Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

NOTE 1. By the name of grace we here understand only actual and assisting grace, not indeed habitual and sanctifying grace; since it is certain that habitual grace is not necessary for knowing natural truths; for very many infidels and Gentile philosophers destitute of that grace, such as Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, acknowledged many truths, even those pertaining to God, such as his existence, veracity, and his other attributes, from creatures. Wherefore St. Augustine, when in book one of the Soliloquies, chapter 2, he had said, O God, who willed that none but the pure know thee, retracted this assertion in book 1 of the Retractations, with these words: For it can be answered, he says, that many who are not pure know many things. The difficulty therefore is raised only about actual, or operative grace, which makes man intrinsically capable of exercising certain acts which he could not elicit by the powers of nature alone.

NOTE 2. A truth is said to be natural on a threefold account: namely either on the part of the light and medium by which alone it is known: or only on the part of the object and thing which is known: or on the part of the thing and light together. On the part of the light alone: thus the existence of God and his divine attributes, although they are of the divine order, and consequently preternatural, are nevertheless known through natural light; for the Apostle says to the Romans 1: The invisible things of him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity. On the part of the object alone, which is indeed of itself of natural order and entity, but cannot be known through some natural and sensible medium, nor sufficiently deduced from sensible things. Such are the free cogitations of hearts, so long as they are not manifested outwardly by words, or gestures, or other signs. Thirdly finally, on the part of object and medium together; such are all those things which not only are of natural order and entity, but moreover present their appearance to the senses; and thus can be perceived by the intellect through mediating sensitive cognition; of which sort are all the elements, and likewise many bodies which present themselves before our eyes. The present question is raised about truth of this threefold kind, whether it can become known to us without the special benefit of actual grace.

NOTE 3. Every natural truth is divided into speculative or practical. Speculative is that in whose mere knowledge the intellect rests, such as that heaven is incorruptible, that earth is immovable, etc. Practical moreover is that which beyond intellectual knowledge also ordains and denotes something to be done or omitted respectively toward the attainment of an end. Further, in this present Question there will be talk only about speculative truth: in the following one the controversy will be raised about practical truth, namely whether for attaining its knowledge some special aid of grace is needed. Both truths, however, can be taken either distributively or collectively. Collectively, when the whole collection of all utterly natural truths is taken, that is when all truths are taken together: distributively however, when one or several of them are taken separately and without others. For just as someone having a single denarius can distribute it among all the poor distributively, because there is no one to whom he cannot give it; yet cannot give it to all at once collectively, so that each receive a whole denarius: so it can be asked whether we can for this mortal life know all natural truths without the benefit of grace distributively, such that of them none exists which naturally could not be known; or whether truly we can discover them all even collectively in this way. — Concerning this the opinion of the Ancients is chiefly threefold. The first is Henry's, which the Doctor relates and refutes in 1 dist. q. 4. n. 2, teaching that we can often attain certain knowledge of any natural truth without special illumination of grace. Which opinion Vazquez seems in part to have imitated, disp. 1 cap. 2, where he teaches that knowledge of any natural truth of one dwelling and adhering to right living cannot be had without the aid of grace through Christ; but that truths which do not pertain to virtue can indeed be had by the aid of the grace of God. The second opinion is that of those who teach that the intellect of fallen man can, with the sole general concurrence of God, discover every speculable natural truth, not only divisim but also coniunctim. Durandus seems to think thus in 2 dist. 25 q. 1. The third opinion is that of the Subtle Theologians, admitting that fallen man can know natural truths divisim, without special benefit or aid of grace, but not coniunctim.

First Conclusion. — MAN CAN EVEN IN THE STATE OF FALLEN NATURE, WITH THE SOLE GENERAL CONCURRENCE OF GOD AND WITHOUT SPECIAL AID AND ILLUMINATION OF GRACE, KNOW WITH CERTAINTY CERTAIN SPECULATIVE TRUTHS OF THE NATURAL ORDER. This is the more common and more certain opinion among theologians.

