Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Note 1. From the Doctor in 2. dist. 21., single question, there is a double portion of the soul, namely the superior and the inferior. The superior portion is the very faculties of the soul, to wit intellect, will, and memory, inasmuch as they are occupied about eternal and spiritual things. The inferior portion indeed is the same faculties, inasmuch as they busy themselves about temporal things. From these the Doctor infers that the portion is not distinguished by the fact that one is contemplative and the other practical, as some wish, because both speculative and practical pertain to the superior portion: the speculative indeed inasmuch as the intellect alone speculates eternals; the practical inasmuch as that same intellect speculates eternals as lovable by us. Practical again inasmuch as the will, as the superior portion, which by its nature is a practical faculty, wills to embrace and pursue eternals. He further infers that the superior and inferior portions of the intellect, likewise the superior and inferior of the will, are not two powers. First, because the same power knows principles and conclusions; otherwise no power would know the same thing, since it is not known per se except from comparison with the principle: but the inferior portion of the intellect, e. g., knows the conclusion, and the superior portion the principle: for St. Augustine says the superior portion is intent upon contemplating eternal and superior rules; the inferior truly intent upon doing temporal things according to eternal rules: but those things about which the inferior portion is occupied are conclusions of the eternal rules: therefore the inferior portion of the intellect knows the conclusions of principles whose superior portion is of the same intellect. It is confirmed, because the same habit does not simply perfect two powers: but the same charity, e. g., perfects the will of the superior portion: since the same charity is in the will of the superior portion, whereby God is loved, nor not also in the will of the inferior portion, whereby neighbor is loved, who is a temporal object; for one and the same charity extends itself to all lovable things: therefore since one and the same habit of charity resides in the superior and inferior portion of the same soul, it follows that those portions are not distinct faculties and powers.

Note 2. The eleven passions of the sensitive appetite or of the inferior portion of the soul customarily enumerated by the Philosophers, of which five reside in the irascible appetite, namely hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger: six truly in the concupiscible appetite, to wit love, hatred, desire, joy, flight, and sadness. It is certain however that hope could be in Christ, as one who was able to hope for the glory of his body, and liberation from all those penalities and torments with which his humanity was agitated both at the time of life and at the time of passion. Despair was similarly in him, indeed not that which the impious Calvin sustains, such namely as the reprobate have concerning the object of beatitude; but only that which busies itself about an unavoidable sensible evil; for when some evil presents itself to us not apprehended as inevitable, we struggle between hope and despair: when truly it is now proposed as inevitable with every hope of escape taken away, we despair. Daring was likewise in him, because he had fortitude of mind and constancy with respect to undergoing death; nor did he only patiently sustain inflicted torments and the insults of adversaries, but even went forth courageously to meet them, as the holy Evangelists relate. Similarly as to the portion of the concupiscible appetite, it is certain he had love and hatred: seeing that with sensitive love and hatred he pursued certain things, namely the conservation of his own life and aversion from death. He had similarly desire, for he said to his Disciples: With desire I have desired to eat this Pasch with you. He had equally flight from death and pain when he prayed the Father: Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me. Although however he was a man of sorrows and in labors from his youth, nevertheless he had delight, especially in spiritual goods; whence in his name the Royal Psalmist sings Psalm 83.: My heart and my flesh have exulted in the living God. Whence it is above all disputed among Theologians whether Christ had passions of sadness, fear, and anger; wherefore,

