Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Three things chiefly are to be established in this Question: First, whether truly the soul of Christ had beatific science, or clear and intuitive vision of God, and that from the instant of His conception. Second, whether that science and cognition was so perfect that it can even be called comprehensive. Third, whether through it the soul of Christ knows all that which God knows.

NOTE 1. That the state of Christ can be distinguished as double: one indeed before His death and resurrection: the other after His resurrection. Concerning the latter there is no place for doubting but that Christ had beatific vision and intuitive cognition of the divine essence; for this the Apostle seems expressly to teach Heb. 1, where speaking of Christ he says: He sitteth on the right hand of the Majesty on high: being made so much better than Angels as He hath inherited a more excellent name than they; which text especially, as Theodoret notes, looks to Christ after the resurrection: but holy Angels contemplate the divine essence intuitively, according to Matthew 18: Their Angels in heaven always see the face of my Father, etc. But it is not so clearly found from Scripture whether Christ while still wayfarer and mortal was possessed of delightful vision of God, and that from the beginning of His conception, wherefore this must be determined in the present Question.

NOTE 2. From the Subtle Doctor in 3 dist. 14 qu. 2 nu. 7, that only that vision is called comprehensive whereby a thing is so perfectly known that there is as much perfection in the cognition as there is perfection in the knowable object:

For it seems, says the Doctor, that only that intellect comprehends some intelligible whose perfection in intellectualitas is as great as the perfection or intelligibility of the intelligible: and therefore there is commensuration, adaequation, and on account of this neither is exceeding with respect to the other, and thus each is quasi-finite to the other, because simply adaequate: just as on account of the equality of the divine persons one person could be said finite to another, because not exceeding it, and yet simply is not finite.

Whence he gathers:

Therefore since no created intellect can have such intellectualitas either in first act or in second act as is the intelligibility of God as object, nay rather it exceeds infinitely; therefore no such created intellect, even if it see anything whatsoever visible on the part of God, can comprehend Him, because there is no commensuration hence thence.

Thus the Doctor.

NOTE 3. From the same Doctor qu. 15 quodlibetica, that for some object to be seen in the Word, or in the divine essence, is nothing else than to be represented in the divine essence itself as in a mirror, so that by the same vision by which that secondary object is seen, e.g., man, the Word also, or that divine essence, be seen as representative of man. Moreover objects represented in the divine essence are of two kinds chiefly: for some are purely possible, nor ever will have existence: others will have, or have, or had existence, and are called either future, actual, or past. The former God is said to know through science of simple intelligence, the latter through science of vision: the diversity of which sciences has been abundantly declared in our second volume disputation On science. It is asked presently however whether the intellect of the soul of Christ through beatific science can know both kinds of object known by God through science of simple intelligence and vision, and that either actually or only habitually. Actually, I say, if He sees all things simultaneously in act: and this again, either by one vision, or by many. By one vision indeed, if namely seeing the divine Word He see also all possibles shining forth in it: by many however, if to each visible object individual intellections correspond in the intellect of Christ. Habitually however, if He have something by way of habit, or first act, whereby He could perceive all those objects. Which again can happen in two ways: namely either by having a habit, or light, representative of all things whatsoever visible in the Word: or rather by eliciting one act of vision which is ostensive of all; such is the act of actual vision of God, which can be called habitual, or existing after the manner of first act, with respect to those things which shine in the Word, insofar namely they can be represented.

