Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

WHETHER, IF ADAM HAD NOT SINNED, THE SON OF GOD WOULD HAVE BEEN INCARNATE NO LESS.

Here we do not speak of the possible, since it is certain that even if no sin of man had existed, any of the divine persons could have clothed Himself in human flesh; for the Incarnation has no necessary and essential connection with sin. Nor is the question moved about the other decree which God might have formed concerning a future incarnation upon the hypothesis that man was not going to sin; for whether in that case God would have had the decree of assuming flesh not as a remedy for sin but for other motives, nothing can be defined with certainty, since Sacred Scripture, through which are made known those things that depend on the will of God alone, decides nothing about this. The only difficulty therefore is whether by force of the decree which God had from eternity the Word was to become incarnate, although Adam had not sinned; that this difficulty may be solved with easier labor,

NOTE 2. That even if the divine Word was in fact incarnate on account of the redemption and reparation of the human race, yet this alone was not the principal cause of His incarnation, nor its more excellent motive: since Sacred Scripture discloses other causes of so great a mystery, namely the manifestation of the divine perfections, which shine forth especially (as we said in the first Article) in the revelation and manifestation of this mystery. Likewise the complement and perfection of the whole universe; likewise also the sublimation and complete beatification of human nature are derived from it. Sacred Scripture also commemorates other ends of such a coming of Christ, for instance that He might be the Doctor of truth, as He Himself testifies John 18: For this I was born, and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth. That He might be for us an exemplar of virtues: thus John 13 says: I have given you an example, that as I have done, so you also may do. Whence St. Augustine, sermon 52 De Diversis: A man who could be seen was not to be followed: God, who could not be seen, was to be followed. Therefore, that there might be shown to man one who could be seen by man and whom man might follow, God became man. Therefore the Theologians of both schools admit plainly that the solving and expiation of sin was not the sole motive for making the incarnation. But whether it was the chief, so that with it ceasing the incarnation would not take place on account of other ends — St. Thomas affirms, 3 p., q. 1, art. 3, with his disciples; but the Subtle Doctor denies in 3, dist. 7, q. 3, together with the Alensi 3 p., q. 2, memb. 13, Blessed Albert the Great, dist. 20, n. 4, and very many others, even from among the Thomists.

NOTE 3. That although the act of the divine will is unique and most simple in itself and really regarded, nevertheless it is understood as multiple by virtue, according to our manner of understanding; so that in it is distinguished the order of prior and posterior, whether that be only an order of reason or rather quasi-natural and of supposition of one thing to another; inasmuch namely as that act, which in its entity is infinite, corresponds to very many acts which we would elicit successively in some thing to be decreed and produced; although that order of priority and posteriority which is found in the divine acts ought rather to be referred to the secondary objects about which the divine intellect and will are occupied, than to the very entity of the act, which in itself is truly most simple and indivisible. But in these acts as well as objects certain signs or instants are wont to be assigned by Theologians, by reason of which one act is said prior or posterior to another. Which acts according to those diverse instants, as regards our purpose namely the decree of the Incarnation of Christ, the Doctor thus distinguishes in 3, dist. 39, q. unica, n. 6, where he says:

That the incarnation of Christ was not foreseen occasionally; but just as the end was seen immediately by God from eternity, so Christ in human nature, since He is nearer to the end, was predestined before the others, speaking of those who are predestined. Then this was the order in the divine prevision: For first God understood Himself under the aspect of the highest good: at the second sign He understood all other creatures: at the third He predestined these to glory and grace, and concerning the others had a negative act of not predestining: at the fourth He foresaw those who were going to fall in Adam: at the fifth He preordained, or foresaw the remedy how they would be redeemed through > the Passion of the Son; so that Christ in the flesh, as well as all the Elect, was seen and destined to grace and glory before the Passion of Christ was foreseen: just as the physician first wills the health of a man before he ordains medicine for healing.

Here the Doctor terminates the five signs or instants of reason which he distinguishes, in which the act of the divine will, as it were fivefold, upon diverse subjects, which God decreed concerning Christ and His coming.

NOTE 1. That just as God decrees things to be made before He produces them, since His decree is from eternity, while the making of things is only in time; hence a twofold order of prior and posterior is wont to be distinguished in the divine operation, one namely according to intention, another truly according to execution: so that some things are called prior according to the intention of God decreeing and determining the production of things; others posterior according to the execution and operation of God producing things, as the physician e.g. according to intention has first the health to be restored than the medicine to be prepared: but according to execution he first prepares the drug before he restores health. Now it is certain that Christ our Lord was not destined by God to be produced before the other creatures: since He was only formed and produced in the middle of time. But the difficulty is moved whether He was destined by God prior, according to the order of intention, to the other creatures, and consequently He would no less have been formed whether men sinned or did not sin, because He was destined to be produced independently of the prevision of the future sin of man.

These things thus premised, two things especially come to be determined in this Question: the first indeed, whether Christ in fact came chiefly to redeem men and to wash away their sins. The second however, whether by force of the present decree He would no less have come although there were to be no sins of men.

First Conclusion. — THE WORD IN FACT ASSUMED FLESH CHIEFLY ON ACCOUNT OF MEN TO BE SAVED AND THEIR SINS TO BE EXPIATED.

This is the common opinion, and

It is proved first from Sacred Scripture, which openly signifies that the Son of God had as the principal cause of His coming into the world the redemption of man from the servitude of sin. Thus Matthew 18 and Luke 19 the same adorable Savior testifies: The Son of man came to seek and to save that which was lost. And John 3: God so loved the world as to give His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. And Luke (5)3: They that are whole need not the physician, but they that are sick: I came not to call the just, but sinners to penance. The same the holy Apostle testifies, First to Timothy 1: Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners. Which motive indeed of the coming of Christ is declared in the Nicene Symbol in these words: Who for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven.

