the Semipelagians: Zachaeus and the Thief anticipated the grace of God by their own desires and vows, and obtained it. For Zachaeus, Luke 19, when he sought to see Jesus who he was, merited to hear from him: Zachaeе, make haste and come down, for today I must abide in thy house: but the Thief, Luke 23, having said to Christ: Lord, remember me when thou shalt come into thy kingdom, merited to hear: This day shalt thou be with me in Paradise. Therefore one can naturally desire the grace of Christ and obtain it, and consequently perform some good work, or at least will it, which pertains thereto. — Zachaeus and the Thief were prevented by the grace of God, says St. Prosper against the Collator, chapter 15: for he who shone in the heart of the Publican Matthew, then persecuting the Church, and of Paul, himself also shone in the heart of Zachaeus and in the heart of the crucified Thief with the Lord: unless perchance the word of the Lord was idle when he deigned to address Zachaeus, who sought to see him who he was: Zachaeе, make haste and come down, for today I must abide in thy house, and did not prepare for himself the mind of him whose lodging he chose. In the justification of the Thief too, even though no signs of operating grace were understood, should we not receive even him with all believers as drawn, the Lord saying: when I shall be lifted up from the earth I will draw all things to myself? Thus St. Prosper.

You will object 2. Cassianus, cited by St. Prosper, chapter 8: The Apostle openly testifies, Romans 1, that sometimes beginnings of good wills arise through the good of nature, which however, unless directed by God, cannot arrive at the consummation of virtues; for he says: To will is present with me; but to accomplish that which is good I find not: therefore he truly holds that the beginning of faith implanted in us is innate from nature.

I deny the consequence: for, says St. Prosper in the same place, the blessed Apostle did indeed say: to will is present with me, but to accomplish I find not. But the same said 2 Cor. 3: Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God: and Phil. 2 the same said: For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will.

Therefore the Apostle is not contrary to himself, but since the good will to will has been given to us, we do not at once find and do, unless seeking, asking, and knocking; He who gave the desire bestows the effect. For that voice of one saying: to will indeed lies close to me, but to accomplish the good I find not, was spoken by those called and placed under grace, who indeed take delight in the law of God according to the inward man, but see another law in their members war against the law of their mind and captivating them in the law of sin: and although he had received knowledge of willing rightly, yet he does not find within himself the virtue of doing those things which stand in the way, until for the good will he has taken upon himself he merit to find what he should do.

You will object 3. God, when He sees us inclining to will the good, comes to meet us, directs, and strengthens us. At the voice of thy cry (says Isaias, chapter 30) as soon as He shall hear, He will answer thee: and Psalm 29: Call upon me, He says, in the day of tribulation, and I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me. Therefore truly man of himself can have an affection for the good, which anticipates and attracts grace. — I deny the consequence, and to the antecedent Saint Prosper answers, chapter 7, that that proposition savors of Pelagianism.

For who, he says, does not see that this doctrine assigns merit to free will, whereby grace is anticipated, so that grace should serve it, rendering a debt, bestowing a gift? which definition was condemned even by Pelagius himself with anathema in the Synod of the Bishops of Palestine. For in him who begins to will the good, and desires to depart from iniquity and error, we profess that the grace of God works this very thing, since the steps of man are directed by the Lord, and He will well order his way.

You will object 1. Christ the Lord, rebuking the Pharisees, said Luke 12: And why even of yourselves do you not judge that which is just? But He would not have said this to them unless He had known from their natural judgment that they were able to discern what is just. Therefore He truly holds that men can by natural virtue know or do what is just. — I distinguish the minor: men can by natural judgment discern what is just by natural and moral equity, this I concede: by supernatural equity, conducing to salvation, and moreover to instituting Christian justice, this I deny. Whence Saint Prosper, chapter 23, responding to this objection, says: To attribute to free will, in the aforesaid objection, not only the will of good but also its possibility: as if intelligence, that is, justice, were required of them because they could produce these things from the goods of nature without the gifts of God. — By which he signifies that men cannot judge naturally concerning things pertaining to salvation to be instituted, and Evangelical justice to be formed.

Finally you will object Cassian's words, 3 Kings, chapter 6, by which Solomon declares to God how David, wishing to build a house to the name of the Lord God of Israel, was nevertheless forbidden by Him to fulfill his vow and desire. Whence he reasons thus: this thought and this design of King David — must it be said to be good and from God, or evil and from man? For if that thought was good and from God, why was he forbidden by Him by whom it was inspired to him? If and from man, why is he praised by the Lord? It remains therefore that it be believed to have been good and from man; after which manner we can also judge our own daily thoughts. For neither was it granted to David alone to think a good thing from himself, nor is it naturally denied to us that we should ever be able to know or think anything good. Thus Cassian. — Saint Prosper answers, chapter 25, that by this testimony and argument it is not proved that pious thoughts arise from free will alone, and not from the inspiration of God.

For the will of David, which was assuredly good, is not therefore to be believed not to have been from God, because the Lord willed that a temple not be built for Himself by him, but by his son.

For sometimes the Lord wills that things be not done which He had nonetheless inspired in men: for although the Lord commanded the Apostles to teach and baptize all nations, nevertheless Acts 16: They were forbidden by the Holy Ghost to speak the word of God in Asia. And again: when they attempted to go into Bithynia, they were forbidden by the Spirit of Jesus. Whence Saint Prosper subjoins:

Did they not have this will from God, namely that they desired to convert to the faith the hearts even of those whom God by a hidden judgment did not then wish to hear the Gospel? Or that the Church prays daily for her enemies, that is, for those who have not yet believed — does she not do this from the Spirit of God? Who would say this, unless one who does not do it, or who > thinks that faith is not a gift of God? And yet what is asked for all is not obtained for all: nor is there iniquity with God, who often does not grant what has been asked, though He gave the power to ask it.

NOTE 1. Concerning the present Question, there are, as we have said, two contending opinions. The first indeed is that of Luther, Calvin, and other heretics of our time, who teach that man, however holy and just, can do nothing good in this state of nature fallen and repaired, even with the help of grace itself: nay, that all his works are defiled and are to be accounted true sins; yet these do not harm him, nor are they imputed to him unto damnation, if he firmly believe that they are forgiven him by God, nor are they reckoned unto punishment. The second, however, is that of John Hus, to which Michael Baius seems to have subscribed, teaching that sanctifying grace is so necessary for the exercise of any good that, in its absence, all the works of man would be sins: for among the erroneous propositions asserted in his writings or sayings, and proscribed and condemned by the supreme Pontiffs Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Urban VIII, is this, number 27: Free will without the aid of the grace of God avails only for sinning. There also is condemned that proposition number 39: Every love of a rational creature is either vicious concupiscence, by which the world is loved, which John forbids: or that laudable charity, by which God is loved through the Holy Spirit diffused in the heart. Likewise this one, number 39: In all his acts the sinner serves dominant concupiscence. From which it appears that he wished to hold not only that no one can avoid sin without sanctifying grace, and that all the works which can be done in its absence are sins, but also that whatever is not done from the principle and motive of charity is truly reckoned among sins: whence the proposition which is number 25 states: All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of the Philosophers are vices.

NOTE 2. The present difficulty is not raised about the actions of man, but about human actions, that is, about those which proceed from the judgment of reason and deliberate will; which actions (as we have proved in our moral Philosophy) are good, or indifferent, or vicious. They can indeed possess either goodness, namely moral and natural, or meritorious and supernatural. In this especially they are distinguished from one another: that the first is constituted by the sole conformity which the act has with right reason and prudence; but the second proceeds from the influx of grace and charity, referring our acts to a supernatural end. From the preceding Question it is clear that man cannot elicit any work of the supernatural order meritorious of eternal life without sanctifying grace: whether, however, in its absence he cannot exercise certain acts naturally and morally good — this must be determined here.

NOTE 3. The moral goodness of acts is drawn chiefly from a threefold source: namely, the object, the end, and the circumstances. From the object indeed, not as it is regarded in itself and according to its entity; but as it is conformable to right reason; for this is the distinction between the intellectual and the moral virtues, that the intellectual virtues consider the object inasmuch as it is in itself: but the moral virtues are concerned with the object inasmuch as it accords with right reason. From the end, moreover, while namely the act tends toward a congruous end, conformable to the right dictate of the conscience of reason; and this through licit and ordered means; for it can happen that an act tend toward an excellent end, which nonetheless will be vicious: suppose, if it be proposed as to be obtained through vitiated and perverse means: thus health to be acquired for the exercise of acts of charity, and for serving God more freely and easily, is an act good from the end; yet it can be most wicked, if namely that restoration of health were procured through sorceries and the aid of demons: whence, that any act may be accounted good from the end, it is necessary that it tend toward it through congruous means. Finally, from the circumstances an act is judged good when it is affected by those circumstances and conditions which right reason sees to be required on the part of person, place, time, etc.

These things having been premised, two things must be established in this Question: First, that the works of the faithful existing in sanctifying grace are not sins. Second, that the faithful defiled by mortal sin can sometimes elicit morally good works.

First Conclusion. — It is heretical to assert that all the works of a man who is just and existing in sanctifying grace are sins. The truth of this Conclusion is evident from the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 25, decreeing: If anyone shall say that in any good work the just man sins at least venially, or — what is more intolerable — mortally, etc., let him be anathema.

And it is proved first: Sacred Scripture very often exhorts us to the exercise of good works, and commends the works of just men: but it is impious to assert that it leads us to perpetrating vicious works, and extols the sins of men with praises: therefore, etc. The major is evident from various texts of that sacred Scripture. Thus Matthew 5, Christ the Lord addressing His disciples and followers says: Let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works. And to Titus 2: The grace of God hath appeared to all men, instructing us, that denying impiety and worldly desires, we should live soberly, justly, and godly in this world, etc. Similarly He commends the works of the just. For Job 2: In all these Job did not sin with his lips. Weighing which words Saint Gregory says: Of blessed Job testimony is borne both of his mouth and of his heart, who both checked fault from his tongue and cleansed it from his heart. So also 3 Kings, chapter 14, God rebuking the impiety of Jeroboam through an Angel, says: Thou hast not been as my servant David, who kept my commandments, and followed me with all his heart, doing that which was pleasing in my sight. And Matthew 26: Why do you trouble this woman? for she hath wrought a good work upon me. Whence Matthew 25 the just Judge calls the Elect to the heavenly kingdom: For I was hungry, and you gave me to eat, etc.; by which He signifies that they are given eternal reward because they exercised works of mercy. Whence Saint Peter admonished the faithful, chapter 2 of his second epistle, verse 1: Endeavour that by your good works you may make sure your calling. For in doing these things you will never sin.

It is evident also by reason. A just man is bound to keep the divine precepts prescribed to him, and to render this he has the powers necessary, divine aid shining forth upon him: for God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding He both admonishes thee to do what thou canst and to ask what thou canst not, and He aids thee that thou mayest be able to ask, as the Council of Trent teaches, session 6, chapter 11: but a man fulfilling the divine commandments cannot be judged to be doing anything evil: otherwise God would command what is evil, and would be accounted the author of sin: which assuredly it is impious to assert: therefore it must be confessed that a just man exercises good works.

The heretics will object that Psalm 13: There is none that doeth good, there is not even one: therefore there is no one in any state who executes some good work. Moreover Psalm 142 the royal Bard prays: Enter not into judgment with thy servant, O Lord, for in thy sight no man living shall be justified: therefore no one is free from sin and guilt, so that from his works he should not have that whereby he is condemned. Finally they object Isaiah 61: We are become all as unclean, and all our justices as a rag of a menstruous woman: therefore truly no man is free from guilt, and all the works of the just, however holy they appear, are truly sins. — I deny the consequence: for far different is the sense of the aforesaid texts of sacred Scripture from that intended by the heretics. For I say first, that the discourse there is concerning Atheists, of whom mention had been made in the preceding verse: The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God. Or if it be extended more broadly, it can be said that the Psalmist spoke not in the rigor of speech, but by metonymy, by which a few are accustomed to stand for all; which assuredly is not infrequent, nor unusual in Scripture: for thus Genesis 6 we read that All flesh had corrupted their way, when nevertheless it is said there that Noe was just and perfect in his generations, and walked with God, and found grace before the Lord. — To the second I say, that by those words is signified that man cannot appear just in every respect in the sight of God, that is, if he be compared with God: not that truly in himself he is not just, but that his justice, if compared with the divine, scarcely merits the name of justice, namely in that manner in which the stars, although most lucid in themselves, nevertheless when compared with the sun seem deprived of all light: in which sense Job said, chapter 1 (9): Can man be justified in comparison with God? — To the third I say then, that this was said of the most wicked Jews of that time, whose legal justices were not only empty of grace and merit, but stained with many sins. Nor does it stand in the way that Isaias speaks in the common voice, as though he counted his own justice depraved together with the rest of the Jews: for this he did after the manner of the Prophets, who, even though just, while they bewail the crimes of men, are wont to attribute them to themselves out of study for humility, or affection of charity, that thus they may bend God more easily and efficaciously to clemency.

Second Conclusion. — A sinner destitute of sanctifying grace can exercise some morally, or honestly good work. And accordingly not all his works before justification are sins. Thus Doctor Subtilis in 2. dist. 28. and the Seraphic Doctor, in the same place.

It is proved first by the authority of Councils, but especially of the Council of Constance, session 15, in which the errors of John

Hus are related and condemned, who in article 10 held: Without sanctifying grace no good work can be done, and consequently all the works of a sinner are sins. Similarly the Council of Trent, session 6, Canon 7, decrees: If anyone shall say that all the works which are done before justification... are truly sins, let him be anathema. And by Canon 6 he is condemned who says that the fear of hell is evil: but this fear is found in sinners before the attainment of the grace of justification: therefore the Council holds that whatever things are done by sinners before the attainment of justification are not sins.

It is proved also by the definition of the supreme Pontiffs Pius V, Gregory VIII, and Urban VIII, condemning the propositions of Nichaëlis Baius, as was said in the 1st Notable.

Thirdly, the truth of this assertion is evident from sacred Scripture; for Luke 11 Christ exhorts sinners to bestow alms and to exercise mercy toward the poor, saying: Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you: but He would exhort to something impious if alms could not be done by a sinful man without sin: therefore Christ the Lord holds that a sinner, before the attainment of the grace of justification, can elicit some morally good work. Similarly Daniel advised King Nabuchodonosor that he redeem his sins with alms: but sins can in no way be redeemed by wicked and sinful works: therefore alms done by a sinner, with the intention of relieving another's misery, is not a sinful work, but morally good and honest.

This same truth is confirmed by all those oracles of the Holy Fathers by which, as the following Question will make manifest, they teach that nature avails for good, and that infidels sometimes exercise moral good, and moreover possess true virtues: for if infidels can do this, much more sinners, who are enlightened by faith.

Moreover this truth is urged by reason: By natural and divine law the works of the virtues of justice, religion, mercy, etc. are commanded even to unjust men: but they would not be commanded unless men could execute them without admixture of sin, and unless they were honest in every respect: therefore it must be that those works elicited by a sinner are honest.

The Subtle Doctor adds, in 2. dist. 28, number 4, that he who asserts that a sinner can do no good does not seem to say anything other than to pervert all who have once committed mortal sin, so that afterward they do no good work of its kind; to which nevertheless they are elsewhere bound: when yet they ought to be persuaded and moved to the opposite, namely that they do good works of their kind, because these dispose them toward obtaining grace more quickly and easily.

You will say 1: God turns away His face from the praises, prayers, and sacrifices which are made by sinners: therefore all the works of sinners are evil. The antecedent is evident from Psalm 4: But God hath said to the sinner: Why dost thou declare my justices, and take my covenant in thy mouth? And from Isaiah 1: To what purpose do you offer me the multitude of your victims? saith the Lord, etc. Offer sacrifice no more in vain. Incense is an abomination to me.... And when you stretch forth your hands I will turn away my eyes from you; for your hands are full of blood. — I distinguish the antecedent: God turns away from and execrates those things because they are done irreverently, and against the prescription of the law and the pleasure of God, this I concede: precisely because they are offered by sinners, this I deny. Or otherwise: things offered by sinners out of fear of punishment, with the intention of persevering in sins, are unpleasing to God, this I concede: simply and precisely because they are offered by men existing in sin, this I deny. To these add that the Prophet speaks especially of the Jews performing all these things not from affection of religion and honesty, but with a hypocritical and profane mind, and placing all the force of justice in that external worship; whence chapter 20 (29) he complains of them, saying: This people honoureth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me.

You will say 2: From St. Matthew chapter 7: An evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit: but that evil tree designates the sinner: therefore he cannot bring forth fruits of good works, — I distinguish the minor: the sinner acting from an evil intention and perverse will is designated, this I concede: simply and absolutely, because he is a sinner, this I deny: for thus St. Augustine interprets the aforesaid passage, book 1 Contra Iulianum, chapter 3: Therefore not insofar as he is man, which is the work of God; but insofar as anyone is of an evil will, he is an evil tree, and cannot bring forth good fruit.

You will insist: If by the evil tree be understood the sinner acting from an evil will, then the sinner will not be able to be discerned and known by his works, because a good thing by reason of its office can be done from an evil end and evil will: but the consequence conflicts with the intention of Christ saying by their fruits you shall know them: therefore by the evil tree the sinner is simply understood. — I deny the consequence of the major: for although a sinner can sometimes do certain works good by reason of the object with an evil will; nevertheless he rarely accomplishes this, and from his ordinary works he can easily be recognized for what sort he is, not only by intention and end, but also by object. This only, however, does Christ the Lord intend to signify, namely that from the daily conversation of each one his morals can easily be uncovered and recognized.

You will urge: As evil works contaminate the will from which they proceed, even if those works are substantially good in themselves; so conversely a perverse will defiles all works which arise from it, even if they are good in themselves from elsewhere: but the will of a sinner is perverse: therefore, etc. — I deny the parity: and the reason of the disparity is, that the will is therefore defiled by all its evil acts because it is per se their cause; but although the works of an evil will are its effects, they are not however defiled by it because they are its effects, just as the will is per se good, though per accidens evil. Thus while a proud man bestows alms, that act is per se the act of a merciful man, and per accidens of a proud man.

You will say 3: All the acts of a man existing in mortal sin are referred to an evil end on the part of the agent: therefore they are morally evil. The consequence is evident, for a perverse end vitiates and disorders the act. The antecedent is proved: a sinner orders all that he desires toward a private good; for the last end of a sinner is either the sinner himself, or the good of the sinner himself; but that end is perverse and vicious: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the antecedent: all evil acts which are truly mortal sins, this I concede: those which are either merely venial sins, or honest works, this I deny. For only by those works is the sinner judged to constitute and desire himself or his private good as a last end, through which grace and charity are destroyed and eliminated, which ought to direct all the works of man to Him as their last end: but these are destroyed only privatively by mortal sins: for venial sins, or honest works, elicited by a sinner, do not conflict privatively with charity and grace, but only cut themselves off from it, inasmuch namely as they are not referred to God as to a last end: therefore by these the sinner does not positively regard himself as a last end.

You will say 4: Whatever is done by man is done either from charity or from concupiscence, as St. Augustine teaches in many places, especially book 9 De Trinitate, chapters 7 and 8: but charity is not distinguished from sanctifying grace: therefore what is not done from sanctifying grace must needs be done from concupiscence, which St. Paul calls the root of all evils. — I distinguish the minor: perfect charity is not distinguished from sanctifying grace, this I concede: inchoate charity, this I deny. For charity is twofold according to St. Augustine in the book Natura et gratia, chapter 70: Charity, he says, inchoate, is justice inchoate: charity advanced, is justice advanced: charity perfect, is justice perfect. Moreover inchoate charity is twofold: one indeed by reason of motive, when God is indeed loved, but more for our utility than for His glory: the other by reason of degree, when namely God is loved for Himself, but more remissly and with lesser ardor. But charity imperfect in the former manner is not sanctifying grace, but only perfect charity at least by reason of motive, when namely God is loved for Himself.