Conclusion first. — THE SOUL OF CHRIST STILL WAYFARER AND MORTAL HAD INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD, AND THAT FROM THE INSTANT OF HIS CONCEPTION. This is common regarding both parts among Theologians But the first is proved by very many texts of Scripture, especially from chapter 3 of John where Christ speaks thus: No man ascendeth into heaven but he that descendeth from heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven. In which words Christ still wayfarer and mortal, and still acting on earth, asserts Himself to be in heaven: but He was not in heaven by local and corporeal presence: therefore by mental and spiritual: but to be in heaven by reason of soul and spirit is nothing else than to see God intuitively: therefore Christ mortal enjoyed intuitive vision of God. It is confirmed from this, that Christ uttered these words, that He might prove to Nicodemus that He ought to be believed by him, as an eyewitness, existing simultaneously on earth and in heaven, which had happened to no Prophet ever; whence He said there: what we know we speak, and what we have seen we testify, ... who came from heaven is above all, what He saw and heard, this He testifies. — It can also be proved from John 12 where the same Christ says: If any man minister to me let him follow me, and where I am there also shall my minister be. He does not say where I shall be, but where I am; signifying that He already enjoyed clear vision of God, which those following His divine footsteps would attain, especially in hardships and torments to be endured. But that He there speaks as man appears hence, that He institutes discourse concerning Himself, as about to die for us, and following through death, then because in what follows He addresses the eternal Father as man.

Some prove the same truth also from the holy Fathers; but very few are express testimonies conceived nominally concerning supreme felicity before death and resurrection of Christ; and those usually brought forward by some, perhaps one excepted, plainly demonstrate the matter not at all. One passage here, which I mean, is Augustine's from question 63 On eighty-three questions, where expounding the allegorical signification of Lazarus raised by the Lord, he says the sudary wherewith his face was covered is the figure of present vision in us, whereby through a glass we see in an enigma: which Christ commands to be taken away, that is, that after this life all veils will be taken away, that we may see face to face. But how great the difference between the man whom the wisdom of God bore, through whom we are freed, and other men, is understood hence, that Lazarus unless going out of the monument is not loosed: that is, even the soul reborn cannot be free from all sin and ignorance except by resolution of body, so long as through a glass and in an enigma it sees the Lord. But the linen cloths and sudary of Him who did no sin and knew nothing not were found in the monument. He alone in flesh was not oppressed in the monument, lest any sin be found in Him; nor entangled in linen cloths, lest anything lie hidden from Him or retard His journey.

The reason is also supported as follows: First, because human nature was sublimated by the incarnation to supreme being: therefore it ought equally to have been raised to the most perfect operation, which is the beatific vision. Next, he who is the cause that others become comprehensors ought himself to possess beatitude in a more excellent degree; yet Christ, even while still mortal, was the cause why the first men became comprehensors, which appears above all from that celebrated promise which he made to the penitent thief, saying: Today you shall be with me in Paradise: for, as St. Augustine observes in epistle 57, although on that very day of death that repentant thief was to be in limbo, nevertheless because there he was going to see God, he is said to have been about to be in Paradise: therefore Christ himself, even while uttering these words and enduring the dreadful torments of the cross, truly enjoyed the vision of God. Finally, it was not fitting that the natural son should be so long deprived of his own inheritance, especially since that suspension of beatitude, as regards the soul, contributed nothing at all to the work of our salvation and restoration.

⟦OCR gap: one or more print lines lost here by the OCR; text resumes mid-word at "-dimus", i.e. the end of a Scripture quotation (Ioan. 1. "…vidimus gloriam eius").⟧ dimus gloriam eius, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father. By these words the Evangelist expressed that the glory of the soul of Christ is derived from the personal union of the Word. Second, from what follows these words, full of grace, and truth. Whence I argue thus: the fullness of grace is glory itself; but grace stands related to glory as the imperfect to the perfect; moreover, the fullness of truth consists in the intuitive knowledge of God. Third, in the same place: No man has seen God at any time: the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he himself has declared him. John 3. What we know we speak, and what we have seen we testify. John 8. And if I bear testimony to myself, my testimony is true: for I know whence I came, and whither I go: and afterwards: If I should say that I know him not, I shall be like unto you a liar: but I do know him, and keep his word. From these I argue thus: Christ is there set forth as the most perfect witness of the truth, sent by the Father, not only as God, but even as man; but perfect testimony proceeds from sight: hence, upon hearing those who are worthy of belief we give credence, because they declare that they saw with their own eyes the things themselves: therefore he saw the things concerning which he bore witness: therefore he beheld God himself intuitively. Since, however, these things prove that Christ before his passion saw God intuitively, and since there is no reason why at one time rather than another, it follows that he saw him from the first instant of his conception.

