Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

That the Theological virtue is so called by which man is immediately ordered toward God, supernaturally to be attained through acts transcending every capacity of nature. But three especially are assigned, namely Faith, Hope, and Charity, of which some involve a certain imperfection, as faith and hope: For faith, since it is the evidence of things that appear not, imports obscurity and inevidentness: but Hope the absence of the thing hoped for: but Charity, since it says no defect of itself, and is either not distinguished from sanctifying grace, as we shall teach with the Subtle Doctor in the Treatise on Grace, or at least is necessarily consequent upon it, as the Thomists will have it, there is no doubt that it was in Christ the Lord, concerning whom likewise all Theologians agree; about faith and hope, however, they do not so consent.

Note 2. Faith and hope can be regarded in two ways, namely, either as to act, or as to habit. As to act indeed, insofar as it is actual attainment of God Himself, either known by the intellect through faith, or as certainly expected and not yet possessed, through hope: but as to habit, which is a supernatural quality persevering continually in the soul, whereby it is inclined and helped to exercise acts of faith or supernatural hope. And although all Theologians agree that faith and hope, as to act, were not in Christ with respect to the principal object of those virtues, namely God Himself to be possessed and seen, because Christ from the instant of His conception, as will be proved below, enjoyed most sweet fruition of God through vision and love: nevertheless some contend with Durandus that they existed in Christ as to habit; nay even some with Suarez, in his exposition art. 1, q. 1, will have hope in Christ been present both as to act and habit, whereby Christ while still mortal desired the beatitude of His body, likewise also the exaltation of His name. For a twofold object of hope is distinguished, namely primary and secondary. The primary object is what is hoped for per se, as objective beatitude, namely God to be possessed: but the secondary object are certain goods of body or soul which follow upon beatitude itself, and consequently can be the object of hope, such as could be in Christ the exaltation of name and glorification of body.

Note 3. That two motions and acts are required for faith, one in the intellect, another in the will. The act in the intellect is faith's assent itself elicited by the intellect, which assents to things revealed; the prerequisite act on the side of the will is a certain motion of the will commanding the intellect, that it yield assent to revealed objects, though obscurely proposed, notwithstanding its natural inclination to yield assent only to evident things. Which motion indeed some call the imperium of the will, as Theologians commonly do; others the pious affection of the will, as most of the Recentiores; some the affect of credulity, as the Fathers of the Council of Orange, Canon 3. But the Apostle calls it obedience Rom. 10, when he says: All do not obey the Gospel, as if he said: all have not the affect, or will, of believing the Gospel. Moreover, Theologians gather that this motion of the will for eliciting the act of faith from the intellect is necessary in us for this reason, that since the object of faith is inevident and obscure, it is not per se sufficient to move the intellect to yield assent, therefore the intellect must be moved by the will, and be held captive by it in obedience to faith, as St. Paul says.

These things thus premised, three things come to be established in the present Question: First, that in the intellect of Christ there was no faith, neither as to act nor as to habit. Second, that neither in His will was there the pious affection, whereby it would move the intellect to assent of faith. Third, that likewise there was not in Christ Theological hope, neither as to act nor as to habit, both regarding the primary object and the secondary.

Conclusion first. — THEOLOGICAL FAITH WAS IN CHRIST THE LORD NEITHER AS TO ACT NOR AS TO HABIT.

It is proved first: Whatever intrinsically implies imperfection and opposition to the beatific state and to the clear vision of God was not in Christ: but infused faith, both as to act and as to habit, implies imperfection and opposition to beatific vision: therefore it must not be admitted in Christ. The major stands; because Christ was blessed from the instant of His conception, and consequently had the clear vision of God, and therefore everything opposed to the state of beatitude and to that intuitive vision of God was repugnant to Him. The minor also is proved: because faith is per se inevident cognition and assent to an obscurely proposed thing, whence that common saying: Faith is to believe what thou dost not see; wherefore St. Paul says Hebrews 11: Now Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not: but what is obscure and inevident directly conflicts with evident and intuitive cognition: therefore, etc. Then, enigmatical cognition conflicts with intuitive cognition: but the cognition of faith is enigmatical; but beatific cognition is facial and intuitive; hence the Apostle 1 Cor. 13: We see now through a glass in an dark manner, but then face to face: therefore, etc. Finally, that which belongs only to Wayfarers, and is to be evacuated in the blessed, was not in Christ, because He was blessed from the instant of conception: but what is known through faith is to be evacuated in patria, as the Apostle teaches there, saying: When that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away: therefore faith could not be in Christ.

