Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Claude Frassen

Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Claude Frassen (1620–1711)


Tractatus I: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Quaestio I: Quot, et quae fuerint haereticorum erronea dogmata circa incarnati Verbi mysterium

Disputatio I: De Existentia, Natura, et Causis Incarnationis

Articulus I: De Possibilitate, Convenientia, et Complemento seu Peractione Mysterii Incarnationis

§ I: De Possibilitate Incarnationis

Quaestio I: An unio divinae naturae cum humana in unitate personae sit possibilis

Quaestio II: An, et quo lumine cognosci possit et suaderi

§ II: De Convenientia Incarnationis

Quaestio I: An conveniens fuerit Deum incarnari

Quaestio II: An convenientius fuerit naturam humanam, quam Angelicam, aut aliquam aliam a Verbo assumi

Quaestio III: Utrum convenientius fuerit Filium, quam Patrem, aut Spiritum Sanctum incarnari

Quaestio IV: An convenienti tempore facta fuerit incarnatio

§ III: De Necessitate Incarnationis

Quaestio I: An, et qualiter necessaria fuerit incarnatio

Quaestio II: Utrum purus homo Deo satisfacere potuerit pro hominum offensa, eorumque ruinam restaurare

Quaestio III: Utrum Christus Deo condignam satisfactionem exhibuerit

Quaestio IV: Utrum Christus pro nobis satisfecerit ad iuris apices, seu ex rigore iustitiae

Quaestio V: Utrum revera peractum sit incarnationis mysterium, et Iudaeis promissus Messias advenerit

Articulus II: De Unione Hypostatica

§ I: De Unione Hypostatica secundum se spectata

Quaestio I: Quid sit unio hypostatica

Quaestio II: An unio hypostatica facta fuerit in unitate naturae aut personae, idque per veram et proprie dictam compositionem, an per utriusque commixtionem

Quaestio III: Quis sit terminus unionis hypostaticae

Quaestio IV: Utrum unio hypostatica sit immediata, et omnium unionum maxima

§ II: De Persona Assumente

Quaestio I: Qualiter, et per quid Verbum divinum naturam humanam terminaverit et assumpserit

Quaestio II: Utrum subsistentia Dei absoluta et communis tribus personis possit naturam humanam assumere, illique immediate uniri

Quaestio III: Utrum plures personae divinae possent assumere eandem humanitatem, et eadem persona plures humanitates

Quaestio IV: An persona creata possit alienam naturam terminare et assumere

§ III: De Unione Hypostatica ex parte Naturae Assumptae

Quaestio I: An natura tam Angelica, quam irrationalis, sit assumptibilis a persona divina

Quaestio II: An natura accidentis possit assumi a persona divina

Quaestio III: Qualiter, et quo ordine Verbum divinum humanitatem et eius partes assumpserit

Articulus III: De Causis Incarnationis

§ I: De Causa Efficiente Incarnationis

Quaestio I: Quae fuerit vel esse potuerit causa efficiens et instrumentaria Incarnationis

Quaestio II: An aliqua fuerit causa media, seu praeparativa ad Incarnationem per modum effectionis et dispositionis

§ II: De Causa Morali et Meritoria Incarnationis

Quaestio I: An Christus per opera priora vel subsequentia unionem hypostaticam ipsam potuerit promereri

Quaestio II: An et qualiter Beata Virgo meruerit esse Mater Dei

Quaestio III: Utrum Sancti Patres meruerint, aut saltem mereri potuerint de congruo, Incarnationem eiusque circumstantias

§ III: De Causa Finali et Motiva Incarnationis

Quaestio I: Utrum si Adamus non peccasset, Filius Dei non minus esset incarnandus

Quaestio II: Propter quod peccatum expiandum Christus principaliter venerit

Disputatio II: De Christi Domini Entitate, Praecellentiis, et Operationibus

Articulus I: De Christi Domini Divinitate et Humanitate

§ I: De Christi Domini Divinitate

Quaestio I: An revera Christus sit idem unus Deus cum Patre, eandem indivisam cum eo naturam divinam habens

Quaestio II: Utrum Christus in quantum homo sit Filius Dei adoptivus aut naturalis