It is proved likewise by arguments. First, the glory of the body, which he displayed to the Apostles on Mount Thabor, is a most evident sign of the glory of his soul: nor can any reason be assigned why he had it at this time rather than that. Second, the inheritance is due to the natural Son of God as soon as nothing prevents him from obtaining it: but Christ as man is the natural Son of God: the inheritance is the intuitive vision of God, or created knowledge: nor is there any assignable reason why from the first instant of his conception he did not attain it.

You will object 1. certain passages of Scripture, such as John 7. The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified. John 17. Glorify, concerning the glorification of Christ on the very day of the Ascension, when in the sight of the Apostles he was lifted up, and a cloud received him from their eyes; and not of the very glory of the soul. So Augustine, tractate 32 on John. To the second and third, I say they are to be understood of the glory of the body and of the exaltation of name, of which the Apostle speaks to the Philippians 2. For which cause God also has exalted him, etc. So Augustine, tractate 101 on John. Which indeed is confirmed by the fact that Christ the Lord there asks the Father for that clarity with which he himself glorified his divine Father; and this was certainly nothing other than the manifestation of the name and majesty of the Father; for he says in the same place: Father, I have manifested your name to men, whom you gave me.

You will object 2. Christ merited for himself knowledge, or the beatific vision: therefore he did not possess it during the time of his mortal life, nor from the beginning of his conception. The consequence is evident; for it is necessary that the reward follow merit, since merit is the way to the reward. The antecedent is proved: that which is more perfect is to be attributed to Christ: but it is more perfect to have something by merit than without merit; for to have something by merit is to obtain it independently of another, and from the motive of justice: whereas to have it without merit is to have it merely dependently upon the liberality of the giver: therefore, etc. — I deny the antecedent: for although Christ merited the glory of his body, he did not however merit the glory of his soul, which he had from the first instant of his conception, not by the title of reward, but by the mode of nature, and by the right of natural filiation. Hence, to the proof I say that, speaking generally, it is indeed more perfect to have a thing by merit than without merit; nevertheless, per accidens it is sometimes better to have something without merit than by merit, namely, when its attainment by merit would derogate from natural dignity and from the perfection naturally due: but that beatitude, by reason of the hypostatic union and of natural filiation, was due to Christ as it were by native right; hence it would have been a certain prejudice to his dignity if he had been bound to earn it by study and labor. The remaining things that are wont to be objected against this assertion will be proposed and resolved in an easier and more suitable order in what follows.

Second conclusion. — THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST THE LORD WAS INDEED PERFECT, BUT NOT COMPREHENSIVE. So holds the Doctor in the place cited, and he

proves it by the same arguments by which he proved that the soul of Christ in fact possessed perfect and supreme grace: for, having asked in q. 2, n. 2, whether the intellect of Christ can be perfected by the most perfect vision of the Word, he answers: I say that it can, for the same reason for which in the preceding question 1 I said that his will can have supreme charity. Now the proof can be formed thus: supreme fruition follows upon supreme grace: therefore the most perfect degree of fruition must correspond to the most perfect degree of grace: but Christ had supreme grace: therefore also supreme fruition: but for supreme fruition, which is wrought chiefly by beatific love, the most perfect vision of God is required: therefore from supreme grace it follows that Christ possessed the supreme vision. — He confirms it by the authority of St. Isidore, who says in chapter 12 on Exodus: The Trinity is known to itself alone, and to the man assumed: which indeed can be true insofar as the Trinity alone, together with the man assumed, knows the Trinity herself with that knowledge than which a more perfect cannot be granted to any creature.