Note 3. From the Doctor in 3. d. 18. num. 12., one must philosophize in the same manner concerning sadness and joy, as, proportion preserved, concerning delectation and pain with respect to the sensitive appetite; for just as pain in the body is caused by a disagreeing object approached and applied to the sensitive part, so likewise sadness is caused by an object ungrateful to the will; whence St. Augustine book 14. Of the City of God, chapter 14.: Pain of the flesh is only offense of the soul from the flesh, and a certain dissent from its passion: just as the pain of the soul, which is called sadness, is its dissent from those things which happen to us unwillingly. It happens however, says the Doctor, that the will is disposed toward objects from which it can receive sadness in many ways: First indeed it happens that something be contrary, indeed not to the elicitive act of the will itself and the free appetite, but only to the natural appetite; for although the will is one simple faculty, it is nevertheless sometimes considered as natural appetite; at other times truly as free appetite: as natural appetite it agrees with all other natural things, to which it is common to have some convenient objects and some inconvenient or contrary ones; just as water, for example, to which heat is contrary, as coldness is convenient. The will therefore, viewed as natural appetite, naturally tends toward felicity, likewise naturally flees misery: so that even without any elicited act given by it, it is deemed naturally borne toward beatitude and turned away from misery: therefore when an object of that sort disagreeing with the natural appetite of the will presents itself, sadness follows from it. Secondly, sadness is caused when something happens with the will unwilling by elicited nolition, whatever that may be which it does not will; for example, if someone be unwilling to be visited, and is visited: thence the will is saddened. Thirdly, sadness is caused from conjunction of the will with sensitive affection; for it is impossible for the sensitive faculty to receive pain, and thence not to raise up sadness in the will. Fourthly, although there be no nolition, the will can also be saddened through weariness; how e. g. someone taking a bitter potion would be unwilling to take it if he could, and on account of that unwilingness sadness arises in his will. From these the Subtle Doctor gathers that sadness resides formally in the will, just as sensible pain resides in the sensitive appetite; and that sadness is not any action of the will, just as sensible pain is not an action of the sensitive appetite, because every action of the will is in the power of the will, but sadness is not in the power of the will, at least consequently: therefore it is not an action of the will. I say at least consequently, because it is clear antecedently to be in the power of the will, namely inasmuch as volition and nolition, from which sadness arises, are in the power of the will; yet once the nolition of some object has been posited, with that object antecedently actually notwilled, it is not in the power of the will not to be saddened. It is added that experience teaches sadness not to be any action, for when we are saddened we experience ourselves suffering strongly, from which passion there sometimes follows anguish, that is a vehement passion, and melancholy, that is sadness hardened by long duration; which things indeed indicate passion rather than action.

First Conclusion. — In Christ the Lord there were truly human passions, yet not with that imperfection with which they exist in other men.

This is determined of faith in the 6th Synod Act. 1., and is proved by various texts of Scripture, whereby human affections and movements are asserted to have been in Christ. Thus John. 2. it is said of him: The zeal of thy house hath eaten me. Mark 3.: Looking round on them with anger, being grieved for the blindness of their hearts, Matth. 26.: My soul is sorrowful even unto death.

The Holy Fathers testify the same with unanimous sentiment: Ambrose book 1. On the Faith chapter 3.; Augustin lib. 14. De Civit. Dei, c. 7.; and St. Leo Epistle 11., which is to Julian near the end, where he writes thus: Bodily senses flee without the law of sin, and the charity of affections under the moderation of Deity and mind. The same St. Damascene taught, 3. On the Faith chapter 20., concerning all defects of our soul which are alien from reprehension, among which he enumerates fear, anguish, refusal of death. Reason also favors it, because those affections of the sensitive appetite look to the conservation, dignity, and exercise of human life; they contribute also to satisfaction for the sins of men, as appears of pain and sadness.

The second part also appears, namely that those passions were otherwise in Christ than in us, both as to object, and as to principle, and as to effect. First indeed as to object, because those movements of mind in us are mostly borne toward illicit things: but in Christ the Lord they always tended to an honest good, because he was truly impeccable and lacked the very fomes of sin inclining toward evil. Secondly, as to principle, because passions of that sort in us often anticipate judgment and use of reason: but in Christ they always arose according to the disposition of reason, either positively moving, or providing and permitting; whence they never anticipated his reason; but were in him only by deliberate will, when he willed, as long as he willed, and how he willed. Which John certainly signified when chapter 11. he thus said of Christ the Lord: He groaned in spirit, and troubled himself: for that manner of speaking signifies that Christ the Lord freely excited in himself that movement of compassion and indignation, from which he himself was troubled, as St. Augustine teaches, tract. 19. on John. In his power, he says, it was to be affected thus or not thus; for the Word took upon himself soul and flesh, fitting to himself the nature of the whole man in unity of person. And a little after: Where supreme power is, infirmity is handled according to the nod of the will — that is, he troubled himself. St. Athanasius likewise proves the same, Oration Against Apollinaris, from the fact that Christ the Lord signally said John 12.: Now is my soul troubled; for he says: For that cause the Lord said: now is my soul troubled, but this particle now is the same as when he willed. Finally thirdly those passions were otherwise in Christ than in us as to effect: for in us they sometimes drag reason toward illicit things, so that it consent to those disordered movements, nor do they consist only in the sensitive appetite, but they entice even the rational appetite toward themselves; it was otherwise in Christ, for since his soul had full dominion over all its faculties and acts, he admitted into himself such passions not only by simple permission, but by positive consent; and since he had all treasures of wisdom hidden in himself and foresaw the future, he could easily know all that which his appetite could excite, and make it so that these passions could in no way drag him toward illicit things. Thence most Scholastics after St. Jerome on chapter 25. of St. Matthew say that in Christ there were indeed not passions, but propassions, because, they say, by the name of propassion is signified an affection which excites some motion of the body, and moves man indeed, but does not remove his reason from its right and free exercise, as happens through passions. Truly this distinction existed only among the Stoic Philosophers and their followers: for among the Peripatetics and the Holy Fathers the name of passion and propassion plainly signifies the same thing, and is common both to ordered and disordered affections.

