Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Or rather, from what has been said it must be recalled that Christ was simultaneously wayfarer and comprehensor. Wayfarer, I say, according to the lower portion, inasmuch namely as his soul informed a passible and mortal body, bestowing on it a living, vegetative, and sensitive grade, and inasmuch as he was the principle of the passions or animal affections of the sensitive appetite; but comprehensor according to his mind, or higher part, in respect of which his soul had being and operating independently of the body, and elicited its own operations of intellect and will, in which he clearly saw God and enjoyed his divinity. Whence, as the Doctor most excellently observes, d. 18, the state of Christ the Blessed differed from the state of other Blessed ones, since the other Blessed are joined to God most perfectly according to both affections, of justice and of advantage, with respect to the higher portion, and thence no disadvantage is left regarding the lower portion; but Christ was indeed so joined to God beatifically through the affection of justice, by which he adhered to him through vision and love, but not through the affection of advantage and pleasure, since he still lay subject to many disadvantages and penalities according to the lower portion, and consequently he did not adhere to God beatifically most perfectly and completely.

NOTE 2. Although the same soul institutes the inner and higher portion, nevertheless its acts are one sort according to the higher part and another according to the inner part, as is evident per se. Theologians agree among themselves that Christ without doubt merited through the acts of the lower portion, since according to it he was perfectly a wayfarer; but they dispute among themselves concerning the acts of the higher portion: especially through the acts of charity both toward God and toward neighbor. St. Thomas, part 3, question 19, article 3, ad 1, and with him all his disciples teach indeed that Christ merited through charity toward God; but since that act of charity seems necessary — for Christ, as clearly and intuitively seeing the divine essence, necessarily loved God, since God clearly seen ravishes the will into love of himself and quasi-necessitates it, as St. Thomas teaches, 2-2, q. art. 1, in these words: The will of one seeing the essence of God loves out of necessity under order toward God — to solve this difficulty some of his disciples, with Soto, book 1, On Nature, chapter 1, and Suarez, distinction 39, section 2, distinguish in Christ two dilections toward God: one regulated by blessed science, the other regulated by supernatural and infused science; and assert the first to be necessary, but the other free and meritorious. Others distinguish two other acts of charity in Christ, each regulated by blessed science: one whereby Christ loved goods intrinsic to God, namely his divine essence, perfections, persons, etc.; the other whereby he willed goods extrinsic to him, namely glory, praise, honor, and obedience which are exhibited to him by creatures; whence they assert that he merited not through the first act of charity but through the second. Thus teaches Lorca, d. 72, chapter 2. Some assert that the dilection of Christ was terminated to the divine goodness, and that as it is the reason of loving and willing goods intrinsic to him it was not free, nor consequently meritorious: but as it was terminated to the divine goodness inasmuch as that is the reason of loving creatures and of willing God extrinsic goods, it was not, they say, necessary, but free, and consequently meritorious. Thus Capreolus, distinction 19, book 3. But the rest, oppressed by the difficulty of the argument, incline to the position of the Subtle Doctor, who affirms that Christ the Lord merited not only through the actions of the inner portion, but also through the actions of the higher portion, especially through acts of charity toward neighbor, whom he beheld in the Word, as well as through the act of beatific charity regarding God clearly seen.