And it is proved by very many texts of Scripture, whereby it is established that men can have certain knowledge not only of created things but even of God as author and administrator of nature: thus Wisdom 1:1. Sanctified by investigation, and the invisible creature is found out by the thing that is made. Psalm 18: The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of his hands. Similarly St. Paul to the Romans 1 plainly teaches that many things about God can be known naturally, when he says: That which is known of God is manifest in them. For God hath manifested it unto them: for his invisible things from the creation of the world are seen, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also, and Divinity: so that they are inexcusable, namely the Gentile philosophers, of whom the discourse there is, because having known God they did not glorify him as God. — By which words the Apostle above all signifies: first indeed that there is something in God so conspicuous that it can be acknowledged by the mere natural light alone, which therefore he calls that which is known of God: otherwise indeed it is certain that in God nothing is so abstruse, and so impervious to human minds, that it cannot be apprehended through grace and special revelation; for thus the Trinity of persons and equality in unity of essence, which lies hidden naturally, becomes manifest and known through revelation and grace. He signifies moreover by these words, By the things that are made are clearly seen, that the Gentile philosophers by natural discourse from creatures, as from divine effects, attained some knowledge of God, and indeed so great that for this reason they were inexcusable, because they knew God, and did not glorify him as God. — Nor does it stand against this that the Apostle says there, For God hath manifested it unto them: for he means that he manifested it not by the aid of special revelation or grace, but through creatures made by himself, as the following words signify, by the things that are made are clearly seen. Here must be recalled what we said in the previous volume to demonstrate that the knowledge of God is innate in us by natural light.

This assertion is proved further by the authority of the Holy Fathers: Augustine, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 12, says of those concerning whom the Apostle speaks in Romans 1, Who hold the truth of God in injustice, that they arrived through visible creatures at the understanding of the invisible Creator. And shortly after he calls them knowers of the Creator through the creature. More authorities of the same Doctor we shall set forth below. — His most faithful disciple St. Prosper subscribes to him, book Against the Collator, chapter 22, where, assailing Cassian for affirming that our natural knowledge can be repaired unto salvation, he thus criticizes him: What does he define as apt for the renovation of our miserable old age? The nakedness of the science of the transgressor? As if that science, either remaining from the resources of nature, or acquired through the instruction of legal doctrine, could by its perception avail so that what we know should be done we also love to do. By which words he confesses that there survives in us a certain knowledge, and a sure apprehension of truth, from the remains of nature created by God.

The Subtle Doctor also proves this truth in 1 dist. 3 q. 4, against the Academics and Henry, who contended that no certain cognition could be obtained by us through the powers of nature: first indeed from Aristotle, 2 Metaph.: First principles are known to all, like the doorway in a house, because the doorway escapes no one, though the interior of the house be hidden, says the Doctor; whence he argues thus: that which belongs to all of a species follows the specific nature; therefore since each one has infallible certitude about first principles, and moreover the form of a perfect syllogism is naturally evident to anyone, as appears from its definition; and since knowledge of the conclusion depends only upon the evidence of the principles and upon the evidence of the syllogistic inference; the consequence is, that any conclusion whatsoever demonstrable from premises known per se can naturally be known to anyone. — Second, since Henry especially defends his opinion by the authority of St. Augustine, the Doctor proves that the same holy Doctor grants that we can naturally attain certain cognition through the experience of the senses: which he demonstrates first from lib. 15. De Trinitate, chapter 12, where he says: Far be it from us to doubt that things which we have learned through the senses of the body are true; for through them we learned heaven and earth and those things in them that are known to us, insofar as he who created us and them willed them to become known to us. From these the Doctor thus infers: «If therefore we do not doubt their truth, and are not deceived: then we are certain of things known through the way of sense; for certitude is had when doubt and deception are excluded». — Moreover, St. Augustine grants there certitude about our own acts: Whether anyone sleep, he says, or wake, he lives; for even to sleep and to see in dreams is the mark of one living. Nor does it avail to say, says the Doctor, that living is not a second act but the first; because Augustine adds there: If anyone say, I know that I live, he cannot be deceived, even while reflecting in whatever manner upon the first act of knowing. And there: If anyone say, I know that I live, he cannot be deceived.

It is evident therefore from St. Augustine that certain knowledge of natural things can be had, and that by the powers alone either of ingenerate light or of light acquired, whereby each one experiences while acting that he has an act, and while living that he has been endowed with life.