You will say. The more excellent the intellect is with an equal light of glory, the nobler and more excellent the beatific vision can be: but the intellect of an Angel is more perfect in natural things than the intellect of the soul of Christ: therefore, upon the hypothesis that an Angel should have the light of glory equal to that granted to the soul of Christ, he would elicit a more perfect beatific vision: and consequently the beatific vision of the soul of Christ is not the most perfect and supreme of all. The major is evident from what was said in the first volume concerning the inequality of the light of glory: for it was proved that the more vigorous intellect, with an equal light of glory, elicits a more excellent vision. The minor also is certain: since from the Apostle to the Hebrews, Christ was made a little less than the Angels. — I distinguish the major: that it can be nobler and more excellent by reason of the intellective faculty fortified and elevated by the light of glory, I concede: by reason of the light of glory itself, I deny. And with the minor granted, I similarly distinguish the consequent: that the beatific vision of an Angel would be more excellent than that of Christ, by reason of the intellective faculty, I concede: by reason of the light of glory, I deny. For not so much light of glory would be conferred upon an Angel as upon Christ; for since Christ possesses being far more excellent, by reason of the hypostatic union, than any creature whatsoever, therefore he ought to possess a nobler principle of operating, if not natural, at least supernatural. Hence the beatitude of Christ is supreme merely in point of fact, but not in point of possibility, as we said in similar fashion concerning his grace.

The second part is proved, namely, that this knowledge of Christ is not comprehensive of the Divinity; for St. Augustine says in book 83 of Questions, q. 14: Whatever comprehends itself is finite to itself: but the divine essence is not finite in comparison with the soul of Christ, since it exceeds it to infinity: therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the divine essence. Second, the infinite is not comprehended by the finite: but the soul of Christ is finite both entitatively, and as regards the intellective power, and the light of glory by which it is corroborated: but the divine essence, as comprehensible, is infinite: therefore, etc.

You will say. The intellect of the soul of Christ, according to the Doctor in the place cited above, n. 6, sees the divine essence as infinite: but to see the divine essence as infinite is to comprehend it: therefore the beatific knowledge

of Christ is comprehensive. The Doctor proves the major: Because, he says, nothing except under the formal aspect of the infinite can quiet the intellect: such that, if the infinite were not formally apprehended as infinite, but infinity only accompanied it, it would no more quiet the apprehensive power than any other intelligible thing; for infinity accrues to it when compared to that power, just as a triangle as white would no more quiet the sight than as black, if the triangle alone, precisely as triangle, were compared with that power, and what accompanies it were apprehended per se. Similarly the essence does not quiet unless as essence existing as seen in three supposita; but this belongs to it only by reason of infinitude: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the minor: that he who sees the divine essence as infinite in an infinite manner, so that there is as much perfection in the beholder as in the visible object, comprehends it, I concede: that he who sees that infinity merely in a finite manner comprehends it, I deny. Now the intellect of the soul of Christ indeed sees the divine essence as infinite; but it sees it in a finite manner, like the other Blessed; hence, by the same reason whereby the other Blessed do not comprehend God: therefore neither does the intellect of the soul of Christ comprehend him.

You will say 2. St. Isidore, cited above, says that the Trinity is known to herself alone, and to the man assumed: therefore he holds that the man assumed, by parity of reason, knows the Trinity in the same manner: but the divine Trinity knows herself comprehensively: therefore Christ also. — I answer, that St. Isidore utters these words to signify that the man assumed can be compared to the divine Trinity in the knowledge of God, not by reason of comprehension, but by reason of a certain most excellent knowledge, whereby the soul of Christ, before all other creatures, beholds the divinity more perspicaciously and sublimely. Or otherwise I say that Isidore means nothing else than that the mystery of the Incarnation is incomprehensible, even as the mystery of the Trinity, as he himself teaches in almost similar words in book 1 of the Sentences, chapter 3, saying: The Trinity alone knows herself integrally, and the humanity received by Christ: by which words he says that the Trinity is known to herself alone, even as the assumed humanity, to signify that each of these mysteries is perfectly known to God alone; wherefore the Apostle calls the incarnation the unsearchable riches of God.

Third conclusion. — IT IS MORE PROBABLE THAT THE SOUL OF CHRIST DOES NOT SEE ALL THINGS WHICH GOD SEES BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF SIMPLE INTELLIGENCE, NAMELY ALL POSSIBLE THINGS. This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Doctor at n. 20, as his Scholiast gathers from the same place, although in truth he rather seems doubtful in resolving this difficulty.

