Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

WHETHER AND WHAT GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR KNOWING SUPERNATURAL TRUTHS, OR FOR ASSENTING TO THE MYSTERIES OF FAITH.

Note 1. That some truth can be called supernatural on a threefold account; namely, on the part of the object, on the part of the reason or motive for assenting, or on the part of both together. A truth is said to be supernatural on the part of the object only, when of itself it indeed transcends the natural capacity of the intellect, nor could it be perceived unless it had been divinely revealed; yet it is attained by a merely natural reason and motive, as happens in heretics, whenever by human faith, or by their own will, they give assent to some supernatural truth, for instance the mystery of the Trinity and of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ; for although those truths be supernatural of themselves, nevertheless the motive or reason by which the heretic assents to them is purely natural: he does not give them assent on account of the motive of divine revelation; otherwise he would believe the other revealed mysteries by equal right: but he is only moved to believe those mysteries on account of human reason, which is subject to error. Secondly, a truth is said to be supernatural on the part of the motive alone, when namely the intellect perceives it, and gives assent to it through divine revelation: e.g. while one believes that Isaac begot Jacob — this being purely natural on the part of the object — yet it becomes supernatural by reason of the motive, when one believes it because holy Scripture reports it with God revealing it. Thirdly and finally, a truth is said to be supernatural on the part both of the object and of the motive, when namely the object known, and the motive by which it is known, are supernatural, as while we believe that God is threefold because Christ revealed this.

Note 2. That some supernatural truth requires two things for its knowledge; one indeed on the part of the object, namely that it be proposed to the intellect, and set before it to be perceived; another on the part of the intellect, namely that it can believe the object proposed to it, and give assent to it. Concerning both, however, a difficulty is raised; whether namely supernatural grace is required, both that the object be proposed to the intellect, and that the intellect give assent to it. Pelagius admitted the first, conceding that for having faith concerning the mysteries it is required that they be proposed through the preaching of the Gospel; but he denied the second, namely that interior grace is necessary for believing the revealed truth, or at least he wished it to be desired only for believing more easily, as was said in the first volume, in reporting the errors of Pelagius.

Note 3. Concerning the present difficulty the Semipelagians differed from the Pelagians chiefly in this, that some among them would admit indeed that grace is necessary for attaining perfect faith and exercising it; yet they wished there to be in us certain beginnings and seeds of faith, whereby we could merit that perfect faith; of which St. Prosper in his Epistle to St. Augustine has this: Certain ones however of these depart so little from the paths of the Pelagians that, when they are compelled to confess that grace of Christ which prevents all human merits, lest if it is rendered to merits it should be vainly named grace, they take refuge in the condition of the proper nature of each man, in which, since we merited nothing previously, because we did not even exist, grace establishes free will and rationality so that through discerning good and evil, and toward knowledge of God, and obedience to his commandments, he could direct his will, and arrive at that grace whereby we are reborn in Christ: seeking, asking, knocking by natural faculty of course, so that he may receive, find, enter because he used well the good of nature, and by the help of initial grace merited to arrive at that saving grace. But the Pelagians wished free will to suffice of itself for assenting to revealed truths, nor was any grace needed for that. Against whom let there stand

One Conclusion. — MAN CANNOT KNOW ANY SUPERNATURAL TRUTH WITH CERTAINTY WITHOUT SPECIAL GRACE, WHICH ILLUMINES THE INTELLECT AND MOVES THE AFFECTION, NOR THEREFORE WITHOUT SUCH GRACE CAN HE BELIEVE AS ONE OUGHT FOR SALVATION.

It is proved first from holy Scripture. For John 6, Christ the Lord testifies: No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him. For to come to Christ is nothing else than to believe in Christ, as the Savior himself, to be adored, indicates in these following words: Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to me.

And shortly after: But there are some of you that believe not... therefore I say unto you, that no man can come to me, etc. Whence saint Augustine in book De Praedest. Sanctorum, chapter 8: What is it, he says, to come to me, but to believe in me? And shortly after: Therefore to be drawn by the Father to Christ... is nothing else than to receive a gift from the Father, whereby one believes in Christ. Furthermore John 12: Therefore they could not believe, where again he says Isaiah: Blind the heart of this people, and make his ears heavy, etc. For since blinding comes about through the withdrawal of divine light, and they cannot believe who lack that light, it openly follows that no one can believe without the special aid of divine grace.

