Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini
Claude Frassen (1620–1711)
Tractatus I: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini
Quaestio I: Quot, et quae fuerint haereticorum erronea dogmata circa incarnati Verbi mysterium
Disputatio I: De Existentia, Natura, et Causis Incarnationis
Articulus I: De Possibilitate, Convenientia, et Complemento seu Peractione Mysterii Incarnationis
§ I: De Possibilitate Incarnationis
Quaestio I: An unio divinae naturae cum humana in unitate personae sit possibilis
Quaestio II: An, et quo lumine cognosci possit et suaderi
§ II: De Convenientia Incarnationis
Quaestio I: An conveniens fuerit Deum incarnari
Quaestio II: An convenientius fuerit naturam humanam, quam Angelicam, aut aliquam aliam a Verbo assumi
Quaestio III: Utrum convenientius fuerit Filium, quam Patrem, aut Spiritum Sanctum incarnari
Quaestio IV: An convenienti tempore facta fuerit incarnatio
§ III: De Necessitate Incarnationis
Quaestio I: An, et qualiter necessaria fuerit incarnatio
Quaestio II: Utrum purus homo Deo satisfacere potuerit pro hominum offensa, eorumque ruinam restaurare
Quaestio III: Utrum Christus Deo condignam satisfactionem exhibuerit
Quaestio IV: Utrum Christus pro nobis satisfecerit ad iuris apices, seu ex rigore iustitiae
Quaestio V: Utrum revera peractum sit incarnationis mysterium, et Iudaeis promissus Messias advenerit
Articulus II: De Unione Hypostatica
§ I: De Unione Hypostatica secundum se spectata
Quaestio I: Quid sit unio hypostatica
Quaestio II: An unio hypostatica facta fuerit in unitate naturae aut personae, idque per veram et proprie dictam compositionem, an per utriusque commixtionem
Quaestio III: Quis sit terminus unionis hypostaticae
Quaestio IV: Utrum unio hypostatica sit immediata, et omnium unionum maxima
§ II: De Persona Assumente
Quaestio I: Qualiter, et per quid Verbum divinum naturam humanam terminaverit et assumpserit
Quaestio II: Utrum subsistentia Dei absoluta et communis tribus personis possit naturam humanam assumere, illique immediate uniri
Quaestio III: Utrum plures personae divinae possent assumere eandem humanitatem, et eadem persona plures humanitates
Quaestio IV: An persona creata possit alienam naturam terminare et assumere
§ III: De Unione Hypostatica ex parte Naturae Assumptae
Quaestio I: An natura tam Angelica, quam irrationalis, sit assumptibilis a persona divina
Quaestio II: An natura accidentis possit assumi a persona divina
Quaestio III: Qualiter, et quo ordine Verbum divinum humanitatem et eius partes assumpserit
Articulus III: De Causis Incarnationis
§ I: De Causa Efficiente Incarnationis
Quaestio I: Quae fuerit vel esse potuerit causa efficiens et instrumentaria Incarnationis
Quaestio II: An aliqua fuerit causa media, seu praeparativa ad Incarnationem per modum effectionis et dispositionis
§ II: De Causa Morali et Meritoria Incarnationis
Quaestio I: An Christus per opera priora vel subsequentia unionem hypostaticam ipsam potuerit promereri
Quaestio II: An et qualiter Beata Virgo meruerit esse Mater Dei
Note 1. All scholastic Theologians agree among themselves that certain circumstances of the Incarnation could fall under merit of men; but among such circumstances the Maternity of God, namely that Christ should have such a Mother, and not another, holds first place, as that which infers greater affinity of some pure creature with Christ. Yet there is controversy whether most Blessed Virgin could merit that dignity, and that not only by worthy or congruous merit, but even by merit de condigno: concerning which the opinions of Theologians are various. For there are who judge blessed Virgin to have merited de condigno divine Maternity: which opinion Gabriel judges probable in 3. d. 1. art. 8. dub. 3., and it is upheld by some Recentiores.
But the second opinion teaches, B. Virgin merited indeed by worthy merit, not however condign, to be Mother of God. So St. Bonav. in 3. d. 1. art. 2., for he distinguishes a triple merit, namely condign, worthy and congruous; but he calls worthy merit that work which of itself has no equality, and dignity corresponding to reward; yet obtains it from benignity of God accepting such work for that reward. But the third opinion, which is more common and safer, contends blessed Virgin merited that dignity neither worthily nor condignly, but only congruously.
Note 2. It is one thing to merit de condigno a form, or certain dignity, another truly to merit the disposition requisite in subject, that worthily, decently it receive such form, or dignity; for these two can be separated, chiefly when disposition, and dignity are not necessarily, and quasi physically connected among themselves; but only according to a certain moral proportion; for then it can come about that although someone be worthily disposed toward receiving form or dignity, nevertheless such form is not owed to him from justice, and hence that he does not merit it de condigno. It is asked however whether blessed Virgin was condignly disposed, that she be chosen into Mother of God.