Second Conclusion. — Christ truly had the affection of sadness, indeed not in the superior portion of the soul precisely and separately taken, but inasmuch as it is bound up with the sensitive appetite.

This Conclusion has two parts, of which

The first stands from those texts of Scripture praised above, whereby it is asserted that Christ was truly saddened. Thus Matt. 26.: My soul is sorrowful even unto death. And Luc. 22.: Being in agony, he prayed the longer. Thence St. Ambrose book 2. On the Faith chapter 2.: And man had sadness. For he received my sadness. Confidently do I name sadness, who preach the cross.

The Seraphic Doctor proves the same truth dist. 15. art. 2. q. 2. First indeed, because, as we read Luke 19., Christ seeing the city of Jerusalem wept over it: but weeping is a sign of pain and grief: therefore Christ by weeping testified anguish of mind and sadness. Secondly, Christ loved and desired our salvation: but whoever loves something is saddened by its loss: therefore when Christ saw many neglecting their salvation, it appears that he felt in himself true affection of sadness. Thirdly, the greater the bowels of piety in anyone, the more he is affected with grief: but Christ had most abundant bowels of piety: therefore he had greatest sadness over the necessities and infirmities of others.

The second part also stands, namely that that sadness was not in the superior portion of the will of Christ, because that superior portion of the will cannot be saddened unless from the fact that someone would not will God to be, or would not will him to have some intrinsic perfection; for the will as superior portion attends to eternal things: but neither of these movements could the soul of Christ have: partly because eternal things cannot bring any molestation; since they are desired by natural appetite, because the will is naturally borne toward eternal things as toward the highest good and supreme commodity: they are likewise desired by elicited appetite, because the will cannot orderly flee what right reason dictates: but it dictates that eternal things should be pursued; and forthwith the will cannot flee them by elicited appetite: partly also because the will of Christ, although most free, by reason of its eminent love toward the Father, was borne with highest affection toward all that which had been decreed by him concerning his own humanity. Hence he said John 4.: My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, that I may perfect his work: whence at the pressing time of death, when his soul according to the inferior part shuddered at the torments to be inflicted, and had therefore asked the Father: If it be possible, let this chalice pass from me: immediately he subjoined: But yet not my will, but thine be done.

Finally the third part appears, namely that sadness was in the soul of Christ as bound up with the sensitive appetite: so great is the connection and confederation of the rational soul with the body that they communicate to each other their proper affections and passions; hence when the soul labors with sadness, the body fails with languor, and sometimes is altogether extinguished. Whence Ecclesiasticus 30. admonishes most excellently: Put sadness far from you, for sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it. Similarly when the body is oppressed with pain, the soul labors with sadness; whence vehement pain cannot be felt in the sensitive part without the rational part being affected with greatest sadness: but there was greatest pain impressed upon the body of Christ at the time of passion; whence truly at that time he suffered anguish of mind and sadness.

That sadness however, however truly it was in Christ, was nevertheless not in him in the same manner as it was in us; for (says St. Bonaventure in the place praised at the beginning of this Conclusion:)

There is a certain sadness which is beyond the command of reason: and there is a sadness which is against the right judgment of reason: and there is a sadness which is subject to the command and judgment of reason. And that sadness beyond the command of reason is that which arises from a certain necessity and surreption, as first movements: and this indeed is common to wise and unwise, good and bad. That sadness truly is against the right judgment of reason, in which reason is subjected to sensuality, nor only disturbed but even perturbed. But that sadness is according to the command and judgment of reason, when anyone is saddened by reason dictating and urging him only thus, and that he ought thus to be saddened over something. I say therefore, that in Christ there was sadness only in this third manner: because he was saddened over nothing except according as reason dictated to him. And John hints at the same thing, where it is said: But Jesus groaned in spirit, and troubled himself: in which it is shown that disturbance and sadness did not preside over reason, but lay subject to it: but in the first two manners sadness was not in Christ.

