Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

That the Theological virtue is so called by which man is immediately ordered toward God, supernaturally to be attained through acts transcending every capacity of nature. But three especially are assigned, namely Faith, Hope, and Charity, of which some involve a certain imperfection, as faith and hope: For faith, since it is the evidence of things that appear not, imports obscurity and inevidentness: but Hope the absence of the thing hoped for: but Charity, since it says no defect of itself, and is either not distinguished from sanctifying grace, as we shall teach with the Subtle Doctor in the Treatise on Grace, or at least is necessarily consequent upon it, as the Thomists will have it, there is no doubt that it was in Christ the Lord, concerning whom likewise all Theologians agree; about faith and hope, however, they do not so consent.

Note 2. Faith and hope can be regarded in two ways, namely, either as to act, or as to habit. As to act indeed, insofar as it is actual attainment of God Himself, either known by the intellect through faith, or as certainly expected and not yet possessed, through hope: but as to habit, which is a supernatural quality persevering continually in the soul, whereby it is inclined and helped to exercise acts of faith or supernatural hope. And although all Theologians agree that faith and hope, as to act, were not in Christ with respect to the principal object of those virtues, namely God Himself to be possessed and seen, because Christ from the instant of His conception, as will be proved below, enjoyed most sweet fruition of God through vision and love: nevertheless some contend with Durandus that they existed in Christ as to habit; nay even some with Suarez, in his exposition art. 1, q. 1, will have hope in Christ been present both as to act and habit, whereby Christ while still mortal desired the beatitude of His body, likewise also the exaltation of His name. For a twofold object of hope is distinguished, namely primary and secondary. The primary object is what is hoped for per se, as objective beatitude, namely God to be possessed: but the secondary object are certain goods of body or soul which follow upon beatitude itself, and consequently can be the object of hope, such as could be in Christ the exaltation of name and glorification of body.

Note 3. That two motions and acts are required for faith, one in the intellect, another in the will. The act in the intellect is faith's assent itself elicited by the intellect, which assents to things revealed; the prerequisite act on the side of the will is a certain motion of the will commanding the intellect, that it yield assent to revealed objects, though obscurely proposed, notwithstanding its natural inclination to yield assent only to evident things. Which motion indeed some call the imperium of the will, as Theologians commonly do; others the pious affection of the will, as most of the Recentiores; some the affect of credulity, as the Fathers of the Council of Orange, Canon 3. But the Apostle calls it obedience Rom. 10, when he says: All do not obey the Gospel, as if he said: all have not the affect, or will, of believing the Gospel. Moreover, Theologians gather that this motion of the will for eliciting the act of faith from the intellect is necessary in us for this reason, that since the object of faith is inevident and obscure, it is not per se sufficient to move the intellect to yield assent, therefore the intellect must be moved by the will, and be held captive by it in obedience to faith, as St. Paul says.

These things thus premised, three things come to be established in the present Question: First, that in the intellect of Christ there was no faith, neither as to act nor as to habit. Second, that neither in His will was there the pious affection, whereby it would move the intellect to assent of faith. Third, that likewise there was not in Christ Theological hope, neither as to act nor as to habit, both regarding the primary object and the secondary.

Conclusion first. — THEOLOGICAL FAITH WAS IN CHRIST THE LORD NEITHER AS TO ACT NOR AS TO HABIT.

It is proved first: Whatever intrinsically implies imperfection and opposition to the beatific state and to the clear vision of God was not in Christ: but infused faith, both as to act and as to habit, implies imperfection and opposition to beatific vision: therefore it must not be admitted in Christ. The major stands; because Christ was blessed from the instant of His conception, and consequently had the clear vision of God, and therefore everything opposed to the state of beatitude and to that intuitive vision of God was repugnant to Him. The minor also is proved: because faith is per se inevident cognition and assent to an obscurely proposed thing, whence that common saying: Faith is to believe what thou dost not see; wherefore St. Paul says Hebrews 11: Now Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not: but what is obscure and inevident directly conflicts with evident and intuitive cognition: therefore, etc. Then, enigmatical cognition conflicts with intuitive cognition: but the cognition of faith is enigmatical; but beatific cognition is facial and intuitive; hence the Apostle 1 Cor. 13: We see now through a glass in an dark manner, but then face to face: therefore, etc. Finally, that which belongs only to Wayfarers, and is to be evacuated in the blessed, was not in Christ, because He was blessed from the instant of conception: but what is known through faith is to be evacuated in patria, as the Apostle teaches there, saying: When that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away: therefore faith could not be in Christ.

You will object 1. That of Isaiah 11, where the Prophet delineating the future virtues of Christ the Lord says: And faith shall be the girdle of His reins: therefore truly Christ had faith. — I distinguish: He had faith, which is supernatural assent to things obscurely divinely proposed, I deny; He had faith, which is fidelity and truthfulness in promises, I concede. But the Prophet under the name of faith signifies nothing else than that fidelity, as St. Jerome observes on that passage: which virtue, since it is moral and says perfection without imperfection, because it imports conformity of deeds to words and promises, therefore it could be in Christ.

