Scotus Academicus, Tomus octavus: De Divino Gratiae Beneficio, et initium De Virtutibus Theologicis

It is a trite and common place among Theologians that the state of man can be distinguished fivefold; concerning which it would be a matter of doubt whether grace were necessary to him for pursuing and attaining any given truth.

The first is called the state of pure nature, in which man is neither promoted through grace beyond the powers of the end of nature, nor recalled through any sin or vice from his fitting natural end, but is left under these powers and innate endowments; and he is subject to no other defects than those which arise naturally from the constitution of body and soul, such as mortality, infirmity, ignorance, and the rebellion of the lower part against the higher. — That state is called the state of integral nature which, besides all natural perfections, includes a special internal peace, namely between the higher part of man and the lower: that is, the perfect subjection of the sensitive appetite under the rational; so that the sensitive appetite neither forestalls the command of the will nor resists it, but at its nod compresses or exerts its own movements and passions; whence it comes about that the flesh does not concupiscence against the spirit, nor the spirit against the flesh. But when this happens otherwise, man suffers a certain sickness and diminution in his powers, in this way distracted and tending toward contrary things: therefore while both parts are in accord, he is said to possess a certain moral integrity, by that concord of his powers, namely with forces united and conspiring toward the same end: whence it comes about that the rational part is more governed toward acting well, and life is to be lived conformably to right reason. — The third state is that of innocent nature, or original justice, which besides man's natural perfection and integrity embraces many gratuitous benefits pertaining to body and soul: namely freedom from death and disease, the infusion of sanctifying grace and supernatural virtue, and likewise the conferral of all these upon posterity, to be transmitted by continual propagation, had he not sinned.

Although this most foul state must altogether be lamented and execrated, inasmuch as it is the overflow and lerna of all evils that are derived upon the whole human race: nevertheless it demonstrates an outstanding endowment of man, namely liberty, by which, arbiter of his own fortune, an honored psalmist and fashioner, he gives his hand to whatever part and lot he may prefer. - Finally the fifth state is that of nature restored and repaired through the grace of

Christ the Lord. Now the question here concerns only the state of fallen nature: whether namely grace be necessary to us for uncovering truth. Since however truth is threefold — one indeed natural and speculative; another moral and practical; a last supernatural and divine — it will have to be resolved in the three following Questions whether and in what manner grace is required for the knowledge of that truth.

NOTE 1. By the name of grace we here understand only actual and assisting grace, not indeed habitual and sanctifying grace; since it is certain that habitual grace is not necessary for knowing natural truths; for very many infidels and Gentile philosophers destitute of that grace, such as Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, acknowledged many truths, even those pertaining to God, such as his existence, veracity, and his other attributes, from creatures. Wherefore St. Augustine, when in book one of the Soliloquies, chapter 2, he had said, O God, who willed that none but the pure know thee, retracted this assertion in book 1 of the Retractations, with these words: For it can be answered, he says, that many who are not pure know many things. The difficulty therefore is raised only about actual, or operative grace, which makes man intrinsically capable of exercising certain acts which he could not elicit by the powers of nature alone.

NOTE 2. A truth is said to be natural on a threefold account: namely either on the part of the light and medium by which alone it is known: or only on the part of the object and thing which is known: or on the part of the thing and light together. On the part of the light alone: thus the existence of God and his divine attributes, although they are of the divine order, and consequently preternatural, are nevertheless known through natural light; for the Apostle says to the Romans 1: The invisible things of him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity. On the part of the object alone, which is indeed of itself of natural order and entity, but cannot be known through some natural and sensible medium, nor sufficiently deduced from sensible things. Such are the free cogitations of hearts, so long as they are not manifested outwardly by words, or gestures, or other signs. Thirdly finally, on the part of object and medium together; such are all those things which not only are of natural order and entity, but moreover present their appearance to the senses; and thus can be perceived by the intellect through mediating sensitive cognition; of which sort are all the elements, and likewise many bodies which present themselves before our eyes. The present question is raised about truth of this threefold kind, whether it can become known to us without the special benefit of actual grace.

NOTE 3. Every natural truth is divided into speculative or practical. Speculative is that in whose mere knowledge the intellect rests, such as that heaven is incorruptible, that earth is immovable, etc. Practical moreover is that which beyond intellectual knowledge also ordains and denotes something to be done or omitted respectively toward the attainment of an end. Further, in this present Question there will be talk only about speculative truth: in the following one the controversy will be raised about practical truth, namely whether for attaining its knowledge some special aid of grace is needed. Both truths, however, can be taken either distributively or collectively. Collectively, when the whole collection of all utterly natural truths is taken, that is when all truths are taken together: distributively however, when one or several of them are taken separately and without others. For just as someone having a single denarius can distribute it among all the poor distributively, because there is no one to whom he cannot give it; yet cannot give it to all at once collectively, so that each receive a whole denarius: so it can be asked whether we can for this mortal life know all natural truths without the benefit of grace distributively, such that of them none exists which naturally could not be known; or whether truly we can discover them all even collectively in this way. — Concerning this the opinion of the Ancients is chiefly threefold. The first is Henry's, which the Doctor relates and refutes in 1 dist. q. 4. n. 2, teaching that we can often attain certain knowledge of any natural truth without special illumination of grace. Which opinion Vazquez seems in part to have imitated, disp. 1 cap. 2, where he teaches that knowledge of any natural truth of one dwelling and adhering to right living cannot be had without the aid of grace through Christ; but that truths which do not pertain to virtue can indeed be had by the aid of the grace of God. The second opinion is that of those who teach that the intellect of fallen man can, with the sole general concurrence of God, discover every speculable natural truth, not only divisim but also coniunctim. Durandus seems to think thus in 2 dist. 25 q. 1. The third opinion is that of the Subtle Theologians, admitting that fallen man can know natural truths divisim, without special benefit or aid of grace, but not coniunctim.

First Conclusion. — MAN CAN EVEN IN THE STATE OF FALLEN NATURE, WITH THE SOLE GENERAL CONCURRENCE OF GOD AND WITHOUT SPECIAL AID AND ILLUMINATION OF GRACE, KNOW WITH CERTAINTY CERTAIN SPECULATIVE TRUTHS OF THE NATURAL ORDER. This is the more common and more certain opinion among theologians.

And it is proved by very many texts of Scripture, whereby it is established that men can have certain knowledge not only of created things but even of God as author and administrator of nature: thus Wisdom 1:1. Sanctified by investigation, and the invisible creature is found out by the thing that is made. Psalm 18: The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of his hands. Similarly St. Paul to the Romans 1 plainly teaches that many things about God can be known naturally, when he says: That which is known of God is manifest in them. For God hath manifested it unto them: for his invisible things from the creation of the world are seen, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also, and Divinity: so that they are inexcusable, namely the Gentile philosophers, of whom the discourse there is, because having known God they did not glorify him as God. — By which words the Apostle above all signifies: first indeed that there is something in God so conspicuous that it can be acknowledged by the mere natural light alone, which therefore he calls that which is known of God: otherwise indeed it is certain that in God nothing is so abstruse, and so impervious to human minds, that it cannot be apprehended through grace and special revelation; for thus the Trinity of persons and equality in unity of essence, which lies hidden naturally, becomes manifest and known through revelation and grace. He signifies moreover by these words, By the things that are made are clearly seen, that the Gentile philosophers by natural discourse from creatures, as from divine effects, attained some knowledge of God, and indeed so great that for this reason they were inexcusable, because they knew God, and did not glorify him as God. — Nor does it stand against this that the Apostle says there, For God hath manifested it unto them: for he means that he manifested it not by the aid of special revelation or grace, but through creatures made by himself, as the following words signify, by the things that are made are clearly seen. Here must be recalled what we said in the previous volume to demonstrate that the knowledge of God is innate in us by natural light.

