Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Here the discourse is not about justification and sanctification from a contrary state, whereby one passes from state of sin to state of adoption of sons of God; for since Christ the Lord never sinned, thus neither could he be sanctified by that kind of sanctification which is made through passage from state of sin to state of grace: but only here we speak of justification and sanctification from a privative state, whereby one can pass from state of pure naturals to state of grace; by which sanctification without doubt Christ was sanctified: for although in fact he existed nowhere without grace, yet it is certain that his natural things, by priority at least of nature, ought to have been presupposed to sanctifying grace. But the difficulty is by what formally Christ is said sanctified and just. — It must moreover be known, that to justification three things are desired: First, that through that justification and sanctification man be rendered grateful to God, and become object of divine dilection, and by that reason be ordered to eternal life and supernatural beatitude. Second, that through it he become holy and unpolluted, not having any stain of sin. Third finally, that he be called just, that is, holding right to eternal life, and behave justly in order to God, himself, and neighbor. But it is certain that these three were in Christ the Lord. For first he was loved of God; for the eternal Father Matt. 3. testifies: This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. Also he was endowed with all holiness, as testifies the Angel addressing the Virgin Luke 1. For that which shall be born of thee holy, shall be called Son of God. Wherefore he is preannounced by Daniel as Sanctus Sanctorum. Third finally he was just; for under this title he is promised by Prophets, and his advent is sought by most holy men. Thus Isaiah 45. Drop down clouds the Just, etc. But among Theologians it is controverted by what these three belong to Christ, whether namely through some gratuitous created gift infused into his soul; or truly through grace itself of union; so that as Christ was subsisting formally through subsistency of Word, thus also he was sanctified formally through sanctity itself of the Word.

NOTE 2. That sanctity is defined by St. Dionysius, book On Divine Names, cap. 12., thus: Sanctity is free from all wickedness, perfect, and wholly uncontaminated purity. Which definition certainly agrees to a triple sanctity which Theologians distinguish in divine things. For there is in God essential sanctity, which is proper to the divine essence itself, inasmuch as this is distinguished formally from its attributes: which also is called radical, because divine essence, to which it belongs, is root of attributes and all things which belong to them. Second can be called moral or formal sanctity, which is nothing else than the very rectitude of divine will in God, both in loving and in operating freely ad extra. For conformity of affect with eternal law is true sanctity; hence it is that all works of God are called holy and just. It is called moral sanctity because it belongs to acts of divine will, which with respect to objects ad extra are plainly free. Third finally can be called transcendental, whereby whatever from its own reason is divine formally, is also holy; for whatever is divine is maximally pure, wholly uncontaminated, immune from every wickedness and pollution. It is called transcendental, since as thing or entity is something transcendent, belonging to all things which are in God, for nothing in God is which is not really something divine, and consequently some divine entity, whether essential, attributal, or personal: so that sanctity, which is imbibed in such divine entity, is called transcendental. Hence it is that since divine personalities in themselves are something and real entities, inasmuch as they are condistinguished from divine essence and attributes, they vindicate to themselves this transcendental sanctity, and therefore this by another name rightly can be called personal, to distinction of essential and moral sanctity.

NOTE 3. That in Word Incarnate these three can be distinguished: First is Deity or divine essence. Second is proper subsistency, or personality itself of Word, as condistinguished formally from divine essence itself. Third is personal union of Word itself with humanity. — Hence controversy exists among Theologians whereby of these humanity of Christ the Lord is truly sanctified with substantial sanctity. Certain Thomists indeed with Vazquez disp. 41. will that sanctity be sought precisely from Deity itself. Some with Suarez d. 18. sect. 1. contend it arises from mode of union itself, which Suarez judges to be something substantial. Very many of ours teach that personal sanctity becomes formal through personality itself of Word united to humanity. But we shall walk between these extreme opinions in the safest middle, teaching substantial sanctity of Christ to be borrowed neither from union alone, nor from Deity or personality of Word separately, but jointly. But since certain Theologians with Paludanus in 3. d. 3. q. 2. acknowledge no other sanctity in Christ than that which is sought from habitual grace; and therefore will that sanctifying grace, whereby we are justified formally, was absolutely necessary to soul of Christ, that it be holy and pleasing to God; first must be resolved whether soul of Christ the Lord, excluding all other grace both actual and habitual, was by force of hypostatic union singularly holy, pleasing, acceptable to God, with substantial or personal sanctity and gratitude.

First conclusion. — Soul of Christ the Lord, excluded all grace both actual and habitual, truly was holy, pleasing to God, acceptable in order to beatitude through personal and substantial sanctity. This is the more common and safer.

It is proved 1. By authority of Council of Frankfurt in epistle to Bishops of Spain, where it says thus: Christ anointed by nature, not through grace, because in him was fully Deity. And St. Cyril 1. 4. in John cap. 29. says Christ anointed, not as other Saints and Kings; but because Word was made flesh. Similarly St. Nazianzen Oration 4. On Theology: Christ therefore, he says, on account of humanity, for that humanity was united, not by act and operation, as in others who are named Christians, but by presence of whole Anointer. St. Athanasius, oration against Arians, where he introduces Word speaking thus: I am Chrisma, as unction; but Christ, or anointed, is man, who has been assumed by me. St. Dionysius Alexandrinus, in Epistle against Paul of Samosata, where he says Christ to excel John, Because in John indeed there was work, labor of justice: but in Jesus nature; so that, as explained Turian. Scholio 1. and 2., Christ was Holy, Just, and Anointed, not by labor and exercise of virtue from grace, but by Deity itself, whereby he could not be not good.

It is proved moreover by reason: Every intellectual substantial being by virtue of this is holy and grateful to God, precisely taken by virtue of which it has right to eternal life: but Christ is intellectual substantial being, and has right to eternal life by hypostatic union precisely taken: therefore precisely by such union Christ is holy and grateful to God: but this sanctity is substantial and personal: therefore he claims it for himself. The major stands by similitude: for by no other reason is one called holy through habitual grace, as we said in 2. Notabile, than because he is grateful to God, and has right to eternal life. The minor is proved: Christ by virtue of that has right to eternal life, and is grateful to God, whence he has that he is natural Son of God: but that he has from hypostatic union: therefore from it he has that he is grateful to God, and vindicates right to himself to eternal life. The major is St. Paul's To Galat. 4. saying: And if sons, heirs also: heirs indeed of God; where he founds right to possession of God on reason of filiation. Minor also stands from what was said, where we proved Christ to be natural Son of God. — Next, that is substantially and intrinsically holy which intrinsically and substantially is constituted and completed through something divine: but Christ, as subsisting through subsistency of Word, is constituted, made, completed through suppositum of him, which is divine: therefore as such is substantially and intrinsically holy. The minor is of faith, and more fully proved by us in preceding things. Major also appears true; for everything divine is holy; since divine sanctity is not only poured into divine essence itself, but also into all that which is in God: therefore since every constitutive confers its formal reason on constituted, it follows that suppositum of Word is substantially holy, and confers that sanctity on its constituted.

You will say: If Christ be substantially and intrinsically holy precisely by virtue of hypostatic union, also by same reason he will impeccable: but this sequel militates against doctrine of Subtle Doctor, teaching impeccability of Christ not to be sought precisely from hypostatic union, but either from sanctifying grace, or from beatitude which he enjoyed: therefore etc. — I answer, sequel of major can be denied: since only formal sanctity, at least unamissible, such as was sanctity of Christ, formally conflicts with impeccability; not truly substantial and personal sanctity. And reason of disparity is, that personal sanctity first and per se respects entity and substance of thing, to which impeccability first and per se does not look, because ability to sin is of will, not of nature. That personal entity respects first entity of thing which it sustains is gathered from this, that that sanctity is sanctity of Word, as sustaining and suppositing, and accordingly is conferred on that which is said sustained and supposited; but this properly belongs to entity and assumed nature: but formal sanctity respects first power, namely will, to which immediately and proximately pertains ability or inability to sin; for grace or charity, which is form whereby we are sanctified, is received first and immediately in will. Therefore by reason of such personal sanctity, neither was Christ simply impeccable, nor were his actions precisely meritorious; because that sanctity can equally affect subject incapable of peccability or impeccability, and of meritorious actions; for if Word had assumed wood, or any other nature devoid of reason and liberty, he would have attributed to it that substantial and supposititious sanctity; and nevertheless that assumed nature would neither be peccable or impeccable, nor by reason of that sanctity would be elicitative of meritorious actions: but in intellectual nature, such as that which was truly assumed by Word, personal sanctity confers impeccability and also power of meriting; not indeed de condigno and formally, but de congruo and causally; because namely substantial sanctity through that impressed union was cause and as it were origin of all graces, whereby Christ formally was holy and proximately impeccable.

You will say 2: There is no stronger reason why suppositum of Christ confer substantial and divine sanctity on humanity than eternity, immensity, and other divine attributes: but those it does not confer; for assumed nature is not said eternal, infinite, immense: therefore neither ought it confer divine and substantial sanctity. — I distinguish the major: there is no stronger reason on part of Word, I concede: on part of assumed nature, I deny. Nor does it repugn, I say, on part of Word, because sustaining nature itself he confers on it all that which is required for complement and ornament thereof, to which it has not from itself incompatibility and repugnance, which truly it has toward infinity, immensity, eternity; because those attributes are thus peculiar to divine nature that they can in no way belong to any created nature; since created nature since finite and limited of itself both in entity and duration, has from itself repugnance to be infinite, immense, eternal: but similar repugnance it has not, to be called holy; for as of itself it has nothing repugnant that it subsist divine subsistency, so likewise it has nothing whereby it repugns to it attributed substantial divine sanctity, which is imbibed in divine suppositum itself.

You will insist: Humanity of Christ has no greater repugnance to divine power and knowledge than to divine sanctity: for as it is capable of sanctity, so it is capable of knowledge and power: but it cannot be made omnipotent or knowing properly through omnipotence and knowledge of Word: therefore neither can it be called holy by sanctity of Word. — I deny the major, because to be holy here is understood nothing else than to be united to something by reason of which conjunction there results in the united dignity, at least moral and of congruence, on account of which he may be judged worthy that he be loved by God, be devoid of sin, and have right to eternal beatitude; all which do not presuppose some form intrinsically existing: but to be omnipotent and knowing not only signifies something conjoined physically with someone having knowledge or omnipotence; but moreover that knowledge and omnipotence inexist intrinsically, whether through identification or through inherence: therefore between both there is no parity.

You will object 3. The Subtle Doctor dist. 10. n. 5. expressly says: That negation of extraneity in Christ is not except on account of habitual grace of Christ, because on account of that alone he has right in eternal inheritance; but not on account of personal union alone: therefore the Doctor judges Christ to have no sanctity to be sought from personal union. — I answer 1. Doctor brought this only against his own response, and did not solve that replica, because he willed elsewhere to examine and solve it; whence he says: seek the response: wherefore as conclusion of that replica is not from proper opinion of Doctor, so neither is major whence that proposition is deduced; for it would be absurd that whenever someone against his doctrine should propose some objection whose solution he deferred, so often should that objection be judged to be at his mind; since it could happen that in solutions which he promises he would solve those propositions and deny them. I answer 2. That although it be gratuitously admitted that Doctor approved that doctrine, thence nevertheless does not follow him willing that Christ precisely by virtue of hypostatic union not have right to eternal life, nor thus be grateful to God that God could deny him eternal life; but that such right he would have by reason of habitual grace whereby suppositing divine acceptation he would vindicate that right for himself; not indeed by reason of itself, but by reason of that divine acceptation; which indeed would also be necessary that personal sanctity might wholly obtain that right, as more fully we shall say in treatise on Grace.

You will object 4. If hypostatic union by reason of nature and personality divine had force of sanctifying, it would follow that wherever such union were present, it would sanctify subject, and make grateful to God and acceptable to eternal beatitude: but this is false: therefore etc. Major is clear: for what is posited by virtue of something is always necessarily admitted by position of that from which it flows: therefore if personal union of Word had force of sanctifying necessarily, it would confer that sanctity on every subject to which it were united. But minor is proved; because simply and absolutely speaking. Word could assume some irrational nature: but this is wholly incapable of sanctity and supernatural gratitude, for these can belong only to rational nature: therefore etc. — I could answer first distinguishing the major: if that subject were capable of sanctity, I concede: otherwise, I deny. For as although divine personality itself, inasmuch as it affects intellectual nature, makes it person; yet it could not make person an irrational nature, if it assumed it; because that nature is not capable of such personality: so neither would it render that irrational nature holy, on account of similar defect of capacity. Which indeed is confirmed: partly because habitual grace, whereby by its reason it otherwise makes men whom it affects adoptive sons of God; yet does not constitute Christ adoptive son of God; so similarly grace of union can make rational nature assumed grateful and holy, although it would not make such irrational nature, if it assumed it: partly because hypostatic union from its own nature confers exigence toward habitual grace and beatitude: but nature of stone or horse would not confer it, if he assumed it: therefore hypostatic union can attribute formal effect to one subject capable of that effect, although it would not attribute same to any other subject not having such capacity. But because soon we said that personal sanctity is not judged distinct from personality and subsistency itself of Word, therefore I answer 2. distinguishing the major: it would render assumed nature holy in that mode wherein it is capable of sanctity, I concede: otherwise, I deny. Since irrational nature is not capable of sanctity which confers right to beatitude, therefore if Word assumed it, he would not confer on it that sanctity; but only substantial, which is no other than subsistency of Word.

Second conclusion. — SUBSTANTIAL SANCTITY OF CHRIST THE LORD IS NOT SOUGHT IMMEDIATELY FROM UNION ITSELF OF HUMAN NATURE WITH WORD.

It is proved first: That union is not formally and in itself anything substantial and divine, but only respect adventing extrinsically, as proved in first Disputation: but relation in itself formally cannot confer substantial sanctity: therefore humanity of Christ cannot be said substantially sanctified through union itself.

Next: That substantial mode in which Suarez wills hypostatic union to consist formally, is something created, namely inexistent to humanity itself: but nothing created can confer substantial sanctity: partly because it is not sanctity by essence, since it be something finite; nor even through participation, because neither is it participation of divine essence, to which chiefly belongs predicate of sanctity by essence, nor has necessary connexion with divine essence itself after manner of predicate whether essential, attributal, or personal: therefore from that substantial mode substantial sanctity cannot be sought.

Finally: Therefore that union would be said to confer substantial sanctity on humanity of Christ, because unless it united uncreated good, which is substantially and essentially holy: but from this reason it could not be said that that union confers sanctity itself precisely and immediately: as similarly union of habitual grace with soul does not confer per se precisely sanctity itself of soul, which not through that union, but through sanctifying grace adhering to it, is truly and formally said to be sanctified: therefore neither union of humanity of Christ with person of Word, which was made substantially, can be precise and immediate formal reason whence substantial sanctity ought to be sought.

You will object 1. You insist with various authorities of Holy Fathers, from which gathered Christ, as man, formally by virtue of grace itself of union was absolutely and simply holy and grateful to God. Thus Holy Fathers expounding Psal. 44. God thy God hath anointed thee with oil of gladness: and Isaiah 61. and Luc. 4. Spirit of Lord upon me, wherefore he hath anointed me, etc. say this unction whereby Christ man was anointed, and from which Christ is called Christian, to be Deity itself, or Word, through whose presence humanity is sanctified. Thus Nazianzen praised in prior Conclusion, whence there he adds Christ to be besmeared with Deity, for this is unction of humanity. And St. Cyril lib. 3. Thesauri, cap. 3. Himself, he says, anointed himself, for Deity is unction of humanity. And St. Augustine lib. 15. De Trinit. cap. 26. then says human nature anointed by insensible God when divine person joined: wherefore in Enchiridion cap. 10. calls union of humanity to Word highest grace: therefore Holy Fathers judge sanctity of Christ chiefly to be sought from union itself of humanity with Word. — I distinguish the consequent: Holy Fathers judge that sanctity to be sought from union taken formally, or inasmuch as precisely union, I deny: taken materially, or inasmuch as connotes person itself of Word, and through it mediating divine essence joined to humanity itself, I concede: for personality itself of Word per se immediately confers that sanctification on humanity through immediate conjunction of itself with it.

You will object 2. Hypostatic union qua union is formal, and as created thing in humanity, is something more excellent and perfect than habitual grace: but habitual grace per se immediately sanctifies formally subject in which it inheres: therefore that union sanctifies humanity, not only as condition, or way to sanctity, but also of itself immediately, and as form obtaining force of sanctifying, confers that sanctity. — I distinguish the major: is something more perfect in itself and precisely inasmuch as union, I deny: since that union thus regarded is only extrinsic respect, which has lesser perfection than grace itself, which according to its entity is more excellent, and nobler than every extrinsic respect: is something more perfect by reason of personality of Word, which is said united to humanity, I concede: whence dignity thereof is to be sought not from formal reason itself, but only on part of extremes.

Third conclusion. — PERSONAL OR SUBSTANTIAL SANCTITY IS NOT TO BE SOUGHT PRECISELY FROM DEITY NOR FROM PERSONALITY OF WORD SEPARATELY, BUT JOINTLY. This Conclusion has three parts, which converge into one.

The first part indeed stands, because humanity of Christ cannot precisely be sanctified substantially immediately through that which is not judged immediately conjoined to it: but Deity is united to humanity only mediatedly through personality; since union of divine nature with human is only hypostatic and personal: therefore that sanctification is not made except mediatedly through personality itself.

Second part also stands: For personality of Word, as formally distinct from divine nature, is not sanctity, neither essential nor formal: therefore as such cannot sanctify humanity of Christ. The consequence is open. The antecedent is proved: if personality of Word, as formally distinct from divine essence, were sanctity, or this belonged to it from its peculiar concept; or by reason of divine entity identified with it: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, for no reason appears why personality of Word should rather be sanctity formally than personality of Father or Holy Spirit, or any other divine attribute whatever. Nor yet the second, since divine entity itself is identified not only with personality of Word, but also with other personalities, and likewise with all divine attributes; it is consequent that if by reason of that identification personality of Word were formally sanctity, then personalities of Father and Holy Spirit, and any divine attribute whatever, would formally be sanctity; but thus humanity of Christ would be holy not only from the personality immediately united to it and from the divine nature, but also from intellect, from divinity, from omnipotence, and other attributes and perfections of God, which is absurd. — It is confirmed from this, that divine relations constituting persons say no perfection in their formal concept: because otherwise (as we taught in treatise on Trinity) there would be given in God three relative perfections really distinct mutually; whence further consequent would be that divine perfections compared among themselves were unequal, and to each of divine persons some perfection lacking, since one person has not personality of another: but if personality of Word from itself formally were sanctity, it would follow that it had peculiar perfection distinct from perfection of Father: it would follow moreover that in divine persons there were three sanctities, as three personalities are; which certainly no Scotist or Thomist will admit: therefore he ought not admit personality of Word to be formally sanctity.

