Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

All Theologians indeed agree that the merit of Christ is infinite: but they disagree in assigning the reason of this infinitude. For the Thomists and very many Recent authors teach that the merit of Christ was infinite formally and intrinsically: but the Subtle Doctor with all his Disciples contends that it was only extrinsically, or denominatively, infinite, in the way, for example, that beatific vision can be said to be infinite in some respect. Now this accidental and extrinsic infinitude can arise from a manifold head: First indeed, on the part of the object about which it is concerned; for just as mortal sin through a certain extrinsic denomination from the infinite object which it offends is denominated gravely infinite, so also the merit of Christ by reason of its object can be denominately called infinite. Second, on the part of the operating person: thus the actions of the humanity of Christ can be said to be infinite, because namely from his union with the Word there arises a certain dignity in the humanity, and consequently in its actions, by reason of which dignity those actions can be extrinsically and accidentally called infinite. Third, on the part of divine acceptance, because namely God accepts those merits of Christ for the salvation of infinite men, if so many men were to run toward salvation. But whether the merits of Christ were infinite only with this extrinsic infinitude will be determined here.

Note 2. Or rather, from what has been said we must return to this: that the divine Word has no special physical causality concerning the assumed humanity which the Father and the Holy Spirit do not have: since the works of the most holy Trinity ad extra are indivisible, so that no person works anything without the other persons being likewise reckoned to produce the same; since their operation ad extra is through power and will, which in the three divine persons is indivisible and most simple. Whence they are not three omnipotents but one omnipotent. Add that the divine Word terminates only the dependence of the assumed nature, in quasi the same kind of termination whereby a point terminates a line, which certainly can occur without special influx.

Note 3. A principle never operates except according to the nature and perfection of the principle quo. Warm water, for example, as four has never warmed as five: because the heat, which is the principle of warming, has only the perfection of four degrees. Hence it follows that although the person of the divine Word should physically concur with special influx to the elicition of the actions of the assumed humanity, nevertheless such actions would always have to be measured according to the perfection of the principle quo, say of created intellect or will; which principles, since they are physically and naturally finite, cannot give forth physically and naturally infinite actions. Whence let it be

Single conclusion. — THE MERIT OF CHRIST IS NOT INFINITE FROM ITSELF FORMALLY AND INTRINSICALLY, BUT ONLY EXTRINSICALLY.

So the Doctor, distinction 19, number 4, and he proves that Conclusion with very many reasons, of which the first can be proposed thus: if some human action of Christ were of infinite value and acceptability, it would follow that it would be of such value as is the uncreated and essentially infinite volition of God himself: but it is wholly absurd that a created and contingent volition, which by its nature could intrinsically be and not be, and which depends upon a finite and limited principle, should be of such value as uncreated volition: therefore the meritorious action of Christ is not of infinite value. The major is also plain: because uncreated volition cannot have greater value than the infinite: therefore if created volition had infinite value, it would have as much value as uncreated volition has. — It is confirmed: if the created volition of Christ has from itself infinite value and acceptability, then it is required from itself that it be as pleasing and acceptable to God as the very person of the Word is pleasing and acceptable to God: but this seems altogether absurd: therefore it is not of such value or acceptability. The minor is proved, because thence it would follow that as the Word and its volition are simply infinite, so also that created volition would be simply infinite, which certainly not even the adversaries themselves will admit, nor can it by any reason be probable.

The Doctor proves secondly: If the created volition of Christ were from itself of infinite value, it would also have infinite perfection in the order of fruition: the dignity of merit arises from the greater dignity of the act: therefore if created volition has not such great perfection in the order of fruition, it will not have such great dignity, nor consequently such great value: or if it has such great value, it must have such great perfection in the order of fruition.

The Thomists reply: the reason of the Doctor is true if the merit of Christ were infinite in the order of being: but since it is infinite only in the order of merit, not indeed in the order of being, that argument concludes nothing. — Against, the merit of Christ is not infinite in the order of being: therefore neither is it infinite from itself formally and intrinsically. The antecedent the Adversaries admit. The consequence is proved: it cannot be understood how formally and intrinsically the merit of Christ is infinite unless because in its formal entity, and inasmuch as it depends upon an infinite operator operating infinitely, it is infinite: but that is to be infinite in the order of being: therefore if the merit of Christ is infinite formally and intrinsically, as the Adversaries wish, it will be infinite in the order of being.

