Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Rational appetite I call the human will, whereby man pursues with liberty and desires those things which are consonant or dissonant to reason. And as the propensity of that will toward good is virtue, so also movement and inclination toward a prohibited object is reckoned vice and sin. Hence sin itself, as well as sinful propensity, are truly defects of that appetite exorbitating from the straight path of reason and virtue. Wherefore theologians deservedly inquire here whether Christ either could sin, or had some inclination prone to sinning which is commonly called the fomes of sin.

Note 1. It is certain by faith that Christ was never stained by any original sin: for from the very beginning of his formation he was endowed with all fullness of graces, as has been proved above at length. Hence the Angel, herald of his nativity, says to the Virgin, Luke 1, That which shall be born of thee shall be holy, by which he signified that he had as it were native holiness, as St. Basil teaches most excellently on Ps. 14, expounding this verse: Thou hast loved justice, etc. For being what it is, other men indeed are asserted to be well affected to honesty and averse from evil by labor, exercise, and attention of mind: but to thee there belongs a certain natural kinship with good and alienation from evil. Cyril subscribes, book 11 on John: Holy, he says, is all that which is immune from the filth of the world: which indeed naturally is in Christ, according to

the similitude of the Father: but adventitious and acquired inheres in holy disciples through sanctification which is of grace.

Reason also supports this: since original sin flourishes only in those who derive origin from Adam through the seminal way: but Christ was not propagated from Adam through the seminal way, because he was not conceived from virile seed but only from the Holy Spirit, nor did he receive from Adam actively human nature but only materially, inasmuch namely as he took the visible substance of flesh from the flesh of the Virgin, which had been propagated from Adam through the seminal way; like other men he would have been under the guilt of original sin unless by an intervening divine benefit she had been preserved. The difficulty therefore concerns only actual sin, whether namely the humanity assumed by the Word ever fell into any sin, or at least could have fallen into it, apart from the extraordinary power of God. Although among the more ancient heretics none was so blasphemous and impudent toward Christ as to ascribe to him any sin; among the more recent ones however, being more impudent, there was a certain Apostate of the Praemonstratensian Order who dared to assert that the crucified Christ fell into despair when he said: My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? and for this reason was condemned to the torments of hell, as Lindanus relates in dialogue 2 and Hosius book 1 De Haeresibus nostri temporis. Calvin also, as Suárez narrates, disp. 33, sect. 1, is said to have asserted that Christ in the garden was so troubled and agitated with temptations that he prayed without spirit saying: Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me, and therefore as if returning to himself immediately corrected the disorderly petition, and subjected his own will to the will of the Father. Wherefore it is worth the labor here to prove that Christ was never defiled by any actual sin.

Note 2. The impeccability of Christ the Lord, as man, can be considered either by comparison precisely to his liberty: or by comparison to the blessedness of his soul, which he always had from the first instant of his creation; or by comparison to his sum of habitual grace and the other supernatural gifts accompanying it; or finally by comparison to the hypostatic union taken simply and precisely. But the present difficulty is moved only according to the last consideration; namely whether impeccability thus befits Christ as he is man, that while only the hypostatic union of the divine Word with his humanity remains, all other supernatural gifts set aside, he would still be impeccable, and it would conflict with him to commit any sin even the lightest.

Note 3. These two are distinguished from each other: to have the power whereby one sins, and to have the power of sinning. For the first imports having a created will, which by that very fact that it is created is defectible if considered in itself, and is that by which sin is committed: but the second superadds to this first an aptitude for committing sin and a quasi-propensity into sin, insofar as the created will is (so to speak) lapsable into sin. Here there is no speech concerning the power whereby one sins, whether that be in Christ the Lord: since this is nothing else than a created will, it had place in Christ the Lord as man; but only the power of sinning is treated of, not indeed insofar as it signifies a propensity into sin, but insofar as it signifies non-repugnance; so that without any contradiction Christ, notwithstanding the hypostatic union, absolutely — if God by an extraordinary disposition permitted it — could sin.

First Conclusion. — IT IS OF FAITH THAT CHRIST NEVER IN FACT COMMITTED SIN EVEN THE LIGHTEST.

It is proved first from sacred Scripture, which so often most constantly testifies to the outstanding sanctity and innocence of Christ. Thus Christ himself John 8 says to his Jewish detractors and calumniators: Which of you shall convince me of sin? Isaiah had pronounced this very thing cap. 53, saying that he had done no iniquity neither was guile found in his mouth: to which place St. Peter alluded, Epistle 1 cap. 2, when he says: Who (namely Christ) did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth. Hence St. Paul Heb. 4: We have an high priest who cannot have compassion on our infirmities, tempted in all things by similitude without sin, etc. As if he said: tempted in all things after our manner, or by similitude of us; yet so that he never sinned. And cap. 7, For it was fitting that we should have such an high priest, holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners.

It is proved secondly from Councils, as the Ephesine Can. 10, defining that Christ had no need of oblation for himself, because he knew sin not at all. The Lateran under Martin I, Can. 5, defining that our substance was perfectly in Christ, without sin. This very thing all the holy Fathers and ancient theologians most constantly testify, who defend the innocence of Christ and his immunity from every sin. Thus St. Basil Epist. 65, Gregory of Nyssa Orat. 14, Augustine book 5 contra Julianum, cap. 5, etc.

