Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini
Claude Frassen (1620–1711)
Tractatus I: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini
Quaestio I: Quot, et quae fuerint haereticorum erronea dogmata circa incarnati Verbi mysterium
Disputatio I: De Existentia, Natura, et Causis Incarnationis
Articulus I: De Possibilitate, Convenientia, et Complemento seu Peractione Mysterii Incarnationis
§ I: De Possibilitate Incarnationis
Quaestio I: An unio divinae naturae cum humana in unitate personae sit possibilis
Quaestio II: An, et quo lumine cognosci possit et suaderi
§ II: De Convenientia Incarnationis
Quaestio I: An conveniens fuerit Deum incarnari
Quaestio II: An convenientius fuerit naturam humanam, quam Angelicam, aut aliquam aliam a Verbo assumi
Quaestio III: Utrum convenientius fuerit Filium, quam Patrem, aut Spiritum Sanctum incarnari
Quaestio IV: An convenienti tempore facta fuerit incarnatio
§ III: De Necessitate Incarnationis
Quaestio I: An, et qualiter necessaria fuerit incarnatio
Quaestio II: Utrum purus homo Deo satisfacere potuerit pro hominum offensa, eorumque ruinam restaurare
Quaestio III: Utrum Christus Deo condignam satisfactionem exhibuerit
Quaestio IV: Utrum Christus pro nobis satisfecerit ad iuris apices, seu ex rigore iustitiae
Quaestio V: Utrum revera peractum sit incarnationis mysterium, et Iudaeis promissus Messias advenerit
Articulus II: De Unione Hypostatica
§ I: De Unione Hypostatica secundum se spectata
Quaestio I: Quid sit unio hypostatica
Quaestio II: An unio hypostatica facta fuerit in unitate naturae aut personae, idque per veram et proprie dictam compositionem, an per utriusque commixtionem
Quaestio III: Quis sit terminus unionis hypostaticae
Quaestio IV: Utrum unio hypostatica sit immediata, et omnium unionum maxima
§ II: De Persona Assumente
Quaestio I: Qualiter, et per quid Verbum divinum naturam humanam terminaverit et assumpserit
Quaestio II: Utrum subsistentia Dei absoluta et communis tribus personis possit naturam humanam assumere, illique immediate uniri
Quaestio III: Utrum plures personae divinae possent assumere eandem humanitatem, et eadem persona plures humanitates
Quaestio IV: An persona creata possit alienam naturam terminare et assumere
§ III: De Unione Hypostatica ex parte Naturae Assumptae
Quaestio I: An natura tam Angelica, quam irrationalis, sit assumptibilis a persona divina
Quaestio II: An natura accidentis possit assumi a persona divina
Quaestio III: Qualiter, et quo ordine Verbum divinum humanitatem et eius partes assumpserit
Articulus III: De Causis Incarnationis
§ I: De Causa Efficiente Incarnationis
Quaestio I: Quae fuerit vel esse potuerit causa efficiens et instrumentaria Incarnationis
Quaestio II: An aliqua fuerit causa media, seu praeparativa ad Incarnationem per modum effectionis et dispositionis
§ II: De Causa Morali et Meritoria Incarnationis
Quaestio I: An Christus per opera priora vel subsequentia unionem hypostaticam ipsam potuerit promereri
Quaestio II: An et qualiter Beata Virgo meruerit esse Mater Dei
Quaestio III: Utrum Sancti Patres meruerint, aut saltem mereri potuerint de congruo, Incarnationem eiusque circumstantias
§ III: De Causa Finali et Motiva Incarnationis
Quaestio I: Utrum si Adamus non peccasset, Filius Dei non minus esset incarnandus
Quaestio II: Propter quod peccatum expiandum Christus principaliter venerit
Disputatio II: De Christi Domini Entitate, Praecellentiis, et Operationibus
Articulus I: De Christi Domini Divinitate et Humanitate
§ I: De Christi Domini Divinitate
Quaestio I: An revera Christus sit idem unus Deus cum Patre, eandem indivisam cum eo naturam divinam habens
Quaestio II: Utrum Christus in quantum homo sit Filius Dei adoptivus aut naturalis
Quaestio III: Utrum in Christo sint duae filiationes, una aeterna ad Patrem, alia temporalis ad Matrem
Quaestio IV: Utrum Christus Dominus sit et dici possit Dei servus, et aeterno Patri subiectus
§ II: De Humanitate Christi
Quaestio I: An Christus vere integram humanitatem anima rationali et humano corpore constantem habeat
Quaestio II: An Verbum divinum assumpserit hypostatice omnes humani corporis partes, manente vero sanguine et aliis humoribus
Quaestio III: Utrum Verbum assumpserit animae rationalis facultates, nempe intellectum et voluntatem
Quaestio IV: Utrum natura humana in Christo propriam habuerit existentiam et subsistentiam creatam substantialem
§ III: De Modo Loquendi in hoc Mysterio
Quaestio I: Utrum per communicationem idiomatum omnia quae sunt Dei de homine, et vicissim quae sunt hominis de Deo praedicentur
Articulus II: De Praecellentiis Christi Domini
§ I: De Gratia Christi
Quaestio I: Utrum humanitas Christi sanctificetur formaliter per gratiam unionis, an vero requirat aliquod donum ab ipsa unione distinctum
Quaestio II: Utrum in anima Christi fuerit gratia habitualis, et ad quid necessaria
Quaestio III: Qualis fuerit gratia habitualis Christi
The title of this Question presents three chief difficulties, which the Authors discuss most fully. The first is whether the grace of Christ was infinite. The second, whether it was the greatest. The third, finally, whether it could be increased. All of which we shall examine in this one Question by three Conclusions following, setting aside useless quarrels and contentions about words rather than things. But that the resolution of what is to be said may be more open and evident,