The Conclusion is proved further by reason: Man by his nature has principles sufficient for acquiring speculative knowledge of natural things: therefore for this the aid of grace is not needed. The inference is manifest; for grace is not judged necessary for any other reason to attain knowledge of things divinely credible than because for this the powers of nature fail. But the antecedent is proved; for it is established that man naturally perceives sensible objects through internal and external senses, from which natural truths are deduced; next, through the agent intellect he can fabricate intelligible species expressing such apprehension of the senses; and finally perceive that same species formed by the agent intellect, struck off as the image of things perceived through the senses, in the possible intellect, and thus have perfect formal knowledge of those things: man therefore has by his nature sufficient power to know any natural truth whatsoever; nor does he need the aid of grace for this. — Second, if grace were necessary for man to know natural truths, chiefly as physical principle, or as moral principle of such cognition: yet neither can rightly be asserted. Not the first indeed, because the intellect is a sufficient active principle for eliciting cognition, provided it be informed by an intelligible species; which (as we said just now) it can attain by the powers of nature.

Nor yet as a moral principle; for a principle of this kind can be judged necessary for forming cognition in two ways, namely either intrinsically, by infusing light or directing the phantasms, or extrinsically, namely by applying suitable objects or removing impediments: but in neither way does grace seem necessary for the knowledge of natural truths taken disjunctively, and in particular; for the internal illumination, which cannot come from objects and which therefore must be supernatural, does not pertain to the mode of knowing natural truths, which ought to be connatural to man; and the objects are sufficiently proposed to the senses by the force of the natural order, which God established among the causes of the universe, provided he himself does not deny them his general concurrence: nor is God's special providence needed for removing impediments, because the things that are met with in the investigation of any matter can easily be overcome by human industry and labor. Therefore by no reason does the assistance of grace seem necessary for attaining the knowledge of natural truths taken distributively. — It is confirmed: such an order of things could not have been instituted without some mark of imperfection and defect of the providence naturally due, that no man should naturally know any truth: therefore it must not be judged that it was so made; for God by sagacious providence and wisdom constituted and disposed all things most orderly. The antecedent is plain: for just as providence would be defective if it had instituted such an order that all should be born blind, or deaf, or tongueless, so too, and much more, if all were senseless and perpetually deprived of the use of reason; but supposing the use of reason, and objects occurring naturally, together with God's general concurrence, many truths cannot fail to be known, especially those which are so manifest that there is no one possessed of reason who does not immediately perceive them without any difficulty; such as that fire is hot, that man is risible, that the whole is greater than its part: therefore grace does not seem necessary for this.

You will object 1. Certain texts of Scripture, by which it seems proved that grace is necessary for uncovering truth; especially that of Gen. 6: All the thought of their heart was bent upon evil. Likewise that of 2 Cor. 3: Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God. Therefore St. Paul judges that we can form no certain thought without divine aid. — I deny the consequence., and to the first text I say: all thought bent upon evil, for the most part, I grant; always, I deny: for it is said there in the same place that all flesh had corrupted its way, and yet we read there in the same place: Noe found grace before the Lord. To the second I say, that from the text it sufficiently appears that St. the Apostle is speaking not of every thought and cognition of truth, but of holy cognition, that is, contributing unto true sanctity and justice, and availing unto salvation and unto exciting that confidence of which he had immediately spoken: Such confidence we have through Christ toward God: as St. Augustine also interprets, book De bono perseverantiae, chap. 13, where he says: As regards the rite of piety and the worship of things divine, we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves: such thoughts, we confess, cannot be had without the special benefit of grace. Or else I distinguish the antecedent: that we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, so that it may profit unto salvation and conduce to persuading faith, I grant; simply, and absolutely, I deny. For we may assert that this is the mind of the Apostle, as appears from the text; since he had congratulated the Corinthians that they were the Epistle of Christ written, not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God: he had also congratulated himself that this Epi- stle had been written by his own ministry. Lest therefore he might seem to have ascribed to himself too arrogantly the ministry of so great a thing, he refers the whole to the grace of his Lord, and pours it back into the Author of the gift. Whence he adds: But such confidence we have through Christ toward God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, who also has made us fit ministers of the New Testament. From which it appears that the mind of the Apostle is only that he profess himself not sufficient to think anything of himself that pertains to persuading faith.