Quaestio III: Utrum in Christo sint duae filiationes, una aeterna ad Patrem, alia temporalis ad Matrem

Quaestio IV: Utrum Christus Dominus sit et dici possit Dei servus, et aeterno Patri subiectus

§ II: De Humanitate Christi

Quaestio I: An Christus vere integram humanitatem anima rationali et humano corpore constantem habeat

Quaestio II: An Verbum divinum assumpserit hypostatice omnes humani corporis partes, manente vero sanguine et aliis humoribus

Quaestio III: Utrum Verbum assumpserit animae rationalis facultates, nempe intellectum et voluntatem

Quaestio IV: Utrum natura humana in Christo propriam habuerit existentiam et subsistentiam creatam substantialem

§ III: De Modo Loquendi in hoc Mysterio

Quaestio I: Utrum per communicationem idiomatum omnia quae sunt Dei de homine, et vicissim quae sunt hominis de Deo praedicentur

Articulus II: De Praecellentiis Christi Domini

§ I: De Gratia Christi

Quaestio I: Utrum humanitas Christi sanctificetur formaliter per gratiam unionis, an vero requirat aliquod donum ab ipsa unione distinctum

Quaestio II: Utrum in anima Christi fuerit gratia habitualis, et ad quid necessaria

By the name habitual grace is signified that supernatural quality divinely infused into the soul and inhering in it, and that not only sanctifying and making worthy, whereby it is loved by God, accepted by him, ordered to eternal beatitude: but also elevating to a supernatural state and degree, so that by its aid and concurrence the soul can elicit supernatural acts meritorious of eternal life. Hence for various ends that grace is judged useful and necessary: First indeed, that it confer formal sanctity. Second, that the soul, connaturally and from a supernatural comprinciple inexistent to itself, while it elevates itself to supernatural state, can edere connatural supernatural acts. Third finally, that eternal life as a supernatural reward it can also connaturally merit. It is asked however whether for this threefold effect habitual grace was necessary in Christ.

Note 2. That formal sanctity is distinguished from personal in this, that personal inheres in the subject and belongs to it from the precise reason of hypostatic union and of personality and subsistency, through which divine nature, which is the fountain and origin of all sanctity, is united to human nature; but formal sanctity is that whereby the subject which is denominated holy is said such on account of some form intrinsically adhering to it, and inasmuch as through that form as through a certain principle inexistent to itself it is rendered potent to elicit supernatural acts of divine dilection. They differ secondly, because one is substantial and infinite at least by reason of its principle; but the other accidental, created, and limited; for it is made through habitual grace, which is a quality. Thirdly, personal sanctity affects human nature after the manner of a term; for so is it conjoined to it as the divine nature and divine personality whence it is sought. But from what has been said it stands that divine nature is not united to humanity formally or after the manner of a form or compartis, of which divinity is wholly incapable; but mediatedly through the personality of the Word, exercising the offices of a created suppositum, terminating the communication and dependence of that humanity. Accidentally truly it affects after the manner of a form. These both sanctities first agree in this, that both truly are real and intrinsically united to humanity itself mediated through the personality of the Word; but the formal becomes through sanctifying grace, a true real quality inhering in the soul, which it formally sanctifies. Secondly these two sanctities agree in that they elevate the subject itself to some divine and supernatural being; the personal indeed to the supernatural being of the Word, inasmuch as through it man is God and natural Son of God: the posterior truly to divine being through participation, as we shall say in the Treatise De Gratia. Hence controversy exists among Theologians whether sanctifying grace was necessary to Christ that he become denominated formally holy; or truly only, as the Thomists will, for his complete sanctification and for operating connaturally in the order of grace.

NOTE 3. That meritorious acts are of two kinds: some are supernatural as regards their entity, such as the dilection of God above all things, both as Author of grace and of glory; others truly only as regards their mode, which indeed are natural according to their entity, but because they are ordered to a supernatural end and made by a man existing in grace, by this reason they are called supernatural, for example to give alms on account of Christ. Moreover it must be adverted that the supernatural act as regards its substance can be conceived produced in two ways, namely in a connatural way or in a supernatural way. It is said to be produced connaturally when it is elicited by an intrinsic principle permanently inhering in the vital principle which is elicitive of such an act, by reason of which adjunct comprinciple the vital principle is corroborated and its virtue completed ultimately for exercising such acts. But it is said to be produced supernaturally when it is elicited through some supernatural actual or transient aid corroborating the power itself, or through something else which supplies the offices of that aid, for example an ampler concourse of God.

