Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

WHETHER AND WHEN CHRIST MERITED.

NOTE 1. The primary function of Christ as Mediator and Redeemer is not only to establish reconciliation and peace between God and men, but also to merit for them grace and eternal life, and by meriting to make satisfaction to the Father angry on account of their offenses. It must be known, however, that calling, merit, satisfaction, redemption, and mediation are various appellations which, according as they are viewed in different ways, befit one and the same action of Christ; for the voluntary oblation of Christ unto death was at once meritorious, satisfactory, redemptive, and mediatorial. Meritorious indeed, inasmuch as it was a free action performed in grace, and in the state of wayfaring, in obedience and for the glory of God: satisfactory, inasmuch as it was offered to God in compensation for the injury inflicted by our sins: redemptive, inasmuch as through it Christ rescued us from the captivity of the devil and of sin: finally mediatorial, because, as the Apostle says, 2 Cor. 5, God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, not imputing to them their sins. Nevertheless all these seem in some degree to differ among themselves, for merit signifies some right to a reward and price, which properly and per se ought not to belong to satisfaction. Moreover, merit extends to more objects than satisfaction does, because the satisfaction of Christ regards only our sins, whereas merit regards the Angels and Christ himself, since he merited many things for himself. Likewise satisfaction is distinguished from redemption in that the former regards principally the person offended, and less principally the person on whose behalf satisfaction is made; while the latter regards principally the person who is set free, and quasi-secondarily either the person through whose service he is set free, or those things from which his liberation is made. Finally mediation is distinguished from all of these inasmuch as it equally regards two extremes, or two persons, whom it mutually reconciles.

NOTE 2. In general a twofold merit is assigned by theologians: one of condignity, the other of congruity. Merit of condignity is said to be that to which the recompense or reward is owed from condignity, or from justice: but that merit is called of congruity to which compensation is not indeed owed from justice; yet it is rendered from a certain fittingness and honorableness. Now for merit of condignity six conditions are required. First, that the work be morally good, namely from its object and all its circumstances; for, as St. Augustine says in the book On Grace and Free Will, chapter 6, The Lord does not crown evil works: since just as evil works do not deserve praise but blame, so neither do they deserve reward, but punishment. — The second condition is that the meritorious action be voluntary and free, because with respect to natural acts we neither merit nor demerit. Whence the Apostle, 1 Cor. 9, If I do this willingly, I have a reward: but if against my will, a dispensation is committed to me: what then is my reward? And St. Augustine, book 2, chapter 1, On Free Choice: How would that good exist, whereby justice itself is commended in condemning sins and honorable deeds are held in honor, if man lacked the free choice of his will? — Third, merit must be an act of man the wayfarer, for the Blessed and the damned, because they are at the term, can neither merit nor demerit. Whence the Apostle to the Galatians 6, Whilst we have time, let us work good. The Subtle Doctor sets forth the reason for this in book 2, distinction 6, question 2, namely because merit proceeds from an affection of justice, and that in a twofold manner: namely either by loving God with the love of friendship in himself, or by moderating appetite on his account; but when we are only wayfarers, the occasion offers itself of moderating the affections of our own advantage; because only in this state can we inordinately will our own advantage; whence it follows that for the notion of merit the one meriting must exist in the state of wayfaring. — Fourth, that the meritorious act proceed from a man existing in the state of grace and friendship with God; for if the subject is not pleasing to God, all his works cannot be pleasing to him. Whence the Apostle, 1 Cor. 13, If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. — Fifth, the meritorious act must be referred to God as to its proper end and object. For just as, the Doctor says in book 1, distinction 1, question 6, the love of concupiscence is properly the root of all demerit, so the love of divine friendship is the root of all merit: but the love of friendship is an elicited act conformable to the superior rule, which is the supernatural dictate of reason, or a certain knowledge deduced or revealed concerning the things necessary for salvation, according to which as often as we act, so often are we borne by the love of friendship toward God; and consequently with an affection of justice, in which love and affection disorder cannot occur, for the object of it is supremely right and supremely rectifying actions; and thereupon for the notion of a meritorious act it is necessary that it be referred to God with an affection of justice, or the love of friendship. — Sixth and last, it is necessary that there be present on the part of God a covenant and promise; and on the part of the one acting, or meriting, an ordination of the work toward obtaining the reward; because without such a promise and ordination God cannot be obligated to anyone to render a reward. This condition the Council of Trent clearly designates, session 6, chapter 16, when it says: for those who work well even unto the end, and who work in God, eternal life is to be proposed, both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a reward faithfully to be rendered for their good works and merits by the promise of God himself.

