Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

By the name of moral virtue is here understood every elective habit consisting in a mean as regards us, according as the prudent man will define; of which definition you have the parts clearly expounded in our Moral Philosophy. But it is called moral, because it informs human acts and the manners of men. Now there are four principal moral virtues, of which three are called appetitive, because they reside in the rational appetite and are ordered to regulating the will: those are Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance; and one intellectual, namely Prudence, which illumines the minds of men and directs them in eliciting and composing their acts rightly and duly. And this virtue is called moral, not because it resides in the will and immediately directs it, but because it orders the intellect to moderating and regulating the free and deliberate acts of that will; and it is so necessary that, with it absent, the other virtues vindicate for themselves a futile and empty name. But these four virtues are commonly called Cardinal, by a comparison taken from the hinges of a door. For as a door turns on its hinge, so our whole moral manner of life turns toward honesty upon these virtues as on hinges. They are also called principal, because all others are ordered to them. I add moreover that some moral virtues include or connote no imperfection in those having them, such as Fortitude and Justice: others truly, which include and connote some imperfection, as Continence, whereby namely man resists present concupiscences with difficulty.

Note 2. That moral virtues can be regarded in a threefold state, namely imperfect, perfect, and heroic, or superexcellent. In the imperfect state there is not properly virtue, but a certain disposition which perfect virtue is apt to follow; or it is virtue only begun, or remitted. In the perfect state is virtue indeed intense and firm, but conversant only about its proper matter, as Temperance about curbing and moderating the pleasures of body and soul. In the superexcellent and heroic state, however, when it extends itself beyond its proper object, as Temperance moderating pleasures even before the danger of death proposed; by which reason it seems extended toward Fortitude, or a most strict federation and close bond, contracted with the very virtue of Fortitude. The difficulty is, in which of those states they existed in Christ.

Note 3. That although moral virtues are acquired by human industry, nevertheless they can also be infused divinely, like the theological ones; with this difference however, that theological virtues are infused per se and necessarily, since they can be obtained by no powers of nature, no labor and industry of men: but moral virtues are said to be infused only per accidens, since although they can be acquired by human diligence and exercise, nevertheless without all man's industry they can be infused divinely into the soul from the supreme liberality of God: not indeed for that reason only whereby they are ordered to a supernatural end, e.g. when those virtues order man to operating from the motive of charity and for the glory of God, but even when they are referred to a natural end; e.g. when they elicit their acts from the motive of public peace and for human honesty. For I cannot prove the opinion of certain Moderns who will that moral virtues can be infused divinely only insofar as they order man to a supernatural end and move him to operate from the motive of charity. Indeed if moral virtues, insofar as infused, were distinguished by this from themselves insofar as acquired, it would follow that no one could elicit by an acquired moral virtue an act deliberate in order to a supernatural end, and from the motive of charity, which is plainly false.

Three things therefore are to be determined in this Question: First, whether truly Christ had all moral virtues. Second, whether he had them in the perfect and heroic state. Third, whether he obtained them by his own industry, or rather by infusion, and that from the instant of his conception.

First conclusion. — All moral virtues which include and connote no imperfection were truly in Christ.

It is proved first: No perfection, even natural or moral, ought to have been wanting to Christ: but moral virtues are very great perfections, because they most perfectly perfect men in order to human life honestly, studiously, monastically, economically, and politically conducted: therefore they ought not to have been wanting to Christ. Then, Christ readily elicited moral actions, e.g. of Justice, Fortitude, and Prudence, whenever occasion offered itself: therefore he elicited them through the mediation of moral virtues, because no one can readily and promptly break forth into that action without habits ordered to it. Finally, there could be in Christ some difficulty in exercising acts of virtues, as when at the time of death his senses fled death: therefore to overcome it it was fitting for him to have the virtue of Fortitude.

You will object. Liberality, Temperance, Continence, and Prudence were not in Christ: but those virtues are moral and denote no imperfection conflicting with the state of Christ: therefore not all moral virtues which have no imperfection annexed were in Christ. The minor is evident. The major is proved: first indeed, that Liberality was not in him is plain, because it is the virtue whereby riches are rightly dispensed: but Christ was supremely poor. That neither Temperance nor Continence were in him is proved: because the former moderately composes the senses concerning sensible objects, so that it exercises ordered motions about them; but the latter tempers the motions of flesh: but Christ had no motions which needed coercion. Of Prudence too it is proved, for it is not acquired except with acquired knowledge: but Christ at the instant of his conception did not have acquired knowledge: therefore not even for that instant prudence. This is urged on a sufficiently weak foundation by Vasquez in 3 p. of D. Thomas dist. 2. cap. 2, to defend that Prudence was not infused in Christ at the instant of conception, but gradually acquired together with acquired science. —