It is proved, therefore, first: If the soul of Christ saw all possible objects, this would be either through many visions, or through one: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because since those objects are supposed to be infinite in number, it would be necessary for him also to have actually infinite cognitions: but a finite faculty, such as is the soul of Christ, cannot have actually infinite cognitions, because it conflicts that a finite power should be able to accomplish as much as an infinite one; especially in that which pertains to simply simple perfection: but if a created intellect could understand infinite objects by infinite intellections, it would accomplish that; for it would perceive all that which infinite power perceives: now the cognition of infinite objects denotes perfections without imperfection. Or even according to the second way, because that unique cognition would either of necessity represent all those possible objects formally, by its intrinsic nature, or would accomplish only this by means of certain respects superadded after the manner of accidents, which its intrinsic nature would not require. But the first cannot be said, because truly then that vision would be of infinite perfection, and could be called actual wisdom infinite entitatively, such as belongs to God alone: since that vision would be not only extensively infinite, inasmuch as it would tend to all intelligible objects, but also intensively: for it does not seem to be a greater perfection to see one object most intensely, than to see perfectly all intelligible objects together: for there is no one who would not prefer a perfect vision, as it were one vision, of ten objects, to a vision of eight of one object alone. Moreover, if one intellection could represent infinite objects, it would follow that the intellect also was of infinite intellective power; since it conflicts no less that a created intellect should have infinite power indivisibly for producing an intellection of infinite perfection, than that a created intellection should have infinite power for representing infinite objects: it conflicts that the intellect of Christ have infinite power; otherwise it would in fact be endowed with that power: since everything of perfection ought to be attributed to the soul of Christ which can belong to it without repugnance and indecorum: therefore equally it conflicts that there be given an intellection which has infinite force of representing infinite objects by reason of its own intrinsic nature. It is confirmed by a similar case; because it conflicts that one man should be able to be equivalent to infinitely many men, as regards removing some infinite weight which could be carried by infinitely many men: for that man would need to have infinite power of carrying: therefore equally it conflicts that one vision be equivalent to infinite visions, as regards representing infinite objects. — Neither can the second be said, namely, that that vision would represent all possible objects by means of superadded respects. First, because, as Poncius says on the present question n. 107, it would be necessary that infinitely many respects be added to that vision toward those infinite possible objects, and thus there would be given an actual infinite, which we demonstrated to conflict in the Physics. Second, it would follow that those respects would be formally visions, and thus there would be given many visions of those objects, which is against the hypothesis. The consequence is proved: because through those respects those objects would be seen secondarily, but not through the vision itself; for, such a vision being posited, the objects would not be perceived, but with the respects added they would be perceived: but that by which an object is seen is a vision: therefore it would follow that those respects would be formally visions, and consequently that there would be actually infinite visions of infinite objects. It is confirmed, for nothing else is required that something be called a vision than that it make a visible object be perceived, and that it inhere in the very seeing intellect: but truly those respects would have to be in the intellect, since they would affect the act of the intellect, and by means of those respects the intellect would be said to perceive visible objects, which by those respects alone it would not see: therefore those respects would truly be visions. Then, it would also follow that the vision would not be an absolute form, but a respective one, because if by some superadded respect any visible or knowable object can be represented formally, there is no reason

why it should be limited and determined to a determinate number of objects, beyond which it cannot simultaneously understand more. Which indeed is gathered from the distraction, and lesser attention, of the intellect to many objects; which lesser attention, or distraction, surely does not proceed from the production of the vision, since otherwise it would follow that fire, by the simultaneous production of many fires, would suffer distraction and diminution of its power; nor does it arise from the impotence of the organs, since otherwise that lesser attention regarding many objects, rather than fewer, would not be in Angels; but it arises from the limitation of its power to perceiving simultaneously many objects through distinct visions.