You will urge: Therefore at least without this inchoate charity no good work can be done: but that is not in sinners: therefore they can exercise no good work. — I distinguish the minor: sinners do not have inchoate charity by reason of state, and such as is supernatural, this I concede: by reason of motive, and such as is purely natural and moral, this I deny. For, as will be proved below, men can love God above all things without any aid of supernatural order of grace, as the Author of nature, and their most liberal benefactor and preserver; which love seems to be a kind of initial natural charity. The remaining things which are wont to be objected against our assertion will solve

Note 1. Concerning the resolution of the present Question, a most serious controversy once arose between St. Augustine and Julian, as is clear from chapter 3 of book 1 which that holy Doctor wrote against the same Julian. For Julian contended three things: first indeed that in infidels there had been true virtues by which they were rightly judged to live. This St. Augustine denied. For you are accustomed (says St. Augustine at the beginning of the chapter), denying the grace of God, to deny the virtues by which one lives rightly, and attributing them to nature and to human endowment, not to the grace of God, to use this as an argument — namely that infidels sometimes have them — so as to attempt to evacuate what we say, that no one lives rightly except by faith through Jesus Christ. Secondly, Julian wished the acts of those natural virtues to suffice for justifying infidels. That this is certainly false St. Augustine demonstrates there with several arguments; but especially with the argument ad hominem: for elsewhere Julian had taught that indeed the beginning of justice is in man, but its consummation from God: yet speaking of the works of infidels, departing from his own opinion, he attributes to man not only the affection of virtue but also its effect. While saying these things, says St. Augustine, behold, you have now even taken away that which you had attributed to the grace of God: namely the very effect of the will: for you did not say that they willed to be merciful, modest, chaste and sober, and were not such because they had not yet attained through grace the effect of this good will; but rather that if they willed to be such and are such, then in them both the will and the effect abound with virtues. Whence he concludes: Of course, far be it that true virtue be in anyone unless he be just: but far be it that anyone be just unless he live by faith, for the just man lives by faith. Moreover, who among those who wish to be regarded as Christians, except the Pelagians alone, or perhaps you yourself alone among them, would call an infidel just, call an impious man just, call one enslaved to the devil just? Finally, thirdly, Julian wished that to be true virtue from which any work whatsoever proceeds, whether meanwhile the end be vicious or honest: yet with this distinction, that where the end was honest, and the virtue tended toward eternal things, then the work was fruitful and meritorious; but where it looked to temporal things, and the end was vicious, then the work was sterile and useless unto salvation. That absurd opinion you thus carp at, St. Augustine: Therefore those virtues, so base and deformed by such an end, and therefore in no way true virtues, nevertheless seem so true and beautiful that, he says, they can sustain neither the loss of their name nor of their kind, but are frustrated only by the paltriness of the reward which they coveted, that is, by the fruit of earthly commodities, not of heavenly promises, etc.: from which it is clear that St. Augustine denies true virtues in infidels no otherwise than Julian was asserting them, namely that they suffice for the justification and beatitude of man.

Note 2. From the same St. Augustine in the same place, that true virtue, or a good moral work, can be called good in two ways, namely either by reason of duty or by reason of end. Duty, he says, is that which must be done: but the end is that for the sake of which it must be done. Whence a work is called good by reason of duty when it is good from its object; thus to give alms to a poor man is good by reason of duty; but to bestow it on account of God, or Christ morally existing in the poor man, is good not only by reason of duty but also by reason of end. Moreover the same holy Doctor observes there that for a work to be simply good, it does not suffice that it be such by reason of duty; but it is also required that it be such by reason of end: for if it be good only by reason of duty, it will truly be evil because of the discovered circumstance of an evil end; whence addressing Julian he says: Virtues ought to be discerned not by duties, but by ends... Whatever good is done by man, which true wisdom commands ought to be done, although it be judged good by reason of duty, yet by the very fact that the end is not right it is sin. Therefore some good things can be done by those not doing well, by whom they are done: for it is good that help be given to a man in peril, especially an innocent one: but he who does this, if he does it for worldly glory, for men more than for God, does not do well, nay he does not do a good thing, because he does it with a will that is not good. Which saying certainly accords with that common maxim of the Philosophers, good from an integral cause, evil from the least defect.

Note 3. Concerning the present Question there exists the greatest controversy: for all agree that some good work can be done without faith by reason of duty alone; but they dissent concerning a good work by reason of both duty and end together. Now the negative part is defended not only by Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Peter Martyr, and many other heretics; but also by some among Catholics, such as Gregory of Rimini on book 2, distinction 28, Capreolus in the same place, Marsilius on book 3, question 20, to whom certain more recent authors subscribe, asserting that the virtues of the Gentile philosophers are vices, and that the mere absence of faith suffices for all the works of infidels to be true sins. But since this Question has an affinity with that in which it is asked whether man in the state of fallen nature can produce some good moral work by his own powers and without the aid of actual grace, therefore I shall untangle both at once.

Single Conclusion. — The grace of faith is not so necessary for acting rightly that without it no good moral work could be done, and consequently all the works of infidels are not to be judged absolutely sins. This is the more common and safer assertion among Catholic Doctors. That its proofs may be made more evident and appear more efficacious, for the sake of clarity I choose to set them forth under diverse headings, together with the responses of the Adversaries, and weigh them.

It is proved first. — From Sacred Scripture. — Divine Scripture often exhorts sinners, even infidels, to fasting, prayer, and almsgiving: therefore it supposes those works can be rightly done by them. This is evident from what follows, for it would be impious to assert that Scripture exhorts them to some wicked work. The antecedent is proved from Daniel 4, where the Prophet addressing King Nabuchodonosor says: Let my counsel please thee, and redeem thou thy sins with alms: but sins are not redeemed by wicked works and other sins: therefore the alms of the King, though an infidel, were not sins; nay they could have been pleasing to God, and apt for obtaining His mercy and averting the imminent vengeance. — Likewise Ezechiel 29: Nabuchodonosor is said to be about to receive a reward for the service by which he served God in the assault upon Tyre. Therefore I, says God, will give Nabuchodonosor king of Babylon the land of Egypt: and he shall take her multitude, and spoil her booty, and rifle her spoils: and it shall be wages for his army, and for the service wherewith he served against her, for I have given him the land of Egypt because he hath laboured for me, saith the Lord God. From which one may argue: God remunerates no sins with wages: but some works of infidels are remunerated with wages, as is clear from the foregoing text, and also from others: for God repaid the benefit bestowed upon the Israelites by the Egyptian midwives by building them houses, because they feared God, as we read Exodus 21: and the kindness shown by Rahab to the spies of the Israelites was compensated by Josue, without doubt according to the will of God: therefore some works of infidels are not sins. And therefore deservedly St. Jerome reasons thus on chapter 29 of Ezechiel, verse 18: And from the fact, he says, that Nabuchodonosor receives the reward of a good work, we understand that even the Ethnic nations, if they have done anything good, are not passed over without reward by the judgment of God.

The Adversaries respond, that those infidels received the reward on account of works that were good indeed by reason of duty, but not by reason of end, and consequently it is not to be inferred from this that those works were not sinful. — On the contrary, the same force of argument always recurs and presses, namely that it is not credible that God praised and rewarded them for their sins: but if works of this kind were good only by reason of duty, yet evil from a perverse end, it would follow that they were praised and rewarded by God for their sins.

They urge: From chapter 1 of Exodus, the Egyptian midwives, who contrary to the command of the King preserved the male infants of the Hebrews, receive a reward on account of a lie, for they said to the King: The Hebrew women are not as the Egyptian women: for they themselves have the knowledge of midwifery, and before we come to them they give birth: which is certainly false, and yet it is added: God dealt well with the midwives. Therefore God can bestow some temporal reward upon a sinful action which has a certain species of virtue by reason of duty. — I deny the consequence: for a twofold action must be distinguished in those Egyptian midwives, one by which out of compassion and a sense of humanity, and fear of God, they saved the Hebrew children: another by which they lied to the King cruelly commanding: the former was good not only from the object but also from the end. For it is said there, verse 17, But the midwives feared God, and did not do according to the precept of the king of Egypt, but preserved the males. But the latter action, namely the lie, was intrinsically evil. Now God praised and rewarded the former action, but not the latter; whence it is written there, verse 21: Because the midwives feared God, he built them houses.

They respond secondly, that those works of infidels were from actual and supernatural grace, and therefore were good, and praised by God. — On the contrary, this is feigned gratuitously and without foundation, since there is sufficient proportion between the natural powers of man and the works of the natural order; especially when there is propensity and natural inclination toward such things; nor are there any impediments except slight ones, which can easily be overcome. Add that if this response availed, faith would no longer be the first grace, as the adversaries wish: forasmuch as the Gentiles, in whom there was no faith, would have had grace for eliciting good works of this kind.

Moreover it is proved from the Apostle to the Romans 2, verse 14, where the Apostle says that the Gentiles, who have not the law, do naturally the things that are of the law, that is, that by natural instinct and guidance they do certain things contained in the written law, and necessary by the force of the law of nature itself, and sufficiently known by the light of reason; for they prefer this sense, as Paul's words sound, especially joined with what follows: Who are a law to themselves, showing the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, etc. Which interpretation and exposition is proved from the Fathers: for Origen, book 2 on the Epistle to the Romans, has thus: But also the Greek, that is the gentile, who although he have not the law, is himself a law to himself, showing the work of the law in his heart, and acts by natural reason, as we see some among the nations hold justice, or chastity, or prudence, and keep temperance: this man, although he seem alien from eternal life because he believes not in Christ, and cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven because he has not been reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, seems, by those things which are said by the Apostle, to be able by no means wholly to lose the glory and honour and peace of good works. And from Tertullian, book On the Crown of the Soldier, chapter 6, where he thus says: The Apostle writing to the Romans, that the nations do by nature the things that are of the law, suggests both the natural law and legal nature. And Jerome in the place cited above: It is clear, he says, that we are despised in comparison with the Gentiles, if they by the natural law do what we neglect even though written, concerning which the Apostle Paul disputes most fully to the Romans.

The adversaries respond, that St. Augustine in book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapters 27 and 28, interprets the aforementioned text of the Apostle of those Gentiles which from the natural wild olive had been grafted into the good olive: that is, which had been transferred from gentility to the faith of Christ. Since they are disciples of that man, namely St. Prosper against the Collator chapter 22, and St. Fulgentius book On the Grace of Christ, chapters 25 and 26, therefore the exposition favouring our assertion cannot stand. — I deny the consequence: because texts of this kind can bear several Catholic senses, even literal ones, as the Theologians teach in the preliminaries of Theology: therefore St. Augustine himself, who reports the interpretation of the aforesaid Fathers in the same book chapter 27, does not disapprove it; nay he seems to approve it: for he says:

But if these, who do naturally the things that are of the law, are not to be reckoned among those whom the grace of Christ justifies, but rather among those, even of the impious, who most certainly worship not the true God justly, yet certain deeds of theirs, which we either read, or know, or hear of, we cannot according to the rule of justice not merely censure, but we also deservedly and rightly praise: although if they are examined with regard to the end for which they are done, they fall short of that which merits the due praise and defence of justice.

Therefore St. Augustine judges that even the nations persisting in unbelief sometimes elicit certain good works, which according to the rule of justice cannot be censured, nay which deservedly are praised.

They urge: St. Fulgentius book On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ, chapter 25, says that those contradict the grace of God who assign the aforesaid text of the Apostle to unbelieving Gentiles: therefore the Apostle speaks only of Gentiles converted to the faith. — I distinguish the antecedent: St. Fulgentius thinks those contradict grace who assign this passage of the Apostle to unbelieving Gentiles, according to the sense of the Pelagians, who used this passage of the Apostle both to show that by the powers of nature the nations could fulfil the whole law, and to prove that the nations could be justified without faith in Christ — I concede; according to the sense of the orthodox Fathers using that passage, so as to persuade that some morally good works could exist in infidels — I deny. For the same St. Fulgentius in the following chapter of the same book says: Those men of whom mention is made by the Apostle can indeed do certain good works which pertain to the equity of human society: but because they are not done in the charity of God, they cannot profit unto salvation, namely and eternal life. — To these add that this 21st proposition of Baius has been condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs: They think with the Pelagians who interpret the text of the Apostle to the Romans 2, Those who have not the law do naturally the things that are of the law: as speaking of the Gentiles not having the grace of faith. — This same assertion of ours can also be confirmed by those words of Christ in which He supposes some good moral work can be done by ethnic nations and infidels, for instance when He says Matthew 5: If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this? and if you salute your brethren only, what more do you? do not even the Ethnic nations this? where Christ speaks of love and salutation morally good; for no one is so foolish as to hope for reward from God for an evil thing: and Luke 11: If you then being evil know how to give good gifts to your children, namely from a good affection; for otherwise it would be no wonder that an evil gift should proceed from evil men.

It is proved secondly. — From the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs. — For Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Urban VIII in the Bull published against Michael Baius condemn this proposition number 25: All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of the philosophers are vices.

The adversaries respond, that that proposition was not condemned in the sense in which it is asserted; since five other senses of the aforesaid proposition can be discovered, on account of which it deservedly ought to have been condemned: The first is, that Baius would say all works of infidels are sins, even those with which reason does not consent, and which man suffers unwillingly, such are all the motions of first-first concupiscence. The second is, that he would assert all works of infidels to be sins, even of those who have not distinct and explicit faith in Christ, however much they may have some faith in God, and consequently implicit faith concerning Christ. The third is, that according to the mind of Baius all works of infidels not having faith perfectly formed by charity are sins. The fourth is, that all works of infidels who have not the infused habit of theological faith are sins. The fifth is, that in the opinion of Baius all works of infidels are sins not only by reason of end but also by reason of object and duty. Therefore that proposition 25 was not condemned because it asserted all works of infidels to be sins on account of the absence of faith, from whose defect it comes about that those works are always done with evil intention and from the perverse end of the one acting. — On the contrary: although the aforesaid proposition could deservedly have been condemned according to the five senses proposed, yet this does not prevent its having been condemned also in the sense we intend. First, because it is established that that proposition of Baius, put forward by him universally and without any explanation, was condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs also generally, and without any explanation or limitation, and consequently in the sense intended by us. Secondly, because it is certain that the aforesaid proposition was asserted by Baius in the sense intended by us. Thirdly, because that sense which we intend is the natural and genuine sense of the aforesaid proposition. But the others, although they can perhaps be accommodated to it, are nevertheless less natural. Now it is certain that when any proposition is condemned, it must always be expounded in the more natural and genuine sense: therefore, etc.

It is proved thirdly. — From the holy Fathers. — In the first place St. Clement appears, book 1 of the Apostolic Constitutions, chapter 31, where he says: Abraham our progenitor taking up the way of truth from the very faculty of nature, when Thou didst appear to him, Thou didst lead him forth as a Leader: and when Thou hadst given him to understand what this world at last was, knowledge went before unto his faith, and faith followed upon knowledge, and upon faith the covenant. Therefore Abraham took up the way of truth from the very faculty of nature, and before supernatural faith infused by God through nature's Author, and despised the world: he therefore wrought good by his own powers of nature before receiving the gift of supernatural faith. — Irenaeus book 1 against heresies chapter 72: All men are of the same nature, able to retain and work good, and again able to lose it and not do it. By which words he affirms that in man's nature there is a power of working good, and therefore he pronounces it common to all men, even infidels; which power he certainly confirms throughout as natural to man: but the adversaries do not concede grace to be common to individual men: consequently also in their opinion Irenaeus does not speak of a power of doing good proceeding from grace, inasmuch as he pronounces it common to men. — Tertullian in the book against the Jews: Before the law of Moses written on stone Tablets, he says, I contend there was an unwritten law, which was understood naturally and kept by the Fathers. For whence was Noe found just, unless natural justice of the law preceded him? And so before the written law, as the natural law was understood by all by their alone inborn light, so it was kept by the Fathers with a natural affection, which made natural justice. — Athanasius in the Oration against Idols: The mind occupies its own liberties, he says, and abuses itself toward those pleasures which it has contrived, because it is free and of its own arbitrium: for it can incline itself toward good, and likewise resist goods: therefore to the human mind, under the title ⟦illegible⟧ There are among us, he says, the very virtues according to nature: for having these seems to be inherent in the soul by an affinity, not from human doctrine but from nature herself.* — Nazianzen in Oration 19 in praise of his deceased Father commends him excellently because before faith he had most excellently pursued moral natural virtues, prudence, temperance, from the instruction of nature alone: but especially justice so incorrupt that although, he says, he was engaged in great offices and administrations of the Republic, he did not increase his means by a single farthing. Which he had premised also of many others removed from the illumination of faith: As, he says, many of our own are not with us, whom of course a scandalous life separated from the common body: so on the contrary many of the rest stand among ours, because they evidently prefer faith in conduct, and while caring to be Christians in name alone, possess the thing itself, among whom my own father also was: alien indeed, but otherwise inclining toward us by the honesty of his morals. He therefore admits true virtues in infidels. — Nyssenus in the book On the Fifth Beatitude says: He who made man according to His image laid up in his nature the materials and supports of all goods, so that nothing good and honest should thrust itself into us from without and insinuate itself, but it should be within our power to have what we will, drawing forth the whole good from nature out of that certain store: he therefore concedes that the faculty of every virtue and honesty is implanted in nature itself, so that we draw forth good from nature herself as from our own storehouse. — Jerome explaining that text to the Galatians 1, That He might reveal His Son in me, says: Let it be clear that the knowledge of God is in all by nature, and that they have in themselves the seeds of justice and of the other virtues: whence many without the faith and Gospel of Christ have been either wise or holy, so as to obey their parents. Thence concerning those infidels he gathers: Thou art damned by a greater judgment, that having in thyself the principles of virtues and the seeds of God thou believest not in Him without whom thou canst not be. But if the powers of nature availed only unto sinning, how would it be clear that the seeds of justice and of all virtues are in all by nature? How would infidels having the seeds of virtues be guiltless by not producing their fruits, if they had not the powers for it? — Chrysostom Homily 22 on 1 Corinthians: Whoever wishes to become good, he says, nothing impedes him, even though he was previously among the worst of men: and that happens to us even more opportunely, that virtue is according to nature for us, malice beyond nature, not otherwise than good and adverse health. But how is virtue according to nature if it is not natural? how is malice beyond nature if its inclination and faculty avail only unto sinning? how finally is nothing an impediment to the worst men and infidels that they become good, if grace is wanting to them, nor are the powers of nature present that they attain goodness? — Damascene book 3 On the Faith, chapter 14: Natural are the virtues, he says, and naturally, and without labour, are they present in all, although we do not all equally exercise those things that are of nature: for from the fact that we have fallen from what is according to nature into what is beyond nature by transgression. By which he plainly confesses that there is inherent in us a natural faculty for pursuing and attaining virtues. Therefore the sentence of the holy Fathers is concordant, and there are in us natural powers for moral good, nor are they in infidels so worn away and scattered that they cannot break out into act and fruit.

It is proved fourthly. — From St. Augustine and his Disciples. — Countless things can be gathered from St. Augustine to demonstrate that God has granted men so much a natural faculty for pursuing good and taking up moral virtues that they flourish even in infidels; but from these I bring forward the choicer ones. First indeed book 3 On Free Choice, chapter 23, has thus: Advancement in the best studies, and piety, for which the capacity has not been denied him, if he neglect it of his own will, justly precipitates him into a graver ignorance than exists in others, and difficulty. Now that the capacity granted to nature for advancing in the best studies is natural he demonstrates there for this reason: For that which she knows not naturally, and cannot naturally, to this she did not devote the facility of the soul for comparing itself toward doing rightly. He judges therefore that neglected study of virtue cannot be imputed as guilt to the soul, if she cannot naturally pursue it either with knowledge or with love, yet has a natural capacity, which indeed he proves by this example: For to speak, or to know, or not to be able, is natural to the infant, which difficulty and ignorance of speech is not only blameless, but also pleasing and welcome to human affections. Therefore since the desertion of virtue is not blameless in man, it follows that he has a natural potency for pursuing it. Hence so often against the Manichaeans he demonstrates nature to be good, from this, that vices are against nature. The vices themselves too, he says, book 1 Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, chapter 5, bear testimony to the goodness of nature, for because evil is through vice, surely good is through nature: for vice is against nature, because nature harms, nor would it harm unless it diminished its own good: therefore evil is nothing but privation of good: but the goods from which vices deprive souls are the moral perfections of virtues: therefore virtues are natural. He has similar things in the Enchiridion chapter 11, and book 1 against Julian chapter 8, and the book On Two Souls, chapter 14. — More openly he declares this truth in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 27, where treating of the works of infidels he has thus:

But if those who do naturally the things that are of the law are not yet to be reckoned in the number of those whom the grace of Christ justifies, but rather in that of those, even of the impious, who worship not the true God most certainly and justly, yet certain deeds of theirs, which we either read, or know, or hear of, we cannot according to the rule of justice not merely censure, but we also deserve to praise rightly. Although if it be examined with what end they are done, none will be found who merit the due justice and defence.

In which place the particle or evidently proves that in the mind of the holy Doctor, although rarely, yet sometimes infidels can do good works, both by duty and by end. Wherefore in chapter 28 he adds: Not so utterly has the image of God been worn away in the soul of man by the stain of earthly affections that there have remained in it no last lineaments as it were, whence it can deservedly be said that even in impiety itself it can do some things of law and nature. Wherefore again in the same chapter he says: So just as certain venial sins do not impede eternal life, without which this life is not led, so certain good works profit the impious nothing unto eternal salvation, without which most difficultly is the life of any man passed, even the worst. — To these especially gives support that which he has in Epistle 150, where he says:

You recall Polemo, as you write, and we too from his letters remember that disputing concerning the fruit of temperance he converted suddenly to other manners one not only drunken but drunk at the time. Since therefore he, as you have wisely and truthfully understood, was not acquired to God, but only freed from the dominion of luxury: yet lest we should attribute to human operation that same thing which was made better in him, rather to divine. For of the body itself, which is for our sake, whatever goods there are, as beauty, and strength, and health, and if anything of this kind, are only from God creator and perfecter of nature. How much more can none other bestow the gifts of the soul? For what can human memory conceive more proud or more ungrateful than if it thought God makes man beautiful in flesh, chaste in soul to be made by man? This in the book of Wisdom is thus written: When they knew, he says, that no one can be continent unless God give it. If therefore Polemo, having become continent from luxurious, knew so whose this gift was, and worshipped Him piously, casting aside the superstitions of the Gentiles, he would be not only continent, but also truly wise and wholesomely religious, which would avail him not only for the honesty of the present life but also for future immortality.