NOTE 3. Four times or instants can be distinguished concerning which the controversy may be whether Christ merited in it: namely either the instant of conception and formation: or the intervening time from his conception up to the last instant of death: or the very instant of death: finally the time which followed after death up to the resurrection, and the immortal and beatific state of his body. Hence the opinion of theologians is fourfold. The first denies that Christ merited in the first instant of conception. Thus the Alexandrine, part 3, q. 17, m. 2, art. 1. To him subscribes St. Bonaventure, book 3, d. 18, art. 10, q. 2. The second asserts that Christ merited not only in this mortal life, but also after death, especially when his blood was poured out from his transfixed side. The third extends the merit of Christ up to the instant initiatory of death and terminative of life. Thus Cajetan, 2-2, q. 124, art. 1. The fourth, finally, more common and truer, teaches that Christ did indeed merit from the first instant of conception up to the last instant immediately preceding death.

First conclusion. — CHRIST TRULY AND PROPERLY MERITED FOR US THE GRACE OF REDEMPTION AND RECONCILIATION WITH GOD.

This is of faith, and is gathered from Isaiah 53, If he shall lay down his life for sin, he shall see a long-lived seed. And for that he labored, his soul shall see and be filled. By his knowledge shall this my just servant justify many, and he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I distribute to him very many, and he shall divide the spoils of the strong, because he hath delivered his life unto death, etc. Even as the Apostle declares in his epistle to the Philippians, He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross: For which cause God also hath exalted him, etc. In which places there is contained, as it were, a certain stipulation and pact of God with the man Christ: and indeed of such a kind, that if he should wish to spend his death upon men to be redeemed, then they would be admitted to grace and to the hope of recovering salvation: then he himself for his part would acquire glory, and God immortality.

There also supports this a reason, because all the conditions required for merit were truly and perfectly in Christ. First, indeed, his acts were free, and freely he took upon himself the burden of redemption imposed on him by the Father. For he was offered because he willed it, Isaiah 53. Hence John 10 he said himself: Therefore doth the Father love me: because I lay down my life, that I may take it again. No man taketh it away from me: but I lay it down of myself: and I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. — Second, his actions were morally good and honorable, both from their object and from their circumstances, as he himself testifies, John 8, saying, I do always the things that please him. — Third, his humanity was supremely pleasing and acceptable to God by reason of the grace of union and habitual and actual sanctification. — Fourth, he ordered all his acts to the glory of God, as he testifies in many places, especially John 8 in these words, I seek not my own glory, but the glory of him that sent me. — Fifth, his state was that of a wayfarer. For although Christ according to his mind, or higher part, was comprehensor from the instant of his conception, nevertheless according to the lower part, and inasmuch as he bestowed upon his body vegetative and sensitive life, and inasmuch as he was the principle of the passions or animal affections of the sensitive appetite, he was a wayfarer also according to his soul: whence simultaneously in the same soul of Christ were found the joy of the comprehensor and the sadness of the wayfarer, as we said when treating of the Passions of Christ. Wherefore Jeremiah prophesies of him, chapter 14, The expectation of Israel, the Saviour thereof in time of trouble: why wilt thou be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man that turneth aside to tarry for a night? — Finally, that a covenant intervened is evident from the words of Isaiah praised above, concerning which covenant Rupert treats most excellently in the first book of his commentaries on Genesis, chapter 31, where he accommodates to Christ that covenant which God entered into with Noah and his posterity after the flood, when he said: My covenant shall be established with you. We say, he says, that the covenant is not often indeed promised, but one and entered into once. One covenant, I say, by which alone the enmities are dissolved, which existed between God and men: the Incarnation, or the Passion of Christ the Son of God. Thither without any contradiction the constitution of peace stands ratified with the reason of giving and receiving, while God receives faith from men, and gives to men the same Christ his Son, that we may be saved through him. But this faith God exacted from men through the Mediator and Arbitrator, and as it were feudal champion, Christ the Lord, who stipulated on behalf of the human race. Moreover in chapter 36 Rupert explains more openly the force of this covenant thus: In this, he says, God struck a covenant with men through Christ his Son, whereby, reconciling us to himself in him dying on the cross, he washed us from our sins in his blood, and gave us through him the holy spirit of his charity.