This assertion is proved further by the authority of the Holy Fathers: Augustine, in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 12, says of those concerning whom the Apostle speaks in Romans 1, Who hold the truth of God in injustice, that they arrived through visible creatures at the understanding of the invisible Creator. And shortly after he calls them knowers of the Creator through the creature. More authorities of the same Doctor we shall set forth below. — His most faithful disciple St. Prosper subscribes to him, book Against the Collator, chapter 22, where, assailing Cassian for affirming that our natural knowledge can be repaired unto salvation, he thus criticizes him: What does he define as apt for the renovation of our miserable old age? The nakedness of the science of the transgressor? As if that science, either remaining from the resources of nature, or acquired through the instruction of legal doctrine, could by its perception avail so that what we know should be done we also love to do. By which words he confesses that there survives in us a certain knowledge, and a sure apprehension of truth, from the remains of nature created by God.

The Subtle Doctor also proves this truth in 1 dist. 3 q. 4, against the Academics and Henry, who contended that no certain cognition could be obtained by us through the powers of nature: first indeed from Aristotle, 2 Metaph.: First principles are known to all, like the doorway in a house, because the doorway escapes no one, though the interior of the house be hidden, says the Doctor; whence he argues thus: that which belongs to all of a species follows the specific nature; therefore since each one has infallible certitude about first principles, and moreover the form of a perfect syllogism is naturally evident to anyone, as appears from its definition; and since knowledge of the conclusion depends only upon the evidence of the principles and upon the evidence of the syllogistic inference; the consequence is, that any conclusion whatsoever demonstrable from premises known per se can naturally be known to anyone. — Second, since Henry especially defends his opinion by the authority of St. Augustine, the Doctor proves that the same holy Doctor grants that we can naturally attain certain cognition through the experience of the senses: which he demonstrates first from lib. 15. De Trinitate, chapter 12, where he says: Far be it from us to doubt that things which we have learned through the senses of the body are true; for through them we learned heaven and earth and those things in them that are known to us, insofar as he who created us and them willed them to become known to us. From these the Doctor thus infers: «If therefore we do not doubt their truth, and are not deceived: then we are certain of things known through the way of sense; for certitude is had when doubt and deception are excluded». — Moreover, St. Augustine grants there certitude about our own acts: Whether anyone sleep, he says, or wake, he lives; for even to sleep and to see in dreams is the mark of one living. Nor does it avail to say, says the Doctor, that living is not a second act but the first; because Augustine adds there: If anyone say, I know that I live, he cannot be deceived, even while reflecting in whatever manner upon the first act of knowing. And there: If anyone say, I know that I live, he cannot be deceived.

It is evident therefore from St. Augustine that certain knowledge of natural things can be had, and that by the powers alone either of ingenerate light or of light acquired, whereby each one experiences while acting that he has an act, and while living that he has been endowed with life.

The Conclusion is proved further by reason: Man by his nature has principles sufficient for acquiring speculative knowledge of natural things: therefore for this the aid of grace is not needed. The inference is manifest; for grace is not judged necessary for any other reason to attain knowledge of things divinely credible than because for this the powers of nature fail. But the antecedent is proved; for it is established that man naturally perceives sensible objects through internal and external senses, from which natural truths are deduced; next, through the agent intellect he can fabricate intelligible species expressing such apprehension of the senses; and finally perceive that same species formed by the agent intellect, struck off as the image of things perceived through the senses, in the possible intellect, and thus have perfect formal knowledge of those things: man therefore has by his nature sufficient power to know any natural truth whatsoever; nor does he need the aid of grace for this. — Second, if grace were necessary for man to know natural truths, chiefly as physical principle, or as moral principle of such cognition: yet neither can rightly be asserted. Not the first indeed, because the intellect is a sufficient active principle for eliciting cognition, provided it be informed by an intelligible species; which (as we said just now) it can attain by the powers of nature.

Nor yet as a moral principle; for a principle of this kind can be judged necessary for forming cognition in two ways, namely either intrinsically, by infusing light or directing the phantasms, or extrinsically, namely by applying suitable objects or removing impediments: but in neither way does grace seem necessary for the knowledge of natural truths taken disjunctively, and in particular; for the internal illumination, which cannot come from objects and which therefore must be supernatural, does not pertain to the mode of knowing natural truths, which ought to be connatural to man; and the objects are sufficiently proposed to the senses by the force of the natural order, which God established among the causes of the universe, provided he himself does not deny them his general concurrence: nor is God's special providence needed for removing impediments, because the things that are met with in the investigation of any matter can easily be overcome by human industry and labor. Therefore by no reason does the assistance of grace seem necessary for attaining the knowledge of natural truths taken distributively. — It is confirmed: such an order of things could not have been instituted without some mark of imperfection and defect of the providence naturally due, that no man should naturally know any truth: therefore it must not be judged that it was so made; for God by sagacious providence and wisdom constituted and disposed all things most orderly. The antecedent is plain: for just as providence would be defective if it had instituted such an order that all should be born blind, or deaf, or tongueless, so too, and much more, if all were senseless and perpetually deprived of the use of reason; but supposing the use of reason, and objects occurring naturally, together with God's general concurrence, many truths cannot fail to be known, especially those which are so manifest that there is no one possessed of reason who does not immediately perceive them without any difficulty; such as that fire is hot, that man is risible, that the whole is greater than its part: therefore grace does not seem necessary for this.

You will object 1. Certain texts of Scripture, by which it seems proved that grace is necessary for uncovering truth; especially that of Gen. 6: All the thought of their heart was bent upon evil. Likewise that of 2 Cor. 3: Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God. Therefore St. Paul judges that we can form no certain thought without divine aid. — I deny the consequence., and to the first text I say: all thought bent upon evil, for the most part, I grant; always, I deny: for it is said there in the same place that all flesh had corrupted its way, and yet we read there in the same place: Noe found grace before the Lord. To the second I say, that from the text it sufficiently appears that St. the Apostle is speaking not of every thought and cognition of truth, but of holy cognition, that is, contributing unto true sanctity and justice, and availing unto salvation and unto exciting that confidence of which he had immediately spoken: Such confidence we have through Christ toward God: as St. Augustine also interprets, book De bono perseverantiae, chap. 13, where he says: As regards the rite of piety and the worship of things divine, we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves: such thoughts, we confess, cannot be had without the special benefit of grace. Or else I distinguish the antecedent: that we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, so that it may profit unto salvation and conduce to persuading faith, I grant; simply, and absolutely, I deny. For we may assert that this is the mind of the Apostle, as appears from the text; since he had congratulated the Corinthians that they were the Epistle of Christ written, not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God: he had also congratulated himself that this Epi- stle had been written by his own ministry. Lest therefore he might seem to have ascribed to himself too arrogantly the ministry of so great a thing, he refers the whole to the grace of his Lord, and pours it back into the Author of the gift. Whence he adds: But such confidence we have through Christ toward God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, who also has made us fit ministers of the New Testament. From which it appears that the mind of the Apostle is only that he profess himself not sufficient to think anything of himself that pertains to persuading faith.