These things St. Augustine. From which testimony two things especially confirm our present assertion: The first, that St. Augustine calls the works of Polemo good not only materially and from object, but also formally and from end: both because he names them simply goods of the soul and gifts of God, such as are not works only materially good and intrinsically evil from end: then because they are referred to God, to whom formally evil works ought not to be referred: then because he says they avail for the honesty of life, to which those things which are done from a perverse end can contribute nothing at all: finally because he teaches that if Polemo were converted wholly to God and worshipped Him piously, they would avail for the immortality of future life, unto which only formally good works can profit. — The second is, that those works of Polemo were not supernatural and elicited by aid of grace, but natural, performed with the sole general concurrence of God: both because St. Augustine refers that continence of Polemo to God as Creator and perfecter of nature, unto whom strength, fortitude, and other gifts of the body are referred; but supernatural works, and conceived by aid of grace, are not referred to God as author of nature, but to the giver of grace Himself: then because certain Adversaries deny that aids of grace are conceded to those who are outside the faith, such as Polemo was.

The adversaries respond, that good things indeed are done by infidels by the sole powers of nature, but by reason of the object, not by reason of circumstances and end. — On the contrary, St. Augustine in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 27, concedes that good works are sometimes done by infidels even by reason of end, although this happens most rarely, and this was observed p. 92. Moreover works which are done with evil end cannot be called simply good; but those works which infidels sometimes exercise are said there c. 28 by St. Augustine to be simply good: For as, he says, certain venial sins do not impede eternal life, without which this life is not led: so certain good works profit the impious nothing unto eternal salvation, without which most difficultly is the life of anyone passed, even the worst. But this opposition of venial sins in the just, and good works in infidels, would not be sound, if these works by reason of perverse end, or defect of due end, were venial sins, or, which is worse, mortal. Nor would Augustine say rightly that they do not profit the impious unto eternal life; for if they were evil and true sins, they would not only not profit unto eternal life, but would even harm, as is clear: therefore he judges those works of infidels were not evil from the end of the one acting, but are absolutely morally good.

His most faithful disciples subscribe to the holiest Doctor, above all St. Fulgentius in the book On the Incarnation, chapter 25, where he teaches that before faith there are morally good works which do not merit eternal glory: Which also those do, he says, who receive not the grace of faith, keeping by a certain natural law those things which pertain to honesty of morals and society of life: he therefore admits in infidels morally good works pertaining to the society of life; which indeed he confirms c. 26, where speaking of those who without the grace of faith have known God, says: In them indeed some good things can be found, which pertain to the equity of human society: but because they are done without the charity of God, they cannot profit. — Holy Prosper sings in harmony with him in the book against the Collator, chapter 26, where he teaches that although infidels exercise many acts morally good, agreeable to laws and reason, yet because they are not supernatural, nor proceed from grace, therefore they cannot lead to true life: For of human nature, whose Creator God remains even after its prevarication, substance, form, life, senses, and reason, and the other goods of body and soul, which are not wanting even to the wicked and vicious; but theirs is not the true perception of good, which can honour mortal life but cannot confer eternal. The same he sang elegantly in Epigram 81.

Although many things remain in man after the first wound, Which make this life have the ornament of praise: Yet if there be wanting the fountain of faith To bright intellect and love of probity… The useless germ of all fruits withers.

It is proved fifthly. — By Theological Reason. — If an infidel could not elicit any morally good act, this would be required either from the side of the person, because he is an infidel, or from the condition of the object, or from the circumstance of end: but it is impeded by none of these. Certainly not by the first head, because infidelity is related to the operation only materially and concomitantly: for the infidel is not bound, nor necessitated, to act as an infidel. Nor indeed by the second head, for nothing forbids why an infidel cannot be borne toward a thing good from its object: for to honour parents, to give alms to the poor, and others of this kind are goods from the object and by reason of duty, which truly can be exercised by infidels, and the histories of the nations report them performed by very many of them. Finally not by the third: for man destitute of the knowledge of faith can exercise some good work by reason of duty, for instance to honour parents, to give alms: which work indeed will be ordered to God virtually and implicitly from its nature: since a good act per se, and from its nature, unless vitiated from evil end by the one acting, has an essential order to right reason: which right reason says an essential order to God, and the divine reason, of which it is a certain participation. For as the stone tends by its nature to the centre, unless it be violently detained; so every work good and honest from object and from its nature tends into God, as into the light of reason and the fount of all good and honest things, unless it be violently referred by man to a perverse end: but an infidel can elicit such an act, which not be referred to an evil end, for instance to give alms from an affection of mercy, but not from an affection of vain glory. — But that this implicit and virtual relation of the work to God as to its last end suffices for its honesty, thence appears, for otherwise if it did not suffice, it would follow that some good work exercised by a man even faithful and just would be sin, which is absurd. The sequence is declared; for it can happen that a faithful and just man thinking nothing of God gives alms to a poor man from the sole motive of relieving his misery; in which case, since he does not think of God, he will not be able to refer the alms formally and expressly to Him; and consequently he would sin against Him, if the implicit relation did not suffice.

You will say: Then that man faithful and just refers such alms habitually to God through the habit of charity with which he is endowed. — But truly on the contrary, a habit contributes nothing to the act unless it concurs toward operating it; otherwise he who has the habit of justice, if afterwards he sins through intemperance, would also sin with the sin of injustice on account of such a habit of justice which he contracted. — Secondly, human nature through sin is not totally corrupted: therefore there remains in it a certain power, albeit slight, with respect to the good connatural to it. The antecedent is clear by the authority of the Council of Trent Session 6, chapter 1, asserting Free arbitrium was by no means extinguished: though attenuated in its powers, and weakened. The consequent is from St. Augustine book On the Perfection of Justice, chapter 2, where to the question whether sin is natural or accidental he responds that it is not of nature, but an accident of nature especially vitiated: whence we were made by nature children of wrath, and the arbitrium of the will avails little unto not sinning unless helped and healed by the grace of God. Where he concedes that free arbitrium has indeed a power, albeit modest, for not sinning: which is certainly illustrated by the similitude of an infirm man, who of himself can have some motion, yet cannot perfectly be moved with the motion of a sound man unless he be healed by the aid and benefit of medicine. — Thirdly, the light of natural reason can direct the intention with respect to some connatural good: therefore the rational appetite of man can follow such guidance of reason, especially where no temptation, or at least only a light one, impedes. The antecedent can be confirmed by the authority of St. Prosper against the Collator chapter 22, where he says: Who doubts that these remnants of wisdom for the utility of temporal life, issued from nature by God, survive in the human race? For if even for ordering these earthly things the ingenuity of reason's soul did not prevail, nature would be not vitious but extinct. The consequence also is clear: for the appetite can tend toward the good proportioned to it if it holds cognition, and encounters no impediment. — I add from St. Bonaventure on book 2, dist. 28, art. 3, q. 3, where he declares and luminously proves this truth. For after he premised that some work can be called good threefold: first meritoriously with respect to eternal beatitude; 2. Dispositively, namely inasmuch as it disposes congruously toward obtaining the good of grace and glory; 3. Honestly, namely inasmuch as the act is orderable to an honest end: finally he concludes this good of the last mode can be done without any aid of grace.

Free arbitrium, he says, by the operation of God alone without any gift of grace, although difficultly, can go forth into some moral good; yet by it it is neither disposed to grace nor to glory, because it is not ordered into the last end but only orderable: but that good which leads to perfect good, whether by merit of congruity or by merit of condignity, cannot be done without the aid of God, as the authorities of the Saints expressly say. And that they ought to be understood in this manner, is plain. For if free arbitrium be left in its own naturals alone; there will still remain to it the judgment of reason, by which it knows parents are to be honoured: and it stands that if it have this natural judgment, by that by which it can know parents are to be honoured, by that it can think; and since it has a natural instinct, it can also will it: and since it has exterior organs subservient, it can fulfil it in act: but as it makes that judgment of right reason, without the gift of grace, it is not directed toward obtaining the end, which is God, and the reward of eternal beatitude, which it cannot know unless God reveal. And therefore the Saints say that it can neither think nor will nor do good without the help of divine grace, because they speak of good according as it is ordered unto a certain possession of beatitude.

The aforesaid reasons will be confirmed, and at the same time our assertion solidified, by the solution of all those things which the Adversaries object, whose arguments and foundations we shall distribute under certain fixed heads, and weigh severally.

FIRST CAPITAL ARGUMENT of the adversaries drawn from the weakness of free arbitrium, and the uselessness of the law for good unless the subsidy of grace shine forth. — Therefore they object: If infidels could operate anything good, especially by the powers of free arbitrium: yet they cannot; forsooth man's free arbitrium in the state of fallen nature is held captive under the bonds of earthly cupidities in such wise that, unless it be helped by divine grace, it is utterly weak and invalid for pursuing good: therefore by the powers of nature no morally good work can be done. The antecedent is proved: First indeed from those words of Christ the Lord, John 8, If the Son shall make you free, then shall you be free indeed: therefore without the liberating grace of Christ there can be no liberty unto good. Secondly, from the Council of Orange Canon 13, The arbitrium of the will weakened in the first man, unless through the grace of baptism, cannot be repaired: what is lost, unless from Him who could give it, cannot be restored. Thirdly from St. Augustine affirming this same in several places: most truly however book 2 to Boniface, chapter 5, where he says: We do not say that by the sin of Adam free arbitrium perished from the nature of men, but that it avails for sinning in men subjected to the devil; but avails not for living well and piously unless the will of man itself be liberated by the grace of God, and aided unto every good of action, speech, thought. — I distinguish the antecedent: free arbitrium in the state of fallen nature by no powers can attain supernatural, salutary, and beatific good — I concede: that it is utterly invalid and infirm toward natural, moral good, and pertaining to the honesty of human society — I deny. For we said above from the Council of Trent, and St. Augustine, that free arbitrium in men is not altogether extinct, although attenuated and weakened. I say therefore indeed that free arbitrium was extinguished by the sin of Adam with respect to the good pertaining unto salvation, unless it be freed from the bonds of cupidities with which it is ensnared and pressed by grace vegetating and liberating: whence St. Augustine, book 1 to Boniface: Which of us, he says, would say that by the sin of the first man free arbitrium perished from the human race? Liberty indeed perished through sin, but that which was in Paradise, of having full justice with immortality: on account of which human nature needs divine grace, the Lord saying: if the Son shall make you free, then shall you be free indeed. But with respect to natural goods, although free arbitrium be weak and wounded, it is nevertheless not on that account judged extinct, and utterly impotent for pursuing that good, as was proven above.

They insist: St. Augustine openly confesses that free arbitrium avails for nothing except sinning: for in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 4, he says: Nor does free arbitrium avail for anything except sinning, if the way of truth lie hidden: therefore every work of free arbitrium left to itself is sin. — I distinguish: that it avails nothing whatsoever except sinning, that it avails little for pursuing good by its own powers — I concede: that it avails nothing at all — I deny: for the same St. Augustine in the same book, chapter 27, acknowledges that free arbitrium in infidels can operate some good. — Otherwise I distinguish: that free arbitrium avails nothing whatsoever except sinning insofar as sin is called everything which does not conduce to obtaining eternal life — I concede: that it is opposed to the dictate of right reason — I deny. That this is the mind of St. Augustine is clear in the same place, for he adds: Even that which must be done, and toward which we must strive ⟦running head stripped: AN INFIDELIUM OPERA SINT PECCATA⟧

…⟦illegible: est cupriit non latore⟧, unless it also delight and be loved, it is not done, not undertaken. ⟦illegible: mm brne riritur⟧: but that it be loved, the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, not through free arbitrium, which arises from us, but through the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.

It is objected 2. Various texts of Scripture by which it seems insinuated that men cannot operate anything good unless aided by the help of grace: thus John 17, Without me you can do nothing. 2 Corinthians 3, Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves … what have you that you have not received? ⟦restored: Agieureine Dei auxiio⟧ without the aid of God we cannot do anything good, nor will or accomplish any good. — I distinguish: unless divine ⟦attulerit? print: atlulgeat⟧ aid come to us we cannot perform anything good that pertains unto eternal salvation — I concede: that it be an honest moral good — I deny. But Christ the Lord and the Apostle wished to signify nothing else. For Christ the Lord had said shortly before: as the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it abide in the vine, so neither you, unless you abide in me: by which words He shows the disciples cannot make any fruit that profits unto salvation without His aid: in which manner also the Council of Orange in Canon seven uses the aforesaid Oracle, to insinuate that by the vigour of nature no good can be done which suffices unto salvation. The Apostle likewise signifies that we cannot do and accomplish anything good which pertains unto salvation, unless aided by God author of grace; but the Apostle does not deny that we can will and accomplish something which is moral and natural good, aided by God author and moderator of nature.

It is objected 3. Truly the powers of free arbitrium and of nature help not at all toward pursuing good, if the law itself and knowledge of doing good, where grace is absent, profit nothing toward avoiding sins, but rather toward sinning more gravely: but so it is: therefore, etc. The major is evident. The minor is proved from the Apostle everywhere, especially in the Epistle to the Romans, for he says chapter 4, For the law worketh wrath: and where there is no law, neither is there transgression. And chapter 5, The law crept in that sin might abound. And chapter 7, Without the law sin was dead. And 1 Corinthians 15 the law is called the strength of sin. And 2 Corinthians 3 the Law is called the killing letter, the ministry of death, and the ministry of damnation: now the law is said to work wrath, increase transgression, raise up sin, minister death, etc. on no other ground than because without grace it can by no means be directed toward good, but rather excites unto offending: therefore man by the powers of free arbitrium alone can in no way pursue good. — I distinguish the minor: the law without grace works wrath, increases transgression, etc. per se, and from its institution — I deny: per accidens, and occasionally as received by him upon whom it is imposed, namely by reason of resisting concupiscence, whereby ⟦fit?⟧ for the most part, but not always, man obeys not the mandate of the law — I concede. I say therefore all those evil effects which are ascribed to the law by the Apostle are not effected per se and from the institution of the law: first, because the same Apostle chapter 7 says: For the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good: secondly, because the same Apostle in the same chapter warns that care be taken lest good be made to be death or the cause of death: thirdly, because the end of the law is good, namely the knowledge of sin; …for verily by the law is the knowledge of sin, he says in the same place chapter 3. Whence St. Augustine in the book On the Spirit and the Letter says: The law shows to man his infirmity, that fleeing to the mercy of God through faith, he may be healed through faith. And book 13 On the Words of the Apostle, chapter 3, he says: Good, he says, is the law, if anyone use it lawfully. What then is it to use the law lawfully? to acknowledge by the law his disease, and seek health, and run to divine aid. — I say secondly, that the law is said to be the cause of wrath, death, sin, etc. per accidens, and by occasion taken, in that sense in which Christ the Lord Luke 2 is said to be set for the ruin and resurrection of many. And 2 Corinthians 6 the Apostles are said to be authors of death unto death, namely by occasion: but the law is said to be the cause of death, wrath, and sin by occasion and per accidens for three causes. First, because if there were not law there would be no transgression, since knowledge notifying obligation brings a greater penalty: whence St. Augustine in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 14 ⟦print: 1t⟧ The letter, he says, prohibiting sin does not justify man, but rather kills by increasing concupiscence, and heaping up iniquity by transgression. Secondly, because as the same St. Augustine teaches in the same place chapter 4, the law although good increases desire by prohibiting evil: as the rush of waters if it cease not to flow into that part becomes more vehement by the opposed dam, which mass when it has overcome, precipitated with greater accumulation, bursts forth more violently over the plains: for I know not in what manner this very thing which is coveted ⟦print: enneupiscitur⟧ becomes more pleasant while forbidden. Finally thirdly, the law is said to be occasionally the cause of sin, because for the most part from the law, men to whom it is given take occasion of pride, as St. Augustine testifies book 3 to Boniface, chapter 1(?): The letter, he says, cut in two, so as openly to make themselves guilty either by not doing what it commands, or by thinking they do what is spiritual, that is from God, they exercise not charity: so they remain either openly iniquitous or fallaciously just: prudent in open iniquity, humbled; foolishly proud in fallacious wisdom.

SECOND CAPITAL ARGUMENT, by which the Adversaries strive to prove that everything which proceeds not from charity is sin. — They object. No act is given midway between culpable cupidity and holy charity: therefore no good work morally good in all its circumstances is given without grace, and consequently without faith, which is the first grace: forsooth if such an act were given, it would be midway between charity and culpable cupidity. They prove the antecedent from St. Augustine in several places, especially book 9 On the Trinity chapter 8, where he says every word is conceived either by cupidity or by charity: No one loving, he says, does anything which he has not first spoken in his heart: which word is conceived by love, either of creature, or of Creator; that is, either of mutable nature, or of unchangeable truth. And on Ps. 18, Whoever will refuse to serve charity, must serve iniquity: and in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapter 11 ⟦print: 1i⟧ Reigns, he says, carnal cupidity where there is not the charity of God. — I answer first, distinguishing the antecedent: no act is given midway between holy charity and culpable cupidity concomitantly, and by reason of subject — I concede: because almost no act is done by man except one in which either cupidity or charity dominates: formally, and considering the sole reason of the act itself — I deny; for truly some act can be indifferent, nay even morally good, where charity is absent, that affection namely which orders and directs all things per se into God. — I answer secondly, that the antecedent can be denied: for St. Augustine himself acknowledges some act midway between charity and vitious cupidity which is not evil: for he says in the book On Patience, chapter 26, If anyone not having charity, and placed in some schism, lest he deny Christ, suffers tribulations, anguishes, hunger, etc., by no manner are those things culpable: nay truly even this patience is praiseworthy. And in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, he says the impious do some things which not only cannot be censured, but truly which deservedly are praised. Therefore he does not judge all acts which proceed not from charity to be derived from vitious cupidity. And lest he appear contrary to himself, it must be said he uses the name of cupidity here in a broader signification, for that affection which is not perfect charity, nor is ordered per se to God.

They insist: The same St. Augustine affirms first that without charity and love of God nothing can be done per se except sin; for he says in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 14, That is not good fruit which springs not from the root of charity. — I distinguish: that it is not good fruit without charity which is sufficient for obtaining salvation — I concede: that it be morally good and contribute to the honesty of human society — I deny. For as often as St. Augustine says charity is desired for a good act, so often it is understood of good work conducing unto eternal life: thus is to be understood what he says book 1 On the Grace of Christ, chapter 26, What good should we do unless we love? And a little after: Where love is not, no work is imputed, namely unto merit of eternal life.

Finally they urge from the same St. Augustine, book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 1, If the commandment is done through fear of punishment, not love of justice, it is done servilely, not liberally, and therefore it is not done: but from the same St. Augustine chapter 8, Whosoever (of the Jews) did what the law commanded, not aiding spirit of grace, did through fear of punishment, not love of justice: and hence before God it was not in the will which before men appeared in the work: rather they were accused from this, that in mind they wished rather to prefer that God, if it could be done, commit with impunity. Therefore no commandment can be fulfilled nor good done without grace and charity. — I distinguish the minor: that this happens for the most part — I concede: always and on every occasion given — I deny: for such is not the opinion of St. Augustine, that whatever is done through fear of punishment is vitious; for he himself commends fear of God even servile in many places, most truly however book 1 Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, chapter 16. Healthfully, he says, sacred scripture commends not only the goodness but also the severity of God: since God both is loved usefully and feared. And on Psalm 127 explaining those words: Blessed the man who feareth the Lord, he says: Me(?) whose fear is not yet chaste feareth the presence of the Lord, and punishments. Through fear he does whatever good he does. Not through fear of losing that good, but through fear of suffering that evil: he fears not lest he lose the embraces of the most beautiful spouse: but fears lest he be cast into gehenna: good is this fear too, useful is it. And in the book On Grace and Free Arbitrium, chapter 18, he calls that Spirit of fear a great gift of God: not that Peter denied Christ through fear, but of one the Lord Christ said: Fear him who hath power to send soul and body into gehenna. And in Tractate 1 on the Epistle of John he says the fear of the Lord occupies the mind first, that charity may enter afterward, and fear is the medicament of the soul, but charity its health. —

All the other holy Fathers agree with them: for St. Cyprian, in the book On the Praise of Martyrdom, says: You have been roused by the fear of things to come to this glorious title (of Martyrdom, that is): for they to whom greater things are promised, to them greater are those things which seem to be objects of fear. And St. Basil, expounding on Psalm 33 those words The rich man wanted and hungered, says: if ever you sense sin breaking out and springing up in any one thing, call back to your mind that dreadful judgment of Christ, which no mortal can endure. And there he affirms that fear to be salutary, a worker of holiness, and to curb the soul from sinning as it were with a certain bridle. And St. Chrysostom, Homily 15 To the People of Antioch, says: What? Is hell graver; but nothing is more useful than the fear of it: for the fear of hell brings us the race toward the kingdom: unless fear were good, Christ would not have devoted many sermons, and long ones, speaking about that punishment and torture. The like is found in St. Ambrose on Psalm 118, and Jerome on chapter 1 of Malachi.