You will object 1. Christ could not sin: therefore neither could he merit. The consequence is proved: if he could not sin, he must have been perfectly joined to the ultimate end: but he who is perfectly joined to the ultimate end cannot merit, otherwise the Blessed, so joined to God, could merit: therefore if Christ could not sin, neither could he merit. — I deny the consequence, and of the proof of it I distinguish the major: he must have been perfectly joined to the ultimate end with respect to both affections, of justice and of advantage, I deny: with respect to the affection of justice only, I concede. And similarly, with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence. For Christ was indeed perfectly joined to God as regards the affection of justice: For the superior portion in Christ, says the Doctor, number 16, is joined to God by the glory quieting that portion, and by the affection of justice the whole man, so that he could not sin; he could however suffer, because something could happen against the affection of advantage, and that Christ could ordinate and accept, and thus merit. So the Doctor, by which words he signifies that although Christ was so perfectly joined to God by the affection of justice that he could not turn away from him by sin, and thus by reason of that union he could not sin, nevertheless because that union did not prevent him from being able to suffer something freely, since he was not perfectly joined by the affection of advantage and of delightful good as regards the lower portion, hence it is that although he could not sin, yet he could merit.

You will object 2. Christ always enjoyed God: therefore he never merited. The consequence is proved: because if he could merit, then most of all either by the same act of fruition, or by a distinct one: not by the same, because of the notion of a meritorious act it belongs that it be elicited contingently, so that the will, insofar as it is prior by natural priority to that act, can contingently elicit it or not elicit it: but the beatific act of fruition, since it is necessary, cannot be contingently elicited: therefore neither can it be meritorious. Nor even by a distinct act, because the act of fruition is adequate to the power; for the power enjoys God as much as it can, and spends every effort in eliciting love of him: therefore it cannot have another act concerning God. — I deny the consequence, and to the proof of it I say that Christ was able to merit by an act of the lower portion of the soul, which was distinct from the act of fruition belonging to the higher portion; for although that fruition was an act adequate to the higher portion of the soul, that did not prevent him from being able, according to the lower portion, to have another act, which is in some way referred to God: for although a meritorious act ought to presuppose the love of friendship of God, it is not nevertheless necessary that it be the love of friendship of God, because it can be immediately love of a thing as of an object loved on account of God.

You will insist. Christ ought to have merited according to acts of the soul as it is an understanding and free faculty: but as such it is not the lower but the higher part of man: therefore if Christ could not merit according to the higher portion, by no means could he merit. — I distinguish the minor: the soul, as understanding and free, is the higher part of man insofar as it is occupied immediately about divine and eternal things, I concede: insofar as it is occupied about temporal and created things, I deny. Now the soul of Christ, as understanding and willing, could merit by that same reason by which it gave life to the body and moved it to acts, and voluntarily accepted all the bitter things of pain and sorrow, which both the body and itself had to endure in the Passion, that it might comply with the eternal Father, who had decreed and commanded such acts or passions.

Second conclusion. — Christ merited in the first instant of his conception.