Reason supports this too: The first indeed can be sought from the plenitude of grace. He who has the plenitude of sanctifying grace cannot have any sin; since sanctifying grace, in the ordinary way at least, does not subsist together with sin, and consequently the plenitude of habitual grace eliminates every sin whatsoever. The second can be sought from the blessedness of Christ; since nothing defiled shall enter into the kingdom of heaven: but Christ from the instant of his conception was blessed: therefore he was defiled by no sin. The third reason finally is sought from the end of the Incarnation; for in this appeared the Son of God that he might dissolve the works of the devil, namely sin; for Christ came into the world for this, that he might wash away all sin and be the Lamb of God taking away the sins of the world: but he could not have fulfilled this ministry if truly he himself had been stained with sin. If indeed, says St. Athanasius, book On the Incarnation of Christ a little from the beginning, the Son of man came that he might dissolve the works of the devil, in what way could he have sin in himself, since he himself came that he might destroy sins in us? Whence St. Paulinus excellently in the Panegyric on the death of Celsus:

For he would not blot out faults unless free from them,

nor could he release the guilty, himself being guilty.

Nor would death yield to the sinner, since holding bound

the ones bound by sin he legitimately retains.

St. Bernard pursues elegantly the same reason, sermon 1 On the Vigil of the Nativity, in these words: Behold a lamb without stain, the lamb who takes away the sins of the world; for who would better take away sins than he upon whom sin does not fall? He without doubt can wash me, of whom it stands forth that he is not stained. This hand cleanses my eye covered with mud, which alone is without dust. He draws out for me the mote from my eye, who has not a beam in his own. Nay this one draws out the beam from mine, who has not even a little dust in his.

They object, heretics, certain texts of Scripture by which sin seems to be attributed to Christ: thus Ps. 21, My God, my God, look upon me; why hast thou forsaken me? far from my salvation are the words of my sins, which words it is beyond controversy that the Psalmist pronounced in the person of Christ. Whence St. Augustine judges that this Psalm ought to be called not so much a prophecy as an Evangelic history. Since therefore Christ calls some sins his own in these words, he does not seem to be devoid of sin. Similar is that Ps. 38, Because of the face of my sins, which St. Augustine likewise admits was said concerning Christ. There can be added the testimony of the Apostle 2 Cor. 5 and Gal. 3, saying Christ was touched by sin for us and made a malediction. —

I answer by denying that from there any sin could be concluded to have been in Christ. Not indeed from the testimonies of the Psalmist: for this particle of my sins does not signify that there was any sin in Christ, but since Christ as surety had promised that he would satisfy God the Father for us: Ps. 39, Holocaust and oblation for sin thou didst not require; then I said: Behold I come, etc., and Isaiah 53, and thus had taken upon himself the obligation of satisfying for all men, the eternal Father exacted from him satisfaction for all the sins of men, by which reason those sins as if proper to himself made him far from the salvation of body and liberation, which he sought from natural inclination. Whence St. Augustine in the exposition on this Ps. says: Of whose sins, of whom it was said, who did no sin neither was guile found in his mouth? How therefore does he say: my sins, except because he prays for our sins, and made sins, that he might make his justice our justice! Therefore he calls the sins of men his own by personal appropriation, because what belongs to the members is attributed to the person of the head, according to the rule of Tyconius received by St. Augustine book 3 De doctrina Christiana, cap. 32: The things which are of the members are attributed to the head, on account of the conjunction they have with it, considering head and members after the manner of one person: which rule however is thus to be understood, provided those things which are of the members do not impede their conjunction with the head; otherwise it would follow that the sins of the faithful which are done daily could also be attributed to Christ, and that when the faithful sin Christ himself sins. Whence in the Council of Basel, session 2, among other propositions of Augustine de Roma Archbishop of Nazareth the following proposition is condemned as scandalous and erroneous: Christ sins daily, and similarly this: since Christ has been, he sinned daily. But the Council adds these words: Although he says he does not understand it of the Head of the Church, Christ Jesus our Savior, but of his members, which with Christ their Head he asserted to be one Christ. To the Apostle I say, Christ is said to have been made sin insofar as he was touched as victim for sins: for in the ancient law sacrifices for sins were called sins, according to that Osee 4: They shall eat the sins of my people. Thus explains St. Aug. in the Enchiridion cap. 49. Or he is said made sin, because he was made in the similitude of sinful flesh, on account of the mortal and passible body, as well as on account of the penalities due to sin which he assumed.

You will object 1. He can sin in the ordinary way in whom there is free will flexible toward good and evil: but Christ the Lord had free will flexible toward good and evil: therefore in the ordinary way he could sin. —

I distinguish the major: in whom there is free will flexible toward good and evil both in act second, and in act first, both extrinsically and intrinsically — this I concede; only in act first and intrinsically — this I deny. Similarly I distinguish the minor: in Christ there was free will flexible toward good and evil in act first and intrinsically — let this pass; in act second and extrinsically — this I deny. Indeed since the human nature of Christ was of the same rational character as ours, ignorance and sin set aside, it also had a free faculty like ours in act first; but not in act second; because his liberty by reason of the plenitude of grace and beatific union was so determined toward good that it could by no means incline into evil: whence Christ indeed had power, namely free will whereby one sins, but truly not the power of sinning or propensity into sin.

You will object 2. Christ could merit: therefore also demerit: for merit and demerit turn about the same thing. — I deny the consequence; since, as we shall say in Disputation 3 treating of the merit of Christ, for the ratio of merit it is not necessary that one be able to demerit and sin, but only that he have free will furnished with sanctifying grace together with the other conditions necessary for merit.