NOTE 3. That Christ exercised acts of two kinds, of which some were commanded, as the Passion and death, which were prescribed and ordained for him; whence he calls death the chalice which the Father gave him. Others indeed were not commanded and prescribed by God, nor did Christ elicit them from the motive of obedience, but from the motive of other virtues: for instance, either of mercy while he cured the infirm, or almsgiving while he fed the hungry, or mortification while he watched and fasted, or devotion while he spent the night in prayer to God, or religion while he went up to the temple to adore and pray. All Theologians agree that he merited through acts which were not prescribed, but since he was impeccable and would not seem free regarding prescribed acts, because liberty in obedience to a precept consists in an acquired power to obey or not obey; hence some Theologians judge more probably that he did not merit through commanded acts, since it does not appear by what reason he had sufficient liberty that he might exercise those acts meritoriously. But others, affirming that he merited even through those acts, split into various parties: for some, that they may reconcile the liberty of Christ with his impeccability, teach that there was not imposed upon Christ a strict prescription obliging under guilt to dying and suffering, but only the will of God was intimated, which had decreed that men could not be redeemed except through his death. Thus Lorca, d. 73. They concede indeed, given that command of dying, that Christ could not fail to die; this necessity however, they say, was not antecedent but consequent upon the liberty of Christ, because he had freely asked of the Father that this command be imposed on him, and freely accepted it: but consequent necessity does not impede liberty. Thus Cabrera. Some, with Lugo, assert indeed that Christ had a command of dying which he could not fail to accept; nevertheless he died freely, because that command did not oblige to dying for that instant at which it was posited. Whence Christ could, before that time of fulfilling pressed on, ask and obtain from the Father its dispensation or commutation, and consequently he died freely. Very many recent authors, with Lessius, Vazquez, Valencia, say that Christ notwithstanding his impeccability freely fulfilled the command of undergoing death, because although he was not free regarding the substance of death, so that he could not fail to die; yet he was free regarding the motive, because he could die from a motive of fortitude, or patience, or mercy. There are also those to whom Gonet subscribes, who affirm that Christ died freely for this reason, because although he could not will not to die in the composite sense, that is, join the negation of death with the command obliging to death, yet he could well do so in the divided sense, willing the negation of death inasmuch as it prescinds from the command. But how useless these modes are for reconciling the liberty of Christ with his impeccability we shall show below.

There are therefore three things to be determined in this Question: First, that Christ merited through the acts of the lower portion, as well as of the other virtues distinct from charity. Second, that he also merited through acts of charity not only of the wayfarer, corresponding to infused science of God, but also through acts of beatific charity, both toward neighbors shining forth and as seen in the Word, and toward God, or through the very fruition of God. Third, that he truly merited through commanded acts, because for this he had sufficient liberty.

First conclusion. — Christ merited through the acts of the lower portion and of the other virtues distinct from charity.

So the Doctor, d. 18, n. 5.

The first part is evident: for through those acts Christ merited which he freely elicited as wayfarer: but Christ freely elicited the acts of the inner portion, since he exercised them at the nod and command of the will with the previous dictate of the intellect: therefore, etc. The Doctor unfolds this truth thus, n. 5.

Christ, he says, was in some respect a wayfarer and passible according to the sensitive part, and the inner portion of the volun> tatis: thence he had many objects present to the senses and to the inner portion, about which he could freely will against the affection of advantage, which is always fitting to that to whom it belongs; the same by fasting, watching, praying and many other such things he could merit, either by exercising such things outwardly, or by willing them inwardly for God.

By which words indeed the Conclusion is sufficiently proved. Yet further he inquires how this could come about, especially from the will? And he answers that although the higher portion was perfectly joined to God according to the beatific act, nevertheless it was the same will passible according to the lower portion, and as such was wayfaring, and consequently could merit.

The Doctor objects: What is simply at the term cannot merit: but the lower portion of the will of Christ was simply at the term: therefore it could not merit. The major is certain. The minor is proved: that is simply at the term which cannot have an inordinate act concerning something tending to an end: but the lower will of Christ could not have an inordinate act concerning something tending to an end: therefore it was simply at the term. — I answer with the Doctor, conceding the major and denying the minor; and to the proof by saying that indeed such a will could not have an inordinate act concerning something tending to an end, yet not for that reason was it simply at the term, because from the fact that the lower portion was joined to God solely by reason of the conjunction of the higher portion, it does not follow that the lower portion was joined with God according to the affection of advantage, which nevertheless is required for it to be said to be simply at the term; and because from the defect of such conjunction many things befell Christ the Lord against the affection of advantage, therefore by accepting them for God he could merit.

The second part also stands, namely that He could merit through acts of the other virtues distinct from charity: since indeed He merited through the virtue of obedience, because He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross, for which cause God exalted Him and gave Him a name, etc., as the Apostle says to Philippians 2: but obedience is distinct from charity: therefore, etc.