This is common to both the Angelic and the Subtle school, and is gathered from Hebrews 10, where the Apostle says of Christ: When he cometh into the world, he saith: Sacrifice and oblation thou wouldest not... then said I: Behold I come. In the head of the book it is written of me, that I should do thy will, O God. There the Apostle says pointedly, coming into the world, not indeed after he had come; that he might signify that in the very first instant of his union and formation he devoted himself to the Father as a victim. From these things one may argue thus: that voluntary oblation, whereby Christ, coming into the world, devoted himself as a victim to passion and death for the glory of his divine Father, was meritorious: but such an oblation occurred in the first instant of his formation: therefore in that instant Christ merited. The major is evident: since such oblation and acceptance of death was free and from charity, and had the other conditions required for merit. Hence the Apostle subjoins of it there: in which will we are sanctified by the oblation of the body of Jesus Christ once: but the will, or operation, by which Christ sanctified us, was satisfactory and meritorious. The minor also is clear from the words of the Apostle, since, as we have observed, he said notably, coming into the world, which signifies the first instant of his formation. — Moreover this is also gathered from this, that Christ said, then said I, etc.; for the word then refers to that passage, but a body thou hast fitted to me, that is, to that instant at which God fitted to him a body for immolation and sacrifice. But this adaptation was made in the first instant of the formation of his body: therefore, etc.

The Doctor proves the conclusion, distinction 18, number 11, with this reason: Christ in the first instant of his conception had all that which was required for a meritorious act: therefore in that instant he could merit. The consequence is plain: since there must be attributed to Christ the Savior all that which most conduces to the glory of God and to the salvation of men for that instant at which he can operate it, seeing that it redounds most greatly to his glory and to the completion of his ministry. But the antecedent is proved: since in that first instant the human nature of Christ, for that instant in which it was united to the Word, had an act of will free, supernatural, pleasing to God, acceptable, and affected with the other conditions required for merit; indeed in that instant he had vision and beatific love, and knew very many creatures in the Word, and consequently beheld the lot and state of men whom he could save if he willed. And since through beatific love and sanctifying grace he burned with supreme charity, there is no doubt that in that very instant he offered himself to the Father as a victim for the salvation of men: therefore for that instant he merited. — It is confirmed: if anything stood in the way of Christ's being able to merit in the first instant, it would be especially because merit consists in free operation, which he could not have in the first instant of the formation of Christ: both because operating follows upon being, and because a free act requires consultation, and since consultation consists in discourse and comparison, it cannot be exercised in an instant: but this reason is null, since for a meritorious and free action it is not required that the cause, or principle, precede in time its operation, or elicited act; but it suffices that it precede by priority of nature, and consequently can be simultaneous with it. Whence just as in the same instant in which the sun began to be, in that same it also began to illuminate, so Christ, since in the first instant of his conception he possessed the fullness of speculative and practical science, and an intellect perfectly illuminated, and a will ready and perfect in all respects, in order to exercise a meritorious and voluntary act, needed neither consultation nor deliberation of counsel in order to elicit that act freely, and consequently no time was required of him that he might exercise that meritorious act.

You will object 1. A meritorious act must come about contingently, because it proceeds from a will freely determining itself to act: but Christ in the first instant of his formation could not have a contingent act: because whatever is, when it is, must necessarily be: therefore neither meritorious. The minor is proved: an act cannot be contingent unless inasmuch as its cause precedes its act in time, and can elicit it: but a will having an act for the first instant of its existence does not precede that act in time: therefore if the will of Christ had an act for the first instant of its formation, that act could not be contingent and free, nor consequently meritorious. — I distinguish the major: it must come about contingently, that is, it must proceed from a will freely determining itself to elicit that act, I concede: that is, it must proceed from a will existing prior in time and determining itself to elicit that act, I deny. Whence I deny the minor, and to its proof I say: whatever is, when it is, must necessarily be; in the composite sense, on the supposition that it exists, I concede: in the divided sense, so that what is for this instant could not absolutely fail to be for the same instant if the will had not willed to determine itself to it, I deny. Or otherwise I say with the Doctor, number 17: whatever is, when it is, must necessarily be in the mode in which it is, I concede: otherwise, I deny. Hence when a contingent being is, it is true that it is necessarily contingent: but it does not follow thence that it is a necessary being, and thus it is necessarily, not necessary.