THE THIRD CAPITAL ARGUMENT is drawn from this, that all the works of infidels are said to be sins, and their virtues false and counterfeit. — It is objected 1. The Apostle, Romans 14, saying: whatsoever is not from faith is sin: but the works of infidels cannot be derived from faith: therefore they are sins. — I distinguish the minor: that what is not from faith, as the rule of acting, is sin, I concede; that what is not from faith, as the principle or rule of believing, is sin, I deny. For faith is taken in two ways (for the present): first, for that by which someone judges something to be licit for himself; this is, for the dictate of conscience: in which sense we commonly say that we do a thing in good faith, which we carry out from conscience and the dictate of reason: thus the Fathers of the Lateran Council took the name of faith in Canon 41, where we read: Since all that is not from faith is sin, we shall hold by synodal judgment that no prescription at all without good faith, that is, without a good conscience. Second, the name of faith signifies the habit and act by which we believe some truth on account of the authority of the one saying it. But the Apostle here takes faith in the prior way: for he speaks of Jews converted to the faith, who through an erroneous conscience judged it not lawful to eat foods prohibited by the Mosaic law. When therefore they distinguish food from food, and nevertheless eat of that food which they judge illicit, they truly sin, because they act not from faith, that is, not from the dictate of conscience judging it licit. Moreover, everything that does not proceed from such faith, that is, what is not done according to that rule, is sin. So St. Chrysostom interprets it, Homily 26 on the Epistle to the Romans, saying: Here faith is understood not of dogmas, but of the argument of the proposed undertaking, that is, the persuasion concerning the matter at hand about doing it: with whom concur OEcumenius, Theophylactus, and several other more recent interpreters with Estius.

They urge: Most of the holy Fathers take faith here for the faith of believing. For so Augustine understands it in several places, especially book 4 Against Julian, chapter 3: therefore the solution given above is null. And presently, that what is done by one lacking the habit of infused faith is sin. — I distinguish the consequent: that what is not from faith contrarily, and positively, that is, what is done unfaithfully, and against what faith persuades should be done, is sin, I concede; that what is done negatively, that is, with faith absent, is sin per se, and precisely because it is done by one not having faith, I deny. Now in the former way (if he speaks of divine faith) the Apostle uses it: for he forms his proposition about the Jew, who judges that abstinence is owed from certain foods, and nevertheless against the faith he has eats those foods; whose action is doubtless sin, as being done against the light and dictate of conscience. That this is the Apostle's meaning is clear from the preceding words; for he says: But he that discerneth (that is, makes a certain discernment of foods, judging some clean, others unclean), if he eat, is condemned: because not from faith: for all that is not from faith is sin.

They insist: Yet the Apostle says not only the works done contrary to faith, but also those done negatively, are sins: therefore the solution is null. They prove the antecedent from that passage to the Hebrews 11: Without faith it is impossible to please God: therefore no work of infidels can be good and pleasing to God. — I deny the antecedent; and first I distinguish the text of the Apostle: without faith it is impossible to please God by reason of the agent, I concede; by reason of the work, I deny. I confess indeed that an infidel so long as he remains in infidelity cannot please God by reason of himself, although sometimes he may please by reason of the work; yet not with that complacency of which the Apostle treats there, and which proceeds from supernatural justice and sanctity, by which the Saints pleased God, of whom he goes on to treat throughout the whole chapter, consequently to what he had said at the end of the preceding chapter, My just one lives by faith.

Finally they urge: Not only by reason of the agent, but even by reason of the work all the works of infidels are sins, and unpleasing to God: therefore etc. The antecedent is proved from the same Apostle to Titus 1: Unto the defiled and unbelievers nothing is pure. — I distinguish the antecedent: unto the defiled and unbelieving nothing is pure with perfect and supernatural purity, I concede; with imperfect and moral purity, I deny. For there can be a twofold purity of a work: namely perfect, and of the supernatural order, which proceeds from sanctifying grace, whereby it comes to pass that all the works of the just are truly pure, pleasing to God, and acceptable for supernatural beatitude; but another is moral purity, and of the natural order, whereby it comes to pass that a work elicited about an honest good, and illustrated by the due moral circumstances, is judged pure, and the object of natural divine complacency, by which God approves all the offspring and fruits of nature which come forth according to the order prescribed by natural Providence. For if the shoots of trees and plants please God, as is gathered from these words of Genesis 1: The earth brought forth green herbs, and such as yield seed according to its own kind, and the tree that beareth fruit, having seed each one according to its kind: And God saw that it was good: much more can the acts and fruits of the will, in which there remain certain, though faintest, lineaments of the divine image, please God in a nobler manner. — And otherwise I distinguish: unto the defiled and unbelieving who either abuse the creatures of God through uncleanness of heart, or through infidelity treat them as though they were impure and use them not, nothing is pure, I concede; simply to infidels, and by reason only of their infidelity, I deny. Otherwise by an equal consequence it would follow that all the works even of the clean are pure; for the Apostle says: all things are pure to the pure. Which however is absolutely false; otherwise nowhere could anyone sin once justice had been attained. Thus St. Augustine in book 21 Against Faustus the Manichee, expounds this text of the Apostle both of believers and of unbelievers who abuse the creatures of God, e.g. foods, through impurity, keeping neither time, nor manner, nor measure; and he applies it both against the Jews, who after the abrogation of the law still judged foods unclean, and against the Manichees, who judged all foods altogether unclean and produced from an evil principle. — And finally I distinguish: the Apostle speaks of those impure ones who have a perverse and depraved conscience, whose works are therefore altogether impure because they have an evil intention in their works. This certainly seems the genuine mind of the Apostle; for he says: Unto the defiled and unbelievers nothing is pure, but both their mind and their conscience are defiled: they profess that they know God, but in their works they deny him: being abominable, and incredulous, and to every good work reprobate.

They object 2. St. Augustine, who declares and proves in many places that the works of infidels are sins, and that in them there are no true virtues, especially in book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 3: Let it be far off, then, that he be said truly chaste who does not hope in his wife through the true faith of marriage for the sake of God. And in the following chapter: Those who do not generate children with this intention, this will, this end, that they transfer them from the members of the first man to the members of Christ: but infidels wishing to glory in an infidel progeny, even if their observance be so great that they come together according to the rules of matrimony solely for the cause of begetting children, have not in them true conjugal chastity. Since chastity is a virtue, to which vice contrary is shamelessness, and since all virtues, even those which operate through the body, dwell in the soul, how is the body asserted to be truly of chastity when the very soul is not strengthened by the true God? Whereas that holy Psalmist accuses fornication, where he says: For behold they that go far from thee shall perish: thou hast destroyed all them that commit fornication against thee. True chastity therefore, whether conjugal, or widowed, or virginal, must not be called such except that which is enslaved to true faith. But above all he immediately treats and discusses the matter in book 4 Against Julian, chapter 3, writing thus: But you set before us examples of impious men most bitter enemies of this grace, whom you say, alien from the faith, are to be held to have virtues, in which without the aid of grace there is only the good of nature, though enslaved to superstition, who by the sole inborn forces of liberty are frequently found merciful, modest, chaste, and sober. Which error St. Augustine refuts chiefly with three arguments: First indeed by an argument ad hominem, because Julian elsewhere taught that the beginning of justice is indeed in man, but its consummation is from God: namely, that the will, or desire of good, is from us, but its effect from God; whereas speaking of the works of infidels he attributes to the forces of free will not only the willing, but even the effect of the good of the will: whence St. Augustine thus interrogates him: But if, as they were, and are, we now find in them the willing and the effect of the willing, what remains to be reserved for grace in those evidences in which you say they abound in virtues? Second he attacks him with an argument drawn from Proverbs 21: He that saith to the wicked man: Thou art just, shall be cursed among the people, and odious to the nations. Third he presses him with the authority of the Apostle to the Romans 1: The just lives by faith. Let it be far off, he says, that he be just who does not live by faith; for the just lives by faith. From these places the Adversaries argue thus: there cannot there be any good work where true virtue cannot be found; but St. Augustine openly confesses that in infidels no true virtue is found: therefore he denies equally that there is any good work in them. — I distinguish the minor: St. Augustine confesses that infidels do not possess true virtues, that is, no habit by which a man is judged to live rightly, and by which he obtains the grace of justification and eternal life, as Julian wished, as we noted in the third Notable; I concede: that there is no habit of virtue by which a man is inclined to any morally good work of the natural order, at least where grave temptation does not press, I deny. I confess therefore that in infidels there is no true virtue simply, by which a man is ordered to salvation: in which sense alone St. Augustine uses true virtue, as appears in the same third chapter. For he says: If therefore for attaining true beatitude, which immortal faith, which is in Christ, truly promises us, the virtues profit man nothing, then in no way can they be virtues. And thus he denies that infidels have virtues because no infidel can be just: because, as he repeats many times in the same place, the just lives by faith: Who moreover, he says, who wish themselves to be held Christians, unless the Pelagians alone, or perhaps you yourself alone among them, would call an infidel just? Would call impious just, would call him just who is enslaved to the devil? Let him be Fabricius, let him be Fabius, let him be Scipio, let him be Regulus, whose names you thought fit to use as terrors, as though we were speaking in the ancient Roman Curia. But in this cause, even if you appeal to the School of Pythagoras or of Plato, where most erudite and learned men, ennobled by Philosophy far excelling the rest, said that true virtues are none but those which are in a manner imprinted on the mind by that eternal and immutable substance, which is God: even there against you I shall cry out as much as He grants, who called us in the liberty of piety: neither in those is there true justice, because the just lives by faith: faith is by hearing, but hearing by the Word of Christ; the end of the law is Christ unto justice for everyone that believeth: how are they truly just, in whom the humility of the true Just One is cheap? For the nearer they approached by understanding, the further pride receded: because knowing God, they did not glorify him as God, etc. Whence he concludes: if justice is by nature and will: then Christ died gratuitously; if justice is by teachings of men of whatever sort: then Christ died gratuitously. For by that by which is true justice, by that also is the kingdom of God: for God himself would be unjust, which be far from us, if a true just one were not admitted to his kingdom, etc. Such are the words of St. Augustine, by which it abundantly appears that down to here St. Augustine denies that the virtues of infidels are true, inasmuch as those virtues of infidels cannot contribute anything to salvation.

He urges: If infidels had within them any true virtues, and only morally good ones, they could be called barren in respect of beatitude: but St. Augustine plainly denies that any virtues can be called barren; for thus about the middle of the same third chapter he carps at Julian: It cannot be said how much that opinion of yours supports you, because you said all virtues are fruitful, by which we are good either fruitfully or barrenly: It cannot be, that we are good barrenly. But we are not good whatever barrenly we are: For a good tree brings forth good fruit: far be it that, as God is good, from whose axe is prepared destruction for trees bringing forth no good fruit, good trees be cut down and cast into the fire. In no way therefore are men good barrenly: but those who are not good can be some less evil, others more evil. Therefore according to St. Augustine no virtue can be barren. — I distinguish the minor: no virtue can be barren in respect of a natural good to be attained, I concede; that no virtue can be fertile in respect of a natural good, and barren in respect of a supernatural good, I deny. For St. Augustine himself in book 5 Of the City of God, chapter 15, affirms that God gave to the Romans Empire over so many Nations and kingdoms in reward for their civil and moral virtues. He judges therefore that those moral virtues merit some temporal reward; and hence even though they appear barren in respect of eternal felicity, they can nevertheless truly be fertile in respect of a temporal good, which God promises and renders to them in reward.

They insist: St. Augustine there denies that men can be good barrenly. For there he charges Julian with having said that all virtues are certain affections, by which we are good either fruitfully or barrenly: It cannot be (says the holy Doctor) that we are good barrenly, but we are not good whatever barrenly we are. And a little later in the same place: in no way are men good barrenly. And still somewhat later he thus upbraids Julian: How therefore, I beseech thee, dost thou jest in these disputations, or rave, thou who praisest the fruits of barren trees, which certainly are either none; or if they are none, they are not to be praised; or if the fruits are good, surely the trees are not barren; nay rather they are good, since the fruits are good, and ought to please God, which good trees cannot fail to do: and finally at the end of the aforesaid chapter he declares that good is not that which is barren, in these words: According to thee, let such wills, he says, be called good trees; it suffices that they are barren before God, so that by this they are not good. From all which one may thus infer: if there were any morally good work in infidels, it would be barren, and not conducing to the end of eternal salvation: but from the aforesaid places of St. Augustine no barren good is given: therefore no morally good work is given in infidels. — I answer, distinguishing the minor: no barren good is given from which men are called good simply and perfectly, I concede; that no barren good is given from which men are called good secundum quid and less perfectly, I deny. Again I distinguish: no barren good is given in the sense of Julian, whom St. Augustine attacks there, I concede; in another sense, which Theologians commonly defend, I deny. For it is certain that there is some barren good, in that sense which Theologians commonly defend, namely that good which from object, end, and circumstances is morally good, yet profits nothing toward salvation, because it is done without grace. For the holy Fathers acknowledge such a barren good. Among others St. Ambrose in his Commentary on Psalm 1, on the verse: And his goodness faileth not: where such morally good...

He insists: From the place of St. Augustine just cited, the fruits of barren trees are not to be praised: but infidels are barren trees: therefore their fruits, that is, their acts, are not to be praised. — I answer, distinguishing the major: of barren trees operating barrenly and unfaithfully, I concede; otherwise, I deny.

They urge in the same St. Augustine: If the fruits are good, surely the trees are not barren: therefore if the works of infidels are good, infidels must not be called barren trees, which is against St. Augustine. — I answer, distinguishing the antecedent: if the fruits are good simply, I concede; if they are good only secundum quid, I deny.

He insists again from the same Augustine: a barren will is not good: therefore a barren work is not good. — I answer, distinguishing the antecedent: it is not good in every mode, I concede; that it is not good secundum quid, I deny; that is, it is not good in the order to salvation and the attainment of the kingdom, which is the supreme good of man; but it is good in the order to moral honesty, and to the right natural formation of man.

OBJECTION 3. Several other sayings of St. Augustine, by which he seems openly to confess that all the works of infidels are sins, because whatever good they sometimes seem to do, they carry it out with an evil end. And this he asserts especially in book one On Baptism and Concupiscence, chapter 3. When, he says, men do these things without faith which seem to pertain to conjugal chastity, whether seeking to please men, or themselves, or others, or avoiding human hardships in those things which they covet as necessary for life, or serving demons, sins are not thereby restrained, but by these sins other sins are overcome. Let it be far off, then, that he be called chaste otherwise who does not keep to his wife the sure faith of marriage for the sake of God. Similarly in book 4 against Julian, chapter 3, Julian asking: If a pagan covers the naked, is it sin because it is not from faith? he answers thus: Precisely insofar as it is not from faith, it is sin. And again at the end of the same chapter he addresses the same Julian thus: Understand, he says, what the Lord says: if thy eye is wicked, thy whole body shall be darksome: but if thy eye is simple, thy whole body shall be lightsome: and acknowledge this eye to be the intention with which each one does what he does, and learn that he who does not do good works with the good intention of faith, that is, of that faith which operates through love, has the whole body, so to speak, which consists of those works as members, darksome, that is, full of the blackness of sins. Or else, since you at least grant that the works of infidels which seem good to you do not however lead them to eternal salvation and the kingdom, know that we say that that good of men, that good will, that good work, cannot be conferred on anyone without the grace of God, which is given through the one Mediator of God and men, by which alone man can be brought to the eternal gift of God and the kingdom. All other things therefore, which seem among men to have something of praise, seem to thee true virtues, seem good works, and without any commission of sin. As for me, this I know, that it is not made by a good will. For the will of an infidel, and impious, is not good. It cannot be, as being done in a most evil state: nor does the name of sin apply here in the strict and proper signification, inasmuch as it signifies an act disagreeing with and contrary to the dictates of right reason and the prescriptions of the laws. I answer 2. For the most part indeed the works of infidels are sins, because it rarely happens that they are not truly acts disagreeing with the rules of right living and right reason; for they are accustomed to act from infidelity, which, since it is an erroneous rule, there is no doubt that whatever proceeds from it is vitiated and sinful. I answer 3. Therefore the works of infidels are for the most part sins, because rarely do they propose to themselves any right end in their works, that they might obey the mandates of God by rendering glory to Him: nay rather for the most part they act for a most evil end: because, as St. Augustine says in the words praised above, they seek either to please themselves or others. Whence in chapter 3 of book 4 against Julian, where he pronounced that covering the naked, insofar as it is not from faith, is sin, he straightway subjoins: Not because through the deed itself, which is covering the naked, it is sin: but to glory in such a work not in the Lord is sin: for to glory not in the Lord is something done unfaithfully, breathing of pride, that is, of presumption: whence in the same chapter, giving the reason why infidels do goods badly, he says: Because namely they do them not as a faithful, but as an unfaithful and evil cultivator. Finally, while in the same chapter he says: Where there is not the intention of good faith, which operates through love, the whole body is full of the blackness of sins: he wished only that sin reigns in infidels, and is present concomitantly, on account of the absence and defect of faith, which is the principle of justification.

He urges: Whatever infidels do from infidelity is sin formally, and not only concomitantly: but St. Augustine testifies that infidels, doing all even those things which seem good works, always act from infidelity, for in book 1 On Baptism and Concupiscence, chapter 1, he says: Infidels have the good of conjugal chastity, because they use it unfaithfully, turning it into evil and sin: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: whatever infidels do formally from infidelity is sin, I concede; because namely infidelity itself is the evil tree, which cannot bring forth good fruits: that whatever they do in the state of infidelity is formally sin, I deny. Nor did St. Augustine mean anything else: for in the same place he subjoins: But now truly they turn into the use of justice that concupiscence whereby the flesh concupisceth against the spirit, the marriages of the faithful: it is certain however that the marriages of the faithful do not convert it except while they act faithfully and from faith: whence he subjoins: For they have the intention of generating children to be regenerated: so that those who are born sons of this world may be reborn sons of God.

He urges: If what is not from faith were sin only concomitantly, and not formally, the reasoning of St. Augustine against Julian would be vain and useless: since Julian would without difficulty have admitted that indeed whatever proceeds formally from infidelity is sin: but otherwise concerning the other works of infidels, which are not formally acts of infidelity, but acts of virtue, or mercy, or justice, or temperance: therefore St. Augustine judges the works of infidels to be sins not only inasmuch as they proceed from infidelity itself, but also as they are done within infidelity itself. — I deny the antecedent: For Julian judged not only that the works of infidels are morally good; but also that they suffice for sanctifying grace, and for meriting eternal glory: he judged also that man, with the pursuit of holiness approaching, could by grace adhere so as to be unable to fall into sins, as St. Augustine testifies in the aforesaid chapter 3 of book 1. Against your persuasions, he says, and you grant, saying, therefore what God swears can be believed to be perfected by the pursuit of sanctity, once prayed for: this error he attacks with those words of the Apostle, Whatsoever is not from faith is sin. — Moreover Julian judged those works which are good from their object to be nevertheless good, even if done from a perverse end: which holy Augustine reproaches him there as a most evil dogma and utterly unworthy of Christian men. Whence, he says, lest I seem to calumniate your very words, I shall now set them down: The origin of all virtues, you say, is situated in the rational soul, and all the affections, by which we are good either fruitfully or barrenly, are in the subject of our mind: prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude. Since therefore the force of these affections is naturally in all, yet, you say, it does not hasten toward one end in all, but according to the judgment of the will, whose nod they serve, they are directed either to eternal things or to temporal ones. Which being in that which they are, not in that which they do, they vary only in that which they merit: and therefore they can sustain no loss, you say, either of their name or of their kind, but are enriched only by the magnitude of the reward they desired, or frustrated by its smallness. This opinion of Julian, as insipid, St. Augustine thus beats back: I know not when you learned these things: yet now you see, I judge, that it follows that the prudence of flies be true, whereby they devise kinds of little gains: and the justice of flies, whereby through fear of greater loss they more easily sometimes despise their own than usurp what belongs to another: and the temperance of flies, whereby they prohibit the appetite for luxury, because it is costly, and are content with necessary food alone and covering: and the fortitude of flies, whereby, as Horace says, book 1 Epist. 1, Through seas they flee poverty, through rocks, through fires: whereby finally we learn that by a certain barbaric irruption they could have been compelled under many terrors of enemies to betray what they had: whence he concludes: Therefore those virtues with such an end are shameful and deformed, and therefore in no way genuine and true virtues; yet they seem to you so true and beautiful that they could sustain no loss of their name or kind; but are enriched or frustrated only by the magnitude of the reward they desired, that is, by the fruit of earthly goods, not of heavenly rewards. Against this latter error moreover St. Augustine heaps up many other things, by which he signifies that that is evil which evil, noxious, and unfaithful will makes.

He insists again: By what was the mind of St. Augustine concerning the works of infidels cannot appear more clearly than from the doctrine of his Disciples, especially of St. Prosper: but St. Prosper openly confesses that the works of infidels, insofar as they are done in the state of infidelity, are sins: therefore, etc. The minor is proved from the book against the Collator, chapter 22. Nature, he says, uses its goods badly, in which without the worship of the true God it is conquered by impieties and impurities, and is accused from that very thing whence it thinks itself defended. And book 1 On the Vocation of the Nations, chapter 2. Without the worship of the true God, he says, even that wherein virtue seems to be is sin: nor can that

please God without God: but he who does not please God, by whom if not by vices and clamors does he please? Finally, in the book On the Ungrateful, chapter 16.