Second Conclusion. — Christ truly merited through acts of charity, not only toward neighbour, but also toward God, and that even through the act of beatific charity.

This consists of three parts: of which

The first is common to both schools, the Subtle and the Angelic, and which the Subtle Doctor expressly hands down, number 8, where he says: The inferior portion merited by eliciting operation about creatures, by loving mother, and others good in God, and evil men for God's sake; and it is proved: the act of charity toward neighbour, whether it correspond to acquired or infused science, belongs to the inferior portion: but according to the acts of the inferior portion He could merit, as was said above: therefore also through acts of charity toward neighbour. — Then, Christ could merit absolutely, and truly did merit, as was proved: therefore He could also merit through the act of charity. The antecedent stands from the preceding Question. The consequence is evident, because Christ must be granted merit according to every possible perfection: but the merit of the act of charity is specifically more perfect than the merit of the other virtues: therefore it must be held that Christ merited through the act of charity. — Finally, if anything stood in the way of Christ's having merited through an act elicited by charity — especially since this act in Christ would not have been free, seeing that all other conditions required for merit are not wanting to this act of charity: but neither is necessary freedom wanting to it, since Christ most freely determined Himself to execute and perform all that which most conduced to the glory of God and the utility of neighbour: therefore Christ the Lord could truly merit through acts of charity tending immediately to neighbour and mediately to God.

The second part is also evident, namely that Christ merited through acts of charity terminated immediately in God: since indeed Christ as wayfarer could know God, and truly did know Him through infused science, and consequently could love Him with a love corresponding to that science: but a love corresponding to that science was truly meritorious: therefore Christ could merit immediately through the act of charity. The major stands from what was said in treating of the knowledge of God. Its sequel too is evident: for then the will can love with love all that which is represented to it by the intellect as lovable: therefore since God was represented through infused science to the soul of Christ, as an object supremely good and lovable, there is no doubt that the soul of Christ could tend toward Him by an act of love corresponding to that infused science. The minor also appears true: since that act is meritorious which has all the conditions desired for merit: but the act of the love of God elicited by the soul of Christ, inasmuch as she knows God through infused science to be supremely lovable, has all the conditions for merit: for it is indeed an act of a wayfarer, free, honest, and pleasing to God: therefore it is truly meritorious.

Finally the third part is proved by the Doctor, n. 9, namely that Christ merited even through beatific love:

Because, he says, every act accepted by God, as a good and laudable act, for which God wishes to retribute something to him whose act He accepts, or to another for whom it is done, is meritorious: such is every act of Christ according to His human nature, even the beatific act, whereby according to the superior portion He enjoys God; because that person was not simply in termino according to every condition of itself; therefore God could accept every created act of that person as worthy of some good to be retributed for it to that person, had He stood in need, or to another, namely us, for whom He merited. And holding this, one must say that if the beatific act according to the superior portion of Christ was meritorious — which involves no contradiction — the beatific act of Michael, or of any other Blessed, can be accepted as something worthy of retribution, which being retributed would be given on account of merit: suppose something were given to Michael on account of the meritorious act of guardianship which he exercises over me: a contradiction, I say, there would not be; yet in fact God does not so accept that act, because that person is wholly outside the state of meriting according to the whole subject: not so Christ; but according to something He was in the state of wayfarer, and on this account every created act of His was accepted, and meritorious for those for whom it was offered to God.

You will say: According to that portion Christ could not merit, according to which He was outside the state of the way: but He was outside the state of the way in respect of the superior portion, and through beatific acts: therefore He could not thus merit. — The Doctor answers, that just as merit consists not only in the act itself elicited, but in some manner in the conditions of the person eliciting, so divine acceptance regards not only the act, but the accidental conditions of the meriting person; whence although the superior portion and that act of fruition were outside the state of the way, nevertheless by reason of the whole Christ eliciting the meritorious act, there was some congruity of accepting that act of fruition as meritorious, such congruity as is not in the other Blessed, who are altogether outside the state of the way; although however speaking absolutely no repugnance seems to appear why the act of the beatitude of another Blessed might not also be accepted as meritorious, and worthy of some retribution, in the way, for example, that God can accept the act of guardianship which a guardian Angel exercises over me as meritorious, and worthy of retribution.