You will say. If distraction of cognition, and lesser attention, were to occur in the knowledge of many things rather than in the knowledge of one object alone, it would follow that Christ would less perfectly know the divine essence, if along with it he simultaneously understood other secondary objects, than if he saw that essence alone; and thus he would not have the supreme vision of the divine essence: but these consequences seem absurd: therefore it is false that through the knowledge of many objects attention is distracted, and a lesser cognition results. I distinguish the major:

that this would follow if that cognition were made through many visions, I concede: if through one, I deny. I confess indeed, that if cognition is made through many visions, then the intellect is distracted, and each cognition will be less perfect; but it is otherwise when by one cognition the intellect perceives many things; for then that cognition, extending itself to many objects, especially when they are mutually subordinated, is not called less perfect, but rather more excellent.

You will urge: If through the knowledge of many objects, which are perceived by one vision, no distraction occurs: then by a single act of vision Christ could perceive all possible objects whatsoever.

I deny that consequence, because that cognition of all possible objects conflicts with him on other grounds; for since that cognition is actual, if he perceived all those objects actually, since they are supposed infinite, it would follow that he has a cognition not only extensive, but also intensively infinite, as was said. You will press further: If the intellect is distracted, and its cognition becomes lesser, while it has diverse cognitions, the consequence will be that Christ will not have so perfect a cognition of the divine essence while simultaneously understanding all other objects by infused, or acquired science, as he would have if he did not understand them through those sciences: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. I distinguish the major: if he would know through

many cognitions, which would tend to diverse objects, such that the terminative object of one cognition were not the terminative object of another, I concede: otherwise, I deny. I confess indeed, that the intellect is distracted through many cognitions when they tend to diverse objects; but it does not happen thus when those diverse cognitions are referred to the same objects: but the cognitions which Christ has by infused or acquired science do not tend to diverse objects, but to the same objects diversely known; hence no distraction of his intellect ought to occur. I say with Poncius, n. 114, that indeed the beatific cognition of Christ ought to be distracted by the cognition infused, or acquired, of other objects, unless God, out of special favor, willed him to have the beatific cognition in the highest degree: and therefore by the more abundant light of glory, and a singular concurrence, he so braced that intellective power of his, that through the cognition of other objects the beatific cognition would become neither lesser nor less attentive.

You will say 2: If Christ could not see possible objects through a created intellect, chiefly because from the infinity of those objects it would follow that his cognition would be intensive infinite: but this is false: since one could only infer thence that that cognition would be extensive infinite, because indeed it would tend to objects infinite in number: but from an infinitely extensive cognition there is not gathered an intensively infinite cognition: just as although in a continuum there are infinitely many parts divisible in potency by some divider, it does not follow that any created divider has actually infinite power to divide those parts. Then, although the beatific vision is terminated and extends itself to the infinitude of God; nevertheless it is not intensive infinite, because, as we said, it does not see infinitude in an infinite manner. Then the Doctor refutes the arguments by which St. Bonaventure proved that Christ does not see infinite things actually: First, because thence it would follow that the intellect of the soul of Christ would understand as much as the divine intellect, and as such would have infinite power: second, because infinite power sees two more distinctly and perfectly than three, and three than four, and so ascending to infinity, it will always be able to see more things less distinctly and perfectly than fewer: therefore if he saw infinite things infinitely many times, he would see them less clearly and distinctly than if he saw merely infinite things: but what is seen infinitely many times less perfectly and distinctly is just as if it were seen in no way at all: third, because extensively infinite power presupposes intensively infinite power: but the soul of Christ cannot extend itself to objects infinite in number.

The Doctor, I say, at n. 21, resolves and refutes these arguments: but they are the same arguments by which we confirmed our aforesaid Conclusion: therefore our assertion is opposed to the opinion and doctrine of the Subtle Doctor.