The holy Fathers also give their support, above all St. Athanasius, in the book De Humanitate Verbi, where he says: That you may know that our fault gave Him the occasion to descend, and that our transgression elicited the humanity of the Word of God, so that He might hasten to us and appear among men; for we gave the cause of that incarnation for our salvation: so human did He become, that He wished both to be and to appear in a human body. Basil, homily De Humana Christi generatione, c. 27: Learn the mystery: therefore God is in flesh because this cursed flesh had need of being sanctified. Hence it was defined in the Sixth Council of Toledo: We confess that only the Son came forth from the secret mystery of the Father for the redemption of the human race, on account of the debts of sins which we had contracted originally through the disobedience of Adam, and by our own free will. From all which testimonies it plainly appears that Christ the Lord came into the world especially that He might save sinners: wherefore excellently St. Augustine, sermon 9 De Verbis Domini: There was no cause of Christ the Lord's coming except to save sinners: take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no cause for medicine.

Yet I do not deny that the Word had not this alone but several other motives for the incarnation de facto accomplished, for instance the manifestation of omnipotence, wisdom, and divine goodness: the exigency of a head proximately univocal and proportionate with the Church; for, as St. Chrysostom says in sermon 1 De Pentecoste: The Church is dear to God; for the sake of the Church heaven was stretched out, the sea diffused, the air extended, the earth founded, etc. And shortly after: For the Church the sea was divided, the rock was cleft, manna flowed from heaven... for the Church the Prophets, for the Church the Apostles, nay, for the Church the Only-begotten God was made man. By which St. Chrysostom openly teaches that one of the chief motives of the accomplished incarnation was that the Church might obtain a head worthy of herself, namely the Son of God, visible in the flesh.

Second Conclusion. — BY VIRTUE OF THE SIXTH SIGN OF THE PRESENT DECREE THE DIVINE WORD WOULD HAVE ASSUMED HUMAN FLESH EVEN IF ADAM HAD NOT SINNED. This Conclusion rests upon and is confirmed by a fourfold foundation.

FIRST PROOF. — Drawn from the fact that Christ was decreed prior to creatures. — Christ was willed and destined by God before the foreknowledge of the sin of men; therefore although man had not sinned, nevertheless by force of the present decree the divine Word would have put on flesh. The consequence is evident: since the prior does not depend on the posterior, if the coming of Christ is willed and decreed by God before the foreknowledge of the sin of men, it is evident that His coming was decreed independently of such sin; and it would have been committed by God to execution although man had not sinned. The antecedent is proved: The production of Christ was decreed before the production of creatures; but the decree of the production of creatures preceded the decree of permitting sin; therefore Christ was willed and decreed before the permission, and consequently before the foreknowledge of the sin of men. Whence it stands: for God could not previously have had the decree of permitting the sins of men, nor foreknow them as future, before having the will of producing them themselves; since operation follows being, and consequently the foreseen sinful action presupposes the foreseen existence of the man about to sin. But the major is proved by very many texts of Scripture in which Christ is called the first of all creatures. Thus Ecclesiasticus 24: I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn before every creature; where He excludes no creature whatsoever; which text the Council of Sardica expounds at the end of its Epistle to all Bishops concerning Christ: so that those words, I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, signify His eternal generation inasmuch as He is the Son of God; while the rest designate His temporal generation decreed before any creature whatsoever. Which indeed can be confirmed from St. Paul to the Colossians 1, where he says: Who is the image of the invisible God, firstborn of every creature: for in Him were created all things in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible... He is the head of the body, the Church, who is the beginning, firstborn from the dead, that in all things He may hold primacy: but Christ is not firstborn of every creature according to the order of temporal execution; since He was only formed and born in the midst of the years; therefore He is firstborn in divine intention and destination: and consequently His future incarnation precedes the decree of the production of things, and consequently precedes the decree of the permission of sin. — It is confirmed first from Proverbs 8: The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning, I was ordained from eternity, and of old before the earth was made... the depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived. Each of which words of this oracle confirms our opinion in a wondrous manner. Indeed those words are expounded of incarnate Wisdom, namely Christ our Lord, by the holy Fathers, especially St. Clement Romanus book 1 of the Apostolic Constitutions, chapter 20; Basil book 10 contra Eunomium; Athanasius sermon 3 contra Arianos, and Nazianzen in oration 1 Theologica; Cyril book 3 of the Thesaurus, chapter 1; Augustine.

The adversaries reply from St. Jerome, epistle 136, that "the Lord possessed" is better rendered from the Hebrew than "the Lord created." Moreover very many of the holy Fathers expound that passage of uncreated divine Wisdom; the following words of that oracle favor them: When He prepared all things composing them, and I delighted in every day, playing before Him at all times: which certainly can be understood only of an actually existing thing; but Christ did not exist from the beginning of the world; therefore the aforesaid oracle must be understood not of incarnate Wisdom but only of uncreated. — But I answer that this response of the adversaries does not dissolve the force of the aforesaid argument: for first, although "the Lord possessed" is better translated than "the Lord created," nevertheless those words must necessarily be understood of divine Wisdom as incarnate; since it is said that he who possessed that divine Wisdom is its Lord; but the divine Word, as Son of God, acknowledges no lord; but only as son of man; since, as St. Athanasius says in the Symbol: equal to the Father according to Divinity, less than the Father according to humanity. Nor does it stand in the way that some Fathers expound the words adduced of Wisdom as uncreated: for Theologians commonly teach that sometimes there can be several literal senses of one and the same text of Sacred Scripture, especially of those which are uttered concerning Christ our Lord: since Christ has two natures subsisting in the same person of the Word, namely the divine and the human, thence it comes that the same text of Scripture sometimes designates both natures; whence although certain words of the aforesaid oracle are interpreted of Christ as sustained by the divine nature, nothing hinders the rest from coming to be expounded of Him Himself as sustained by the human nature.

It is confirmed from the fact that that divine Wisdom says there: My delights were to be with the children of men; which if true of fallen men, seems far more true of men to be repaired.

They reply 2: That Christ is called the beginning of the ways of God, yet not of the works of creation, but of reparation. Moreover if He be called the beginning of the ways of God in the order of creation, He is not so called according to priority of intention, as if God intended to produce Christ before other creatures, but only according to priority of dignity and excellence. Thus Job 10 Behemoth is called the beginning of the ways of God. — But neither of these expositions dissolves the aforesaid argument. Not indeed the first, which is altogether absurd and without foundation, and moreover openly contrary to these following words of that oracle: Before the earth was made, before all hills I was brought forth. The second exposition likewise does not obstruct, because Christ is not only called the beginning of the ways of God, which indeed could designate priority of dignity; but He is also called possessed and created by God, that is, decreed in the beginning before external creatures were decreed.