You will say 2: A meritorious act ought to be free; but the act of beatific love is not free: therefore, etc. — The Doctor denies the minor in dist. 1, qu. 1, proving its contrary: because a diverse approximation of something passive to the agent, or of a power to the object, does not make necessity or non-necessity, but only renders the act more intense or less intense: but loving God in the way and in the fatherland differ only in respect of a diverse approximation of one and the same power to the same object: therefore this approximation will not cause necessity, if previously there was no necessity, but only a more intense or less intense act; wherefore the love of God in the fatherland differs from the love of God in the way only in that the former is more intense than the latter, not more or less necessary. Therefore it must be concluded with the Doctor, n. 10, that the beatific love of Christ was free and meritorious inasmuch as it tends to God Himself immediately, and inasmuch as it terminates at creatures shining forth and intuitively known in the Word. Whence he concludes there, that Christ could merit simply; first, through acts of the sensitive power commanded by the will: secondly, through the act of beatific love as it tends to God Himself: thirdly, through the same act as it tends to creatures for God's sake.

You will say 3: That act is not free whose opposite act cannot be given: but to the beatific act of the love of God an opposite act cannot be given, namely the act of hatred about God intuitively known: therefore the act of the love of God intuitively known is not free. The major seems true, since for an act to be free the power ought to be indifferent, that it may exercise a contrary and opposite act about the same object. But the minor is proved: in God intuitively known no reason of evil appears: therefore neither can any motive of hatred be. — I distinguish the major: that the will be free with the liberty of contrariety, it must be able to elicit an act opposite to that which it elicits — I concede; that it be free with the liberty of contradiction — I deny: for to this liberty it is not necessary that the will be able to elicit a contrary act, but it suffices that it can suspend its act about the proposed object. But the will of Christ considered physically in itself can suspend its act about the beatific object, although by reason of the maintenance and of the object extrinsically attracting and determining more strongly to its love, it cannot morally suspend that act of love. Whence, the minor being distinguished, the consequence must be denied.

Third conclusion. — Christ merited through the acts whereby he observed the precepts imposed upon him, especially since for that instant at which he kept the precept he could, simply as regards physical power, fail to observe it, although morally he could not.

It is proved first: Because he merited through obedience: but obedience presupposes a precept: therefore, etc. The minor is plain. The major is proved from the Apostle to the Romans 5, As by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one many shall be made just. And Philippians 2, Becoming obedient unto death, etc.

It is proved second: If Christ had not merited through the observance of precepts, it would be chiefly because in them he was not free: but he had sufficient liberty for merit: therefore, etc. The major is plain: since all agree that the observance of a precept has the other conditions required for merit, seeing that it is an act morally good, pleasing to God, ordered to him, and elicited by Christ as wayfarer. But the minor, wherein lies the difficulty, is proved: the reason of a precept precisely considered in itself does not take away the liberty of exercising an act: therefore Christ could freely fulfill the precept. The consequence is plain. The antecedent is proved: liberty is only taken away by a necessity imposed on the very act itself, or only by that very fact that the act is exercised necessarily, because the liberty of the will is properly opposed to necessity, since the will is free not only from coaction but also from necessity: but the reason of a precept, as such, does not effect that the act be exercised necessarily by the will: therefore neither does it take away from such an act the character of free. The minor stands, because we ourselves freely observe precepts, and consequently the reason of the precept does not prevent the prescribed act from being exercised freely.