You will object 2. Faith is more perfect than the moral virtues: but in Christ there are moral virtues, as we shall see: therefore also faith; for the more perfect a virtue is, the rather does it seem to be posited in Christ.

I answer, not every nobility makes a virtue be in Christ, but that which has no imperfection annexed to itself, or opposition to the state of Christ: but moral virtues have neither imperfection nor opposition with respect to the state of Christ; but faith has it, as was said: therefore although it be more perfect than the moral virtues by reason of object, yet on account of that imperfection and opposition to the state of Christ, it is not to be posited in Him.

You will object 3. Even if in Christ the Lord there are not riches, or great expenditures, around which magnificence is occupied, nevertheless the virtue of magnificence does not cease to have place in Him: therefore by parity, although there be not with respect to Christ the Lord the object of faith, which is a divine thing not seen, nevertheless Theological faith must not be denied to be in Him.

I answer by denying the consequence: since in Christ the Lord there was magnificence, although wealth was wanting to Him, because wealth and great expenditures are only the material object of that virtue, while the formal object is the manner to be observed in distributing wealth and making expenditures; and if something is lacking under the aspect of matter, it does not follow that the habit must be lacking, but only if it be lacking under the formal aspect of the object: but in Christ the formal aspect of the object of magnificence is not lacking, namely the manner in which wealth is to be distributed and expenditures made. But in Christ the Lord the formal aspect of faith is not found, namely the divine thing, as formally unseen. Thus entirely opposite is the ratio of magnificence and of faith in Christ; inasmuch as the material object of magnificence is lacking with respect to Him, namely wealth and expenditures, but the formal object is not lacking, namely the manner under which wealth is to be distributed and expenditures made; on the contrary, the material object of faith is not lacking in Christ; for the material objects of faith are the things to be believed: but in His intellect are the Trinity, Incarnation, etc.; but the formal object is lacking, because in Him the Trinity is not as unseen, nor the Incarnation as obscurely known, but as clearly seen and intuitively known.

Conclusion second. — There was not in Christ the Lord the pious affection and motion of will by which the intellect is held captive in obedience to faith, and moved to assent to truths obscurely revealed by God.

Proof: The means follows the ratio of the end and of its necessary condition of its principal: but this pious affection of will is a means to the act and habit of faith as to an end, and is ordered to it as accessory to principal: therefore for the same reason that faith is not admitted in Christ, neither ought this pious affection of will be asserted in Him. — It is confirmed: where something is so subordinated to another as to be only in aid of it and to serve it, then if that to which it is subordinated be entirely absent, neither can that aid be found, otherwise it would be futile: but this pious affection of will is so subordinated to infused faith as to be admitted only that it may determine the intellect to believe revealed things: therefore it is not to be asserted in the will of Christ.

You will say. Christ has in Himself generative and nutritive power, which are ordered to the conservation of His life, and incline Him to exercise acts which nowhere will nor can be in Christ on account of the state in which He now is: therefore by parity there can be in Him that pious affection of will, although it incline Him to acts of faith which on account of the repugnance of state He will never elicit. — I deny the parity, for far different is the ratio, because the generative and nutritive virtues, inasmuch as they are considered in first act, imply no imperfection, nor deprive Christ of any good intrinsic to Him and fitting His state, as faith itself does, which since it intrinsically imports obscurity would deprive Christ of the intuitive vision of God. Add that those virtues and powers pertain to the integrity of human nature, whence they are not in Christ in vain.

You will say 2. Faith was in Christ according to merit, as most Theologians teach with St. Thomas 3 p. q. 7, art. 3, ad 2: but that merit of faith consists in that pious affection of will moving the intellect to assent of faith: therefore that motion was in the will of Christ. — I distinguish the minor: that it was virtually, insofar as the will of Christ was ready to obey God perfectly in all things; so that He would even obey God revealing and obscurely proposing truths to be believed through faith, if He did not otherwise see them clearly and intuitively, I concede: that it was in act and formally, such that He had actual merit of faith on account of that motion of will, I deny. But for that virtual merit that pious motion of will is not required, but suffices the best disposition and readiness in the will to obey faith, should the state permit; which disposition indeed I do not dispute was in Christ as in first act.

Conclusion third. — HOPE WAS NOT IN CHRIST, NEITHER AS TO ACT NOR AS TO HABIT, BOTH REGARDING THE PRIMARY OBJECT AND THE SECONDARY. This Conclusion consists of three parts, of which the first is proved, namely that that virtue was not in Christ as to act, because what is possessed cannot be hoped for, according to Rom. 8: But hope that is seen is not hope, that is, hope is not of things had and possessed, for no one hopes for what he already has: yet Christ from the first instant of His conception enjoyed God as supreme good, as we shall see: therefore He could not hope for God, or exercise an act of hope toward God. The force of this argument is explained: hope is a certain motion of soul toward what it does not have: therefore just as the motion ceases when the terminus is attained, so also when beatitude is obtained the act of hope ceases in the Blessed, such as Christ was from the first instant of His conception.