These things having been thus premised, three things come to be resolved: first, whether truly Christ had habitual grace. Second, whether he had need of it that he become formally and completely holy. Third, whether it was necessary that he elicit supernatural and meritorious acts.

First conclusion. — THE SOUL OF CHRIST TRULY WAS ILLUSTRATED WITH HABITUAL GRACE. This is common among Theologians; for although some affirm that the humanity of Christ was sanctified formally through the hypostatic union, nevertheless there is none who denied that it is also sanctified through grace.

Some prove the Conclusion with various texts of sacred Scripture, of which I bring forward one or other more openly evincing this truth. First indeed that Isaiah 11, where it is said of Christ, The spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him: at which place by the particle Spirit of the Lord is understood the permanence of grace in Christ, as St. Cyril expounds at the beginning of book 2 on Isaiah. The Prophet confirms the same truth in chapter 61, where speaking in the person of Christ he says: The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord hath anointed me: which words indeed Christ himself taught were prophesied concerning himself Luke 4; and they convey this sense, that therefore the Spirit of the Lord inheres in Christ through the gift of habitual grace, because he himself through the hypostatic union is united to substantial and uncreated grace.

The same truth is proved likewise from chapter 1 of St. John, where of the Word Incarnate it is said: We saw his glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father full of grace and truth: where the fullness of grace is doubtless to be understood of created grace, and that habitual and persevering; for soon it is added: And of his fulness we all have received: for what is received from the fullness of some fountain must be of the same condition as regards entity with some of those things which fill the fountain, as is clear in water derived from a fountain, which is of the same nature as that which immediately flows from the fountain itself: but the fullness of the grace of Christ, from which we all receive, is after the manner of a fountain (as we shall explain in the Treatise De Gratia), from which fountain we have received not only actual graces, but also sanctifying and permanent grace. Wherefore Christ so often in sacred Scripture is called our justification and our justice: therefore as our sanctification and justification is created, habitual and persevering, so also that grace which is in Christ as in a fountain, from which ours flows forth, must be created and habitual. Nor does it avail to reply with Erasmus and Cajetan that those words full of grace and truth are not to be construed with those antecedents, and the Word was made flesh, and we saw his glory, etc., but with these following, John beareth witness; because, they say, in the Greek Codices the particle πλήρης, that is full, is of the masculine gender and nominative case, as also this John, although it ought to be of the accusative case if it were retained to that the Word was made flesh, as this verbal particle we saw indicates. This, I say, does not stand in the way, for the Greek and Latin Codices, indeed even the common use of the whole Latin Church, by which at the end of Mass the Gospel of St. John is recited, insert those words after those cited, full of grace and truth: therefore they judge those words to look not to what immediately succeeds, but to the antecedents, and consequently to the Word Incarnate. Next, those words are to be understood of him of whose fullness all men a little later are said to have received: for thus plenitude and its redundancy correspond mutually; but we do not say we have received of the plenitude of St. John Baptist, but of the plenitude of Christ: therefore those words full of grace and truth are said of the Word. Nor does it please Cajetan and Erasmus that the word πλήρης is in the masculine gender and nominative case, for λόγος which is called in Latin verbum is in Greek of the masculine gender, and these words we saw his glory, as of the Only-begotten of the Father, are read parenthetically, whence just as there Word, in Greek λόγος, is of the masculine gender and nominative case, so also this its adjective πλήρης; as if the sense were: the Word was made flesh, which is full of grace, and we saw his glory… Augustine confirms this, lib. 15 De Trinitate, chapter 26, where he interprets the aforesaid words of St. John of created sanctifying grace received by Christ; for he says: The Lord Jesus himself not only gave the Holy Spirit as God, but also received him as man, and therefore was called full of grace, because God anointed him with the Holy Spirit; not indeed with visible oil, but with the gift of grace, which is signified by the visible ointment wherewith the Church anoints the baptized: by which words he signifies Christ had created and habitual grace. But most openly St. Bernard teaches this truth, homily 1 on Missus est, where he says: Singularly holy was whatever the Virgin conceived, both through the fictive conception of the Holy Spirit and through the assumption of the Word, whereby he distinguishes a twofold sanctification in Christ, one which is made through the hypostatic union, and another which is made through the sanctification of the Spirit, which certainly is none other than that which is made through sanctifying grace, created and habitual.