You will object 2. The Council of Milevis, or Carthage, decreeing in Canon 1: Both are gifts of God, to know what we ought to do, and to love, that we may do it. Likewise that of Orange, Canon 9: It is a gift of God when we think aright. — I deny the consequence: for the Councils speak only of thoughts and truths pertaining to the attainment of eternal life, as may be gathered both from the fact that the same Councils openly profess to establish in their Canons the Catholic dogma against the error of the Pelagians and Semipelagians, and hence treat of the knowledge of truth pertaining to salvation: and from the fact that the Council of Orange explains the aforesaid limitation in Ca- non 7, saying: if anyone affirms that he is able to think or choose any good that pertains to the salvation of eternal life, without illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, he is led astray heretically.

You insist: The same Council, Can. 22, affirms that no one has of himself anything but falsehood and sin: therefore one cannot know truth of oneself and by one's own powers. — I distinguish the antecedent: if de suo is taken of ignorance and concupiscence, of which man is the author, by which man's faculties are ruined and rush into worse, I grant; if you interpret de suo, of the nature and faculties of man, by which he can detect truth and pursue good, I deny. For all things that are in man are of twofold genus; for some are good, and are granted by God, the creator and bestower of all good things: they belong to the Creator and Artificer. But vice, which darkens and weakens these natural things, so that it needs illumination and cure, was not contracted from the blame- less Artificer, but from original sin, which was committed by free choice. And book 1 De gratia Christi, chap. 20: The cupidity of men, which is a vice, has man for its author, or the deceiver of man, not the creator of man. — Then I say, the Council speaks only of supernatural thought, and contributing unto salvation; for it says: But whatever truth and justice man has is from that fountain which we ought to thirst for in this desert, that irrigated by certain drops from it we may not faint on the way. This salutary knowledge, moreover, we confess of itself cannot be had without the special assistance of divine grace.

You will urge: The same Councils constantly teach that man cannot have of himself any beginning of his justification: but if by the forces of nature he could attain truth and uncover error, he could in some measure prepare himself for conversion and justification; for by knowing the excellence of virtue and the foulness of vice, without difficulty he could pur- sue virtue and abhor vice: therefore, etc. — I deny the major, since natural things are not proportionate to grace and justification, which is a supernatural benefit, they cannot avail even to dispose for it, or obtain it, or merit it; but they avail only to impetrate, or merit certain natural goods proportioned and suitable to themselves.

You will object 3. Various sayings of St. Augustine, by which he seems to insinuate that we cannot know any truth with certainty, except in the eternal rules, which, since they exist in the uncreated light, transcend the grasp of the human mind. Thus lib. 9. De Trinitate, chap. 6: But we contemplate, he says, the inviolable truth, from which perfectly, as far as we can, we define not what the mind of each man is like, but what it ought to be like according to the sempiternal reasons. And there: By other rules altogether, remaining unchangeably above our mind, we are compelled both to approve with ourselves, and disprove, whenever we rightly approve or disap- prove anything. And there: Taking with simple understanding beyond the keenest edge of mind the art ineffably beautiful of such figures. And there chap. 7: In that eternal truth, therefore, from which all temporal things have been made, we behold the form according to which we are…, and thence we have within us the true knowledge of things conceived from it as a word. Likewise book 12, chaps. 2 and 3: But it belongs to a higher reason to judge about those corporeal things according to incorporeal and sempiternal reasons. Likewise in the same book, chap. 11: Nor do only the intelligible and incorporal reasons of sensible things placed in places remain without local spaces. Likewise book 14, chap. 15, speaking of the unjust man, who rightly praises and blames much in the morals of men, says: By what rules at last do they judge? Near the end he adds: Where then are they written, except in that book of that light which is called truth? Finally book 12 of the Confessions, chap. 25: If we both see the truth, neither you in me, nor I in you: but both in it, the unchangeable truth which is above the mind. Therefore St. Augu- stine judges that the knowledge of no truth can be had, without the special illustration of uncreated light, and consequently without the assistance of divine grace. — The Doctor denies the consequence, in dist. 3, quest. 1, n. 18, where he expounds the aforesaid authorities, and resolves that necessary truths are seen in the eternal rules in either of these four ways: First indeed, as in the proximate object, because the divine intellect gives intelligible being to creatures from eternity, in which necessary truths shine forth immutably; and thus every intellect which detects those truths can be said to see them in the eternal light, that is, in the secondary object of the divine intellect, which is the truth or light eternal. Second, as in the containing proximate object; because the divine intellect contains those truths, as it were a book. Third, as in something by whose power it moves the object; because as the divine intellect produces other things from itself in intelligible being, so it gives the reason directly, because it moves; and concerning this the Doctor brought forward certain subtle points. Fourth, as in the remote object known, because the divine Essence is the first principle of speculables and the last end of practicables; and thus cognition through principles drawn from it is purer and more eminent. — I should believe, therefore, with the Subtle Doctor, that St. Augustine by the eternal rules of necessary things understands ideas, which he says exist in the uncreated light, both because God contains in himself ideas of this kind; and because he produced them from eternity, producing, to be sure, creatures in intelligible being: and finally because God is the measure of all speculables and of the parts among speculables. Philosophers therefore know necessary truths in the eternal rules, that is, in his ideas, not which they see in the Word, but which they participate from the Word; for all the ideas which we have of nece- ssary truths are participations of the divine ideas. And this answer can be confirmed from the same St. Augustine, book De Trinitate, chap. 16, where he contends that philosophers do not know contingents in the eternal rules: for if by eternal rules he understood the special aid of grace, he would not deny that contingents can be known in the eternal rules, because not less aid is needed for knowing contingents than necessary ones: therefore from the fact that he denies contingents are known in the eternal rules, we must understand by them immutable and eternal ideas, in which contingents cannot be represented.

You insist: The same St. Augustine, book 83 Questions, q. 146, requires the greatest purity in those who desire to grasp truth: None but the pure…, he says, attain it: but that purity cannot be had without grace: therefore this is necessary for acquiring the knowledge of truth. — The Doctor distinguishes the major there, n. 22: St. Augustine requires physical, or Platonic, purity, which is purification and withdrawal from sensible things, both external and internal, that is, from phantasms; I grant: he requires moral purity, or purification and separation from vices, which can be obtained only through grace; I deny. For the same Augustine lauded above, book 15 De Trinit., cap. ⟦cap.?⟧ grants that the unjust man sees in the eternal rules.

You will object 4. God must be entreated to grant science and knowledge, whereby truth may be detected: therefore this knowledge cannot be acquired by the forces of nature. The antecedent is plain from that of St. James, chap. 1: If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God, who gives to all abundantly, and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him. But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. The consequence likewise is evident; for St. Augustine says, Epist. 95: The giving of thanks is the clearest testimony of grace. And Epistle 109 he says: The giving of thanks is the surest sign of a gratuitous benefit. — I answer, granting the antecedent, by denying the consequence: for we can pray God for general aid, and give thanks to him for obtaining it, when it has something of contingency and fallibility: for on account of such contingency it has the character of general ⟦aid⟧, but general because it is contingent, and on the side of event it has falli- bility: wherefore we pray God for rain, fair weather, the fruits of the earth, and when these are obtained, we give thanks to him, because although they pertain to general provi- dence, nevertheless they have contingency and fallibility on the side of event.