That He did not have it even as to habit is clear, for it intrinsically and really includes imperfection with respect to Christ, namely to incline the will in first act toward God, its supreme good, as absent and not possessed: but the state of Christ was such that He always saw God clearly; whence this habit is removed from Christ not precisely because idle and superfluous, but because it argues imperfection in Him and includes a certain repugnance with His state, namely the absence of the object, which the soul of Christ always had present.

Neither was hope in Christ regarding secondary objects, namely the glorification of His body. Proof: where the real specificative reason of some habit is absent, there the corresponding habit is entirely absent: yet the real specificative reason of the habit of hope of the Theological virtue is absent from Christ: therefore also the habit of hope; nor consequently did He have it in order to secondary objects. The major stands, because nothing can be without its real constituent. The minor is proved: the real specificative reason of the habit of hope of the Theological virtue is God Himself as to be enjoyed and possessed, because habits are signified through order to their proper and real object; but God as to be possessed and enjoyed is the proper object of hope: yet this ratio of God, as object to be possessed and enjoyed, was always entirely absent from Christ, because He was always blessed: therefore the habit of hope was always entirely absent from Christ, even regarding secondary objects. — This argument is confirmed: habit only inclines the power toward secondary objects through and presupposing inclination toward its primary object; because secondary objects are like participations or appendices of primary objects: therefore wherever there is no inclination toward the primary and specifying object, as in Christ with respect to hope, neither will there be given inclination toward the secondary object. — Moreover, for the ratio of hope it is required that the object not only be arduous, but also have some incertitude, contingency, and fallibility: yet the glory of the body was not difficult and arduous to Christ, even considered as to the manner of conjoining it to Himself, nor was it contingent and fallible to Him: therefore Christ did not have hope. The major is urged by example: for no one, e.g., is said to hope that the rising of the sun on the following day will occur, because this is necessary and infallible and in no way arduous. It is proved next from this, that hope is concerned with the difficult in such wise that, according to the manner in which it occupies itself with it, it is distinguished from daring and fortitude: but daring and fortitude are concerned with it as simply difficult: therefore hope is concerned with that same thing insofar as it has some incertitude and contingency, such that hope is given to strengthen the will; which on that account is accustomed by some to be compared with fear, in this that both concern an object not altogether certain, but fallible of itself. The minor has two parts: the prior is that the glory of the body was infallible and most certain to Christ: the posterior is, that it was not difficult for Christ to have it. Therefore the prior is proved; because if between any two things there is a certain natural circumcession and connection, one being obtained it is certain the other will follow: but there is natural connection between the glory of the soul and the glory of the body, indeed so great that the glory posited in the soul necessarily follows in the body; at least while not separated from the soul, unless impeded by special dispensation, as happened in Christ: therefore the glory of the body was certain and infallible to Him. The posterior also is proved: the difficulty which is required for the virtue of hope, and which consists in conjoining the object of hope with the one hoping, must proceed from the condition of that very object, and not from the mere liberty of the one hoping, which as it were casts fetters upon itself lest it easily obtain a good otherwise owed to it: yet the difficulty of obtaining the glory of the body in Christ was only from His mere will, whereby He decreed not to obtain it otherwise than by dying for us. The major is confirmed; because otherwise every good whatsoever, though absent, even most easy of itself by nature, could be the object of our hope, since it is free to anyone to procure impediments for himself against obtaining it, yet goods themselves are commonly not said to be hoped for. But the minor is proved from the very mystery of the transfiguration of Christ the Lord: for therein, by His liberty and good pleasure, out of several gifts of the glorious body He permitted only clarity to be manifested: therefore since Christ was equally free regarding the other gifts as regarding glorification, just as from His good pleasure and mere will He impeded the others from appearing in His transfiguration, so also it lay within His liberty to impede all those gifts of the glorious body, as regards merit and redemption of the human race, lest they result and flow over from the beatitude of the soul into His body.

Suarez answered, that for the ratio of hope incertitude and fallibility are not desired, because, he says, if that were necessary, it would follow that in wayfarers confirmed in grace there would no longer be hope, since they are secure about their salvation. — But I answer, that glory whether of body or of soul can be called necessary and inevitable in two ways: first indeed from its own nature, when namely the one hoping has within himself the necessary principle of that glory. Second, per accidens, when the principle of effecting that glory, which is in the one expecting and hoping, is indeed fallible of its own nature; de facto nevertheless, by reason of another extrinsic thing superadded, that which is hoped for is said to be certainly future; just as a just man has grace, by which he can obtain glory, in which grace he dies contingently, because he could die not in it; per accidens however, insofar as God protects him with special help, he dies in it infallibly. Moreover, the first inevitability and necessity takes away from the object of hope the difficulty and contingency proper to it, because then the expected good is joined inevitably and necessarily to the expectant himself, because upon its position there quasi-naturally follows the effect as from its cause. But the second inevitability and necessity does not take away from the object of hope the difficulty and contingency proper to it, as appears in adult just men dying in the state of grace, who infallibly obtain glory; nevertheless that attainment is said to be contingent, because they could not die in the state of sanctifying grace. Whence since in those confirmed in grace who know their state from special revelation only that second inevitability per accidens is found, hence it is that in them the habit of hope always remains. Moreover in Christ there was the prior inevitability with respect to the glory of the body; since by reason of the blessedness of His soul He had an internal principle of attaining the glory of the body, seeing that the glory of the soul, unless impeded by miracle, flows into the body itself.