The holy Apostle inculcates the same truth in many places, especially 1 Corinthians chapter 1: What hast thou that thou hast not received? With which testimony St. Augustine in the place cited above, chapter 3, confesses he was altogether convinced that faith is a gift of God, whereas before he thought it was in us from ourselves, and that we obtain through it the gifts of God, whereby we live temperately, piously, and justly in this age. Likewise chapter 1: I have obtained mercy that I might be faithful: whence saint Augustine rightly observes in book De Gratia et libero arbitrio chapter 7: For he did not say, I have obtained mercy because I was faithful, but that I might be faithful; thereby showing that that very faith cannot be possessed unless God have mercy, and is a gift of God. Likewise 2 Corinthians chapter 3: Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God: whence St. Augustine in book De Praedest. Sanctorum chapter 2 draws this truth: To believe, he says, is nothing else than to think with assent: and everyone who believes thinks, and by believing thinks, and by thinking believes. Likewise Ephesians chapter 2: By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God. On which passage Augustine uses book De Gratia et libero arbitrio chapter 7 and De Praedest. Sanctorum chapter 7: There is also, he says, what I said, through faith not of yourselves, but it is the gift of God. Philippians 1: For unto you it is given, not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him. Whence Augustine in book De Gratia et Libero arbitrio, chapter 14: Both things therefore belong to the grace of God, the faith of believers and the endurance of sufferers: because he said both were given.

It is proved secondly, from the Council of Carthage, Canon 4, where it is stated that it is a gift of God both to know what we ought to do, and to love that we do it. By the Canon of Orange 7, defining as heretics of such spirit those who think that without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit men can by the powers of nature think anything that pertains to salvation; and Can. 9: It is a divine gift, when we think rightly, and hold our feet back from falsehood and injustice; by the Tridentine, Session 6, Canon 3, pronouncing anathema against those asserting that without the preventing inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and his aid, man can believe, etc.

It is proved thirdly from the holy Fathers. From St. Clement, book 6 of the Stromata, pages 501 and 502: Moreover, whoever among the Greeks glory that truth has been comprehended by them, let them tell us from whom they boast they learned it. If indeed they say not from God, they confess they learned it from men. But men are not worthy of belief when they speak about God, insofar as they are men; for neither can he who is a man speak truly worthily of God, weak and subject to death, whose destruction is the work of him who made him. Then, he who cannot speak truly about himself, ought he not much less to be believed even concerning God? For as far as man is distant from the power of God, so weak also is his reason, even if it speaks not God himself, but about God and the divine Word. Since even those who claim God as their Master scarcely attain knowledge of God, grace bringing them aid toward however small a cognition, as they accustom themselves to contemplate the Holy Spirit by the Holy Spirit: because the Spirit searcheth the deep things of God; but the animal man perceiveth not those things that are of the Spirit. Therefore the only doctrine handed down from God is that which is with us, upon which depend all fountains of wisdom, whatsoever are borne toward truth as toward their mark. In which words St. Clement beats down all certain and salutary cognition of God and of divine things into the illumination of grace and the teaching of the Holy Spirit.

It is proved from the holy Fathers cited by saint Augustine in book De Bono perseverantiae, chapters 17 and 19. By Cyprian in book 3 ad Quirinum chapter 1, writing, in nothing must we glory, when nothing is our own. By Ambrose in book De Fuga saeculi, chapter 1: It is not in our power our heart, and our thoughts, etc.

It is proved also by reasons, especially those which St. Augustine uses, the first of which is drawn from prayers and thanksgivings: for no one prays unless he is about to ask of him whom he prays that which is undeserved and beyond his capacity: yet the faithful pray the Lord for the unfaithful, that he convert them from unfaithfulness to faith: therefore this faith is an undeserved gift, and from grace. Likewise thanks are not given to God except for some gift, and grace properly so called: but they are given for the conversion of unbelievers; thus St. Augustine Epistle 17: Vainly, he says, and perfunctorily rather than shamefully do we pour forth prayers to God for these men, that they may consent to believe the doctrine to which they are opposed, if it does not pertain to his grace to convert to faith his wills contrary to that faith. Vainly also, and perfunctorily rather than shamefully, do we render great thanksgivings with exultation to God when certain of them believe, if he himself does not work this in them. Let us not deceive men, when we cannot deceive God.