You will object 5. Man cannot attain the knowledge of any truth unless sensible objects are proposed to him so suitably as to lead him into true cognition, not into error: but that is not in man's power, to be stirred by objects in such a way, and disposed to cognition, since it depends upon the particular providence of God establishing the order of things thus: therefore it is a special benefit of God that man can know any truth. The major stands. The minor is proved: God could have disposed created things so that from their course and operation man, who sometimes attains truth, would always stumble into error: whence that things are in fact disposed so as to lead man at times into the knowledge of truth proceeds not from God's general providence, whereby he could dispose things otherwise, but pertains to his special providence and ordination, and consequently to a peculiar grace distinct from the benefit of creation: therefore man could, saving God's creation and general provi- dence, lack the knowledge of any truth whatsoever. — I deny the minor: for although God by absolute power could thus have instituted the universe that objects occurring here and there would lead man into error; yet that he disposed things otherwise is not properly a benefit of grace, of which here is the question, but the benefit of creation itself, though more favorable than the prior disposition (by which it could be instituted). Whence whatever follows in the ordinary way through the common flux of causes and the general concurrence of God from such ordination pertains to the same benefit of crea- tion: otherwise certainly, that man is sound in body, whole in limbs, and born with apt disposition of the senses, would have to be ascribed to peculiar grace, and not to the benefit of creation, because it might happen otherwise, if to be sure God had established another order in things, which nevertheless no one of sound mind would say.

You will object 6. With Henry: sensible objects are changed perpetually: therefore species drawn from them cannot suffice for certain cognition. Then, one cannot have a certain and infallible know- ledge of truth unless he has something by which he can discern the true from the probable: but that other thing cannot be anything other than the benefit of grace: therefore it is required for uncovering truth. The minor is proved: if anything else sufficed, especially a species received from objects: but it is insufficient for this, because sometimes it represents itself, sometimes indeed it represents itself as the object which it expresses: where it represents itself only, the cognition is true: where truly it represents itself as the object, it is false: therefore that species does not suffice, so that anyone could disce- rn whether his cognition is false, or probable, or true. Finally, the soul is of itself changeable and subject to error: therefore it cannot be freed from er- ror by something which is more changeable than itself: but created species are more changeable than the soul itself: therefore through them the soul cannot be freed from error. — The Doctor denies the consequence in 1. dist. 3, qu. 1, n. 13, and to the first indeed he answers that from a changeable thing an immutable cognition can be acquired, just as from a contingent thing a necessary one, because although the object were changeable, nevertheless it could cause a species whereby it represented itself under an immutable aspect; for mutability is not the reason for generating a species, but the very nature of the object, which in itself and its intrinsic predicates is not changeable, but always holds itself in the same way. He adds besides, that even if the species received from a changeable thing were changeable, it could nevertheless represent the thing under an immutable aspect: just as God, although he is immutable, is nevertheless represented by something mutable in himself, namely by an infused, or acquired species. To the second the Doctor says, the argument avails only against those denying intelligible species as distinct from phantasms, and affirming that only phantasms serve to determine the intellect; for those who admit intelligible species can deny that these sometimes represent themselves as themselves, at other times indeed as the object; for they always represent themselves as themselves, nor does anyone ever use them while asleep. To the third he answers: truly the soul is changeable from ignorance to knowledge, and from negation of intellection to intellection, I grant: that it is changeable from right cognition to erroneous cognition, especially about objects which are apt to cause evidence when duly applied, such as are, v. gr., first principles and conclusions deduced from them, I deny.

You will object 7. Very many natural truths are hitherto unknown to Phi- losophers, namely the cause of the ebb and flow of the sea, and many others: therefore man cannot know all of them distributively. Then, if each of such truths of the natural order, taken distributively, could be known without grace with only general concurrence, which God confers within the natural order, they could be known by any man whatsoever; of which thing nevertheless we experience the contrary. Finally, to have cognition of purely natural truths we pray God; whence Solomon in Wisdom 9. thus addresses God suppliantly: Give me wisdom, O Lord, that sitteth on thy throne, etc.: therefore for the cognition of such truths divine liberality is needed, and consequently the benefit of grace. — I deny the consequence. And to the first I say, those truths are natural by reason of the object only, not by reason of object and medium together: or if they are natural also by reason of the medium, their ignorance does not proceed from defect of power in the intellect, but either from defect of study, application, and experience, or from some other defect: whence it came about that most truths unknown in prio- r ages at length became known in later ones. To the second, I deny the sequela of the antecedent, whose reason is that the intellect of any man whatever can be considered in two ways: first indeed according to those things that belong to it per se, essentially, and from its specific nature: second, according to certain particular reasons and accidental conditions which it has from the diversity of temperament and quali- ties of body. In the prior way the intellect of man, insofar as it is of itself, has sufficient physical power to know any truth whatsoever purely natural by reason of object and medium together, but because the intellect in its operation depends on the body and its temperament, thence it happens that by reason of such complexion, that power and sufficientia physica cannot be reduced to act in some men, who are known in this latter way to be less apt for acquiring science. Our conclu- sion however is understood of natural power considered in the prior way, not the latter. To the third I distinguish the antecedent: We pray God for obtaining such cognition more easily, or that we may use it as expedites salvation, I grant: to have it simply, as though some grace were absolutely necessary unto this end, I deny. Nor otherwise must Solomon's deprecation be understood, if it be restricted to the mere truths of the natural order; for that can be extended also to the truths of supernatural order.

Second Conclusion. — MAN IN THE STATE OF FALLEN NATURE CANNOT APPREHEND ALL AND SINGULAR NATURAL TRUTHS BOTH DISJUNCTIVELY AND COLLECTIVELY WITHOUT THE SPECIAL ASSISTANCE OF DIVINE GRACE.

It is proved first: Although for perceiving all those natural truths collectively man has physical power, because those truths are contained within the line of sensible being, or of being cognoscible through species accepted from the senses, which is the object proportionate to our intellect, nevertheless he has no moral power for this without the special assistance of grace: therefore he has need of it. The consequence is plain. The antecedent likewise, since for acting there is required not only physical power but also mo- ral and ready power, or free from all impediments. But in this state of fallen nature the intellective faculty of man is entangled and bound by many impediments, lest it be able to break forth upon its whole object collectively taken without error and defect. First indeed the brevity of life recalls it from that, for longest and most protracted time is needed to know all truths, inasmuch as they are innumerable, and among them some exceedingly difficult of understanding, so that the greatest part of life would have to be spent in the detection of some one of those truths. Second, far imperfect is the ministry of the senses, through whose benefit truth ought to be detected; great indeed is their sluggishness and tardiness of operation; great equally the debility of the organs in which they reside, and their infirmity growing heavier day by day on account of the excessive consumption of animal spirits in actions of theirs oft repeated. Third, the dullness and corruptibility of the mortal body itself is an obstacle; whence Galenus Aphorism. 2: Art is long, life brief, occasion precipitous, experiment perilous, judgment difficult. To these add the assaults of the passions and the mockeries of the senses, and the narrow limits, since they busy themselves only about sensibles, from which other things are to be dug out by analogy and discourse, not without great and frequent danger of falsity. Add equally frequent care and occupation about temporal things and those necessary for food, clothing, dwelling, etc., all of which take away time from detecting truth elsewhere. — All these impediments luculently noted and described the Wise Man, chap. 9, saying: The body that is corrupted weighs down the soul, and the earthly habitation depresses the sense thinking many things. For the brevity of life and the infirmity of the body, and the dullness of the senses, are signified by the body that is corrupted; slowness and sloth of learning, and difficulty of judgment, by the soul weighed down: occupation in external things and those necessary for sustenance by the earthly habitation: finally the diverse motions of the passions disturbing the mind and dragging it this way and that, by the sense thinking many things.