You will object those words of Psalm 17: My God, my helper, and I will hope in him: which words the holy Apostle expounds of Christ: therefore truly

Christ had hope. — I answer, that there the word of hoping is not taken for an act of hope, but for confidence, whereby one entrusts his salvation to another; whence also the Apostle does not use the word of hoping; for where David says I will hope in him, he himself writes I shall be confident in him. Therefore there could indeed be in Christ a certain desire with respect to obtaining the glory of the body, but not hope properly so called: for that desire could arise from supreme charity toward God, on account of whom He properly desired the glory of the body.

From these gather likewise that the virtue of penance was not in Christ, insofar as its primary and specificative act is either sorrow for sin from the motive of amendment; or intention of expiating debt; for the habit cannot be in a subject to whose intrinsecus its primary act is repugnant: but to the humanity of Christ, by reason of that union to the Word and fullness, the object specifying the primary act of penance, namely the penitent's own sin, as expiable or amendable, is repugnant intrinsically, and consequently the habit of penance is repugnant to Him. But if penance be taken for the virtue of religion, obedience, or charity itself, which also of themselves militate against sin and undertake to expiate and destroy it, I do not dispute that by this reason the virtue of penance existed in Christ.

By the name of moral virtue is here understood every elective habit consisting in a mean as regards us, according as the prudent man will define; of which definition you have the parts clearly expounded in our Moral Philosophy. But it is called moral, because it informs human acts and the manners of men. Now there are four principal moral virtues, of which three are called appetitive, because they reside in the rational appetite and are ordered to regulating the will: those are Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance; and one intellectual, namely Prudence, which illumines the minds of men and directs them in eliciting and composing their acts rightly and duly. And this virtue is called moral, not because it resides in the will and immediately directs it, but because it orders the intellect to moderating and regulating the free and deliberate acts of that will; and it is so necessary that, with it absent, the other virtues vindicate for themselves a futile and empty name. But these four virtues are commonly called Cardinal, by a comparison taken from the hinges of a door. For as a door turns on its hinge, so our whole moral manner of life turns toward honesty upon these virtues as on hinges. They are also called principal, because all others are ordered to them. I add moreover that some moral virtues include or connote no imperfection in those having them, such as Fortitude and Justice: others truly, which include and connote some imperfection, as Continence, whereby namely man resists present concupiscences with difficulty.

Note 2. That moral virtues can be regarded in a threefold state, namely imperfect, perfect, and heroic, or superexcellent. In the imperfect state there is not properly virtue, but a certain disposition which perfect virtue is apt to follow; or it is virtue only begun, or remitted. In the perfect state is virtue indeed intense and firm, but conversant only about its proper matter, as Temperance about curbing and moderating the pleasures of body and soul. In the superexcellent and heroic state, however, when it extends itself beyond its proper object, as Temperance moderating pleasures even before the danger of death proposed; by which reason it seems extended toward Fortitude, or a most strict federation and close bond, contracted with the very virtue of Fortitude. The difficulty is, in which of those states they existed in Christ.

Note 3. That although moral virtues are acquired by human industry, nevertheless they can also be infused divinely, like the theological ones; with this difference however, that theological virtues are infused per se and necessarily, since they can be obtained by no powers of nature, no labor and industry of men: but moral virtues are said to be infused only per accidens, since although they can be acquired by human diligence and exercise, nevertheless without all man's industry they can be infused divinely into the soul from the supreme liberality of God: not indeed for that reason only whereby they are ordered to a supernatural end, e.g. when those virtues order man to operating from the motive of charity and for the glory of God, but even when they are referred to a natural end; e.g. when they elicit their acts from the motive of public peace and for human honesty. For I cannot prove the opinion of certain Moderns who will that moral virtues can be infused divinely only insofar as they order man to a supernatural end and move him to operate from the motive of charity. Indeed if moral virtues, insofar as infused, were distinguished by this from themselves insofar as acquired, it would follow that no one could elicit by an acquired moral virtue an act deliberate in order to a supernatural end, and from the motive of charity, which is plainly false.

Three things therefore are to be determined in this Question: First, whether truly Christ had all moral virtues. Second, whether he had them in the perfect and heroic state. Third, whether he obtained them by his own industry, or rather by infusion, and that from the instant of his conception.

First conclusion. — All moral virtues which include and connote no imperfection were truly in Christ.