Finally the third part is proved, namely that substantial sanctity ought to be sought from Deity itself to humanity conjoined mediated through person. This indeed indicate the Holy Fathers praised above, while openly they teach humanity of Christ to be sanctified through divinity itself. Thus especially openly speaks St. Nazianzen Orat. 2. at Easter, where after he brought the figure of paschal lamb, writes thus of Christ: Perfect truly not only on account of humanity besmeared with Deity and made the same as that by which anointed, and as many speak, companion of Deity, or according to another version, at once God. So that man be denoted sanctified in Christ, not only because associated to Deity, but chiefly because he was at once God and man. Therefore that sanctification chiefly from Deity, hypostatically joined to humanity, is to be sought.

Also reason supports; because substantial sanctity of Christ ought to be sought from that which of itself is formally and essentially holy and sanctifying: but Deity, under concept of divine nature united to humanity, is essentially and formally holy and sanctifying: therefore from it precisely substantial sanctity of Christ is to be sought. The major stands. The minor likewise: for divine nature in itself is essentially holy, has also formal sanctity formally convenient to itself, which is an attribute proper to it: therefore since it of itself and in itself has all sanctity whether essential or formal, it follows that through union of itself with humanity it sanctifies it: and accordingly from it sanctification substantial of that humanity is to be sought. Nor does it matter that Deity is not immediately conjoined to humanity, but only mediated through person: for this does not oppose that personal sanctity of union be sanctifying per se of humanity itself to which finally through mediation of person is joined. As whitening of wall is chiefly sought from whiteness conjoined to it, although whiteness inhere in it only mediated through inherence: so divine nature has more principal force of sanctifying humanity, although union thereof with personality be required, whereby immediately joined to humanity as condition sine qua non: as inherence of whiteness to wall is required that wall become white. To these add that personality of Word is not distinguished really but only formally from divine essence: whence mediation of union does not hinder that Deity immediately with real immediation sanctify humanity; although it performs not with formal immediation.

You will say. Habitual grace sanctifies soul formally because quasi deifies it, promotes consortium of divine nature: but personality of Word, as formally distinct from divine nature, deifies human nature in more perfect manner than habitual grace; since that deifies substantially, this accidentally: therefore substantial sanctity is chiefly sought from personality of Word. — I distinguish the major: habitual grace sanctifies soul formally through participation of divine nature: Since indeed St. Peter says, God bestowed great and precious gifts upon us, whereby we are made partakers of divine nature, I concede: sanctifies through communication or imitation of any perfection divine, I deny. Similarly distinguish minor: personality of Word, as formally distinct from divine nature, deifies more perfect manner than habitual grace through imitation of divine nature as nature is, I deny: through application of something divine, namely personality of Word, I concede. And deny consequence.

You will say 2: Through that precisely humanity of Christ is sanctified, to which more immediately united: but more immediately united to subsistency of Word than divine nature: since to latter only mediated through person joined: therefore humanity of Christ principally and more immediately sanctified through personality of Word than nature. — I distinguish major: if that to which more immediately united be formally sanctity, or have sanctity formally, I concede: otherwise, I deny. Whence since personality of Word of itself is not formally holy, nor has divine sanctity formally to itself, but only conveniently really, thence it is that itself precisely not have force of sanctifying separate from Deity, but only jointly.

You will say 3: That immediately sanctifies humanity of Christ which by communication of itself so elevates it to divine being, that it be positive first radix founding in it some right of supernatural beatitude to obtain (for thus habitual grace, since in us and Angels positive first radix eternal life to obtain, name glory supposes it, us and Angels sanctifies): but personality of Word, as virtually condistinct from divine essence, so immediately united to humanity that by virtue of immediate union itself positive first radix founding in it right obtaining supernatural beatitude: for this, as taught within, was owed positively to it by virtue of union: and if per impossibile personality of divine Word were realiter distinct from essence divine, and nevertheless union of humanity to divine Word made, above which cannot sublimari, would have some right eternal life: therefore personality of Word, as condistinct from essence divine, quasi form sanctifying immediately and formally humanity of Christ Lord. — I distinguish major: if that elevating nature to divine being be of itself either essentially or formally holy, confer right proximate beatitude supernatural, concede: if only holy transcendental sanctity, confer only remote and inchoate right beatitude, deny. Similarly distinct minor, deny consequence. Since suppositum Word not of itself formal sanctity, but only transcendental; nor of itself precisely confers right beatitude, but only with divine nature, which through him mediating united to humanity, tributes complete right beatitude obtaining.

You will insist. Whatever of itself is divine is formally holy and sanctifying: but personality of Word of itself, as condistinct from Deity, is something divine: therefore also of itself formally holy and sanctifying. — I distinguish the major: formally holy and sanctifying, that sanctity it vindicates, concede: any other sanctity, deny. Minor also distinguish: suppositum of Word holy with formal sanctity, I deny: transcendental sanctity, I concede. Therefore can indeed of itself precisely confer on humanity transcendental sanctity, but this not sufficient that it have right to beatitude.

You will press: That is precisely formally holy with formal sanctity, which in itself can be adored with absolute adoration of latria; since then adored only on account of peculiar excellence and proper sanctity: but personality of divine Word, as condistinct formally from essence divine, is adorable with absolute adoration of latria, as Church teaches, while in Preface of Mass of Holy Trinity sings: In confession of true and sempiternal Deity, and in persons propriety, and in essence unity, and Majesty equal adored: words signify adoration latria owed divine personalities, as condistinct from essence, as owed deity condistinct from personalities. — I distinguish the major: adored with adoration latria on account of itself precisely, abstracto, I deny: on account of self, and divine nature realiter identified, concrete taken, that is inasmuch as connotes not only personality but also divine nature with personality constituting divine person, I concede. Thus distinct minor, I deny consequence. Nor Church aforesaid words signify divine personalities abstract taken precisely adorable, but only teaches in God maximally adorable unique essence in three Persons subsisting, whence Majesty equal peers. If contend Church understood of personalities abstract accepted, major denied: for necessary not what in itself adorable latria absolute, be formally holy, have force conferring right beatitude of itself precisely separately from any other, but suffices transcendental sanctity, imbibed everything divine.

By the name habitual grace is signified that supernatural quality divinely infused into the soul and inhering in it, and that not only sanctifying and making worthy, whereby it is loved by God, accepted by him, ordered to eternal beatitude: but also elevating to a supernatural state and degree, so that by its aid and concurrence the soul can elicit supernatural acts meritorious of eternal life. Hence for various ends that grace is judged useful and necessary: First indeed, that it confer formal sanctity. Second, that the soul, connaturally and from a supernatural comprinciple inexistent to itself, while it elevates itself to supernatural state, can edere connatural supernatural acts. Third finally, that eternal life as a supernatural reward it can also connaturally merit. It is asked however whether for this threefold effect habitual grace was necessary in Christ.

Note 2. That formal sanctity is distinguished from personal in this, that personal inheres in the subject and belongs to it from the precise reason of hypostatic union and of personality and subsistency, through which divine nature, which is the fountain and origin of all sanctity, is united to human nature; but formal sanctity is that whereby the subject which is denominated holy is said such on account of some form intrinsically adhering to it, and inasmuch as through that form as through a certain principle inexistent to itself it is rendered potent to elicit supernatural acts of divine dilection. They differ secondly, because one is substantial and infinite at least by reason of its principle; but the other accidental, created, and limited; for it is made through habitual grace, which is a quality. Thirdly, personal sanctity affects human nature after the manner of a term; for so is it conjoined to it as the divine nature and divine personality whence it is sought. But from what has been said it stands that divine nature is not united to humanity formally or after the manner of a form or compartis, of which divinity is wholly incapable; but mediatedly through the personality of the Word, exercising the offices of a created suppositum, terminating the communication and dependence of that humanity. Accidentally truly it affects after the manner of a form. These both sanctities first agree in this, that both truly are real and intrinsically united to humanity itself mediated through the personality of the Word; but the formal becomes through sanctifying grace, a true real quality inhering in the soul, which it formally sanctifies. Secondly these two sanctities agree in that they elevate the subject itself to some divine and supernatural being; the personal indeed to the supernatural being of the Word, inasmuch as through it man is God and natural Son of God: the posterior truly to divine being through participation, as we shall say in the Treatise De Gratia. Hence controversy exists among Theologians whether sanctifying grace was necessary to Christ that he become denominated formally holy; or truly only, as the Thomists will, for his complete sanctification and for operating connaturally in the order of grace.

NOTE 3. That meritorious acts are of two kinds: some are supernatural as regards their entity, such as the dilection of God above all things, both as Author of grace and of glory; others truly only as regards their mode, which indeed are natural according to their entity, but because they are ordered to a supernatural end and made by a man existing in grace, by this reason they are called supernatural, for example to give alms on account of Christ. Moreover it must be adverted that the supernatural act as regards its substance can be conceived produced in two ways, namely in a connatural way or in a supernatural way. It is said to be produced connaturally when it is elicited by an intrinsic principle permanently inhering in the vital principle which is elicitive of such an act, by reason of which adjunct comprinciple the vital principle is corroborated and its virtue completed ultimately for exercising such acts. But it is said to be produced supernaturally when it is elicited through some supernatural actual or transient aid corroborating the power itself, or through something else which supplies the offices of that aid, for example an ampler concourse of God.

These things having been thus premised, three things come to be resolved: first, whether truly Christ had habitual grace. Second, whether he had need of it that he become formally and completely holy. Third, whether it was necessary that he elicit supernatural and meritorious acts.

First conclusion. — THE SOUL OF CHRIST TRULY WAS ILLUSTRATED WITH HABITUAL GRACE. This is common among Theologians; for although some affirm that the humanity of Christ was sanctified formally through the hypostatic union, nevertheless there is none who denied that it is also sanctified through grace.

Some prove the Conclusion with various texts of sacred Scripture, of which I bring forward one or other more openly evincing this truth. First indeed that Isaiah 11, where it is said of Christ, The spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him: at which place by the particle Spirit of the Lord is understood the permanence of grace in Christ, as St. Cyril expounds at the beginning of book 2 on Isaiah. The Prophet confirms the same truth in chapter 61, where speaking in the person of Christ he says: The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord hath anointed me: which words indeed Christ himself taught were prophesied concerning himself Luke 4; and they convey this sense, that therefore the Spirit of the Lord inheres in Christ through the gift of habitual grace, because he himself through the hypostatic union is united to substantial and uncreated grace.

The same truth is proved likewise from chapter 1 of St. John, where of the Word Incarnate it is said: We saw his glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father full of grace and truth: where the fullness of grace is doubtless to be understood of created grace, and that habitual and persevering; for soon it is added: And of his fulness we all have received: for what is received from the fullness of some fountain must be of the same condition as regards entity with some of those things which fill the fountain, as is clear in water derived from a fountain, which is of the same nature as that which immediately flows from the fountain itself: but the fullness of the grace of Christ, from which we all receive, is after the manner of a fountain (as we shall explain in the Treatise De Gratia), from which fountain we have received not only actual graces, but also sanctifying and permanent grace. Wherefore Christ so often in sacred Scripture is called our justification and our justice: therefore as our sanctification and justification is created, habitual and persevering, so also that grace which is in Christ as in a fountain, from which ours flows forth, must be created and habitual. Nor does it avail to reply with Erasmus and Cajetan that those words full of grace and truth are not to be construed with those antecedents, and the Word was made flesh, and we saw his glory, etc., but with these following, John beareth witness; because, they say, in the Greek Codices the particle πλήρης, that is full, is of the masculine gender and nominative case, as also this John, although it ought to be of the accusative case if it were retained to that the Word was made flesh, as this verbal particle we saw indicates. This, I say, does not stand in the way, for the Greek and Latin Codices, indeed even the common use of the whole Latin Church, by which at the end of Mass the Gospel of St. John is recited, insert those words after those cited, full of grace and truth: therefore they judge those words to look not to what immediately succeeds, but to the antecedents, and consequently to the Word Incarnate. Next, those words are to be understood of him of whose fullness all men a little later are said to have received: for thus plenitude and its redundancy correspond mutually; but we do not say we have received of the plenitude of St. John Baptist, but of the plenitude of Christ: therefore those words full of grace and truth are said of the Word. Nor does it please Cajetan and Erasmus that the word πλήρης is in the masculine gender and nominative case, for λόγος which is called in Latin verbum is in Greek of the masculine gender, and these words we saw his glory, as of the Only-begotten of the Father, are read parenthetically, whence just as there Word, in Greek λόγος, is of the masculine gender and nominative case, so also this its adjective πλήρης; as if the sense were: the Word was made flesh, which is full of grace, and we saw his glory… Augustine confirms this, lib. 15 De Trinitate, chapter 26, where he interprets the aforesaid words of St. John of created sanctifying grace received by Christ; for he says: The Lord Jesus himself not only gave the Holy Spirit as God, but also received him as man, and therefore was called full of grace, because God anointed him with the Holy Spirit; not indeed with visible oil, but with the gift of grace, which is signified by the visible ointment wherewith the Church anoints the baptized: by which words he signifies Christ had created and habitual grace. But most openly St. Bernard teaches this truth, homily 1 on Missus est, where he says: Singularly holy was whatever the Virgin conceived, both through the fictive conception of the Holy Spirit and through the assumption of the Word, whereby he distinguishes a twofold sanctification in Christ, one which is made through the hypostatic union, and another which is made through the sanctification of the Spirit, which certainly is none other than that which is made through sanctifying grace, created and habitual.

It is proved likewise by reason: Where there is conformity of sanctity, there ought to be parity of sanctifying grace, which may be the foundation of such conformity: but between Christ and the Predestinate there is conformity of sanctity, according to that saying of St. Paul to the Romans 8. Whom he foreknew and predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son, that he might be the First-begotten among many brethren: therefore since the sanctifying form of the Predestinate is something persevering, also the grace of Christ must be such. — Next, all that perfection which belongs as well to Angels as to just men is not to be denied to the soul of Christ: especially since it illustrates it, nor does it disgrace the state and glory of the Incarnation: but sanctifying grace, which is given to Angels and men, contributes most to the supernatural beauty and perfection of the soul, and has no repugnance with the hypostatic union; for this first and per se says only opposition with the proper subsistency of the assumed humanity, which is something wholly distinct from habitual grace: therefore that grace is not to be denied to Christ. — Finally, besides the physical union of humanity to the Word, it was needful that the soul of Christ be united also to God through supernatural knowledge and love: but for the connatural elicition of those acts (such as befitted the soul of Christ) habitual grace was necessary, as we shall teach in what follows: therefore he had such grace.

You will say 1: Whatever is incapable of adoptive filiation is also incapable of habitual grace: but Christ is incapable of adoptive filiation: therefore, etc. The minor is clear from what has been said. The major similarly stands: for to be an adoptive son is the formal effect of habitual grace, as the Apostle indicates Rom. 8 and the Council of Trent teaches Session 6 chapter 10, when it defines justification (whose formal cause is habitual grace) as translation from the state of sin to the state of adoption of sons of God: but a form cannot be in a subject without its formal effect: therefore neither habitual grace in Christ unless he were its adoptive son. — I deny the major, and to its proof I distinguish the major: to be an adoptive son is the primary formal effect of habitual grace, I deny: secondary, I concede: and thus the minor being distinguished, I deny the consequence. For although the effect of some form cannot be separated from the subject to which that form is communicated, nevertheless the secondary effect can be separated from it, as is clear in quantity affecting the Body of Christ the Lord, whose primary effect is to extend parts outside parts in order to itself; but secondary to extend them in order to place; but in the sacrament of the altar the Body of Christ the Lord indeed has that primary effect of quantity, not truly the secondary. But that adoptive filiation is only a secondary effect of habitual grace stands; because habitual grace is a certain absolute form, since it is a permanent quality; but divine adoptive filiation is of the genus of relations: yet no relation is the primary and formal effect of any permanent quality, but only results from the position of it in a capable subject: therefore the primary and formal effect of habitual grace is to render its subject grateful to God with formal and inherent gratitude, to which effect divine adoptive filiation follows where and when the subject which this grace affects is capable of adoptive filiation. Whence since Christ, at that instant at which habitual grace was infused into him, was incapable of divine adoptive filiation, because through the grace of union he was already natural Son of God, but natural filiation has opposition with adoptive; hence it is that habitual grace could not confer on Christ that adoptive filiation.

You will say 2: He who is God by essence cannot be God by participation: but if Christ had had besides the grace of union also created habitual grace, he would have been God by essence by reason of hypostatic union, and also God by participation by reason of habitual grace, which is a certain participation of divine nature: therefore it is false that Christ had created habitual grace. The major stands: for to be God by essence is to be God without every exception and limitation: but to be God by participation is to be such partially and limitedly: it implies however to be God totally and in part, without exception and with exception: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: who is God by nature cannot be God by participation by reason of the same whereby he is God by nature, I concede: by reason of another, I deny. Therefore Christ could be God by essence by reason of the substance and divine nature communicated to him, and similarly by participation by reason of habitual grace.

You will say 3: Where a subject contains eminently within itself some perfection, it cannot have it formally or by a form inexistent to itself: but Christ by reason of the grace of union contains habitual grace and all other graces eminently: since the grace of union in a far nobler mode makes Christ grateful and holy to God than habitual grace, which only accidentally perfects its subject: therefore it repugns Christ to have habitual grace in himself. The major stands: for since the Sun is hot eminently, it cannot be formally hot: similarly, since the rational soul contains eminently the vegetative and sensitive grade, it repugns it to have a properly and formally sensitive and vegetative soul, such as is in brutes and plants. — I answer as regards the present undertaking, distinguishing the major: if eminential containment is not only effective of the thing which it is said to contain, but also executive of the effects which that thing can perform, I concede: if it is only productive of that thing which it is said eminently to contain, not truly executive of the effects which that thing can edere, I deny. But the grace of union, although it contains eminently every grace, nevertheless cannot edere the same effects which habitual grace performs per se in the soul of Christ, since that neither sanctifies the soul of Christ formally, nor constitutes it in a state such that connaturally it can edere supernatural and meritorious acts.