It is confirmed secondly: The exemplar according to which something is made is intended prior by the agent than that which ought to be produced in imitation of it; but Christ our Lord was the exemplar in imitation of which God produced Adam; therefore the formation of Christ ought to have been intended and decreed prior to that of Adam. The major is evident, for every cause precedes its effect with a certain priority; but the exemplar has the character of a cause. But the minor is proved from Tertullian, book De Resurrectione carnis, where pondering those words of Genesis 1: Let us make man to our image and likeness, he says: That clay then putting on the image of the future Christ in the flesh was not only the work of God, but also a pledge. And St. Athanasius, in the sermon on the most holy Mother of God, says: It is rather to be said that God made man according to the image of God: for God made man according to the image and similitude of that kind of Incarnation and assumed humanity.

It is confirmed finally: He is intended first in the order of creation on whose account all things are created and founded; but all things are created and founded on account of Christ; therefore, etc. The major is evident; for the end is intended prior by the agent than those things which are toward and on account of the end;

But the minor is proved: both from the above-praised chapter to the Colossians, where it is said that in Christ Himself, that is, on account of Him, all things were created; and from First Corinthians 3, where the Apostle declares the order of ends to which creatures are ordered: namely that corporeal creatures are for the elect, the elect for Christ, but Christ immediately for God; for he says: All things are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's: but this inference would not be legitimate unless Christ had been intended and decreed by God prior to the other creatures; for just as the creation of men was intended prior by God than the formation of the world on account of that created man, as on account of the primary end, so also the production of Christ ought to have been intended prior before men were decreed to be created on account of Him: which indeed the Apostle confirms to the Hebrews 2, where he says: For it became Him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, who brought many children into glory, etc.

The holy Fathers confirm the aforesaid argument, especially St. Cyril book 5 of the Thesaurus, chapter 3, where disputing against the Arians he says: If, as the heretics say, God produced the Son that He might produce us, He will have been made on account of us, not we on account of Him: why therefore should He not give thanks to us, who exist for our sake? He will also be our glory in such wise as woman is of man; for man was not created on account of woman, but woman on account of man. Rupert favors it too, expounding the just now praised words to the Hebrews, where he thus says: It must be religiously said, and reverently heard, that on account of this Son of Man, namely Christ, to be crowned with glory and honor, God created all things.

SECOND PROOF. — Drawn from the fact that Christ is the Firstborn, Exemplar, and Moral Principle of the Elect and Predestined. — He who is the first exemplar of all the Predestined and Elect, and their moral principle, is intended prior by God as future than the permission of sin be foreseen and decreed: but such is Christ; therefore, etc. The major stands, especially in the opinion of the Thomists, who affirm that Predestination takes place before foreseen merits or demerits according to intention, although according to execution it depends on merits. But the minor is proved: first indeed that Christ was firstborn and exemplary cause of all the predestined; for this the holy Apostle openly teaches to the Romans 8 in these words: Whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be Himself the firstborn amongst many brethren. And First to the Ephesians: He has blessed us with all spiritual blessing in heavenly places in Christ, as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world. And shortly after: He predestined us through Jesus Christ unto Himself: where the particle "through" signifies also that Christ was the meritorious and morally efficient cause of our predestination; but the particle "unto" denotes Him to be the final cause of the same predestination.

These things are confirmed by the authority of the holy Fathers: for Irenaeus book 3 Contra haereses, chapter 11, said thus: The Word, maker of all things, had preformed in Himself the future dispensation of the human race concerning the Son of God, God predestining first the animal man, namely that he might be saved by the spiritual, when the saving one pre-existed; it was fitting that even the carnal be saved, so that the saving one not be in vain. Mark: He had preformed the law in Himself, and the law, since the saving one pre-existed, and finally he predestined first the animal man, that he might be saved by the spiritual, etc. All which manifestly declare that in the divine predestination for the glory of God Himself Christ, as moral head, or according to the dignity of Savior, was predestined before the predestination of man; nay that this man was predestined precisely for this, that salvation should not have been empty, and the office of Christ the Savior already antecedently prefinished. The same teaches St. Cyril book 5 of the Thesaurus, chapter 8, where he says: Christ is laid as foundation before all, and upon Him we are all built up, and this before the beginning of the world in the foreknowledge of God; that with divine order blessing preceded malediction, and damnation into death short of pollution, liberty of divine adoption servitude, and human nature, overcoming the evils which in the meantime befell, could run back into that pristine dignity (through the grace of Christ who founded her in good things) which God indeed established by charity through His Son would come to pass: therefore if blessing preceded malediction, and the grace of Christ founded human nature in good things, it follows that human nature, which in the first Parent was founded in good things and had blessing and life through original justice before malediction and death through the lack thereof, or through original sin, was predestined through Christ, or (as Cyril speaks) built up in Christ, in the foreknowledge of God, or intention of God, and consequently that Christ was predestined before original sin, as moral cause. Whence Cyril concludes: Therefore as regards the foreknowledge and counsel and purpose of the Father, and of the whole Deity, Christ was founded before the ages, and born in due time of the Virgin; in whom we are repaired, who before the beginning of the world had Him Himself as the foundation of our salvation.