It is proved first: No perfection, even natural or moral, ought to have been wanting to Christ: but moral virtues are very great perfections, because they most perfectly perfect men in order to human life honestly, studiously, monastically, economically, and politically conducted: therefore they ought not to have been wanting to Christ. Then, Christ readily elicited moral actions, e.g. of Justice, Fortitude, and Prudence, whenever occasion offered itself: therefore he elicited them through the mediation of moral virtues, because no one can readily and promptly break forth into that action without habits ordered to it. Finally, there could be in Christ some difficulty in exercising acts of virtues, as when at the time of death his senses fled death: therefore to overcome it it was fitting for him to have the virtue of Fortitude.

You will object. Liberality, Temperance, Continence, and Prudence were not in Christ: but those virtues are moral and denote no imperfection conflicting with the state of Christ: therefore not all moral virtues which have no imperfection annexed were in Christ. The minor is evident. The major is proved: first indeed, that Liberality was not in him is plain, because it is the virtue whereby riches are rightly dispensed: but Christ was supremely poor. That neither Temperance nor Continence were in him is proved: because the former moderately composes the senses concerning sensible objects, so that it exercises ordered motions about them; but the latter tempers the motions of flesh: but Christ had no motions which needed coercion. Of Prudence too it is proved, for it is not acquired except with acquired knowledge: but Christ at the instant of his conception did not have acquired knowledge: therefore not even for that instant prudence. This is urged on a sufficiently weak foundation by Vasquez in 3 p. of D. Thomas dist. 2. cap. 2, to defend that Prudence was not infused in Christ at the instant of conception, but gradually acquired together with acquired science. —

I answer, denying the major, and saying to each part of its proof, first, that moral virtues do not consist in the very exercise of deliberate and morally good act, but in a permanent quality which be productive of that act, as is taught in the Ethics: and consequently according to that saying, the poor can be liberal as well as the rich, although they possess nothing which they can bestow, because the permanent quality suffices, or the deliberate habit rightly affecting the will concerning acts of liberality to be exercised, should occasion offer itself; and thus no one denies that liberality was in Christ. Add that even as to external act Christ exercised liberality, especially when twice he fed the greatest multitude of men, Matt. 14 and 15. Second, temperance and continence are not acquired for coercing inordinate motions only, but lest those motions be present; wherefore temperance and continence in the common degree temper indeed inordinate motions about sensibles, but in the heroic degree not only temper, but even effect that they be in no way present: but Christ had temperance and continence in the heroic degree, and therefore he had those virtues, so that in him there were no inordinate motions about sensibles. But Prudence is found not only with acquired knowledge, but also with other moral virtues, of which all it is the form and rule; wherefore although Christ at the instant of conception had not acquired knowledge, yet no less ought he to have had prudence, which then would likewise be moderator of the other virtues, that those were infused in him at the instant of conception will be proved below.

You will object 2. Those virtues which have repugnance with the state of beatitude and perfect sanctity were not in Christ: but moral virtues have repugnance with the state of beatitude and perfect sanctity: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for Christ from the instant of his conception was blessed. The minor is also evident; because those virtues do not remain in the Blessed, nor are required in most holy men; since they are ordered to restraining passions, which are present in most holy men; most of all in Christ, who had passions subject most perfectly to the empire of reason, as will appear below: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor, and to its proof I say first that moral virtues remain in the state of beatitude, not indeed as to the material, such as are the pleasures and delights of foods and venery with respect to temperance, or fear or daring about dangers of death with respect to fortitude, or distributions and exchanges of things with respect to justice, etc.: yet they remain according to what is formal in the very virtue, namely right election according to the order of reason concerning the honesty and mean of those passions which those virtues are of themselves ordered to moderate; or they remain as to primary and internal act, but not as to secondary and external; for those virtues are ordered first and per se so as to dispose the appetite to choosing easily and readily in their own matters conformably to reason; secondarily to restraining passions: whence those virtues can be in most holy men as to that primary effect, although they cannot be in them as to the secondary.

Second conclusion. — Christ had the moral virtues in the heroic degree, and that by infusion, from the instant of his conception. This Conclusion consists of three parts; of which the first is proved: In him moral virtues were not in the common degree, but in the superexcellent one, in which there are not immoderate passions, but well-ordered and composed ones: but in Christ there were not immoderate passions, but composed at nod and will: therefore there were in him virtues in the heroic degree. The major is evident: for since heroic virtue chiefly consists in this, that it repress all passions and subject them to the empire of the will, it is certain that he has heroic virtue who has passions well composed. Whence virtues in the perfect state are said to purge the soul: but in the heroic degree Aristotle and Plotinus call them virtues of the purged soul. The minor is also evident: for, as we shall prove below, Christ exercised and moderated all his passions, all sensitive appetitive motions, according to will and nod. Then, Christ had virtues in the most perfect state possible: but truly virtue in the heroic degree is possible: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for it was most fitting to the dignity of Christ that he have every excellence and perfection whatsoever compossible with his state. The minor is evident from the Philosophers. — Finally, that virtue is reckoned to be had in the heroic state which has other virtues annexed with it: but Christ had all virtues connected with himself: therefore, etc.