You will say, finally: Habitual and sanctifying grace is granted above all so that the soul may become pleasing to God: but the soul of Christ cannot be more pleasing with habitual grace than without it. Proof: a soul that is infinitely pleasing to God cannot be more pleasing, because nothing is greater than the infinite: but by the grace of union the soul of Christ is pleasing to God infinitely by reason of the Divinity communicated to it and hypostatically united to it; therefore it cannot be more pleasing. — I deny the minor, and I distinguish its proof: that what is infinitely pleasing cannot be more pleasing in the same genus of gratification, I concede; in another genus, I deny. Now the soul of Christ by the grace of union is indeed pleasing to God with an infinite substantial gratification, which does not prevent it from likewise being able to be made pleasing in another genus, namely by some accidental form superadded. And this is confirmed by a similar case; for although Christ by reason of the hypostatic union be substantially infinite in perfection, that substantial perfection did not prevent him from having besides all the accidental gifts with which his humanity was adorned.

Second conclusion. — HABITUAL GRACE WAS NECESSARY FOR CHRIST, THAT HE MIGHT BE SANCTIFIED FORMALLY.

Proof: Christ ought to have been formally holy: but he could not be such without habitual grace: therefore this was necessary to him for that end. The major is evident from the preceding Conclusion; for Christ ought to have had every sanctity whatsoever that can most of all illumine and consecrate his soul, and that in the most intimate and excellent manner: but it is far more excellent to be sanctified formally, or by an intrinsically inhering form, as men and Angels are sanctified, than merely by some extrinsic denomination and unction, as holy places and vessels are. But the minor is proved: if, habitual grace set aside, Christ could have been sanctified formally, then especially by a substantial and personal sanctity: but he could not be sanctified thus. Which I prove first: that by which it cannot have the ratio of a sanctifying form cannot sanctify formally: but neither the personality of the Word nor the Divinity itself, from which a substantial sanctity is sought, has the ratio of a sanctifying form. Not indeed the personality: for this does not affect the human nature by the mode of a form, but by the mode of a term; nor does it have of itself, as we have proved, the power of sanctifying, because it is not formally sanctity. This also the Divinity cannot supply, because Divinity cannot be a form sanctifying the humanity: for a form must be united intrinsically, and per se immediately, to that of which it is the form: but Divinity is not united to the humanity per se, but only by reason of the supposit in which the hypostatic union was made; for no real union can be made immediately between the divine nature and the human: therefore Divinity could not have the ratio of a form sanctifying the human nature. — It is confirmed, because if Divinity were to sanctify the humanity of Christ formally, it would do so either as a physical form or as a moral one: but it supplies this in neither way. Not indeed as a physical form; both because a physical form is of itself ordered as a part to actuating and composing: but Divinity cannot have the ratio of an informing and actuating part, since this savors of imperfection; and because if Divinity were united to the humanity by the mode of a physical form, it would make it formally God, for formal communication of Divinity makes God: but this is absurd; and finally because Divinity per se and formally supplies only a title in order to uncreated beatitude: but that title cannot belong first and per se to the humanity of Christ, but only through the communication of idioms: therefore the humanity of Christ cannot be sanctified physically by the Divinity itself. Nor indeed can it be sanctified formally by it, as by a moral form; both because a moral form, although it connotes a principle and a real subject, yet in itself is precisely not real, for it is only a respect extrinsic, proceeding from the ordination of God accepting such a one unto beatitude: but Christ ought to have been really holy with a formal sanctity: therefore he ought to have had that sanctity by some intrinsic form really inhering in him; and because every physical form is according to entity more excellent than a moral one: therefore, since our sanctification is wrought by a physical form really inhering in us, it would follow that our justification, according to its entity, would be more excellent than the sanctification of Christ; and finally because Christ, as the Holy of holies and the head of the predestined, ought to have conformity with his members in the ratio of sanctity: but by the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7 and Canon 11, the just are not sanctified by something extrinsic and moral, but by a form intrinsically inhering: therefore for this reason too Christ ought to have been sanctified.

You will say: That sanctification which is more excellent and more illustrious must be granted to Christ: but it is far more excellent to be sanctified formally by the divinity itself than by any created thing: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: if that most excellent mode be possible, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But it conflicts, as has just been proved, for the divinity or anything divine to have the ratio of a sanctifying form, and consequently it conflicts for the humanity of Christ to be sanctified formally by the divinity itself.

You will say 2: A soul that is holy with a sanctity virtually and eminently containing all sanctity has also formal sanctity: but the soul of Christ, by the very force of the hypostatic union, is holy with a sanctity eminently containing all sanctity that would arise from grace whether actual or habitual: therefore it does not need habitual grace in order to be called formally holy. The minor is evident: Christ by the hypostatic union has the uncreated sanctity of God, whereby he eminently contains all created sanctity, just as the divine entity eminently contains all created entity. But the major is proved: God therefore does not need habitual grace in order to be formally holy with every manner of sanctity, because his sanctity eminently contains whatever sanctity is in habitual grace: therefore by similarity, if the soul of Christ by the power of the hypostatic union has a sanctity originating from grace, it in no way needed such grace in order to be reckoned wholly formally holy. — I deny the major: since for formal sanctification it is not enough that something contain eminently all other sanctity: but it must also inhere in it by the mode of a form affecting and perfecting it, in which way uncreated sanctity, or anything divine, cannot be in Christ, as has just been said. To the proof of the major, I say the antecedent is false; for not precisely because his sanctity eminently contains all other sanctity does God not need habitual grace in order to be formally holy, but because the divine uncreated sanctity itself inheres in him intrinsically, by the mode of a form, or of an attribute affecting and perfecting the divine essence.

Third conclusion. — HABITUAL GRACE WAS NECESSARY FOR CHRIST, THAT HE MIGHT ELICIT SUPERNATURAL AND MERITORIOUS ACTS CONNATURALLY.

It is proved first: An agent operates connaturally when it has proportion to the acts it elicits: but the soul of Christ, since it is a natural entity, cannot have proportion to the production of supernatural acts without habitual grace: therefore for the producing of those effects it was necessary to Christ. The major is evident; for it is for no other reason that vision is said to be elicited connaturally than because it is made through the visual power, the intelligible species, and a proportionate medium, all of which complete and integrate the principle so that it may produce vision. It is proved again: if anything besides habitual grace could raise the soul of Christ to the supernatural state and incline it intrinsically to produce supernatural acts, it would be especially either the personality and subsistence of the Word, or the divinity communicated to it: but neither does this; for the soul to be so raised and inclined, it must have in itself some co-principle operative as the quo, and elicitive of such acts: but the subsistence of the Word cannot supply this, because it is not an active virtue, but a pure term of the nature. Therefore it cannot concur to acts by the mode of a principle quo; but only by the mode of a condition constitutive of the supposit, and of a principle quod concurring to the operation. Nor can the divinity supply this, for the operative principle quo must either have identity with the principle that operates, or must physically inform it: but both conflict with the divinity with respect to the humanity; therefore neither the subsistence of the Word nor the divinity can have the ratio of a principle quo in the humanity, in order to the connatural production of supernatural acts. — The same must be said of meritorious acts: for merit of a supernatural reward necessarily requires that the meritorious act be supernatural, either as to entity or at least as to mode: therefore if a supernatural act cannot be produced connaturally by the soul without habitual grace, neither will a meritorious act be able to be produced.

You will say 1: Only that which is of itself operative can incline the soul to supernatural acts by the mode of a co-principle: but habitual grace is not of itself operative: therefore the soul of Christ does not need it for eliciting supernatural and meritorious acts connaturally. — I distinguish the major: That habitual grace is not per se operative, nor ordered to operating primarily and proximately, I concede: for it is thus ordered to sanctifying the soul and making it worthy to be loved by God and ordered to a supernatural end: that it is not operative radically and secondarily, I deny: for, as will be proved in the Treatise on Grace, that habitual grace not only illumines and dignifies the soul, but also confers on it the power to produce supernatural acts.

You will say 2: For the soul of Christ to be raised and inclined connaturally to supernatural acts, it suffices that it have in itself some actual supernatural help: therefore for that it does not need habitual grace. — I distinguish the antecedent: that actual help suffices that a supernatural act be done, I concede: that it be done connaturally, I deny: for a natural agent is not inclined to its effect unless, besides the actual motion, it be inclined to its act by some form residing and permanent in itself; wherefore God, as author of nature, endowed each natural agent with some form or virtue by which it naturally tends to eliciting its acts.

Be mindful, however, that we are here treating only of the ordinary power, whereby God, as author of nature and grace, is wont to incline secondary causes to their acts: for if the question concerns absolute and extraordinary power, there is no doubt that, all habitual grace set aside, God could confer on the soul the power to produce supernatural and meritorious acts; and that either by an actual help of the supernatural order, or by a more abundant concurrence, in which way, we said, in treating of the beatific vision, God can supply the place of the light of glory; or by some other stronger help, or at least one equally supplying the activity of habitual grace. For God, as we taught in the Physics, can supply all the efficiency of an extrinsic and non-vital secondary cause: now the efficiency whereby grace concurs to the production of supernatural acts is merely extrinsic, for it is from it as from a habit; and all efficiency of a habit is extrinsic, as appears from the induction made through all habits: therefore God can per se, or by some stronger help, supply the efficiency of habitual grace; and consequently make the soul of Christ exercise supernatural acts as to their substance, without habitual grace. Note further that Vazquez and Suarez contend here in vain, as it seems to me, over whether Christ had by habitual grace a more excellent sanctity than he would have had with the grace of union alone. For Vazquez denies it, contending that the personal sanctity, which he takes to be formal, was infinite; and consequently was not receptive of any increase. Suarez indeed affirms it, because, he says, since formal sanctity denotes some perfection, Christ must by it be called formally more perfect and more holy, nay wholly and consummately holy. I however judge that neither opinion is to be defended: not indeed that of Vazquez, for although personal sanctity would be conceded infinite in its genus; yet it does not follow from that that it is infinite in every genus; and consequently a further sanctity, namely formal, is not incompossible with it. Nor yet that of Suarez, for although formal sanctity denotes a perfection, and by it Christ is called formally holy, in which way he is not called so by personal sanctity; yet, speaking correctly and in strict rigor, he cannot be called more, or consummately, holy; for those terms consummation, or more, regard degrees of the same species in some entity, and are found in things that are related similarly; but not in things that are related otherwise: but Christ by habitual grace is not holy similarly, but differently, as by the grace of union: therefore by the former he is not to be called more holy, but holy differently.

The title of this Question presents three chief difficulties, which the Authors discuss most fully. The first is whether the grace of Christ was infinite. The second, whether it was the greatest. The third, finally, whether it could be increased. All of which we shall examine in this one Question by three Conclusions following, setting aside useless quarrels and contentions about words rather than things. But that the resolution of what is to be said may be more open and evident,

Note 1. That the habitual grace of Christ can be understood as infinite in various ways, but chiefly in one of these six modes, as Izambert observes with many Theologians, ad qu. 7. disp. 1. art. 3. First indeed in the ratio of entity and quality: since grace is a quality according to its entity. Second, by reason of some physical mode intrinsic to that grace and accruing to it from its union with the Word, which mode, in the ratio of a mode, is infinite, and thus by affecting and modifying that grace confers on it a certain infinity. Third, it can be understood as infinite in the ratio of grace, namely insofar as it could infinitely dignify the nature. Fourth, by the mere extrinsic acceptance of God; so that God judges it worthy to produce effects conducing to the possession of the infinite good. Fifth, by the order and moral habitude it would have to the divine supposit of the Word; insofar as it inheres in a humanity subsisting by the subsistence of the Word. Sixth, finally, that although considered in itself and according to its entity it is finite, yet it is called infinite insofar as, according to the ordinary power of God, no other habitual grace greater is given, and also it extends itself to all those effects that could be conceived as producible by habitual grace.

Note 2. From the Subtle Doctor, B. dist. 18, question 1, number 2, that grace can be conceived as greatest in two ways: namely positively, and negatively. It is called positively greatest, insofar as it exceeds every other grace existing or credible; and in this sense, if some greatest grace were given, another equal to it would not be possible, for what is positively greatest is also unique in that genus in the ratio of the greatest. But grace can be called negatively greatest, if it be so great and so perfect that no other grace is possible that would exceed it, although many equals could be given, which would neither exceed it nor be exceeded by it. And it is called negatively greatest because it is reckoned greatest only from this, that it denotes a negation of excess, whereby it can neither exceed nor be exceeded. But the Doctor confesses there that grace positively greatest could be conferred neither on Christ nor on any other, because with whatever possible grace produced, God can produce another similar and equal one; For he could, he says, and can assume another nature equal, and consequently confer on it a grace like that which he conferred on the soul of Christ. Whether however he gave Christ a negatively greatest grace must be resolved in the present place.

Note 3, or rather to be repeated from the Physics, that the increase of a quality can be considered in two ways: namely extensively, in that it is in an extended subject: thus the whiteness of milk increases with the increase of the milk itself: secondly, intensively, when the quality is perfected by the addition of new degrees; thus whiteness becomes greater by the addition of another degree in the same part of the subject. But the Philosophers distinguish two kinds of degrees, namely quidditative, or specific, by which the essences of things are said to be indivisible, and to be as numbers, so that nothing can be added to them or taken from them without the essence being varied: others individual and entitative, and they are certain realities of the same genus and species, which if they exist separately will be truly distinct individuals of the same species; if however they are united in the same subject they make one unique thing. E.g. if two whitenesses in two remitted degrees exist in distinct subjects, there will be two individuals of whiteness; but if they are placed in the same subject, they make one whiteness indeed numerically, but more intense. — But what I said of corporeal qualities must be said likewise of spiritual ones, both natural and supernatural: for there is no quality, whether natural or supernatural, that cannot be increased by the addition of another degree of the same ratio and species. Whether however it can be increased to infinity by the repeated addition of degrees is disputed, not only among Philosophers, but even among Theologians; and especially in the present matter, in which the Angelic Doctor and the Subtle One agree in some points but differ in others. They agree, I say, in this, that each teaches the grace of Christ was not actually infinite according to entity and degrees: but they differ, because St Thomas contends the grace of Christ was infinite at least in power, because by the absolute power of God it could have been increased to infinity, and consequently was not a possible greatest, because it could be increased; but the Subtle Doctor denies this. — Three things therefore are to be determined in this Question: First, that the grace was not de facto and actually infinite. Second, that it was in fact so perfect that none more excellent could be produced or communicated to a creature. Third, that it could not be increased to infinity; and consequently, that it was not infinite in power.

First conclusion. — The grace of Christ, both in the ratio of entity and quality, and in the ratio of intension, was not de facto infinite. This is common among the followers of both the Angelic and the Subtle Schools.

It is proved first, because de facto no actually infinite entity is given, for Wisdom 11: God made all things in number, weight, and measure: but the grace of Christ, both according to entity and according to intension, is an actual entity: therefore in neither of these modes can it be infinite. — Next, if the grace of Christ had any infinity, that would have to be sought either on the part of the subject it affected, or on the part of the effects it produced: since there must be proportion between the subject and the accident received in it, as also between the accident itself and the effects to whose production it is ordered: but from neither head can this infinity of grace be gathered. Not indeed on the part of the subject, because the soul of Christ is a finite and limited entity: nor even on the part of the effects: for no effect produced or to be produced by grace can be assigned which, either entitatively or intensively, is infinite, insofar as it proceeds physically and efficiently from that grace: therefore the grace of Christ, both according to entity and according to intension, is de facto finite. — Finally, it conflicts for any created entity to be of such perfection as uncreated entity is: but if grace were infinite, both according to entity and according to intension, it would be equally perfect as uncreated entity: therefore, etc. The major is evident, for uncreated entity is far more excellent than every created entity. But the minor is proved, because either grace is really the same as charity, or at least it necessarily has charity annexed to itself connaturally according to the same intension that it obtains, so that if grace were of infinite intension, charity too should be of infinite intension: but if created charity were of infinite intension, it would be equally perfect as divine and uncreated charity, and could produce an act of love equally perfect. Moreover, since every infinitely perfect entity is owed connaturally to God, it would follow also that grace so infinite is owed to God as his native property, which is plainly absurd: therefore by no reason ought the grace of Christ to be judged infinite.

Some also prove this Conclusion a posteriori; because, they say, if the grace of Christ were infinite, it would follow that the light of glory was also infinite: and if the light of glory were infinite, the beatific vision would be infinite, and consequently comprehensive of God, which is absurd; for it belongs to God alone to be able to comprehend himself. This third reason is insufficient, because, granted that the light of glory is infinite, it does not follow from that precisely that the beatific vision of Christ is infinite, for vision is elicited not only from the light of glory but also from the intellect, which is finite and incapable of infinite action. — Besides, even if it were conceded that the beatific vision of Christ is infinite; still it would not follow that it is comprehensive of God; for that a vision be infinite and comprehensive, it must be infinite simply, and without modification, as is that vision by which God comprehends himself: but the beatific vision of Christ would not be infinite simply, and without modification; otherwise it would be God himself: therefore from the fact that it is infinite, it does not follow that it would be comprehensive of God. — Therefore we say the Blessed in their fatherland do not comprehend God, although they see the whole God, all the divine attributes, all possible things, which shine forth in the divine essence; and all the respects and habitudes which God has toward them; because they would not know all these things as much as they are knowable; and consequently their vision could indeed be called infinite beatific, yet not comprehensive, because it would be called infinite with modification, namely it would be called infinite extensively, but not intensively.

You will say. All that perfection and grace is to be asserted in Christ which is neither unworthy of his state, nor involves manifest contradiction: such is infinite grace: therefore this is to be asserted in Christ. — I deny the minor: since, as has just been proved, it conflicts for any grace to be actually infinite. Add that that infinite grace would have been wholly superfluous, both for the end of the Incarnation, because even if the redemption of men required an infinite merit and price, it would not be necessary that that infinity of merit be sought on the part of an infinite habitual grace; for the personality of Christ sufficed for that, which would confer such a price on meritorious works by a certain extrinsic dignity.

You will urge: Habitual grace in the human nature of Christ contributed to adorning it, on account of the hypostatic union: but this union was actually infinite: therefore also that. — I answer. 1. By denying the major, for it is false, as we said in the first Disputation, that grace was a prerequisite as a necessary medium for the hypostatic union. Then, even if habitual grace had truly been prerequisite in order to the hypostatic union, it does not follow from that that it ought to have been actually infinite; for just as creatures, although ordered to God as to their end, do not denote infinity; so neither would grace require any infinity on account of that ordination to the hypostatic union. Finally, it is false that the hypostatic union formally taken is infinite, both by reason of itself and by reason of the extremes immediately united. Not indeed by reason of itself, because that, as we said, is a respect extrinsically accruing, which truly is something finite. Nor even by reason of the extremes, because the humanity is finite; but the personality of the Word, which is the other immediate extreme of that union, is neither finite nor infinite.