It is proved likewise by reason: Where there is conformity of sanctity, there ought to be parity of sanctifying grace, which may be the foundation of such conformity: but between Christ and the Predestinate there is conformity of sanctity, according to that saying of St. Paul to the Romans 8. Whom he foreknew and predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son, that he might be the First-begotten among many brethren: therefore since the sanctifying form of the Predestinate is something persevering, also the grace of Christ must be such. — Next, all that perfection which belongs as well to Angels as to just men is not to be denied to the soul of Christ: especially since it illustrates it, nor does it disgrace the state and glory of the Incarnation: but sanctifying grace, which is given to Angels and men, contributes most to the supernatural beauty and perfection of the soul, and has no repugnance with the hypostatic union; for this first and per se says only opposition with the proper subsistency of the assumed humanity, which is something wholly distinct from habitual grace: therefore that grace is not to be denied to Christ. — Finally, besides the physical union of humanity to the Word, it was needful that the soul of Christ be united also to God through supernatural knowledge and love: but for the connatural elicition of those acts (such as befitted the soul of Christ) habitual grace was necessary, as we shall teach in what follows: therefore he had such grace.

You will say 1: Whatever is incapable of adoptive filiation is also incapable of habitual grace: but Christ is incapable of adoptive filiation: therefore, etc. The minor is clear from what has been said. The major similarly stands: for to be an adoptive son is the formal effect of habitual grace, as the Apostle indicates Rom. 8 and the Council of Trent teaches Session 6 chapter 10, when it defines justification (whose formal cause is habitual grace) as translation from the state of sin to the state of adoption of sons of God: but a form cannot be in a subject without its formal effect: therefore neither habitual grace in Christ unless he were its adoptive son. — I deny the major, and to its proof I distinguish the major: to be an adoptive son is the primary formal effect of habitual grace, I deny: secondary, I concede: and thus the minor being distinguished, I deny the consequence. For although the effect of some form cannot be separated from the subject to which that form is communicated, nevertheless the secondary effect can be separated from it, as is clear in quantity affecting the Body of Christ the Lord, whose primary effect is to extend parts outside parts in order to itself; but secondary to extend them in order to place; but in the sacrament of the altar the Body of Christ the Lord indeed has that primary effect of quantity, not truly the secondary. But that adoptive filiation is only a secondary effect of habitual grace stands; because habitual grace is a certain absolute form, since it is a permanent quality; but divine adoptive filiation is of the genus of relations: yet no relation is the primary and formal effect of any permanent quality, but only results from the position of it in a capable subject: therefore the primary and formal effect of habitual grace is to render its subject grateful to God with formal and inherent gratitude, to which effect divine adoptive filiation follows where and when the subject which this grace affects is capable of adoptive filiation. Whence since Christ, at that instant at which habitual grace was infused into him, was incapable of divine adoptive filiation, because through the grace of union he was already natural Son of God, but natural filiation has opposition with adoptive; hence it is that habitual grace could not confer on Christ that adoptive filiation.

You will say 2: He who is God by essence cannot be God by participation: but if Christ had had besides the grace of union also created habitual grace, he would have been God by essence by reason of hypostatic union, and also God by participation by reason of habitual grace, which is a certain participation of divine nature: therefore it is false that Christ had created habitual grace. The major stands: for to be God by essence is to be God without every exception and limitation: but to be God by participation is to be such partially and limitedly: it implies however to be God totally and in part, without exception and with exception: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: who is God by nature cannot be God by participation by reason of the same whereby he is God by nature, I concede: by reason of another, I deny. Therefore Christ could be God by essence by reason of the substance and divine nature communicated to him, and similarly by participation by reason of habitual grace.