The aforesaid proof is confirmed: What has not been done hitherto is rightly judged impossible by the forces of nature: but no man has been found hitherto who has acquired all speculative truths: nay rather as many as have existed among the ancient Philosophers erred in these; whence Aristotle, 1 Physics, noted many errors of the ancients concerning the principles of nature; and he himself asserted the eternity of the world, and was greatly doubtful about the immortality of the soul; and scarcely one of the ancient Wise Men was there who asserted and worshipped God as the unique ruler of the world, and accordingly no one has been found hitherto who attained all natural truths whether distributively or conjunctively.

You will say 1: Natural appetite ought not to be frustraneous, but attains in some individual at least that toward which it tends: but there has been implanted in us a natural appetite for knowing every truth whatsoever natural: therefore that appetite ought to be fulfilled in some individual at least of human nature through the attainment of cognition of all truths. — I distinguish the major: That appetite attains in some individual at least what it tends toward both intensively and extensively, I deny: intensively at least, I grant. To the minor I say the appetite for knowing truths is fulfilled not indeed extensively, namely as regards the cognition of each of them, because not all fall under sense nor arrive at the intellect; but it is fulfilled at least intensively, because clearly it acknowledges the general principles of all things, from which particular conclusions and truths can be deduced.

You will say 2: Our intellect is capable of all truths whatsoever natural: therefore it can know any whatsoever. — I distinguish the antece- dent: if they be duly applied to the senses, I grant: otherwise, I deny. We cannot, moreover, apply all such truths to our senses; partly on account of the subtlety of some; for there are things too subtle to be able to lie open to our senses, such as invisible things: partly on account of their immense number, for who can hold in number the stars of heaven, the sand of the sea, the leaves of trees, etc.?

You ask: whether at least such a cognition of all natural things can be had through extraordinary aid and benefit of God? — I affirm, partly because no reason of repugnance can be adduced: partly because from fact to power the consequence holds; Theologians confess, as do Christian Philosophers too, that God granted Adam, and Salomon also, knowledge of all such things; why then could he not bestow the same benefit on another?

You ask again: whether that benefit would be of the natural order or su- pernatural? — I answer it would be supernatural per accidens, and by reason of mode, because clearly it could not be acquired by the forces of nature; it would be natural by reason of object, because certainly cognition of such objects would be of the same species as our knowledge, just as the eyes which Christ the Lord gave to the man born blind were of the same species as the eyes which nature would have produced.

Note 1. Practical truths differ in two ways: for some are about the works of art, and are called mechanical, of which the account is the same as of speculative truths: others are called moral, which look to the morals of men being rightly and justly instituted. Again, moral truths are regarded either as universal, such as are the general principles of morals, for instance, that you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to another: God is to be worshipped: parents are to be honored, etc.; or particular, as that here and now the parent is to be honored, alms are to be given to this or that poor man. Here, however, the question is not about universal truths, because knowledge of them is the same as cognition of speculative truths; but the whole difficulty turns chiefly upon particular truths, insofar namely as they are regarded with all the circumstances requisite for acting well morally.

Note 2. Practical truth can be known naturally in two ways: namely, either through the light ingenerated in individual men, whereby each one, nature leading and teaching, and without any ratiocination or light mended from elsewhere, knows that this and that is good or evil, to be pursued or fled; or through the light compared and acquired by the benefit of ratiocination or study, whereby each one can detect what agrees or disagrees with right reason, not only in general, but even in the particular. Here, however, there is no question of ingenerated knowledge; for it is certain that it follows the lot of nature, so that where the intellect is more vigorous, the ingenerated light also shines more excellently, whereby it appears more clearly what is to be pursued and what to be shunned according to the internal dictate of conscience: consequently there remains only this difficulty to solve, whether each one through the compared natural light can detect practical truths in particular without any assistance of actual grace.

Note 3. Some practical truths are of such perfection and sublimity that they cannot be acknowledged except by God revealing, such are all those which inform and illustrate Christian and Evangelical man; and they are called Evangelical truths and virtues, as denial of self, voluntary poverty. Others indeed are of lower grade and order, which regard man standing within the sole line of nature and reason, and which, as we said, can become known through the ingenerated or compared light. Here the difficulty is not about truths of the first order, but only about the practical truths of the latter order, concerning which it is asked whether they can be detected without the special benefit of grace exciting and assisting.

First Conclusion. — MAN IN THE STATE OF FALLEN NATURE CAN KNOW CERTAIN MORAL TRUTHS WITHOUT THE SPECIAL ASSISTANCE OF GRACE.

It is proved first from the Apostle to the Romans 1, saying that the Gentile Philo- sophers were inexcusable in their idolatry and depravation of morals, because when they had known God, they glorified him not as God: he judges therefore that the Philosophers knew by natural light that God ought to be glori- fied; otherwise they would not have sinned by not rendering to him glory and due honor; for as every sin is voluntary, so it presupposes judgment and knowledge of the thing to be done. Moreover the same Apostle, chap. 2, says: The Gentiles, who have not the law, do naturally those things that are of the law; such having not the law are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them: that is, they show themselves to know by the forces of nature and through the ingene- rated light what is to be done and what to be shunned, the natural light dictating: therefore as the natural light of the speculative intellect still flourishes even in the state of fallen nature and suffices for detecting speculative truths, so also flourishes and still subsists the natural light of synderesis, or practical intellect, for knowing truths of morals. Nor does it matter that St. Augustine, chap. 27 of book De spiritu et littera, refers this passage to Gentiles pertaining to the grace of the Mediator; for he does not there condemn the opinion of those who refer it to ethnic infidels.

The same truth the Holy Fathers prove, for St. Chrysostomus, Hom. 50 on Genesis says: In our nature is implanted knowledge of good and evil, let no one therefore make pretext that ignorant of virtue he neglects it, etc. And Homily 51: A sufficient teacher, he says, we have, conscience, and it cannot be that anyone be deprived of that aid; for together with the formation of man is implanted knowledge of things to be done and not to be done. To them accords St. Augustine, book 2 of the Confessions, chap. 4: Thy law, he says, is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself does not erase: For what thief calmly endures a thief? Which sentiment S. Prosper explains in marvelous fashion, in his poem De providentia Dei, about its middle, thus singing:

Go yourselves into the recesses of your mind, and within Behold the engraved marks, the written volumes of the heart, And acknowledge the law born with you along with you: For who shall there now be, not the flock of the field, nor the beast of the deep, Who should foolishly delight so in open vices, Or wish himself to suffer what he does? Deceptive falsehood, Rapacious of the future, furious and atrocious, bloody homicide He condemns, and against the adulterer draws the swords of adultery.

This assertion is further proved by reason: First indeed, moral and practical truth is the object proportioned to the light of natural human intellect: therefore it can naturally be detected by it. The inference is evident: for every natural faculty can perceive by its own powers an object connatural and proportioned to itself; nor does the eye need a special grace, that it may apprehend a colored object. The antecedent also is established; for natural moral truth lies within the line of natural intellect, and hence is an object proportioned to it. — Secondly, man can by his ingrafted light know universal principles which pertain to morals being rightly and justly formed, as was said shortly before, both from Scripture and from the holy Fathers: therefore by these same powers, without the special assistance of grace, he can know particular conclusions deduced from those principles: for whoever, e.g., knows in general that alms ought to be given to the needy, whenever an occasion of bestowing alms offers itself in the particular case, will easily judge by nature's own prompting that alms ought to be given to such a poor man. — Finally, if man could not know by nature's powers any moral truths in particular, it would follow that he could not sin against those same truths without grace: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The inference of the major is evident: for it would not be in his power to have such knowledge, whence ignorance of truths of this kind would be altogether invincible, and accordingly whatever he did against them would not be imputed to him as guilt.