You will object 2. The Council of Milevis, or Carthage, decreeing in Canon 1: Both are gifts of God, to know what we ought to do, and to love, that we may do it. Likewise that of Orange, Canon 9: It is a gift of God when we think aright. — I deny the consequence: for the Councils speak only of thoughts and truths pertaining to the attainment of eternal life, as may be gathered both from the fact that the same Councils openly profess to establish in their Canons the Catholic dogma against the error of the Pelagians and Semipelagians, and hence treat of the knowledge of truth pertaining to salvation: and from the fact that the Council of Orange explains the aforesaid limitation in Ca- non 7, saying: if anyone affirms that he is able to think or choose any good that pertains to the salvation of eternal life, without illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, he is led astray heretically.

You insist: The same Council, Can. 22, affirms that no one has of himself anything but falsehood and sin: therefore one cannot know truth of oneself and by one's own powers. — I distinguish the antecedent: if de suo is taken of ignorance and concupiscence, of which man is the author, by which man's faculties are ruined and rush into worse, I grant; if you interpret de suo, of the nature and faculties of man, by which he can detect truth and pursue good, I deny. For all things that are in man are of twofold genus; for some are good, and are granted by God, the creator and bestower of all good things: they belong to the Creator and Artificer. But vice, which darkens and weakens these natural things, so that it needs illumination and cure, was not contracted from the blame- less Artificer, but from original sin, which was committed by free choice. And book 1 De gratia Christi, chap. 20: The cupidity of men, which is a vice, has man for its author, or the deceiver of man, not the creator of man. — Then I say, the Council speaks only of supernatural thought, and contributing unto salvation; for it says: But whatever truth and justice man has is from that fountain which we ought to thirst for in this desert, that irrigated by certain drops from it we may not faint on the way. This salutary knowledge, moreover, we confess of itself cannot be had without the special assistance of divine grace.

You will urge: The same Councils constantly teach that man cannot have of himself any beginning of his justification: but if by the forces of nature he could attain truth and uncover error, he could in some measure prepare himself for conversion and justification; for by knowing the excellence of virtue and the foulness of vice, without difficulty he could pur- sue virtue and abhor vice: therefore, etc. — I deny the major, since natural things are not proportionate to grace and justification, which is a supernatural benefit, they cannot avail even to dispose for it, or obtain it, or merit it; but they avail only to impetrate, or merit certain natural goods proportioned and suitable to themselves.

You will object 3. Various sayings of St. Augustine, by which he seems to insinuate that we cannot know any truth with certainty, except in the eternal rules, which, since they exist in the uncreated light, transcend the grasp of the human mind. Thus lib. 9. De Trinitate, chap. 6: But we contemplate, he says, the inviolable truth, from which perfectly, as far as we can, we define not what the mind of each man is like, but what it ought to be like according to the sempiternal reasons. And there: By other rules altogether, remaining unchangeably above our mind, we are compelled both to approve with ourselves, and disprove, whenever we rightly approve or disap- prove anything. And there: Taking with simple understanding beyond the keenest edge of mind the art ineffably beautiful of such figures. And there chap. 7: In that eternal truth, therefore, from which all temporal things have been made, we behold the form according to which we are…, and thence we have within us the true knowledge of things conceived from it as a word. Likewise book 12, chaps. 2 and 3: But it belongs to a higher reason to judge about those corporeal things according to incorporeal and sempiternal reasons. Likewise in the same book, chap. 11: Nor do only the intelligible and incorporal reasons of sensible things placed in places remain without local spaces. Likewise book 14, chap. 15, speaking of the unjust man, who rightly praises and blames much in the morals of men, says: By what rules at last do they judge? Near the end he adds: Where then are they written, except in that book of that light which is called truth? Finally book 12 of the Confessions, chap. 25: If we both see the truth, neither you in me, nor I in you: but both in it, the unchangeable truth which is above the mind. Therefore St. Augu- stine judges that the knowledge of no truth can be had, without the special illustration of uncreated light, and consequently without the assistance of divine grace. — The Doctor denies the consequence, in dist. 3, quest. 1, n. 18, where he expounds the aforesaid authorities, and resolves that necessary truths are seen in the eternal rules in either of these four ways: First indeed, as in the proximate object, because the divine intellect gives intelligible being to creatures from eternity, in which necessary truths shine forth immutably; and thus every intellect which detects those truths can be said to see them in the eternal light, that is, in the secondary object of the divine intellect, which is the truth or light eternal. Second, as in the containing proximate object; because the divine intellect contains those truths, as it were a book. Third, as in something by whose power it moves the object; because as the divine intellect produces other things from itself in intelligible being, so it gives the reason directly, because it moves; and concerning this the Doctor brought forward certain subtle points. Fourth, as in the remote object known, because the divine Essence is the first principle of speculables and the last end of practicables; and thus cognition through principles drawn from it is purer and more eminent. — I should believe, therefore, with the Subtle Doctor, that St. Augustine by the eternal rules of necessary things understands ideas, which he says exist in the uncreated light, both because God contains in himself ideas of this kind; and because he produced them from eternity, producing, to be sure, creatures in intelligible being: and finally because God is the measure of all speculables and of the parts among speculables. Philosophers therefore know necessary truths in the eternal rules, that is, in his ideas, not which they see in the Word, but which they participate from the Word; for all the ideas which we have of nece- ssary truths are participations of the divine ideas. And this answer can be confirmed from the same St. Augustine, book De Trinitate, chap. 16, where he contends that philosophers do not know contingents in the eternal rules: for if by eternal rules he understood the special aid of grace, he would not deny that contingents can be known in the eternal rules, because not less aid is needed for knowing contingents than necessary ones: therefore from the fact that he denies contingents are known in the eternal rules, we must understand by them immutable and eternal ideas, in which contingents cannot be represented.