Nor must you say that the condition of Christ is unlike ours, and that for this reason we are said to observe precepts freely because we can omit them by sinning. Christ, however, being impeccable, could not fail to observe the precepts prescribed to him. This answer, I say, does not dissolve the force of the argument, for those confirmed in grace cannot sin, and nevertheless they observe the precepts freely, and through that observance they merit, as is evident both of the most blessed Virgin and of the Apostles, who while they were wayfarers, after receiving the fullness of the Holy Spirit, could not sin, yet truly merited: therefore although the soul of Christ is impeccable, nevertheless when it was still in the mortal state it did not cease to merit through the free observance of precepts.

Further, these two things — not being able freely to admit omission of a precept, and not being able to commit anything against a precept — are greatly distinguished from this third proposition: to have necessarily an act of will executing the precept; nor can the third be inferred from the two prior propositions. For the two former are compatible with liberty; but the third not so: yet the will of the soul of Christ, by reason of its impeccability, had only the two former; but by reason of the precept imposed on it it did not have the third: therefore freely, and not necessarily, it could fulfill what was commanded. The major stands: because being able to will evil does not pertain to liberty: but those two prior propositions denote only the supreme rectitude of the will in the one acting, which accords excellently with liberty in acting: but the third proposition takes away liberty altogether, since liberty cannot be understood together with a necessary act of willing. The minor indeed sufficiently stands of itself regarding the prior part. It is proved regarding the latter part: the precept imposed on the will of Christ was related of itself toward that will in the manner in which the commands of God stand toward our wills, because it cannot be explained what the precept prescribed to Christ had peculiar to itself, qua precept, which the precepts prescribed to us do not have: but the precepts prescribed to us stand toward our wills in such wise that those wills nevertheless have a free act, and not a necessary one, of willing execution of what is commanded, nor do they receive from the force of the precept anything by which they are determined to exercise the act of the precept necessarily: therefore also the will of Christ, even given the precept, had a free act, nor by virtue of it was it determined to observe it necessarily.

It is confirmed: If anything necessarily determined Christ to observing the precepts divinely prescribed to him, it would be especially vision and beatific love: but these did not so determine him that physically speaking he could fail to observe those precepts if he had willed: therefore notwithstanding them he was free in the observance of precepts. The minor is proved: beatific vision does not determine to an act except mediately through love: but love does not determine except inasmuch as it itself exists: but the act of love ought not to be so necessary that the will cannot fail to elicit it, otherwise that act of love would not be free, nor consequently would the act of beatific love in Christ have been meritorious, whose contrary was proved above: therefore if that act of beatific love is not so necessary that the will cannot cease from it, at least physically, neither will it so necessarily determine the will to observing the precepts that it could not physically turn away from that observance. Add that no reason can be assigned why the will, which is a power essentially free, could be so determined by any object however intentionally proposed to producing love, that physically it could not fail to elicit that act of love, although it be so determined and allured by the object that it cannot cease from love of it: therefore it is not determined necessarily to that love physically: therefore it can physically cease from it, and consequently through it the will is not necessitated to keeping the precepts.