Second Conclusion. — CHRIST WAS WHOLLY IMPECCABLE, NOR COULD HE IN ANY WAY SIN. Thus agree all the holy Fathers and theologians, although they dissent among themselves in assigning the reason of this impeccability; for certain ones with Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure in 3 dist. 12 wish it to be sought precisely from the force of the hypostatic union. The others however with the Subtle Doctor in the same place seek it precisely from the plenitude of consummated grace, or glory, which Christ had as blessed: for the Doctor says num. 2: I say that since Christ in the first instant of his union with God was blessed, and blessedness took away from him all peccability or possibility of sinning which can be taken away through blessedness: although with this the power of meriting stood dispensatively; for the plenitude of glory with which he was joined no less than another Blessed One, although he could have merited — thus it excludes every power in him of averting from the end, as in others, etc.

That however Christ was not impeccable precisely by reason of the hypostatic union the Doctor proves; because the hypostatic union cannot attribute impeccability to Christ unless either insofar as it would necessarily make him blessed: or insofar as it has absolute incompossibility with sin: but neither is absolutely true. Not indeed the first, because such union has not necessarily conjoined to it blessedness: therefore it does not necessarily make Christ blessed. The Doctor proves the antecedent dist. 2, q. 1, nu. 3. First, because what is prior can be without what is posterior: but the hypostatic union is prior to fruition and blessedness; for just as it is prior for a nature to be personated in itself than that it operate, and proper personality is prior to operation, nor does it have so necessary a connection with operation that excellently there could be a nature personated with proper personality without any operation; so it is prior for a nature to be personated by an alien personality when it has not its own, than to operate; nor is there any utterly necessary connection between alien personality and operation by reason of which it could not be personated by alien personality without operating: therefore the hypostatic union can be without vision and beatific love, in which blessedness consists.

Then: No nature can necessarily become blessed unless it be necessarily joined to the beatific object: but by the hypostatic union human nature is not necessarily joined with God as he is the beatific object; because, says the Doctor, no nature necessarily enjoys that object except that which is necessarily immuted by it as present: but human nature is not immuted by the beatific object either under the aspect of intelligible or under the aspect of enjoyable through the hypostatic union; partly because the beatific object necessarily immutes only an intellect proportioned to itself, namely the divine under the aspect of intelligible, and the divine will under the aspect of enjoyable; partly because through that union the Word is present to the nature only personally, and under the aspect of supposit terminating the dependence and communicability of that nature; but not under the aspect of object moving to knowledge and love of itself: therefore, etc.

Finally: Beatific operation cannot be produced without the effective concurrence of God: therefore unless that concurrence be present necessarily, however much the hypostatic union be present, there can be no beatific operation of human nature: but that concurrence is not so necessarily granted to the assumed nature for beatific operation that God could not deny and suspend it: therefore there can be hypostatic union without that beatific operation. The antecedent is evident: the consequence equally. The subsumption is proved: if that concurrence required for beatific operation were necessarily granted to the human nature assumed, especially because it would be really identified with the unitive action of that human nature with the Word, or because it would be a property or accident of it necessarily consequent upon it: but none of these can rightly be established; since that concurrence to beatific operation can be without hypostatic union, as stands forth in the Blessed, who have such concurrence although they are not hypostatically united to the Word: similarly God can concur to the hypostatic union without that he necessarily concur with human nature to beatific operation: partly because union is really distinguished from operation: partly because by no reason can the contrary be proved, namely that God cannot concur to the hypostatic union without that he concur to that very beatific operation.

The second part is proved, namely that that union has not absolute incompatibility with sin, such that it implies a contradiction that the humanity sin while it remains united to the Word. I say it is proved: The human will of Christ is from itself as indifferent and free toward good and evil as ours: therefore thus also it could sin, like ours, unless by something else it were determined not to sin: but it cannot be so determined not to sin through the hypostatic union, but rather if God willed, with such union posited, it could sin. It is proved: if that union so determined the will not to sin, yet if

God absolutely willed it could still sin, especially since it would determine it either physically or morally: but neither way can this be done. Not indeed physically, because it would physically determine the will not to sin insofar as it would physically concur to an act incompatible with sin, either in the genus of efficient cause or in the genus of formal cause, in the manner in which a habit or one act determines a faculty toward another act: but the hypostatic union, or personality of the Word, does not so concur with the will of the assumed human nature. Not indeed the union, partly because it is a relation adventitious from without, which of itself is neither effective nor operative: partly because it is not subjected precisely in the will but in the whole humanity: finally partly because it is not proposed objectively to that will, that it determine it to operating or not operating. Nor indeed the personality of the Word, since that has not the character of an efficient principle but only of a supposit terminating the humanity of the Word, nor is it of itself active ad extra. Add that even if either union or personality could determine the will not to sin insofar as they would concur with the human will to an act opposite sin, they would grant that only with God concurring with them: but God would not so necessarily have to concur with them that he could deny such concurrence to them and suspend it: therefore, etc. Nor indeed can the hypostatic union or the personality of the Word morally determine the will of the assumed nature not to sin necessarily and infallibly, because no reason can be assigned why they would so determine it morally, unless either insofar as they would be proposed objectively to the will, and thus allure it concerning good, so that it could not be turned away from it; or insofar as they themselves would be determinations of the will whereby they would affect it, and thus determine it; or finally insofar as by divine ordination they would have some incompatibility with sin: but neither of those can rightly be affirmed. Not indeed the first, for neither union nor the personality of the Word are thus proposed objectively to the will of the assumed nature. Nor the second, because the union and personality of the Word cannot stand in the manner of a form so affecting and determining human will. Finally not the third, because such divine ordination would be asserted without foundation. Therefore neither the personality of the Word nor the hypostatic union can of themselves precisely so determine the will of the assumed nature not to sin, but by the absolute power of God the will itself remains so free for sinning that truly it could sin, unless it were rendered impeccable from elsewhere than precisely from that hypostatic union itself.