Note 3. Condign disposition of most Blessed Virgin herself toward Maternity of God can be gathered from various gifts wherewith she was illustrious: First indeed from eximious sanctity, and preeminent habitual grace, whereby she was anticipated from the first instant of her conception, together with all gifts and infused habits: Secondly, this disposition illustrated in wondrous manner certain privileges of perpetual innocence, lack of fomes; which although conferred in first sanctification, nevertheless obtained new and multiplied vigor through assiduous exercise of merits, and virtues: Finally in third place contributed most to that disposition increment of graces and virtues, since from the very instant of her conception, according to St. Bernardinus, or at least from that time when infants are wont to be gifted with liberty and use of reason, unto the very instant of conception of Christ, through daily assiduous increment of merits and virtues it advanced her unto the summit of piety and sanctity. These things premised, three things are to be determined: First, whether B. Virgin merited divine Maternity de condigno. Secondly, whether at least she merited it de congruo. Finally, whether truly she was worthy that, before all creatures, she be chosen into Mother of God.
First Conclusion. — BLESSED VIRGIN DID NOT MERIT DE CONDIGNO TO BE MOTHER OF GOD.
It is proved first: Two condign rewards diverse among themselves cannot respond to same merit: but eternal glory, which as wage responds to meritorious works, is reward condign to them, and is distinct from Incarnation: therefore blessed Virgin, who through meritorious works merited eternal glory, could not demand from justice another reward; nor consequently merit divine Maternity through those works. It is confirmed: all merits of blessed Virgin proceeded from grace of adoption, which as thus considered respects and inclines only toward obtaining beatitude; not toward meriting things which are of hypostatic order, to which Maternity of God pertains, since that be intrinsic circumstance of Incarnation.
Then, for merit de condigno beyond excellence and dignity of work, pact and promise are necessarily required on part of rewarding one, which promise excluded, however excellent the work would be, the rewarding one would not be held to concede reward: which is especially true in God, who cannot be moved to confer any benefit unless either by reason of goodness, of justice, or rather of fidelity to be kept in promises: now there is no pact, nor any promise, whereby divine Maternity was promised to blessed Virgin under condition of her good works; therefore she could not obtain that Maternity by merit de condigno.
Finally, if blessed Virgin had condignly merited to be Mother of God, which is circumstance of mystery of Incarnation, also SS. Patriarchs, chiefly Abraham, would in fact have merited that Christ arise from his seed: both because his works made from grace, although they were not so distinguished as works of blessed Virgin, were nevertheless of the same nature, and thus were referred by their own nature to same genus of reward: and because also if promise be required for rationale of condign merit, as we said just now is in fact required, Abraham had that promise made to him, Genes. 8; but we read no similar made to most Blessed Virgin with respect to divine Maternity to be conferred upon her. Moreover now it seems absurd to all Theologians to assert that Abraham condignly merited that circumstance of Incarnation: therefore far less must it be attributed to blessed Virgin with respect to divine maternity, which infers far more sublime dignity on account of her more intimate confederation with Christ than was dignity of Abraham, that Messiah would originate from his seed.
You will say 1: Most Blessed Virgin condignly merited that which is greater and more excellent than Incarnation, namely beatitude, and augmentation of grace or justification: therefore she also merited what is less: but maternity of God is something less than eternal beatitude and augmentation of grace: therefore she could merit even that maternity. The major stands: because who can effect greater can also less. But the minor is proved: both from that of Matthew 12. Whosoever shall do the will of my Father who is in heaven, he is my brother, and sister, and mother. Wherefore Luke 11., a certain woman lifting up voice, after she had said to Christ: Blessed is the womb that bore thee, and the paps that gave thee suck: Christ subjoined: Yea rather, blessed are they who hear the word of God, and keep it; plainly placing sanctity of life to be preferred before dignity of divine maternity. Wherefore St. Augustine expounding those words Tractate tenth on John, says: My mother whom ye have called blessed, blessed for this reason because she kept the Word of God, not because in her the Word was made flesh. And lib. De sancta Virginitate, c. 3.: More blessed was Mary perceiving faith of Christ than conceiving flesh of Christ.
I deny the consequence: for although most Blessed Virgin merited something more excellent than divine maternity, thence however it does not follow that she had merited even that maternity; indeed who can more, can also less, in things which are of same rationale and order; but otherwise in things which are of diverse rationale: for greater is it to reason than to fly; and yet it does not follow: someone can reason: therefore he can also fly, because flying and reasoning are of diverse rationale: well however follows: some agent can produce four degrees of heat: therefore also two. So at present, since reward of eternal life, and augmentation of grace, is of diverse rationale from reward of divine maternity, it is not consequent that if blessed Virgin could merit the former de condigno, she also could merit the latter.