I deny all these consequences, and to the first reason I say, that indeed from extensive cognition intensive cognition is not rightly gathered, when extensive cognition is concerned with objects understood actually, but merely in potency, I concede: when that extensive cognition is supposed in fact to be occupied with infinite objects known actually, I deny. For since, as we said, through the cognition of many objects not subordinated, which must necessarily be attained by diverse cognitions, distraction of the intellect occurs, and each cognition is less perfect, it follows that if anyone should know actually, perfectly and distinctly, objects infinite in number, he would necessarily need to have an infinite power of understanding, just as if anyone should in fact divide the infinite parts of a continuum, he would need infinite divisive power. Secondly, in the second place I say, there is a disparity between the cognition of God as infinite, and of infinite objects, namely that the cognition of God under the aspect of the infinite can be made in a finite mode; for it is not required that there be as much perfection in the knower as in the knowable object; for God seen as infinite is not necessarily perceived according to every single degree of his perfection and infinitude: just as, for example, that the sun be seen inasmuch as lucid, it is not necessary that it be perceived according to every degree and perfection of its light; otherwise it could not be seen more perfectly by one eye than by another; but that all possible objects should be seen actually, it would be necessary that the seeing intellect have infinite power, for it would either see them through one vision or through many: if through one, it would be necessary that that intellection be actual infinite in representing, for it would represent infinite objects, which would shine forth in it, and through it become manifest to the intellect: but the productive power of an infinite act must be infinite, and consequently the intellect of Christ, productive of that infinite intellection, would need to have infinite power. The same must be said if he would know those objects through intellections infinite in number, for just as power as it were twofold is required to produce the intellections of two objects, so power as it were fourfold is required to produce the intellections of just as many objects: therefore by parity of reason infinite power would be desired, that infinite cognitions of infinite objects might be produced.

To the third, I say that the Doctor refutes the arguments of St. Bonaventure only to this extent, insofar as the Seraphic Doctor wished not only that no created intellect could produce intellections infinite in number, but also that it could not elsewhere receive such as produced: which indeed the Doctor does not approve; hence he says in the same place: It can be said that to see less distinctly with respect to many things is not necessarily on the part of the intellect as receptive, but only as elicitive: for it could receive visions equally distinct of many things as of few: and thus, if the argument held, it would conclude only that the intellect cannot be elicitive with respect to infinite visions. And below: Extensive infinity toward certain things, or toward forms to be received, does not conclude infinite entity of the receiver, as is evident in matter, if it were receptive of infinite forms: indeed it rather concludes imperfection: but some extensive infinity, as toward effects simultaneously coexistible, concludes extensive infinity, because such plurality concludes greater perfection in that which extends itself to more things; not so of the receptive. By which words the Doctor openly signifies, that even if perhaps the intellect is receptive of intellections infinite in number divinely produced, even as of species intelligible infinite in number, such as some Theologians wish to have been granted to the Angels from the instant of their formation; nevertheless it does not follow that the same intellect could produce intellections infinite in number; which is the very argument by which we confirmed our Conclusion: therefore the Doctor is not opposed to us.

Nor does it matter that he adds in the same place: Yet if the intellect also is posited as elicitive of infinite things; I say that neither does that extensive infinity conclude an extensive infinity of the intellect, but of the object: for the object is the principal active cause with respect to those visions, and not the intellect. That, I say, presents no obstacle, because by those words he intends to signify nothing else than that although the intellect might be said to elicit the cognition of infinite objects, it ought not on that account be called infinite, because it was not the principal cause of the cognition of those objects; but God himself, who concurring in an extraordinary manner with it would produce their vision in the intellect of Christ itself; and thus the intellect would rather be said to be receptive than productive of such cognition.

Fourth conclusion. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE INTELLECT OF CHRIST DOES NOT SEE ALL THINGS WHICH GOD SEES BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF VISION, BUT ONLY CERTAIN ONES: AND THIS NOT ACTUALLY, BUT HABITUALLY: INDEED NOT THROUGH THE LIGHT OF GLORY, OR ANY QUALITY, BUT FROM THIS, THAT HE HAS AN ACT OF BEATIFIC VISION TOWARD AN OBJECT REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL THOSE THINGS WHICH CHRIST WISHES TO KNOW. This seems more conformable to the mind of the Doctor, as regards the three parts of which it consists, of which

the first is against the Thomists, who affirm that the soul of Christ, by blessed science, knows in the divine essence all whatsoever things present, past and future. But it is proved, because future objects can be infinite in number, for instance the infinite cognitions and affects of men and Angels throughout all eternity: but, as was said, Christ cannot understand infinite objects, for the same reasoning applies to those future objects as to possibles: therefore, etc.