The adversaries reply that from these only is gathered that Christ was predestined first, but not that He was predestined before original sin: for, they say, predestination regards the order of grace, while the permission of sin regards the order of nature; but since the order of nature precedes the order of grace, it follows that the decree of the permission of sin precedes the predestination of Christ. — But on the contrary, Christ is called absolutely the first and head of the predestined, and the exemplary and morally efficient cause of the predestination of men; therefore He was predestined before the predestination of Adam; but Adam, according to the mind of the Thomists, was predestined independently of the prevision of merits, and consequently before sin was foreseen; therefore Christ also was predestined before the prevision of sin. But to the argument I say that although nature precedes grace in order of execution, nevertheless it is preceded by it in order of intention: for what is more perfect is intended prior than what is less perfect, because it is ordered to that which is more excellent; but nature is less perfect than grace, to which it is ordered; therefore although in order of execution nature precedes grace, nevertheless in order of intention grace is intended prior by God than nature; for it does not conflict that the subject exist on account of the form, and yet by the intention of the agent the form be prior to the subject; thus we see the substantial form prior to matter in the intention of the material agent; yet in execution matter is presupposed for the form. Therefore although the permission of sin regards the order of nature, thence it does not follow that it was intended prior than the destination to grace and glory. Add that the death of the predestined pertains to nature, for it is naturally a defect; and yet the foreknowledge of his death does not precede his election to grace and glory, especially in the opinion of the Thomists, who will that predestination take place before merits foreseen. Similarly the sin of those crucifying Christ was truly a great sin, and consequently according to the adversaries ought to regard the order of nature; therefore if the order of nature were intended prior than the order of grace and glory, it follows that God saw prior the sin of those crucifying Christ than Christ Himself, which is absurd: since since Christ is the subject about which that sinful action ought to be occupied, this could not be foreknown before such a subject were foreknown.

THIRD PROOF. — Drawn from reason. — One willing in an orderly manner those things which of their nature hold as end and means ought prior to will the end, and among the means those which are nearer to the end, and finally those means which are more remote; but toward the manifestation of the divine goodness, which is the end intended by God in the production of things, nearer stands the incarnation of the Word and the glorification and predestination of Christ than the predestination of all men and their beatification and justification; since the incarnation of the Word, and Christ Himself is nearer to God than all creatures; therefore since God always wills in the most orderly way, He intends prior the manifestation of His goodness, and immediately after willed the incarnation of the Word, then the order of grace, and finally that of nature, to which the permission of sin belongs; and consequently the decree of incarnation preceded the decree of production of things and the decree of permission of sin. The minor stands: since Christ is God-man, He stands more intimately and nearly to God than any creature whatsoever, and contributes more to His glory.

But the Adversaries reply, that the major is true of those means which are nearer to the end in order of causality; false however of those means which are nearer only in order of perfection. For, they say, that one mean is nearer to the end than another can be understood in two ways: first indeed by reason of causality, namely because it conduces immediately to the attainment, other means not immediately but mediately through it. Thus v.g. in the glorification of man, which is the end intended by God predestinating, although in order of execution vocation conduces to it prior than justification; nevertheless in order of intention justification is intended prior by God than vocation, because justification conduces more immediately to glorification than vocation. Secondly, one mean is said nearer to the end than another by reason of greater perfection and affinity with the end; by which reason that which participates more of divine being and of the goodness of God is said nearer to Him than that which participates less. But although Christ is more perfect than the whole order of grace, and by this reason nearer to God, nevertheless He is not nearer to the end intended by God in order of causality, because God could decree simultaneously all things which conduce to His glory, whether they be of the order of nature, of grace, or of hypostatic union; He could also order a less perfect mean to a more perfect, or a more perfect to a less perfect, since this depends on the sole will of God. He could therefore first decree the permission of sin and the redemption of men, then truly the Incarnation of the Word, as a posterior crushing mean toward the glorification of men. — On the contrary, first, although truly God perhaps can without some disorder choose and order a less perfect mean for attaining an end, and afterwards that which is more perfect; nevertheless it appears more fittingly and congruously that He intend and order immediately that mean which by reason of its perfection has greater affinity with the very end being attained; for that befits more the summit of His wisdom and sweet administration of things. Secondly, the adversaries concede that willing in an orderly fashion one wills the end prior than the things toward the end: but Christ is the immediate end of all creatures, both of the order of nature and of the order of grace; therefore He is intended prior by God than the other creatures, of whatever order they may be. The minor stands from what was said, where it was proved from the Apostle 1 Corinthians 3 that just as all things are created on account of the predestined, so all created things and also the predestined themselves are on account of Christ, as He is man, as on account of an end, just as all those things and Christ Himself are on account of God, as on account of the ultimate end; therefore since God, willing in an orderly fashion, wills the end prior than the means, it is necessary that as He intends prior the manifestation of His glory than the incarnation of the Word, because His glory is the ultimate end of all His works, so He intend Christ prior than all those things which are ordered to Him. — Thirdly, to will in an orderly fashion signifies nothing else than to will lovable objects as they are lovable among themselves: but the object which of itself is more perfect and noble is also more lovable; therefore willing orderly the end, one wills prior the more perfect means than the less perfect: but the incarnation of the Word contributes in a more excellent manner to the manifestation of the glory of God, which as end is intended in all His works, than does the redemption of men and the permission of sin contribute; therefore God ought to decree prior the incarnation than the permission of sin. Finally, the permission of the sin of Adam ought of its nature to be the lack of actual grace in Adam, but the lack of grace presupposes its concession; therefore Adam was foreseen prior having grace than lacking grace: but every grace conferred on Adam, whether in the state of innocence or in the state of reparation, was granted him only in view of the merits of Christ to come, for no effect of the predestination of Adam was independent of the merits of Christ; since Christ is the head of all predestined men, and that through the mediating actions by which He merited beatitude for us, it follows that the predestination of Adam, and consequently every effect thereof, depends on the merits of Christ: but the grace which Adam had, even in the state of innocence, was an effect of his own predestination: because since every degree of glory of a predestined man is an effect of his predestination, that grace pertains to the effects of the predestination of Adam, to which corresponds some degree of glory in which Adam himself now exists: but the grace he had in the state of innocence corresponds to some degree of glory which Adam now enjoys; for although that grace was lost through the subsequent sin, and its merit mortified, nevertheless through penance it was restored to him, and the merit vivified for receiving that degree of glory to which he had right in the state of innocence.

