Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

Note 1. Practical truths differ in two ways: for some are about the works of art, and are called mechanical, of which the account is the same as of speculative truths: others are called moral, which look to the morals of men being rightly and justly instituted. Again, moral truths are regarded either as universal, such as are the general principles of morals, for instance, that you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to another: God is to be worshipped: parents are to be honored, etc.; or particular, as that here and now the parent is to be honored, alms are to be given to this or that poor man. Here, however, the question is not about universal truths, because knowledge of them is the same as cognition of speculative truths; but the whole difficulty turns chiefly upon particular truths, insofar namely as they are regarded with all the circumstances requisite for acting well morally.

Note 2. Practical truth can be known naturally in two ways: namely, either through the light ingenerated in individual men, whereby each one, nature leading and teaching, and without any ratiocination or light mended from elsewhere, knows that this and that is good or evil, to be pursued or fled; or through the light compared and acquired by the benefit of ratiocination or study, whereby each one can detect what agrees or disagrees with right reason, not only in general, but even in the particular. Here, however, there is no question of ingenerated knowledge; for it is certain that it follows the lot of nature, so that where the intellect is more vigorous, the ingenerated light also shines more excellently, whereby it appears more clearly what is to be pursued and what to be shunned according to the internal dictate of conscience: consequently there remains only this difficulty to solve, whether each one through the compared natural light can detect practical truths in particular without any assistance of actual grace.

Note 3. Some practical truths are of such perfection and sublimity that they cannot be acknowledged except by God revealing, such are all those which inform and illustrate Christian and Evangelical man; and they are called Evangelical truths and virtues, as denial of self, voluntary poverty. Others indeed are of lower grade and order, which regard man standing within the sole line of nature and reason, and which, as we said, can become known through the ingenerated or compared light. Here the difficulty is not about truths of the first order, but only about the practical truths of the latter order, concerning which it is asked whether they can be detected without the special benefit of grace exciting and assisting.

First Conclusion. — MAN IN THE STATE OF FALLEN NATURE CAN KNOW CERTAIN MORAL TRUTHS WITHOUT THE SPECIAL ASSISTANCE OF GRACE.

It is proved first from the Apostle to the Romans 1, saying that the Gentile Philo- sophers were inexcusable in their idolatry and depravation of morals, because when they had known God, they glorified him not as God: he judges therefore that the Philosophers knew by natural light that God ought to be glori- fied; otherwise they would not have sinned by not rendering to him glory and due honor; for as every sin is voluntary, so it presupposes judgment and knowledge of the thing to be done. Moreover the same Apostle, chap. 2, says: The Gentiles, who have not the law, do naturally those things that are of the law; such having not the law are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them: that is, they show themselves to know by the forces of nature and through the ingene- rated light what is to be done and what to be shunned, the natural light dictating: therefore as the natural light of the speculative intellect still flourishes even in the state of fallen nature and suffices for detecting speculative truths, so also flourishes and still subsists the natural light of synderesis, or practical intellect, for knowing truths of morals. Nor does it matter that St. Augustine, chap. 27 of book De spiritu et littera, refers this passage to Gentiles pertaining to the grace of the Mediator; for he does not there condemn the opinion of those who refer it to ethnic infidels.

The same truth the Holy Fathers prove, for St. Chrysostomus, Hom. 50 on Genesis says: In our nature is implanted knowledge of good and evil, let no one therefore make pretext that ignorant of virtue he neglects it, etc. And Homily 51: A sufficient teacher, he says, we have, conscience, and it cannot be that anyone be deprived of that aid; for together with the formation of man is implanted knowledge of things to be done and not to be done. To them accords St. Augustine, book 2 of the Confessions, chap. 4: Thy law, he says, is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself does not erase: For what thief calmly endures a thief? Which sentiment S. Prosper explains in marvelous fashion, in his poem De providentia Dei, about its middle, thus singing:

Go yourselves into the recesses of your mind, and within Behold the engraved marks, the written volumes of the heart, And acknowledge the law born with you along with you: For who shall there now be, not the flock of the field, nor the beast of the deep, Who should foolishly delight so in open vices, Or wish himself to suffer what he does? Deceptive falsehood, Rapacious of the future, furious and atrocious, bloody homicide He condemns, and against the adulterer draws the swords of adultery.

This assertion is further proved by reason: First indeed, moral and practical truth is the object proportioned to the light of natural human intellect: therefore it can naturally be detected by it. The inference is evident: for every natural faculty can perceive by its own powers an object connatural and proportioned to itself; nor does the eye need a special grace, that it may apprehend a colored object. The antecedent also is established; for natural moral truth lies within the line of natural intellect, and hence is an object proportioned to it. — Secondly, man can by his ingrafted light know universal principles which pertain to morals being rightly and justly formed, as was said shortly before, both from Scripture and from the holy Fathers: therefore by these same powers, without the special assistance of grace, he can know particular conclusions deduced from those principles: for whoever, e.g., knows in general that alms ought to be given to the needy, whenever an occasion of bestowing alms offers itself in the particular case, will easily judge by nature's own prompting that alms ought to be given to such a poor man. — Finally, if man could not know by nature's powers any moral truths in particular, it would follow that he could not sin against those same truths without grace: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The inference of the major is evident: for it would not be in his power to have such knowledge, whence ignorance of truths of this kind would be altogether invincible, and accordingly whatever he did against them would not be imputed to him as guilt.