You will say 1: From the knowledge of moral truths is acquired the habit of prudence, which embraces in its bosom all the virtues: but all the virtues cannot be acquired without the special benefit of grace: therefore neither the knowledge of their truths. — I distinguish the major: there is acquired an imperfect habit of prudence, and only as regards some very slight degrees, I concede: there is acquired the perfect habit of prudence, whereby one is said to be truly prudent, and has a permanent facility of judging prudently on any given occasion, even while the gravest difficulties arise, about what must be done ⟦protereudi⟧, I deny. And likewise, with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence. For prudence, which is said to embrace all virtues in its bosom, is not only that imperfect prudence by which one exercises some act of natural prudence, or judges rightly once and again about doing or not doing a thing; but it is a permanent disposition, and a sound judgment whereby for the most part one judges well about things to be done even in arduous matters: but this cannot be acquired without the assistance of grace: whereas the former can be obtained and exercised by the mere powers of nature.

You will say 2. To approve false things as true is a wound contracted through original sin, as saint Augustine teaches in many places, especially concerning those things which pertain to practical truths; therefore to uncover those truths is a benefit of grace. — I distinguish the antecedent: To approve them with an efficacious approbation, which moves and draws the affection, is a wound of original sin, I concede: with an inefficacious approbation, I deny. Likewise I distinguish the consequence: Not to approve all false things as true is a benefit of grace, I concede: only some, I deny. We confess therefore that human reason very often grows blind, and wanders from the truth in uncovering very many moral truths; for thus the Philosophers among the Gentiles did not attain certain knowledge of many practical truths: for as we are affected, so we form our judgment about things: yet it very often happens that men are ill affected; and consequently it is certain that they mostly do not apprehend moral truth with certainty.

You will insist. From the holy Fathers man is said to be through original sin not only wounded, but even blinded: therefore in the state of fallen nature he can attain knowledge of no truth, especially practical and moral truth, without the illumination and benefit of divine grace. The antecedent is evident, especially from St. Gregory the Great, Homily 11 on the Gospels, where speaking of the blind man whom Christ illumined in Luke 18, he has this: Who that blind man was according to history we do not know; yet we know what he signifies by mystery: for the blind man is the human race, which expelled from the joys of Paradise by its first parent, ignorant of the clarity of the supernal light, suffers the darkness of its damnation; yet it is illumined by the presence of its Redeemer, that it may already see through desire the joys of the inner light, and set the steps of good work in the way of life. — I distinguish the antecedent: Man through original sin is blinded as regards the knowledge of supernatural truths, which he lost through the loss of faith and infused science, I concede: as regards the knowledge of natural truths, both speculative and practical, I deny. For as the light of reason is not extinguished through original sin, so neither is that innate power and capacity of the intellect lost for perceiving any truths whatsoever that lie within the breadth of its natural object. But that this was the mind of the holy Fathers, and especially of St. Gregory, is clear from the same place; for he says: While our Redeemer drew near to Jericho, the blind man returned to the light; because while the Divinity took upon itself the defect of our flesh, the human race received again the light it had lost; from the fact that God suffers human things, thence man is raised up toward divine things. From which it appears that he treats only of spiritual blindness as regards the knowledge of supernatural truths, which the human race lost when Adam sinned together with innocence, and which it recovered at the approach and shining of the Sun of justice, who enlightens every man coming into this world.

You will say 3. Men are very often pressed by so grave a temptation of the devil that they are drawn away from the study and contemplation of moral truths: therefore in order to overcome and master those temptations they need the help of grace. — I distinguish the consequent: There is needed the help of grace strengthening the will, that it may overcome those temptations, and that the mind be not called back and distracted from the study of those truths, I concede: strengthening and fortifying the intellect, so that applied to the study of those truths it obtain their knowledge, I deny. Here however there is no question of the difficulty which the human will can suffer toward the pursuit of truth, as it sometimes suffers toward another good work; but of the power which the intellect has for perceiving truths that lie within the breadth of its natural object; which certainly we say can be perceived without any benefit of grace.

You will say finally. If man could by the mere powers of nature attain knowledge of things to be done, it would follow that he would have something necessary for acting morally well, which should be credited to himself, and not to God: for such knowledge is necessary for acting well: but this openly conflicts with the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4, saying: For who distinguisheth thee? And what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it? Therefore, etc.

I deny the inference of the major: for man thence has no occasion for congratulating himself and glorying: First, because he cannot know with certainty whether he had a thought of that kind by the mere powers of nature, or by the sole benefit of divine grace: for it sometimes happens that God informs certain men of those things, as it were divinely and miraculously, which could be known by mere natural reason. Wherefore no one can boast rashly and proudly of any good thought whatever, as though he had not received it from God, since perhaps in fact he had it from the special grace and benefit of God. Secondly, even if he knew with certainty that he had had such a thought from his own powers and industry, he ought not on that account to glory on that score; because, as saint Cyprian rightly admonishes, book 3 Ad Quirinum, chapter 4: In nothing must we glory, when nothing is our own; all natural goods are from God; for from him we have received the powers of nature, and every faculty of acting, nor can we do anything without at least his general concurrence. To the passage of the Apostle I say that it ought properly to be understood of things pertaining to piety, and to the supernatural end of eternal salvation, in which sense St. Augustine expounds it in book De Praedestinatione sanctorum, chapters 4 and 5.

WHETHER AND WHAT GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR KNOWING SUPERNATURAL TRUTHS, OR FOR ASSENTING TO THE MYSTERIES OF FAITH.

Note 1. That some truth can be called supernatural on a threefold account; namely, on the part of the object, on the part of the reason or motive for assenting, or on the part of both together. A truth is said to be supernatural on the part of the object only, when of itself it indeed transcends the natural capacity of the intellect, nor could it be perceived unless it had been divinely revealed; yet it is attained by a merely natural reason and motive, as happens in heretics, whenever by human faith, or by their own will, they give assent to some supernatural truth, for instance the mystery of the Trinity and of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ; for although those truths be supernatural of themselves, nevertheless the motive or reason by which the heretic assents to them is purely natural: he does not give them assent on account of the motive of divine revelation; otherwise he would believe the other revealed mysteries by equal right: but he is only moved to believe those mysteries on account of human reason, which is subject to error. Secondly, a truth is said to be supernatural on the part of the motive alone, when namely the intellect perceives it, and gives assent to it through divine revelation: e.g. while one believes that Isaac begot Jacob — this being purely natural on the part of the object — yet it becomes supernatural by reason of the motive, when one believes it because holy Scripture reports it with God revealing it. Thirdly and finally, a truth is said to be supernatural on the part both of the object and of the motive, when namely the object known, and the motive by which it is known, are supernatural, as while we believe that God is threefold because Christ revealed this.