The adversaries answer that it is false that to that grace which Adam had in the state of innocence formally as such corresponds some degree of glory which Adam obtains; since, they say, that grace was totally extinguished by sin; nor did the meritorious works done through it retain any right to glory as to a reward, but remained altogether dead and incapable of reviviscence through penance: in which they differ from our merits, which, since they are only mortified by lethal sin, revive through penance unto those same degrees of glory to which they had special right. The reason of this discrimination is that, destroyed in us there remains nevertheless still one of the moral and vital principles of those actions by which before we fell into sin we merited something with God, namely Christ Himself, who is the moral cause of all our merit: but with respect to Adam still innocent, Christ did not yet inflow into his merit, but only contributed to it the grace conferred on him, which was the radical and vital principle of such merit; therefore that principle destroyed, every merit which had proceeded from it totally lost life; and consequently it was not only mortified but altogether dead. — On the contrary, first, they assert without foundation, and not without danger of error, that grace was not conferred on Adam out of the merits of Christ. Indeed the Apostle to the Ephesians 1 expressly pronounces: He has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in heavenly places in Christ: but the grace conferred on innocent Adam was a supreme blessing, not only for himself but also for us his posterity, upon whom he ought to transfuse it; therefore it was conferred in view of the merits of Christ. — Then, they put forward as solution the very thing in controversy: for we are disputing whether Christ was decreed prior than Adam or any other creature; therefore that response does not seem suitable. — Moreover, the Mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to Adam in the state of innocence, as St. Thomas teaches 2 q. 2 art. 1, and St. Augustine book 1 De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia, chapter 2, where he affirms that marriage in the state of innocence was a sign and Sacrament of the conjunction and spiritual union of Christ with the Church; which he proves from that passage of the Apostle to the Ephesians 5, where having related those words which Adam uttered after his wife was formed: Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh, he immediately adds: This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ, and in the Church. By which the Apostle signifies that Adam uttered those words not only to denote the intimate union of spouses but also the union of Christ with the Church; therefore innocent Adam foresaw Christ to come. — Finally, the Adversaries falsely bring forward that the merits of Adam through the subsequent sin were altogether dead, since for that reason our merits do not at all die as long as we are faithful, because through faith we are always united to Christ the head and mediator of our salvation; but Adam did not lose faith, otherwise the Church would have been wholly extinguished at that time; therefore he could have the same union with Christ the head even while he sinned, as sinners now have who have not lost faith.

FOURTH PROOF. — Drawn from the absurdities which arise from the contrary opinion. — If Christ had come only on account of sin, it would follow that He is a merely occasioned good, namely that He would not have had existence unless sin had been committed; but it is absurd that so great a good, such as Christ, should be only occasionally intended by

God, since He is of Himself supremely willed and lovable, no less than redemption itself from sin, nay much more, inasmuch as He is of Himself a more excellent good; therefore, etc.

THE ADVERSARIES REPLY 1: That it is not inconvenient that Christ was decreed only occasioned by sin; because, they say, a far greater benefit was bestowed on men by the fact that God became incarnate for the remedy of sin alone, than if He became incarnate for other motives in the order to justification and glorification which men would have had if they had persevered in the state of innocence, because the less worthy the recipient, other things equal, the greater the benefit: but an incarnation made on account of the sole remedy of sin would be a benefit made to a sinner and unworthy one; whereas if it took place for those motives, this benefit would not be conferred on an unworthy one; therefore nothing hinders the Incarnation of the Word from being an occasioned good. — But, I say, this response neither meets the point of the difficulty nor contains true doctrine. It is not indeed to the point of the present difficulty, because it is not asked whether the incarnation of the Word would be a greater or lesser benefit if it took place on account of the sole redemption from sin: but whether of itself it is a greater good than redemption, so that that good would not exist unless redemption were to be made. Nor does it contain true doctrine, because doubtless it would be a greater benefit that the incarnation take place for the justification and glorification of men, and also for the dignity of human nature, than if it took place for the sole redemption: for it is more excellent to give a hand to a man lest he fall into captivity and guard and keep his liberty, than if he be rescued from chains.

THEY REPLY 2: That "occasioned" is taken in two ways: first, as identical with "beside the intention of the agent," and accidental; in which sense they admit the incarnation is not an occasioned good, especially with respect to God, since all things are subjected to His governance: secondly, a good is said to be occasioned because it depends on some occasion, although intended by God from elsewhere; and in this sense they concede the incarnation to be an occasioned good. — But from this response it follows either that the incarnation of itself would be a lesser good than the remission of sin, or that God orders a greater good, namely Christ, to a lesser good, namely the remedy of sin: but both are absurd. For Christ, as God-man, is a far more excellent good than the salvation of all men: since God receives greater glory through Christ alone than He would receive through the salvation of all men. Similarly God would act disorderly if He ordered a greater good to a lesser: for beings less perfect are ordered, according to the just ordination of divine Providence, to more excellent ones: thus the elements serve living things, plants serve brutes, brutes truly men.

THEY REPLY AGAIN, that it would indeed proceed disorderly if a greater good were ordered to a lesser as to an end qui, that is for whose sake something is done: not however if it were ordered as to an end cui, that is to which; for Angels in Scripture are said to be produced and sent in ministry to men: and the salvation of the rustic is said to be the end cui of royal providence; because the good of the rustic results from the best administration of the king. - On the contrary, if the incarnation were decreed only on account of the sole remission of sin, it would follow that it would not be unless sin existed, and consequently that it would have existence only on the occasion of remitting sin, and thus of itself and absolutely be ordered to sin; but that which of itself and absolutely is ordered to another, so that it has existence only on account of that ordination, is ordered not only to an end cui but also to an end cuius gratia. Therefore if it were a disorderly disposition that a greater good be referred to a lesser as to an end qui, it would follow that the incarnation would be less rightly ordered to the sole remission of sin. The minor stands: for that is said to be ordered to another as to an end qui, at least immediate, when it is produced only on account of another and would have no existence if it were not so ordered to another: thus creatures are said to be ordered to the glory of God as to an end qui, because they are created only for the glory of God. These responses will be confirmed from the following absurdities.