For every work of probity, unless it spring From the seed of true faith, is sin, and turns into guilt, And barren glory heaps up punishment for itself.

Now by the name of this barren glory, which heaps up punishment for itself, he signifies the works of infidels elicited in the state of infidelity: therefore, etc. — I answer, St. Prosper is to be explicated in the same way in which we expounded St. Augustine: namely of the morally good work, which is done unfaithfully, and with some presumption of obtaining grace through it. Indeed the Semipelagians, against whom St. Prosper militates, judged that man by natural pursuit and desire of faith could merit both faith itself and the other gifts of God, by which one arrives at eternal life. But St. Prosper teaches on the contrary that these works, conceived with that type and spirit of pride, are sins, are turned into guilt, and rather heap up punishment than merit grace, which he clearly explains in chapter 37 of the work praised above:

Yet if they think that anyone can grasp these By his own strength, whether that labor be worthy to be called Merited genius, they say, of one seeking true goods: They conceive growing, they are diminished; advancing, They fail; shining they fall: running they recede.

In exactly the same way must be explicated the other passage of the same St. Prosper from the book On the Contemplative Life, chapter 3, where he says: The Apostle, by saying that whatsoever is not from faith is sin, declared that all goods which are done from faith are virtues, or if they should have been done without faith, they are not to be believed any goods, but vices, which we ought not to stand approving, but condemning, and hurling away as hostile, and driving out from the bounds of eternal salvation. For St. Prosper speaks there of the intentions of infidels, which not the mere absence of faith, but the unfaithful and noxious will renders culpable. For St. Prosper sufficiently hinted that those works are elicited by a spirit of pride, while he says they are hurled down inflated: similarly while he adds that what he said of infidels could also be twisted against believers, who live not according to God but according to man. Finally his meaning appears more lucidly near the end of the chapter, where he intimates that he treats of the works of God which are done by infidels with an evil intention, while he says: Therefore if ever it has also shone forth clear, that they do not seem to have their virtues who feign: and those feign who not from faith, nor for the sake of God, but for the sake of men only operate some good, in fastings, and vigils, chastity, constancy, and the other goods to be sown. Not that they may become good, but that they fashion themselves as good before men, nor that they may receive the eternal reward, but for acquiring popular glory. It must be said therefore that by the name of that barren glory, which heaps up punishment for itself, he understands nothing else than vainglory, with which infidels abounded on every side, especially the Philosophers, whom Tertullian accordingly calls lovers of glory.

The Adversary heaps up various opinions of other disciples of St. Augustine, by which they strive to prove that truly the works of infidels are formally sins. First indeed St. Fulgentius seems to define the matter openly in the book On the Truth of Predestination, chapter 18, where he says: Before human will receives faith, by itself it can merit punishment, not faith: for every one that is not from faith is sin, and without faith it is impossible to please God. But he who does not please God, doubtless displeases God, not mitigating God, but rather exasperating him. And book 2, chapter 5: We do not please God unless we will; but from himself is granted to us that we will, by whom unless the will of man be changed so that it be good, it always desires evil, so that it never rightly desires good: and thus while it does not keep the right order in its own affairs, it in no way pleases the true and good God. — Primasius on these words, 1st chapter, of Romans: What is not from faith, says: Not from the faith which works through charity: but everything that is not from faith is sin; whatsoever builds not up is not from faith, and therefore is sin. — Bede on the cited chapter: All the life of infidels is sin; and nothing is good without the highest good; for where the acknowledgment of the true and immutable truth is lacking, even in the best morals virtue is false. — Prudentius in the book Against John Scotus, chapter 4, has: Man after that damnation has free will, by which he can incline by his own will, and is inclined to evil; he has free will by which he can rise again to good. But that he rise to good, is not of his own strength, but of the grace of God having mercy. He has free will that he can will well, that he can live well, that he can adhere to God: but that he will well, that he live well, that he adhere to God, is not of his own strength, but of the grace of God having mercy. — St. Remigius, and the Church of Lyon in the book On the Three Epistles, chapter 22: Truly dead are the works of infidels, not only when they openly serve vices and sins, but also when, instigated by the natural good which the omnipotent Creator grants, or imbued with natural law, they seem to have and exercise certain good works, and as it were certain virtues; because, ignorant or hating, or even persecuting, the faith of God and of his Christ, since they do not operate from that faith, altogether neither good work nor true virtue can there be, which does not proceed from the root of truth and goodness: for while those things which seem good works according to man are never referred by true faith to the Lord whom they know not, nor do they act for his sake, but for the sake of some honesty by which they may seem great among men, or for the desire of some temporal commodity, by the very impiety of infidelity, by the very inflation of elation, by the very perversity of cupidity, all things are so impure and defiled that before God they are not

Sermon one On Innovation: It is certain, he says, that all things tend toward their own origin as far as lies in them, and are ever more inclined toward it. So also we who were created from nothing, it is agreed that if we are left to ourselves we slip always into sin, which is nothing. — I answer, those holy Fathers are to be understood in that way in which we expounded St. Augustine, namely that in infidels there is no good, no true virtues, and their works are sins, either because weighed down and conquered by the weight of their concupiscences they most frequently rush into vices: or because, not acknowledging the true God, they do not operate for his glory, but for the desire of some temporal or empty vanity; whence it comes to pass, as the Church of Lyon presently argued, that by the very impiety of infidelity, by the very intention of their works, by the very perversity of cupidity, all things are so impure and defiled that before God they are judged not virtues but vices. Or finally, I say that the virtues and morally good works of infidels are called sins comparatively with respect to the theological and infused moral virtues: for the acquired moral virtues appear midway between those theological and infused moral virtues, and vices or sins. Whence since a medium compared to the more perfect extreme is judged imperfect; whereas on the contrary it seems perfect when compared with the other less perfect extreme: thus tepid compared to hot seems cold, and compared to cold, seems hot: similarly dark compared to black appears white, but appears black when placed next to white. Hence it is that the acquired moral virtues, by reason of order and comparison with the theological and infused moral ones, or those which operate from the principle of grace and charity, are called imperfect; whereas on the contrary they can be judged perfect, if they are compared with the vices to which they are opposed. Since therefore St. Augustine and his Disciples consider the virtues of infidels in order to the perfect virtues of Christians, and compare those with these: therefore they say that they are not true virtues, but counterfeit: and those truly sin...

THE FINAL ARGUMENT prevails by reason. — They object 1: No good work can be given without right and perfect intention: but in infidels there cannot be right intention: therefore neither any morally good work. The major is clear from that saying of St. Ambrose, book 1 On Duties, chapter 3: Your effect puts its name upon your work. The minor is proved: there cannot there be right intention where there is no faith, which is the eye of the mind directing intention. For, says St. Augustine on Psalm 31, let them reckon their works good before faith, where indeed faith was not, there was no good work: for a good work intention makes; faith directs the intention. — I answer, granting the major, distinguishing the minor: where there is no faith, there cannot be right intention, nor direction of the work to the ultimate supernatural end, I concede; to an honest subalternate natural and moral end, I deny. For as faith directs the intention of man with respect to the supernatural ultimate end, so also the light of reason can direct the intention with respect to some honest end connatural to man.

They insist: Every work which is referred to some created end, and is not directed to God, is sin: but where there is no true faith and knowledge of God, a work cannot be directed to God: therefore since in infidels there is no true faith and knowledge of God, it follows that their works are sins. They prove the major from St. Augustine, book 4 Against Julian, book 3. Whatever good is done by man, he says, and is not done for that for which true wisdom commands it ought to be done, although it may seem a duty, is by its very wrong end a sin. — I distinguish the major: that what is not referred to God either explicitly or implicitly: actually but virtually, or habitually, is sin, I concede; that what is referred implicitly, habitually, and virtually, namely by the intrinsic relation which is identified with, and as it were imbibed in, the very entity of the act, is sin, I deny. For an act can be referred to God in three ways, as St. Bonaventure notes in 2 dist. 41, namely actually, virtually, and habitudinally. First, when someone thinking of God loves him, and directs his work to his glory. Second, when someone refers some work to God having at the beginning of the work his glory as end, though he does not think of him during the course of the work. Third is when, without a preconsidered ultimate end, or God, from the sole nature of the good work there comes about its direction to God. But infidels, who in no way acknowledge God, cannot indeed explicitly and actually direct their work to his glory; this however they can implicitly: for since they act for the particular end of virtue, as truly they can act; for instance when they give alms because natural reason dictates it honest to help the needy, implicitly and virtually or habitually they refer that work to God: for they act for an end instituted by God.

They urge: If it were licit to act for some other end besides the glory of God, and if some act of a creature could be licitly referred to some created end, especially to the very honesty of virtue: yet from St. Augustine, lib. 19. De Civit. Dei, it is not licit to act for the sole end of virtue: For indeed they are thought by certain persons to be virtues with a fine and honest end, when they are referred to themselves; even then they are inflated or proud: and therefore they must be judged not virtues but vices: therefore by no means can an act be good which is referred to another end than to God. - I distinguish the minor: it is not licit to act for the honesty of virtue as for the ultimate end, I concede; as for a subalternate end ordainable to the ultimate end, whether virtually or habitudinally, I deny. Now St. Augustine says in the former sense that the virtues, when they are referred to themselves, are proud and inflated, such as were most often the virtues of many Gentiles, especially of the Philosophers, and likewise of the men of valor, who tasted in their own virtues or splendid deeds nothing but human and fleeting glory: whence St. Augustine, book 1 Of the Unfinished Work against Julian: Hear, and understand: the fortitude of the Gentiles worldly cupidity makes; but the fortitude of Christians the charity of God, which is poured forth in our hearts, not by the arbitrium of our will, which is from us, but by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. Or as he explains more lucidly in the book On True Religion, c. 38: Infidels seek, he says, threefold cupidity, either of pleasure, or of excellence, or of spectacle: thus knowing not how to love temporal things, that from them they expect beatitude. But to those things whereby each wishes to be made blessed he must serve whether he will or will not: for whithersoever they lead, thither follows also whoever has been seen to take them away, he is feared.

They object 2. If any act could be good without grace, it would follow that God concurs no otherwise to an evil and sinful act than to an act of virtue, because he would concur to each only with a general concourse, and as Author of nature: but the consequent is against orthodox and Catholic doctrine, which St. Augustine defends most sharply, book 2 On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 18, where he proves God to be the author of the good work in us, not of the evil: The will, he says, is either good or evil: and certainly we have not an evil one from God: there remains therefore, that we have a good will from God... wherefore what turns us away from God is ours, and this will is evil: but that we turn ourselves to God, we cannot unless he excite and help, and this will is good: therefore no morally good work can be done without grace. — I deny the sequel of the major: For God concurs to a good act per se, and intending it directly; because he offers his general concourse to creatures with this intention, that they use it well: whereas he in no way intends an evil act, but only his general concourse is determined to an evil end by the created will, which abuses that general concourse impressed on her by him, twisting it into a perverse end not intended by God; therefore God is to be said to concur to that evil act only per accidens.

You will urge: If these things were so, it would follow that demons can effect a morally good work, because the forces of nature are not less perfect in demons than in men: but the consequent is absurd: therefore also the antecedent. — I deny the sequel of the major, and toward its proof I say that natural forces are indeed not less perfect in demons than in men according to substance and physical principle, pass over that; according to the state of misery in which demons are, I deny. For that state prohibits them so that they cannot effect any moral good of the natural order in every respect, because in that state they are obstinate in evil; whence it comes to pass that they cannot elicit any act except it be done from some evil circumstance and from an affection of a perverse end.

Corollary I. From the three questions set forth above it follows first, that fallen man without any special actual aid of the supernatural order can exercise some moral good; and next that the opinion of Gregory of Rimini appears less probable, in 2 dist. 28. quest. 1. art. 1., where he teaches that beyond every thought and previous motion which can be made through natural causes, some special transient aid is necessary, by which the will be physically forced, so that it refer its act to God as ultimate end, without which relation and habitude that act cannot be morally good. - But from what has been said it abundantly appears that neither is that actual relation universally necessary for a morally good work, but sometimes virtual and habitual suffices; nor is any supernatural subsidy needed that the act be exercised. First, because however weak and infirm the forces of human arbitrium may be, they suffice for this. Because (as St. Augustine teaches in the book Of Spirit and Letter, c. 28.) the image of God in the human soul has not been so worn away by the defilement of earthly affections that there have not remained in it, as it were, remnants whence it can merit to be said that even amid the impiety of his life man does or savors somewhat of the law. And a little later speaking of the Nations, which although they have not the law naturally do the things that are of the law, he says: For they also were men, and there was inherent in them that of nature, by which the rational soul both perceives and does something lawful: but piety, which transfers to the other life, blessed and eternal, has the law immaculate converting souls. Whence the Author of the book Hypognosticon, which is woven entirely out of the sayings of St. Augustine, says, chapter 1: We confess that free arbitrium exists in all men, having indeed the judgment of reason, yet not by which it is fit to begin or certainly accomplish things pertaining to God (that is, eternal beatitude) without God; but only in the works of the present life, both good and evil; namely goods which arise from the goods of nature. — Add here that this proposition of Baius num. 61 was condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs: Without Pelagian error can be admitted some use of free arbitrium that is good or not bad: and he injures the grace of Christ who thinks and teaches thus. Whence Lessius meritedly in the book On Riches, chapter 10, num. 5, constantly affirms that the opinion of Gregory of Rimini together with the erroneous doctrine of Michael Baius was condemned by these Pontiffs. Add all those things by which in the second Question we proved that grace is not required for a morally good work of the natural order. Moreover, if for every good work there were desired a special antecedent aid beyond the motion which can be made through natural causes, such that without it no good act could be done, and it being posited, could not fail to be done, as the same Gregory teaches, it would follow first that the good act would not be done freely, because it would not be done with indifference and antecedent power toward appetite; since the will prevented by that aid cannot but operate. It would follow second that all who do not operate morally well are altogether impotent to operate rightly, because they lack something absolutely necessary and antecedent, which they have neither in reality, nor is it in their free power that they obtain it; for if they could have and merit it, especially through some morally good act: but such aid is prerequired for that good act, as Gregory contends. Wherefore either before every good act some good act ought to precede, which is contradictory; or such aid is not in the power of the operator, nor depends on any good act of him who is deprived of it. Finally, since such a morally good act is of the natural order, the physical force complete and sufficiently potent is undeservedly denied without that special transient aid, so that the will can exercise that act; for if anything rendered that act to the will, most especially moral goodness: but that does not hinder; nay rather it renders the act proportionate to the will, since its object, proportionate, is the moral good consonant with reason. Furthermore free arbitrium in fallen man is not utterly extinguished, but only infirm, as was said above from the Council of Trent: therefore just as in an infirm person some forces remain sufficient for an act, though imperfect, so also in the will of fallen man there remain sufficient forces for doing some morally good and honest work; e.g. to honor parents, to relieve the needy, etc. The foundations of Gregory together with those of Vazquez will be dissolved below.

Corollary II. — It follows second, that the opinion of Vazquez is also less probable, who in disputation 190 teaches that for a morally good work some aid is prerequired, not to give the power, but to actually act, and he judges it to consist in a certain honest and congruous thought, that is, tempered to the genius, complexion or temperament of the man, either infused by God in those circumstances and occasions in which he foresaw from eternity through middle knowledge that free arbitrium, excited by that pious thought, would consent to it. But this special aid he says is grace granted through Christ. That it is grace, he proves thus: every gift of God not owed by the force of creation is special favor and grace, or a gratuitous gift: but every congruous thought, with which one acts morally well, is thus not owed; because man by his nature demands one thought no more than another, nor does he more claim this true order from which that thought follows; otherwise whenever anyone acts badly, he would have been deprived connaturally of the congruous thought owed to him. Add that that congruous thought is not given to all, hence it is not connatural: but beyond the lot of nature. For what is owed to nature is granted to all; and therefore it is grace, inasmuch as grace signifies every gift of nature not owed, whether meanwhile that gift be above the order of nature, or not. Finally, if God gave man only a sufficient thought, he would satisfy the debt of nature; therefore where he prepares a congruous and efficacious one for exercising a morally honest good, he does beyond the debt of nature; and consequently that gift must be called a gratuitous benefit. — But that that special benefit tending to honesty is through Christ, he proves, because from the fall of Adam we were left in that state in which no congruous thought was owed; and moreover on account of original sin we all ought to be deprived of it; hence God grants it not except in view of the merits of Christ the Lord Redeemer. — But this opinion is attacked: First, because some practical thought about a morally good act can be had by the mere forces of nature, as was proved in the second Question of the first Article: therefore also a good affection. But whether the affection to which that pious thought leads follow or follow not, that depends on the will, which determines itself at pleasure to follow or not follow the dictate of reason: and therefore for that no special subsidy of divine grace is needed: for the forces of free arbitrium suffice for it. Second, that congruous thought about some honest act signifies two things only, namely that it be a thought of an honest good, and that it be congruous or efficacious: but from neither head is it necessary that it be a special grace of God: therefore, etc. The major stands. The minor indeed is proved as to each part: because that thought ought not to be judged grace precisely from this, that it is about an honest act and object; for human liberty and nature is not so vitiated that from phantasms it can abstract certain species of evil, and so also of moral and honest good; because not only delectable objects are proposed to the senses, but also honor toward parents and observance toward friends: for wherever man is educated, sustained, protected, and lives among men of the same nature, thence he can have more thoughts inducing to the cult of parents and observance of friends. That truly the thought about an honest good considered as congruous, or as efficacious, is not special grace, is also clear; partly because the same Vazquez judges sufficient knowledge about the honest act and object not to be special grace; therefore he ought to judge the same about the congruous or efficacious thought. The consequence is clear: for efficacious and sufficient aids are within the same order of grace: therefore if the sufficient thought about an honest act be not judged true grace, neither equally should the efficacious thought be placed within the order of grace. Third, original sin did not constitute men obstinate in evil and morally inflexible to good; nor does it entirely impede the general course and concourse of things and secondary causes both acting naturally and freely together with the general concourse of the first Cause; therefore notwithstanding it man can have the affection of a good thought; since it does not transcend its forces. — Nor does it stand in the way that original sin might have merited that men be deprived of natural goods, and perhaps also of congruous thoughts, and likewise of every honest action: since indeed it did not merit it in reality, thence it does not follow that every pious thought of ours is a gratuitous gift of God; otherwise also natural life and the other natural and ingrafted gifts ought equally to be called graces, because on account of original sin we could be deprived of them by God: therefore as those natural benefits are not properly called graces, in the sense in which Vazquez here uses grace, so neither ought that honest thought be judged grace, although on account of original sin we could deservedly be deprived of it as of life. - Nor does it matter either that the congruous thought follows here and now rather than at another time and place, or in this individual rather than in that; for this does not always arise from some special grace or causality of God, but sometimes proceeds also from the force of the order of secondary causes, their natural disposition being supposed, and the free use of human will conjoined, with the sole general concourse of God due to such causes naturally: but this benefit does not transcend the gift of creation, nor the natural disposition and state of things. Otherwise the benefit of grace would also be judged that any man whatever is not born blind, lame, etc.; for another disposition of causes was possible from which that would follow, as another series was possible from which those pious thoughts would not arise. Nay even the merely sufficient thought itself would have to be called grace, because another order of things was possible in which that thought would not occur to this and that man, to whom now de facto it happens. Similarly generation itself, and the natural complexion, and such or such an indoles would be reckoned grace, because another series of things was possible in which either this one would not be born, with complexion and indoles; and thus nothing at all...

They object 1. Those texts of Scripture by which it seems intimated that man in the state of fallen nature without special aid of God can effect no morally good work, nor have any congruous thought, of which kind is that John 15: Without me you can do nothing. And 2 Corinthians 3: Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God: whence St. Augustine in tractate 8 On John says: Whether therefore little or much, it cannot be done without him without whom nothing can be done. — I answer, these and similar texts of Scripture are to be understood (as we have already often said) of works pertaining to salvation, on account of which it is necessary that we adhere to Christ as branches to the vine of life, according to that which he says in the same chapter of John: I am the vine, you the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit unto life eternal; for without me you can do nothing, that namely which profits toward it.

They object 2. Certain oracles of Councils and holy Fathers: First indeed in the Diospolitan Council Pelagius was compelled to confess that the grace of God is given for individual acts. Similarly in the second Arausican Council, Canon nine: As often as we do good, God operates in us and with us that we may operate: that is, his grace precedes us, and induces us to operate well: and Canon 18: A reward is owed to good works if they be done, but grace precedes that they be done: and Canon 12: No one has of himself except falsehood and sin: but if anyone man has truth, it is from that fountain which we ought to thirst after. The same the holy Fathers openly teach: above all St. Ambrose, book 1 On the Vocation of the Nations, chapter 3, says: If God works not in us, we can be partakers of no virtue. St. Augustine, Sermon 13 On the Words of the Apostle, chapter 11, speaking of the aid of the Holy Spirit, which the Pelagians wished necessary only for operating more easily, says, if he pour it not out we can do nothing good at all: Thou dost indeed act (he says) without his helping, with free will, but badly. And further on: When I say to thee: without the aid of God thou doest nothing, I say nothing of good: for to do evil thou hast without the aid of God a free will. From these therefore it follows that we can work nothing whatsoever without the subsidy of God. — I distinguish the consequent: that we can do nothing whatsoever without the subsidy of God, either as author of nature, or as author of grace, I concede; that we can do nothing without the aid of God as author of grace, I deny. Or otherwise I distinguish: that we can do nothing without the subsidy of God as author of grace which profits toward eternal life, I concede; which profits toward the honesty of human society and rectitude of morals, I deny. Therefore while the Councils and holy Fathers require divine aid for the right and just operation of man, they speak of works conducing to salvation; for thus the Fathers of the Carthaginian Council express their mind in the Synodal letter which they write to Zosimus the supreme Pontiff, where among other things they have this: Let us say that the grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord, aids us through individual acts not only to know the truth, but also to do justice; so that without the grace of God we are able to have, think, say, and do nothing of true and holy piety. In like manner St. Prosper interpreted the mind of the Council in the eighth response to the Chapters of the Gauls: with two hundred and fourteen priests, whose constitution against the enemies of the grace of God the whole world embraced with truthful profession, as their discourse has it: let us say the grace of God, etc. — But to Canon 22 of the same Council we have already answered: that no one has of himself except falsehood and sin for the most part, because he can know little truth and do good, I concede; that he can do nothing at all, I deny.