Note 1. That the habitual grace of Christ can be understood as infinite in various ways, but chiefly in one of these six modes, as Izambert observes with many Theologians, ad qu. 7. disp. 1. art. 3. First indeed in the ratio of entity and quality: since grace is a quality according to its entity. Second, by reason of some physical mode intrinsic to that grace and accruing to it from its union with the Word, which mode, in the ratio of a mode, is infinite, and thus by affecting and modifying that grace confers on it a certain infinity. Third, it can be understood as infinite in the ratio of grace, namely insofar as it could infinitely dignify the nature. Fourth, by the mere extrinsic acceptance of God; so that God judges it worthy to produce effects conducing to the possession of the infinite good. Fifth, by the order and moral habitude it would have to the divine supposit of the Word; insofar as it inheres in a humanity subsisting by the subsistence of the Word. Sixth, finally, that although considered in itself and according to its entity it is finite, yet it is called infinite insofar as, according to the ordinary power of God, no other habitual grace greater is given, and also it extends itself to all those effects that could be conceived as producible by habitual grace.
Note 2. From the Subtle Doctor, B. dist. 18, question 1, number 2, that grace can be conceived as greatest in two ways: namely positively, and negatively. It is called positively greatest, insofar as it exceeds every other grace existing or credible; and in this sense, if some greatest grace were given, another equal to it would not be possible, for what is positively greatest is also unique in that genus in the ratio of the greatest. But grace can be called negatively greatest, if it be so great and so perfect that no other grace is possible that would exceed it, although many equals could be given, which would neither exceed it nor be exceeded by it. And it is called negatively greatest because it is reckoned greatest only from this, that it denotes a negation of excess, whereby it can neither exceed nor be exceeded. But the Doctor confesses there that grace positively greatest could be conferred neither on Christ nor on any other, because with whatever possible grace produced, God can produce another similar and equal one; For he could, he says, and can assume another nature equal, and consequently confer on it a grace like that which he conferred on the soul of Christ. Whether however he gave Christ a negatively greatest grace must be resolved in the present place.
Note 3, or rather to be repeated from the Physics, that the increase of a quality can be considered in two ways: namely extensively, in that it is in an extended subject: thus the whiteness of milk increases with the increase of the milk itself: secondly, intensively, when the quality is perfected by the addition of new degrees; thus whiteness becomes greater by the addition of another degree in the same part of the subject. But the Philosophers distinguish two kinds of degrees, namely quidditative, or specific, by which the essences of things are said to be indivisible, and to be as numbers, so that nothing can be added to them or taken from them without the essence being varied: others individual and entitative, and they are certain realities of the same genus and species, which if they exist separately will be truly distinct individuals of the same species; if however they are united in the same subject they make one unique thing. E.g. if two whitenesses in two remitted degrees exist in distinct subjects, there will be two individuals of whiteness; but if they are placed in the same subject, they make one whiteness indeed numerically, but more intense. — But what I said of corporeal qualities must be said likewise of spiritual ones, both natural and supernatural: for there is no quality, whether natural or supernatural, that cannot be increased by the addition of another degree of the same ratio and species. Whether however it can be increased to infinity by the repeated addition of degrees is disputed, not only among Philosophers, but even among Theologians; and especially in the present matter, in which the Angelic Doctor and the Subtle One agree in some points but differ in others. They agree, I say, in this, that each teaches the grace of Christ was not actually infinite according to entity and degrees: but they differ, because St Thomas contends the grace of Christ was infinite at least in power, because by the absolute power of God it could have been increased to infinity, and consequently was not a possible greatest, because it could be increased; but the Subtle Doctor denies this. — Three things therefore are to be determined in this Question: First, that the grace was not de facto and actually infinite. Second, that it was in fact so perfect that none more excellent could be produced or communicated to a creature. Third, that it could not be increased to infinity; and consequently, that it was not infinite in power.
First conclusion. — The grace of Christ, both in the ratio of entity and quality, and in the ratio of intension, was not de facto infinite. This is common among the followers of both the Angelic and the Subtle Schools.