The second part is proved from Isaiah c. 7, where of Christ still an infant it is said: He shall eat butter and honey, that he may know to refuse the evil and choose the good. On which place St Jerome writes thus: Wrapped in swaddling clothes, fed with butter and honey, he shall have judgment of good and evil, so that refusing evil he may choose the good. Moreover Christ was at least equally perfect as the first parents: but the first parents, immediately upon being created, had all moral virtues, as the Theologians commonly teach: therefore much more Christ had those moral virtues. Finally Christ from the first instant of his conception was perfect, both as to will and as to intellect; for therefore he is called Man even for that instant in sacred letters, as when it is said, A woman shall compass a man: but the perfection of will according to the order of nature comes about chiefly through moral virtues acquired by genus: therefore Christ had them from that instant.

The third part is proved: Christ did not have those virtues by acquisition: therefore he had them by infusion. The antecedent is proved: for it is more probable that all moral virtues were in Christ for that instant of conception: but he could not acquire all simultaneously for that instant, because acquiring one by some most intense act, the others would not yet have been present: therefore it is more probable that those moral virtues were in Christ not by acquisition, but by infusion.

The gifts of the Holy Spirit are commonly numbered as seven from Isaiah c. 11, where speaking of Christ he says: And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him: the spirit of wisdom and of understanding, the spirit of counsel and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and of godliness. And he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord. Of all which gifts three pertain to the will, namely fear, godliness, and fortitude: but the remaining four regard the intellect: For Godliness disposes man in things that are toward another: Fortitude in those that are toward himself against the incursion of dangers: Fear in those that are toward himself against inordinate concupiscence of delights. Understanding perfects the mind for apprehension of speculative truth: Wisdom for judging perfectly: Counsel for apprehension of practical truth: Knowledge finally for rightly forming practical judgment concerning that truth, as Durandus teaches in 3 dist. 31 q. 3 n. 6, where he judges that these gifts were in Christ as wayfarer both as to act and as to habit; but in Christ as sole Comprehensor such as he now is, only those even as to act exist which perfect man in speculative life; while those which perfect him in active and practical life are only as to habit; but the other Theologians mostly contradict him.

Note 2. From the Subtle Doctor in 3 dist. 24 num. 6, it is more probable that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not distinguished from the theological and moral virtues except by way of aid to the aforesaid virtues; for as he reasons admirably:

Only those habits are to be posited in a wayfarer whereby one is perfected concerning every object as much as can be perfected on the way. Such are seven virtues in genus, not regarding acquired speculative sciences: therefore besides acquired speculative sciences no other habit is to be posited in a wayfarer simply distinct from the seven virtues. Proof of the major: the object concerning which a wayfarer can be perfected can be nothing but God or creature: but concerning God he is sufficiently perfected by three theological virtues, and this most perfectly as far as he can be perfected, if those three habits be most perfect in their genus: but concerning creature (not speaking of the speculative) the intellect is most perfectly perfected through prudence, if prudence be most perfect; for it is about everything doable, and has most perfect knowledge as to every condition of the doable. — Similarly as to appetite, he is most perfectly perfected by three moral virtues, if they be most perfect; because both concerning another and what is appetible to another, and concerning self and what is appetible to self; and this either first and directly, or secondarily on account of those firsts: and this understanding those four Cardinal virtues not as one habit-number in anyone which would be to itself universal Temperance or universal Justice, that is, concerning all things, but that each species of Justice inhere in its own proper singulars. But by the three theological virtues the wayfarer is sufficiently perfected concerning God immediately: because concerning him, as to be known immediately on the way, faith sufficiently perfects; since of God on the way there cannot be had except cognition of faith, as was said above in this third book, dist. 24; but concerning him as lovable in himself, Charity sufficiently perfects; and as appetible and good for me, Hope sufficiently perfects, as appears in the preceding Questions on faith, hope, and charity. But it does not befit a wayfarer to have ordered acts concerning God other than to understand him, love him in himself, and desire him as my good: therefore, etc. Similarly concerning every other good than God, as object, the wayfarer is sufficiently perfected by intellectual and appetitive habits: but those intellectual habits perfecting the intellect are intellectual virtues, and those sufficiently perfect the wayfarer as far as possible both for considering and for syllogizing practically; also appetitive habits are appetitive virtues, which virtues sufficiently perfect the wayfarer for desiring or loving, whether in order to himself or to another: therefore man, perfect by the three theological virtues, by intellectual virtues speculative and practical, and by moral virtues ordering toward self and toward another, is perfected as much as can befall a wayfarer: therefore some necessity does not appear of positing any other habits beyond these, which are theological, intellectual, and Moral virtues ».