You will say. Physical liberty does not suffice for a precept to be duly prescribed to anyone, nor for him to be judged worthy of praise and reward when he fulfills it: therefore if Christ had only physical liberty with respect to fulfilling the precept, he could not merit through the observance of it. The antecedent is proved, because when someone is morally determined to an act, although physically he could fail to have it, such an act would be superfluously prescribed to him, nor would he acquire anything of praise in eliciting that act; for absurdly would someone forbid another to slay a whole army of men opposing him, nor would it be much praiseworthy for him to obey such a command, because although he has physical power for it, he has not moral power: therefore if the observance of a precept be not also within the moral power of the observer, he can procure nothing of praise and merit thence. The consequence is plain. The antecedent is proved: for although it were good not to slay all men, although also it lies in the physical power of one man to slay them, nevertheless he is not said freely not to slay all of them, nor does it redound to his praise that he does not slay them, because that is morally impossible to him: therefore if it be morally impossible that Christ, loving God with beatific love, fail to observe his precepts, that observance cannot be meritorious for him. — I deny the antecedent. For something can be prescribed to which one is morally determined, because although a precept does not serve to determining, nor even to positing the substance of an act, yet it could be imposed so that a laudable act, which otherwise would be performed, should have also the goodness and merit of obedience; thus, for example, it can be prescribed that he who fasts out of devotion on Fridays fast on those days out of precept also, because although that precept does not determine the man on whom it is imposed to the substance of fasting, which already he was prepared elsewhere to perform, nevertheless it determines him to observe it from the motive and virtue of obedience. To the proof of the antecedent I deny that parity about killing, because that killing is not within the power even physical of the will; for it depends on the forces of the body, which of themselves do not suffice for the slaying of an army, even though the will should determine itself to that killing; whence that non-killing does not redound to the praise of the will itself, not because the will has not moral power for it, but because the will alone ought not concur in that killing, since other faculties also ought to contribute to it, which are not subordinated to the will for performing it: therefore that example does not fit. Therefore although Christ through beatific love is morally determined to fulfilling all that which is commanded him by God; nevertheless these things are no less usefully commanded him, because if they were not commanded, beatific love would not determine him to it; for it determines him because the omission of those acts would be sinful: but sin is incompatible with the love of God above all things: but that omission would not be sinful unless the acts were commanded: therefore although Christ is morally determined by God, nevertheless those acts were rightly and usefully commanded him by God.

You will insist. If Christ had only physical liberty not to observe the precepts, it follows that he had no greater liberty for non-observance of precepts than for ceasing from beatific love, and consequently that he did not merit more by undergoing the death prescribed him than he merited by loving God with beatific love: but it does not seem very laudable, nor meritorious, that Christ seeing God clearly and intuitively loves him, although physically he could fail to love: therefore if for the observation of precepts Christ had no other liberty than physical for observing them, he does not seem to have merited much in that observance. — I answer, that the reason of greater praise and merit was in the death of Christ and in the observance of other precepts than in beatific love, because although he was morally determined, on supposition of beatific love and of the precept, to accept it, yet truly death was very difficult and bitter for him, nor could he undergo it de facto without greatest pain and supreme sorrow: whence on account of the greatest difficulty which undergoing death carried with it, it was very laudable for him, and he merited a great reward by undergoing it.

You will say 2: Christ could not fail to elicit acts commanded by the Father, nor fail to accept death: therefore in them he was not free with the liberty of election. The antecedent is proved, because he could not sin: but he would have sinned by not accepting what the eternal Father had commanded. — I answer by denying the antecedent, for although Christ could not sin, and therefore not transgress the mandate of the Father; yet he obeyed that mandate in such wise that at that same time at which he performed the commanded acts he could fail to perform them, if his human will be considered in itself, and according to the mode of operating which he had in that state. And just as the blessed Angels execute the divine mandates with the liberty of election, and yet cannot transgress them or sin, so Christ kept the mandates of his Father with the liberty of election, freely, even though he could not sin.

You will insist. Given the precept, Christ was not indifferent to choosing the commanded acts, nor to accepting death. — I answer: He was not indifferent given the precept, indifference on the part of the act, I concede: indifference on the part of the power, I deny. Thus, given the determination of the last judgment of reason, the will is not indifferent to choosing this or that means, indifference on the part of the act, because the act of will necessarily follows the last judgment of reason; yet it is indifferent on the part of the power, because the will of itself is indifferent to this or that means: so, given the premotion of efficacious grace, the will is not indifferent to acting or not acting, indifference on the part of the act, but is indifferent on the part of the power.

You will insist. Given the precept he cannot fail to keep it. — I answer: He cannot fail to keep it in the composite sense, I concede: in the divided sense, I deny: that is, these two things cannot be composed together in Christ — for example the precept of undergoing death and an unwillingness to die; simply, however, if both death and the will of Christ be considered in themselves, with the same precept standing, he retained the free faculty of not dying, and could fail to die: for the precept of the Father wrought nothing in the will of Christ that would impede its liberty, but left it equally free as regards acts of election, as if it had not been given.