You ask 1. Since sadness is a movement of mind fleeing those things which happen to us unwillingly; and since we can have a double nolition of a thing which we flee, one indeed conditional and by hypothesis, the other truly absolute and simply: you ask, I say, whether the sadness which Christ had concerning future death followed upon an absolute nolition of that death?

The Doctor answers dist. 15. num. 27., affirming both parts to be probable: for indeed that Christ did not have sadness following an absolute nolition, but only a conditional nolition of death, he proves with five reasons, which Pontius thus weighs in his commentary:

First, because the same power, such as the will is, as to the superior and inferior portion, cannot have opposite acts in the highest degree: but to judge a passion to be simply to be willed is an act of intellect opposite to the act whereby he would judge that it was not simply to be willed: and to will simply is an act opposite to not willing simply: therefore since Christ, as to intellect, judged the passion to be simply to be willed, and as to will willed it simply; he could neither, as to intellect, judge that it should be simply notwilled, nor as to will simply not will it.

He proves secondly, because opposites do not follow from principle and conclusion: but they would follow if this assertion were not true: therefore, etc. The minor is proved: because the conclusion of the practical discourse, whereby the intellect proves death to be simply to be willed, is this: Death is to be willed simply, and this conclusion follows from these principles: What is necessary for the ultimate end is simply to be willed: but death is necessary for that: therefore it is simply to be willed: but this very conclusion ought to be the principle from which it could be concluded by the inferior portion that death was to be notwilled: therefore opposites would follow from principle and conclusion — nay, it would follow that some proposition could be a principle for demonstrating its own opposite, which implies contradiction. This last sequel is proved: because conclusions of practical principles taken from the ultimate end are principles for concluding something about particular ends, which are ordained to the ultimate end: therefore that conclusion, death is to be willed, would be a principle for concluding that it was to be notwilled in order toward some particular end.

He proves third, independently of the doctrine supposed in the preceding reason: because it is impossible that opposites be concluded simply about the same conclusion, just as it is impossible that it be simply to be walked here and now, and not be simply to be walked: therefore if the superior reason shows from principles that death is simply to be willed, the inferior reason cannot rightly conclude from the same principles that it is not simply to be willed.

He proves fourth, that the inferior reason could not dictate death to be notwilled: the inferior reason dictates death to be sustained for the common good; since the common good of men depended upon the death of Christ: therefore the inferior reason could dictate that death should be sustained for that good: and consequently it could not judge that it should be notwilled.

You will say. It is one thing that death should be sustained, and another that it should be willed: therefore although the inferior reason could dictate death to be sustained, it does not follow thence that it could dictate it to be willed.

On the contrary, because if death is to be sustained: therefore either the will does not positively will it, and so it is not conformable to reason; or it wills it, and so cannot absolutely not-will death, because if it absolutely notwilled death, it would not will to sustain death, but would flee from it as much as it can. He adds two other reasons from the authority of St. Augustine clear enough: but he does not propose this assertion absolutely as his own, but seems to me to incline more toward it. Thus Pontius proposes and weighs the reasons of the Doctor.

He also proves the other part, namely that the inferior portion could absolutely not-will the Passion, and consequently Christ was saddened over it as over an object absolutely notwilled, n. 31., from the fact that the inferior portion ought not consider the Passion with order to the ultimate end, because it is not occupied about eternals, but only about temporals: therefore since the Passion is not to be willed simply and absolutely except as conducing to the ultimate end, which is apprehended only through the superior portion, Christ according to the inferior portion could absolutely not-will the Passion. Next, he solves the arguments proposed for confirmation of the denying part. Truly since the Doctor proposes this only for the sake of exercise, in the opinion of others who would wish to embrace this part, therefore I judge it more correctly to be said, with Gabriel, Cavello, and Pontius, that the Doctor inclines more to the former than to the latter part, namely that Christ was saddened from the fact that his Passion was conditionally notwilled. However it be, it is most certain that Passion-sadness truly was in Christ.