You will object 1. That of Isaiah 11, where the Prophet delineating the future virtues of Christ the Lord says: And faith shall be the girdle of His reins: therefore truly Christ had faith. — I distinguish: He had faith, which is supernatural assent to things obscurely divinely proposed, I deny; He had faith, which is fidelity and truthfulness in promises, I concede. But the Prophet under the name of faith signifies nothing else than that fidelity, as St. Jerome observes on that passage: which virtue, since it is moral and says perfection without imperfection, because it imports conformity of deeds to words and promises, therefore it could be in Christ.

You will object 2. Faith is more perfect than the moral virtues: but in Christ there are moral virtues, as we shall see: therefore also faith; for the more perfect a virtue is, the rather does it seem to be posited in Christ.

I answer, not every nobility makes a virtue be in Christ, but that which has no imperfection annexed to itself, or opposition to the state of Christ: but moral virtues have neither imperfection nor opposition with respect to the state of Christ; but faith has it, as was said: therefore although it be more perfect than the moral virtues by reason of object, yet on account of that imperfection and opposition to the state of Christ, it is not to be posited in Him.

You will object 3. Even if in Christ the Lord there are not riches, or great expenditures, around which magnificence is occupied, nevertheless the virtue of magnificence does not cease to have place in Him: therefore by parity, although there be not with respect to Christ the Lord the object of faith, which is a divine thing not seen, nevertheless Theological faith must not be denied to be in Him.

I answer by denying the consequence: since in Christ the Lord there was magnificence, although wealth was wanting to Him, because wealth and great expenditures are only the material object of that virtue, while the formal object is the manner to be observed in distributing wealth and making expenditures; and if something is lacking under the aspect of matter, it does not follow that the habit must be lacking, but only if it be lacking under the formal aspect of the object: but in Christ the formal aspect of the object of magnificence is not lacking, namely the manner in which wealth is to be distributed and expenditures made. But in Christ the Lord the formal aspect of faith is not found, namely the divine thing, as formally unseen. Thus entirely opposite is the ratio of magnificence and of faith in Christ; inasmuch as the material object of magnificence is lacking with respect to Him, namely wealth and expenditures, but the formal object is not lacking, namely the manner under which wealth is to be distributed and expenditures made; on the contrary, the material object of faith is not lacking in Christ; for the material objects of faith are the things to be believed: but in His intellect are the Trinity, Incarnation, etc.; but the formal object is lacking, because in Him the Trinity is not as unseen, nor the Incarnation as obscurely known, but as clearly seen and intuitively known.

Conclusion second. — There was not in Christ the Lord the pious affection and motion of will by which the intellect is held captive in obedience to faith, and moved to assent to truths obscurely revealed by God.

Proof: The means follows the ratio of the end and of its necessary condition of its principal: but this pious affection of will is a means to the act and habit of faith as to an end, and is ordered to it as accessory to principal: therefore for the same reason that faith is not admitted in Christ, neither ought this pious affection of will be asserted in Him. — It is confirmed: where something is so subordinated to another as to be only in aid of it and to serve it, then if that to which it is subordinated be entirely absent, neither can that aid be found, otherwise it would be futile: but this pious affection of will is so subordinated to infused faith as to be admitted only that it may determine the intellect to believe revealed things: therefore it is not to be asserted in the will of Christ.

You will say. Christ has in Himself generative and nutritive power, which are ordered to the conservation of His life, and incline Him to exercise acts which nowhere will nor can be in Christ on account of the state in which He now is: therefore by parity there can be in Him that pious affection of will, although it incline Him to acts of faith which on account of the repugnance of state He will never elicit. — I deny the parity, for far different is the ratio, because the generative and nutritive virtues, inasmuch as they are considered in first act, imply no imperfection, nor deprive Christ of any good intrinsic to Him and fitting His state, as faith itself does, which since it intrinsically imports obscurity would deprive Christ of the intuitive vision of God. Add that those virtues and powers pertain to the integrity of human nature, whence they are not in Christ in vain.