Corollary. — From what has been said it follows that all those modes of reconciling the impeccability of Christ with his liberty in keeping the mandates prescribed to him set forth in the third Notable are not to be approved, nor do the aforesaid opinions appear probable. Not indeed the first, which contends that no precept strictly and properly so called was imposed on Christ as man, but only that the divine will was intimated to him, which did not clothe itself with the obligation of executing the thing so that its omission would be sin. It is not proved, I say, because truly from Sacred Scripture it stands that a command of dying was imposed on Christ by the Father, for John 10, This commandment I have received of my Father, namely to lay down my life: and as the Father gave me commandment, so do I, and 15, As also I have kept my Father's commandments: which things all plainly signify that precepts properly so called were imposed on Christ, since the words of Sacred Scripture ought to be taken according to their proper signification when no repugnance or indecency follows thence: but none appears from a precept properly so called having been imposed on Christ, because, as is evident from what has been said, he was no less free in keeping those precepts than if they were precepts taken in a wider signification. Next, it is certain that Christ the Lord as man was subject to the precepts of the law of nature; for under the name of law of nature nothing else is understood than the dictate of natural reason, which God the Creator implanted together with nature in the minds of men, which are ordered to doing or not doing something; wherefore whoever is a true man is bound by natural law: therefore Christ was bound to keep those precepts: therefore either he merited through the observance of those precepts, and thus he could also merit through positive precepts observed: or he did not merit, which seems absurd, seeing that the observance of the precepts of natural law in Christ has all that which is required for the notion of merit. Finally, the proper object of obedience is a precept: but Christ truly merited through obedience, as is evident from Romans 5, As by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one many shall be made just, in which words the holy Apostle compares the obedience of Christ with the disobedience of Adam, to signify that as Adam was disobedient to a command of God properly so called, so the obedience of Christ became known in his subjection to a command strict and properly so called.

The second opinion also, asserting that Christ freely kept the precepts prescribed to him because, although given the precept of undergoing death he could not fail to die, this necessity of dying was not antecedent but consequent upon the liberty of Christ, since that precept was imposed dependently upon his acceptance — this mode, I say, is not proved first, because it has no foundation in Scripture, which is far from signifying that that command was not imposed on Christ the Lord except dependently upon his free acceptance; rather it teaches that the command preceded and the acceptance of Christ followed, as we read Psalm 39, where the Prophet in the person of Christ says: In the head of the book it is written of me that I should do thy will: O my God, I have desired it, and thy law in the midst of my heart. Nor do those texts favor this opinion, Isaiah 53, He was offered because he willed it. And John 10, No man taketh my life away from me, but I lay it down of myself: for they signify only that Christ suffered death not unwillingly but gladly and willingly. Next, the obedience of Christ ought to have been most perfect: but that obedience is more perfect by how much the less the command depends upon the will of the subject: therefore the obedience of Christ ought to have depended more upon the will of God ordaining and commanding death than upon the will of Christ desiring that command be imposed on himself. Finally, this opinion has no place regarding the precepts of the law of nature, by which Christ was bound independently upon his free acceptance: but the liberty of Christ must be reconciled with his supreme impeccability regarding the observance of the precepts of natural law just as much as regarding the observance of other precepts of positive law: therefore this mode of reconciling is less fitting.

Nor is the third mode proved, which affirms that Christ freely fulfilled the mandate of dying because before the time of fulfilling that command pressed on Christ could ask and obtain from the Father its dispensation: it is not proved, I say, both because it does not seem that dispensation could easily be granted to Christ concerning the precepts of the law of nature, by which he was bound: therefore neither could he ask dispensation from the Father concerning them. Then because God could at some instant command him to do something: but in that instant the command could not be removed, because otherwise it would follow that the command would be and not be in the same instant: therefore it is necessary that the observance of the command be reconciled with impeccability in another way than through being able to ask dispensation. Then because although Christ had no command against asking efficaciously a dispensation from the command of dying for the salvation of the human race, yet he had counsel against asking it, since that death ought to redound to the glory of God and the salvation of men: but Christ had power not only not to transgress commands but also non-embracing the counsels of God was repugnant to him, because not only sin by reason of his holiness but any moral imperfection whatsoever contracted through omission of a counsel was repugnant to him: therefore this mode of reconciling does not seem suitable either.