The second part similarly stands, namely, that Christ does not see those objects habitually, as it were through the light of glory, or some other quality, which would represent to the intellect, after the manner of a habit, all future objects: for neither could the intellect of Christ be determined by itself to seeing those objects any more than by the light of glory, or by some similar quality, which would stand after the manner of a habit: but it cannot be determined by itself to the seeing of all those objects: therefore not either by the light of glory. The major stands, because the light of glory could determine the intellect to the perception of those objects from no other source than because of itself it could concur to the cognition of those cognitions whereby those objects would be perceived: yet by parity of reason the intellect could concur to those cognitions: therefore this can no more occur through the light than through the intellect, especially since the intellect without any light of glory, and with a mere more abundant actual concurrence, can be determined to the cognition of objects: but the light of glory could not concur to that vision except dependently upon the intellect. This part will be confirmed a little below.

The third part likewise stands, namely, that Christ sees future objects to this extent, namely, insofar as he sees the divine essence like a voluntary mirror, and as representative of all those things either among possibles or among futures, which Christ wishes to know; for by this reason the cognition of Christ can be called most perfect, since although he does not actually perceive all objects whatsoever, nevertheless his intellect is always ready in first act to uncover them, whenever, whether for his accidental felicity, or to answer the inquiry of others, he shall wish to know those objects.

FROM THESE GATHER, that the Doctor Subtle is to be understood in this last sense when he says that Christ sees all things habitually in the Word. Moreover he is to be understood according to the second part of the present Conclusion, when he denies, according to the opinion of St. Bonaventure, that Christ sees all things habitually, in that manner namely, in which the Seraphic Doctor affirmed that in the intellect of Christ there is some quality after the manner of a habit, whereby it would come about that Christ could habitually know all objects both possible and future; which indeed the Doctor assaults by showing that that habit, representative of all objects, is impossible; partly because either that habit would be the ratio of knowing infinite objects precisely per se, and thus would have infinite power in representing, which conflicts from what has been said: or it would accomplish this by means of respects founded in the habit itself, by order to those intelligible objects themselves, which equally cannot be said: for, by the same reason that infinite respects are posited in such a habit, lest that habit be granted to be infinite, by the same reason infinite respects can be founded in some act, which nevertheless on that account would not be infinite according to that opinion: but in the same opinion an act founding infinite respects toward infinite objects is not admitted: therefore neither ought a habit to be admitted. Moreover, it is impossible that infinite respects be founded in habits toward objects unless that habit is posited actually infinite; for a habit has no other respect toward its object than either the respect of caused to causing, or of measured to its proper measure: therefore if it has infinite respects measured to measure, that habit will be infinitely measured: but to be infinitely measured is to be infinitely perfect; for to be measured is to be perfected, or at least perfectly known: therefore the habit will be not only infinite extensively, but even intensively. Hence Poncius deservedly censures Suárez, because he said in disputation 26, near the beginning, that the Doctor Subtle departed from the opinion of St. Bonaventure, which he expounded otherwise, in a manner less probable: in which words, says Poncius, though few, Suarez thrice erred grossly: First, when he said that Scotus differed little from the opinion of St. Bonaventure, which he impugned; for he is as far from that opinion as the last part of this conclusion, which is affirmative, differs from the first, which is negative, and one of which has utterly no connection with the other, as is manifest. Secondly, when he said that Scotus afterwards expounded otherwise the opinion of St. Bonaventure impugned by him; for although he expounded habitualiter otherwise than St. Bonaventura, nevertheless he did not expound the opinion of St. Bonaventure otherwise, but established another opinion wholly different. Thirdly, when he said the exposition of Scotus was less probable; for from what has been said the opposite stands. He errs further also, when in the same place he supposes that Scotus said that actual vision would sometimes stand after the manner of a first act, sometimes after the manner of a second act: for Scotus did not dream this; but only said that, by means of the vision whereby, as it were a second act, he sees the beatific object potent and ready to represent all intelligibles, he has applied a first act sufficient for causing with the intellect the cognition of any intelligible whatever; not indeed conjunctively, but divisively; which is without doubt true. Such are the words of Poncius.