You insist: The same St. Augustine, book 83 Questions, q. 146, requires the greatest purity in those who desire to grasp truth: None but the pure…, he says, attain it: but that purity cannot be had without grace: therefore this is necessary for acquiring the knowledge of truth. — The Doctor distinguishes the major there, n. 22: St. Augustine requires physical, or Platonic, purity, which is purification and withdrawal from sensible things, both external and internal, that is, from phantasms; I grant: he requires moral purity, or purification and separation from vices, which can be obtained only through grace; I deny. For the same Augustine lauded above, book 15 De Trinit., cap. ⟦cap.?⟧ grants that the unjust man sees in the eternal rules.

You will object 4. God must be entreated to grant science and knowledge, whereby truth may be detected: therefore this knowledge cannot be acquired by the forces of nature. The antecedent is plain from that of St. James, chap. 1: If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God, who gives to all abundantly, and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him. But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. The consequence likewise is evident; for St. Augustine says, Epist. 95: The giving of thanks is the clearest testimony of grace. And Epistle 109 he says: The giving of thanks is the surest sign of a gratuitous benefit. — I answer, granting the antecedent, by denying the consequence: for we can pray God for general aid, and give thanks to him for obtaining it, when it has something of contingency and fallibility: for on account of such contingency it has the character of general ⟦aid⟧, but general because it is contingent, and on the side of event it has falli- bility: wherefore we pray God for rain, fair weather, the fruits of the earth, and when these are obtained, we give thanks to him, because although they pertain to general provi- dence, nevertheless they have contingency and fallibility on the side of event.

You will object 5. Man cannot attain the knowledge of any truth unless sensible objects are proposed to him so suitably as to lead him into true cognition, not into error: but that is not in man's power, to be stirred by objects in such a way, and disposed to cognition, since it depends upon the particular providence of God establishing the order of things thus: therefore it is a special benefit of God that man can know any truth. The major stands. The minor is proved: God could have disposed created things so that from their course and operation man, who sometimes attains truth, would always stumble into error: whence that things are in fact disposed so as to lead man at times into the knowledge of truth proceeds not from God's general providence, whereby he could dispose things otherwise, but pertains to his special providence and ordination, and consequently to a peculiar grace distinct from the benefit of creation: therefore man could, saving God's creation and general provi- dence, lack the knowledge of any truth whatsoever. — I deny the minor: for although God by absolute power could thus have instituted the universe that objects occurring here and there would lead man into error; yet that he disposed things otherwise is not properly a benefit of grace, of which here is the question, but the benefit of creation itself, though more favorable than the prior disposition (by which it could be instituted). Whence whatever follows in the ordinary way through the common flux of causes and the general concurrence of God from such ordination pertains to the same benefit of crea- tion: otherwise certainly, that man is sound in body, whole in limbs, and born with apt disposition of the senses, would have to be ascribed to peculiar grace, and not to the benefit of creation, because it might happen otherwise, if to be sure God had established another order in things, which nevertheless no one of sound mind would say.