The second absurdity, which arises from the adverse opinion, is that if Christ were decreed only for our redemption, it would follow that the sin of Adam would have been useful to Him, because He would not have His existence, nor grace and glory, unless Adam had sinned; nay He could rejoice over the sin of Adam; for someone can rightly rejoice over that without which he would not receive his being nor have his perfections: but this consequence is altogether absurd. The major is proved by a like authority of St. Anselm book 1 Cur Deus Homo, c. 18, where he reproves the opinion of those asserting that men were made and predestined only that they might fill the empty seats of the Angels; for if it were so, it would follow that men ought to congratulate themselves on the perdition and fall of the Angels. And he says:

If men could in no wise have been made except for the restoration of the lost Angels, it is a fine thing, that unless those Angels had fallen from that beatitude, men would not ascend to it: if anyone therefore should say that the elect men will rejoice as much at the perdition of the Angels as they will rejoice at their own assumption, since doubtless this would not be unless that had been, how can they be defended from this perverse congratulation?

But the same would have to be said of Christ, if He had been decreed to come only for repairing lost men.

THE ADVERSARIES REPLY: That it is false that Christ would rejoice at the fall of men, but that He would rejoice only at the goodness and mercy of God, who produced so great a good out of so great an evil as out of an occasion: for neither, they say, did we give the occasion of the being of Christ of Himself, and by our intention, but only per accidens, and by the intention of God, who willed out of the sin of Adam as out of an occasion to decree the incarnation of the divine Word. To the authority of St. Anselm they deny parity; because, they say, therefore men ought to rejoice at the fall of the Angels if they were ordained to fill their seats, because, upon supposition of the Angelic fall, men would be predestined without a new benefit, as Anselm supposes in the opinion of those whom he impugns: for they said God had chosen a certain number of Angels to glory with this condition, that if some should defect, so many should be assumed from among men; and therefore by force of that pact they would be predestined without a new benefit; and therefore they ought to rejoice at the fall, from which without a new benefit their predestination would follow; but the incarnation of Christ did not proceed from the fall of men without a particular benefit; whence Christ ought not to rejoice at the sin of Adam. - But these responses do not satisfy.

Not indeed the first: although indeed Christ ought to rejoice in the mercy of God, from which principally and for its own sake His production proceeds, nevertheless it seemed wholly to follow that He ought also to rejoice in that without which God would not be moved by mercy to decree the coming of Christ Himself, just as He would not be moved to predestine so many men unless, as those whom Anselm impugns will, so many Angels had fallen. Nor does the disparity satisfy which they bring forward between their proposal made by Anselm and ours, because it is entirely the same thing whether the predestination of men takes place from the fall without a new benefit, or does not so take place, in order that men might have ground for joy over the fall of the Angels: for the motive of joy would not be the lack of a new decree, or that they not be destined by a new decree to glory: but the motive of that joy would be the conservation of their predestination, which would take place upon the supposed fall of the Angels: but it would not take place if the Angels had not fallen. Whence their joy would arise only from their predestination, whereby it would infallibly follow from the ruin of the Angels. But the same would have to be said of Christ our Lord, if His coming had been decreed only to free men from sin.

The third absurdity, which arises from the opposite opinion, is that if Christ were decreed only for men to be redeemed, there would follow first, that He would owe thanks to us to repay, not we to Him. Secondly, that we would be far more excellent than Christ. Thirdly, that sin would have been necessary in order that Christ exist. But these three consequences are absurd, and repugnant to the doctrine of the holy Fathers. The first indeed, because St. Athanasius infers it and impugns it in book 3 Contra Arianos, with these words:

If God, he says, willing to produce creaturely nature, begot the Son for use unto them according to your opinion, that through Him He might build us up: consider how bold is the impiety in your words. First, because it will appear that the Son was created for us, and not we for the Son: for we would not have been created for His sake, but He for ours, and so that He Himself should owe grace to us, not we to Him. And immediately he infers: If that is conceded, it plainly follows, that the Father did not will the Son for Himself, for not willing to create Him He created Him, but, when He willed to save us, for our sake He instituted Him.

— The second consequence St. Cyril impugns in book 2 of the Thesaurus, chapter 3, where he says: If the Son was made for us, and not we for the Son; we shall be far more excellent than He Himself. Which is confirmed also by St. Basil book 4 Contra Eunomium, where he says: That which was made on account of another, and not for itself, either is part of that for which it was made, or is less than it. — Finally the third consequence is impugned by the authority of St. Augustine, who lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, c. 23, denies that sin was necessary in order that Saints be born and the generation of men take place. And he says: Whoever said that Adam and Eve were not going to come unless they had sinned — what did he say except that on account of the numerosity of Saints the sin of man was necessary? For if by not sinning they alone would remain, because as they think, unless they had sinned they could not generate, certainly in order that not only two but many just men could exist, sin was necessary, which it is absurd to believe. Therefore much more absurd, that sin was necessary in order that Christ, the head of men and Holy of Holies, come into this world. Which inference Rupert draws in these words: *According to Augustine, he says, it would be absurd to say that on account of sin the generations of men were not going to happen. If therefore on account of men, that they be born, sin had been necessary, what must be thought concerning the Head and King of all the Elect, Angels and men, except that He Himself most of all had no need of sin, in order that He become man from men, about to dwell with them the delights of His charity?