You will object 2. Two changes whose terminus of one precedes the terminus of the other cannot be simultaneous in the same instant of duration: but the will, which is the terminus of the creative change whereby it itself is produced, must necessarily be presupposed to the volition which is the terminus of the change whereby the will moves itself so as to pass from not willing to willing: therefore the change whereby the will is produced cannot be simultaneous with that whereby the will operates. — I distinguish the major, says the Doctor: those changes cannot be simultaneous with a simultaneity opposed to that priority which one of the termini ought to have with respect to the other, he concedes the major: with another simultaneity not opposed to it, he denies the major. Similarly the minor must be distinguished: it must be presupposed in time, I deny: in nature, I concede. Therefore since between those changes the order of time is not observed, but only of nature, therefore also between their termini the order of time need not necessarily be observed, but of nature; and consequently since the will of the soul of Christ and its act could be simultaneous in time, in the same instant of time in which the will existed, it could merit through that simultaneous act.

Third conclusion. — Christ merited throughout the whole time of his life.

This likewise is common, and

He fulfilled the office of Mediator: but the chief office of Savior and Redeemer is to merit for us those things which are necessary for salvation, and to pay to the eternal Father the satisfaction due for our offenses: therefore he merited throughout the whole time of his life. The major is evident: indeed among the other titles of glory by which Christ is celebrated, he is specially called Jesus and Savior. Hence Luke 1, the Angel, messenger of the Incarnation, addressing the Virgin says: And thou shalt call his name Jesus. And chapter 2, the Angels announcing the nativity of Christ to the Shepherds said: This day is born to you a Saviour; and consequently for this above all he had come, that he might fulfill the office of Savior and Redeemer. The minor also is evident: indeed he could not fulfill the role of the most perfect Savior and Redeemer without making satisfaction most perfectly to the eternal Father for our debts, and meriting for us his grace and glory, and restoring us to our pristine dignity and liberty lost through sin. But all these things he could not effect except by his merits and good works: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed: If there were any time in which it could be thought that Christ had not merited something for us, especially the time of his infancy: but at that very time Christ merited our salvation by his merits: therefore, etc. The major is evident: since at that time especially Christ seems to have been less apt and disposed to merit anything for us, seeing that he elicited no external acts, nor did he seem to suffer anything voluntarily, by which he could most be thought to merit anything. But the minor St. Ambrose proves, book 2, on Luke, chapter On the Nativity of the Savior, where among other things he says:

He therefore was a little child, an infant, that thou mightest be a perfect man: he was safe in swaddling clothes, that thou mightest be loosed from the snares of death: he was in the manger, that thou mightest be on the altars; he was on earth, that thou mightest be in heaven: he had no other place in that lodging, that thou mightest have many mansions in the heavens... Therefore that poverty of his is my inheritance, and the infirmity of the Lord my strength: he chose to be in want himself, that I might abound... His weeping infancy washes me clean; those tears of mine washed away my faults: therefore more, Lord Jesus, do I owe to thy injuries, that I am redeemed, than to thy works, that I am created.

But in no other way could Christ procure these things for us except by way of merit: therefore St. Ambrose acknowledges in the tears, the swaddling clothes, and the humility of Christ's infancy, the merit we contend for. To him subscribes St. Augustine, sermon 11, On the Seasons, where he speaks thus of Christ: Let us adore the swaddling clothes of his infancy, from which were made the plasters of our nature. And St. Bernard, sermon 2, On Circumcision: Deservedly indeed, he says, while the child who is given to us is circumcised, he is called Savior, namely because from this he had already begun to work our salvation by shedding that immaculate blood for us. In which words those holy Fathers plainly signify that Christ merited for us even by his infancy.