It is proved first, because de facto no actually infinite entity is given, for Wisdom 11: God made all things in number, weight, and measure: but the grace of Christ, both according to entity and according to intension, is an actual entity: therefore in neither of these modes can it be infinite. — Next, if the grace of Christ had any infinity, that would have to be sought either on the part of the subject it affected, or on the part of the effects it produced: since there must be proportion between the subject and the accident received in it, as also between the accident itself and the effects to whose production it is ordered: but from neither head can this infinity of grace be gathered. Not indeed on the part of the subject, because the soul of Christ is a finite and limited entity: nor even on the part of the effects: for no effect produced or to be produced by grace can be assigned which, either entitatively or intensively, is infinite, insofar as it proceeds physically and efficiently from that grace: therefore the grace of Christ, both according to entity and according to intension, is de facto finite. — Finally, it conflicts for any created entity to be of such perfection as uncreated entity is: but if grace were infinite, both according to entity and according to intension, it would be equally perfect as uncreated entity: therefore, etc. The major is evident, for uncreated entity is far more excellent than every created entity. But the minor is proved, because either grace is really the same as charity, or at least it necessarily has charity annexed to itself connaturally according to the same intension that it obtains, so that if grace were of infinite intension, charity too should be of infinite intension: but if created charity were of infinite intension, it would be equally perfect as divine and uncreated charity, and could produce an act of love equally perfect. Moreover, since every infinitely perfect entity is owed connaturally to God, it would follow also that grace so infinite is owed to God as his native property, which is plainly absurd: therefore by no reason ought the grace of Christ to be judged infinite.
Some also prove this Conclusion a posteriori; because, they say, if the grace of Christ were infinite, it would follow that the light of glory was also infinite: and if the light of glory were infinite, the beatific vision would be infinite, and consequently comprehensive of God, which is absurd; for it belongs to God alone to be able to comprehend himself. This third reason is insufficient, because, granted that the light of glory is infinite, it does not follow from that precisely that the beatific vision of Christ is infinite, for vision is elicited not only from the light of glory but also from the intellect, which is finite and incapable of infinite action. — Besides, even if it were conceded that the beatific vision of Christ is infinite; still it would not follow that it is comprehensive of God; for that a vision be infinite and comprehensive, it must be infinite simply, and without modification, as is that vision by which God comprehends himself: but the beatific vision of Christ would not be infinite simply, and without modification; otherwise it would be God himself: therefore from the fact that it is infinite, it does not follow that it would be comprehensive of God. — Therefore we say the Blessed in their fatherland do not comprehend God, although they see the whole God, all the divine attributes, all possible things, which shine forth in the divine essence; and all the respects and habitudes which God has toward them; because they would not know all these things as much as they are knowable; and consequently their vision could indeed be called infinite beatific, yet not comprehensive, because it would be called infinite with modification, namely it would be called infinite extensively, but not intensively.
You will say. All that perfection and grace is to be asserted in Christ which is neither unworthy of his state, nor involves manifest contradiction: such is infinite grace: therefore this is to be asserted in Christ. — I deny the minor: since, as has just been proved, it conflicts for any grace to be actually infinite. Add that that infinite grace would have been wholly superfluous, both for the end of the Incarnation, because even if the redemption of men required an infinite merit and price, it would not be necessary that that infinity of merit be sought on the part of an infinite habitual grace; for the personality of Christ sufficed for that, which would confer such a price on meritorious works by a certain extrinsic dignity.
You will urge: Habitual grace in the human nature of Christ contributed to adorning it, on account of the hypostatic union: but this union was actually infinite: therefore also that. — I answer. 1. By denying the major, for it is false, as we said in the first Disputation, that grace was a prerequisite as a necessary medium for the hypostatic union. Then, even if habitual grace had truly been prerequisite in order to the hypostatic union, it does not follow from that that it ought to have been actually infinite; for just as creatures, although ordered to God as to their end, do not denote infinity; so neither would grace require any infinity on account of that ordination to the hypostatic union. Finally, it is false that the hypostatic union formally taken is infinite, both by reason of itself and by reason of the extremes immediately united. Not indeed by reason of itself, because that, as we said, is a respect extrinsically accruing, which truly is something finite. Nor even by reason of the extremes, because the humanity is finite; but the personality of the Word, which is the other immediate extreme of that union, is neither finite nor infinite.
You will say. 2. That which has infinite efficiency is also infinite in entity: but the grace of Christ has infinite virtue and efficiency, for it is an inexhaustible fountain, from whose plenitude men, and Angels, if there were any, could borrow their grace. Moreover that habitual grace of Christ conferred infinite value on his works, and made them worthy to suffice for the redeeming and saving of infinite men and Angels. — I deny the minor, and to its first proof I say that the grace of Christ is not reckoned the fountain from whose plenitude we have all received in the sense that it contains in itself all graces whatsoever as to entity, which flow into all men and Angels, just as in a fountain are contained all the droplets of water that overflow into streams; but only that Christ was the meritorious cause of all graces and heavenly charisms, which God grants to men and Angels in view of his merits. To the second proof I say that even if the merits of Christ had been of infinite value and capacity, so that they contributed to the redemption of infinite men, it does not follow from that that his grace was infinite according to entity, because that infinite value of merits would not require an infinite principle quo, but only a principle quod: and consequently it would not be necessary that the habitual grace of Christ, which is only the principle quo of those merits, be infinite; but it is only required that the principle quod, namely the person of the Word, from whom that value derives, attribute a certain infinity to them by reason of the divine nature identified with himself. Add that the value of meritorious works must especially be sought from the acceptance of God; God could accept the merits of Christ our Lord for their redemption and salvation; but this acceptance does not presuppose an infinite grace, from which that
From these gather 1, that the grace of Christ cannot rightly be called infinite by reason of the extrinsic acceptance of God, because that acceptance is in the divine supposit, as some modern Theologians teach; since that extrinsic acceptance is only a certain moral dignity of a grace morally dignified by the supposit of the Divine Word: but on account of that moral dignification the grace of Christ ought not be called infinite. Proof: the supposit of the Word does not dignify more the grace residing in the humanity of Christ than the humanity itself, for on account of that dignification of the humanity, the humanity is not called infinite: therefore neither for that reason ought the grace of Christ be called infinite. The major is evident, because the humanity of Christ is united to the Word more intimately and immediately than any accident inherent in that humanity: but by reason of that intimate union the humanity cannot be called of infinite dignity, but only that it has infinite dignity, on account of the infinite Word to which it is joined. Nor does it matter that the merit of Christ is called infinite by reason of the supposit, at least extrinsically, and by reason of divine acceptance: for the same cannot be said of grace, because merit truly is offered to be accepted insofar as it can be accepted. Whence the divine will, in view of the Word, accepts it infinitely, that is, for an infinite merit, and for infinite men and Angels, if there were so many; but grace is not offered to be accepted, but rather is a partial principle of that which is offered to be accepted; and therefore just as the other partial principle of merit, namely the will of Christ, is not called infinite, so neither ought grace be called infinite, however much the merit proceeding from both those principles may be called in some sense infinite.