THE OBJECTIONS ARE SOLVED. — THEY OBJECT 1. THE ADVERSARIES: The decree of the Incarnation, since it is above nature's due, can become known only through revelation: but whenever Sacred Scripture, Councils, or the holy Fathers, from whom the divine will must be gathered, speak of such a decree, they assign no other cause or motive of it than liberation from sin, or the redemption of man from the servitude of sin; therefore by force of the decree which God de facto had, the Word would not have assumed flesh, Adam not sinning. They suppose the major as true: but prove the minor: First, by all those passages of Sacred Scripture by which in the preceding Conclusion we proved that Christ truly came chiefly to redeem men from sin. Secondly, from the Councils, especially Nicaea, and from its Symbol of faith, where it is said: Who for us men, and for our salvation came down from heaven. Thirdly, finally they confirm it by very many authorities of the holy Fathers, chief among which are St. Irenaeus book 3 chapter 14 saying: If flesh did not have ⟦original sin?⟧, the Word of God would by no means have become flesh, and if the blood of the just did not have ⟦to be impiously shed?⟧, the Lord would never have had blood. St. Cyril of Alexandria dialogue 1 De Trinitate, where he says: If we had not sinned, neither would the Son of God have been made like unto us, nor would He have suffered: and if He had not died, He would not have been assumed, that He might be adored by us and by the Saints, that is the Angels. St. Ambrose book De Incarnationis Dominicae sacramento, chapter ⟦4?⟧: What was the cause of the Incarnation, except that the flesh which had sinned might be redeemed? Augustine, sermon De Verbis Domini: If man had not perished, the Son of man would not have come. St. Leo sermon 3 In Pentecosten: If man, he says, made to the image and similitude of God, had remained in honor of his nature, nor deceived by diabolical fraud had declined from the law laid upon him through concupiscence, the creation of heaven and world would not take place: nor would the Eternal undergo temporality: nor would He who is equal to God the Father, and Son of God, assume the similitude of the flesh of sin. Gregory the Great on 1 Kings chapter 1: If Adam had not sinned, our Redeemer would not have needed to take our flesh: for He was sent to call the just, but sinners to penance: if therefore He came for sinners, if sins were absent, He would not need to come. — I answer with the Doctor, granting the major, distinguishing the minor: No other motive of the Incarnation is assigned as it de facto happened and truly was accomplished — I concede: as it would have to be fulfilled upon the hypothesis that there was no sin — I deny. For it stands both from Sacred Scripture and from the holy Fathers praised for our opinion, that even if Adam had not sinned, nevertheless Christ would have come. Whence, if those texts of Scripture and oracles of the Fathers praised for our opinion may be interpreted by the adversaries, why may not also the sentences objected by them be expounded in a like manner by benign interpretation, lest the Fathers and Scripture appear to conflict mutually? Add that the holy Fathers themselves lay the foundation of our exposition: since when they deny Christ would come if sin were not, they either signify that He would not have come in the similitude of the flesh of sin, as stands from St. Leo; or that He would not be subject to death and other miseries to which He subjected Himself, that He might satisfy for sinners; or that He would not come as Redeemer, Savior, and Physician: in which sense St. Augustine sermon 90 De verbis Apostoli, expounding these words 1 Timothy 1: Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners, says: There was no cause of redeeming for Christ the Lord except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no cause of medicine: if a physician should come from heaven, the sick would lie wondering throughout the whole circle of the earth: the sick one himself is mankind.

They press: That the holy Fathers expressly pronounce simply and without any addition that Christ would not come if sin were absent: but this speech would be false if Christ came, sin not intervening, in impassible flesh; for of him who is to come in impassible flesh it is true to say that He is to come; therefore it is false to assert that He is not to come; therefore when the holy Fathers pronounce absolutely that Christ is not to come if sin were absent, they judge that by no means would there be incarnation if Adam had not sinned.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I deny the consequence. For the holy Fathers do not say simply that He would by no means come, but that He would not come in that passible and mortal state in which He appeared; whence they speak of the Incarnation as it was made, wherefore some use this interrogatory mode, as Nazianzen and Ambrose: What cause of the Incarnation, except to save sinners? By which formula of speech they signify that the principal cause of the accomplished Incarnation was the salvation of sinners; yet they do not deny that there are other causes for making the Incarnation if there were no sin. Nor does their mode of speaking therefore present falsity; for someone can be said not to come, although he comes; not indeed in that way in which he was expected, but in another: thus John 7 Christ our Lord said to His kinsmen: Go you up to this festival day, but I will not go up to this festival day: and yet the Evangelist adds: And when his brethren went up, then He also went up to the festival day, not manifestly, but as it were in secret: whence Christ our Lord saying absolutely that He would not go up is to be understood, not publicly but secretly.

They insist: Christ could not come by force of that decree de facto existing except in passible flesh; therefore if Adam had not sinned, either He would by no means have come, or He would have had to come in passible flesh. The consequence is evident, for there is no other possible mode of Incarnation except in passible or impassible flesh. Therefore if Christ had not come in impassible flesh, He would have had to come in passible flesh. The antecedent is proved: since God first decreed the Incarnation efficaciously, either the Word was to become incarnate in impassible flesh or in passible flesh, or He decreed only His coming in common and as to the substance of humanity: but the first cannot be said, because if God had first willed efficaciously that the Word assume impassible flesh, de facto He would have assumed it when He became incarnate; otherwise either that decree would not have been efficacious, and thus with Adam not sinning would not have attained its effect, nor consequently in this hypothesis would the Word have become incarnate; or it would have been changed at a subsequent sign of reason, upon supposition of the permission and prevision of sin, by another decree, whereby God, having previously destined the Incarnation in impassible flesh, afterwards willed that it take place in passible flesh, that it might be a remedy for sin: but this cannot be said, because it conflicts with the immutability of God and the perfection of divine Providence, which is not uncertain and changeable as ours, on account of the limitation of our intellect and will. The second also cannot be said, because in two ways God can be feigned to have willed first the Incarnation, or hypostatic union, in common, abstracting from passible or impassible flesh: first indeed so that He decreed only in common, and as it were confusedly, to assume some individual of human nature, not determining whether He would assume this or that one; secondly, so that He willed to unite this humanity hypostatically to Himself in individuo, yet not determining whether He would assume it in passible or impassible flesh: but neither mode of speaking is true. Not indeed the first, because an efficacious act of the divine will is terminated to the thing in particular, with all its accidents, circumstances, and modes with which it ought to exist: otherwise that act of the divine will would not have been efficacious, because it would not have been terminated to the thing under that state under which it is not possible in act; therefore God did not will efficaciously the Incarnation of the Word only in common and as to its substance, abstracting from passible or impassible flesh. Add that to will something in common, and afterwards in particular with all its accidents, circumstances, and modes, denotes an imperfection of our intellect and will; therefore it could not have place in God.