The adversaries reply, that that union impedes lest the will of Christ sin, insofar as it is formally incompatible with sin, just as whiteness with blackness, or love with hatred. — On the contrary, things formally do not expel each other unless insofar as they can be subjected in the same subject, or be occupied about the same object: but union and personality are not subjected in the same subject in which sin could inhere, nor do they turn about the same object or the same term; for the term of the sinful act which could be done is one, and the term of the hypostatic union another. Add that sin, qua such, is a moral entity: but it is absurd that any physical form should have from its nature incompatibility with a moral form qua moral.

They reply 2, that the hypostatic union is opposed to sin insofar as it necessarily requires that God not concur to sin, nay that he concur to an act incompatible with sin. — On the contrary, if it required this, it would require it especially either physically or morally. Not physically, because no physical entity can require necessary divine concurrence except insofar as that would be necessary for conserving that entity for that time or instant in which it ought to exist: but concurrence to an act opposed to sin cannot be necessary for the conservation of the hypostatic union, which can remain even without any act and operation: nor indeed can the negation of concurrence to sin seem necessary except insofar as it itself had formal incompatibility with sin: but it has not this, as stands forth from what has been said: therefore it does not require it physically. Nor indeed does it require it morally, because this alone it would require insofar as if God did not effect it, he would do something judged most unworthy of himself: but although Christ as man on the hypothesis should in fact sin, that sin would redound neither upon God nor upon the person of the Word, as will appear in the solution of objections: therefore, etc.

They object 1. The adversaries bring various authorities of the holy Fathers, by which they strive to prove that the impeccability of Christ is to be sought precisely from the hypostatic union, because the holy Fathers teach that Christ is impeccable on account of the communion and union of his humanity with the Word. Above all they produce Dionysius of Alexandria in the Epistle against Paul of Samosata, where near the end he says: Unless he had been (namely Christ) the same who was God the Word, he could not be alien from the power of sinning; for there is none who cannot sin except the one Christ, as the Father of Christ, and the Spirit, etc. —

I answer first, that this authority is of no moment: for above all it needs exposition in every opinion: for it seems to signify that the Blessed Virgin needed exercise and contest, that she might be freed from sin; and even that she in fact had some sinful defect; which however is false. Nor does it avail to reply with Vazquez that the Blessed Virgin did not have sin in fact; but yet that it did not proceed from her sanctity, but from the providence and care of God; for above all this does not touch the matter; for St. Dionysius seems to say there is none besides Christ who does not have sin, whether it proceeds from justice and sanctity or from elsewhere. Then, just as the Blessed Virgin could be alien from sin and from the power of sinning through the providence of God although she was not God, so Christ could be immune from sin, and thus the sole Deity and its union would not be the cause on account of which he was alien from the power of sinning; which seems contrary to this passage. One could also answer with Poncius, that the sense of this passage is that for this reason Christ the Lord in fact is immune from the power of sinning, because his humanity is united to a divine person and imbued with divinity; which indeed is true, although from elsewhere he could also be immune from sin under other headings, namely either from the special providence and protection of God, or from this that beatitude of soul is attributed to him, even if he could sin by absolute power: for just as one might say that fire burns applied tow from its nature, that no other reason exists on account of which it burns than because it is of such nature and virtue; nevertheless from that it does not follow that even if it had not such nature it could not burn, if namely God gave it heat, just as he can give it to water although it would not require it from its own nature; nor does it follow that it must burn so necessarily that by the absolute power of God it could happen that it not burn. The same by similitude can be said of Christ.

They object 2. Origen book 2 Periarchon cap. 6 where he says: Iron by its nature is capable of heat and cold; yet if it be always kept within the furnace of fire it may be called incapable of cold: in this manner also that soul, namely of Christ, which as iron in fire is placed always in the Word, always in wisdom, always in God, all that it does, that it senses, that it understands, it is God; and therefore it can not even be called convertible, which possessed inconvertibility ignited unceasingly from the unity of the Word of God. From which the adversaries infer that the inconvertibility of the soul of Christ toward sin, which we call impeccability, proceeds from the very Deification which takes place through union. —

But I answer, that by this example our opinion is rather defended than assailed: for just as although connaturally iron placed in fire cannot grow cold, yet it could supernaturally conserve its cold if God disposed matters thus, namely that he not concur with fire to introduce its heat into that iron; or if he conserved heat together with cold in the iron: so by similitude, although connaturally impeccability follows from the hypostatic union, because this has annexed the plenitude of sanctifying grace; nevertheless, just as by absolute power God can conserve grace together with sin, so by the same power God could permit that the humanity of Christ fall into some sin, the hypostatic union however persevering in it.

They object 3. The authority of St. Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. 36, which is the fourth On Theology, where speaking of the will of Christ: Whose will since it is wholly deified, doubtless does not oppose God: therefore the impeccability of Christ is referred to the deification of the will, which is the hypostatic union itself. To him subscribes St. Epiphanius in the Ancoratus, where he says: If we have said Christ a perfect man born of Mary, do we then suspect that he was subject to sins? Far be it; for he did no sin neither was guile found in his mouth; for if he breathed his power into Saints, and those whom he inspired testify that they were holy, just, advancing in their days beyond reproach: how much more he, in whom it pleased all the fullness of Deity to dwell corporally, even if he received true flesh from Mary ever Virgin, and a truly human soul, and mind, and whatever else there is in man, himself having in himself all things held them, being God undivided toward malice, not broken by that evil one, not captured in will, not falling under the sin of Adam!

I answer, that these or similar authorities signify nothing else than that the hypostatic union from its nature and dignity required that some form be conferred and conserved in Christ, namely either sanctifying grace or blessedness, whereby Christ would be determined not to sin; but not that that union precisely would be per se the reason of that impeccability.