They object 3. The Church persuades us to demand the grace of God for exercising individual good acts: therefore she judges it necessary for this. The antecedent appears from various prayers of the Church, in which the grace of God is sought for all our actions. Thus in the prayer of the 6th Sunday after Epiphany it is said: Grant, we beseech thee, O almighty God, that ever meditating on things reasonable, what are pleasing to thee we may carry out both in word and deed. And in the prayer of the Sunday after Pentecost: Grant to us, we beseech thee, O Lord, always the spirit of thinking what is right, etc. And in that celebrated Collect: Direct our actions, we beseech thee, O Lord, by thy inspiration, and further them by thy continual help. The same appears in the two Collects which are recited each day at the office of Prime. The consequence indeed is proved from the holy Fathers, who everywhere gather from the utility of prayer the necessity of grace, saying that we pray in vain if what we ask lies within our own power; for thus reason the Fathers of the Carthaginian Council, Epistle to Innocent or Zosimus; for against the Pelagians asserting that for operating, perfecting justice, and fulfilling the mandates of God human nature alone suffices of itself, they argued thus: if with the possibility of nature and the arbitrium of the will these things are constituted in our power, who does not see that they are vainly asked of the Lord and prayed for fruitlessly? — I answer first, therefore we implore divine aid for our individual acts not only that they be made morally good and honest, but also that they profit toward salvation, so that we decline toward no sin, but that our words ever proceed to do the justice of God, our thoughts and works be directed. - I answer second, that although some good works be done through nature, nevertheless we can beseech God to aid us in exercising them: first indeed, that they be done more perfectly within the order of nature: second, because it is not infallible that we shall act honestly and morally well: third, because neither shall we long persevere without sin by the mere forces of nature, and perhaps we shall sin lightly or gravely, unless God remove the occasions of sinning. Nor ought it seem wonderful that we pray God for a natural work; for the Church also admonishes us to beseech God, and prescribes certain prayers for obtaining the fruits of the earth, serenity of the air, and the removal of tempests; all which although they come to pass according to the course of natural providence, yet not so invariably that they could not happen otherwise.

Finally they object: We render thanksgivings to God for individual good works: but thanksgiving is the acknowledgment of received grace: therefore it supposes grace collaborating in all our good acts. — I distinguish the major: We render thanksgivings to God for every good work, either common ones, which are rendered for natural goods, as rain, serenity of weather, etc.; or special ones, which are owed to God for supernatural gifts, I concede; that special ones only, I deny.

Corollary III. — That all the aforesaid and similar objections may be dissolved the more easily, it must be known, that although we grant that free arbitrium sometimes suffices for exercising some morally good work, nevertheless our mind is not, that without the aid of God any morally good work whatever can be done singly and distributively: for many natural goods are beset by grave temptations, and seem arduous: but without some divine aid grave temptations cannot be overcome, as the following Article will prove, nor on account of the weakness and infirmity of free arbitrium can we attempt and undertake anything arduous unless God aiding and divinely assisting: hence even though free arbitrium sometimes prevails for pursuing some morally and naturally good work, it is not to be inferred that it can undertake and carry out any good work whatever; nor likewise long persevere in the exercise of some good, on account of the immense temptations and continual struggle of concupiscence, and of the senses declining to the depraved and perverse corruption.

Note 1. The love of God is twofold, namely natural and voluntary. The former is the very propensity of nature toward God as the last end and highest good; for every creature inclines toward God as its author, moderator, and end with a certain weight of love — insensible things indeed by natural motion, brute animals by sensitive motion, but rational creatures by intellectual love, which is properly called dilection, because it is made with advertence and election: the latter, however, is the free and effective propensity of the rational creature toward God as the last end and highest good. — Again, voluntary dilection is twofold: one of friendship, the other of concupiscence. The former is that whereby we are said to love a friend for his own sake, willing his own good only on his account: the latter, when we love that which suits us; thus, with a love of concupiscence we are said to love God when we desire Him to be present to us or rejoice in Him. And this love of concupiscence is again constituted twofold: one licit, whereby God is loved by us as the last end; the other vicious, whereby God is loved by us in the manner of a certain means, on account of temporal goods, so that He may satisfy our cupidities. — Again, each love, both of benevolence and of concupiscence, is still further twofold, namely absolute and conditioned. The former proceeds from an absolute will of loving God, while a man thus establishes it in his mind: I will to love God: the latter, which is also called ineffective, proceeds from a merely conditioned will, e.g., while a man thus resolves in his heart: I would wish to love God with my whole heart and all my strength, if on that account pleasures, delights, and riches, as Christ the Lord indicates, did not have to be renounced. Finally, absolute love is still further twofold: one perfect, the other imperfect. Perfect is that whereby God is so loved that He is preferred to all things whatsoever, with the purpose of pleasing Him in all things, even at the loss of all other goods; such was the love of Paul thus resolving in his mind, Romans 8: I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor Angels, nor Principalities, nor Powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor might, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the charity of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord. Imperfect, however, is that whereby God is loved as the author of nature, or as the fountain and giver of justice, yet not above all things, nor preferred to others. The former is called the love of God above all things, the latter the love of God together with all things. — But each of these loves of God is again twofold, namely natural and supernatural. Natural is that which not only proceeds from a principle and will acting by their own forces alone, but also is borne toward God as the author of nature and the giver of all goods; thus we love God because He has granted us to be, to live, and the goods of life. Supernatural likewise is that which not only is exercised with the help of grace, but also tends toward God as the giver of grace itself and the munificent bestower of glory. Moreover, both dilection is divided into the dilection of God above all things and that which is not above all things. The former is that which prefers God to all things, so that one is rather prepared to suffer the loss of all goods whatsoever than to do anything displeasing to God. The latter, namely the natural dilection of God above all things in a qualified sense, is that whereby man is indeed affected toward God more than toward the rest, on account of His supreme clemency, but is not prepared to cast aside the rest for the keeping of the law of God on every occasion given. — Again, the natural dilection of God above all things is twofold: one indeed in a certain respect, the other simply. The former is that whereby God is loved by man precisely under the aspect of a common good, which as such ought rather to be loved than any creature whatever; for right reason prescribes that the whole and the common good be loved more than the part and the particular good; which dilection, moreover, is common to man with beasts and inanimate things, and even with demons and the damned; for every part operates by a certain natural inclination for the common good of the whole, even with peril or detriment to itself. It is manifest, however, that God is the common good of the whole Universe and of all its parts, whence every creature in its way loves God more than itself. But the natural dilection of God above all things simply is that whereby He is loved under every aspect and perfection that He has within the order of nature, so that the rational creature, on account of the integrity of all perfections which it discovers in God, loves Him more than every other created thing, in which it recognizes a lesser perfection. — Finally, the love of God, both natural and supernatural, is again twofold, namely affective and effective. Affective is the purpose of the will resolving to love God above all things, to please Him in all things, and to avoid all things that can displease Him. Effective, however, is that whereby man so prefers God to all things on whatever occasions, that he fulfills His commandments and precepts.

Note 2. That God can be loved above all things in three ways: namely either intensively, or extensively, or estimatively or appreciatively. Intensively indeed, when He is loved with the utmost effort of the will, and with an act more fervent and intense than is any love wherewith a creature is loved. Extensively, however, in respect of the duration and perseverance of love, while evidently the dilection lasts longer than that of any other good. Appreciatively, finally, and estimatively, when God is so loved that He is held of greater worth than the other goods and preferred to them; whether meanwhile He be compared with created goods in particular and preferred to them, or be loved absolutely as infinite good, and far excelling any other goods whatsoever. This love, however, can be exercised in two ways, namely either willing only that goodness and perfection reside in God; or furthermore willing that created goods be exhibited to Him, such as honor, worship, and reverence from all creatures, although He has no need of our goods. — Further, this is not the question here, whether by the forces of nature alone God can be loved above all things both intensively and extensively: partly because neither of those modes of loving God above all things is exacted of us; for the mode of intension or extension of an act does not fall under precept; partly because neither contributes anything to the determination of the present question; since the different manner of intension or extension does not induce diversity of order and species in the act; for a remisser act, or one of lighter duration, is of the same nature and order as the more intense or longer lasting, when all else is equal.

Note 3. That the natural love of God differs from the supernatural in many respects: First indeed by reason of the connection whereby supernatural love is tied to habitual grace, whether existent, or future, or possible, of which connection purely natural love is destitute. Secondly, because supernatural love, beyond the natural activity of free will, requires an infused habit of charity, as the efficient principle of it, with the aids of grace supernatural in entity: natural love, however, beyond the active powers of nature and the principles due to nature, requires no principle, neither efficient nor formal, which of its own nature be infused and supernatural. Thirdly, because supernatural knowledge necessarily precedes supernatural love: natural knowledge, however, precedes natural love. Fourthly finally, because supernatural love elicited by a sinner contributes to his justification, while elicited by a just man it contributes to a fuller beatitude: natural love, however, helps nothing positively either toward justification or toward glory, but only negatively, by removing obstacles and occasions of sin. Now the present controversy is not raised concerning that dilection which is a certain natural propensity toward God, for since this is common both to irrational and insensible creatures and to those using reason, it is most certain that it can be had without grace. Nor concerning the dilection of God as the author of grace: for no one doubts that grace's assistance is needed for that dilection, since it exceeds the forces of nature. Nor concerning the vicious love of concupiscence, whereby God is loved as a means for obtaining temporal goods, and because He is their giver; for this love is disorderly and culpable, as St. Augustine teaches in Psalm 70, where he says: They who seek God on account of earthly benefits seek not God, but themselves. Therefore only the other loves of God come into disputation, namely the appreciative and the intensive, of concupiscence and of benevolence. Here therefore three things especially must be solved: First, whether the precept of loving God can be fulfilled by the forces of nature. Second, with what perfect love God can be naturally loved. Third, whether equally the other precepts of the divine law pertaining to the neighbor can be fulfilled without any aid of grace.

First Conclusion. — GOD CAN BE LOVED WITH A NATURAL LOVE OF BENEVOLENCE WITHOUT ANY AID OF GRACE.

Proof is made first from Romans 1: The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness of men, who detain the truth of God in injustice; because that which is known of God is manifest in them: for God hath manifested it unto them: for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, his everlasting power also and Divinity, so that they are inexcusable. In which words St. Paul accuses the Gentiles, especially the Philosophers, of impiety and injustice, so that they are inexcusable, because they do not worship the true God, namely with love and observance, for worship consists especially in His love, according to that saying of St. Augustine, Epistle 120: Piety is the worship of God, nor is He worshipped save by loving. But if such worship and justice were impossible to them, they could rightly be excused, and would undeservedly be accused of having forsaken the love of justice and the true worship of God; for there is no greater ground of excuse than impossibility; therefore St. Paul manifestly supposes the Gentiles able to love God: but this power, which the Apostle supposes in them, is purely natural; since it arises from the natural notion of God, which they can borrow from visible creatures; but the love possible from a natural notion is purely natural, for a natural notion cannot move toward supernatural love: therefore, etc. — This our reasoning is confirmed by the testimony of St. Ambrose, who, weighing the foregoing passage, says: From the very fabric of heaven God is seen by them: for this reason He made the stars so beautiful, that from them how great and how admirable their Creator is may be acknowledged, and He alone adored; therefore by the natural law he renders the human race guilty: for they were able to apprehend this by the law of nature, the fabric of the world bearing witness, that God alone the author was to be loved, which Moses handed down in writing. By which words St. Augustine signifies that the infidel who does not worship God is therefore accused as guilty of injustice, because with a natural notion drawn from the fabric of creatures he could apprehend that God alone the author is to be loved, and he is bound by the natural law to such dilection and love of justice. — To him concurs St. Prosper, book 1. On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 2, writing: According to Scripture we believe and most piously confess that the care of divine Providence has never been wanting to the whole body of mankind. And though it directed the people set apart for itself by special institutes unto piety, yet it withheld the gifts of its goodness from no nation of men, that the prophetic voices and legal precepts might be shown to have received witness in the services and testimonies of the elements. They became vain and inexcusable, who made gods for themselves, and venerated unto worship what had been created for use. Therefore St. Prosper judges with St. Paul that infidels are inexcusable, who render to creatures the worship of the Creator, since from the natural testimony of creatures they have sufficient principles for the true worship and love of God and of justice, toward which the faithful people are promoted by the prophetic voices and oracles of the Scriptures. — The same truth is again intimated by the same Apostle in Acts 14, where, speaking of the Gentiles, he says: He left not himself without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness. Whereby by the testimony which God left to the Gentiles, inwardly moving hearts and sealing them to the obligation of prayer and dilection, he signifies reason, which gathers from creatures the truth and beneficence of the Creator, so that thence it may be spurred to His love and worship. To this pertains also that saying of Acts 17: Determining appointed times, and the bounds of their habitation, to seek God, if perhaps they may feel after him, or find him. By which St. Apostle declares that by the natural disposition of times and things the Gentiles can not only seek God, but also, as it were, feel after and find Him with love and worship; For, says St. Prosper, book 2. On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 1: They worship all celestial things, sea and earth, and all things that are in them, and with the harmonious concert of their kind and order proclaim the glory of God, and by perpetual preaching speak forth the majesty of their author.

Proof secondly from the authority of the Councils, which, while they define grace necessary for loving God, not without counsel but notably add these clauses (as is required for salvation, or for eternal life, or for justification); whereby they signify that a dilection of God is possible which contributes nothing to salvation, and which is purely natural and is made without any aid of grace. Thus speaks the Second Council of Orange, especially Can. 20. No one, it says, can love God as is fitting, or believe in God, or work for God that which is good, unless grace, or divine mercy, prevent him: in like manner speak the Fathers of the African Council in Prosper's Response to chapter 8 of the Gauls: so likewise the Tridentine, Session 6, Can. 3: If anyone shall say that without the preventing inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His aid man can believe, hope, love, or repent, as he ought, so that the grace of justification be conferred upon him, let him be anathema. From which it is lawful thus to argue: theological phrases found in the definitions of Councils are to be understood in that mode and that sense in which they are commonly received by theologians: but this phrase (as is fitting) is so received by theologians that it signifies possible morally good natural acts, which are not done as is fitting and require no grace, and from which salutary acts, which claim grace, are distinguished; therefore the Councils suppose possible acts of natural dilection of God.

Proof thirdly from the definition of the Supreme Pontiffs, who condemned these propositions of Baius, namely number 31: That distinction of a twofold love, namely natural, whereby God is loved as the author of nature, and gratuitous, whereby God is loved as beatifier, is vain and fictitious. Likewise proposition 37: Natural love, which arises from the forces of nature, is defended by some authors from Philosophy alone, by an elation of human presumption with injury to the cross of Christ. Again proposition 39: Every love of a rational creature is either a vicious cupidity, whereby the world is loved, or that laudable charity diffused through the Holy Spirit in the heart, whereby God is loved. It is evident therefore that some natural love of God, conceived by the forces of free will alone, must be admitted.

Fourthly this same truth is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers: for St. Basil, Homily 9, That God is not the author of evils, says: Whence is man wicked? From his own free will. Whence is the devil evil? From the same previously known cause; for he too had free will and a power implanted in himself, either of following God or of departing from the good. By which he signifies to us that the power of following God is implanted naturally: but we follow God by loving and worshipping Him. — To him concurs St. Gregory of Nyssa, Catechesis 5: It was altogether necessary, he says, for the construction of our nature, that by a power implanted in it it should know that which is supreme, that it should be held by the desire of divine eternity. By which he refers to the very construction of nature the power implanted in it of the notion of God and the desire of eternity. — To this truth most especially St. Augustine gives assent: For first he teaches that there resides in man a natural inclination and innate appetite toward the love of God: but an innate appetite cannot be borne toward supernatural love, and accordingly it busies itself about the natural love and dilection of God. This argument the adversaries admit. But the major is proved from that saying of book 1 of the Confessions, chapter 1: Thou hast made us for thee, and our heart is restless until it rest in thee. Which restlessness is born from the very creation and condition of rational nature, which, as it was created for loving God, so neither can it rest in the love of any created thing, no less than a stone outside its center. — Secondly, according to the doctrine of St. Augustine, it is natural for a rational creature to adhere to God through dilection: but it would not wish thus to adhere unless such love were natural to it: therefore, etc. The major lies hidden in all those places wherein he signifies that vice is therefore an evil of nature because it separates it from God, to whom it was fitting to adhere. Thus especially lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, c. 1. When it is said of the vice of a rational creature that it adheres not to God, hence is openly declared that it belongs to its nature to adhere to God. Therefore, since to depart from God is the vice of nature, to adhere to God through dilection is the perfection of nature itself. — Finally the mind of St. Augustine is detected most especially in this, that he proves the celebrated tenet of the Platonic Philosophers, who taught that the natural beatitude of man constituted in this life consists in the contemplation and love of God: but those Philosophers acknowledged no other love of God than natural, arising from the forces of nature alone: therefore with them St. Augustine supposes the love of God natural in entity, and possible from the principles of nature alone. The major is evident, for those Philosophers were ignorant of all faith infused and of grace supernatural in entity. The minor is proved from the same St. Augustine lib. 8. De Civit. Dei, c. 5. If then, he says, Plato said that the wise man is the imitator, knower, and lover of this God, by whose participation he is blessed, what need is there to sift the others? none of whom came nearer to us than these. And in book 10, chapter 1, speaking of the same Platonists, he says that they deny that anyone will be blessed who has not adhered with the purity of chaste love to that one supreme good, which is the unchangeable God. Therefore it is conformable to the mind and doctrine of St. Augustine that the love of God be possible naturally in entity.

THE ADVERSARIES RESPOND that that love toward which the Philosophers referred the beatitude of this life is judged by the same Augustine to be supernatural: indeed he recalls it to grace itself, for in book 11, chapter 25, according to Plato's mind he proclaims God the inspirer of the love whereby one lives well and blessedly, and the giver of intimate sweetness. And in book 22, chapter 22, he relates from Tully that no greater gift had been given by the gods, nor could be given, than this love. — On the contrary, the benefit to which the Philosophers recalled this love is not of the supernatural order, but natural, pertaining to the grace of creation and to God as the author and provider of nature; which is gathered first, because the Platonists spoke in the same manner of the wisdom and knowledge of God as of His love; but the wisdom and knowledge of God which they had was natural in entity, being acquired from creatures either by the connatural light or by a natural discourse. Secondly, this very thing St. Augustine teaches in the same chapter 25, where he says: Because our nature, that it might be, has God for its author, doubtless, that we may wisely understand, we owe to have Him Himself for Doctor; Him also, that we may be blessed, the giver of intimate sweetness. By which he signifies that we receive from God His love and knowledge in the same manner in which we received nature: but nature was conferred by God as the author of nature: therefore from the same proceeds that love which the Platonics required for beatitude. — To the most holy Doctor subscribe his disciples, for St. Fulgentius, book On Faith, chapter 3: God, he says, implanted the faculty of knowing and loving Himself in none but Angels and men... And because of the liberty of will, which was chiefly to be conferred on intellectual creatures, He so endowed them with the faculty and will of knowing and loving Himself, that each one could both have it and lose it. By which words he declares that the power conceded by God of loving Him is of the same manner as that which had been conceded of knowing Himself: but the power of knowing God belongs to the forces of nature alone: therefore also the power of loving Him. — St. Prosper concurs, book 2. On the Vocation of the Gentiles, chapter 1, where he says: For heaven, and earth, and sea, and every creature that can be seen and understood is disposed chiefly unto this venerable utility of man, that rational nature from the contemplation of so many species, from the experience of so many gifts, and the perception of so many bounties, should be imbued with the worship and dilection of its author: therefore St. Prosper judges that the principal end of creating corporeal creatures is not the temporal utility of man, but spiritual and honest, which is perceived from the worship and dilection of the author of nature, which all created things provoke. — St. Anselm subscribes in the Monologion, chapter 66: Nothing is fitter, he says, than that the rational creature be made for this, that it love the supreme Essence and Good above all things, even as Itself is the supreme Good, nay, that it love nothing except It, or on account of It: therefore the love of God, and of creatures for God, is the natural end of the rational soul itself, and accordingly is to be obtained through natural love as a congruous medium.