You will say 3: Where a subject contains eminently within itself some perfection, it cannot have it formally or by a form inexistent to itself: but Christ by reason of the grace of union contains habitual grace and all other graces eminently: since the grace of union in a far nobler mode makes Christ grateful and holy to God than habitual grace, which only accidentally perfects its subject: therefore it repugns Christ to have habitual grace in himself. The major stands: for since the Sun is hot eminently, it cannot be formally hot: similarly, since the rational soul contains eminently the vegetative and sensitive grade, it repugns it to have a properly and formally sensitive and vegetative soul, such as is in brutes and plants. — I answer as regards the present undertaking, distinguishing the major: if eminential containment is not only effective of the thing which it is said to contain, but also executive of the effects which that thing can perform, I concede: if it is only productive of that thing which it is said eminently to contain, not truly executive of the effects which that thing can edere, I deny. But the grace of union, although it contains eminently every grace, nevertheless cannot edere the same effects which habitual grace performs per se in the soul of Christ, since that neither sanctifies the soul of Christ formally, nor constitutes it in a state such that connaturally it can edere supernatural and meritorious acts.

You will say, finally: Habitual and sanctifying grace is granted above all so that the soul may become pleasing to God: but the soul of Christ cannot be more pleasing with habitual grace than without it. Proof: a soul that is infinitely pleasing to God cannot be more pleasing, because nothing is greater than the infinite: but by the grace of union the soul of Christ is pleasing to God infinitely by reason of the Divinity communicated to it and hypostatically united to it; therefore it cannot be more pleasing. — I deny the minor, and I distinguish its proof: that what is infinitely pleasing cannot be more pleasing in the same genus of gratification, I concede; in another genus, I deny. Now the soul of Christ by the grace of union is indeed pleasing to God with an infinite substantial gratification, which does not prevent it from likewise being able to be made pleasing in another genus, namely by some accidental form superadded. And this is confirmed by a similar case; for although Christ by reason of the hypostatic union be substantially infinite in perfection, that substantial perfection did not prevent him from having besides all the accidental gifts with which his humanity was adorned.

Second conclusion. — HABITUAL GRACE WAS NECESSARY FOR CHRIST, THAT HE MIGHT BE SANCTIFIED FORMALLY.

Proof: Christ ought to have been formally holy: but he could not be such without habitual grace: therefore this was necessary to him for that end. The major is evident from the preceding Conclusion; for Christ ought to have had every sanctity whatsoever that can most of all illumine and consecrate his soul, and that in the most intimate and excellent manner: but it is far more excellent to be sanctified formally, or by an intrinsically inhering form, as men and Angels are sanctified, than merely by some extrinsic denomination and unction, as holy places and vessels are. But the minor is proved: if, habitual grace set aside, Christ could have been sanctified formally, then especially by a substantial and personal sanctity: but he could not be sanctified thus. Which I prove first: that by which it cannot have the ratio of a sanctifying form cannot sanctify formally: but neither the personality of the Word nor the Divinity itself, from which a substantial sanctity is sought, has the ratio of a sanctifying form. Not indeed the personality: for this does not affect the human nature by the mode of a form, but by the mode of a term; nor does it have of itself, as we have proved, the power of sanctifying, because it is not formally sanctity. This also the Divinity cannot supply, because Divinity cannot be a form sanctifying the humanity: for a form must be united intrinsically, and per se immediately, to that of which it is the form: but Divinity is not united to the humanity per se, but only by reason of the supposit in which the hypostatic union was made; for no real union can be made immediately between the divine nature and the human: therefore Divinity could not have the ratio of a form sanctifying the human nature. — It is confirmed, because if Divinity were to sanctify the humanity of Christ formally, it would do so either as a physical form or as a moral one: but it supplies this in neither way. Not indeed as a physical form; both because a physical form is of itself ordered as a part to actuating and composing: but Divinity cannot have the ratio of an informing and actuating part, since this savors of imperfection; and because if Divinity were united to the humanity by the mode of a physical form, it would make it formally God, for formal communication of Divinity makes God: but this is absurd; and finally because Divinity per se and formally supplies only a title in order to uncreated beatitude: but that title cannot belong first and per se to the humanity of Christ, but only through the communication of idioms: therefore the humanity of Christ cannot be sanctified physically by the Divinity itself. Nor indeed can it be sanctified formally by it, as by a moral form; both because a moral form, although it connotes a principle and a real subject, yet in itself is precisely not real, for it is only a respect extrinsic, proceeding from the ordination of God accepting such a one unto beatitude: but Christ ought to have been really holy with a formal sanctity: therefore he ought to have had that sanctity by some intrinsic form really inhering in him; and because every physical form is according to entity more excellent than a moral one: therefore, since our sanctification is wrought by a physical form really inhering in us, it would follow that our justification, according to its entity, would be more excellent than the sanctification of Christ; and finally because Christ, as the Holy of holies and the head of the predestined, ought to have conformity with his members in the ratio of sanctity: but by the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7 and Canon 11, the just are not sanctified by something extrinsic and moral, but by a form intrinsically inhering: therefore for this reason too Christ ought to have been sanctified.