You will say 1. Contraries cannot be together in the highest degree in the same subject: but the soul of Christ had joy in the highest degree because of beatitude: therefore it could not have sadness.

The Doctor answers n. 33., distinguishing the minor: joy and sadness are contraries when they are about the same object, he concedes: when they are about diverse objects, he denies. But joy and sadness in Christ were about diverse objects, joy indeed about the beatific object, sadness truly about death and torments to be undergone. That sadness and joy about diverse objects can be together, he proves by a similar case of knowing and not-knowing, which can be in the same intellect with respect to diverse objects.

You will insist. Highest joy, whether about the same or a diverse object, excludes any sadness whatever: because it of itself impedes consideration of other objects which could inflict sadness: but Christ had highest joy: therefore he could by no means have sadness.

The Doctor answers, distinguishing the major: highest joy excludes all sadness directly and formally, I deny: indirectly, I concede: that is, although there was in the soul of Christ highest delectation de facto, which naturally could of itself impede consideration of other saddening objects; yet God so disposing it did not impede, nor did the greatest joy in the superior portion of the will of Christ exclude pain in the sensitive appetite, nor even sadness in the inferior portion: because that delectation did not overflow into the inferior portion. Whence this was done through a new miracle — that the glory in the superior portion of the will did not overflow into the body, but permitted it to be passible, nor even did it overflow into the same power as it is compared to another object. Whence just as it was through miracle that he was at once wayfarer and comprehensor, so it was miraculous that this glory did not overflow into the body, nor into the lower powers, as it overflows in the Blessed.

You will say 2. Impassibility of the glorious body does not admit, nor can it bear, in the same glorious body any Passion from whatsoever cause extrinsic or intrinsic: therefore neither can the beatitude of the soul admit sadness repugnant to itself. — I deny the consequence; and the reason of the disparity is, that the glorious body has not two portions, such that with respect to one it could be impassible and passible according to the other: but the soul of Christ since it was united to God, and to a mortal and passible body, had two portions and two affections, whereof one tending toward God affected it with highest delight and beatitude: but the other occupied about the passible body was straitened with grief on account of the torments to be inflicted upon that body.

You will say 3. Because the soul of Christ is joined to the ultimate end through knowledge and beatific love, therefore it cannot sin even concerning neighbor: therefore likewise, because that soul is joined to God as highest good and ocean of all delight and joy, it cannot in any manner be saddened even by reason of penalities and torments of the body. — I deny the consequence, and the reason of the disparity is, that the beatific love, whereby the soul is united to the ultimate end, determines her to do nothing that opposes or offends that end: but she would be offended if that soul sinned against neighbor, because that sin would redound upon God commanding love of neighbor and forbidding every offense to be inflicted upon him: but joy about the beatific object does not hinder the soul from being able to be affected with sadness on account of another object, especially when it vivifies a still passible body, because that sadness in no manner looks to, nor is reflected upon God, inasmuch as he is the object of beatitude.

You will say 1. Sadness is about those things which happen to us unwillingly: but Christ suffered nothing with the will resisting; for, as we read Isaiah 53.: He was offered because he himself willed: therefore he had no sadness. — I distinguish the major: sadness is about those things which happen to us unwillingly either absolutely or conditionally, I concede: absolutely only, I deny. Christ however, as we said, although he willed the Passion absolutely, especially according to the superior portion of the soul, could not-will it; nay even with respect to the very inferior portion he could not-will that Passion.

Finally you will object certain texts of Scripture whereby sadness seems to be barred from Christ; truly above all that Isa. 12. where of Christ it is said: He shall not be sad, nor turbulent; likewise that Prov. 12.: Whatsoever shall happen to the just man shall not sadden him. The Stoics assign this reason for it, because no one is saddened except by loss and forfeit of his own goods: but the just man reputes none of his own goods except justice and virtue, which he cannot lose: but Christ was most just; whence Jeremiah 23.: This is the name wherewith they shall call him, The Lord our just one: therefore, etc. — The Seraphic Doctor answers that Isaiah does not exclude from Christ any sadness whatever, but only disturbing sadness; whence it is said Matth. 26.: He began to be sad and heavy, whereby is signified that Christ the Lord, although affected with highest sadness, was nevertheless not cast down in mind, nor perturbed in reason, as usually happens in other men who, when oppressed with immense sadness, cast away all use of reason and constancy of soul. He answers the second text similarly, that the Wise man must be understood of that sadness which overturns the state of mind; but not of that whereby anyone is saddened by compassionating others, or even by fleeing some evil inflicted upon himself.