Finally proof is made by theological reasoning: that which the intellect can know by the forces of nature the will can naturally love: but the intellect can know God by the forces of will alone: therefore the will also can love Him. The major stands by the authority of the holy Fathers, for St. Athanasius, in the treatise Of Definitions, column 3: Whatever it understands, he says, it is agreed is led by the will. St. Fulgentius to Monimus, chapter 18: Nor can reason reside therein in any wise, unless the dilection of the Creator could reside in it. St. Damascene On the Two Wills of Christ: Man, he says, inasmuch as he partakes of reason follows reason as his leader in appetiting. Therefore natural will is a certain appetite of reason, consentaneous with sense, which is accommodated only to naturals; but the wills of nature are first that we obey the laws of God: for by nature man is the servant of God. Therefore it stands that to the power of understanding there is annexed the natural power of willing the good understood. — Secondly, the natural law commands and counsels the dilection of God before all created goods, because God is made known by natural reason as worthy of love before them all: but the native law cannot command nor counsel an impossible love, such as the love of God would be, the benefit of grace excluded, if that love were not natural: therefore truly such a natural love of God must be conceded. — Thirdly, we pursue parents, benefactors, and friends with a natural love of benevolence: therefore with equal right we can love God. The consequence is evident; since purely natural reason can suggest motives to the will whereby it be more efficaciously excited to love God than to the love of parents, benefactors, and friends: whether you adduce natural benefits, or consider the communion of goods, or observe the bonds whereby we are bound to other men, far higher are those things which natural reason can investigate and attain in God for provoking His love. Therefore if human motives can obtain from a created will a love of benevolence so efficacious that sometimes we contemn temporal advantages, nay even life itself, for parents and benefactors, why shall we deny that divine motives proposed by natural reason can obtain the same love?

You will object. 1. Sacred Scripture makes mention of no love of God except that which is of charity, and which leads to eternal life: but that is not natural: therefore no natural love of God is to be admitted from sacred Scripture.

I answer. First, by denying the major; for from the first proof of this Conclusion it stands that the holy Apostle sufficiently designated a natural love of God, when he said the Gentiles were inexcusable because they had known God naturally, yet had not worshipped Him by adoring and loving. I answer secondly, by distinguishing the major: sacred Scripture makes no mention of that natural love of God explicitly, and expressly, I concede; implicitly, and virtually, I deny. Add that the end and principal scope of sacred Scripture is to commend to men the supernatural love of God, for the reason that He alone is worthy of God, and He alone leads to His possession and fruition, whence it makes express mention of that supernatural love alone.

You will object. 2. Various testimonies of St. Augustine, whereby he seems to establish five principal points: The first indeed is, that the love of benevolence toward God be pure and chaste, whereby God is loved gratuitously and without hope of any gain: but that love is impossible by the forces of nature alone, because for it St. Augustine desires the spirit of grace, as stands evident from the Commentary on Psalm 118, Sermon 3, and book 5 Against Julian, chapter 3. God Himself, he says, is present both by illuminating the mind, and by overcoming concupiscence, and by terrifying molestation; for all this is rightly done when it is done on account of Himself, that is, when He Himself is loved gratuitously; which love cannot be in us except from Himself. — The second is, because he who loves God loves truth and rectitude: for God is the rectitude and truth of every virtue, according to St. Augustine book 2 On Free Choice, chapter 10: but moral truth and rectitude cannot be loved without the spirit of grace, as the same teaches in many places, especially in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 2: When men do this as it ought to be done, that is, with dilection and delectation of justice, let them rejoice to have received the sweetness which the Lord gave. — The third is, that whatever is not done out of fear of punishment is done out of the love of justice and truth, which love is charity from God, as the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 14 teaches, where after he has said that the Holy Spirit is necessary to man, whereby there may be made in his soul the delectation and dilection of that supreme and unchangeable good, which God is, from whom he has it that he may be, he subjoins: For neither does free will avail anything except unto sinning if the way of truth lie hid; and even when that which is to be done, and whither we must strive, appears not hidden, unless it also delight and be loved, it is not done, it is not undertaken, it is not lived well. Afterwards he shows this love to be charity, which is from God: But that it may be loved, he says, the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, not through free will, which arises from us, but through the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. — The fourth is, that according to his doctrine every will is either good or evil: and every good will is from grace. Thus he teaches book 2 On the Merits of Sins, chapter 18: If then, he says, the will is either good or evil, and assuredly we have not an evil one from God, it remains that we have a good will from God. — The fifth, because one of the capital controversies between Pelagius and the Catholic Church was whether God can be loved above all things by the forces of nature alone; which indeed St. Augustine denied in the book On Grace and Free Will, chapter 18: Whence, he says, is in men the charity of God, and of neighbor, except from God Himself? for if it is not from God but from men, the Pelagians have conquered; but if from God, we conquer the Pelagians: therefore from St. Augustine there is no natural love of God.

I deny the consequence. And to all those foregoing passages I say that St. Augustine intends nothing else than that every love of God conducing to salvation can be had only with God conferring and inspiring it, for there he treats only of salutary love, as is to be gathered, partly because concerning the other acts of virtue, for which he desires assisting grace, he always disputed against the Pelagians in that acceptation; for they attributed acts of virtue to the forces of nature alone in no other sense than as salutary and meritorious of eternal life: therefore much more, speaking of divine love of benevolence, which is the most perfect of all, he must be judged to speak only of salutary love; partly because the Pelagians acknowledged no love of God that was not salutary and meritorious, however elicited by the forces of nature alone; but they professed even every natural love to be salutary, therefore the whole scope of Augustine was to establish the necessity of grace for every salutary and meritorious act; finally because St. Augustine speaks only of that love which sacred Scripture commends; but that is supernatural, as leading to the possession of God: whence the same Augustine, interpreter of himself, in book 1 Against Julian, chapter 3, says: the love whereby one arrives at God is only from God the Father, through Jesus Christ with the Holy Spirit.

You will urge. St. Augustine continually reciprocates infused charity and the love of God, defining charity solely by the love of God, as stands evident from Sermons 13 and 15 On the Words of the Apostle; but charity is supernatural love: therefore St. Augustine acknowledged no other. — I answer, that St. Augustine therefore defines charity by the love of God because evidently since he was disputing only of salutary love, he did not distinguish the love of God into natural and supernatural; but commended only the supernatural, which truly is not distinguished from charity, and accordingly they can deservedly be defined through one another.

You will object. 3. If the goodness of God could be loved with natural and supernatural love, then also the truth revealing God could be believed with natural and supernatural faith, since the account of each is parallel: but the truth of God revealing cannot be believed with natural faith: therefore neither can goodness be loved with natural love. — I deny the minor; for to the first revealing truth we can assent not only with supernatural assent, but also with natural; and heretics in fact thus assent to the mysteries of faith not controverted by them, which they believe; for they do not have the supernatural habit of faith, as we said in the treatise On Faith.

You will object. 4. If a natural love of God were possible, that love could be had without habitual justifying grace; since such grace is not the elicitive principle of natural love: but the consequent is false, because if there can be a natural love of benevolence of man toward God, then also a sinner remaining in sin could become the friend of God; but this is absurd; for God does not love sinners, but hates them. — I distinguish the minor: that man remaining in sin would be the friend of God in a certain respect, and imperfectly, insofar namely as God would love some natural good inasmuch as He is the author of nature, I concede: perfectly, and absolutely, so that God should will him His fruition and possession, I deny. ⟦Adde: num⟧ it be absurd for man to love God with a natural love, sufficient for a love of friendship with God, without man being loved back by God with the same love of friendship on account of the stain and foulness of sin; for not rarely among men it happens that he who gravely offends another loves the offended with a love of friendship, though the offended is unwilling to love him in return.

You will object 5. No love of friendship can exist between God and man, as Aristotle teaches 8 Ethics: but every love of benevolence is a love of friendship: therefore no love of benevolence can exist between God and men. — I answer first, by distinguishing the major: no love of friendship can exist between God and men if friendship be taken strictly, for mutual and manifest benevolence, and between equals, I concede: if it be taken in the broader signification for the love whereby one wishes well to another for his own sake, I deny. Indeed we can will to God all goods that are internal and natural to Him by complacency, and likewise desire for Him external goods, such as glory, praise, and worship. I answer secondly, that the minor can be denied: for although benevolence and friendship are sometimes used interchangeably for one and the same thing, still this distinction intervenes between them, that friendship includes a certain union of affection toward the beloved thing; whence the lover tends toward the beloved as toward something of himself and pertaining to himself, or as another self: hence that trite saying, A friend is another self; but benevolence says only a simple affection toward another, whereby we wish him some good: which certainly can happen even though between us and him there intervene no true love whereby we love him in himself; thus e.g., while we behold an actor better executing his part, we wish him a larger reward; although nevertheless we love him in himself with no true love; nay, we even hold the infamous man in contempt.

You will object 6. Nature inclines only toward the good suitable to itself, and proper to each thing, as Aristotle teaches in the place praised above: but the love we would have toward God would not be about our own proper good, but common: therefore that love is not natural to man. — I distinguish the major: nature inclines toward the good proper to each thing in this sense, that nothing be loved unless it be in some way conjoined to us and pertaining to us, I concede: as though it were particular to us and ought only to redound to our own use, I deny: for mothers pursue their sons with honest dilection even if they hope for or expect no utility from them.

You will object finally: If there could be a natural love of benevolence of man toward God, a sinner remaining in sin could be the friend of God: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. — I distinguish the major: he could be the friend of God in a certain respect, and imperfectly, inasmuch as God would love in him a certain natural good, I concede: the friend of God perfectly, and so that God wills him supernatural good, I deny: for no one has this perfect friendship of God except the just and holy.

Second Conclusion. — MAN CAN LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS BY NATURAL FORCES; NOT INDEED WITH EFFECTIVE AND EFFECTUOUS LOVE PERFECTLY AND ON EVERY OCCASION WHATEVER: BUT AFFECTIVELY, AND FOR SOME BRIEF INTERVAL OF TIME FREE FROM EVERY MOTION OF GRAVE PERTURBATIONS.

The first part is proved from the Doctor in 3. dist. 27. n. 13. First indeed, natural reason dictates that among lovable things there be one supremely lovable: and consequently lovable more than all others: but the same reason dictates that supremely lovable thing to be God: therefore the same reason dictates God to be loved above all things: but the will can naturally, and without any supernatural habit, love above all things that which by natural reason is proposed as supremely lovable: therefore the will can naturally love God above all things. The major of the argument stands: For since among lovable objects there is a certain order and degree of perfection, such that one be judged more perfectly lovable than another, lest there be a progress into infinity, some supremely lovable thing containing in itself all lovableness and perfection must be admitted. The minor also is evident; namely that that object which natural reason demonstrates to be supremely lovable is God: because otherwise it would follow that charity inclines toward supremely loving that which natural reason dictates is not to be supremely loved. But the subsumption is proved: if the will could not love whatever is proposed by the intellect as to be loved, in the manner wherein it is exhibited as to be loved, it would follow that it would not have liberty for forming that dilection, and consequently that it would not be evil if it naturally loved something else more than God: for sin would not be imputed to it for loving itself more than God, if it could not love God more than itself by the forces of nature.

It is proved secondly: If one could not love God above all things without an infused habit, it would follow that someone, where he experienced that he loved God more than other things, could detect that he had the habit of infused charity, and consequently that he was in the state of grace: but this openly militates against sacred Scripture, signifying in many places that no one knows whether he is worthy of himself; and therefore it is necessary that by natural dilection, and without any infused habit, the created will can love God above all things.

It is proved thirdly: Because according to the Philosopher 9 Ethics, chapter 9, the brave citizen ought to expose himself to death for the safety of the republic of which he is a member; and consequently ought to love the commonwealth more than himself; but right reason dictates no more that one ought to expose himself to death for the safety of the Republic, or that he ought to love it more than himself, than that he ought to expose himself to the peril of death for God, and love Him more than himself; therefore natural reason dictates God to be loved more than oneself. The sequence is evident: for neither will certain reason be able to dictate to the will that something be done which the will itself cannot do. The major also stands: for right reason persuades that a part ought to be exposed to peril for obtaining the safety of the whole, a member amputated for preserving the health of the other parts of the body: therefore it also stimulates the brave man that he steadfastly cast himself into death for preserving the republic, and safeguarding its peace and welfare.

It is proved fourthly: In two ways the help of grace can be feigned necessary for eliciting some act. First, as the physical principle of it; when the will does not have from itself intrinsically sufficient forces for such an act, but is disproportionate to it. Secondly, as the moral principle removing impediments: when indeed the will has sufficient natural forces from itself for that effect: yet as to the use, or exercise of the work, it cannot unfold them, as it were, because of impediments occurring, which, that they may be removed or overcome, it needs aid. But neither can here be said: partly because that act is in itself natural and does not exceed the internal faculty of free will; partly because in its use difficulties do not always occur which would require grace for overcoming them: as e.g., in the love of concupiscence, whereby God is loved as our good by the mode of simple complacency, or efficacious desire, or conditioned desire, without consideration of the difficulties that occur in the efficacious pursuit of that good; for this love has no difficulty requiring grace. And I say the same of the love of benevolence or friendship, whereby God is loved as good in Himself by reason of Himself, and also as supremely good, and excelling above all things: by complacencing ourselves in divine goods, and therefore willing His supreme excellence, and all goods internal and external expected confusedly, and abstracted from difficulties, and even somewhat willing to please Him in all things, with a certain weak and imperfect and tacitly limited will. With these inconveniences God can, as it were incidentally, be loved even somewhat above all things confusedly, without a naturally insuperable difficulty.

You will object 1. The will cannot efficaciously will by its natural forces that which it cannot perform by those same forces: but in effect the will cannot love God above all things, as author of nature, by proper forces in the state of fallen nature: therefore neither can it conceive by the forces of nature the purpose of loving God above all things. — I answer by denying the major: For as a certain king can efficaciously will, or have the efficacious purpose of gaining victory by himself, although he cannot truly obtain victory without the aid of his soldiers, or of some mightier Prince: so man can naturally will always to love God above all things according to affection, although he cannot in effect, without the grace of God, love God above all things, and prefer Him to all things on whatever occasions.

You will object 2. The most excellent act of human will cannot be done by its proper forces: but the dilection of God above all things is the most excellent act of the human will: therefore it cannot be done by its natural will. — I distinguish the minor: The dilection of God, as the author of grace and glory, is the most excellent act of the human will, I concede: as the author of nature, I deny: Or otherwise, it is the most excellent among natural acts, I concede: among all acts of the same will of whatever order they be, I deny.

You will insist: Most internal acts cannot be done without the dilection of God with grace: e.g., the act of a certain heroic fortitude, the love of enemies, etc.; therefore much less can the dilection of God be elicited without grace. — I distinguish the antecedent: Those acts cannot be done on account of the difficulties annexed to them, I concede: on account of the reason of the object, I deny: for the difficulties arising extrinsically removed, it is more natural, and accordingly easier, to love God than all other things; because the more a thing has of truth, if it pertain to us in any way, toward that the will tends with natural and greater impetus.

You will object 3. If one could love God by the forces of nature, then by the same virtue one could observe all His commandments: since observance of the commandments is an argument of dilection: but no one can observe all the divine precepts by the forces of nature: therefore neither thus to love God. — I distinguish the major: If he would love God above all things with love both affective and effective, constantly, perfectly, and on every occasion given, I concede: if only he loves God with affective love, and likewise effective love only imperfect, I deny: but God cannot be loved effectively, constantly, on whatever occasions, by the forces of nature, as the Second part of the Conclusion will prove: For that God be loved constantly and efficaciously, it is required that against every impediments and whatever difficulties that love be firmly held; so that the will be prepared absolutely and efficaciously, as far as lies in itself, to please God in all things, and avoid everything displeasing to Him: but such love cannot be had by the forces of nature: for as man in the state of corrupted nature has a moral impotence for long keeping the divine commandments, and temptations supernaturally to be avoided: so also for loving God efficaciously and constantly, and even with so perfect an affection that by the force of that affection he adheres to Him above all things; for so great perfection exceeds the fragility of corrupted nature and its propension toward sensible goods, from which it cannot recall its affection without the aid of grace. Therefore that effective love above all things must conquer all mortal sins, either in effect, if they occur while it is actual: or in affection, because it includes a purpose efficacious of itself for avoiding everything contrary to such love: but it is impossible for fallen man to conquer all sins, even those adverse to the natural law, without special assistance of grace: therefore it is also impossible that he have the dilection of God victorious over all such sins through that efficacious purpose of avoiding them.

Third Conclusion. — GOD CANNOT BE LOVED AS THE AUTHOR OF GRACE AND GLORY, WITH A PERFECT OR IMPERFECT BENEVOLENCE, WITHOUT A SPECIAL BENEFIT OF GRACE. This truth is evident sufficiently from what we have said,

And it is proved by all those texts of Scripture whereby the perfect love of God is reckoned a divine benefit. Thus Romans 5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. Ephesians 6: Peace to the Brethren, and charity with faith, from God the Father. 1 John 4: Charity is of God. Weighing which texts St. Augustine in the book On Grace, and Free Will, chapter 19, says: Great are these things, but they say all are from God, he says, the Father, and Lord Jesus Christ: Therefore these great goods are gifts of God.

It is proved likewise from the Councils, especially however the Milevitan decreeing Canon 1: When the Apostle says: Knowledge puffeth up, charity edifieth. it is most impious that we should believe that we have the grace of Christ unto that which puffeth us up, and not unto that which buildeth up, since each is a gift of God, both to know what we ought to do, and to love that we may do it. Similarly the Tridentine Council Session 6, Canon 3, thus decrees: if anyone shall say that without the preventing inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and His aid, man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification be conferred upon him, let him be anathema.

Reason also lends support. For since the love of God, as the author of grace, has for formal object the supernatural order, it is necessary that the love itself be of the same order; for acts are specified by the formal objects toward which they tend. Furthermore, the aforesaid love is the effect of perfect piety, for God is worshipped chiefly by love, as St. Augustine teaches Epistle 29. Piety, he says, is the worship of God, which is exhibited chiefly by loving. But the act of piety cannot be perfectly done without grace: therefore etc. Finally, the love of God above all things as the author of grace is the ultimate disposition unto justification, as we shall prove within: but it is heretical to assert that man can by his own forces dispose himself proximately unto justification, as St. Augustine teaches in book 1 to Boniface, last chapter: therefore with equal reason it is heretical to say that God, the giver of grace, can be loved above all things by fallen man by the virtue of free will alone. Which truth certainly we shall explain more fully and confirm more efficaciously in the disputation concerning divine charity.

HOW GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR KEEPING THE COMMANDMENTS.

Note 1. The divine commandments (insofar as concerns the present question) are of a twofold kind; for some are natural, which can be known by the light of nature, and are contained in the two tables of the Decalogue; and these comprise observance, whether toward God or toward one's neighbor: while others are supernatural, which, supposing man's elevation and ordination to a supernatural end, prescribe to him the means necessary thereto, and oblige man to apply himself to them, insofar as he may be able to attain that end; such are the precepts concerning the exercise of the three Theological virtues, and likewise those which pertain to the frequentation, administration, and worthy reception of the Sacraments: for supposing that man is ordained to attain a supernatural end, he is bound by God's precept to elicit acts of the supernatural virtues and to frequent the sacraments. — But among Theologians no controversy is raised over the supernatural precepts: for it is certain that they cannot be kept without the help of grace: but the difficulty concerns the precepts of the law of nature, a question about which Authors vary in many ways. For some contend that all those precepts can be kept by fallen man according to their substance; though not according to their manner, without grace, and this steadfastly, and on every given occasion, provided no gravest temptation presses. Others indeed judge that fallen man can indeed observe all the mandates of the law of nature, for a brief time, and this negatively only, namely when within that brief time nothing occurs which moves us to act against a negative precept. Finally others think that man, constituted in the state of fallen nature, can by no means, without the help of grace, keep some mandates of the law of nature in such a way that in their observance, even as regards their substance, he does not sin by failing to add the circumstance of the end which the Legislator intends.