Note 3. That generally Fear is threefold: the first is natural, which is the passion whereby an animal naturally flees impending evil: this resides in the sensitive part and per se is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. The second is worldly or human, whereby any temporal evil whatever, or loss of any temporal good, is so feared that justice is deserted for that reason, either by committing illicit things or omitting due ones: this is always vicious and reprobated by the Scriptures; especially Ecclesiasticus 1 and Matthew 10. The third finally is divine, which again some Theologians distinguish as threefold, namely servile, initial, and filial. Servile is that whereby someone abstains from evil work not from love of justice but from dread of gehenna, or even temporal punishment, and does what is of the law: but that it is good to fear punishment the Council of Trent defines, Session 6, and the holy Fathers prove, above all St Augustine, who everywhere teaches unless man begin to worship God out of fear he will not arrive at love, as in Ps. 149. Whence he urges men to do out of fear of punishment what they cannot yet do out of love of justice: so sermon 13 On the words of the Apostle: Do it even out of fear of punishment, if thou canst not yet out of love of justice. And Tractate 43 on John: If thou canst not yet love justice, fear punishment. — Initial fear is that which withdraws from evil and impels to good, partly from dread of punishment and partly from love of justice. It is called initial because it properly belongs to beginners leading a spiritual life. It is between servile and filial, of which we shall now speak: but so that it approaches nearer to filial than to servile, because it has order to filial as tending toward God, and turns away from servile as deserting him. Filial fear is that whereby one fears to offend God, and to be separated from God by offense, that is fault, or at least reverences God as supreme Lord of all and just avenger of sins. This fear is called chaste, filial, reverential. Chaste, according as God is compared to our souls as bridegroom, according to 1 Cor. 11, I espoused you to one husband, to present you a chaste virgin to Christ. Filial, according as it is compared to God as Father, Rom. 8, You received the spirit of adoption of sons, wherein we cry, abba Father. Reverential, according as men thereby reverence God, even when endowed with beatitude. This posited, I say the gift of fear is not so named from natural fear; which fear nevertheless certainly was in Christ as wayfarer; nor yet from worldly fear, which was never in Christ nor could be, because that fear is vicious and carnal; but whether the threefold divine fear was in him, namely servile, initial, and filial, must here be determined.

Single conclusion. — All the gifts of the Holy Spirit truly were in Christ.

It is proved from Isaiah cap. 11 praised in the first Notable, and likewise from all those texts of sacred Scripture whereby it was shown above that all graces and all divine charisms, which are derived into all men, pre-exist in Christ as in head, and flow from him into men as into his members. It is proved moreover: The gifts of the Holy Spirit are nothing else than certain perfections of the powers whereby man is easily moved by the Holy Spirit to exercise most perfect works: but Christ was moved by the Holy Spirit to most excellent works: therefore, etc. The major is evident from all Theologians positing this distinction between gifts and virtue whether infused or acquired, that virtues perfect man as to common acts, but gifts as to most excellent acts. The minor is evident from many works of Christ, as when the Holy Spirit moved him to fasting forty days and nights. — Moreover, those which denote perfection without imperfection and remain in the Blessed, were in Christ: but the gifts of the Holy Spirit remain in the Blessed, indeed not each as to act, but as to habit, and are an ornament to the Blessed like the other virtues. They denote also perfection without imperfection, as appears running through each: for Wisdom is the habit whereby the intellect is rendered easily movable by the Holy Spirit, that it judge firmly of divine things on account of supernatural reasons: Understanding is the gift whereby the same intellect is easily movable to apprehending and expounding the first principles of our religion: Knowledge the gift whereby it is easily rendered movable, that it draw conclusions from those principles: the gift of counsel is that whereby it is rendered easily movable, that it judge in particular what is here and now to be done: the gift of godliness is that whereby the will is rendered easily movable to the cult of God; or, as others will, to mercy toward neighbor: the gift of fortitude is that whereby the same will is rendered easily movable to adhering with constant soul to a difficult work: finally the gift of fear, whereby the same will is rendered easily movable to subjecting itself to divine Majesty on account of his supreme eminence: but all these denote no imperfection, but rather perfection: therefore those gifts of the Holy Spirit were in Christ, and even now remain in him.

That those gifts existed in Christ according to act appears from many of his works; as when Matthew 4 he went into the desert; which is thus described by the Evangelist, He was led into the desert, etc. when he fasted there forty days and forty nights: when Luke 6, He went forth into a mountain to pray, and to pass the night in prayer of God: when he answered most prudently those asking whether it were lawful to give tribute to Caesar: when he spoke to those bringing to him a woman taken in adultery, that she be condemned by his calculus: when moved by mercy in the desert he fed the people.

You will say. Only those gifts of the Holy Spirit are to be asserted in Christ which regard blessed and contemplative life; not however active life, which has no place in supernatural beatitude: but among the gifts of the Holy Spirit enumerated above some are such as regard only active life, as counsel, knowledge, godliness, and fear: therefore those gifts are not to be asserted in Christ as Comprehensor. — I answer 1. That the major is true of those gifts which considered adequately regard active life, otherwise however, if only inadequately. To the minor however I say the five aforesaid gifts differ in this from the two others, that the two others in no way pertain to active life, but the five others partly to active, and partly to contemplative life are ordered.