You will object 6. With Henry: sensible objects are changed perpetually: therefore species drawn from them cannot suffice for certain cognition. Then, one cannot have a certain and infallible know- ledge of truth unless he has something by which he can discern the true from the probable: but that other thing cannot be anything other than the benefit of grace: therefore it is required for uncovering truth. The minor is proved: if anything else sufficed, especially a species received from objects: but it is insufficient for this, because sometimes it represents itself, sometimes indeed it represents itself as the object which it expresses: where it represents itself only, the cognition is true: where truly it represents itself as the object, it is false: therefore that species does not suffice, so that anyone could disce- rn whether his cognition is false, or probable, or true. Finally, the soul is of itself changeable and subject to error: therefore it cannot be freed from er- ror by something which is more changeable than itself: but created species are more changeable than the soul itself: therefore through them the soul cannot be freed from error. — The Doctor denies the consequence in 1. dist. 3, qu. 1, n. 13, and to the first indeed he answers that from a changeable thing an immutable cognition can be acquired, just as from a contingent thing a necessary one, because although the object were changeable, nevertheless it could cause a species whereby it represented itself under an immutable aspect; for mutability is not the reason for generating a species, but the very nature of the object, which in itself and its intrinsic predicates is not changeable, but always holds itself in the same way. He adds besides, that even if the species received from a changeable thing were changeable, it could nevertheless represent the thing under an immutable aspect: just as God, although he is immutable, is nevertheless represented by something mutable in himself, namely by an infused, or acquired species. To the second the Doctor says, the argument avails only against those denying intelligible species as distinct from phantasms, and affirming that only phantasms serve to determine the intellect; for those who admit intelligible species can deny that these sometimes represent themselves as themselves, at other times indeed as the object; for they always represent themselves as themselves, nor does anyone ever use them while asleep. To the third he answers: truly the soul is changeable from ignorance to knowledge, and from negation of intellection to intellection, I grant: that it is changeable from right cognition to erroneous cognition, especially about objects which are apt to cause evidence when duly applied, such as are, v. gr., first principles and conclusions deduced from them, I deny.

You will object 7. Very many natural truths are hitherto unknown to Phi- losophers, namely the cause of the ebb and flow of the sea, and many others: therefore man cannot know all of them distributively. Then, if each of such truths of the natural order, taken distributively, could be known without grace with only general concurrence, which God confers within the natural order, they could be known by any man whatsoever; of which thing nevertheless we experience the contrary. Finally, to have cognition of purely natural truths we pray God; whence Solomon in Wisdom 9. thus addresses God suppliantly: Give me wisdom, O Lord, that sitteth on thy throne, etc.: therefore for the cognition of such truths divine liberality is needed, and consequently the benefit of grace. — I deny the consequence. And to the first I say, those truths are natural by reason of the object only, not by reason of object and medium together: or if they are natural also by reason of the medium, their ignorance does not proceed from defect of power in the intellect, but either from defect of study, application, and experience, or from some other defect: whence it came about that most truths unknown in prio- r ages at length became known in later ones. To the second, I deny the sequela of the antecedent, whose reason is that the intellect of any man whatever can be considered in two ways: first indeed according to those things that belong to it per se, essentially, and from its specific nature: second, according to certain particular reasons and accidental conditions which it has from the diversity of temperament and quali- ties of body. In the prior way the intellect of man, insofar as it is of itself, has sufficient physical power to know any truth whatsoever purely natural by reason of object and medium together, but because the intellect in its operation depends on the body and its temperament, thence it happens that by reason of such complexion, that power and sufficientia physica cannot be reduced to act in some men, who are known in this latter way to be less apt for acquiring science. Our conclu- sion however is understood of natural power considered in the prior way, not the latter. To the third I distinguish the antecedent: We pray God for obtaining such cognition more easily, or that we may use it as expedites salvation, I grant: to have it simply, as though some grace were absolutely necessary unto this end, I deny. Nor otherwise must Solomon's deprecation be understood, if it be restricted to the mere truths of the natural order; for that can be extended also to the truths of supernatural order.

Second Conclusion. — MAN IN THE STATE OF FALLEN NATURE CANNOT APPREHEND ALL AND SINGULAR NATURAL TRUTHS BOTH DISJUNCTIVELY AND COLLECTIVELY WITHOUT THE SPECIAL ASSISTANCE OF DIVINE GRACE.