From these gather 2, that the grace of Christ is not even infinite in the ratio of grace, or in the ratio of the formal effect whereby it made Christ pleasing, or of the effective effect insofar as it was the principle of meriting for men and Angels: for each of those effects, whether formal or effective, insofar as it was from grace, was wholly finite, because no form can supply an effect, whether formal or otherwise, beyond its own entity; for virtue does not exceed entity: but the entity of grace is finite: therefore it cannot supply an infinite effect; whence also that effect, whether formal or effective, is referred back rather to the person of Christ than to the grace itself.
From these gather 3, that the grace of Christ is not even reckoned infinite by reason of some physical mode intrinsic accruing to it from its very conjunction with the divine Word; since it cannot be explained what that infinite mode is: for nothing else could be conceived than that the grace itself, through the medium of the soul and will of Christ, in which it inheres, is terminated by the supposit of the Word: but this ratio of termination cannot confer on grace any infinity; both because by this reason the other accidents that are in Christ would also be called infinite; and because with better right that infinity would be attributed to the very will and soul of Christ, which is united more immediately to the supposit of the Word than the grace itself.
Second conclusion. — DE FACTO THE GREATEST HABITUAL GRACE WAS CONFERRED ON CHRIST.
It is gathered from John 1: We saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. As if the Evangelist said that Christ had such glory as befitted him to be held who is the only-begotten Son of God: but it beseemed him that the greatest glory be conferred on him: therefore also de facto it was conferred: but glory corresponds to grace and is founded on it; therefore if the glory of the soul of Christ is greatest, also the grace of that soul ought to have been greatest. It is confirmed from chapter 3, where John the Baptist, speaking of Christ, says: For God giveth not the Spirit by measure. Which words the holy Doctors and interpreters explain of Christ: which is also gathered from the following words, The Father loveth the Son, and he hath given all things into his hand: but he who has not spirit and grace by measure must necessarily have every possible grace, and therefore the greatest that can be contained in a creature: therefore Christ had such. It can be confirmed by the authority of the Philosopher saying that in every genus there is one thing which is the measure and standard of the others, and is more excellent than all others contained under the same genus: therefore likewise in the genus of grace: but this one cannot be anything other than Christ, because he is the one Mediator of God and men, the unique and supreme head of the Church; therefore he is also the one and only one who contains all excellence and plenitude of grace.
The Subtle Doctor proves this truth by this reason: God conferred on Christ our Lord every grace whatsoever possible, and such as no greater can be granted to any creature, if such be possible: but so it is: therefore it must be confessed that he conferred it on him. The major is evident: since God loves Christ, as his natural Son, more than any whatsoever of the just, who are only his adoptive sons, there is no doubt that he conferred on him all the gifts whatsoever that he could confer on adoptive sons, and consequently that he gave him the greatest grace. But the minor is proved, namely that the greatest grace is possible. The greatest grace can be created: therefore it is possible. The antecedent is proved: both because the greatest grace is a finite and limited entity; and every finite entity can be created by God: therefore, etc.; and because in permanent entities, which are apt to have, or to be able to have simultaneously, all parts and perfections and degrees compossible with themselves, God can produce and confer those parts and degrees in one instant: now grace is a permanent entity by its nature, since it is a supernatural quality: therefore God can produce and confer all parts and degrees compossible with it: but grace that has all degrees compossible with itself is truly greatest, since nothing can be added to it, otherwise it would not be reckoned to have all degrees compossible with itself: therefore, etc.: Finally, because God can create the greatest grace producible: but that greatest grace is the greatest: therefore it is not unfitting that the greatest grace be brought into being: therefore truly the greatest grace is possible; but it is most probable that God conferred on his proper Son all possible gifts: therefore, etc.