It is confirmed by the reason of the Doctor, which is his third proof: the meritorious action of Christ was a finite good by its intrinsic notion, not only in the genus of being but also in the genus of morals: therefore it was not infinitely meritorious by its formal notion. The consequence is plain, because it was not more accepted than it was good, according to the opinion of those who wish it to be infinite: therefore if by its formal notion it was not infinitely good in the genus of morals, therefore neither infinitely accepted: therefore neither infinitely meritorious. The antecedent is thus shown: the per se principle of the meritorious action of Christ taken together with all respects even to the Word is intrinsically finite: therefore its action also was formally finite and limited. The antecedent is plain, because the principle of that action is the created will of Christ informed by infinite grace, which from respect to the Word puts on no intrinsic infinitude, because that respect is finite. The consequence is proved: because from a principle essentially intrinsically finite there cannot be an action intrinsically and formally infinite; for an act does not exceed the power of its cause.

The Thomists answer, that the principle quo formal indeed is finite in the genus of being and morals, but the principle quod is infinite: which is so constituted that the meritorious action may be said to be infinite in the genus of morals. — Against, this principle does not act except in virtue of the principle quo, as was said in the third Notable; therefore although the principle quod be infinite, nevertheless an action cannot be elicited except precisely according to the measure of the perfection of the principle quo: which, because it is finite, the meritorious action of Christ also intrinsically and formally ought to be finite. It is confirmed: an agent which through its formal principle is formally finite in the genus of being and nature cannot cause a formally infinite effect, nor elicit a formally infinite action: therefore neither through the principle quo formally finite in the genus of morals and grace can it elicit an infinite action in the genus of morals. The consequence is plain by parity of reason. The antecedent is proved, because Christ, for example, through created intellect cannot elicit a formally infinite intellection.

They reply again, that this infinity must be sought from the fact that the divine Word has a special influx into the actions of the humanity, by reason of the activity of that humanity which belongs to it, whence it can elicit an infinite action, even though the principle by which it merits formally be finite. — Against this, first, nearly all Theologians agree that the divine Word had no peculiar efficiency with respect to those actions. Second, even if it were admitted that he had that influx, it still implies that an action elicited from him through a formally finite principle is infinite. Proof, because an act essentially infinite cannot depend essentially upon causes formally finite in perfection, even with an infinite cause concurring: so that the finite cause have an essential causality over that act: but the assumed nature had a created essential causality over the actions of Christ: therefore they could not be formally infinite. The consequent is evident together with the minor. The major is clear, both because the causality of an effect does not come from a finite cause alone, and also because, although an infinite and a finite cause are subordinated, it still implies that an infinite effect arises from them, because an effect cannot exceed the perfection of its proximate cause, from which it emanates; whence since some effect is produced by God and by the sun, because it depends essentially on the sun, which is a finite cause, such an effect cannot be formally infinite; therefore however much the divine Word may have a peculiar efficiency with respect to the actions of Christ's humanity, nevertheless they cannot for that reason be formally infinite: because they are modified and determined by other finite causes in the genus and order of finite actions and beings.

It is confirmed by the fourth argument of the Doctor: No effect formally and intrinsically infinite follows even from an infinite cause unless that cause itself acts infinitely, or in an infinite manner: but the divine Word, as the person of the assumed humanity, granted that he acted by meriting, did not act in an infinite manner. Proof, both because as such he was acting the part of a human person, which would not have operated otherwise than its own person would have, had there been one; and also because to merit and to satisfy are actions expressing inferiority and submission: therefore they cannot be elicited by God as such: therefore neither by the Word operating infinitely, or in an infinite manner.

The Thomists reply, with Suarez, that indeed the meritorious actions of Christ were not infinite by reason of a certain efficiency and influx which the divine Word had upon the humanity and its operations, but only by reason of the union which those operations of Christ have with the divine Word; by reason of which union those operations of the humanity are reckoned as it were proper to the Word, and consequently dignified into infinity. — Against this, although an action receives some dignity from the person from whom it is elicited, nevertheless an action finite according to its entity cannot receive infinite dignity, even though it be elicited by an infinite person: therefore this response is worthless. Proof of the antecedent: an action finite in perfection according to its entity cannot have as much value and moral dignity as it would have if it were infinite according to its entity: but if it were infinite according to its entity, it could have infinite value and moral dignity: therefore an action which is finite according to its entity, however much it be elicited by an infinite person, cannot of itself and intrinsically have infinite dignity. —

It is confirmed, because an action of infinite goodness proceeding physically from some infinite person ought to have greater dignity also in the order of merit than another action of finite entity elicited by the same infinite person: but this would be false if an infinite reward could correspond to a physically infinite action: therefore such a reward is not owed of itself to such an action proceeding from the person of Christ by reason of its own intrinsic worth and dignity.