You will say. 2. That which has infinite efficiency is also infinite in entity: but the grace of Christ has infinite virtue and efficiency, for it is an inexhaustible fountain, from whose plenitude men, and Angels, if there were any, could borrow their grace. Moreover that habitual grace of Christ conferred infinite value on his works, and made them worthy to suffice for the redeeming and saving of infinite men and Angels. — I deny the minor, and to its first proof I say that the grace of Christ is not reckoned the fountain from whose plenitude we have all received in the sense that it contains in itself all graces whatsoever as to entity, which flow into all men and Angels, just as in a fountain are contained all the droplets of water that overflow into streams; but only that Christ was the meritorious cause of all graces and heavenly charisms, which God grants to men and Angels in view of his merits. To the second proof I say that even if the merits of Christ had been of infinite value and capacity, so that they contributed to the redemption of infinite men, it does not follow from that that his grace was infinite according to entity, because that infinite value of merits would not require an infinite principle quo, but only a principle quod: and consequently it would not be necessary that the habitual grace of Christ, which is only the principle quo of those merits, be infinite; but it is only required that the principle quod, namely the person of the Word, from whom that value derives, attribute a certain infinity to them by reason of the divine nature identified with himself. Add that the value of meritorious works must especially be sought from the acceptance of God; God could accept the merits of Christ our Lord for their redemption and salvation; but this acceptance does not presuppose an infinite grace, from which that

From these gather 1, that the grace of Christ cannot rightly be called infinite by reason of the extrinsic acceptance of God, because that acceptance is in the divine supposit, as some modern Theologians teach; since that extrinsic acceptance is only a certain moral dignity of a grace morally dignified by the supposit of the Divine Word: but on account of that moral dignification the grace of Christ ought not be called infinite. Proof: the supposit of the Word does not dignify more the grace residing in the humanity of Christ than the humanity itself, for on account of that dignification of the humanity, the humanity is not called infinite: therefore neither for that reason ought the grace of Christ be called infinite. The major is evident, because the humanity of Christ is united to the Word more intimately and immediately than any accident inherent in that humanity: but by reason of that intimate union the humanity cannot be called of infinite dignity, but only that it has infinite dignity, on account of the infinite Word to which it is joined. Nor does it matter that the merit of Christ is called infinite by reason of the supposit, at least extrinsically, and by reason of divine acceptance: for the same cannot be said of grace, because merit truly is offered to be accepted insofar as it can be accepted. Whence the divine will, in view of the Word, accepts it infinitely, that is, for an infinite merit, and for infinite men and Angels, if there were so many; but grace is not offered to be accepted, but rather is a partial principle of that which is offered to be accepted; and therefore just as the other partial principle of merit, namely the will of Christ, is not called infinite, so neither ought grace be called infinite, however much the merit proceeding from both those principles may be called in some sense infinite.

From these gather 2, that the grace of Christ is not even infinite in the ratio of grace, or in the ratio of the formal effect whereby it made Christ pleasing, or of the effective effect insofar as it was the principle of meriting for men and Angels: for each of those effects, whether formal or effective, insofar as it was from grace, was wholly finite, because no form can supply an effect, whether formal or otherwise, beyond its own entity; for virtue does not exceed entity: but the entity of grace is finite: therefore it cannot supply an infinite effect; whence also that effect, whether formal or effective, is referred back rather to the person of Christ than to the grace itself.

From these gather 3, that the grace of Christ is not even reckoned infinite by reason of some physical mode intrinsic accruing to it from its very conjunction with the divine Word; since it cannot be explained what that infinite mode is: for nothing else could be conceived than that the grace itself, through the medium of the soul and will of Christ, in which it inheres, is terminated by the supposit of the Word: but this ratio of termination cannot confer on grace any infinity; both because by this reason the other accidents that are in Christ would also be called infinite; and because with better right that infinity would be attributed to the very will and soul of Christ, which is united more immediately to the supposit of the Word than the grace itself.

Second conclusion. — DE FACTO THE GREATEST HABITUAL GRACE WAS CONFERRED ON CHRIST.

It is gathered from John 1: We saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. As if the Evangelist said that Christ had such glory as befitted him to be held who is the only-begotten Son of God: but it beseemed him that the greatest glory be conferred on him: therefore also de facto it was conferred: but glory corresponds to grace and is founded on it; therefore if the glory of the soul of Christ is greatest, also the grace of that soul ought to have been greatest. It is confirmed from chapter 3, where John the Baptist, speaking of Christ, says: For God giveth not the Spirit by measure. Which words the holy Doctors and interpreters explain of Christ: which is also gathered from the following words, The Father loveth the Son, and he hath given all things into his hand: but he who has not spirit and grace by measure must necessarily have every possible grace, and therefore the greatest that can be contained in a creature: therefore Christ had such. It can be confirmed by the authority of the Philosopher saying that in every genus there is one thing which is the measure and standard of the others, and is more excellent than all others contained under the same genus: therefore likewise in the genus of grace: but this one cannot be anything other than Christ, because he is the one Mediator of God and men, the unique and supreme head of the Church; therefore he is also the one and only one who contains all excellence and plenitude of grace.

The Subtle Doctor proves this truth by this reason: God conferred on Christ our Lord every grace whatsoever possible, and such as no greater can be granted to any creature, if such be possible: but so it is: therefore it must be confessed that he conferred it on him. The major is evident: since God loves Christ, as his natural Son, more than any whatsoever of the just, who are only his adoptive sons, there is no doubt that he conferred on him all the gifts whatsoever that he could confer on adoptive sons, and consequently that he gave him the greatest grace. But the minor is proved, namely that the greatest grace is possible. The greatest grace can be created: therefore it is possible. The antecedent is proved: both because the greatest grace is a finite and limited entity; and every finite entity can be created by God: therefore, etc.; and because in permanent entities, which are apt to have, or to be able to have simultaneously, all parts and perfections and degrees compossible with themselves, God can produce and confer those parts and degrees in one instant: now grace is a permanent entity by its nature, since it is a supernatural quality: therefore God can produce and confer all parts and degrees compossible with it: but grace that has all degrees compossible with itself is truly greatest, since nothing can be added to it, otherwise it would not be reckoned to have all degrees compossible with itself: therefore, etc.: Finally, because God can create the greatest grace producible: but that greatest grace is the greatest: therefore it is not unfitting that the greatest grace be brought into being: therefore truly the greatest grace is possible; but it is most probable that God conferred on his proper Son all possible gifts: therefore, etc.

The Doctor proves secondly: Every perfection is owed to Christ of whose reception he is capable without any contradiction and inconvenience: but the soul of Christ is capable of receiving the greatest grace: therefore it must be confessed that it was conferred on him. The major is evident from what has been said, for the humanity of Christ our Lord is to be dignified as much as can be done without any inconvenience. The Doctor proves the minor: a subject receptive of some accident having certain degrees of intension can receive all those degrees, if it be not limited to some certain degree within the highest: but the soul of Christ is receptive of grace: nor is its capacity determined and limited to some certain degree of that grace: therefore it can receive any degree whatsoever. He proves the major by the opposite: for this reason water cannot receive any degree whatever of heat, because heat is an accident disconvening water in some degree, namely the highest, such as belongs to fire; whence that highest degree of heat could not inhere in water unless it corrupted it, since it is the ultimate disposition to the form of fire. The minor is proved: the soul of Christ would be determined of itself to receiving a certain degree of grace either because a further degree would be unworthy of it, or because it could not be communicated to it without contradiction: but no degree of grace, however intense, is unworthy of the soul of Christ, nor does any contradiction appear that it should receive any degree of grace whatsoever possible: therefore it is not limited to receiving some degree of grace short of the greatest. — He confirms it, because the capacity of the soul of Christ our Lord with respect to receiving grace is no less than that in Angels. He proves: if the capacity for receiving grace were less in the soul of Christ than in Angels, especially because that capacity would be proportioned to entity; whence it would follow that the less perfect entity would have the lesser capacity: but this reason is null; both because a greater or lesser perfection of natural entity is irrelevant to the reception of grace, which is of the supernatural order; and because the grace receivable in an Angel is of the same species as that receivable in the soul: but whenever a form susceptible in some things is of the same species, those things too, as receptive, must be of the same species in the ratio of the receiver: hence because the whiteness of milk and snow is of the same ratio, snow and milk are also of the same ratio in receiving whiteness: therefore since the grace receivable in an Angel is of the same species as that received in a rational soul, it follows that the capacity of the same ratio for receiving grace is in the soul and the Angel alike. — Therefore from these it is evident that the soul of Christ is receptive of as great a grace as any other finite intellectual substance can receive; and consequently that Christ had no repugnance to obtaining the most perfect grace: therefore the greatest grace is to be attributed to him; for, as the Doctor says, number 6,

it is probable to say according to the Master, that God conferred on him so great a grace as he could; for in commending Christ I prefer to exceed than to fall short of the praise due to him, if through ignorance I must fall into one of the two. He confirms it by that saying of Augustine, On Free Will: Whatever occurs to thee as better by true reason, know that God did it rather than did it not: Now it seems simply better according to right reason that the greatest grace be conferred on someone than not conferred, because in this the supreme mercy of God shines forth in giving the highest good of grace without merits: therefore it is probable that this was done, and in none other than the soul of Christ: therefore, etc.

Thus the Doctor, not less piously than subtilely.

The same truth the Seraphic Doctor also admirably urges, dist. 13, art. 1, q. 2, in these words:

If we speak of the grace conferred on Christ, according as He is a singular person in Himself, and granted that He says created gift, it is necessarily finite and measured. For finitude and measurement with regard to a creature rather signify complement than imperfection. But if we speak of it in comparison with the graces of other men, thus it exceeds disproportionately by reason of its union with the person of the Word, to which union that grace disposed the soul of Christ. For that grace, because of its supreme conjunction with the eternal Word, must exceed infinitely and immeasurably the graces of other men in three ways, namely as regards the virtue of habit, and as regards uses, and as regards effects. As regards habits; for no creature can ever profit so much as to be capable of so noble and perfect a habit as the soul united to God in the unity of person. As regards uses of virtues, because all the virtues in Christ had uses which look to perfection: and therefore it is said that all the senses were in Him, because He had complete use of all gifts in a more excellent manner than could ever yet be reached by anyone. As regards effect, likewise the grace of Christ exceeds disproportionally: because, for this reason, that this man was the Son of God, His merit is weighed according to the dignity of that person from which the work proceeds: and therefore the merit of His passion infinitely exceeds the merits of our passions: and on this account, because He > was God, His death was weighed by God according to how great He was who died. And therefore as regards sufficiency, if infinite thousands of men were bound under original guilt, by the effect of that passion they might have been set free.

Others prove it thus: To be assumed to divine being is greater than to be assumed to supreme grace: but the humanity of Christ is assumed by supreme union to divine being: therefore also to the highest possible grace. Moreover, the human nature of Christ is assumed to supreme union as regards being: therefore it is assumed also to supreme union as regards operating: but there is no supreme union as regards operating except through the highest habit of grace, which is the principle of operating: therefore the human nature of Christ was assumed to the highest habit of grace.

You will object 1. St. Augustine, book 13 De Trinitate, chapter 5, says: Blessed is he who has whatever he wills, and wills no evil; which is not understood of actual willing; because if any Saint in the way could be blessed at least for some instant, for which he can have whatever he wills, he would even will no evil: but it is understood of the power of willing, namely that he have whatever he can rightly will. Now the humanity, e.g., can rightly will to have as much grace as its nature is capable of: because free or rational willing is always right, because it is conformed to the will, or natural inclination, which is always right: but the natural inclination of Michael is toward as much grace as his nature is capable of: but the nature of the soul of Christ is not so excellent, nor consequently capable of so much grace: therefore in fact He does not have as much grace as Michael has, since Michael is blessed. — The Subtle Doctor answers that blessed is he who has whatever he wills, that is, whatever God wills him to will; but God does not will that any will freely will a greater glory than that which He has conferred on it: and therefore that will cannot rightly will another glory. To the proof he answers that the natural appetite of every will is toward supreme glory; so that every will naturally appetites to be perfected by supreme glory: nevertheless there is not there so great a natural inclination toward supreme glory that its opposite, that is, non-supreme glory, would inhere violently in the power having such an inclination, as happens in that natural inclination by which a heavy body is inclined naturally downward, because its opposite, namely not to be downward, or to be upward, inheres in it violently. The reason is, because that other inclination has no intrinsic principle necessitating it to that which it itself is, such that its opposite could not inhere except violently: for it is inclined toward having supreme grace, and yet it can be quieted in the soul, because it does not have an intrinsic principle determining it to some determinate degree. But free will is then right not only when it follows such a natural appetite, but rather when it conforms itself to the higher rule, namely the will of God; which sometimes wills the rational will to follow the natural appetite, sometimes not; but the divine will wills the blessed will to will no more glory than it has decreed to confer on it, notwithstanding the natural appetite, whose operation, or inclination, is then abandoned without sadness, because in patria incomparably more belongs to the will in following the rule of the superior than the inclination of the natural appetite.

You will object 2. No more grace is to be posited in the soul of Christ than is required for its beatitude: but it can be perfectly beatified without supreme grace. Proof: the inclination of the nature of Christ can terminate without supreme glory: therefore without supreme grace; for His inclination is not supreme, because His nature is not supreme, just as, e.g., because water is not supremely heavy, it can be quieted in a place below which will not be the lowest of all. — The Doctor answers that inclination can be regarded in two ways: either on the side of the foundation, namely of the nature whose inclination it is; or on the side of the terminus, namely of the grace to be received. Inclination on the side of the foundation is more perfect in a more perfect nature than in one less perfect, and consequently more excellent in an Angel than in the soul of Christ, because natural inclination is not really distinct from the nature whose inclination it is; and thus where the nature is more perfect, there the inclination is more perfect on the side of the foundation. But inclination, as regarding such a terminus, namely grace, is not more perfect in a more perfect nature than in one less perfect; because any grace whatsoever simply adorns and perfects nature, and therefore the nature of Christ could have had an inclination toward supreme beatitude. For the explication of this matter, there may be two surfaces, one of two feet, another of one foot; the former is greater and more perfect in itself and in order to receiving more accidents; yet with respect to the intensity of whiteness each is equally perfect, because each can receive equally intense and supreme whiteness.

You will object lastly: Supreme nature was not made: therefore neither supreme grace. The antecedent is proved: any made nature whatsoever can become more excellent. The consequence is proved: because the order of the Universe consists more in species than in individuals, for species adorn the universe more than individuals: therefore a supreme nature ought more fittingly to have been made, which differs in species from other natures, than supreme grace, which differs only in gift from other graces that are not supreme. — The Doctor answers that supreme grace ought rather to have been made than supreme nature, because in the works of nature only power and wisdom are manifested: but in the works of grace goodness and mercy; and it is better that mercy be manifested than power. Therefore God was compelled by no fitting necessity to create a supreme nature; but He was moved toward supreme grace, with respect, namely, to the nature subsisting in so excellent a supposit.

Conclusion third. — THE GRACE OF CHRIST IS NOT OF INFINITE POWER, NOR CAN IT BE INCREASED TO INFINITY. This is the Doctor's, ibidem number 2, and he states it thus:

Proof: The grace of Christ cannot be increased to infinity, if truly this increase is repugnant to grace: but it is repugnant that grace be so increased: therefore also this increase to infinity is repugnant to the grace of Christ. The major stands, because the grace of Christ is not of a different species from the other graces: therefore if the other graces cannot be increased to infinity, neither shall this be affirmed of the grace of Christ. The Doctor proves the minor from the hypothesis, that God might wish to intensify the grace of one degree or another by the addition of other degrees, or will make it grow and increase up to some supreme finite and determinate degree, beyond which no other will be producible, e.g. up to the eighth degree; or in that increase there will be no terminus, but further progress can proceed to infinity. If the first, we have what was intended, namely that every grace has determinate degrees of its intensity. If the second, it will follow that that grace can be actually infinite; because the more it were intensified by the addition of many degrees, the more perfect it will be intensively: whence if progress were made to infinity in that intensity, it follows that that grace could be of infinite intensity: but it is repugnant that any grace be infinitely intense: therefore it is repugnant that the increase of grace be made to infinity.

The adversaries reply, that that argument proceeds from a false supposition, namely that infinity in potency can be made act; for as in a continuum, given any division whatsoever, division can be made to infinity, and yet it does not follow that in the continuum there are actually infinite parts: so although grace can be increased to infinity by the addition of new degrees, it does not follow that it can be actually infinitely intense, because from the fact that something is infinite in potency it does not follow that it can be infinite in act. — Against this the Doctor first urges the authority of the Philosopher, book 3 Physics, chapter on the infinite, saying that as much as can be in potency can be in act, that is, whatever is possible in potency is also possible in act, which is most true in forms, as Averroes interprets: therefore one cannot proceed to infinity without that form likewise being able to be actually infinite, otherwise it could not be so much in act as it can be in potency. But there is no parity between the intensification of grace and the division of the continuum, because the reason is evident why in the division of the continuum all possible parts cannot be simultaneously actual, namely that if all those parts were actual, it would follow that they be indivisible, which is repugnant, because this is against the notion of a divisible continuum: but that all the parts of some intensible form exist simultaneously shows no repugnance: for if there were any, especially because, once the supreme and last degree of that form were added, the power of God would seem exhausted and the hand of the Lord shortened, if He could not produce a further degree: but this repugnance is none, for the omnipotence of God does not look to those things which are untouchable: whence just as the power of God is not exhausted, although human nature cannot add even the least essential degree, because that cannot be done without the species of man being changed; so the power of God does not seem exhausted, even if He could superadd no degree to the grace of Christ, because it is supposed that every possible degree has already been superadded to it.

The Doctor proves it moreover by the same argument by which St. Thomas labors to evince the contrary, from this principle, that grace is a certain participation of God, from which St. Thomas argued thus: God is infinitely participable by a creature: therefore grace could be infinitely intensified, that God be infinitely participated. But the Subtle Doctor argues thus: to participate the infinite perfection of God is to take some part of that infinite perfection: therefore to take some part according to a determinate degree: for if according to an indeterminate and infinite degree, just as the divine perfections are infinite and exist whole and entire together, it would follow also that it would not be repugnant for some creature to have simultaneously infinite degrees of perfection; and thus to be equally perfect as God Himself, who possesses infinite perfection actually, which is absurd: therefore although God, as far as He is of Himself, is infinite and of infinite perfection, He is nevertheless not infinitely participable by any creature of a determinate species, because there is given no creature which is infinitely participative of God, although God is infinitely participable syncategorematically, that is, by infinitely many possible creatures, if they should be possible.