The Doctor proves secondly: Every perfection is owed to Christ of whose reception he is capable without any contradiction and inconvenience: but the soul of Christ is capable of receiving the greatest grace: therefore it must be confessed that it was conferred on him. The major is evident from what has been said, for the humanity of Christ our Lord is to be dignified as much as can be done without any inconvenience. The Doctor proves the minor: a subject receptive of some accident having certain degrees of intension can receive all those degrees, if it be not limited to some certain degree within the highest: but the soul of Christ is receptive of grace: nor is its capacity determined and limited to some certain degree of that grace: therefore it can receive any degree whatsoever. He proves the major by the opposite: for this reason water cannot receive any degree whatever of heat, because heat is an accident disconvening water in some degree, namely the highest, such as belongs to fire; whence that highest degree of heat could not inhere in water unless it corrupted it, since it is the ultimate disposition to the form of fire. The minor is proved: the soul of Christ would be determined of itself to receiving a certain degree of grace either because a further degree would be unworthy of it, or because it could not be communicated to it without contradiction: but no degree of grace, however intense, is unworthy of the soul of Christ, nor does any contradiction appear that it should receive any degree of grace whatsoever possible: therefore it is not limited to receiving some degree of grace short of the greatest. — He confirms it, because the capacity of the soul of Christ our Lord with respect to receiving grace is no less than that in Angels. He proves: if the capacity for receiving grace were less in the soul of Christ than in Angels, especially because that capacity would be proportioned to entity; whence it would follow that the less perfect entity would have the lesser capacity: but this reason is null; both because a greater or lesser perfection of natural entity is irrelevant to the reception of grace, which is of the supernatural order; and because the grace receivable in an Angel is of the same species as that receivable in the soul: but whenever a form susceptible in some things is of the same species, those things too, as receptive, must be of the same species in the ratio of the receiver: hence because the whiteness of milk and snow is of the same ratio, snow and milk are also of the same ratio in receiving whiteness: therefore since the grace receivable in an Angel is of the same species as that received in a rational soul, it follows that the capacity of the same ratio for receiving grace is in the soul and the Angel alike. — Therefore from these it is evident that the soul of Christ is receptive of as great a grace as any other finite intellectual substance can receive; and consequently that Christ had no repugnance to obtaining the most perfect grace: therefore the greatest grace is to be attributed to him; for, as the Doctor says, number 6,
it is probable to say according to the Master, that God conferred on him so great a grace as he could; for in commending Christ I prefer to exceed than to fall short of the praise due to him, if through ignorance I must fall into one of the two. He confirms it by that saying of Augustine, On Free Will: Whatever occurs to thee as better by true reason, know that God did it rather than did it not: Now it seems simply better according to right reason that the greatest grace be conferred on someone than not conferred, because in this the supreme mercy of God shines forth in giving the highest good of grace without merits: therefore it is probable that this was done, and in none other than the soul of Christ: therefore, etc.
Thus the Doctor, not less piously than subtilely.
The same truth the Seraphic Doctor also admirably urges, dist. 13, art. 1, q. 2, in these words:
If we speak of the grace conferred on Christ, according as He is a singular person in Himself, and granted that He says created gift, it is necessarily finite and measured. For finitude and measurement with regard to a creature rather signify complement than imperfection. But if we speak of it in comparison with the graces of other men, thus it exceeds disproportionately by reason of its union with the person of the Word, to which union that grace disposed the soul of Christ. For that grace, because of its supreme conjunction with the eternal Word, must exceed infinitely and immeasurably the graces of other men in three ways, namely as regards the virtue of habit, and as regards uses, and as regards effects. As regards habits; for no creature can ever profit so much as to be capable of so noble and perfect a habit as the soul united to God in the unity of person. As regards uses of virtues, because all the virtues in Christ had uses which look to perfection: and therefore it is said that all the senses were in Him, because He had complete use of all gifts in a more excellent manner than could ever yet be reached by anyone. As regards effect, likewise the grace of Christ exceeds disproportionally: because, for this reason, that this man was the Son of God, His merit is weighed according to the dignity of that person from which the work proceeds: and therefore the merit of His passion infinitely exceeds the merits of our passions: and on this account, because He > was God, His death was weighed by God according to how great He was who died. And therefore as regards sufficiency, if infinite thousands of men were bound under original guilt, by the effect of that passion they might have been set free.
Others prove it thus: To be assumed to divine being is greater than to be assumed to supreme grace: but the humanity of Christ is assumed by supreme union to divine being: therefore also to the highest possible grace. Moreover, the human nature of Christ is assumed to supreme union as regards being: therefore it is assumed also to supreme union as regards operating: but there is no supreme union as regards operating except through the highest habit of grace, which is the principle of operating: therefore the human nature of Christ was assumed to the highest habit of grace.