Third Conclusion. — THE PASSION OF FEAR TRULY WAS IN CHRIST.

It is proved from holy Scripture, for Mark 14.: Jesus began to fear and be weary, and heavy. Whence St. Cyril, book 4. on John, having said that the Word fears nothing according to himself, subjoins: But made flesh, he permits his flesh to suffer what belongs to it: and therefore as true man he dreaded death standing at the doors. The other Fathers teach the same, Chrysostom, Homil. 21. on Matth.; St. Leo, sermon 7. On the Passion of the Lord. Reason also votes for it: because fear is an affection natural to passible man, toward whom some evil impends, and since it is penal it can serve for satisfaction: but Christ assumed everything harmless that most served for demonstrating the truth of the assumed nature, and likewise for satisfying for our offenses: therefore, etc.

You will say. St. Hilary, book 10. On the Trinity, Augustin, Enarration on Psalm 21., and Jerome on chapter 27. of Matth. deny that fear was in Christ, which is confirmed by that Prov. 28.: The just, confident as a lion, shall be without terror: therefore fear did not exist in Christ. — I deny the consequence, and to the antecedent I say that St. Hilary excludes fear from Christ in the manner he does sadness, indeed not disturbing but perturbing; in which manner St. Jerome also is to be understood. To St. Augustine I say, that he excludes fear which would impede efficacious willing of dying; but not that which would not take away that will itself.

You will say 2. Fear could not stand with fortitude of mind in the heroic degree: therefore since in Christ the virtue of fortitude, like the other moral virtues, was in the heroic degree, fear could not be in him. — I answer, that an inefficacious act, and non-absolute, of one passion can stand at once with some efficacious and absolute act of a virtue somehow opposed to it, as appears in Martyrs, who could have inefficacious acts of avoiding death; whom nevertheless they bravely suffered. Add that fear did not arise from absolute desire of living longer; nay rather he supremely wished death for us; but it came only from an inefficacious affection, and insofar as death presented itself as some evil of nature, yet with affection of justice he far preferred the good of our redemption.

You will say 3. From Aristotle 2. Rhetorics, chapter 5., Fear includes uncertainty of the evil apprehended as about to come, and likewise some hope of escaping it: yet the soul of Christ so feared death that nevertheless he knew with certainty it would happen to him in this and that manner; whence he even foretold it in many places. Add that he knew it to have been previously decreed by a certain efficacious decree: therefore properly speaking he had no fear of death. — To this objection the Various answer variously; First indeed St. Thomas, conceding the antecedent, says as to the consequence, that fear indeed was not in Christ according to the perfect and exact character of fear, because truly, he says, as Aristotle has it, fear includes uncertainty of event. Richard our own answers that uncertainty is not necessary for fear when the thing feared is in the power of the one fearing, as when e. g. someone elects to have his arm cut off, since such cutting is in his power; no uncertainty is required in order that he fear the future cutting. Wherefore Christ could properly fear, even if death were not uncertain; because it was in his power. But to Aristotle he says, fear includes uncertainty when the event is not in the power of the one fearing. Vazquez approves this solution — nay further proves that uncertainty is by no reason to be desired for fear; because, he says, many Fathers, among whom is St. Damascene book 2. On the Faith, chapter 13., define fear without any uncertainty of event. To the authority of Aristotle he responds that he does not treat every affection of fear, but that to which Rhetors ought to move their Auditors: but this does not occur, he says, except when the event is uncertain: which he confirms from the fact that Aristotle there speaks of fear which leaves place for deliberation, of which sort only fear including uncertainty of event can be: for when what is future is altogether certain and inevitable, no place is left for deliberation. — But the more common and better response is, that fear of evil is twofold: one efficacious, which accom