You will say: That sanctification which is more excellent and more illustrious must be granted to Christ: but it is far more excellent to be sanctified formally by the divinity itself than by any created thing: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: if that most excellent mode be possible, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But it conflicts, as has just been proved, for the divinity or anything divine to have the ratio of a sanctifying form, and consequently it conflicts for the humanity of Christ to be sanctified formally by the divinity itself.

You will say 2: A soul that is holy with a sanctity virtually and eminently containing all sanctity has also formal sanctity: but the soul of Christ, by the very force of the hypostatic union, is holy with a sanctity eminently containing all sanctity that would arise from grace whether actual or habitual: therefore it does not need habitual grace in order to be called formally holy. The minor is evident: Christ by the hypostatic union has the uncreated sanctity of God, whereby he eminently contains all created sanctity, just as the divine entity eminently contains all created entity. But the major is proved: God therefore does not need habitual grace in order to be formally holy with every manner of sanctity, because his sanctity eminently contains whatever sanctity is in habitual grace: therefore by similarity, if the soul of Christ by the power of the hypostatic union has a sanctity originating from grace, it in no way needed such grace in order to be reckoned wholly formally holy. — I deny the major: since for formal sanctification it is not enough that something contain eminently all other sanctity: but it must also inhere in it by the mode of a form affecting and perfecting it, in which way uncreated sanctity, or anything divine, cannot be in Christ, as has just been said. To the proof of the major, I say the antecedent is false; for not precisely because his sanctity eminently contains all other sanctity does God not need habitual grace in order to be formally holy, but because the divine uncreated sanctity itself inheres in him intrinsically, by the mode of a form, or of an attribute affecting and perfecting the divine essence.

Third conclusion. — HABITUAL GRACE WAS NECESSARY FOR CHRIST, THAT HE MIGHT ELICIT SUPERNATURAL AND MERITORIOUS ACTS CONNATURALLY.

It is proved first: An agent operates connaturally when it has proportion to the acts it elicits: but the soul of Christ, since it is a natural entity, cannot have proportion to the production of supernatural acts without habitual grace: therefore for the producing of those effects it was necessary to Christ. The major is evident; for it is for no other reason that vision is said to be elicited connaturally than because it is made through the visual power, the intelligible species, and a proportionate medium, all of which complete and integrate the principle so that it may produce vision. It is proved again: if anything besides habitual grace could raise the soul of Christ to the supernatural state and incline it intrinsically to produce supernatural acts, it would be especially either the personality and subsistence of the Word, or the divinity communicated to it: but neither does this; for the soul to be so raised and inclined, it must have in itself some co-principle operative as the quo, and elicitive of such acts: but the subsistence of the Word cannot supply this, because it is not an active virtue, but a pure term of the nature. Therefore it cannot concur to acts by the mode of a principle quo; but only by the mode of a condition constitutive of the supposit, and of a principle quod concurring to the operation. Nor can the divinity supply this, for the operative principle quo must either have identity with the principle that operates, or must physically inform it: but both conflict with the divinity with respect to the humanity; therefore neither the subsistence of the Word nor the divinity can have the ratio of a principle quo in the humanity, in order to the connatural production of supernatural acts. — The same must be said of meritorious acts: for merit of a supernatural reward necessarily requires that the meritorious act be supernatural, either as to entity or at least as to mode: therefore if a supernatural act cannot be produced connaturally by the soul without habitual grace, neither will a meritorious act be able to be produced.