I answer 2. The major can be denied; since Christ our Lord, not only while he dwelt among men on earth, but even existing in heaven, leads a life not only contemplative but also active, insofar as concerning us and Angels he exercises the offices of true moral head; for those offices consist not in pure speculation, but in some influx and actual direction, which since they consist not in simple speculation of the beatific object, but are ordered to something to be supplied concerning members constituted under him, that operation pertains not only to contemplative but also to active life.

You will say. The gift of counsel seems to import doubt and ignorance, because counsel is employed there only where there is hesitation and ignorance concerning what is to be done: but in Christ there was no hesitation and ignorance: therefore neither need of the gift of counsel. — I deny the major, for it is false that counsel precisely and formally taken imports doubt and ignorance in the consultor: for everywhere in sacred Letters and the Fathers it is attributed to God, in whom no hesitation and ignorance inheres; but counsel formally imports only the act of intellect whereby the very election of the will is directed. But that counsel as it is in us has doubt and ignorance annexed to it proceeds only from our imperfection.

The difficulty can be only concerning the gift of fear, for grave controversy was once between St Bernard and Abailard concerning this, whether the gift of fear should be admitted in Christ; for Abailard denied that fear to be found in Christ. Truly he recanted this error and afterward taught the contrary, as appears from his epistle 2 to all the sons of the Church, where he has: To recognize that chaste fear permanent unto age of ages, which properly is called the reverence of charity, is in the soul of Christ himself as in elect Angels and men always. — But that truly the gift of fear was in Christ, not indeed according to that act whereby offense of God, or separation from God, is feared; but according to a certain act of reverence toward God arising from consideration of his justice and severity toward delinquents, above all of his eminence itself, is proved by this reason: fear regards two objects, whereof one is terrible evil, and the other is that by whose power evil can be inflicted, as one fears a King, insofar as he has power of killing; whence he who can harm would not be feared unless he had a certain eminence of power which cannot easily be resisted: but Christ was always secure that he would never sin, and thus certain that he would not be separated from God: and therefore he had not this first act of fear, but only the second, namely the act of reverence, inasmuch namely as his soul, stirred by a certain affect of reverence by the Holy Spirit, was borne toward God; whence Hebrews 5 says that he was heard in all things for his reverence.

It is asked however among Theologians, what that act of filial fear, or reverence toward God on account of his eminence, may be: for we can understand by that reverence the affect of obeying God as supreme Lord, and thus it is referred back to obedience: or of worshipping him as supreme being, and thus it regards religion; or of subjecting oneself to God by preferring in all things the divine honor to one's own, and thus it pertains to humility; by which reason St Augustine, book On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount, teaches that the gift of fear corresponds to humility: wherefore sermon 1 On the Annunciation, he opposes it to pride: and the same St Gregory, book 2 Morals, chapter 26, says the gift of fear is given against pride. But from this affect there follows in the will a certain motion by way of flight, whereby a creature in the presence of the divine and supereminent Majesty so bears itself that it dare not approach it, and wholly takes care not in anything to usurp that divine excellence of his, and dreads and flees to investigate his wonders. But this mode is called by the holy Fathers fear of reverence, or admiration, as appears in St Gregory, book 17 Morals, chapter 19, and Dionysius, chapter 13 On the Celestial Hierarchy, where expounding the vision of Isaiah, who saw Seraphim veiling feet and back, he says thereby is signified that sacred and horror-filled veneration full of awe, wherewith the saints shudder at the higher search into mysteries. Hence Apocalypse 16 it is said the Saints sing: Great and wonderful are thy works, O Lord; who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and magnify thy name? But this act of reverence includes not only willing of some good, but also flight from some evil: not indeed that imminent or future evil is dreaded, but because it is evil in itself and conflicting with divine excellence; of which fear St Augustine says, lib. 11. De Trinitate, chapter 6, Under the name of chaste fear is signified that will whereby we shall needs refuse to sin, not with the solicitude of necessity, but with the tranquillity of charity. Therefore the Blessed, inasmuch as he has flight from all sin as separating from God, can be said to have chaste fear; which also Christ could have; for although indeed he could not sin, yet since the human nature which he assumed was of itself capable of sin, he could by his will flee this evil, as simply possible to his nature. From these appears that that filial or reverential fear has no indecency or repugnance with either the hypostatic or beatific state of Christ. Otherwise it seems must be said of servile and initial fear; for servile fear chiefly regards avoiding sin on account of punishment to be paid: but Christ, since he was exempt from all sin and could in no wise sin, had none which he feared punishment to be inflicted for sin. The same seems to be said of initial fear, both because it is imperfect and not yet complete; and because insofar as initial, it includes dread of punishment to be inflicted in vengeance for sin: but from what was just said, that fear of punishment could have no place in Christ: therefore neither that initial fear.