I answer, denying the major, and saying to each part of its proof, first, that moral virtues do not consist in the very exercise of deliberate and morally good act, but in a permanent quality which be productive of that act, as is taught in the Ethics: and consequently according to that saying, the poor can be liberal as well as the rich, although they possess nothing which they can bestow, because the permanent quality suffices, or the deliberate habit rightly affecting the will concerning acts of liberality to be exercised, should occasion offer itself; and thus no one denies that liberality was in Christ. Add that even as to external act Christ exercised liberality, especially when twice he fed the greatest multitude of men, Matt. 14 and 15. Second, temperance and continence are not acquired for coercing inordinate motions only, but lest those motions be present; wherefore temperance and continence in the common degree temper indeed inordinate motions about sensibles, but in the heroic degree not only temper, but even effect that they be in no way present: but Christ had temperance and continence in the heroic degree, and therefore he had those virtues, so that in him there were no inordinate motions about sensibles. But Prudence is found not only with acquired knowledge, but also with other moral virtues, of which all it is the form and rule; wherefore although Christ at the instant of conception had not acquired knowledge, yet no less ought he to have had prudence, which then would likewise be moderator of the other virtues, that those were infused in him at the instant of conception will be proved below.

You will object 2. Those virtues which have repugnance with the state of beatitude and perfect sanctity were not in Christ: but moral virtues have repugnance with the state of beatitude and perfect sanctity: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for Christ from the instant of his conception was blessed. The minor is also evident; because those virtues do not remain in the Blessed, nor are required in most holy men; since they are ordered to restraining passions, which are present in most holy men; most of all in Christ, who had passions subject most perfectly to the empire of reason, as will appear below: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor, and to its proof I say first that moral virtues remain in the state of beatitude, not indeed as to the material, such as are the pleasures and delights of foods and venery with respect to temperance, or fear or daring about dangers of death with respect to fortitude, or distributions and exchanges of things with respect to justice, etc.: yet they remain according to what is formal in the very virtue, namely right election according to the order of reason concerning the honesty and mean of those passions which those virtues are of themselves ordered to moderate; or they remain as to primary and internal act, but not as to secondary and external; for those virtues are ordered first and per se so as to dispose the appetite to choosing easily and readily in their own matters conformably to reason; secondarily to restraining passions: whence those virtues can be in most holy men as to that primary effect, although they cannot be in them as to the secondary.

Second conclusion. — Christ had the moral virtues in the heroic degree, and that by infusion, from the instant of his conception. This Conclusion consists of three parts; of which the first is proved: In him moral virtues were not in the common degree, but in the superexcellent one, in which there are not immoderate passions, but well-ordered and composed ones: but in Christ there were not immoderate passions, but composed at nod and will: therefore there were in him virtues in the heroic degree. The major is evident: for since heroic virtue chiefly consists in this, that it repress all passions and subject them to the empire of the will, it is certain that he has heroic virtue who has passions well composed. Whence virtues in the perfect state are said to purge the soul: but in the heroic degree Aristotle and Plotinus call them virtues of the purged soul. The minor is also evident: for, as we shall prove below, Christ exercised and moderated all his passions, all sensitive appetitive motions, according to will and nod. Then, Christ had virtues in the most perfect state possible: but truly virtue in the heroic degree is possible: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for it was most fitting to the dignity of Christ that he have every excellence and perfection whatsoever compossible with his state. The minor is evident from the Philosophers. — Finally, that virtue is reckoned to be had in the heroic state which has other virtues annexed with it: but Christ had all virtues connected with himself: therefore, etc.

The second part is proved from Isaiah c. 7, where of Christ still an infant it is said: He shall eat butter and honey, that he may know to refuse the evil and choose the good. On which place St Jerome writes thus: Wrapped in swaddling clothes, fed with butter and honey, he shall have judgment of good and evil, so that refusing evil he may choose the good. Moreover Christ was at least equally perfect as the first parents: but the first parents, immediately upon being created, had all moral virtues, as the Theologians commonly teach: therefore much more Christ had those moral virtues. Finally Christ from the first instant of his conception was perfect, both as to will and as to intellect; for therefore he is called Man even for that instant in sacred letters, as when it is said, A woman shall compass a man: but the perfection of will according to the order of nature comes about chiefly through moral virtues acquired by genus: therefore Christ had them from that instant.

The third part is proved: Christ did not have those virtues by acquisition: therefore he had them by infusion. The antecedent is proved: for it is more probable that all moral virtues were in Christ for that instant of conception: but he could not acquire all simultaneously for that instant, because acquiring one by some most intense act, the others would not yet have been present: therefore it is more probable that those moral virtues were in Christ not by acquisition, but by infusion.