They likewise object St. Hilary, book 10 De Trinitate, where explaining that saying of the Apostle Rom. 9 concerning Christ the Lord, who is said to be made in the similitude of sinful flesh, he asserts that it conflicts with Christ as much that he could sin as that he not be Christ:

This man Christ Jesus, he says, is in the truth of Nativity while he is man, and is not in the property of sin while he is Christ; because he who is man could not fail to be man what he was born: and he who is Christ could not lose what he is Christ: and thus while man Christ Jesus is, he has the nativity of man because he is man, nor is he in the vitious infirmity of man, because he is Christ.

From which the adversaries infer that just as by the force of the hypostatic union he has that something be constituted from the personality of the Word and the humanity, so, according to the mind of St. Hilary, the same Christ the Lord has by the force of the same hypostatic union that he cannot sin. Similarly St. Augustine book On Correction and Grace c. 11 speaks thus:

Nor was there to be feared lest in that ineffable manner in the unity of person the human nature assumed by the Word God should sin through free arbitrament of will, since that assumption was such that human nature so assumed by God would admit no motion of will in itself.

By which words St. Augustine seems to reduce the impeccability of the humanity of Christ to its very assumption by the Word. But Anastasius Sinaita cap. 2 Ὁδοῦ seems to teach this most clearly: The mind alone (he says) of Christ and his most holy soul was incapable of and ignorant of all malice: for it was the form of a servant, which was ruled and governed by the divine Word in the same hypostasis conjoined to itself. Rupert also in the book De voluntate Dei, cap. 11 says: That the humanity of Christ, not through creation but through assumption was made such a creature as would not only not will to sin but truly could not sin. And he proves it from the words of Christ John 6: Amen, amen I say to you, the Son cannot do anything of himself but what he shall have seen the Father doing. Sabund.: For what is it for anyone to do anything of himself except to do evil?

I answer, that all these authorities signify nothing else than that truly Christ cannot in fact fall into any sin in the ordinary way, by reason of his hypostatic union, which carries with it annexed the plenitude of sanctifying grace and the blessedness of soul: whereby it comes about that the will of that humanity can by no means in the ordinary way be removed from God through sin; which however does not impede but that according to the absolute power of God the hypostatic union can subsist even if the humanity of Christ rushed into some sin.

You will press. St. Hilary teaches that it is as impossible for Christ to sin as not to be Christ: but by absolute power Christ cannot fail to be Christ, the union of humanity with the Word supposed: therefore equally, that supposed, it is impossible for him to sin.

I answer, that St. Hilary only wishes that if Christ could sin connaturally like other men, from there truly would follow that he had not the hypostatic union requiring connaturally the character of impeccability and blessedness: nevertheless it would not follow that he would not be Christ if by the absolute power of God that impeccability were not conferred upon him, by whose negation he would sin or at least could sin.

You will insist. No absurdity can follow from this, that Christ would in fact sin, which equally would not follow if he could sin by the absolute power of God: therefore just as rightly it is asserted, that those absurdities might be avoided, that he did not in fact sin; by equal reason it must be said that also by absolute power he could not have sinned.

I deny the antecedent; because if he could sin in fact and according to the ordinary power of God, it would follow that he also in fact had not the blessedness of soul nor any external protection of God, namely that whereby the Virgin Mother of God and likewise the Blessed were made impeccable: it would follow equally that the hypostatic union would not require connaturally that impeccability: but none of these absurdities would follow if he were only impeccable by the absolute power of God: therefore there is no parity anywhere.

They object 3. If Christ could sin by the absolute power of God, it would follow that sin ought to be attributed to God: but it implies a contradiction that God can sin: therefore, etc. The sequel of the major is evident: for what is done only through the extraordinary power of God and would by no means come about unless by absolute and extraordinary power God concurred to its production, is attributed to God alone.

I deny the sequel of the major, and I distinguish that proof: what is done through the absolute power of God is attributed to God alone when it is done only through his extraordinary concurrence; as when he works prodigies and miraculous deeds — this I concede; what is done through the extraordinary power of God granting an extraordinary indeed but indifferent concurrence; so that the concurrence does not determine the cause with which it acts to act, but is determined by it — then that act is not to be attributed to God alone, this I deny. But if God by absolute power granted such an indifferent concurrence to Christ toward good and evil acts, such as he grants to men by ordinary power, if through that mediating extraordinary concurrence the humanity of Christ sinned, no more would that sin be attributed to God on account of that extraordinary concurrence than the sin of other men is attributed to him on account of ordinary concurrence. For just as on that account the sin of men is not attributed to God although sinful acts cannot come about except dependently on his concurrence, because that concurrence is of itself indifferent toward good and evil acts, and is determined toward evil acts only through human will; so neither would the acts of the humanity of Christ, if on hypothesis they were sinful, have to be attributed to God on account of that extraordinary concurrence; because this would be of itself indifferent toward good or evil acts, and would be determined toward those sinful acts only through the human will of Christ.

They object 4. Upon the Divine Word by the force of the hypostatic union lies the obligation of governing and ruling the humanity, and holding it to duty; and consequently if the assumed humanity sinned, that sin would be attributed to the divine Word: but by whatever reason it implies God sins, by the same it conflicts also with the divine Word to be infected with sin; therefore, etc. The minor stands forth. The major is proved as to the first part, namely that it falls to the Word to rule the humanity; for St. Epiphanius in the Ancoratus cap. 3 says: The Word, by its virtue restrained the inferior nature from every useless animal multitude .... but the human soul, and mind, and whatever else there is, himself having all things in himself held them, being God undivided toward multitude. And Anastasius Sinaita c. 21 Ὁδοῦ confirms the same:

We confess also that soul and body which are hypostatically united to the Word are subject to the Word, and together with all their properties are more ruled and led by the Word than any other creature is subjected to him and ruled by him, since they are joined far more closely to the Word than all > other things besides.