You will object 1. Luke 2, where it is said: And Jesus advanced in wisdom, and age, and grace with God and men: whereby it appears that He received an increase of grace, as also of age; therefore just as He did not have supreme age, so neither supreme grace. — I answer first that various explanations of this text are brought forward; for St. Damascene, book 3 De fide, chapter 22, brings two explanations: the first of which is, that that advance must be understood of the Church, not of Christ; for what belong to the members are sometimes attributed to the head. The second is, that it must be understood of the increase of grace and wisdom, not internal, but external, namely according to manifestation, because day by day His wisdom and sanctity shone forth more and more before men. So likewise St. Athanasius explains this text, oration t. against the Arians: As, he says, the magnitude of the body grew, the manifestation of the Deity grew in Him. Yet since it is said that He grew not only in external appearance among men, but also in internal advance before God, therefore I should judge more correctly, with the Seraphic Doctor, in Luke 2, that that advance must be understood thus: either that Christ shone forth more and more day by day in works of charity toward God and neighbor: or with the Angelic Doctor, third part, question 1, article 12, that that advance must be understood as to acts and effects; but not as to habits: of which truth a lucid example appears in the Sun, which although it has as much brightness in the morning as at noon; yet with respect to us it does not appear so brilliant in the morning as at noon.

You will object 2. The supreme grace which Christ has is finite: but to any finite thing a greater can be given: therefore that grace, however supreme, can be surpassed by another more perfect one being given. The major stands from what has been said. But the minor is proved; because to any finite creature whatsoever another more excellent creature can be given, if this be not repugnant: but it is not repugnant that, however perfect a creature be, another more excellent creature be given. Proof, because if that were repugnant, especially because from it would follow that that creature would be infinite: but this is not true: for it would become more excellent by the addition of a new degree, whereby it would exceed another creature: but that new degree would not make it infinite: therefore etc. — The Doctor denies the minor; and to its proof he says that that proposition, to any finite grace whatsoever a greater can be given, can be understood in two ways: First, so as to mean that to any finite grace whatsoever a greater can be given by the addition of another degree within the same species; and in this sense he denies the proposition: for when grace, or any other quality whatsoever, has the supreme degree of its perfection, however finite it be, it cannot be made greater: not because, this being posited, it would become infinite if a further degree were added, but because of incompressibility; just as, e.g., whiteness added to blackness cannot intensify it, not because it would make it infinite, but because it is incompossible with it: but also a new degree of grace is incompossible with supreme grace, because from it would follow that it was not supreme, if by a newly superadded degree it could become more excellent: therefore not by reason of infinity, but by reason of incompossibility, it is repugnant that a new degree be added to supreme grace.

For the evidence of which let anyone note, if supreme grace could become more perfect, this would have to be sought especially either from the intrinsic nature of grace, or from a defect of power in the effective cause, or from a defect of capacity in the subject: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because it is of itself a participation of infinite divine grace, or charity, which since it can be participated more and more to infinity, can also render the participant more excellent to infinity. Not even the second, because God is of infinite power, and consequently can unfold His power toward producing infinite effects and degrees. Finally not the third, because the subject capable of receiving some form can receive it according to all its degrees. — The Doctor denies the minor, and draws those very arguments of the objection to his supposition for confirming his opinion. Indeed the first, because every participation of divine perfection is necessarily finite, as we said above; otherwise it would follow that some creature could have infinite perfection, and thus be equally perfect as God, which is repugnant. Likewise the second, because God cannot produce grace except either by creating it from nothing, or from a subject, if He produce it by eduction: but in neither way can He produce infinite grace, because every nature which is produced from the nothing of itself, mediately or immediately, is necessarily limited and finite; because every unlimited perfection is of itself necessary, and consequently cannot be produced from nothing: therefore since every grace is produced by God from the nothing of itself, immediately or mediately, it cannot be infinite. Finally He draws the third argument also to the opposite: for every finite receiver cannot have capacity for infinite perfection; because although the capacity of the receiver is with respect to any degree whatever in the form: yet the capacity of anything finite does not extend to the form in-

From these gather that the grace of Christ is in fact supreme, not only negatively, but also positively with respect to all graces which were granted either to men or to Angels; such that it plainly exceeds all the graces both of Angels and of men: both because all their graces flow from Christ as from the head of the whole Church, whether militant, triumphant, or suffering, into them as into members of His mystical body: but life resides far more nobly in the head than in all the members: therefore habitual grace, which is the principle of spiritual life, is far more excellent in Christ than in all men and Angels alike: and because all Angels and men were pleasing to God only on account of Christ: therefore Christ was far more pleasing to them, because on account of each thing such, and that more so: and consequently He had greater and more excellent grace: finally because to Him, and indeed to Him alone, ought to be conferred the most perfect and supreme principle of operating, to whom alone has been granted the most perfect and supreme principle of being: yet the humanity of Christ has been granted the principle and supreme principle of being, namely divine being by hypostatic union: therefore to Him alone ought to be conferred through grace the most perfect and supreme principle of operating: but what is conferred on one alone in the highest degree is not only negatively but also positively supreme in fact: therefore the grace of Christ is in fact positively supreme.

YOU ASK 1: Whether Christ had every fullness of sanctifying grace, and that from the instant of His conception?

THE SERAPHIC DOCTOR ANSWERS, dist. 18, art. 1, qu. 3, that without doubt in Christ according to His human nature there was from the very beginning of His conception a grace perfect, ordered, and consummated in plenitude; for it did not befit the uncreated Word to be united to a soul in most perfect union, such as is union in unity of person, unless the soul were Deiform, insofar as it was possible. And therefore He had not only Deiformity of grace and glory, but even above all grace and glory; nor was there in Him only the fullness of sufficiency, as in the Saints, of which fullness it is said Acts 6: Stephen full of grace and fortitude; nor only the fullness of prerogative, as in the Virgin Mary, of which fullness it is said: Hail, full of grace; nor only the fullness of numerosity and copia, as in the whole Church, of which fullness it is said Ephes. 4: He ascended above the heavens, that He might fill all things: but also the fullness of superabundance, of which John 1: We saw His glory, etc. Full, I say, with the fullness of superabundance, on account of which He adds: and of His fullness we all have received. — It is confirmed by Luke 1, where the Angel addressing Mary says: That which shall be born of thee shall be holy, and shall be called the Son of God. In which two things are denoted: first, that in the same moment in which the soul of Christ had the grace of union, He likewise had habitual grace, by which He was formally holy. Second, the Angel did not say, that what shall be born of thee will be holy, but that what shall be born of thee shall be holy, so that evidently he signified that Christ from that time when He was formed in the womb of the Virgin had sanctity and habitual grace. St. Augustine proves this same thing excellently in book 13 De Trinitate, chapter 26, from the Prophecy of Isaiah, in which it is said that the Holy Spirit ought to rest upon Christ:

The Lord Jesus Himself, he says, gave the Holy Spirit not only as God, but also received Him as man, on which account He is called full of grace: and more manifestly concerning Him it is written in the Acts of the Apostles: Because God anointed Him with the Holy Spirit, certainly not with visible oil, but with the gift of grace, which is signified by the visible ointment with which the Church anoints the baptized. Nor indeed was Christ then anointed with the Holy Spirit when upon the baptized there descended like a dove: for then He deigned to prefigure His body, that is, His Church, in which the baptized especially receive the Holy Spirit; but He must be understood as anointed with that mystical and invisible unction then, when the Word of God was made flesh, that is, when the human nature was joined to the Word of God in the womb of the Virgin without any preceding merits of good works, so that with Him it might become one person.

Thus St. Augustine.

YOU ASK 2: Besides habitual grace, did Christ also have need of actual grace, which is a certain divine motion granted by God in order to supernatural operation, which, once that operation is transacted, does not reign?

I ANSWER FIRST, that it seems more probable that actual grace was necessary to Christ for free operations looking to the state of wayfarer, e.g., for love of God or neighbor: as well as for acts of moral virtues, obedience, humility, etc. Proof, because actual grace is either antecedent or exciting, or concomitant or helping: but both of these seem to have been necessary to Christ, because exciting grace is a certain holy thought, by which there is proposed to us the pursuit of honest good and flight of dishonest evil: similarly it is a certain subject motion of the will, which the divine Spirit excites in order to fear or love of God: but Christ had need of that motion of intellect by which He judged here and now that God or neighbor must be loved, obeyed, etc. Similarly it was necessary that His will be moved to those acts, and have the special concourse of God: therefore actual grace seems to have been necessary to Him both exciting and helping. It is confirmed, because on account of a similar rationality Christ needed the same natural concourse of God by which other men need it in natural acts, notwithstanding His union to the Word: therefore similarly, notwithstanding the grace of union and habitual grace, He needed besides actual graces, which men are accustomed to need for eliciting supernatural acts.

WHETHER GRATUITOUSLY GIVEN GRACES WERE IN CHRIST.

NOTE 1. That by the name of gratuitously given grace the Theologians understand nothing else than some supernatural gift, principally instituted for the salvation and spiritual utility of others: or, as St Thomas says, 2 qu. 3, art. 1, ordered to this, that man cooperate with another so that he be brought back to God; but man cannot cooperate with that interiorly, since to move and govern the heart of man belongs to God alone; but only exteriorly, either by teaching or by persuading. And therefore the Apostle numbers nine gratuitously given graces, 1 Cor. 12, saying: To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom: and to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit: to another faith in the same spirit: to another the grace of healings: to another the working of miracles: to another prophecy: to another the discerning of spirits: to another kinds of tongues: to another interpretation of speeches.

The reason of this division St Thomas brings forward; in order that a man may instruct another in divine things, three things are necessary: first, that he have plenitude of the knowledge of divine things, that from this he may be able to instruct others. Second, that he may be able to confirm and prove those things which he says, otherwise his doctrine would not be efficacious. Third, that he may be able fittingly to set forth what he conceives to his hearers. For the first it is necessary that the principles of that science which he ought to teach be most certain to him, and this the grace of faith freely given supplies: that he be rightly disposed concerning the principal conclusions, and this wisdom supplies; and that he abound with examples and knowledge of effects through which sometimes causes must be manifested, and that is supplied through knowledge. For the second it is required that he be confirmed either by works, which God alone can do, and for this two things are necessary: the first is the grace of healings, because in confirmation of the truth announced health is restored to the sick; the second is the working of miracles, whereby he works stupendous things e.g. dividing the sea, stopping the sun; or by the manifestation of those things which are known to God alone; and these are of two kinds, future contingents, and hidden things of hearts. For the first Prophecy is given. For the second discernment of spirits. Finally for the third, which is to set forth to hearers what he has conceived, two things are required: namely kinds of tongues, and interpretation of speeches: because this faculty of setting forth conceptions can be regarded only as to two things, or as to the idiom in which someone can be understood, to which the kinds of tongues avail; or as to the sense of those things which are to be set forth, to which the interpretation of speeches is ordered.

NOTE 2. That gratuitously given graces differ chiefly from grace gratum faciens, or justifying, in that grace gratum faciens is granted for the proper utility of the recipient, but grace freely given for the utility of the whole Church, or of another person to be ordered to God. Moreover grace gratum faciens is found in all and only the just; for it is the formal reason by which someone is formally constituted just; but grace freely given is found neither in all nor only in the just. Not indeed in all, because it is not necessary that all be adorned with such graces, since it does not belong to all to direct and order others to God. Nor even only in the just, because grace freely given is not incompossible with sin; since very many even most grievous sinners, as Caiphas and Balaam, were illumined with the gift of Prophecy; hence St Paul, 1 Cor. 13, teaches that Prophecy can be had without charity, which is inseparable from grace gratum faciens. Thirdly, finally, it differs chiefly in this, that grace gratum faciens is a habit permanent in the will: but grace freely given is not a habit, nor is it possessed permanently, but only by way of passing; which is most evident from this, because, as Aristotle says, we use habits when we will: but, as the Theologians teach, the Prophets e.g. did not use the gift of Prophecy whenever they willed, but only when God held it pleasing.

NOTE 3. That faith, which is numbered among gratuitously given graces, can be taken: first, insofar as it says the same as fidelity, and thus regards moral virtues. Second, insofar as it is taken for confidence, and thus is reduced to hope whether natural or supernatural. Third, insofar as it is credulity, or assent to things revealed and obscurely proposed; and this, if it rest on human testimony, must be reduced to human faith; if truly on divine, it is itself the theological and supernatural virtue. Fourth, finally, it is taken for a certain sure trust, or confidence, whereof Mark 11 speaks of faith: Have the faith of God: amen I say to you, that whosoever shall command this mountain to remove and cast into the sea, and shall not stagger in his heart, but believe, that whatsoever he saith shall be done, it shall be done unto him. But faith accepted in this last mode is called grace freely given.

Single conclusion. — IN TRUTH CHRIST OUR LORD HAD ALL GRATUITOUSLY GIVEN GRACES. This is common among Theologians, except Abulensis, who on chapter eleven of the book of Numbers qu. 61 denies that prophecy properly taken was in Christ.

The conclusion is proved: first, by the authority of St Augustine, epistle 57, which is to Dardanus, where he says thus: As all the senses are in the head, so all graces are in Christ. Which truth St Cyril also gathers, book 2 on John, chapter 20, from these words: Of his plenitude we all have received; and likewise from that to Ephesians 4, To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ. From which places one may thus reason: in whomsoever there is the plenitude of all grace, and from whom all and any grace overflows into others, he ought to have each single grace that de facto are granted to some; otherwise he would not have the plenitude of the whole of grace, and grace would have been given him by measure: but Christ had every plenitude of grace, and from his plenitude are derived not only graces gratum facientes, but also gratuitously given graces, into men who are illumined by them: therefore he ought equally to have them.

It is proved secondly: Christ was given to us by God that he might be our leader, Lawgiver, Master, and Doctor of faith: therefore he ought to have all that which most conduces to exercising the office of Lawgiver and Doctor most perfectly: but gratuitously given graces contribute most to that, therefore he ought to have them: The antecedent is proved from Isaiah 55 and Joel 2, where of the Messiah it is said: Be glad and rejoice in the Lord our God, because he hath given you a teacher of justice. And John 13, Christ our Lord professes himself Doctor, when speaking to the disciples he says: You call me, Master, and Lord; and you say well, for so I am. But the subsumption appears from the first Notable; for from it it is evident that each gratuitously given grace contributes most perfectly to executing the office of Doctor of justice and eternal beatitude.

It is proved third: Examining each species of those graces one by one: First indeed of faith this stands, for it is taken either as signifying a singular and excellent knowledge of the things of faith with certitude, or facility and readiness for setting forth matters accommodated to faith, or finally fervor of faith and special confidence in obtaining and working miracles: but in whatever way that faith be taken, it was most perfectly in Christ; for He had the most excellent knowledge of all the mysteries of faith, and supreme facility in revealing and explaining them. Hence He said Matthew 11: No one knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him; and He said to the Apostles John 15: All things whatsoever I have heard of my Father I have made known to you. Similarly He had supreme confidence in God for obtaining and working miracles from Him: hence John 11 He said, when about to raise Lazarus: I give thanks to thee, because thou hast heard me; and I knew that thou hearest me always. — Of Wisdom likewise the knowledge of the mysteries of faith, by which we draw down the deepest causes and easily explain them to others. That it was in Christ is clear from Luke 2, because He sat in the midst of the Doctors, where our reading has, They were astonished at His prudence, the Greek has "at His intelligence"; by which He most acutely and easily explained to them the profound mysteries of faith and sacred Scripture. Likewise from Matt. 22, where against the Sadducees He most wisely showed the future resurrection, and His divinity against the Pharisees. — The same stands of Knowledge, which is nothing else than knowledge of created things, as e.g. of virtues and vices, and skill in curing ⟦final line of leaf garbled in OCR: "Curicendi cotenl usi nas ex e unmtai, rebuex elenit alie sctepoie tat" — unreadable, left flagged; sentence continues on next leaf⟧ infused, than beatific, which He had, as we shall say in the following part: both from the fact that He taught that obedience was owed to Magistrates, Parents to be honored, and other precepts pertaining to moral philosophy, adding also similitudes drawn from natural things, as appears from His countless parables. — Of the grace of healings and the grace of virtues, it is proved similarly, because they are nothing else than the gift by which health is restored to the sick, and a miraculous work, that is unusual and exceeding the order of nature, is exercised: but that Christ healed the sick and worked miracles is clearer than that it needs proof. — Of interpretation of speech it is proved, because it is nothing else than skill in explaining obscure and hidden senses of sacred Scripture, even in a foreign idiom: but that Christ accomplished this stands especially from all those testimonies by which He proves against the Pharisees His divinity, eternity, and consubstantiality with the Father, especially from that when David calls Him Lord saying: The Lord said to my Lord, etc. For He uttered these words in Hebrew and interpreted them most profoundly of Himself, to whom the divine Father was to say at the Ascension: Sit at my right hand. — Hence it also appears He had the gift of tongues, both because by force of infused science and beatific science He had knowledge of all the things which He saw in the Word: and because He had also the power of using them when He willed, because for this there was in Him the readiest faculty and the most perfect organ: then He was universal Doctor, and it belonged to Him to teach every man concerning his own salvation; on which account it was fitting that He speak in the tongues of all. Therefore although it be not expressly read that He spoke in various tongues; nevertheless it is derived sufficiently evidently from many testimonies of the New Testament; for it stands first that He spoke Hebrew on the cross, when He said, eloi, eloi, lama sabacthani; that He spoke Punic, as to the Chanaanean woman, and Latin to the Romans, with whom He conversed in Jerusalem. — Of discernment of spirits it is clear, because it is nothing else than that cognition by which it is judged and penetrated by what spirit someone is impelled to say or do something; that it was in Christ stands from Matt. 22, where He indicated that the Pharisees proposed to Him a question about paying tribute to Caesar, that they might catch Him in speech, and that the complaint of Judas over the effusion of the ointment was from avarice and an inclination to robbery. — Finally it is proved of the prophetic gift, because Deut. 18 Christ is predicted and expressed under the name of Prophet; A Prophet, says Moses, will the Lord raise up out of the midst of thy brethren: which passage St. Peter expounds of Christ, chapter 3, and St. Ambrose sermon 8 on Ps. 18, around that text, I am a partaker; Christ, he says, has partakers, He has partakers of flesh, and He has Prophets, because the Lord, he says, will raise up to you a Prophet, etc. And below: He Himself is the true Prophet, who without the gift of another knows things to come.

Finally it is proved by reason: To be a Prophet is nothing else than to understand by supernatural cognition those things which are distant from the ordinary cognition of wayfarers, and to announce them to men: but Christ by supernatural cognition understood many such things and announced them to men, as the future destruction of Jerusalem, that He would rise again the third day, and many others, as appears from the Gospel: therefore Christ truly was a Prophet.