It is proved first: Although for perceiving all those natural truths collectively man has physical power, because those truths are contained within the line of sensible being, or of being cognoscible through species accepted from the senses, which is the object proportionate to our intellect, nevertheless he has no moral power for this without the special assistance of grace: therefore he has need of it. The consequence is plain. The antecedent likewise, since for acting there is required not only physical power but also mo- ral and ready power, or free from all impediments. But in this state of fallen nature the intellective faculty of man is entangled and bound by many impediments, lest it be able to break forth upon its whole object collectively taken without error and defect. First indeed the brevity of life recalls it from that, for longest and most protracted time is needed to know all truths, inasmuch as they are innumerable, and among them some exceedingly difficult of understanding, so that the greatest part of life would have to be spent in the detection of some one of those truths. Second, far imperfect is the ministry of the senses, through whose benefit truth ought to be detected; great indeed is their sluggishness and tardiness of operation; great equally the debility of the organs in which they reside, and their infirmity growing heavier day by day on account of the excessive consumption of animal spirits in actions of theirs oft repeated. Third, the dullness and corruptibility of the mortal body itself is an obstacle; whence Galenus Aphorism. 2: Art is long, life brief, occasion precipitous, experiment perilous, judgment difficult. To these add the assaults of the passions and the mockeries of the senses, and the narrow limits, since they busy themselves only about sensibles, from which other things are to be dug out by analogy and discourse, not without great and frequent danger of falsity. Add equally frequent care and occupation about temporal things and those necessary for food, clothing, dwelling, etc., all of which take away time from detecting truth elsewhere. — All these impediments luculently noted and described the Wise Man, chap. 9, saying: The body that is corrupted weighs down the soul, and the earthly habitation depresses the sense thinking many things. For the brevity of life and the infirmity of the body, and the dullness of the senses, are signified by the body that is corrupted; slowness and sloth of learning, and difficulty of judgment, by the soul weighed down: occupation in external things and those necessary for sustenance by the earthly habitation: finally the diverse motions of the passions disturbing the mind and dragging it this way and that, by the sense thinking many things.

The aforesaid proof is confirmed: What has not been done hitherto is rightly judged impossible by the forces of nature: but no man has been found hitherto who has acquired all speculative truths: nay rather as many as have existed among the ancient Philosophers erred in these; whence Aristotle, 1 Physics, noted many errors of the ancients concerning the principles of nature; and he himself asserted the eternity of the world, and was greatly doubtful about the immortality of the soul; and scarcely one of the ancient Wise Men was there who asserted and worshipped God as the unique ruler of the world, and accordingly no one has been found hitherto who attained all natural truths whether distributively or conjunctively.

You will say 1: Natural appetite ought not to be frustraneous, but attains in some individual at least that toward which it tends: but there has been implanted in us a natural appetite for knowing every truth whatsoever natural: therefore that appetite ought to be fulfilled in some individual at least of human nature through the attainment of cognition of all truths. — I distinguish the major: That appetite attains in some individual at least what it tends toward both intensively and extensively, I deny: intensively at least, I grant. To the minor I say the appetite for knowing truths is fulfilled not indeed extensively, namely as regards the cognition of each of them, because not all fall under sense nor arrive at the intellect; but it is fulfilled at least intensively, because clearly it acknowledges the general principles of all things, from which particular conclusions and truths can be deduced.

You will say 2: Our intellect is capable of all truths whatsoever natural: therefore it can know any whatsoever. — I distinguish the antece- dent: if they be duly applied to the senses, I grant: otherwise, I deny. We cannot, moreover, apply all such truths to our senses; partly on account of the subtlety of some; for there are things too subtle to be able to lie open to our senses, such as invisible things: partly on account of their immense number, for who can hold in number the stars of heaven, the sand of the sea, the leaves of trees, etc.?

You ask: whether at least such a cognition of all natural things can be had through extraordinary aid and benefit of God? — I affirm, partly because no reason of repugnance can be adduced: partly because from fact to power the consequence holds; Theologians confess, as do Christian Philosophers too, that God granted Adam, and Salomon also, knowledge of all such things; why then could he not bestow the same benefit on another?

You ask again: whether that benefit would be of the natural order or su- pernatural? — I answer it would be supernatural per accidens, and by reason of mode, because clearly it could not be acquired by the forces of nature; it would be natural by reason of object, because certainly cognition of such objects would be of the same species as our knowledge, just as the eyes which Christ the Lord gave to the man born blind were of the same species as the eyes which nature would have produced.