Proof, moreover, as to the second part, namely that that sin would be attributed to the Word, because whenever two things are united in some nature or person, the lower is naturally subordinated to the higher, and consequently the higher is held to rule and govern the lower: but by force of the union of humanity with the Word, the human and divine nature concur in the one person of Christ: therefore by reason of this union the divine nature is held to govern and rule the human; and consequently the sin of the united humanity would be attributed to the Word, not only as subsisting in humanity, but also in itself, and insofar as it subsists in the divinity.

It is confirmed first, because the body is lower than the soul, and through union they concur in one and the same nature; from such a union the soul takes on the obligation of governing the body: but humanity is lower than the Divinity, and by force of the hypostatic union it concurs with the Deity in the same person of Christ: therefore by force of this union there rests upon the Divinity a special obligation of governing humanity. Hence in the 6th General Synod, action 8., it is said thus: Just as our body is ruled and adorned and ordered by our intellectual and rational soul, so in Christ the man the whole dispensation of that same man was always, and in all things, moved immovably by the deity of the same Word.

It is confirmed second, since when a higher and a lower power concur in one and the same nature, there arises in that nature the obligation of governing the lower power through the higher power, as appears in human nature, which is held by natural obligation to rule and govern the lower appetite through the will: therefore likewise when two natures concur in one and the same person, there arises in it the obligation of governing the lower nature through the higher; and consequently there rests upon the Word, in whom by force of the union of humanity with him the divine and human natures concur, a special obligation of ruling and governing the human nature through the divine; and forthwith the sin of the united humanity would be attributed to the Word, not only by reason of the human will, but also by reason of the divine will.

I deny the major, and I distinguish its proof and its confirmations: every superior is held to rule and govern the inferior, such that by reason of the failure of that direction and governance the sins of inferiors are attributed to the superior, when this devolves upon him from office and special justice, I concede; when only from general and common concurrence, I deny. Indeed disordered movements of the interior appetite are attributed to the soul, not precisely because those rational and sensitive powers concur in one and the same nature, and because one of them is superior and the other inferior; but precisely because they are so mutually united that the lower cannot be brought to an honest good except through the cognition and direction of the higher; since all the faculties and powers of man ought to be ruled and governed by his will and knowledge. It is otherwise, however, with the humanity of Christ in respect of the Word, for the humanity of Christ is not governed peculiarly by the uncreated will and knowledge of God, but only commonly, namely in the manner in which the other creatures are governed by the first cause; for the supposit of the Word provides nothing more per se precisely toward the humanity than what its own personality would provide, terminating the communication and dependence of the same nature; whence although that humanity were, on hypothesis, to sin, that sin ought not be attributed to the Word. To the authorities of the Holy Fathers asserting that the Word rules the humanity, just as the soul rules the body, I say they wish only this, that, just as the soul by reason of its conjunction with the body infuses into it life, motion, and natural direction; so the Word congruously infuses into his humanity supernatural life and motion, by reason of the abundant grace and beatitude with which he illumines it and moderates its affections. Whence just as notwithstanding the fullness of grace and the state of beatitude, Saints and Blessed persons could without contradiction commit sin; so also without repugnance, by the absolute power of God, notwithstanding the fullness of grace and beatitude, the humanity of Christ could sin.

They press. Actions belong to supposits or subsistents, as the common axiom teaches: but the supposit of the assumed humanity is the supposit of the Word, inasmuch as it subsists in it: therefore if the assumed humanity could sin, the hypostatic union persevering, truly that sin would be attributed to the Word. It is confirmed: the humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Word: but the actions of instruments are attributed to the supposit whose instruments they are: therefore the sin of the humanity of Christ would have to be attributed to Christ himself.

I distinguish the major: actions belong to supposits elicitively, I deny; denominatively, I concede. For when it is asserted with the common axiom that actions belong to supposits, this is not said because the supposit, as that by which or as that which influences the operations of the nature, but because it sustains the nature proximately operating, as that by which and that which. Whence actions are said to be of supposits not effectively, but only denominatively. To the minor I say that if the humanity sinned, the sin would be reflected only upon it, as upon the elicitive principle of that sinful action, but not upon the Word itself, unless perhaps only denominatively, in which certainly no greater repugnance appears than that the same divine Word should be called dead and crucified: for according to the truth of the thing the denomination of a sinning divine Word does not conflict more with his attributive or essential sanctity than the denomination of dead conflicts with essential life: for death is as repugnant to life as sin is to sanctity: nay more, because death is opposed physically to life, but sin only morally to sanctity.

The Thomists propose: that there is a disparity, because death, like any other evil of punishment, is inflicted by the justice of God and ordained to the glory of God; but the evil of fault, or sin, is committed by a withdrawal from the act of divine wisdom and from the order of divine honesty, and therefore although there be no indecency that the Word, in the assumed nature, or as subsisting in humanity, be denominated passible, crucified, and dead through the communication of idioms: there is nevertheless moral indecency that the Word, even as subsisting in the human nature, or through the communication of idioms, be called sinning, for this offends pious ears and is not admitted by the greater part of Theologians.