Note 2. That some supernatural truth requires two things for its knowledge; one indeed on the part of the object, namely that it be proposed to the intellect, and set before it to be perceived; another on the part of the intellect, namely that it can believe the object proposed to it, and give assent to it. Concerning both, however, a difficulty is raised; whether namely supernatural grace is required, both that the object be proposed to the intellect, and that the intellect give assent to it. Pelagius admitted the first, conceding that for having faith concerning the mysteries it is required that they be proposed through the preaching of the Gospel; but he denied the second, namely that interior grace is necessary for believing the revealed truth, or at least he wished it to be desired only for believing more easily, as was said in the first volume, in reporting the errors of Pelagius.

Note 3. Concerning the present difficulty the Semipelagians differed from the Pelagians chiefly in this, that some among them would admit indeed that grace is necessary for attaining perfect faith and exercising it; yet they wished there to be in us certain beginnings and seeds of faith, whereby we could merit that perfect faith; of which St. Prosper in his Epistle to St. Augustine has this: Certain ones however of these depart so little from the paths of the Pelagians that, when they are compelled to confess that grace of Christ which prevents all human merits, lest if it is rendered to merits it should be vainly named grace, they take refuge in the condition of the proper nature of each man, in which, since we merited nothing previously, because we did not even exist, grace establishes free will and rationality so that through discerning good and evil, and toward knowledge of God, and obedience to his commandments, he could direct his will, and arrive at that grace whereby we are reborn in Christ: seeking, asking, knocking by natural faculty of course, so that he may receive, find, enter because he used well the good of nature, and by the help of initial grace merited to arrive at that saving grace. But the Pelagians wished free will to suffice of itself for assenting to revealed truths, nor was any grace needed for that. Against whom let there stand

One Conclusion. — MAN CANNOT KNOW ANY SUPERNATURAL TRUTH WITH CERTAINTY WITHOUT SPECIAL GRACE, WHICH ILLUMINES THE INTELLECT AND MOVES THE AFFECTION, NOR THEREFORE WITHOUT SUCH GRACE CAN HE BELIEVE AS ONE OUGHT FOR SALVATION.

It is proved first from holy Scripture. For John 6, Christ the Lord testifies: No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him. For to come to Christ is nothing else than to believe in Christ, as the Savior himself, to be adored, indicates in these following words: Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to me.

And shortly after: But there are some of you that believe not... therefore I say unto you, that no man can come to me, etc. Whence saint Augustine in book De Praedest. Sanctorum, chapter 8: What is it, he says, to come to me, but to believe in me? And shortly after: Therefore to be drawn by the Father to Christ... is nothing else than to receive a gift from the Father, whereby one believes in Christ. Furthermore John 12: Therefore they could not believe, where again he says Isaiah: Blind the heart of this people, and make his ears heavy, etc. For since blinding comes about through the withdrawal of divine light, and they cannot believe who lack that light, it openly follows that no one can believe without the special aid of divine grace.

The holy Apostle inculcates the same truth in many places, especially 1 Corinthians chapter 1: What hast thou that thou hast not received? With which testimony St. Augustine in the place cited above, chapter 3, confesses he was altogether convinced that faith is a gift of God, whereas before he thought it was in us from ourselves, and that we obtain through it the gifts of God, whereby we live temperately, piously, and justly in this age. Likewise chapter 1: I have obtained mercy that I might be faithful: whence saint Augustine rightly observes in book De Gratia et libero arbitrio chapter 7: For he did not say, I have obtained mercy because I was faithful, but that I might be faithful; thereby showing that that very faith cannot be possessed unless God have mercy, and is a gift of God. Likewise 2 Corinthians chapter 3: Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God: whence St. Augustine in book De Praedest. Sanctorum chapter 2 draws this truth: To believe, he says, is nothing else than to think with assent: and everyone who believes thinks, and by believing thinks, and by thinking believes. Likewise Ephesians chapter 2: By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God. On which passage Augustine uses book De Gratia et libero arbitrio chapter 7 and De Praedest. Sanctorum chapter 7: There is also, he says, what I said, through faith not of yourselves, but it is the gift of God. Philippians 1: For unto you it is given, not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him. Whence Augustine in book De Gratia et Libero arbitrio, chapter 14: Both things therefore belong to the grace of God, the faith of believers and the endurance of sufferers: because he said both were given.

It is proved secondly, from the Council of Carthage, Canon 4, where it is stated that it is a gift of God both to know what we ought to do, and to love that we do it. By the Canon of Orange 7, defining as heretics of such spirit those who think that without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit men can by the powers of nature think anything that pertains to salvation; and Can. 9: It is a divine gift, when we think rightly, and hold our feet back from falsehood and injustice; by the Tridentine, Session 6, Canon 3, pronouncing anathema against those asserting that without the preventing inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and his aid, man can believe, etc.

It is proved thirdly from the holy Fathers. From St. Clement, book 6 of the Stromata, pages 501 and 502: Moreover, whoever among the Greeks glory that truth has been comprehended by them, let them tell us from whom they boast they learned it. If indeed they say not from God, they confess they learned it from men. But men are not worthy of belief when they speak about God, insofar as they are men; for neither can he who is a man speak truly worthily of God, weak and subject to death, whose destruction is the work of him who made him. Then, he who cannot speak truly about himself, ought he not much less to be believed even concerning God? For as far as man is distant from the power of God, so weak also is his reason, even if it speaks not God himself, but about God and the divine Word. Since even those who claim God as their Master scarcely attain knowledge of God, grace bringing them aid toward however small a cognition, as they accustom themselves to contemplate the Holy Spirit by the Holy Spirit: because the Spirit searcheth the deep things of God; but the animal man perceiveth not those things that are of the Spirit. Therefore the only doctrine handed down from God is that which is with us, upon which depend all fountains of wisdom, whatsoever are borne toward truth as toward their mark. In which words St. Clement beats down all certain and salutary cognition of God and of divine things into the illumination of grace and the teaching of the Holy Spirit.

It is proved from the holy Fathers cited by saint Augustine in book De Bono perseverantiae, chapters 17 and 19. By Cyprian in book 3 ad Quirinum chapter 1, writing, in nothing must we glory, when nothing is our own. By Ambrose in book De Fuga saeculi, chapter 1: It is not in our power our heart, and our thoughts, etc.

It is proved also by reasons, especially those which St. Augustine uses, the first of which is drawn from prayers and thanksgivings: for no one prays unless he is about to ask of him whom he prays that which is undeserved and beyond his capacity: yet the faithful pray the Lord for the unfaithful, that he convert them from unfaithfulness to faith: therefore this faith is an undeserved gift, and from grace. Likewise thanks are not given to God except for some gift, and grace properly so called: but they are given for the conversion of unbelievers; thus St. Augustine Epistle 17: Vainly, he says, and perfunctorily rather than shamefully do we pour forth prayers to God for these men, that they may consent to believe the doctrine to which they are opposed, if it does not pertain to his grace to convert to faith his wills contrary to that faith. Vainly also, and perfunctorily rather than shamefully, do we render great thanksgivings with exultation to God when certain of them believe, if he himself does not work this in them. Let us not deceive men, when we cannot deceive God.

We plainly do not pray to God, but feign that we pray, if we do not believe him to make in us what we pray for; we plainly do not give thanks to God, but feign that we give thanks, if we think that he himself does not do that for which we give him thanks.