You will say 1: Only that which is of itself operative can incline the soul to supernatural acts by the mode of a co-principle: but habitual grace is not of itself operative: therefore the soul of Christ does not need it for eliciting supernatural and meritorious acts connaturally. — I distinguish the major: That habitual grace is not per se operative, nor ordered to operating primarily and proximately, I concede: for it is thus ordered to sanctifying the soul and making it worthy to be loved by God and ordered to a supernatural end: that it is not operative radically and secondarily, I deny: for, as will be proved in the Treatise on Grace, that habitual grace not only illumines and dignifies the soul, but also confers on it the power to produce supernatural acts.

You will say 2: For the soul of Christ to be raised and inclined connaturally to supernatural acts, it suffices that it have in itself some actual supernatural help: therefore for that it does not need habitual grace. — I distinguish the antecedent: that actual help suffices that a supernatural act be done, I concede: that it be done connaturally, I deny: for a natural agent is not inclined to its effect unless, besides the actual motion, it be inclined to its act by some form residing and permanent in itself; wherefore God, as author of nature, endowed each natural agent with some form or virtue by which it naturally tends to eliciting its acts.

Be mindful, however, that we are here treating only of the ordinary power, whereby God, as author of nature and grace, is wont to incline secondary causes to their acts: for if the question concerns absolute and extraordinary power, there is no doubt that, all habitual grace set aside, God could confer on the soul the power to produce supernatural and meritorious acts; and that either by an actual help of the supernatural order, or by a more abundant concurrence, in which way, we said, in treating of the beatific vision, God can supply the place of the light of glory; or by some other stronger help, or at least one equally supplying the activity of habitual grace. For God, as we taught in the Physics, can supply all the efficiency of an extrinsic and non-vital secondary cause: now the efficiency whereby grace concurs to the production of supernatural acts is merely extrinsic, for it is from it as from a habit; and all efficiency of a habit is extrinsic, as appears from the induction made through all habits: therefore God can per se, or by some stronger help, supply the efficiency of habitual grace; and consequently make the soul of Christ exercise supernatural acts as to their substance, without habitual grace. Note further that Vazquez and Suarez contend here in vain, as it seems to me, over whether Christ had by habitual grace a more excellent sanctity than he would have had with the grace of union alone. For Vazquez denies it, contending that the personal sanctity, which he takes to be formal, was infinite; and consequently was not receptive of any increase. Suarez indeed affirms it, because, he says, since formal sanctity denotes some perfection, Christ must by it be called formally more perfect and more holy, nay wholly and consummately holy. I however judge that neither opinion is to be defended: not indeed that of Vazquez, for although personal sanctity would be conceded infinite in its genus; yet it does not follow from that that it is infinite in every genus; and consequently a further sanctity, namely formal, is not incompossible with it. Nor yet that of Suarez, for although formal sanctity denotes a perfection, and by it Christ is called formally holy, in which way he is not called so by personal sanctity; yet, speaking correctly and in strict rigor, he cannot be called more, or consummately, holy; for those terms consummation, or more, regard degrees of the same species in some entity, and are found in things that are related similarly; but not in things that are related otherwise: but Christ by habitual grace is not holy similarly, but differently, as by the grace of union: therefore by the former he is not to be called more holy, but holy differently.