On the contrary, the permission of sin can redound to the glory of God no less than any evil of punishment: for God can ordain sin both to the commendation of his justice by vindicating and punishing it, and to the manifestation of his mercy by relaxing it and freely remitting it: therefore by the reason that punishments can redound to the glory of God, sins can equally redound: nor does one offend pious ears of the wise more than the other, seeing that they know both are attributed to God only denominatively. Nor does it matter that there is a certain moral indecency that the Word be called to sin: for this moral indecency does not hinder that extrinsic denomination from being able to befit him, just as the denomination of dead and crucified, which, being physical, conflicts more with God, who is life by essence, than any moral denomination. Nor does it matter either that sin is an aversion from God: whereas it is repugnant that God be averted from himself. That, I say, does not stand in the way, for this aversion is only something moral: death however is something physical, and physically opposed to the life which it destroys; therefore if, notwithstanding the opposition or withdrawal of death from life, God, who is life essentially, can be called dead through extrinsic denomination by reason of his dead humanity, which is united to him hypostatically, why could he not, by a similar reason, be called sinning, and morally withdrawing from himself, by reason of the assumed humanity, if that were supposed to sin?

To the confirmation I say, whatever be the case concerning the major, the minor must be distinguished: the actions of instruments are attributed to the supposit whose they are, when they have a particular dependence upon him, I concede: when they do not have it, I deny the minor: nor the consequence either, because sinful actions of the will would not have a greater dependence upon the divine supposit in that hypothesis — namely that they would be sinful — than they would truly have if that nature were not united to him. To which response, says Pontius, the example of the axe, insofar as it is the instrument of the craftsman, is most apt, which of itself can at once cut and grow hot; for in cutting wood it also warms: but that heating is not attributed to the craftsman, but to the axe; the cutting, however, is ascribed to the craftsman, because to that he coacts by his locomotive power, and upon him it principally depends.

You will urge. Actions belong to supposits not only denominatively, but even elicitively; since John the Theologian in the Council of Florence, session 18, from this common saying of the Philosophers, that actions belong to supposits, proved that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and that the essence in the divines does not generate, but the Father by reason of the essence: yet the divine Father generates not denominatively only, but even elicitively as that which, through the essence as the principle by which of generating; and none of the Latin Fathers, for whom he was disputing, or the Greeks, against whom he was acting, protested to the contrary: nay, the Greeks, convicted by the argument of John the Theologian, confessed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son: therefore that principle was tacitly approved by the universal Church, Greek as well as Latin.

I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say that (as we have often said, treating of the constitutive principles of the divine persons, and of the real distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son, although he would not proceed from him) all the philosophical reasons which John the Theologian himself assumes to prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son were not truly proved by the Council, seeing that very many even of those reasons fail in sound Philosophy, as we observed there, and moreover all Theologians agree that the reasons which are brought forward in Councils by the actors for establishing dogmas of faith are not always of faith: nay sometimes they rely upon principles contrary to the dogmas of faith, as appears from the 7th Synod, where to prove that Angels can be depicted only this principle is assumed, namely that they are corporeal. For the Council approves as a dogma of faith that Angels can be depicted, but not that they are corporeal, for this is contrary to the dogmas of faith handed down in subsequent Councils, in which it was proved that Angels are spiritual substances, as we proved in the treatise On Angels.

All these are confirmed by our responses and reasons: First, because the human nature in itself would be a sufficient adequate cause of its own sinful action, even if the Word did not physically influence that action in the character of supposit, no less than heat is the efficient cause of its own heating, and the separate soul the cause of its own intellection and volition: therefore it is gratuitously asserted that some concurrence of the divine supposit is necessarily required for eliciting that action.

Next, even if the divine supposit concurred partially and effectively in the sinful action, it would not follow from this that that action ought to be imputed to the supposit as to a cause which would operate culpably: because although the supposit of the Word would concur physically in that action, nevertheless the determination would come from the will, in whose power it is to act or not to act: but a sinful action, as sinful, is not attributed to every cause concurring physically to the entity of the act: otherwise sin would be attributed to God, who physically concurs in all acts, whether good or evil: therefore although the supposit of the Word would concur physically in the actions of humanity which would be sinful, sin on that account ought not be attributed to him, because he is not the determining cause of those acts. Finally, neither with better reason would the Word influence those acts of humanity physically than the Father and the Holy Spirit, because the operations of the Trinity ad extra are undivided: but sinful acts, which are now elicited by men, are not attributed to the Father, nor to the Holy Spirit: therefore by parity of reason those sinful acts which would be elicited by the humanity of Christ would not have to be attributed to the Word.

Finally it is objected. The humanity of Christ is sanctified and made pleasing to God through the hypostatic union, even with every gift of habitual sanctifying grace set aside: therefore it cannot have any sin at least mortal, whether actual or habitual. The consequence is proved, because any sin whatever has an incompossibility with sanctifying grace: therefore if the hypostatic union has a greater power of sanctifying than grace has of itself, it could suffer no sin along with itself. It is confirmed: the humanity of Christ is substantially sanctified by the Deity and personality of the Word through infinite sanctity substantially, indeed not in an infinite manner, because a creature is not capable of such infinite sanctity; but insofar as any creature can be sanctified, so as altogether to become incapable of sin, even by the absolute power of God — if it does not conflict that some creature be of such great sanctity that even by the absolute power of God it cannot commit any sin: therefore such is the humanity of Christ.

I deny the consequence, because, as will be said presently, there is no grace of such perfection that it is physically so incompatible with sin that it could not subsist alongside it by the absolute power of God: but the same must be said of the hypostatic union, inasmuch as it has the power of sanctifying.

To the confirmation Pontius distinguishes the major: the divine nature and personality confer upon the nature such great sanctity as it can receive from them through that conjunction, I concede the major: he confers such great sanctity as can be received both from the divine nature itself and personality and from those gifts, he denies the minor.¹ For who would say that a nature is indeed united yet not blessed, endowed with such great sanctity as a nature united and at the same time blessed would have?