Abulensis objects against this last gift of graces: first,

that John the Baptist was more than a Prophet: therefore much more Christ, and consequently He did not have the gift of Prophecy, but something else far more excellent. Second, of the nature of Prophecy it is that the revealed thing should not be known to the Prophet except only under veils and in an enigma: but in Christ nothing was obscure, nothing abstruse to and impenetrable by His divine cognition. Third, nothing that was to be evacuated existed in Christ, because evacuation implies imperfection: but according to the Apostle 1 Cor. 13, Prophecies shall be made void: therefore the gift of Prophecy did not exist in Christ. Finally, if Christ had been a Prophet, especially either as God or as man: but not as God, as is known per se: nor even as man: because as such He was blessed: but the blessed are not Prophets: therefore, etc.

I answer to the first, St. John the Baptist is called more than a Prophet, not by way of exclusion, but of preeminence: so that with a more excellent gift of Prophecy than the other Prophets he was illumined. Hence his father St. Zachary prophesies of him: Thou child shalt be called the Prophet of the Highest. Whence that particle, more than a Prophet, is not exclusive of the gift of Prophecy, but significative of a certain prerogative of St. John the Baptist himself above the other Prophets, which consisted chiefly in this, that not like the other Prophets did he announce Christ obscurely and afar off, but openly he knew Him and made Him manifest, pointing Him out with his finger.

To the second I say, that although revealed things were mostly not open to the Prophets, but hidden, this happened by accident to the gift of Prophecy, to which it precisely pertains to perceive and announce those things which exceed man's natural capacity and knowledge, whether they be past, present, or future: but this the Lord Christ had most perfectly, as appears from all those things which He announced as future. To the third I say, that Prophecy would be made void by reason, namely of obscurity, which it ordinarily involves, because it is incompatible with beatific vision: but in Christ Prophecy involved no obscurity; whence there was no reason why it should be evacuated in Him. Or I say the Apostle signifies Prophecy to be made void, just as there he says knowledge is to be destroyed, not as to habit, but as to the effect of instructing others, because namely in the other life none will remain to be taught. To the fourth finally I answer, that Christ was a Prophet as man. Nor does it matter that He was blessed, because He was at once Wayfarer and Comprehensor; whence He could claim for Himself the excellencies of both states. Nor does it avail to infer thence that Christ was a Prophet only extrinsically and by reason merely of state: for that I will deny, because although that cognition be Prophetical extrinsically by reason of state; yet Christ intrinsically was a Prophet by reason of the aforesaid cognition inhering intrinsically.

But here observe, that although in the other Prophets Prophecy is after the manner of an act quickly passing away, yet it was in Christ after the manner of a habit continually persevering, whereby He knew most perfectly all things past, present, and future, as St. Jerome signifies, Epistle 125 to Damasus On three questions of sacred Scripture, in the third question, because He Himself was the habit of infused science, and Himself the habit of the light of glory, through which He knew all things clearly. The same judgment must be borne of the other graces, wisdom, knowledge, faith, discernment of spirits; but not of the grace of miracles and healings, and of the gift of tongues.

That the Theological virtue is so called by which man is immediately ordered toward God, supernaturally to be attained through acts transcending every capacity of nature. But three especially are assigned, namely Faith, Hope, and Charity, of which some involve a certain imperfection, as faith and hope: For faith, since it is the evidence of things that appear not, imports obscurity and inevidentness: but Hope the absence of the thing hoped for: but Charity, since it says no defect of itself, and is either not distinguished from sanctifying grace, as we shall teach with the Subtle Doctor in the Treatise on Grace, or at least is necessarily consequent upon it, as the Thomists will have it, there is no doubt that it was in Christ the Lord, concerning whom likewise all Theologians agree; about faith and hope, however, they do not so consent.

Note 2. Faith and hope can be regarded in two ways, namely, either as to act, or as to habit. As to act indeed, insofar as it is actual attainment of God Himself, either known by the intellect through faith, or as certainly expected and not yet possessed, through hope: but as to habit, which is a supernatural quality persevering continually in the soul, whereby it is inclined and helped to exercise acts of faith or supernatural hope. And although all Theologians agree that faith and hope, as to act, were not in Christ with respect to the principal object of those virtues, namely God Himself to be possessed and seen, because Christ from the instant of His conception, as will be proved below, enjoyed most sweet fruition of God through vision and love: nevertheless some contend with Durandus that they existed in Christ as to habit; nay even some with Suarez, in his exposition art. 1, q. 1, will have hope in Christ been present both as to act and habit, whereby Christ while still mortal desired the beatitude of His body, likewise also the exaltation of His name. For a twofold object of hope is distinguished, namely primary and secondary. The primary object is what is hoped for per se, as objective beatitude, namely God to be possessed: but the secondary object are certain goods of body or soul which follow upon beatitude itself, and consequently can be the object of hope, such as could be in Christ the exaltation of name and glorification of body.

Note 3. That two motions and acts are required for faith, one in the intellect, another in the will. The act in the intellect is faith's assent itself elicited by the intellect, which assents to things revealed; the prerequisite act on the side of the will is a certain motion of the will commanding the intellect, that it yield assent to revealed objects, though obscurely proposed, notwithstanding its natural inclination to yield assent only to evident things. Which motion indeed some call the imperium of the will, as Theologians commonly do; others the pious affection of the will, as most of the Recentiores; some the affect of credulity, as the Fathers of the Council of Orange, Canon 3. But the Apostle calls it obedience Rom. 10, when he says: All do not obey the Gospel, as if he said: all have not the affect, or will, of believing the Gospel. Moreover, Theologians gather that this motion of the will for eliciting the act of faith from the intellect is necessary in us for this reason, that since the object of faith is inevident and obscure, it is not per se sufficient to move the intellect to yield assent, therefore the intellect must be moved by the will, and be held captive by it in obedience to faith, as St. Paul says.

These things thus premised, three things come to be established in the present Question: First, that in the intellect of Christ there was no faith, neither as to act nor as to habit. Second, that neither in His will was there the pious affection, whereby it would move the intellect to assent of faith. Third, that likewise there was not in Christ Theological hope, neither as to act nor as to habit, both regarding the primary object and the secondary.

Conclusion first. — THEOLOGICAL FAITH WAS IN CHRIST THE LORD NEITHER AS TO ACT NOR AS TO HABIT.

It is proved first: Whatever intrinsically implies imperfection and opposition to the beatific state and to the clear vision of God was not in Christ: but infused faith, both as to act and as to habit, implies imperfection and opposition to beatific vision: therefore it must not be admitted in Christ. The major stands; because Christ was blessed from the instant of His conception, and consequently had the clear vision of God, and therefore everything opposed to the state of beatitude and to that intuitive vision of God was repugnant to Him. The minor also is proved: because faith is per se inevident cognition and assent to an obscurely proposed thing, whence that common saying: Faith is to believe what thou dost not see; wherefore St. Paul says Hebrews 11: Now Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not: but what is obscure and inevident directly conflicts with evident and intuitive cognition: therefore, etc. Then, enigmatical cognition conflicts with intuitive cognition: but the cognition of faith is enigmatical; but beatific cognition is facial and intuitive; hence the Apostle 1 Cor. 13: We see now through a glass in an dark manner, but then face to face: therefore, etc. Finally, that which belongs only to Wayfarers, and is to be evacuated in the blessed, was not in Christ, because He was blessed from the instant of conception: but what is known through faith is to be evacuated in patria, as the Apostle teaches there, saying: When that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away: therefore faith could not be in Christ.

You will object 1. That of Isaiah 11, where the Prophet delineating the future virtues of Christ the Lord says: And faith shall be the girdle of His reins: therefore truly Christ had faith. — I distinguish: He had faith, which is supernatural assent to things obscurely divinely proposed, I deny; He had faith, which is fidelity and truthfulness in promises, I concede. But the Prophet under the name of faith signifies nothing else than that fidelity, as St. Jerome observes on that passage: which virtue, since it is moral and says perfection without imperfection, because it imports conformity of deeds to words and promises, therefore it could be in Christ.

You will object 2. Faith is more perfect than the moral virtues: but in Christ there are moral virtues, as we shall see: therefore also faith; for the more perfect a virtue is, the rather does it seem to be posited in Christ.

I answer, not every nobility makes a virtue be in Christ, but that which has no imperfection annexed to itself, or opposition to the state of Christ: but moral virtues have neither imperfection nor opposition with respect to the state of Christ; but faith has it, as was said: therefore although it be more perfect than the moral virtues by reason of object, yet on account of that imperfection and opposition to the state of Christ, it is not to be posited in Him.

You will object 3. Even if in Christ the Lord there are not riches, or great expenditures, around which magnificence is occupied, nevertheless the virtue of magnificence does not cease to have place in Him: therefore by parity, although there be not with respect to Christ the Lord the object of faith, which is a divine thing not seen, nevertheless Theological faith must not be denied to be in Him.

I answer by denying the consequence: since in Christ the Lord there was magnificence, although wealth was wanting to Him, because wealth and great expenditures are only the material object of that virtue, while the formal object is the manner to be observed in distributing wealth and making expenditures; and if something is lacking under the aspect of matter, it does not follow that the habit must be lacking, but only if it be lacking under the formal aspect of the object: but in Christ the formal aspect of the object of magnificence is not lacking, namely the manner in which wealth is to be distributed and expenditures made. But in Christ the Lord the formal aspect of faith is not found, namely the divine thing, as formally unseen. Thus entirely opposite is the ratio of magnificence and of faith in Christ; inasmuch as the material object of magnificence is lacking with respect to Him, namely wealth and expenditures, but the formal object is not lacking, namely the manner under which wealth is to be distributed and expenditures made; on the contrary, the material object of faith is not lacking in Christ; for the material objects of faith are the things to be believed: but in His intellect are the Trinity, Incarnation, etc.; but the formal object is lacking, because in Him the Trinity is not as unseen, nor the Incarnation as obscurely known, but as clearly seen and intuitively known.

Conclusion second. — There was not in Christ the Lord the pious affection and motion of will by which the intellect is held captive in obedience to faith, and moved to assent to truths obscurely revealed by God.

Proof: The means follows the ratio of the end and of its necessary condition of its principal: but this pious affection of will is a means to the act and habit of faith as to an end, and is ordered to it as accessory to principal: therefore for the same reason that faith is not admitted in Christ, neither ought this pious affection of will be asserted in Him. — It is confirmed: where something is so subordinated to another as to be only in aid of it and to serve it, then if that to which it is subordinated be entirely absent, neither can that aid be found, otherwise it would be futile: but this pious affection of will is so subordinated to infused faith as to be admitted only that it may determine the intellect to believe revealed things: therefore it is not to be asserted in the will of Christ.

You will say. Christ has in Himself generative and nutritive power, which are ordered to the conservation of His life, and incline Him to exercise acts which nowhere will nor can be in Christ on account of the state in which He now is: therefore by parity there can be in Him that pious affection of will, although it incline Him to acts of faith which on account of the repugnance of state He will never elicit. — I deny the parity, for far different is the ratio, because the generative and nutritive virtues, inasmuch as they are considered in first act, imply no imperfection, nor deprive Christ of any good intrinsic to Him and fitting His state, as faith itself does, which since it intrinsically imports obscurity would deprive Christ of the intuitive vision of God. Add that those virtues and powers pertain to the integrity of human nature, whence they are not in Christ in vain.

You will say 2. Faith was in Christ according to merit, as most Theologians teach with St. Thomas 3 p. q. 7, art. 3, ad 2: but that merit of faith consists in that pious affection of will moving the intellect to assent of faith: therefore that motion was in the will of Christ. — I distinguish the minor: that it was virtually, insofar as the will of Christ was ready to obey God perfectly in all things; so that He would even obey God revealing and obscurely proposing truths to be believed through faith, if He did not otherwise see them clearly and intuitively, I concede: that it was in act and formally, such that He had actual merit of faith on account of that motion of will, I deny. But for that virtual merit that pious motion of will is not required, but suffices the best disposition and readiness in the will to obey faith, should the state permit; which disposition indeed I do not dispute was in Christ as in first act.

Conclusion third. — HOPE WAS NOT IN CHRIST, NEITHER AS TO ACT NOR AS TO HABIT, BOTH REGARDING THE PRIMARY OBJECT AND THE SECONDARY. This Conclusion consists of three parts, of which the first is proved, namely that that virtue was not in Christ as to act, because what is possessed cannot be hoped for, according to Rom. 8: But hope that is seen is not hope, that is, hope is not of things had and possessed, for no one hopes for what he already has: yet Christ from the first instant of His conception enjoyed God as supreme good, as we shall see: therefore He could not hope for God, or exercise an act of hope toward God. The force of this argument is explained: hope is a certain motion of soul toward what it does not have: therefore just as the motion ceases when the terminus is attained, so also when beatitude is obtained the act of hope ceases in the Blessed, such as Christ was from the first instant of His conception.

That He did not have it even as to habit is clear, for it intrinsically and really includes imperfection with respect to Christ, namely to incline the will in first act toward God, its supreme good, as absent and not possessed: but the state of Christ was such that He always saw God clearly; whence this habit is removed from Christ not precisely because idle and superfluous, but because it argues imperfection in Him and includes a certain repugnance with His state, namely the absence of the object, which the soul of Christ always had present.

Neither was hope in Christ regarding secondary objects, namely the glorification of His body. Proof: where the real specificative reason of some habit is absent, there the corresponding habit is entirely absent: yet the real specificative reason of the habit of hope of the Theological virtue is absent from Christ: therefore also the habit of hope; nor consequently did He have it in order to secondary objects. The major stands, because nothing can be without its real constituent. The minor is proved: the real specificative reason of the habit of hope of the Theological virtue is God Himself as to be enjoyed and possessed, because habits are signified through order to their proper and real object; but God as to be possessed and enjoyed is the proper object of hope: yet this ratio of God, as object to be possessed and enjoyed, was always entirely absent from Christ, because He was always blessed: therefore the habit of hope was always entirely absent from Christ, even regarding secondary objects. — This argument is confirmed: habit only inclines the power toward secondary objects through and presupposing inclination toward its primary object; because secondary objects are like participations or appendices of primary objects: therefore wherever there is no inclination toward the primary and specifying object, as in Christ with respect to hope, neither will there be given inclination toward the secondary object. — Moreover, for the ratio of hope it is required that the object not only be arduous, but also have some incertitude, contingency, and fallibility: yet the glory of the body was not difficult and arduous to Christ, even considered as to the manner of conjoining it to Himself, nor was it contingent and fallible to Him: therefore Christ did not have hope. The major is urged by example: for no one, e.g., is said to hope that the rising of the sun on the following day will occur, because this is necessary and infallible and in no way arduous. It is proved next from this, that hope is concerned with the difficult in such wise that, according to the manner in which it occupies itself with it, it is distinguished from daring and fortitude: but daring and fortitude are concerned with it as simply difficult: therefore hope is concerned with that same thing insofar as it has some incertitude and contingency, such that hope is given to strengthen the will; which on that account is accustomed by some to be compared with fear, in this that both concern an object not altogether certain, but fallible of itself. The minor has two parts: the prior is that the glory of the body was infallible and most certain to Christ: the posterior is, that it was not difficult for Christ to have it. Therefore the prior is proved; because if between any two things there is a certain natural circumcession and connection, one being obtained it is certain the other will follow: but there is natural connection between the glory of the soul and the glory of the body, indeed so great that the glory posited in the soul necessarily follows in the body; at least while not separated from the soul, unless impeded by special dispensation, as happened in Christ: therefore the glory of the body was certain and infallible to Him. The posterior also is proved: the difficulty which is required for the virtue of hope, and which consists in conjoining the object of hope with the one hoping, must proceed from the condition of that very object, and not from the mere liberty of the one hoping, which as it were casts fetters upon itself lest it easily obtain a good otherwise owed to it: yet the difficulty of obtaining the glory of the body in Christ was only from His mere will, whereby He decreed not to obtain it otherwise than by dying for us. The major is confirmed; because otherwise every good whatsoever, though absent, even most easy of itself by nature, could be the object of our hope, since it is free to anyone to procure impediments for himself against obtaining it, yet goods themselves are commonly not said to be hoped for. But the minor is proved from the very mystery of the transfiguration of Christ the Lord: for therein, by His liberty and good pleasure, out of several gifts of the glorious body He permitted only clarity to be manifested: therefore since Christ was equally free regarding the other gifts as regarding glorification, just as from His good pleasure and mere will He impeded the others from appearing in His transfiguration, so also it lay within His liberty to impede all those gifts of the glorious body, as regards merit and redemption of the human race, lest they result and flow over from the beatitude of the soul into His body.

Suarez answered, that for the ratio of hope incertitude and fallibility are not desired, because, he says, if that were necessary, it would follow that in wayfarers confirmed in grace there would no longer be hope, since they are secure about their salvation. — But I answer, that glory whether of body or of soul can be called necessary and inevitable in two ways: first indeed from its own nature, when namely the one hoping has within himself the necessary principle of that glory. Second, per accidens, when the principle of effecting that glory, which is in the one expecting and hoping, is indeed fallible of its own nature; de facto nevertheless, by reason of another extrinsic thing superadded, that which is hoped for is said to be certainly future; just as a just man has grace, by which he can obtain glory, in which grace he dies contingently, because he could die not in it; per accidens however, insofar as God protects him with special help, he dies in it infallibly. Moreover, the first inevitability and necessity takes away from the object of hope the difficulty and contingency proper to it, because then the expected good is joined inevitably and necessarily to the expectant himself, because upon its position there quasi-naturally follows the effect as from its cause. But the second inevitability and necessity does not take away from the object of hope the difficulty and contingency proper to it, as appears in adult just men dying in the state of grace, who infallibly obtain glory; nevertheless that attainment is said to be contingent, because they could not die in the state of sanctifying grace. Whence since in those confirmed in grace who know their state from special revelation only that second inevitability per accidens is found, hence it is that in them the habit of hope always remains. Moreover in Christ there was the prior inevitability with respect to the glory of the body; since by reason of the blessedness of His soul He had an internal principle of attaining the glory of the body, seeing that the glory of the soul, unless impeded by miracle, flows into the body itself.

You will object those words of Psalm 17: My God, my helper, and I will hope in him: which words the holy Apostle expounds of Christ: therefore truly

Christ had hope. — I answer, that there the word of hoping is not taken for an act of hope, but for confidence, whereby one entrusts his salvation to another; whence also the Apostle does not use the word of hoping; for where David says I will hope in him, he himself writes I shall be confident in him. Therefore there could indeed be in Christ a certain desire with respect to obtaining the glory of the body, but not hope properly so called: for that desire could arise from supreme charity toward God, on account of whom He properly desired the glory of the body.