Hence it appears that Cajetan less rightly asserted in art. 7. question 15., together with some more recent Thomists, that sadness and fear were only in the sensitive appetite of Christ: for this the Holy Fathers most constantly deny outright, since from sadness and love they gather that there was truly in Christ a human mind and will. Furthermore holy Damascene, book 2. On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 15., enumerates six species of fear, all of which he affirms were in Christ: the first is Sluggishness, which is flight from an impending action which we apprehend as burdensome: but that this was in Christ is evident, for he willed not only to suffer torments from others; but also being compelled to do something troublesome and laborious, as to carry the cross: for he could not only fear torments to be inflicted by others; but also be affected with weariness over that troublesome action to be done. The second species is Shame; which is fear impressed on account of expectation of vituperation; which shame Christ could have had, not that he committed any actions worthy of vituperation; but because he was to heaped with reproaches and vituperations of men. The third species is Bashfulness, which is fear arisen on account of disgrace: but that this fear was in Christ stands from the fact that he often suffered disgrace from men; seeing that for us he was made accursed. The fourth is Astonishment, which is born from immense imagination of a noxious and disagreeing thing; which was in Christ, especially at the time of passion — began to weary, and be heavy. The fifth is Terror from some unwonted aspect of a thing; which terror certainly was in Christ is gathered by reason of experimental science, whereby according to that science he could not only marvel at, but even stand astonished at bitter things to be shortly sustained and endured. Finally the sixth is Agony, which is fear of an unlooked-for evil that cannot be foreseen: but this could not have been in Christ according to the truth of the thing, unless perhaps you define agony with certain experts of the Latin tongue, saying that it is fear with trembling of the limbs; of which sort I would not dissent that it truly was in Christ, seeing that St. Luke said chapter 22.: Being in agony he prayed the longer.

Fourth Conclusion. — ANGER WAS IN CHRIST THE LORD. Which indeed is gathered from that John 2. where it is narrated that he made a scourge of cords, and cast out those selling and buying out of the temple. He adds moreover John.: And his Disciples remembered truly, because it was written: The zeal of thy house hath eaten me: for, as St. Mark also relates chapter 3., when the Pharisees watched Christ whether he healed on sabbaths, that they might condemn him and accuse him as a transgressor, then he says to the man having the withered hand: Stand forth into the midst: and he says to them: Is it lawful on the sabbaths to do good, or evil? to save soul, or destroy? But they were silent: and thus looking round upon them with anger, grieved over the blindness of their hearts, he said to the man: Stretch forth thy hand, etc.; therefore truly Christ had movement of anger.

But the Seraphic Doctor observes q. 3. art. 2. dist. 5.

That anger in one manner signifies pure affection: and thus anger is called affection of detestation of some evil, or apparent evil. In another manner anger signifies affection with punishment: and thus anger has perturbation and disquiet annexed. But this can be in triple difference, because either that perturbation touches only the inferior powers, and in no manner touches the eye of the mind, disturbing it for a time but not exceeding: or it touches the eye of the mind itself perturbing and obscuring it; and according to these, the movement of anger is found in fourfold difference, as is gathered from the sayings of the Saints. In one manner it purely signifies effect of detestation, and in this manner it could have been in Adam in the state of innocence. In another manner it signifies manner of detestation with disquiet and perturbation of the sensual part, without any perturbation of mind; and in this manner was the affection of anger in Christ: for as the Gospel says, groaning he troubled himself. In the third manner, it signifies affection of detestation with commotion and perturbation not only of the sensual part but also of reason for a time; and in this manner it is found in just men who are angered with zealous anger, concerning whom Gregory says that thence the perturbed mind profits, that it may shine; as the eye through a collyrium poured in is disturbed for a time, that afterwards it may become clearer. In the fourth manner, anger signifies affection of detestation with commotion of sensuality, and also of mind; such that that commotion has perturbation of mind annexed to it, or is ordained toward it; and thus is anger through vice, and it is found in sinners, and forbidden by the Lord.

THIRD DISPUTATION.

ON THE DIGNITY, MINISTRY, AND CULT OF CHRIST THE LORD.

Having examined, and declared abundantly as far as our capacity permitted, all those things which pertain to the mystery of the incarnate Word and its excellencies, there now remain to be declared and discussed his dignities, functions, and due veneration. Although however all those endowments of Christ the Lord are very many, his ministries varied, and manifold cult to be exhibited to him: nevertheless since these all do not present investigation and resolution so difficult, for that reason suspending longer and more protracted discussion, we shall propose and weigh all these in this present last Disputation in the three following Articles.

FIRST ARTICLE.

ON THE DIGNITIES OF CHRIST.

That Christ shines with innumerable titles of glory, as God and man illustrious with all excellencies, no one denies; nevertheless that we may pass over all of these into a certain order, chiefly under threefold title of Head, King, and Judge we shall comprehend and expound them in as many Sections to be subjoined.