From these it appears, says the same Pontius in his commentary, number 12,

How insipid and imprudent is the censure of certain Theologians: especially Capreolus, when he says (against the most famous Assertors of our opinion, such as Durandus, the Subtle Doctor, and all his Disciples both ancient and recent) that one must proceed not so much with reasons as with flames — but certainly with flames by which he himself ought rather to be burned. He adds that Suarez, a little more modestly, but still quite immodestly, asserts it temerarious. Vasquez did not wish himself to determine the censure, but lest he not censure it, he pronounces it worthy of some censure.

But how vain and groundless this censure is, and unworthy of these Authors, easily appears from what has been said, and from the fact that the moderns themselves assail each other's foundations concerning the impeccability of Christ, and yet the attackers themselves establish nothing better or more efficacious. Moreover, although all these things, which we have said only for the sake of theological exercise, are not without probability; nevertheless I warn that one must abstain from these and similar propositions: Christ was absolutely peccable; or, Christ according to his humanity could sin by the absolute power of God: especially before the ruder and unskilled, for whom such theological controversies are not accessible: lest perchance they take from it occasion for thinking and saying that Christ was peccable in the manner in which other just men are, which would indeed be erroneous and heretical; for perhaps no just man, if you except the Blessed Virgin, was so tenacious of innocence that he never fell into sins at least venial.

From these gather, notwithstanding these things, that the impeccability of Christ is rightly inferred from the hypostatic union; indeed not through the intrinsic way, as the Thomists wish; but through the extrinsic, namely because it is expedient and most congruent that the nature united to the Word be incapable of sin, both on account of his personal sanctity: then on account of the beatific vision, which, joining the soul united to the Word to the first rule of right operation, renders it also impeccable, and moreover has the force and efficacy of repressing every disordered affection of the sensitive appetite: finally on account of the perfection and plenitude of habitual grace existing in the soul of Christ, and likewise of the virtues which flow from it: for since grace is morally opposed to sin, it follows from this that the most abundant fullness of grace, such as was in the soul of Christ, leaves no place for sin. Whence the root of that impeccability is above all the very maintenance of God, whereby the humanity of Christ, as personally united to the Word and joined to God through the beatific union, and also through the fullness of grace, is preserved most constantly in this threefold state, so that it can be separated neither by anything extrinsic, nor admit anything that would beseem ill that hypostatic, or beatific, or gratuitous, that is, sanctifying union, just as sin truly beseems this threefold state exceedingly ill morally. Hence in fact both opinions, that of the Angelic as well as of the Subtle Doctor, agree that the impeccability of Christ must be traced to that threefold union of his soul with God; which suffices both for faith and for the doctrine of the Holy Fathers: whether however it could be done otherwise de possibili is a controversy, pertaining purely to Philosophy.

You ask: whether Christ had the fomes of sin, or an inclination of the sensitive appetite toward sensible objects against the dictation of reason, which inclination is called the fomes of sin, because it is its incentive; and what that would be.

I answer first, that in fact that fomes of sin was in no wise in Christ. And it is proved from the sixth General Synod, action 11., and from the fifth, collation 8., Canon 112., where it is defined that in Christ there were only irreprehensible and innocent passions: but the fomes of sin is a noxious, reprehensible, disordered passion, since it is sometimes called by the Sacred Letters sin, not that it is properly sin, but that it is from sin and inclines toward sin, as the Synod of Trent explains, session 5., in the decree on original sin. It is confirmed from the Fathers, St. Leo writing thus in epistle 11.: The bodily senses constrained him without the law of sin, and the charity of his affections under the moderation of Deity and custom, nor at length was he held by enticements, nor did he yield to injuries. Similarly from St. Damascene 3. On the Faith, chapter 20., saying that Christ was tempted by the demon otherwise than the first parents were, because the first parent was tempted extrinsically and intrinsically, but Christ only extrinsically. Nor does it stand in the way that Heb. 4. it is said, Christ was tempted in all things, for that particle, in all things, must be understood accommodately to the nature and condition. Reason favors this conclusion: because from the Council of Trent the fomes of sin remains in us only for the struggle: but it was not seemly for such shameful struggle to be found in Christ: therefore neither the fomes of sin.

I answer second, that the fomes of sin would have been removed from Christ through the virtues which he had in the most perfect state, and through that excellent dominion which he had over all his powers, and likewise through the perpetual attention of reason, which anticipated all objects that could move his appetite toward sin. It is proved: if justice, e. g., in the state of innocence sufficed for that: therefore these also suffice for it, since they surpass the powers of that state.

I answer third, that even by the absolute power of God the divine Word could not assume a human nature with the fomes of sin, not that there is physical repugnance to this, but because there is moral repugnance, on account of the dignity and majesty of the divine supposit. Which indeed is proved: for if the Word could have assumed a nature with the fomes of sin, especially either because he could assume the nature of a brute, in which there could have been motions of the sensitive appetite toward objects delightful beyond measure, or because although such motions could have been in Christ, yet he could also not consent to them, and so use them for struggle and merit: but the first reason is none, because although in the irrational nature of a brute so great indecency is not said to exist, since this nature is not born to be ruled by the dictation of reason; nevertheless in our nature, inasmuch as it lies subject to the direction of the higher part, there is some indecency in experiencing such imperfection, and since the state of human nature, even as existing in the Word, is due, and in its own way ordered to reason, and it is unseemly to feel base motions in oneself, even though the consent of the will does not follow them, nevertheless on account of such indecency the divine Word ought not, nor could he, assume a nature with the fomes of sin. Likewise the second reason is none, for those things which are in the assumed nature for the struggle ought to be such that they include no indecency with respect to the state and condition of Christ.