From these gather likewise that the virtue of penance was not in Christ, insofar as its primary and specificative act is either sorrow for sin from the motive of amendment; or intention of expiating debt; for the habit cannot be in a subject to whose intrinsecus its primary act is repugnant: but to the humanity of Christ, by reason of that union to the Word and fullness, the object specifying the primary act of penance, namely the penitent's own sin, as expiable or amendable, is repugnant intrinsically, and consequently the habit of penance is repugnant to Him. But if penance be taken for the virtue of religion, obedience, or charity itself, which also of themselves militate against sin and undertake to expiate and destroy it, I do not dispute that by this reason the virtue of penance existed in Christ.

By the name of moral virtue is here understood every elective habit consisting in a mean as regards us, according as the prudent man will define; of which definition you have the parts clearly expounded in our Moral Philosophy. But it is called moral, because it informs human acts and the manners of men. Now there are four principal moral virtues, of which three are called appetitive, because they reside in the rational appetite and are ordered to regulating the will: those are Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance; and one intellectual, namely Prudence, which illumines the minds of men and directs them in eliciting and composing their acts rightly and duly. And this virtue is called moral, not because it resides in the will and immediately directs it, but because it orders the intellect to moderating and regulating the free and deliberate acts of that will; and it is so necessary that, with it absent, the other virtues vindicate for themselves a futile and empty name. But these four virtues are commonly called Cardinal, by a comparison taken from the hinges of a door. For as a door turns on its hinge, so our whole moral manner of life turns toward honesty upon these virtues as on hinges. They are also called principal, because all others are ordered to them. I add moreover that some moral virtues include or connote no imperfection in those having them, such as Fortitude and Justice: others truly, which include and connote some imperfection, as Continence, whereby namely man resists present concupiscences with difficulty.

Note 2. That moral virtues can be regarded in a threefold state, namely imperfect, perfect, and heroic, or superexcellent. In the imperfect state there is not properly virtue, but a certain disposition which perfect virtue is apt to follow; or it is virtue only begun, or remitted. In the perfect state is virtue indeed intense and firm, but conversant only about its proper matter, as Temperance about curbing and moderating the pleasures of body and soul. In the superexcellent and heroic state, however, when it extends itself beyond its proper object, as Temperance moderating pleasures even before the danger of death proposed; by which reason it seems extended toward Fortitude, or a most strict federation and close bond, contracted with the very virtue of Fortitude. The difficulty is, in which of those states they existed in Christ.

Note 3. That although moral virtues are acquired by human industry, nevertheless they can also be infused divinely, like the theological ones; with this difference however, that theological virtues are infused per se and necessarily, since they can be obtained by no powers of nature, no labor and industry of men: but moral virtues are said to be infused only per accidens, since although they can be acquired by human diligence and exercise, nevertheless without all man's industry they can be infused divinely into the soul from the supreme liberality of God: not indeed for that reason only whereby they are ordered to a supernatural end, e.g. when those virtues order man to operating from the motive of charity and for the glory of God, but even when they are referred to a natural end; e.g. when they elicit their acts from the motive of public peace and for human honesty. For I cannot prove the opinion of certain Moderns who will that moral virtues can be infused divinely only insofar as they order man to a supernatural end and move him to operate from the motive of charity. Indeed if moral virtues, insofar as infused, were distinguished by this from themselves insofar as acquired, it would follow that no one could elicit by an acquired moral virtue an act deliberate in order to a supernatural end, and from the motive of charity, which is plainly false.

Three things therefore are to be determined in this Question: First, whether truly Christ had all moral virtues. Second, whether he had them in the perfect and heroic state. Third, whether he obtained them by his own industry, or rather by infusion, and that from the instant of his conception.

First conclusion. — All moral virtues which include and connote no imperfection were truly in Christ.

It is proved first: No perfection, even natural or moral, ought to have been wanting to Christ: but moral virtues are very great perfections, because they most perfectly perfect men in order to human life honestly, studiously, monastically, economically, and politically conducted: therefore they ought not to have been wanting to Christ. Then, Christ readily elicited moral actions, e.g. of Justice, Fortitude, and Prudence, whenever occasion offered itself: therefore he elicited them through the mediation of moral virtues, because no one can readily and promptly break forth into that action without habits ordered to it. Finally, there could be in Christ some difficulty in exercising acts of virtues, as when at the time of death his senses fled death: therefore to overcome it it was fitting for him to have the virtue of Fortitude.

You will object. Liberality, Temperance, Continence, and Prudence were not in Christ: but those virtues are moral and denote no imperfection conflicting with the state of Christ: therefore not all moral virtues which have no imperfection annexed were in Christ. The minor is evident. The major is proved: first indeed, that Liberality was not in him is plain, because it is the virtue whereby riches are rightly dispensed: but Christ was supremely poor. That neither Temperance nor Continence were in him is proved: because the former moderately composes the senses concerning sensible objects, so that it exercises ordered motions about them; but the latter tempers the motions of flesh: but Christ had no motions which needed coercion. Of Prudence too it is proved, for it is not acquired except with acquired knowledge: but Christ at the instant of his conception did not have acquired knowledge: therefore not even for that instant prudence. This is urged on a sufficiently weak foundation by Vasquez in 3 p. of D. Thomas dist. 2. cap. 2, to defend that Prudence was not infused in Christ at the instant of conception, but gradually acquired together with acquired science. —

I answer, denying the major, and saying to each part of its proof, first, that moral virtues do not consist in the very exercise of deliberate and morally good act, but in a permanent quality which be productive of that act, as is taught in the Ethics: and consequently according to that saying, the poor can be liberal as well as the rich, although they possess nothing which they can bestow, because the permanent quality suffices, or the deliberate habit rightly affecting the will concerning acts of liberality to be exercised, should occasion offer itself; and thus no one denies that liberality was in Christ. Add that even as to external act Christ exercised liberality, especially when twice he fed the greatest multitude of men, Matt. 14 and 15. Second, temperance and continence are not acquired for coercing inordinate motions only, but lest those motions be present; wherefore temperance and continence in the common degree temper indeed inordinate motions about sensibles, but in the heroic degree not only temper, but even effect that they be in no way present: but Christ had temperance and continence in the heroic degree, and therefore he had those virtues, so that in him there were no inordinate motions about sensibles. But Prudence is found not only with acquired knowledge, but also with other moral virtues, of which all it is the form and rule; wherefore although Christ at the instant of conception had not acquired knowledge, yet no less ought he to have had prudence, which then would likewise be moderator of the other virtues, that those were infused in him at the instant of conception will be proved below.

You will object 2. Those virtues which have repugnance with the state of beatitude and perfect sanctity were not in Christ: but moral virtues have repugnance with the state of beatitude and perfect sanctity: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for Christ from the instant of his conception was blessed. The minor is also evident; because those virtues do not remain in the Blessed, nor are required in most holy men; since they are ordered to restraining passions, which are present in most holy men; most of all in Christ, who had passions subject most perfectly to the empire of reason, as will appear below: therefore, etc. — I deny the minor, and to its proof I say first that moral virtues remain in the state of beatitude, not indeed as to the material, such as are the pleasures and delights of foods and venery with respect to temperance, or fear or daring about dangers of death with respect to fortitude, or distributions and exchanges of things with respect to justice, etc.: yet they remain according to what is formal in the very virtue, namely right election according to the order of reason concerning the honesty and mean of those passions which those virtues are of themselves ordered to moderate; or they remain as to primary and internal act, but not as to secondary and external; for those virtues are ordered first and per se so as to dispose the appetite to choosing easily and readily in their own matters conformably to reason; secondarily to restraining passions: whence those virtues can be in most holy men as to that primary effect, although they cannot be in them as to the secondary.

Second conclusion. — Christ had the moral virtues in the heroic degree, and that by infusion, from the instant of his conception. This Conclusion consists of three parts; of which the first is proved: In him moral virtues were not in the common degree, but in the superexcellent one, in which there are not immoderate passions, but well-ordered and composed ones: but in Christ there were not immoderate passions, but composed at nod and will: therefore there were in him virtues in the heroic degree. The major is evident: for since heroic virtue chiefly consists in this, that it repress all passions and subject them to the empire of the will, it is certain that he has heroic virtue who has passions well composed. Whence virtues in the perfect state are said to purge the soul: but in the heroic degree Aristotle and Plotinus call them virtues of the purged soul. The minor is also evident: for, as we shall prove below, Christ exercised and moderated all his passions, all sensitive appetitive motions, according to will and nod. Then, Christ had virtues in the most perfect state possible: but truly virtue in the heroic degree is possible: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for it was most fitting to the dignity of Christ that he have every excellence and perfection whatsoever compossible with his state. The minor is evident from the Philosophers. — Finally, that virtue is reckoned to be had in the heroic state which has other virtues annexed with it: but Christ had all virtues connected with himself: therefore, etc.

The second part is proved from Isaiah c. 7, where of Christ still an infant it is said: He shall eat butter and honey, that he may know to refuse the evil and choose the good. On which place St Jerome writes thus: Wrapped in swaddling clothes, fed with butter and honey, he shall have judgment of good and evil, so that refusing evil he may choose the good. Moreover Christ was at least equally perfect as the first parents: but the first parents, immediately upon being created, had all moral virtues, as the Theologians commonly teach: therefore much more Christ had those moral virtues. Finally Christ from the first instant of his conception was perfect, both as to will and as to intellect; for therefore he is called Man even for that instant in sacred letters, as when it is said, A woman shall compass a man: but the perfection of will according to the order of nature comes about chiefly through moral virtues acquired by genus: therefore Christ had them from that instant.

The third part is proved: Christ did not have those virtues by acquisition: therefore he had them by infusion. The antecedent is proved: for it is more probable that all moral virtues were in Christ for that instant of conception: but he could not acquire all simultaneously for that instant, because acquiring one by some most intense act, the others would not yet have been present: therefore it is more probable that those moral virtues were in Christ not by acquisition, but by infusion.

The gifts of the Holy Spirit are commonly numbered as seven from Isaiah c. 11, where speaking of Christ he says: And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him: the spirit of wisdom and of understanding, the spirit of counsel and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and of godliness. And he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord. Of all which gifts three pertain to the will, namely fear, godliness, and fortitude: but the remaining four regard the intellect: For Godliness disposes man in things that are toward another: Fortitude in those that are toward himself against the incursion of dangers: Fear in those that are toward himself against inordinate concupiscence of delights. Understanding perfects the mind for apprehension of speculative truth: Wisdom for judging perfectly: Counsel for apprehension of practical truth: Knowledge finally for rightly forming practical judgment concerning that truth, as Durandus teaches in 3 dist. 31 q. 3 n. 6, where he judges that these gifts were in Christ as wayfarer both as to act and as to habit; but in Christ as sole Comprehensor such as he now is, only those even as to act exist which perfect man in speculative life; while those which perfect him in active and practical life are only as to habit; but the other Theologians mostly contradict him.

Note 2. From the Subtle Doctor in 3 dist. 24 num. 6, it is more probable that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not distinguished from the theological and moral virtues except by way of aid to the aforesaid virtues; for as he reasons admirably:

Only those habits are to be posited in a wayfarer whereby one is perfected concerning every object as much as can be perfected on the way. Such are seven virtues in genus, not regarding acquired speculative sciences: therefore besides acquired speculative sciences no other habit is to be posited in a wayfarer simply distinct from the seven virtues. Proof of the major: the object concerning which a wayfarer can be perfected can be nothing but God or creature: but concerning God he is sufficiently perfected by three theological virtues, and this most perfectly as far as he can be perfected, if those three habits be most perfect in their genus: but concerning creature (not speaking of the speculative) the intellect is most perfectly perfected through prudence, if prudence be most perfect; for it is about everything doable, and has most perfect knowledge as to every condition of the doable. — Similarly as to appetite, he is most perfectly perfected by three moral virtues, if they be most perfect; because both concerning another and what is appetible to another, and concerning self and what is appetible to self; and this either first and directly, or secondarily on account of those firsts: and this understanding those four Cardinal virtues not as one habit-number in anyone which would be to itself universal Temperance or universal Justice, that is, concerning all things, but that each species of Justice inhere in its own proper singulars. But by the three theological virtues the wayfarer is sufficiently perfected concerning God immediately: because concerning him, as to be known immediately on the way, faith sufficiently perfects; since of God on the way there cannot be had except cognition of faith, as was said above in this third book, dist. 24; but concerning him as lovable in himself, Charity sufficiently perfects; and as appetible and good for me, Hope sufficiently perfects, as appears in the preceding Questions on faith, hope, and charity. But it does not befit a wayfarer to have ordered acts concerning God other than to understand him, love him in himself, and desire him as my good: therefore, etc. Similarly concerning every other good than God, as object, the wayfarer is sufficiently perfected by intellectual and appetitive habits: but those intellectual habits perfecting the intellect are intellectual virtues, and those sufficiently perfect the wayfarer as far as possible both for considering and for syllogizing practically; also appetitive habits are appetitive virtues, which virtues sufficiently perfect the wayfarer for desiring or loving, whether in order to himself or to another: therefore man, perfect by the three theological virtues, by intellectual virtues speculative and practical, and by moral virtues ordering toward self and toward another, is perfected as much as can befall a wayfarer: therefore some necessity does not appear of positing any other habits beyond these, which are theological, intellectual, and Moral virtues ».

Note 3. That generally Fear is threefold: the first is natural, which is the passion whereby an animal naturally flees impending evil: this resides in the sensitive part and per se is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. The second is worldly or human, whereby any temporal evil whatever, or loss of any temporal good, is so feared that justice is deserted for that reason, either by committing illicit things or omitting due ones: this is always vicious and reprobated by the Scriptures; especially Ecclesiasticus 1 and Matthew 10. The third finally is divine, which again some Theologians distinguish as threefold, namely servile, initial, and filial. Servile is that whereby someone abstains from evil work not from love of justice but from dread of gehenna, or even temporal punishment, and does what is of the law: but that it is good to fear punishment the Council of Trent defines, Session 6, and the holy Fathers prove, above all St Augustine, who everywhere teaches unless man begin to worship God out of fear he will not arrive at love, as in Ps. 149. Whence he urges men to do out of fear of punishment what they cannot yet do out of love of justice: so sermon 13 On the words of the Apostle: Do it even out of fear of punishment, if thou canst not yet out of love of justice. And Tractate 43 on John: If thou canst not yet love justice, fear punishment. — Initial fear is that which withdraws from evil and impels to good, partly from dread of punishment and partly from love of justice. It is called initial because it properly belongs to beginners leading a spiritual life. It is between servile and filial, of which we shall now speak: but so that it approaches nearer to filial than to servile, because it has order to filial as tending toward God, and turns away from servile as deserting him. Filial fear is that whereby one fears to offend God, and to be separated from God by offense, that is fault, or at least reverences God as supreme Lord of all and just avenger of sins. This fear is called chaste, filial, reverential. Chaste, according as God is compared to our souls as bridegroom, according to 1 Cor. 11, I espoused you to one husband, to present you a chaste virgin to Christ. Filial, according as it is compared to God as Father, Rom. 8, You received the spirit of adoption of sons, wherein we cry, abba Father. Reverential, according as men thereby reverence God, even when endowed with beatitude. This posited, I say the gift of fear is not so named from natural fear; which fear nevertheless certainly was in Christ as wayfarer; nor yet from worldly fear, which was never in Christ nor could be, because that fear is vicious and carnal; but whether the threefold divine fear was in him, namely servile, initial, and filial, must here be determined.

Single conclusion. — All the gifts of the Holy Spirit truly were in Christ.

It is proved from Isaiah cap. 11 praised in the first Notable, and likewise from all those texts of sacred Scripture whereby it was shown above that all graces and all divine charisms, which are derived into all men, pre-exist in Christ as in head, and flow from him into men as into his members. It is proved moreover: The gifts of the Holy Spirit are nothing else than certain perfections of the powers whereby man is easily moved by the Holy Spirit to exercise most perfect works: but Christ was moved by the Holy Spirit to most excellent works: therefore, etc. The major is evident from all Theologians positing this distinction between gifts and virtue whether infused or acquired, that virtues perfect man as to common acts, but gifts as to most excellent acts. The minor is evident from many works of Christ, as when the Holy Spirit moved him to fasting forty days and nights. — Moreover, those which denote perfection without imperfection and remain in the Blessed, were in Christ: but the gifts of the Holy Spirit remain in the Blessed, indeed not each as to act, but as to habit, and are an ornament to the Blessed like the other virtues. They denote also perfection without imperfection, as appears running through each: for Wisdom is the habit whereby the intellect is rendered easily movable by the Holy Spirit, that it judge firmly of divine things on account of supernatural reasons: Understanding is the gift whereby the same intellect is easily movable to apprehending and expounding the first principles of our religion: Knowledge the gift whereby it is easily rendered movable, that it draw conclusions from those principles: the gift of counsel is that whereby it is rendered easily movable, that it judge in particular what is here and now to be done: the gift of godliness is that whereby the will is rendered easily movable to the cult of God; or, as others will, to mercy toward neighbor: the gift of fortitude is that whereby the same will is rendered easily movable to adhering with constant soul to a difficult work: finally the gift of fear, whereby the same will is rendered easily movable to subjecting itself to divine Majesty on account of his supreme eminence: but all these denote no imperfection, but rather perfection: therefore those gifts of the Holy Spirit were in Christ, and even now remain in him.

That those gifts existed in Christ according to act appears from many of his works; as when Matthew 4 he went into the desert; which is thus described by the Evangelist, He was led into the desert, etc. when he fasted there forty days and forty nights: when Luke 6, He went forth into a mountain to pray, and to pass the night in prayer of God: when he answered most prudently those asking whether it were lawful to give tribute to Caesar: when he spoke to those bringing to him a woman taken in adultery, that she be condemned by his calculus: when moved by mercy in the desert he fed the people.

You will say. Only those gifts of the Holy Spirit are to be asserted in Christ which regard blessed and contemplative life; not however active life, which has no place in supernatural beatitude: but among the gifts of the Holy Spirit enumerated above some are such as regard only active life, as counsel, knowledge, godliness, and fear: therefore those gifts are not to be asserted in Christ as Comprehensor. — I answer 1. That the major is true of those gifts which considered adequately regard active life, otherwise however, if only inadequately. To the minor however I say the five aforesaid gifts differ in this from the two others, that the two others in no way pertain to active life, but the five others partly to active, and partly to contemplative life are ordered.