We plainly do not pray to God, but feign that we pray, if we do not believe him to make in us what we pray for; we plainly do not give thanks to God, but feign that we give thanks, if we think that he himself does not do that for which we give him thanks.

The second reason: That which befits certain ones out of the mercy of God, and befits others not out of the just judgment of God, is grace, and a gift properly so called: yet faith befits certain men out of the mercy of God, and befits others not out of the just judgment: therefore, etc. The argument is that of saint Augustine in book De Praedest. chapter 6: Many hear the word of truth, but some believe, others contradict. Who is ignorant of these things? who denies it? But since for some the will is prepared by the Lord, for others the will is not prepared by the Lord, it must certainly be discerned what comes of his mercy, what of judgment. And chapter 8: When the Gospel is preached, some believe, some believe not; but those who believe the preacher sounding outwardly, hear from the Father and learn: but those who believe not, hear outwardly, inwardly hear not, neither learn — that is, to these it is given that they believe, to those it is not given, because he says: no man cometh to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him. And afterward: Therefore faith, both begun and perfected, is a gift of God; and let no one doubt at all that this gift is not given to certain ones, who is unwilling to contend against the most manifest sacred Letters. But why it is not given to all, he ought faithfully not to know, who believes that all deeds done by one are unto most just condemnation: so that there would be no just reproach of God even if none were delivered thence. Whence it is established great that grace, because very many are delivered, and what was owed to itself they acknowledge in those who are not delivered, so that whoever glories, may glory not in his own merits, which appear equal in the damned, but in the Lord.

The third reason: Either faith is grace, or no grace properly so called is given: but the consequent is false: therefore the antecedent is true.

The major is proved: That whence all good merits begin is grace, or that which is given to it on account of its merits is given: if it is given on account of merits, it is not grace: For if, says the Apostle, it be of grace, it is now not of works: therefore that whence good merits begin is either grace, or no grace properly so called exists. This reason is that of St. Augustine Epistle 105, where he says: It remains that we attribute faith itself not to a human free choice whereby men extol themselves, nor to any surpassing merits, because from that source begin whatever goods are merits: but let us confess it to be the gratuitous gift of God, if we think true grace, that is, without merits.

You will object. 1. Whatever is required of man is in his power: yet faith is required of man: therefore it ought to be in his power: but that which is in the power of man is not grace properly so called, nor a gift of God beyond nature's due: therefore, etc. This is evident: for in vain would God require anything of us, unless it lay in our power to fulfill it. Likewise the minor is clear from Mark 16: He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved. And Romans 10: If thou believe, thou shalt be saved.

I answer. 1. This argument was devised by the Semipelagians, as is clear from the Epistle of St. Prosper to St. Augustine, book De Praedest. Sanct. chapter 11, where he says: If thou believest, thou shalt be saved; just as it is said, if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh you shall live: for here too, of these two one is required, the other offered. Therefore that we mortify the deeds of the flesh is required: but that we live is offered. Not therefore on account of many such passages, as that mortifying the deeds of the flesh should we say is not a gift of God, nor confess that it is a gift

of God: since we hear that it is required of us, with the reward of right offered if we have done this. Whence he concludes that since the Semipelagians admitted that to mortify the deeds of the flesh is a work of grace, they ought also to concede that the assent of faith cannot be formed without the assistance of grace.

I answer. 2. By distinguishing the major: Whatever is required of man is in his power, either through the grace of God, or through nature, I concede: through nature always, and without grace, I deny. But both are of God, Augustine says in the same place, both what is commanded, and what is offered: for he is asked to give what he commands: believers ask that their faith be increased: they ask for unbelievers, that faith be given them, so that both in its increases and in its beginnings faith may be the gift of God.