The fourth opinion also is disapproved first, because Sacred Scripture intimates that the death of Christ was commanded not only as regards substance but also as regards the circumstances of time and motive. Of time, I say, as is gathered from Luke 12, where Christ says: And I have a baptism wherewith I am to be baptized: and how am I straitened until it be accomplished! in which words Christ the Lord signifies that the time of his death was determined by the Father and that he anguishes over the delay and postponement of that time: and chapter 22, The Son of man goeth according to that which is determined: and John 17, Knowing Jesus that his hour was come that he should pass out of this world to the Father. Similarly he signifies that other circumstances were commanded him, especially the circumstance of place, Luke 13, It cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem: the circumstance of the manner of punishment, John 3, And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up, etc. Similarly there was commanded him the manner of obedience, as is evident from Philippians 2, He humbled himself becoming obedient unto death. Also the motive of charity was commanded: hence John 14, That the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father hath given me commandment, so do I.

Second, from that opinion it would follow that Christ did not merit our redemption through the satisfaction of death precisely because he died, but only from the fact that he sustained death with such affection or motive: but this conflicts with Scripture; for it is said Isaiah 53, If he shall lay down his life for sin, he shall see a long-lived seed: in which words the reward of the redemption of men is attributed not to the circumstances but to the death itself: therefore, etc. Second it is plain, for an act is meritorious by that reason by which it is free: therefore if it were free only as regards motive and circumstances, but not as regards substance, the consequence is that the death of Christ of itself is not free. — Finally, since Christ through his beatific vision knew the eternal will of God in its unity, he saw not only in it as regards genus and substance of death, but he also saw the motives according to which the eternal law required that he suffer that death, and all the circumstances of that death: for what St. Augustine writes, book 13, chapter 15, On the blessed Angels, can hold also in men, but most truly in Christ comprehensor: Let him see making always, and let him cease if he shall be able.

What thy eternal will willeth concerning times, they read, choose, and love; they read always, and never passes away what they read: for by choosing and loving they read the very immutability of thy counsel. Therefore Christ, as comprehensor, knew not only the substance of his death but also the circumstances defined and ordained by the eternal law of God: now the eternal law is nothing else, as St. Augustine teaches, book 1, On Free Choice, chapter 6, than the highest reason existing in God, which must ever be obeyed. Therefore if Christ was not free as regards the substance of death, because it was commanded, neither would he have been free as regards the circumstances and motives, which were defined by God.

Finally the last opinion must be disapproved, namely that Christ could refuse death in the divided sense, although he could not refuse it in the composite sense, and as it was commanded. It is disapproved, I say, both because the present controversy is not moved about death qua death, but about death qua commanded: therefore if Christ was not free regarding death qua commanded, it cannot be said that he died freely and meritoriously: then because that Christ could refuse death in the divided sense is that he could have willed not to die while nevertheless knowing death was to be undergone: but Christ could not have such willing given his impeccability. It is proved. To be able to will-not commanded death in the divided sense is to will to sever it from the command: but Christ could not have a volition of severing his death from the command of God, otherwise he would have had a volition opposed to the divine volition: therefore Christ could not will-not commanded death in the divided sense.

Nor does it avail to reply with Gonet that divisibility, or the volition of separation of death from the command, is not positive but precissive, because positive division of the negation of death from the command requires ablation of the command, but precissive not so. — This answer, I say, is rather an evasion than a legitimate explanation of the difficulty: for indeed Christ merited positively when he fulfilled the commands: therefore positively he had liberty of fulfilling them: but positive liberty of fulfilling commands supposes, or imports, a positive power of fulfilling them or not fulfilling them; for liberty of indifference requires a power of acting or not acting: therefore if Christ could have nolition of commanded death, it behooved that he have it not only precissively but also positively; so that his will could positively will-not to join death with the command: that is, to will positively to divide it from the command: therefore, etc.