You will say: The acts of Christ were meritorious insofar as they were pleasing to the divine Father and accepted by him in order to the salvation of men: but only his passion seems to have been accepted for that end, since concerning it alone the divine covenant intervened, as is evident from the aforesaid prophecy of Isaiah, If he shall lay down his life for sin, he shall see a long-lived seed: therefore Christ the Lord is not to be said to have meditated upon and worked out our salvation through all the acts of his life. — I deny the minor: for although the acceptance and divine covenant appears most especially with regard to the passion and death of Christ, nevertheless other operations of Christ are not lacking as being meritorious, because that covenant is expressed only on the hypothesis that the Son of God willed to accept and ordain his passion for the benefit of our redemption, especially since all the acts and penalities of Christ were ordained to the passion as to the perfect completion of our satisfaction and redemption. Whence it must be said, says the Alexandrine, member 3, article 2, that every work of Christ before the Passion was meritorious for us: but the Passion was meritorious and satisfactory for us: meritorious of eternal life, and satisfactory with respect to remission of punishment.

You ask: whether all the actions of Christ were meritorious, so that none were indifferent, such as, for example, the actions which we are wont to elicit either for our own advantage or without perfect deliberation and liberty of will. — I answer, that it seems more probable that all the actions of Christ were meritorious, because Christ the Lord did nothing at all for his own advantage, and whatever he wrought he always wrought with full deliberation and supreme liberty of will.

Fourth conclusion. — Christ merited for us up to the instant of death, but not after the instant of death, nor after death.

The first part is evident, because up to the last instant of death Christ had all the conditions required for merit, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said: therefore up to that instant he must be judged to have worked out our salvation.

But the second part of the Conclusion is intimated: because the state of wayfaring required for merit signifies the conjunction and union of soul with a passible and mortal body: but in the physical instant of death the soul of Christ was not united to a mortal body, for according to the common opinion of Philosophers living things cease to be through their first not-being, and consequently in the instant of Christ's death it was true to say: now for the first time Christ is not, as man, living a mortal life; and consequently in that instant the soul of Christ was not united to a mortal body.

Finally the third part is sufficiently evident from what has been said, since one of the chief conditions required for merit is the state of wayfarer: but after death Christ was no longer a wayfarer, whence he said John 9, I must work the works of him that sent me, whilst it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work, that is, merit: but by night St. Chrysostom, Homily 53 on John, and Augustine, tractate 44, understand the time after this life: therefore Christ the Lord could not merit after the instant of his death.

You will say: The death of Christ, and the wound inflicted on his side, and the blood flowing from it with water had the character of merit: therefore in truth Christ merited at the instant of death and after death. The antecedent is proved: both because we are said to be redeemed by the death of Christ, as the Apostle signifies in many places; and because the holy Fathers teach that the blood and water flowing from the side of Christ possessed the greatest power, and thence also flowed the sacraments: thus St. Leo, Epistle 1, chapter 6. Then, he says, he ratified the power of regeneration when from his side flowed forth the blood of redemption and the water of baptism. The same is taught by very many of the holy Fathers, especially Ambrose, book 12, on John, chapter 29, where he calls the blood and water flowing from the side of Christ a certain origin and firstfruits of mystical benediction and sacred Baptism. — I answer, that the death of Christ and that inflicted wound are to be judged meritorious insofar as Christ still living, and foreseeing what he was about to suffer, not only in death but also after death, voluntarily accepted all those things and offered them to God the Father with an anticipated and previous affection in expiation of our offenses and for the securing of our salvation. Nor does it matter that the holy Fathers say that the flow of that blood and water issuing from the side of Christ signifies two sacraments; for thence it does not follow that Christ by that effusion of blood and water merited that divine power which the sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist possess for meriting the salvation of men; but only that those two sacraments were most especially foreshadowed and expressed in that effusion of water and blood.

You ask: whether Christ had one single merit continued from the instant of conception to the extremity of his life, or rather manifold. — I answer, that it seems more probable that he had manifold merit, by reason of the diverse acts which he elicited; for just as he who with one continued will of pleasing God fasts and gives alms has a twofold merit, so it is likewise probable that Christ, through that will whereby he continuously pleased the eternal Father, according to John 8, I do always the things that please him, since he exercised diverse virtues, had diverse merits. Nor does it matter that he had one will of making satisfaction for us, from which will all his acts proceeded; for, as we said just now, the continuation of the same effect and will of pleasing God does not hinder him from having exercised more virtues, and consequently he could have had diverse merits.