You will object 1. St. Augustine, book 13 De Trinitate, chapter 5, says: Blessed is he who has whatever he wills, and wills no evil; which is not understood of actual willing; because if any Saint in the way could be blessed at least for some instant, for which he can have whatever he wills, he would even will no evil: but it is understood of the power of willing, namely that he have whatever he can rightly will. Now the humanity, e.g., can rightly will to have as much grace as its nature is capable of: because free or rational willing is always right, because it is conformed to the will, or natural inclination, which is always right: but the natural inclination of Michael is toward as much grace as his nature is capable of: but the nature of the soul of Christ is not so excellent, nor consequently capable of so much grace: therefore in fact He does not have as much grace as Michael has, since Michael is blessed. — The Subtle Doctor answers that blessed is he who has whatever he wills, that is, whatever God wills him to will; but God does not will that any will freely will a greater glory than that which He has conferred on it: and therefore that will cannot rightly will another glory. To the proof he answers that the natural appetite of every will is toward supreme glory; so that every will naturally appetites to be perfected by supreme glory: nevertheless there is not there so great a natural inclination toward supreme glory that its opposite, that is, non-supreme glory, would inhere violently in the power having such an inclination, as happens in that natural inclination by which a heavy body is inclined naturally downward, because its opposite, namely not to be downward, or to be upward, inheres in it violently. The reason is, because that other inclination has no intrinsic principle necessitating it to that which it itself is, such that its opposite could not inhere except violently: for it is inclined toward having supreme grace, and yet it can be quieted in the soul, because it does not have an intrinsic principle determining it to some determinate degree. But free will is then right not only when it follows such a natural appetite, but rather when it conforms itself to the higher rule, namely the will of God; which sometimes wills the rational will to follow the natural appetite, sometimes not; but the divine will wills the blessed will to will no more glory than it has decreed to confer on it, notwithstanding the natural appetite, whose operation, or inclination, is then abandoned without sadness, because in patria incomparably more belongs to the will in following the rule of the superior than the inclination of the natural appetite.
You will object 2. No more grace is to be posited in the soul of Christ than is required for its beatitude: but it can be perfectly beatified without supreme grace. Proof: the inclination of the nature of Christ can terminate without supreme glory: therefore without supreme grace; for His inclination is not supreme, because His nature is not supreme, just as, e.g., because water is not supremely heavy, it can be quieted in a place below which will not be the lowest of all. — The Doctor answers that inclination can be regarded in two ways: either on the side of the foundation, namely of the nature whose inclination it is; or on the side of the terminus, namely of the grace to be received. Inclination on the side of the foundation is more perfect in a more perfect nature than in one less perfect, and consequently more excellent in an Angel than in the soul of Christ, because natural inclination is not really distinct from the nature whose inclination it is; and thus where the nature is more perfect, there the inclination is more perfect on the side of the foundation. But inclination, as regarding such a terminus, namely grace, is not more perfect in a more perfect nature than in one less perfect; because any grace whatsoever simply adorns and perfects nature, and therefore the nature of Christ could have had an inclination toward supreme beatitude. For the explication of this matter, there may be two surfaces, one of two feet, another of one foot; the former is greater and more perfect in itself and in order to receiving more accidents; yet with respect to the intensity of whiteness each is equally perfect, because each can receive equally intense and supreme whiteness.
You will object lastly: Supreme nature was not made: therefore neither supreme grace. The antecedent is proved: any made nature whatsoever can become more excellent. The consequence is proved: because the order of the Universe consists more in species than in individuals, for species adorn the universe more than individuals: therefore a supreme nature ought more fittingly to have been made, which differs in species from other natures, than supreme grace, which differs only in gift from other graces that are not supreme. — The Doctor answers that supreme grace ought rather to have been made than supreme nature, because in the works of nature only power and wisdom are manifested: but in the works of grace goodness and mercy; and it is better that mercy be manifested than power. Therefore God was compelled by no fitting necessity to create a supreme nature; but He was moved toward supreme grace, with respect, namely, to the nature subsisting in so excellent a supposit.
Conclusion third. — THE GRACE OF CHRIST IS NOT OF INFINITE POWER, NOR CAN IT BE INCREASED TO INFINITY. This is the Doctor's, ibidem number 2, and he states it thus:
Proof: The grace of Christ cannot be increased to infinity, if truly this increase is repugnant to grace: but it is repugnant that grace be so increased: therefore also this increase to infinity is repugnant to the grace of Christ. The major stands, because the grace of Christ is not of a different species from the other graces: therefore if the other graces cannot be increased to infinity, neither shall this be affirmed of the grace of Christ. The Doctor proves the minor from the hypothesis, that God might wish to intensify the grace of one degree or another by the addition of other degrees, or will make it grow and increase up to some supreme finite and determinate degree, beyond which no other will be producible, e.g. up to the eighth degree; or in that increase there will be no terminus, but further progress can proceed to infinity. If the first, we have what was intended, namely that every grace has determinate degrees of its intensity. If the second, it will follow that that grace can be actually infinite; because the more it were intensified by the addition of many degrees, the more perfect it will be intensively: whence if progress were made to infinity in that intensity, it follows that that grace could be of infinite intensity: but it is repugnant that any grace be infinitely intense: therefore it is repugnant that the increase of grace be made to infinity.
The adversaries reply, that that argument proceeds from a false supposition, namely that infinity in potency can be made act; for as in a continuum, given any division whatsoever, division can be made to infinity, and yet it does not follow that in the continuum there are actually infinite parts: so although grace can be increased to infinity by the addition of new degrees, it does not follow that it can be actually infinitely intense, because from the fact that something is infinite in potency it does not follow that it can be infinite in act. — Against this the Doctor first urges the authority of the Philosopher, book 3 Physics, chapter on the infinite, saying that as much as can be in potency can be in act, that is, whatever is possible in potency is also possible in act, which is most true in forms, as Averroes interprets: therefore one cannot proceed to infinity without that form likewise being able to be actually infinite, otherwise it could not be so much in act as it can be in potency. But there is no parity between the intensification of grace and the division of the continuum, because the reason is evident why in the division of the continuum all possible parts cannot be simultaneously actual, namely that if all those parts were actual, it would follow that they be indivisible, which is repugnant, because this is against the notion of a divisible continuum: but that all the parts of some intensible form exist simultaneously shows no repugnance: for if there were any, especially because, once the supreme and last degree of that form were added, the power of God would seem exhausted and the hand of the Lord shortened, if He could not produce a further degree: but this repugnance is none, for the omnipotence of God does not look to those things which are untouchable: whence just as the power of God is not exhausted, although human nature cannot add even the least essential degree, because that cannot be done without the species of man being changed; so the power of God does not seem exhausted, even if He could superadd no degree to the grace of Christ, because it is supposed that every possible degree has already been superadded to it.