Note 2. The observance of the precepts is twofold: for one is as regards the substance of the work, another as regards the intention and manner of the one commanding. Precepts are said to be observed as regards the substance of the work when man carries out what has been prescribed on account of the honesty of the act: but they are said to be kept as regards the manner of the one commanding, insofar as they are done in the way God has prescribed, namely that those precepts be kept out of charity, and order the one acting toward eternal life. This distinction is certainly so well established that St. Pius V. in the Bull of excommunication complains that this distinction of Baïus is condemned: in one way as regards only the substance of the works of the precepts: in the other as regards a certain determinate manner, namely according to which they are able to lead the one acting to the kingdom of heaven, that is according to the manner of merits, as fictitious and to be rejected. Now man does what is commanded as regards the substance of the work, when he fulfills the precept on account of the end of the work and its honesty: but he does so as regards the manner, when he carries out the thing prescribed on account of the end for which the Legislator intends it to be done. — It is certain, however, that neither the supernatural precepts as regards their substance, nor even the natural ones as regards their manner, can be kept without the help of grace, as appears from Canon 5. of the Council of Carthage: where anathema is pronounced against him who asserts that man without grace can fulfill the divine mandates; and also from the Council of Orange, Canon 23. in these words: Men do their own will, not God's, when they do what displeases God: but when they so do what they will as to serve His will worthily, so that worshipping Him they do what they do, still it is the will of Him by whom what they worship is prepared and commanded. And by Canon 25. it is defined that God first inspires in us faith and love of Himself, that with His help we may be able to fulfill what is pleasing to Him. These decrees are chiefly to be understood concerning the observance of the supernatural precepts as regards their substance, and also as regards their manner. Hence there remains only the difficulty, whether without the help of grace those precepts can be kept as regards the substance of the work. 3| 4|Note 3. The observance of the precepts, as regards their substance, can yet be regarded in a twofold way: namely either collectively, that is for all the precepts considered generally, or only distributively, for some one of the precepts considered singly and apart from the others. Further, that observance of the precepts as regards their substance is either regarded precisely as it apprehends only the very work done with its intrinsic circumstances, pertaining to its honesty and moral integrity: or insofar as it is apprehended together with the lack of the extrinsic circumstance of the end of the one acting, which the legislator intends, and which the one acting ought to attend to in that fulfillment of the precepts. 5| 6|First Conclusion. — MAN CANNOT, BY THE FORCES OF FREE CHOICE ALONE, AND WITHOUT THE HELP OF GRACE, KEEP ALL THE PRECEPTS OF THE LAW OF NATURE COLLECTIVELY, NEITHER AS REGARDS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WORK, NOR AS REGARDS THE MANNER OF THE ONE COMMANDING. This is common among Catholics against the Pelagians: and the Subtle Doctor defends it in 2. dist. 28. num. 3. where, responding to the objection that the Gentiles are said by the Apostle to the Romans to keep the law naturally, he says: The Gentiles were able to live justly by keeping the law of nature, and then they became a law unto themselves: that is, by the law of nature written in their hearts, they directed themselves inwardly to live rightly as the Jews did by the written law: but these did not truly live without grace, because grace could have been in them, supposing the hypothesis apart from the observance of the Mosaic law. Hence it appears how greatly some more recent Thomists hallucinate, while they assert that the Subtle Doctor taught that all the precepts of the law of nature can be kept by the forces of free choice alone; and therefore accuse him more boldly of the Pelagian error.

Proof is added for the Conclusion: first indeed from sacred Scripture, namely from all those places in which the Apostle signifies the Mosaic law to be weak, feeble, impotent, and insufficient for justifying: indeed as concluding man the more tightly under sin: Because, he says in Romans 7., occasion being taken, sin wrought in me all concupiscence: For sin, he says, was dead in me without the law: but when the mandate had come, sin revived. Which indeed St. Augustine explains in book De Spiritu et Littera, cap. 1. with this elegant similitude. At the same time, he says, as if the impulse of waters not flowing into one part, it becomes gentler with an obstruction placed, whose movement when it senses, precipitated with a greater mass, it is hurled forth more vehemently down the slopes: for I know not in what way this very thing which is coveted becomes more pleasant when it is forbidden. Whence there the Apostle says: I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, which is in my members. And afterwards asking: Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? He answers: The grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ. By which he signifies that the grace of God is necessary, that the precept thou shalt not covet be fulfilled.

The same truth is proved from the Council of Carthage, in which, as appears from the Synodal Letter to Innocent, the Pelagians were condemned for asserting; that God so instituted man, and created his nature, that it might fulfill the law of God by its own will, whether written naturally in the heart, or given in letters. For the natural law is signified by the law written naturally in the heart. Similarly from the other Council of Carthage, Canon 5. anathema is pronounced against him who asserts that man without grace can fulfill the divine mandates: and he confirms his doctrine from that saying of Christ in John 15. Without me you can do nothing. It accords with Orange 2. Canon 25. in these words. Men do their own will, not God's, when they do what displeases God: but when they so act that they wish to serve the divine will, although willing they say, what they do, still it is the will of Him, by whom what they will is prepared and commanded. But if men could keep the law of nature without grace, they would serve the divine will without grace, which is there condemned. And by Canon 25. it is defined that God first inspires in us faith and love of Himself, that with His help we may be able to fulfill what is pleasing to Him.

It is proved thirdly, from the holy Fathers, but especially from St. Augustine, who everywhere throughout all his works published against the Pelagians, particularly in the book De Spiritu et Littera, devotes himself wholly to showing that the law cannot be kept without grace. Whence cap. 10. of that same book, he professes expressly that the just man must believe that he can in no way supply the infirmity of his nature for fulfilling what that law commands, unless divine grace comes to his aid. Hence in the book De Gratia Christi, cap. 3. For everyone, he says, the law is one thing, grace another, such that the law not only profits nothing, but even harms greatly, unless grace helps, and thus the utility of the law is shown, since it makes those guilty of transgression need to flee to grace to be set free, and to be admonished that they may overcome evil concupiscences: for it commands more than it helps, it teaches the disease exists, it does not heal: nay rather, because it is not healed, there is need, that more attentively and anxiously the medicine of grace may be sought. And in Sermon 13. De Verbis Apostoli, cap. 2. The law was given, that man might discover himself, not that the disease might be healed, but that with the disease growing heavier the physician might be sought. — St. Prosper subscribes, in the book Contra Collatorem, cap. 1. Behold, he says, He can command that no evil be done: but from evil He cannot liberate. The mandate makes known, but does not bestow the effect of obedience, unless what is killing by the authority of the letter becomes vivifying by the spirit of grace. St. Fulgentius also assents, in the book De Praedestinatione, cap. 20. The law, he says, without grace can show the guilt of faults, not heal them: it points out wounds, it does not minister medicines: but that the precept of the law be fulfilled, grace ministers the operation: that thus the law reveals all things, grace bears indulgence: of the law therefore it is, that we know sins, of grace, that we amend them... therefore it belongs to the vice of nature, that man sins. to the aid of the law, that it show to man the precept which he knows not: but to the gift of grace it belongs, that He heal the vice of man, which guilt brought upon him, and the knowledge of the law accumulated.

It is urged also by reason; for fallen man is moved for the most part by graver temptations, while the natural law obliges, and by dire motions and goads of concupiscence is drawn back from its observance: but (as we shall say below) man cannot overcome grave temptations without the benefit of grace: therefore neither can he fulfill all the precepts of the law of nature: Then, for fulfilling every law, there is desired a supreme resolve of never sinning: nor of transgressing that law on any occasion whatsoever. otherwise he will most wisely deflect from it: but such a resolve cannot be established on account of the enticements of temptations pressing in from everywhere, alluring to forbidden sensible good, unless it be upheld by the help of divine grace: therefore such help is required for the observance of the law. Then finally, that the law of nature be kept entirely, it would behoove man by his own forces never to sin anywhere: but that is a signal benefit of grace: for, says the Doctor in 2. dist. 28. n. 1. Free choice cannot of itself guard against every mortal sin in this state, because the soul without grace is stained by some sin, whether original or actual, from which it is not freed except through grace. And presently, this set aside, not all the precepts can be observed.

You will object 1. St. Paul the Apostle to the Romans cap. 2. says that the Gentiles, who have not the law, do naturally the things of the law: therefore the precepts of the law can be observed by the forces of nature. — I distinguish the consequent: they can observe some, and for a brief time, where grave occasions drawing back from that observance are absent, I concede: they can observe all with constant will, and on every occasion given, I deny.

You will object 2. That word of Deuteronomy 5. The mandate which I command thee this day, is not above thee: therefore its observance does not exceed natural forces. — I answer, that the law is not above the grasp of man as regards cognition, namely because the knowledge of it need not be sought from kings far away, I concede: as regards its observance, I deny. And the following text favors this distinction, neither is it placed afar off, nor situated in heaven, etc.

You will object 3. But Ecclesiasticus 15. If thou wilt observe the mandates, they shall keep thee. — St. Augustine answers, in the book De Gratia et Libero arbitrio, cap. 16. It is certain, he says, that we keep the mandates if we will: but since the will is prepared by the Lord, it must be sought from Him, that we will so much as suffices, that by worshiping we may do. It is certain that we will when we will: but He makes us will the good, of which was said what I placed a little before, the will is prepared by the Lord, of which it was said: the steps of man shall be directed by the Lord, and He shall will his way: Of which it was said. It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish. It is certain that we do when we do, but He makes us do, bestowing most efficacious powers upon the will, who said Ezekiel 36. I will make you walk in my justifications, and keep my judgments, and do them.

You will object 4. Very many are read in sacred Scripture to have observed God's mandates without the aid of grace: therefore these can be so kept. Proof meanwhile. First, for Cyrus, a stranger to the grace of faith, kept the natural law: for God said to him Isaiah 44. Thou shalt fulfill all my will. And cap. 46. He names him the man of his will. Moreover Matthew 19. a certain prince not yet imbued with the faith and doctrine of Christ, hearing from Himself: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the mandate, responded: All these have I kept from my youth. Finally the Apostle to the Philippians 3. speaking of himself, when he was not yet converted to faith in Christ, testifies that according to the justice which is of the law he conversed without blame in the law. That is, observed it entirely, and without that reprehension: therefore, etc. — I answer first, that Cyrus fulfilled the will of God, not as regards the observance of the precepts of the natural law, inasmuch as he was an idolater, a man of blood, and a plunderer and invader of other kingdoms, as appears from his history, as St. Jerome rightly notes in the first chapter of Zechariah: but he is said to have fulfilled the will of God for this reason, because he did what had been commanded him by God, namely that he should release the people of Israel from captivity, and should see to the restoration of the temple and city of Jerusalem entirely. Which kind indeed of the divine will can be served by any impious man whatsoever; on that ground even the demons, torturers of the damned, could be said to fulfill the will of God. To the second I answer, either that prince was illuminated by divine grace in keeping the precepts, since moreover he was a Jew, and of the people of God, and thus must not be said to have fulfilled the law by his own forces; or, which is more probable, only with masked and hypocritical mind he seemed to keep the law, which indeed appears true from that excessive adherence of his to his riches; for the sacred text notes that when Christ our Lord had urged him to sell all things which he had in ownership and dominion, and to spend their price upon the poor; when he heard these things he was saddened, because he was very rich, as St. Luke narrates, cap. 18.; and that excessive inclination toward riches was a sin against the law of nature. For the coveting of money is the root of all evils. But to the third I say, that the Apostle said he had conversed without blame in Judaism because he had lived commendably in the Jewish manner, abstaining from actions containing manifest injury of God or neighbor; such are perjuries, homicides, adulteries, and other open crimes, which the law prohibits: but the Apostle does not wish to signify that he was altogether innocent; for in 1 Timothy 1., he says he was a blasphemer and contumelious, and calls himself first, that is chiefest, of sinners: and to Titus 3. For we ourselves also, he says, were some time unwise, unbelieving, erring, serving desires and various pleasures.

You will object 5. No one is held to the impossible: for, says St. Augustine, in the book De Natura et Gratia, cap. 43. God commands not impossibilities: but each one of men, even a Gentile, is obliged to fulfill the whole law: therefore he can keep it.

I distinguish the major: no one is held to that which is impossible absolutely and simply, I concede: that which is impossible according to the usual forces of nature, but becomes possible with divine help, I deny: for thus St. Augustine solves a similar argument of Celestius, in the book De Perfectione iustitiae, cap. 2. where Celestius had objected to him: Whatever is sin is either what can be avoided, or what cannot be avoided: if what cannot be avoided, sin is not: if what can be avoided, man can be without sin, which can be avoided: for no reason or justice suffers at least that to be called sin which cannot by any means be avoided. That argument, in order that St. Augustine may solve it, says: We answer the precept can be avoided, if the vice of nature be healed by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord; for it is so far unhealthy, insofar as it either sees not through blindness what must be done, or does not accomplish it through infirmity. Which solution indeed he explains in the following chapter with this elegant similitude: When we see a lame man, who can be healed, we say rightly indeed, this man ought to be without lameness, and if he ought, he can: and yet he cannot immediately when he wills, but when by treatment applied he has been healed, and medicine has helped his will. And below he says: It is most wisely prescribed to man, that he walk with upright steps, that when he perceives himself unable, he may seek medicine for healing the wound of sin. — Thence cap. 43. of the book De Natura et Gratia, and thence the Council of Trent, Session 6. cap. 11. God commands not impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes thee both to do what thou canst, and to ask what thou canst not, and He helps thee that thou mayest be able.

Second Conclusion. — Not all the precepts of the law of na- ture are fulfilled unless sanctifying grace is required absolutely, but only by the ordinary disposition of God.

The first part is proved: nothing impedes the observance of the natural precepts except ignorance, which is in the intellect, and infirmity, which is in the appetite, as St. Augustine teaches, book 2. De Remissione peccatorum, cap. 17. where he says: Men do not will to do what is just, either because they know not whether it is just, or because it delights not: for we will anything the more vehemently, the more certainly we know how good it is, and the more ardently do we delight in it. Ignorance therefore and infirmity are vices which impede the will from being moved to doing a good work, or from abstaining from an evil work. But that what lay hidden may become known, and that what delighted not may become sweet, belongs to the grace of God, which aids human wills: whereas to make known the good that lies hidden, and to make sweet what delights not, suffices actual healing grace from ignorance and infirmity, even if it heal not from sin: therefore absolutely, and from the nature of the thing habitual grace is not required, but actual grace could suffice for keeping all the precepts of the law of nature.

The second part is proved, namely that habitual or sanctifying grace is necessary by the ordination of God for keeping the law of nature entirely. It is proved, I say; first from the manner of speaking of sacred Scripture signifying the inconstancy and infirmity of men toward any good whatsoever, unless they be strengthened, elevated, and fortified by the divine Spirit. Hence Psalm 35. De Peccatoribus, it is said: Their way is darkness and slippery, and the Angel of the Lord pursuing them. By which is signified that it is necessary that at times men wander, stumble, and rush headlong into sin; no otherwise than those who walk over slippery places and in darkness, unless the gloom of sins be dissolved by the irradiating light of sanctifying grace. To this tends also that word of Ecclesiasticus 27. Who restraineth himself not in the fear of the Lord; quickly shall his house fall. Thren. 1. Jerusalem hath sinned a sin, therefore she is made unstable. Isaiah 57. I hid my face from thee, and was angry: and he went wandering in the way of his own heart. And afterwards: The impious are like the boiling sea, which cannot rest, and its waves overflow, unto trampling down and mire.

It is proved secondly, from the holy Fathers, Chrysostom teaching that, As a ship lacking a rudder goes not where it wills, but where the storm drives it: so man destitute of the grace of God is borne into the precipices of sins. St. Augustine concurs, in the book De Catechizandis rudibus, last chapter, where he teaches that he fulfills not the law unless he who has received the divine Holy Spirit, coeternal with the Father and the Son. And in the book De Spiritu et Littera, c. 26. where he says: When it is said, the doers of the law shall be justified, what else is said than they shall be justified? for the doers of the law are just. St. Gregory 22. Moralium, cap. 12. Sin, which by penance is not soon deleted, draws by its own weight to others. Therefore a sinner cannot long persevere in the observance of the precepts with any actual grace whatever: presently also for the persevering and constant fulfillment of the law of nature it is necessary that man put off sin: but sin cannot be washed away in the ordinary way except by habitual and sanctifying grace: therefore this is necessary for fulfilling the precepts of the natural law.

You will say: A habit is not necessary except for acts proper to itself, e.g. the habit of temperance for acts of temperance, and so of the rest: therefore charity or sanctifying grace is not required for the acts of the natural virtues. — I distinguish the antecedent. It is not required per se, I concede: per accidens, and on account of impediments to be removed, I deny. For temperance is required that the act of justice be exercised constantly, namely by impeding lest man be allured by corporeal pleasures toward evil things, and be turned aside from rendering to each his right.

You will say 2: If a sinner cannot fulfill the whole natural law without habitual grace, everyone will be bound to confess immediately, once he recognizes himself infected with mortal sin; but the consequent is against the common sentiment of Theologians: therefore also the antecedent. The sequence of the major is proved; everyone is bound to avoid the proximate occasion of sinning: but if man existing in sin cannot fulfill the whole natural law, he will always be in the proximate occasion of sinning; therefore, etc. — I deny the sequence of the major: and of its proof I deny the minor: for he who is in sin, although he cannot abstain wholly, and throughout the whole of life, from sin, can nevertheless for some time be removed from it with actual helps, even when temptations press in; but he who is in the proximate occasion of sinning ordinarily succumbs, as soon as that occasion of sinning occurs.

You will say 3: If Faith and habitual grace were required by the ordinary law of God for fulfilling the whole natural law, no infidel could fulfill it; inasmuch as he lacks faith and sanctifying grace; but the consequent is false; otherwise since he ought to fulfill that law, he would be bound to the impossible: therefore, etc. — I answer: Enough has been touched already in the superior conclusion regarding this objection. Nevertheless further. I distinguish the sequence of the major: the infidel will not be able to fulfill the whole natural law as long as he remains in infidelity, I concede: if he have abandoned infidelity, I deny: for no one is an infidel who has not the means by which he can be led to faith, as will appear in the course of this treatise.

Third Conclusion. — Besides habitual grace there is also neces- sary the actual help of God for keeping the whole law of nature.

It is proved first from sacred Scripture: for John 17. Christ our Lord suppliantly implores help of the Father for His Apostles, now already just and clean. Holy Father, He says, keep them in thy name: that is, by thy help, as St. Chrysostom interprets Homily 80. on John.

It is proved similarly from the Council of Carthage, in these words related by Celestine to the Bishops of Gaul, cap. 5. The will is prepared by the Lord, and that they may do some good, He Himself touches with paternal inspirations the hearts of His faithful: and from Orange Canon 10. The help of God is always to be implored by the reborn and by Saints, that they may arrive at a good end, or be able to persevere in good work.

It is proved thirdly from the sentiment of the supreme Pontiffs: First indeed Innocent the First in his rescript to the Council of Carthage says: That we need daily help we cannot deny: for he knows this well who lives, we pray that we may live better and more holily, or when we are turned aside from goods by depraved sentiments, that we may return to the sure way, the more shall we need its help. To this add Celestine cap. 5. and 8. to the Bishops of Gaul, Zosimus to all the Bishops of the City. Felix the Second as compiler of the Canons of the Council of Orange, and Boniface the Second as approver of the same.

It is proved fourthly from the holy Fathers: but especially from St. Augustine, who inculcates this truth in many places, particularly in the book De natura et gratia, cap. 26. God Himself, he says, when through the mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, He spiritually heals guilt, or raises up the dead, that is, justifies the impious, and when He has led him onward to perfect maturity, that is, to perfect life and justice, He does not desert him, if he desert Him not, that he may live piously and justly always: for as the eye of the body even most fully healed, unless helped by the whiteness of light, cannot discern: so man even most perfectly justified, unless he be divinely aided by the eternal light of justice, cannot live rightly. God heals therefore not only that He may delete what we have sinned, but also that He profit us lest we sin. And in the book De libero arbitrio, cap. 6. explaining these words of the Canticles. Who is this that ascendeth from the desert leaning upon her beloved brother? he says. When she was deserted she merited nothing good: therefore now that perchance she may eminently stand well, or if she perseveringly lean upon Him by whom she has been made white: on account of which Jesus Himself, upon whom the whitened one leans, said to His disciples, Without me you can do nothing.

This truth is confirmed also by reason. First indeed, although habitual grace heals the soul totally in order to guilt, it nevertheless does not heal every infirmity arising from original sin; such that it could persevere long in good, and deflect from evil, unless it be divinely aided; presently therefore besides that habitual grace, actual grace also is needed for relieving that infirmity and restoring vanity, nay rather corroborating it. — Then, it is established that the just often fall into sin, while God denies them actual help: whence David, Thou hast turned away thy face from me, and I am made troubled: therefore habitual grace does not suffice for avoiding sin, and keeping the precept. — Finally, the just ought to render thanks to God for each good work, and ascribe to God glory and honor for that work, and accordingly that work has God as its chief Author: but He would not have to be so judged, unless He concurred specially, and by particular actual help, toward exercising that good work: therefore God besides habitual grace also concedes actual helps to the just man for avoiding sins, and fulfilling the precepts.

You will object 1. By Canon 6. of the Council of Milevis or Carthage, in which it is defined that the grace of God, whereby we are justified through our Lord Jesus Christ, avails not for the sole remission of sins which have already been committed: but also for help, that they not be admitted: therefore there is no need of the actual grace of God in the justified man, that he fulfill the law of God. — I distinguish the antecedent: insofar as the grace of God whereby we are justified is taken for habitual grace together with its appendages, that is, with the actual helps accompanying it, I concede: insofar as it is taken precisely for habitual grace separated from the actual helps, I deny.

You will object 2. God concedes habitual grace to man for this purpose, that he may act well, and avoid sins; therefore another help is superfluous. The antecedent is proved: if by habitual grace the just man were not able for living well, his condition is not better, nor greater virtue toward good than the sinner's; since the sinner even with actual grace can at times keep the law: but the consequent is absurd; therefore also that from which it follows. — I deny the antecedent; likewise also the major of its proof: for the justified man possesses greater virtue and disposition for keeping the law than the sinner; both because no one except the justified can keep it entirely, and because sanctifying sacramental grace has annexed to it the right to certain actual helps, to be conceded in due time and occasion given, through which the whole law of nature can easily be observed.