I answer 2. The major can be denied; since Christ our Lord, not only while he dwelt among men on earth, but even existing in heaven, leads a life not only contemplative but also active, insofar as concerning us and Angels he exercises the offices of true moral head; for those offices consist not in pure speculation, but in some influx and actual direction, which since they consist not in simple speculation of the beatific object, but are ordered to something to be supplied concerning members constituted under him, that operation pertains not only to contemplative but also to active life.

You will say. The gift of counsel seems to import doubt and ignorance, because counsel is employed there only where there is hesitation and ignorance concerning what is to be done: but in Christ there was no hesitation and ignorance: therefore neither need of the gift of counsel. — I deny the major, for it is false that counsel precisely and formally taken imports doubt and ignorance in the consultor: for everywhere in sacred Letters and the Fathers it is attributed to God, in whom no hesitation and ignorance inheres; but counsel formally imports only the act of intellect whereby the very election of the will is directed. But that counsel as it is in us has doubt and ignorance annexed to it proceeds only from our imperfection.

The difficulty can be only concerning the gift of fear, for grave controversy was once between St Bernard and Abailard concerning this, whether the gift of fear should be admitted in Christ; for Abailard denied that fear to be found in Christ. Truly he recanted this error and afterward taught the contrary, as appears from his epistle 2 to all the sons of the Church, where he has: To recognize that chaste fear permanent unto age of ages, which properly is called the reverence of charity, is in the soul of Christ himself as in elect Angels and men always. — But that truly the gift of fear was in Christ, not indeed according to that act whereby offense of God, or separation from God, is feared; but according to a certain act of reverence toward God arising from consideration of his justice and severity toward delinquents, above all of his eminence itself, is proved by this reason: fear regards two objects, whereof one is terrible evil, and the other is that by whose power evil can be inflicted, as one fears a King, insofar as he has power of killing; whence he who can harm would not be feared unless he had a certain eminence of power which cannot easily be resisted: but Christ was always secure that he would never sin, and thus certain that he would not be separated from God: and therefore he had not this first act of fear, but only the second, namely the act of reverence, inasmuch namely as his soul, stirred by a certain affect of reverence by the Holy Spirit, was borne toward God; whence Hebrews 5 says that he was heard in all things for his reverence.

It is asked however among Theologians, what that act of filial fear, or reverence toward God on account of his eminence, may be: for we can understand by that reverence the affect of obeying God as supreme Lord, and thus it is referred back to obedience: or of worshipping him as supreme being, and thus it regards religion; or of subjecting oneself to God by preferring in all things the divine honor to one's own, and thus it pertains to humility; by which reason St Augustine, book On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount, teaches that the gift of fear corresponds to humility: wherefore sermon 1 On the Annunciation, he opposes it to pride: and the same St Gregory, book 2 Morals, chapter 26, says the gift of fear is given against pride. But from this affect there follows in the will a certain motion by way of flight, whereby a creature in the presence of the divine and supereminent Majesty so bears itself that it dare not approach it, and wholly takes care not in anything to usurp that divine excellence of his, and dreads and flees to investigate his wonders. But this mode is called by the holy Fathers fear of reverence, or admiration, as appears in St Gregory, book 17 Morals, chapter 19, and Dionysius, chapter 13 On the Celestial Hierarchy, where expounding the vision of Isaiah, who saw Seraphim veiling feet and back, he says thereby is signified that sacred and horror-filled veneration full of awe, wherewith the saints shudder at the higher search into mysteries. Hence Apocalypse 16 it is said the Saints sing: Great and wonderful are thy works, O Lord; who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and magnify thy name? But this act of reverence includes not only willing of some good, but also flight from some evil: not indeed that imminent or future evil is dreaded, but because it is evil in itself and conflicting with divine excellence; of which fear St Augustine says, lib. 11. De Trinitate, chapter 6, Under the name of chaste fear is signified that will whereby we shall needs refuse to sin, not with the solicitude of necessity, but with the tranquillity of charity. Therefore the Blessed, inasmuch as he has flight from all sin as separating from God, can be said to have chaste fear; which also Christ could have; for although indeed he could not sin, yet since the human nature which he assumed was of itself capable of sin, he could by his will flee this evil, as simply possible to his nature. From these appears that that filial or reverential fear has no indecency or repugnance with either the hypostatic or beatific state of Christ. Otherwise it seems must be said of servile and initial fear; for servile fear chiefly regards avoiding sin on account of punishment to be paid: but Christ, since he was exempt from all sin and could in no wise sin, had none which he feared punishment to be inflicted for sin. The same seems to be said of initial fear, both because it is imperfect and not yet complete; and because insofar as initial, it includes dread of punishment to be inflicted in vengeance for sin: but from what was just said, that fear of punishment could have no place in Christ: therefore neither that initial fear.

NOTE 1. That the present question presupposes two natures in Christ, divine and human, and likewise two intellects, namely uncreated and created; since the intellective faculty is an undivided property of spiritual nature, it is necessary that that intellective virtue befit every nature having it; whence in the 6th Synod, Action 11, it is defined that the Word assumed a rational soul consubstantial with our souls, and a mind like to our mind; but mind signifies the soul according to that faculty whereby it is intellective; and in the Lateran Council under Martin, Collation 5, it is defined that all things were twofold in Christ; namely two natures, two intellects, two wills and operations: for although there only the Monothelites are condemned, who rejected only the twofold will in Christ; yet since the intellective power is inseparable from the appetitive, this heresy could not be condemned without at the same time determining two intellects in Christ, namely created and uncreated. Whence here it is deservedly asked, whether as there are two intellects in Christ, so also a twofold knowledge must be admitted, namely created and uncreated.

NOTE 2. That, passing over those heretics who denied Christ a human mind and consequently created cognition and science, against whom dispute has already been often held in the preceding pages, certain Catholic Doctors have asserted that the created intellect of Christ our Lord knew all things by no other cognition than divine and uncreated. Which opinion indeed St Bonaventure reports was at one time pleasing to some, in 3 dist. 11 q. 1. A certain John a Ripa taught it before the others, as Capreolus reports in 3 dist. 11 q. 1 a. 1; nay for asserting it Hugh of Victor labored long, Tractate On the Wisdom of Christ our Lord c. 16, where although at first he seems only to ask whether the science of Christ equals the divine; nevertheless he advances to the point that he preferred to deny created science in Christ; for when it had been objected to him: if the soul of Christ knows all things that exist, God has greater sufficiency than his creature in every good; he thus dissolved it: it is true that God excels his creatures in every good, where some good of creature is found other than the good of Creator: but since the wisdom of that soul is not other than divine wisdom, how can comparison be made? Responding to which he says:

It must undoubtedly be said that another wisdom than the divine was not in Christ; for if the wisdom of the soul of Christ were other than divine wisdom, it would be less... therefore that we may hold that truth firmly, that that soul knew nothing not, but knew all things, it must be said that that soul was wise by no other wisdom; but in God by nature, in that soul by grace.

Truly the other Theologians cry out, affirming as a dogma of faith that as there is in Christ a twofold intellect, created and divine, so also there is in Christ a twofold science, uncreated and human.

NOTE 3. That although in establishing this assertion the Theologians agree with unanimous consent concerning the truth of the thing, and that de facto the matter stood in Christ according to the present ordination of God; nevertheless some contend that de potentia saltem extraordinaria et absoluta the human intellect of Christ our Lord could become cognizant of all things through the uncreated cognition and science of God, nor can it be shown to any convincing reason that the opinion of Hugo Victorinus implies contradiction. Which assertion Aegidius a Praesentatione especially defends, book 1 On Beatitude, qu. 1 art. 2; but the contrary teach all Princes of Theology, and likewise their adherents and disciples, to whom let us subscribe with

First conclusion. — CHRIST TRULY DE FACTO HAD CREATED SCIENCE. This is of faith, determined in Councils defining all things to be twofold in Christ, namely two natures, two wills, two intellects, and two operations. And although they do not speak in particular of the intellect, yet by general definition they comprehend it; for Pope Agatho says in the Epistle of the Roman Synod (which is related in the 6th Synod Action 1, and received in the 8th): We confess in Christ all things twofold, insofar as they pertain to the natures, we preach his two natures, and confess each to have its natural properties, the divine all things that are divine, the human all things that are human, without any sin. — It is confirmed from the same Council, where he alleges St Leo saying: Of the two natures of Christ our Lord each form acts with the union of the other what is proper: namely the Word operating what is of the Word, and the flesh executing what is of flesh: which last words prove our opinion thus far, inasmuch as they assert each nature in Christ our Lord to have exercised its own proper functions, and consequently since actual intellection is one of the proper operations of the human nature, Christ our Lord must have understood by his created intellect through created actual intellection alone. Hence is subjoined: For neither do we give one natural operation of God and creature in anything, so as neither to lead up what is created into the divine essence, nor to cast down what is excellent of the divine nature to a place competent to creatures. This also appears most of all from the Lateran Council under ⟦OCR gap: several lines lost here by the OCR; text resumes mid-sentence⟧ it is likewise defined that all things in Christ are twofold, namely not only two wills, ⟦OCR gap: more lines lost; text resumes at the fragment "manam."⟧ manam. For first, since to each will its own cognition corresponds; if there are two wills in Christ, there must also necessarily be two cognitions. Second, by saying two operations, and not determining to the operations of only one or the other power, that action cannot be excluded from this definition which is first among human ones, namely created cognition. Third, by defining that in Christ are all things which pertain to human nature, created intellection was likewise defined to be in Christ, seeing that no one denies it pertains chiefly to human nature.

The conclusion can also be proved from sacred Scripture, especially from John 8, where Christ our Lord says: For I know him (namely the Father), and keep his word: where this particle I know stands for created cognition corresponding to the observation of the precepts of his Father. Moreover in the same Evangelist c. 13, Knowing that his hour was come, that he should pass out of this world to the Father, having loved his own; from which I infer, that as Christ observed the commandment of God as man, and suffered through the assumed nature, so also as man he knew these things by some created act. Add to these that Christ our Lord elicited very many acts of human intellection which cannot fall into divine cognition, for Luke 2 it is said he advanced in wisdom: but this progress however explained cannot be understood of divine wisdom, which is incapable of any increase as of decrease; Matt. 8 it is said he marveled: but admiration supposes a certain ignorance, which certainly cannot fall into divine science. And Hebrews 5, He learned by those things which he suffered: but to learn something conflicts with Christ by reason of divinity; therefore it behooved that Christ have a created intellect, and consequently created cognition.

It is proved also by reason, because if Christ had not science and created cognition, it would follow that the created intellect in him was frustraneous, for the intellect per se is ordered to its proper action: but the proper action of intellect is intellection elicited by itself: therefore Christ ought to have it. — Then, Christ is true and perfect man: but humanity without created intellection is not perfect: therefore Christ ought to have created intellection. The major is evident. The minor is proved: because whatever lacks its end is imperfect: but human nature, insofar as intellective, is on account of created intellection: for every power is on account of its operation: therefore without it it will be imperfect.

You will say. In vain are many things done which can be done by fewer: but Christ knew all things by uncreated intellection: therefore created intellection was frustraneous to him. — I distinguish the major: In vain are things done by the same faculty and power, pass; by different ones, I deny. But Christ through the divine intellect, and as God, understood indeed all things by uncreated cognition; but through the created intellect, and as man, he knew things by created cognition: therefore by reason of diverse faculty he had diverse cognitions, nor in vain was done through one faculty what could not be supplied through the other intellective faculty.

You will urge. Therefore Christ did not have created subsistence, because He subsisted sufficiently through uncreated: but He also knew all things sufficiently through uncreated science: therefore, etc. — I answer denying the parity; and the reason of disparity is that multiplication of subsistences would multiply supposits, and constitute two entirely separate and divided things, and consequently if there had been two supposits in Christ, there would have been no union of Divinity with humanity: but the like does not happen from double nature, faculty, and operation, because through those there are not constituted in Christ two intelligent beings separate and sundered from one another, but one only, by reason namely of unity of supposit.

You will say 2. If it be unbecoming Christ to know only through created science, especially since, as we said, it would follow thence that the created intellective faculty in Him would be vain: but this argument is nothing. Proof; for no inconvenience is it that some power in Christ not have its due operation nor attain the end to which it is ordered, for Christ indeed had generative power which was nowhere reduced to act. — I deny the minor, and to its antecedent I say that in Christ were all faculties and their acts which conduced to the end of redemption; but actual exercise of the created intellect of the soul of Christ most greatly conduced to that end; otherwise however of generative power; therefore no wonder if the act of this faculty was wanting to Christ.

Conclusion second. — THE HUMAN INTELLECT OF CHRIST, EVEN BY GOD'S ABSOLUTE POWER, COULD NOT BECOME INTELLIGENT THROUGH DIVINE AND UNCREATED SCIENCE. This is common among Theologians. It is proved first from the Epistle of Pope Agatho cited above, for therein he proves that in Christ there cannot be one operation of both natures; because it is impossible that the proper operation of one nature become the operation of another. Which can also be proved by the authority of St. Ambrose book 2 De Fide, chapter 4, where he plainly says the operation of one power cannot be another's: for he says: Where substance is diverse, one operation cannot be. In the same way argues St. Damascene book 3 chapter 13 and Pope Leo Epistle 10 to Flavian.

It is proved also by reason: If the human intellect of Christ could become intelligent through uncreated science, especially either habitually or actually: but neither can be said. Not the first, because uncreated science is not a habit but substance. Not even the second, because that uncreated cognition must be produced by an intellect, either created or divine: but it could not be produced by a created intellect: for whatever is from a created and finite principle is created and finite: therefore a created intellect cannot produce uncreated and infinite intellection. Nor yet by an uncreated one, because actual intellection is the proper effect of the intelligent being; for no one understands through the intellection of another, nor consequently through intellection produced by another: therefore the created intellect of the soul of Christ could not become formally intelligent through intellection produced by the divine intellect. — Then, if the created intellect of the soul of Christ could understand through the uncreated intellection of the Word, this would happen either through proper communication of uncreated intellection, or through union of that intellection with the created intellect. The first cannot be said; because by the same reason that created intellection would be said to be truly communicated to the created intellect of the soul of Christ, all other divine operations could be communicated to the assumed humanity by the same reason, and thus that humanity could spirate by communication of spirative virtue and spiration, and create by communication of creation, which are manifestly absurd and impossible. Not even the second: for if through union of the cognition of the divine intellect the created intellect of Christ could become intelligent, also the will of Christ could become willing and free through volition and liberty uncreated intimately united to itself: but this is false: therefore, etc. The sequence of the major appears: for by the same reason that uncreated intellection could be united to a created intellect, uncreated volition and liberty could be united to created will, since the same ratio appears on both sides. But the minor seems certain: for free volition must be in the power and dominion of will: but divine volition cannot be subject to the power or dominion of created will.

You will say 1. For true and perfect cognition nothing else is required than that the soul have science and wisdom intimately united to it actually: but the soul of Christ has intimately united to itself the divine Word, which is the very knowledge and uncreated wisdom of God: therefore truly through it the soul could know all things. — I distinguish the major: united to itself by the mode of form affecting and perfecting it, in the ratio of intellective faculty, I concede: by the mode of terminus hypostatically terminating its dependence: I deny. But the divine Word is not united to the very soul of Christ by the mode of form, but by the mode of hypostatic terminus: for the subsistence of the Word is terminus in its formal concept, not act; but intellection is formally the act of the intelligent being, and therefore it must be after the manner of form. Which answer is confirmed by what the Seraphic Doctor says d. 14 art. 1 q. 1:

Although the uncreated Word be united to the eye of Christ, and to all parts of Christ's body, nevertheless it is not known by the eye: and this because there is not in it disposition for knowing a spiritual thing: therefore by parity, however much the uncreated Word be united to the soul of Christ, unless the soul be disposed to see God through light which makes it Deiform, it will never behold Him.

You will say 2. Divinity can be united no less to a created intellect in the ratio of actual intellection, whereby the created intellect may understand, than be united to the same intellect in the ratio of intelligible species, or in the ratio of subsistence: yet both the divine essence and the subsistence of the Word are united to human intellect in those two ways: therefore also the divine essence can be united to a created intellect in the ratio of actual intellection, whereby it may understand. The minor stands from what has been said both in the present Treatise and in the treatise On beatific vision. But the major is proved as to the first part: for from the fact that the divine essence is united to a created intellect by way of actual intellection, it would not follow that the intellect does not become formally intelligent, just as it does not follow that it is not formally intelligent from the fact that the divine essence is united to it by way of intelligible species. It also appears as to the second part: for as the personality of the Word makes the humanity of Christ subsist in a far nobler manner and satisfies most sufficiently the appetite of humanity, so actual uncreated intellection far better satisfies the intellect of the soul of Christ, since created actual intellection cannot serve it either for knowing objects which it does not know, through that actual uncreated cognition of God; or for knowing them in a nobler manner: therefore the intellect of the soul of Christ knows not only through actual uncreated cognition of God, but also besides it has no other actual created intellection: and consequently it has no scientific habit ordered to such created intellection. — I deny the major regarding both parts; and to the first I say there is not parity of reason between the union of the divine essence in the ratio of actual intellection and the union of the same in the ratio of intelligible species, for the intelligible species is extrinsic to intellect: but intellection is intrinsic and the proper formal effect of the intellect itself. To the second argument I say there is not likewise parity between the union of uncreated subsistence with humanity and the union of uncreated intellection with a created intellect, because human nature is not ordered first and per se to subsisting as to its proper formal effect connaturally owed to it: but the intellect is ordered to its proper intellection, such that if that be taken away it can no longer be conceived how it understands; because to understand through intellection produced elsewhere it would need that it be received in it by way of word of mind: but uncreated intellection cannot be received in a created intellect, otherwise it would exist after the manner of accidental form, which is repugnant. I add that positing the subsistence of the Word in humanity implies the proper subsistence resulting in humanity: but however much uncreated intellection be posited in the created intellect of Christ, it would not imply that this intellect understand also through a created act elicited by itself; because although in that hypothesis it would know all objects which it can know through created intellection, and indeed in the noblest manner; nevertheless there would remain another mode whereby it could still know those objects, namely natural cognition proportionate to itself: just as de facto Christ, although He knows objects by beatific and infused cognition, not less therefore knows them also by acquired and experimental cognition.

You will say 3. A scientific habit is given only that it be known by: but there was no necessity that Christ know through created science, seeing He already knew all things through uncreated science: therefore there is no necessity of admitting created science in Christ. — I distinguish the minor: there was no necessity simply, I concede: secundum quid, and on account of perfection of the created intellect, I deny.