You will say 1: From the knowledge of moral truths is acquired the habit of prudence, which embraces in its bosom all the virtues: but all the virtues cannot be acquired without the special benefit of grace: therefore neither the knowledge of their truths. — I distinguish the major: there is acquired an imperfect habit of prudence, and only as regards some very slight degrees, I concede: there is acquired the perfect habit of prudence, whereby one is said to be truly prudent, and has a permanent facility of judging prudently on any given occasion, even while the gravest difficulties arise, about what must be done ⟦protereudi⟧, I deny. And likewise, with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence. For prudence, which is said to embrace all virtues in its bosom, is not only that imperfect prudence by which one exercises some act of natural prudence, or judges rightly once and again about doing or not doing a thing; but it is a permanent disposition, and a sound judgment whereby for the most part one judges well about things to be done even in arduous matters: but this cannot be acquired without the assistance of grace: whereas the former can be obtained and exercised by the mere powers of nature.

You will say 2. To approve false things as true is a wound contracted through original sin, as saint Augustine teaches in many places, especially concerning those things which pertain to practical truths; therefore to uncover those truths is a benefit of grace. — I distinguish the antecedent: To approve them with an efficacious approbation, which moves and draws the affection, is a wound of original sin, I concede: with an inefficacious approbation, I deny. Likewise I distinguish the consequence: Not to approve all false things as true is a benefit of grace, I concede: only some, I deny. We confess therefore that human reason very often grows blind, and wanders from the truth in uncovering very many moral truths; for thus the Philosophers among the Gentiles did not attain certain knowledge of many practical truths: for as we are affected, so we form our judgment about things: yet it very often happens that men are ill affected; and consequently it is certain that they mostly do not apprehend moral truth with certainty.

You will insist. From the holy Fathers man is said to be through original sin not only wounded, but even blinded: therefore in the state of fallen nature he can attain knowledge of no truth, especially practical and moral truth, without the illumination and benefit of divine grace. The antecedent is evident, especially from St. Gregory the Great, Homily 11 on the Gospels, where speaking of the blind man whom Christ illumined in Luke 18, he has this: Who that blind man was according to history we do not know; yet we know what he signifies by mystery: for the blind man is the human race, which expelled from the joys of Paradise by its first parent, ignorant of the clarity of the supernal light, suffers the darkness of its damnation; yet it is illumined by the presence of its Redeemer, that it may already see through desire the joys of the inner light, and set the steps of good work in the way of life. — I distinguish the antecedent: Man through original sin is blinded as regards the knowledge of supernatural truths, which he lost through the loss of faith and infused science, I concede: as regards the knowledge of natural truths, both speculative and practical, I deny. For as the light of reason is not extinguished through original sin, so neither is that innate power and capacity of the intellect lost for perceiving any truths whatsoever that lie within the breadth of its natural object. But that this was the mind of the holy Fathers, and especially of St. Gregory, is clear from the same place; for he says: While our Redeemer drew near to Jericho, the blind man returned to the light; because while the Divinity took upon itself the defect of our flesh, the human race received again the light it had lost; from the fact that God suffers human things, thence man is raised up toward divine things. From which it appears that he treats only of spiritual blindness as regards the knowledge of supernatural truths, which the human race lost when Adam sinned together with innocence, and which it recovered at the approach and shining of the Sun of justice, who enlightens every man coming into this world.

You will say 3. Men are very often pressed by so grave a temptation of the devil that they are drawn away from the study and contemplation of moral truths: therefore in order to overcome and master those temptations they need the help of grace. — I distinguish the consequent: There is needed the help of grace strengthening the will, that it may overcome those temptations, and that the mind be not called back and distracted from the study of those truths, I concede: strengthening and fortifying the intellect, so that applied to the study of those truths it obtain their knowledge, I deny. Here however there is no question of the difficulty which the human will can suffer toward the pursuit of truth, as it sometimes suffers toward another good work; but of the power which the intellect has for perceiving truths that lie within the breadth of its natural object; which certainly we say can be perceived without any benefit of grace.

You will say finally. If man could by the mere powers of nature attain knowledge of things to be done, it would follow that he would have something necessary for acting morally well, which should be credited to himself, and not to God: for such knowledge is necessary for acting well: but this openly conflicts with the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4, saying: For who distinguisheth thee? And what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it? Therefore, etc.

I deny the inference of the major: for man thence has no occasion for congratulating himself and glorying: First, because he cannot know with certainty whether he had a thought of that kind by the mere powers of nature, or by the sole benefit of divine grace: for it sometimes happens that God informs certain men of those things, as it were divinely and miraculously, which could be known by mere natural reason. Wherefore no one can boast rashly and proudly of any good thought whatever, as though he had not received it from God, since perhaps in fact he had it from the special grace and benefit of God. Secondly, even if he knew with certainty that he had had such a thought from his own powers and industry, he ought not on that account to glory on that score; because, as saint Cyprian rightly admonishes, book 3 Ad Quirinum, chapter 4: In nothing must we glory, when nothing is our own; all natural goods are from God; for from him we have received the powers of nature, and every faculty of acting, nor can we do anything without at least his general concurrence. To the passage of the Apostle I say that it ought properly to be understood of things pertaining to piety, and to the supernatural end of eternal salvation, in which sense St. Augustine expounds it in book De Praedestinatione sanctorum, chapters 4 and 5.