The Doctor proves it moreover by the same argument by which St. Thomas labors to evince the contrary, from this principle, that grace is a certain participation of God, from which St. Thomas argued thus: God is infinitely participable by a creature: therefore grace could be infinitely intensified, that God be infinitely participated. But the Subtle Doctor argues thus: to participate the infinite perfection of God is to take some part of that infinite perfection: therefore to take some part according to a determinate degree: for if according to an indeterminate and infinite degree, just as the divine perfections are infinite and exist whole and entire together, it would follow also that it would not be repugnant for some creature to have simultaneously infinite degrees of perfection; and thus to be equally perfect as God Himself, who possesses infinite perfection actually, which is absurd: therefore although God, as far as He is of Himself, is infinite and of infinite perfection, He is nevertheless not infinitely participable by any creature of a determinate species, because there is given no creature which is infinitely participative of God, although God is infinitely participable syncategorematically, that is, by infinitely many possible creatures, if they should be possible.
You will object 1. Luke 2, where it is said: And Jesus advanced in wisdom, and age, and grace with God and men: whereby it appears that He received an increase of grace, as also of age; therefore just as He did not have supreme age, so neither supreme grace. — I answer first that various explanations of this text are brought forward; for St. Damascene, book 3 De fide, chapter 22, brings two explanations: the first of which is, that that advance must be understood of the Church, not of Christ; for what belong to the members are sometimes attributed to the head. The second is, that it must be understood of the increase of grace and wisdom, not internal, but external, namely according to manifestation, because day by day His wisdom and sanctity shone forth more and more before men. So likewise St. Athanasius explains this text, oration t. against the Arians: As, he says, the magnitude of the body grew, the manifestation of the Deity grew in Him. Yet since it is said that He grew not only in external appearance among men, but also in internal advance before God, therefore I should judge more correctly, with the Seraphic Doctor, in Luke 2, that that advance must be understood thus: either that Christ shone forth more and more day by day in works of charity toward God and neighbor: or with the Angelic Doctor, third part, question 1, article 12, that that advance must be understood as to acts and effects; but not as to habits: of which truth a lucid example appears in the Sun, which although it has as much brightness in the morning as at noon; yet with respect to us it does not appear so brilliant in the morning as at noon.
You will object 2. The supreme grace which Christ has is finite: but to any finite thing a greater can be given: therefore that grace, however supreme, can be surpassed by another more perfect one being given. The major stands from what has been said. But the minor is proved; because to any finite creature whatsoever another more excellent creature can be given, if this be not repugnant: but it is not repugnant that, however perfect a creature be, another more excellent creature be given. Proof, because if that were repugnant, especially because from it would follow that that creature would be infinite: but this is not true: for it would become more excellent by the addition of a new degree, whereby it would exceed another creature: but that new degree would not make it infinite: therefore etc. — The Doctor denies the minor; and to its proof he says that that proposition, to any finite grace whatsoever a greater can be given, can be understood in two ways: First, so as to mean that to any finite grace whatsoever a greater can be given by the addition of another degree within the same species; and in this sense he denies the proposition: for when grace, or any other quality whatsoever, has the supreme degree of its perfection, however finite it be, it cannot be made greater: not because, this being posited, it would become infinite if a further degree were added, but because of incompressibility; just as, e.g., whiteness added to blackness cannot intensify it, not because it would make it infinite, but because it is incompossible with it: but also a new degree of grace is incompossible with supreme grace, because from it would follow that it was not supreme, if by a newly superadded degree it could become more excellent: therefore not by reason of infinity, but by reason of incompossibility, it is repugnant that a new degree be added to supreme grace.