The second reason: That which befits certain ones out of the mercy of God, and befits others not out of the just judgment of God, is grace, and a gift properly so called: yet faith befits certain men out of the mercy of God, and befits others not out of the just judgment: therefore, etc. The argument is that of saint Augustine in book De Praedest. chapter 6: Many hear the word of truth, but some believe, others contradict. Who is ignorant of these things? who denies it? But since for some the will is prepared by the Lord, for others the will is not prepared by the Lord, it must certainly be discerned what comes of his mercy, what of judgment. And chapter 8: When the Gospel is preached, some believe, some believe not; but those who believe the preacher sounding outwardly, hear from the Father and learn: but those who believe not, hear outwardly, inwardly hear not, neither learn — that is, to these it is given that they believe, to those it is not given, because he says: no man cometh to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him. And afterward: Therefore faith, both begun and perfected, is a gift of God; and let no one doubt at all that this gift is not given to certain ones, who is unwilling to contend against the most manifest sacred Letters. But why it is not given to all, he ought faithfully not to know, who believes that all deeds done by one are unto most just condemnation: so that there would be no just reproach of God even if none were delivered thence. Whence it is established great that grace, because very many are delivered, and what was owed to itself they acknowledge in those who are not delivered, so that whoever glories, may glory not in his own merits, which appear equal in the damned, but in the Lord.

The third reason: Either faith is grace, or no grace properly so called is given: but the consequent is false: therefore the antecedent is true.

The major is proved: That whence all good merits begin is grace, or that which is given to it on account of its merits is given: if it is given on account of merits, it is not grace: For if, says the Apostle, it be of grace, it is now not of works: therefore that whence good merits begin is either grace, or no grace properly so called exists. This reason is that of St. Augustine Epistle 105, where he says: It remains that we attribute faith itself not to a human free choice whereby men extol themselves, nor to any surpassing merits, because from that source begin whatever goods are merits: but let us confess it to be the gratuitous gift of God, if we think true grace, that is, without merits.

You will object. 1. Whatever is required of man is in his power: yet faith is required of man: therefore it ought to be in his power: but that which is in the power of man is not grace properly so called, nor a gift of God beyond nature's due: therefore, etc. This is evident: for in vain would God require anything of us, unless it lay in our power to fulfill it. Likewise the minor is clear from Mark 16: He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved. And Romans 10: If thou believe, thou shalt be saved.

I answer. 1. This argument was devised by the Semipelagians, as is clear from the Epistle of St. Prosper to St. Augustine, book De Praedest. Sanct. chapter 11, where he says: If thou believest, thou shalt be saved; just as it is said, if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh you shall live: for here too, of these two one is required, the other offered. Therefore that we mortify the deeds of the flesh is required: but that we live is offered. Not therefore on account of many such passages, as that mortifying the deeds of the flesh should we say is not a gift of God, nor confess that it is a gift

of God: since we hear that it is required of us, with the reward of right offered if we have done this. Whence he concludes that since the Semipelagians admitted that to mortify the deeds of the flesh is a work of grace, they ought also to concede that the assent of faith cannot be formed without the assistance of grace.

I answer. 2. By distinguishing the major: Whatever is required of man is in his power, either through the grace of God, or through nature, I concede: through nature always, and without grace, I deny. But both are of God, Augustine says in the same place, both what is commanded, and what is offered: for he is asked to give what he commands: believers ask that their faith be increased: they ask for unbelievers, that faith be given them, so that both in its increases and in its beginnings faith may be the gift of God.

You will object. 2. Various texts of Scripture, by which there appears to be in us a certain beginning of good will, through which faith may be sought and desired. Thus Isaias 3: At the voice of thy cry he shall hear thee, and answer thee. Luke 12: Ask and you shall receive, seek and you shall find, knock and it shall be opened to you. Rom. 1: To will is present with me, but to accomplish that which is good I find not. It is evident, therefore, that to him who wills, desires, and seeks, the rewards are proposed and prepared.

I distinguish the consequent: that the rewards are prepared on account of a work elicited by the powers of nature alone, I deny; elicited with the assistance of grace, I concede. I acknowledge, therefore, that to him who wills, desires, and seeks, the rewards are prepared; but that he may will, desire, and seek is of the mercy of God. For from divine Scripture itself it is established that it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy; and that God is he who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish; and because we know not how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings. Hence St. Augustine, book 2, Ad Bonifacium, chapter 9, weighing those words of Proverbs: Man's heart prepareth his way, together with these words of 2 Cor. 3: Not that we are sufficient to think anything, etc., says: Man prepareth his heart, yet not without the aid of God; for if God touches the heart, man prepareth his heart. And again: For if we could do anything without him, assuredly we could neither begin nor accomplish; that we may begin, it was said, His mercy preventeth me; that we may accomplish, it was said, His mercy will follow me.

You will object. 3. Heretics believe certain mysteries of faith, namely of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Resurrection; yet God's gift or grace, by which they might believe, is not conferred upon heretics; therefore one can assent to supernatural truths without the gift of faith and the assistance of grace.

I distinguish the major: they believe either on account of certain natural conjectures, or on account of divine revelation, I concede; on account of a certain natural reason demonstrative and sure, I deny. Likewise I distinguish the minor: grace is not conferred upon heretics when they believe supernatural truths on account of merely human conjecture, or by a faith acquired at second hand, I concede; when they believe on account of the authority and revelation of God, and from a motive purely supernatural, the grace at least of an inchoate and imperfect faith is not given them, I deny. For in them that faith is a certain gift of God, but of the disinherited, as St. Augustine says, book De Patientia, chapter 28, and as we have more fully declared in the Treatise On Faith. Or more briefly and clearly I distinguish the major: they believe by human and acquired faith, I concede; by divine and infused faith, I deny. For they do not believe on account of the authority of God revealing; otherwise they would assent not merely to some, but to all revealed truths whatsoever.

You will object. 4. Supernatural truths are within the line of the specificative object of our intellect; therefore by its native powers they can be attained by it. The antecedent is plain: for truly if such truths were not within the line of the specificative object of the intellect, that intellect could not apprehend them even with any aid whatsoever, just as the eye cannot perceive sound because it is outside the line of its proper object. But the consequence is proved thus: whatever power can by its own powers attain whatever is within its specificative object; therefore if supernatural truths and the mysteries of our faith are contained within the specificative object of our intellect, they can be attained by it through the powers of nature.

I distinguish the antecedent: those truths are within the line of the proportionate specificative object, I deny; of the disproportionate, I concede. And likewise I distinguish the consequent. And in proof of it I say that any power whatever can by its own powers attain whatever is within its specificative object, which is proportionate to it, but not what is disproportionate: as is evident in the case of sight, whose object is every luminous or colored body, when nevertheless, shining with too great splendor, it cannot be apprehended by the eye unless it be aided and strengthened by some special power. Therefore by parity of reasoning, although supernatural truths are within the line of the adequate and specificative object of our intellect, which is every intelligible being abstracting from the natural and supernatural, created and uncreated, spiritual and corporeal; nevertheless since those truths are not contained within its proportionate and connatural object, which for this state is the intelligible being by conversion to phantasms and through species received from the senses, therefore those supernatural truths cannot be perceived by the powers of nature except by the benefit of a light strengthening and elevating the intellect to the supernatural order and state.

You will object. 5. The act of Christian faith can be commanded by the will for an evil end, for example for worldly glory, as St. Augustine teaches, book De Catechizandis Rudibus, chapter 17; but for such an act of faith, or even for the will commanding an act of that kind, grace is not required; therefore, etc.

I answer, denying the major: for that faith is not Christian, but merely natural; whence the same St. Augustine says that men who are moved by an evil will to believe enter the Church with a feigned heart and mock the Christian name.