It is confirmed secondly, that the value of an operation ought no more to grow from the perfection and dignity of the person than the value of cognition or of vision grows from the dignity of the object: for just as the action of a more worthy person is judged more excellent than the action of a less worthy person, so the vision of a more perfect object is held more excellent than that of a less perfect one: but although the perfection of vision grows and is augmented according to the greater perfection of the object, it does not follow from that, that a vision terminated at an infinite object is intrinsically of infinite perfection; otherwise the beatific vision of any creature whatsoever would be intrinsically infinite in perfection: therefore although the dignity of an action grows from the dignity of the person, it does not follow from that, that if the person be of infinite dignity, the action also be of infinite dignity in the genus of morals and merit. These things seen, even if the dignity of the person influenced something into moral goodness, it would not make that goodness infinite, even if that person be infinite: therefore although the circumstance of the person augments the value of merits, it will not make it infinite, even if the person be infinite.

Suarez responds that the consequence does not hold, because, he says, in one way the circumstance of the person concurs toward dignifying the action in the order of merit: in another way indeed toward dignifying it, or augmenting its moral goodness in the genus of virtue: for it dignifies the action in the order of merit by morally affecting the action itself: but it neither dignifies nor augments moral goodness in the genus of virtue except insofar as the power itself is exercised about the object of such a virtue. Whence it cannot communicate goodness except according to the mode in which the power tends toward that object; and therefore, since the power tends finitely toward the object, it comes about that an infinite person does not communicate infinite moral goodness to the elicited act. — Against this, the finite mode in which the power tends toward the object impedes the communication of infinite goodness into that moral action, even though that action proceed from an infinite person: therefore also the finite mode of operating of an infinite person will impede that person from communicating infinite meritorious dignity to this finite action. The antecedent is from Suarez himself. The consequence, however, is clear by priority of reason.

Further, the value and merit of an action is a property consequent upon the moral goodness of the action itself; whence a thing is worth as much as it is good: therefore since the moral goodness of the actions of Christ is finite, the value and merit of those actions will also be finite. Finally, Suarez gratuitously asserts that the person dignifies itself by the action in the genus of merit independently of the object, but does not thus dignify it in the genus of virtue.

Therefore it must be concluded that the merit of Christ is only infinitely extrinsic and accidental, namely by reason of a threefold circumstance, of the object, of the person, and of the divine acceptation. First indeed, from the circumstance of the object; for just as by a certain extrinsic denomination some sin committed against an infinite object, say God, is called infinite, so also a meritorious action elicited toward God, or on account of God, could be called extrinsically infinite by some denomination. Secondly from the circumstance of the supposit, because whenever any nature operates in an infinite supposit, even if that supposit do not concur actively, nevertheless because it dignifies in some way the operating nature, it consequently dignifies also the action elicited by such a nature; whence since the supposit is infinite, those actions too can be called in some way infinite, that is, extrinsically and accidentally. Finally thirdly, by reason of the divine acceptation, because surely, although some work may not be infinite in itself, yet since for its character as meritorious the divine acceptation is required, it can by the power of that acceptation be called infinite, inasmuch surely as it is accepted for infinite sins, or for infinite men: therefore the merit of Christ can be called infinite by many titles which are only extrinsic and accidental.

The Adversaries object, first indeed certain authorities of Scripture, by which although it is not signified that the merit of Christ was infinite, nevertheless it is declared to have been of sufficient value for paying the debts of the sins of all men whatsoever: from which it may be inferred that that merit was infinite: thus Ps. 139. With the Lord there is mercy, and with him plentiful redemption. 1 Cor. 6. For you are bought with a great price. 1 John 2. And not for our sins only, but also for those of the whole world.

They confirm it from Clement VI, in the aforesaid Extravagant Unigenitus, where speaking of the treasury of the Church he says thus: Of whose consumption or diminution there is not any cause for fear whatsoever, on account of the infinite merit of Christ. Therefore according to the Pontiff, the operations of Christ were of simply infinite meritorious value. The consequence is clear: both because if their meritorious value were not simply infinite, the merits of Christ would not be called absolutely infinite; and also because otherwise it would be lawful to fear with reason lest the sins of men grow so much that at length from their multitude the merits of Christ would finally be consumed. But that the Pontiff, to persuade us of the infinity of the merits of Christ, has recourse not to the extrinsic acceptation of God but to the intrinsic conjunction of them with the Word, is gathered from this: that he says one drop of Christ's blood, on account of its conjunction with the Word, was most sufficient for the sins of all men: but if the merits of Christ were only infinite from the extrinsic acceptation of God, he would have recourse to that, and not indeed to the union with the Word: therefore, etc.