For the evidence of which let anyone note, if supreme grace could become more perfect, this would have to be sought especially either from the intrinsic nature of grace, or from a defect of power in the effective cause, or from a defect of capacity in the subject: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because it is of itself a participation of infinite divine grace, or charity, which since it can be participated more and more to infinity, can also render the participant more excellent to infinity. Not even the second, because God is of infinite power, and consequently can unfold His power toward producing infinite effects and degrees. Finally not the third, because the subject capable of receiving some form can receive it according to all its degrees. — The Doctor denies the minor, and draws those very arguments of the objection to his supposition for confirming his opinion. Indeed the first, because every participation of divine perfection is necessarily finite, as we said above; otherwise it would follow that some creature could have infinite perfection, and thus be equally perfect as God, which is repugnant. Likewise the second, because God cannot produce grace except either by creating it from nothing, or from a subject, if He produce it by eduction: but in neither way can He produce infinite grace, because every nature which is produced from the nothing of itself, mediately or immediately, is necessarily limited and finite; because every unlimited perfection is of itself necessary, and consequently cannot be produced from nothing: therefore since every grace is produced by God from the nothing of itself, immediately or mediately, it cannot be infinite. Finally He draws the third argument also to the opposite: for every finite receiver cannot have capacity for infinite perfection; because although the capacity of the receiver is with respect to any degree whatever in the form: yet the capacity of anything finite does not extend to the form in-
From these gather that the grace of Christ is in fact supreme, not only negatively, but also positively with respect to all graces which were granted either to men or to Angels; such that it plainly exceeds all the graces both of Angels and of men: both because all their graces flow from Christ as from the head of the whole Church, whether militant, triumphant, or suffering, into them as into members of His mystical body: but life resides far more nobly in the head than in all the members: therefore habitual grace, which is the principle of spiritual life, is far more excellent in Christ than in all men and Angels alike: and because all Angels and men were pleasing to God only on account of Christ: therefore Christ was far more pleasing to them, because on account of each thing such, and that more so: and consequently He had greater and more excellent grace: finally because to Him, and indeed to Him alone, ought to be conferred the most perfect and supreme principle of operating, to whom alone has been granted the most perfect and supreme principle of being: yet the humanity of Christ has been granted the principle and supreme principle of being, namely divine being by hypostatic union: therefore to Him alone ought to be conferred through grace the most perfect and supreme principle of operating: but what is conferred on one alone in the highest degree is not only negatively but also positively supreme in fact: therefore the grace of Christ is in fact positively supreme.
YOU ASK 1: Whether Christ had every fullness of sanctifying grace, and that from the instant of His conception?
THE SERAPHIC DOCTOR ANSWERS, dist. 18, art. 1, qu. 3, that without doubt in Christ according to His human nature there was from the very beginning of His conception a grace perfect, ordered, and consummated in plenitude; for it did not befit the uncreated Word to be united to a soul in most perfect union, such as is union in unity of person, unless the soul were Deiform, insofar as it was possible. And therefore He had not only Deiformity of grace and glory, but even above all grace and glory; nor was there in Him only the fullness of sufficiency, as in the Saints, of which fullness it is said Acts 6: Stephen full of grace and fortitude; nor only the fullness of prerogative, as in the Virgin Mary, of which fullness it is said: Hail, full of grace; nor only the fullness of numerosity and copia, as in the whole Church, of which fullness it is said Ephes. 4: He ascended above the heavens, that He might fill all things: but also the fullness of superabundance, of which John 1: We saw His glory, etc. Full, I say, with the fullness of superabundance, on account of which He adds: and of His fullness we all have received. — It is confirmed by Luke 1, where the Angel addressing Mary says: That which shall be born of thee shall be holy, and shall be called the Son of God. In which two things are denoted: first, that in the same moment in which the soul of Christ had the grace of union, He likewise had habitual grace, by which He was formally holy. Second, the Angel did not say, that what shall be born of thee will be holy, but that what shall be born of thee shall be holy, so that evidently he signified that Christ from that time when He was formed in the womb of the Virgin had sanctity and habitual grace. St. Augustine proves this same thing excellently in book 13 De Trinitate, chapter 26, from the Prophecy of Isaiah, in which it is said that the Holy Spirit ought to rest upon Christ:
The Lord Jesus Himself, he says, gave the Holy Spirit not only as God, but also received Him as man, on which account He is called full of grace: and more manifestly concerning Him it is written in the Acts of the Apostles: Because God anointed Him with the Holy Spirit, certainly not with visible oil, but with the gift of grace, which is signified by the visible ointment with which the Church anoints the baptized. Nor indeed was Christ then anointed with the Holy Spirit when upon the baptized there descended like a dove: for then He deigned to prefigure His body, that is, His Church, in which the baptized especially receive the Holy Spirit; but He must be understood as anointed with that mystical and invisible unction then, when the Word of God was made flesh, that is, when the human nature was joined to the Word of God in the womb of the Virgin without any preceding merits of good works, so that with Him it might become one person.
Thus St. Augustine.
YOU ASK 2: Besides habitual grace, did Christ also have need of actual grace, which is a certain divine motion granted by God in order to supernatural operation, which, once that operation is transacted, does not reign?
I ANSWER FIRST, that it seems more probable that actual grace was necessary to Christ for free operations looking to the state of wayfarer, e.g., for love of God or neighbor: as well as for acts of moral virtues, obedience, humility, etc. Proof, because actual grace is either antecedent or exciting, or concomitant or helping: but both of these seem to have been necessary to Christ, because exciting grace is a certain holy thought, by which there is proposed to us the pursuit of honest good and flight of dishonest evil: similarly it is a certain subject motion of the will, which the divine Spirit excites in order to fear or love of God: but Christ had need of that motion of intellect by which He judged here and now that God or neighbor must be loved, obeyed, etc. Similarly it was necessary that His will be moved to those acts, and have the special concourse of God: therefore actual grace seems to have been necessary to Him both exciting and helping. It is confirmed, because on account of a similar rationality Christ needed the same natural concourse of God by which other men need it in natural acts, notwithstanding His union to the Word: therefore similarly, notwithstanding the grace of union and habitual grace, He needed besides actual graces, which men are accustomed to need for eliciting supernatural acts.