Quaestio III: Qualis fuerit gratia habitualis Christi

Quaestio IV: Utrum gratiae gratis datae fuerint in Christo

§ II: De Virtutibus Animae Christi et Donis Spiritus Sancti

Quaestio I: An Christus habuerit omnes virtutes Theologicas

Quaestio II: An et qualiter virtutes morales fuerint in Christo

Quaestio III: Utrum Christus habuerit omnia dona Spiritus Sancti

§ III: De Scientia ac Sapientia Christi Domini

Quaestio I: Utrum in Christo sit duplex scientia, creata simul et increata

Quaestio II: Utrum et qualiter scientia beatifica fuerit in Christo

Quaestio III: Utrum praeter scientiam beatificam Christus habuerit scientiam infusam, qua res ipsas in propria earum natura cognosceret

Quaestio IV: Utrum praeter scientiam beatam et infusam Christus habuerit etiam scientiam acquisitam

Articulus III: De Defectibus et Passionibus Corporis et Animi a Christo Domino Assumptis

Quaestio I: Utrum in Christo fuerint defectus et passiones humani corporis

Quaestio II: Utrum in Christo fuerit aliqua ignorantia aut aliquis error

Quaestio III: An Christus assumpserit defectus appetitus rationalis

Quaestio IV: An Christus Dominus assumpserit passiones animae seu appetitus rationalis tam secundum portionem superiorem quam inferiorem

Disputatio III: De Dignitate, Ministerio, et Cultu Christi Domini

Articulus I: De Dignitatibus Christi

§ I: De Dignitate Capitis

Quaestio I: An et per quid Christus ut homo constituatur caput omnis Ecclesiae

Quaestio II: An et quomodo Christus sit caput omnium prorsus hominum

Quaestio III: Utrum Christus dici possit caput Angelorum

§ II: De Regia Christi Dignitate et Potestate

Quaestio I: Utrum Christus fuerit Rex spiritualis an temporalis

§ III: De Iudiciaria Christi Dignitate et Potestate

Quaestio I: Utrum et quomodo iudiciaria dignitas Christo tribuatur

Articulus II: De Christi Functionibus et Ministeriis

§ I: De Christo Domino Mediatore

Quaestio I: Utrum et qua ratione Christus censeatur Dei et hominum Mediator

Quaestio II: Quam reconciliationem et pacem nobis conciliaverit et obtinuerit divinus ille Mediator

§ II: De Christo Domino Redemptore et Salvatore

Quaestio I: Utrum Christus Dominus vere fuerit hominum Redemptor

Quaestio II: Utrum necesse fuerit humanum genus per mortem Christi redimi

Quaestio III: An et quando Christus meruerit

Quaestio IV: Per quos actus Christus meruerit

Quaestio V: Quid Christus sibi, Angelis, et hominibus meruerit

Quaestio VI: Utrum et qualiter Christi meritum fuerit infinitum

§ III: De Pontificatu et Sacerdotio Christi

Quaestio I: Utrum et secundum quam naturam Christus Dominus vere et proprie fuerit Sacerdos

Quaestio II: Quale fuerit Christi Domini sacrificium, et qua ratione nunc Pontificis vices impleat

Articulus III: De Cultu et Veneratione Christi Domini, Eiusque Sanctissimae Genitricis ac Sanctorum, Eorumque Reliquiarum et Imaginum

§ I: De Cultu Latriae Christo Domino debito

Quaestio I: Utrum et qualiter una adoratione sit adoranda divinitas Christi et eius humanitas

Quaestio II: Utrum et quo cultu Crux Christi Domini sit colenda

§ II: De Cultu Sanctorum Eorumque Imaginum et Reliquiarum

Quaestio I: An et quis cultus sacris imaginibus sit debitus

Quaestio II: Utrum et quo cultu Sanctorum reliquiae sint adorandae

Quaestio III: Utrum Sancti sint invocandi

§ III: De Eximia Deiparae Virginis Dignitate ac Veneratione

Quaestio I: Utrum Virgo Deipara ab omni originalis peccati contagione et macula immunis fuerit, eiusque Conceptio dicenda sit omnino immaculata

Quaestio II: Utrum B. Virgo immunis fuerit ab omni peccato actuali

Quaestio III: Utrum beata Virgo vere et proprie dicenda sit Mater Christi

Quaestio IV: Utrum B. Maria Deipara semper Virgo steterit ante partum, in partu, et post partum

Quaestio V: Utrum B. Virgo non solum in anima sed in corpore evecta fuerit in caelum

Quaestio VI: De cultu et invocatione Deiparae Virginis

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