— I answer. From all those authorities both of Scripture and of the Pontiffs nothing else is to be inferred than that truly the merit of Christ is morally infinite, and most sufficient for paying the debts of infinite men: not indeed of itself, or from the fact that it proceeds precisely from an infinite person, but from the fact that God accepted it as the price and satisfaction for remitting the infinite punishment due to sins, and for conferring life eternal; no less than if it were of itself of infinite value. Now the reason why God thus accepted the merits of Christ is rightly gathered from this: that those meritorious works, inasmuch as they proceeded from a divine person, had a special extrinsic dignity which moved God to accept those merits rather than the merits of all men and Angels whatsoever. For although the circumstance of the person did not bestow an intrinsically infinite dignity, nevertheless it conferred so great a value and so great a dignity upon those works that no other meritorious works whatsoever had greater dignity, nor even equal. Whence not without reason does the Pontiff, to signify that the merit of Christ and the price of his blood was most excellent, have recourse to the union; since indeed the supreme dignity of Christ's humanity and of its operation is rightly gathered from the hypostatic union, although it does not follow from that that that dignity be intrinsically infinite.

The Adversaries insist: That divine acceptation either was according to the meritorious dignity of the operation of Christ, or exceeded it; that is, God made those merits worth more by accepting them than they were worth of themselves. If the first, therefore those works have of themselves infinite dignity independently of the acceptation of God. The second indeed cannot be said, because a work not worthy of itself but only by the acceptation of the one rewarding is imperfect in the order of merit, just as a price which of itself is unequal, but has equality only from the voluntary acceptation of the seller, is imperfect in the order of price: therefore if the works of Christ were not of themselves worthy in the order of merit, but had that from the extrinsic acceptation of God, it is necessary that they have been imperfect in the order of merit.

— I answer, that the merits of Christ were not accepted beyond their dignity and value, because although they were not intrinsically infinite, nevertheless because they proceeded from a person of infinite dignity, they were of such value as was required that they be accepted by God for the salvation of infinite men, namely because those merits exceeded the dignity of any other conceivable meritorious work whatever. I add that even if God had accepted them beyond their dignity, it would not follow that those works of Christ were imperfect in the order of merit: since those merits cannot be judged imperfect to which a more excellent and more perfect merit cannot be given: but to the merits of Christ a more excellent merit cannot be given: therefore they cannot be judged imperfect. Hence there is no comparison of those merits with a price. For this very reason a price, whose value depends on the acceptation of the seller, is judged imperfect, because to such a price a greater can be given which would of itself equal the dignity of the thing bought: but to the merits of Christ some more excellent merits cannot be given which could of themselves equal the payment to be made for the expiation of infinite sins and the salvation of infinite men: therefore from that they ought not be judged imperfect.

They object 2. The meritorious actions of Christ are called by the holy Fathers theandrical, that is, divine, or actions of God and man; for thus St. Dionysius calls them, Epistle 1. to Caius, and St. Damascene, book 3. De Fide, chapter 15: but a theandrical action proceeds as much from the Word as from the humanity: therefore the Word inflows into the actions as much as the humanity itself: but an action into which the Word peculiarly inflows is of infinite value: therefore the actions of Christ, as meritorious, were of themselves of infinite value. — I distinguish the major: that they proceed as much from the Word as from the humanity by physical or moral influx, as though the Word equally inflowed into the actions as the humanity inflowed into them, I deny: that they proceed as much from the Word as from the humanity, that is, those actions are produced by a person who is at once God and man, as from the principle by which, I concede: from that, however, it does not follow that the Word influows potentialiter into these actions, and consequently it is not true that those actions are of themselves of infinite value.

They object 3. The gravity of an offense grows according to the perfection of the person offended: but satisfaction according to the perfection of the person satisfying: therefore as the fault committed against an infinite person is judged infinite, so satisfaction made by an infinite person ought to be judged infinite. — I answer, that the antecedent is true according to proportion, not according to degree; that is, by a certain proportion an injury offered to an infinite person is judged infinite, yet not according to the degree of perfection of the person offended, because the person offended, if it be infinite, is infinite according to degrees intrinsically and formally of infinite perfection; but the injury not according to degrees of infinitude, but by a certain extrinsic denomination from the infinite person offended, is called infinite: hence satisfaction, or a meritorious action, is measured according to the perfection of the person meriting, not according to degree but according to proportion, especially if the person to whom the merit is attributed has no efficiency over it, but only dignifies it extrinsically and accidentally, as we said the supposit of the divine Word dignifies the meritorious actions of the assumed humanity.

— Yet I should judge that this controversy could easily be settled, and both opinions reconciled, by saying that Christ truly merited for infinite men as to sufficiency; not that his meritorious works had infinite goodness and dignity, which also very many Thomists concede; but that they were of such dignity and of such great value, from the fact that they would proceed from a divine person, that God, moved by their value and supreme dignity, was led to accept them for all men absolutely, even if they were infinite in number.