I answer, that God decreed first the Incarnation only as to its substance, abstracting from the state of passibility or impassibility; since He had reasons why He should determine prior the substance of the Incarnation than its circumstances; namely, that Christ could merit for the Angels, and the first parent, grace and other gifts, which were conferred on them independently of sin: for neither could the foreseen merits of Christ move God to confer that grace unless the substance of the Incarnation had been decreed before sin was foreseen. Therefore God, seeing it possible that Christ could merit those gifts for Angels and men, or that those benefits be given them in view of His merit, provided His coming were decreed before the prevision of sin, decreed the incarnation to be made absolutely, not yet decreeing the mode nor the state, impassible or passible, taking impassibility for subjection and liability to death and miseries. For a twofold passibility can be distinguished: one indeed arising from the four qualities and contrary elements of which bodies consist, and this is intrinsic to nature, and Adam had it in the state of innocence, but bound through original justice, and the draw of the tree of life, whereby all natural defects were kept from his body. But the other is passibility inflicted on account of sin, which is the very actual subjection to death and miseries. Christ would have had the former passibility even if there had been no sin, because He would come composed of four qualities and contrary elements; and thus by force of the first decree He would equally be passible; but by virtue of the other decree He would come impassible in the second manner, because it was not fitting that, the cause of the redemption of sinners failing, Christ de facto lie subject to death and miseries, but He would have been prevented by God constituting His humanity in a state altogether glorious and impassible. Whence to the argument in form: I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say, that God decreed by His first decree the substance of the Incarnation; and that Christ was to come in passible flesh, taking passibility in the first manner, inasmuch as it is something intrinsic to human nature — I concede; that He decreed Him to come passible, with passibility taken in the second manner — I deny: because upon the hypothesis that there would have been no sin, God by the other decree would have established that coming of Christ take place in impassible flesh, that is not liable to death and hardships; just as de facto He decreed that He come passible, by a decree following that one whereby He had decreed the substance of the Incarnation before the prevision of sin.

They insist likewise: That no foundation can be brought forward for this twofold decree, and all the sentences of Scripture and the holy Fathers concerning the futurition of the Incarnation signify only that there is a single decree, both as to the substance and as to the circumstances of the Incarnation itself; therefore the solution touched upon is null.

I deny the antecedent: for upon the hypothesis that the Word is to become incarnate before the prevision of sin, as we proved, it is necessary that another decree follow, whereby namely it is determined that He is to come in the impassible state, upon the hypothesis that there is no sin: because it was fitting that He not lie subject to death and hardships if no sin existed. Therefore there would be need that the decree de facto existing about the substance of incarnation be followed by another decree about the mode of passibility; but since that supposition of not committing sin was not true, therefore to the decree about the substance of the Incarnation it was necessary that another follow, whereby the coming of Christ in passible flesh was established. Whence two decrees are rightly distinguished in God: one about the Incarnation as to substance, the other about the same according to its circumstances: the prior precedes every prevision of sin: the posterior truly follows it; namely so that God first willed to send His Son into the earth as leader, head, and lawgiver of the human race; secondly foresaw original sin and others which flowed from it; thirdly decreed to send Him in passible flesh, so that He who would have been Leader, head, and lawgiver only, if no sin had existed, that same One would be our redeemer suffering death for the guilty. These things are confirmed by the example of one who efficaciously wills some end without determining the means. V.g. if someone wished to go from Marseilles to Rome, since he could not get there except by sea or land; he, by force of that intention, upon the hypothesis that there were an impediment of going by sea on account of dangers, ought to resolve upon departure by land; not indeed precisely by force of the prior decree, but through another subsequent decree intervening, whereby he decrees to go by land, because he cannot set out to Rome by sea; therefore similarly, since God decreed the substance of the Incarnation independently of the circumstances, because, as proved, the Son of God would have become incarnate even if there were no sin; the same need was of a new decree, whereby out of the prevision of sin the coming of Christ in passible flesh would be decreed.

It subsists: If there is need of a new decree, that the coming of Christ in passible flesh be decreed, it follows that Christ would not come by force of the present decree whereby His Incarnation is predestined as to substance: and consequently if Adam had not sinned, Christ would not have come by force of the present decree, as the Conclusion affirmed.

I deny what is subsumed: for although Christ would not come as passible by force of the present decree whereby His passibility is destined, because sin failing, such a decree would not exist; nevertheless He would come by force of the present decree whereby His incarnation is predestined as to substance; not indeed precisely, and without another decree, but mediated by a decree about His future coming in impassible flesh. For just as v.g. he who would proceed to Rome would be said to go there by land by force of the prior decree, inasmuch as to the prior decree necessarily followed another about going by land, upon the hypothesis that there were an impediment to going by sea, and vice versa: so since God de facto decreed the substance of the Incarnation independently of the circumstances, and that decree determined no more toward establishing a future Incarnation in passible flesh, upon the hypothesis that there would be sin, than it determined that it be in impassible flesh if there were no sin, truly it can be said that by force of that decree about the substance of the Incarnation the circumstance of impassibility would be decreed, upon the hypothesis that there would be no sin: and thus Christ would come in impassible flesh by virtue of that prior decree, because the last decree would necessarily have followed upon the decree about the substance of the Incarnation.

He objects 2: All the merits of Christ our Lord are merits of the Redeemer, and consequently presuppose captivity contracted through sin, from which He redeems us: but in the case that the first man did not sin, there would not be such captivity; indeed nature would have remained intact in that state in which she had been created; therefore in that case Christ would not have come.

I distinguish the major: They are merits of the Redeemer, either preservative or relieving — I concede; relieving only — I deny. For there is a twofold office of the Redeemer: one whereby He preserves lest anyone incur captivity: the other whereby He redeems and relieves from that very captivity. The former Christ would have exercised if He had come in impassible flesh: the latter however He exercised while de facto He came in passible flesh.

He objects 3: The Incarnation is a certain humiliation and emptying of a divine person, according to that passage of the Apostle to the Philippians 2: He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant: which emptying occurs not only through death and passion, but especially in the very fact that the Son of God assumed human nature; for man by the condition of his nature is a servant comparatively to God, because God is his Lord, as Lord of all creation: but the Son of God had no other cause of humbling Himself thus than because Adam unduly willed himself raised above his condition; therefore if Adam had not so sinned, the Son of God would have had no occasion to humble Himself thus through the Incarnation.

I deny the minor: for besides the expiation of sin, very many other reasons underlie the making of the Incarnation: namely that Christ be the head of the Church, Lawgiver of men, and that He commend His divine power, goodness, and wisdom, and also that He converse with men; for as that divine Wisdom says, Proverbs 8: My delights were to be with the children of men.