You will object. 2. Various texts of Scripture, by which there appears to be in us a certain beginning of good will, through which faith may be sought and desired. Thus Isaias 3: At the voice of thy cry he shall hear thee, and answer thee. Luke 12: Ask and you shall receive, seek and you shall find, knock and it shall be opened to you. Rom. 1: To will is present with me, but to accomplish that which is good I find not. It is evident, therefore, that to him who wills, desires, and seeks, the rewards are proposed and prepared.

I distinguish the consequent: that the rewards are prepared on account of a work elicited by the powers of nature alone, I deny; elicited with the assistance of grace, I concede. I acknowledge, therefore, that to him who wills, desires, and seeks, the rewards are prepared; but that he may will, desire, and seek is of the mercy of God. For from divine Scripture itself it is established that it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy; and that God is he who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish; and because we know not how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings. Hence St. Augustine, book 2, Ad Bonifacium, chapter 9, weighing those words of Proverbs: Man's heart prepareth his way, together with these words of 2 Cor. 3: Not that we are sufficient to think anything, etc., says: Man prepareth his heart, yet not without the aid of God; for if God touches the heart, man prepareth his heart. And again: For if we could do anything without him, assuredly we could neither begin nor accomplish; that we may begin, it was said, His mercy preventeth me; that we may accomplish, it was said, His mercy will follow me.

You will object. 3. Heretics believe certain mysteries of faith, namely of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Resurrection; yet God's gift or grace, by which they might believe, is not conferred upon heretics; therefore one can assent to supernatural truths without the gift of faith and the assistance of grace.

I distinguish the major: they believe either on account of certain natural conjectures, or on account of divine revelation, I concede; on account of a certain natural reason demonstrative and sure, I deny. Likewise I distinguish the minor: grace is not conferred upon heretics when they believe supernatural truths on account of merely human conjecture, or by a faith acquired at second hand, I concede; when they believe on account of the authority and revelation of God, and from a motive purely supernatural, the grace at least of an inchoate and imperfect faith is not given them, I deny. For in them that faith is a certain gift of God, but of the disinherited, as St. Augustine says, book De Patientia, chapter 28, and as we have more fully declared in the Treatise On Faith. Or more briefly and clearly I distinguish the major: they believe by human and acquired faith, I concede; by divine and infused faith, I deny. For they do not believe on account of the authority of God revealing; otherwise they would assent not merely to some, but to all revealed truths whatsoever.

You will object. 4. Supernatural truths are within the line of the specificative object of our intellect; therefore by its native powers they can be attained by it. The antecedent is plain: for truly if such truths were not within the line of the specificative object of the intellect, that intellect could not apprehend them even with any aid whatsoever, just as the eye cannot perceive sound because it is outside the line of its proper object. But the consequence is proved thus: whatever power can by its own powers attain whatever is within its specificative object; therefore if supernatural truths and the mysteries of our faith are contained within the specificative object of our intellect, they can be attained by it through the powers of nature.

I distinguish the antecedent: those truths are within the line of the proportionate specificative object, I deny; of the disproportionate, I concede. And likewise I distinguish the consequent. And in proof of it I say that any power whatever can by its own powers attain whatever is within its specificative object, which is proportionate to it, but not what is disproportionate: as is evident in the case of sight, whose object is every luminous or colored body, when nevertheless, shining with too great splendor, it cannot be apprehended by the eye unless it be aided and strengthened by some special power. Therefore by parity of reasoning, although supernatural truths are within the line of the adequate and specificative object of our intellect, which is every intelligible being abstracting from the natural and supernatural, created and uncreated, spiritual and corporeal; nevertheless since those truths are not contained within its proportionate and connatural object, which for this state is the intelligible being by conversion to phantasms and through species received from the senses, therefore those supernatural truths cannot be perceived by the powers of nature except by the benefit of a light strengthening and elevating the intellect to the supernatural order and state.

You will object. 5. The act of Christian faith can be commanded by the will for an evil end, for example for worldly glory, as St. Augustine teaches, book De Catechizandis Rudibus, chapter 17; but for such an act of faith, or even for the will commanding an act of that kind, grace is not required; therefore, etc.

I answer, denying the major: for that faith is not Christian, but merely natural; whence the same St. Augustine says that men who are moved by an evil will to believe enter the Church with a feigned heart and mock the Christian name.