You will say 2. Faith was in Christ according to merit, as most Theologians teach with St. Thomas 3 p. q. 7, art. 3, ad 2: but that merit of faith consists in that pious affection of will moving the intellect to assent of faith: therefore that motion was in the will of Christ. — I distinguish the minor: that it was virtually, insofar as the will of Christ was ready to obey God perfectly in all things; so that He would even obey God revealing and obscurely proposing truths to be believed through faith, if He did not otherwise see them clearly and intuitively, I concede: that it was in act and formally, such that He had actual merit of faith on account of that motion of will, I deny. But for that virtual merit that pious motion of will is not required, but suffices the best disposition and readiness in the will to obey faith, should the state permit; which disposition indeed I do not dispute was in Christ as in first act.

Conclusion third. — HOPE WAS NOT IN CHRIST, NEITHER AS TO ACT NOR AS TO HABIT, BOTH REGARDING THE PRIMARY OBJECT AND THE SECONDARY. This Conclusion consists of three parts, of which the first is proved, namely that that virtue was not in Christ as to act, because what is possessed cannot be hoped for, according to Rom. 8: But hope that is seen is not hope, that is, hope is not of things had and possessed, for no one hopes for what he already has: yet Christ from the first instant of His conception enjoyed God as supreme good, as we shall see: therefore He could not hope for God, or exercise an act of hope toward God. The force of this argument is explained: hope is a certain motion of soul toward what it does not have: therefore just as the motion ceases when the terminus is attained, so also when beatitude is obtained the act of hope ceases in the Blessed, such as Christ was from the first instant of His conception.

That He did not have it even as to habit is clear, for it intrinsically and really includes imperfection with respect to Christ, namely to incline the will in first act toward God, its supreme good, as absent and not possessed: but the state of Christ was such that He always saw God clearly; whence this habit is removed from Christ not precisely because idle and superfluous, but because it argues imperfection in Him and includes a certain repugnance with His state, namely the absence of the object, which the soul of Christ always had present.

Neither was hope in Christ regarding secondary objects, namely the glorification of His body. Proof: where the real specificative reason of some habit is absent, there the corresponding habit is entirely absent: yet the real specificative reason of the habit of hope of the Theological virtue is absent from Christ: therefore also the habit of hope; nor consequently did He have it in order to secondary objects. The major stands, because nothing can be without its real constituent. The minor is proved: the real specificative reason of the habit of hope of the Theological virtue is God Himself as to be enjoyed and possessed, because habits are signified through order to their proper and real object; but God as to be possessed and enjoyed is the proper object of hope: yet this ratio of God, as object to be possessed and enjoyed, was always entirely absent from Christ, because He was always blessed: therefore the habit of hope was always entirely absent from Christ, even regarding secondary objects. — This argument is confirmed: habit only inclines the power toward secondary objects through and presupposing inclination toward its primary object; because secondary objects are like participations or appendices of primary objects: therefore wherever there is no inclination toward the primary and specifying object, as in Christ with respect to hope, neither will there be given inclination toward the secondary object. — Moreover, for the ratio of hope it is required that the object not only be arduous, but also have some incertitude, contingency, and fallibility: yet the glory of the body was not difficult and arduous to Christ, even considered as to the manner of conjoining it to Himself, nor was it contingent and fallible to Him: therefore Christ did not have hope. The major is urged by example: for no one, e.g., is said to hope that the rising of the sun on the following day will occur, because this is necessary and infallible and in no way arduous. It is proved next from this, that hope is concerned with the difficult in such wise that, according to the manner in which it occupies itself with it, it is distinguished from daring and fortitude: but daring and fortitude are concerned with it as simply difficult: therefore hope is concerned with that same thing insofar as it has some incertitude and contingency, such that hope is given to strengthen the will; which on that account is accustomed by some to be compared with fear, in this that both concern an object not altogether certain, but fallible of itself. The minor has two parts: the prior is that the glory of the body was infallible and most certain to Christ: the posterior is, that it was not difficult for Christ to have it. Therefore the prior is proved; because if between any two things there is a certain natural circumcession and connection, one being obtained it is certain the other will follow: but there is natural connection between the glory of the soul and the glory of the body, indeed so great that the glory posited in the soul necessarily follows in the body; at least while not separated from the soul, unless impeded by special dispensation, as happened in Christ: therefore the glory of the body was certain and infallible to Him. The posterior also is proved: the difficulty which is required for the virtue of hope, and which consists in conjoining the object of hope with the one hoping, must proceed from the condition of that very object, and not from the mere liberty of the one hoping, which as it were casts fetters upon itself lest it easily obtain a good otherwise owed to it: yet the difficulty of obtaining the glory of the body in Christ was only from His mere will, whereby He decreed not to obtain it otherwise than by dying for us. The major is confirmed; because otherwise every good whatsoever, though absent, even most easy of itself by nature, could be the object of our hope, since it is free to anyone to procure impediments for himself against obtaining it, yet goods themselves are commonly not said to be hoped for. But the minor is proved from the very mystery of the transfiguration of Christ the Lord: for therein, by His liberty and good pleasure, out of several gifts of the glorious body He permitted only clarity to be manifested: therefore since Christ was equally free regarding the other gifts as regarding glorification, just as from His good pleasure and mere will He impeded the others from appearing in His transfiguration, so also it lay within His liberty to impede all those gifts of the glorious body, as regards merit and redemption of the human race, lest they result and flow over from the beatitude of the soul into His body.

Suarez answered, that for the ratio of hope incertitude and fallibility are not desired, because, he says, if that were necessary, it would follow that in wayfarers confirmed in grace there would no longer be hope, since they are secure about their salvation. — But I answer, that glory whether of body or of soul can be called necessary and inevitable in two ways: first indeed from its own nature, when namely the one hoping has within himself the necessary principle of that glory. Second, per accidens, when the principle of effecting that glory, which is in the one expecting and hoping, is indeed fallible of its own nature; de facto nevertheless, by reason of another extrinsic thing superadded, that which is hoped for is said to be certainly future; just as a just man has grace, by which he can obtain glory, in which grace he dies contingently, because he could die not in it; per accidens however, insofar as God protects him with special help, he dies in it infallibly. Moreover, the first inevitability and necessity takes away from the object of hope the difficulty and contingency proper to it, because then the expected good is joined inevitably and necessarily to the expectant himself, because upon its position there quasi-naturally follows the effect as from its cause. But the second inevitability and necessity does not take away from the object of hope the difficulty and contingency proper to it, as appears in adult just men dying in the state of grace, who infallibly obtain glory; nevertheless that attainment is said to be contingent, because they could not die in the state of sanctifying grace. Whence since in those confirmed in grace who know their state from special revelation only that second inevitability per accidens is found, hence it is that in them the habit of hope always remains. Moreover in Christ there was the prior inevitability with respect to the glory of the body; since by reason of the blessedness of His soul He had an internal principle of attaining the glory of the body, seeing that the glory of the soul, unless impeded by miracle, flows into the body itself.

You will object those words of Psalm 17: My God, my helper, and I will hope in him: which words the holy Apostle expounds of Christ: therefore truly

Christ had hope. — I answer, that there the word of hoping is not taken for an act of hope, but for confidence, whereby one entrusts his salvation to another; whence also the Apostle does not use the word of hoping; for where David says I will hope in him, he himself writes I shall be confident in him. Therefore there could indeed be in Christ a certain desire with respect to obtaining the glory of the body, but not hope properly so called: for that desire could arise from supreme charity toward God, on account of whom He properly desired the glory of the body.

From these gather likewise that the virtue of penance was not in Christ, insofar as its primary and specificative act is either sorrow for sin from the motive of amendment; or intention of expiating debt; for the habit cannot be in a subject to whose intrinsecus its primary act is repugnant: but to the humanity of Christ, by reason of that union to the Word and fullness, the object specifying the primary act of penance, namely the penitent's own sin, as expiable or amendable, is repugnant intrinsically, and consequently the habit of penance is repugnant to Him. But if penance be taken for the virtue of religion, obedience, or charity itself, which also of themselves militate against sin and undertake to expiate and destroy it, I do not dispute that by this reason the virtue of penance existed in Christ.