You will say 2: If anything had stood in the way of the blessed Virgin meriting worthily the maternity of God — either because God had not accepted her works toward so great a dignity, or because He had not promised it to her on account of merits, or finally because she could not have merited that circumstance of the Incarnation, namely divine maternity, without also having merited the principle of merit: yet nothing of these stood in her way. Not indeed the first, because the blessed Virgin was created and ordained for this, that she might be the Mother of God; hence the Church attributes to her those words: From eternity I was ordained; likewise these: God chose her, and pre-elected her; namely, that from her and in her He might prepare a dwelling worthy of His Son. Nor indeed the second, for the promise did not fail her; for in Isaiah 7 it is said: Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son. Finally not the third, for just as the Mystery of the Incarnation is presupposed on the part of the principle of our merits, and those of the blessed Virgin, so too the humanity of Christ is presupposed: not indeed humanity in general, but that singular one composed from this matter and form. But since He took the matter of His body from the Virgin, on the part of the principle the dignity of the Mother is already understood in the Virgin; and therefore such a dignity cannot fall under merit itself, whose principle it is.
I deny the minor, and to the first proof I say that the blessed Virgin was indeed chosen by God and ordained that she might be the Mother of God, either by an ordination preceding her merits, and therefore wholly gratuitous, or following upon merits which were not de condigno but only de congruo. To the second I say that it was indeed promised to the Jewish people that some Virgin would conceive the Messiah; but that promise was not made specifically to the most blessed Virgin, and therefore there was no divine pact concerning the conferral upon her of divine maternity. To the third I say that the blessed Virgin could not have merited that circumstance of the Incarnation without having at the same time merited the Incarnation itself, since that merit would not have been with respect to generated humanity in general, but to that special and individual humanity which was to be assumed by the Word.
You will say 3: The blessed Virgin is said to have been worthy, so that she merited to become the Mother of God; therefore in fact she merited divine maternity. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved: first from what the Church sings of the same blessed Virgin in the prayer after Compline: That she might merit to become a worthy dwelling of Thy Son, Thou didst prepare her, the Holy Spirit cooperating: for what else is it to be a worthy dwelling of the Son of God than a worthy Mother of Him? And if she was made a worthy Mother, surely she was made so by good and meritorious works. Then because the holy Fathers use the same manner of speaking, especially St. Ambrose book 2 De Virginibus, Damascene book 1 De Fide, chapter 15, Bernard sermon 1 De Assumptione.
I answer, that by those or similar formulas of speech is signified indeed that the most blessed Virgin was worthy, so that she might be chosen as Mother of God; yet it does not follow from this that she merited that dignity de condigno by her good works: for that manner of speaking, "worthy of something from someone," does not always denote condign merit, but only that whoever receives a benefit from God seems worthy of that benefit. On this account the Church says in the prayer of Tuesday after the Sunday of the Passion: May our fasts be acceptable to Thee, O Lord, which, while they make us worthy of Thy grace by expiation, may lead us to eternal remedies. But who would say that by fasts we are so prepared that we may merit condignly the grace of God, by which we are expiated from sin?
You will say lastly: Whoever merits de condigno a disposition to some form seems also to merit that form itself: but the blessed Virgin merited de condigno that degree of holiness by which she was ultimately disposed to the maternity of God; therefore she equally merited de condigno her maternity.
I answer first by denying the major, because it can happen that a disposition to some dignity does not exceed the proportion of the meriting power, while the dignity itself well may: as e.g. if for someone to become a Bishop it were required that he be a Doctor, he could indeed acquire that disposition of himself; yet it would not follow that he could likewise of himself be promoted to the episcopate, since to obtain that dignity there would be need of the nomination of the King, and the designation and conferral of power on the part of the supreme Pontiff. I answer second, that the major can indeed be true of those dispositions which necessarily infer the form, but not of those which have only a certain moral connection, or fittingness and congruity with the form to be inferred. Now the holiness of the most blessed Virgin was not a physical disposition, and by the nature of the thing, to divine maternity, but only a moral and congruous one, since it was fitting that she who was purest and most holy of all virgins should be taken up to conceive the Holy of Holies.
Second Conclusion. — THE MOST BLESSED VIRGIN WAS WORTHY, AND MERITED DE CONGRUO, THAT SHE MIGHT BECOME THE MOTHER OF GOD.
This is the more common and truer opinion,
And it is proved from the holy Fathers, who expressly declare that the blessed Virgin was worthy, so that she might bring forth the Son of God and become His Mother. Thus above all St. Ambrose book 2 De Virginibus: Why, he says, do I linger over details? She was worthy from whom the Son of God was to be born. Basil, homily on the human generation of Christ: Worthy, he says, of the divinity of the Only-begotten was her wedlock. Chrysostom, homily 13 on John, expounding those words: How shall this be, since I know not a man? says: For this very reason it came to pass: for if you had known a man, you would not have been held worthy to minister to this mystery. Epiphanius, heresy 7: How dare they touch the unstained Virgin, who was made worthy to become the dwelling of the Son of God? Damascene book 4, chapter 15, calls her a holy, admirable, and temple most worthy of God. Finally Bernard, sermon 1 De Assumptione, says: Neither on earth is there a place more worthy than the virginal womb, in which Mary received the Son of God, nor in heaven the royal throne, on which her Son exalted Mary.
But that she had that dignity partly from divine grace preventing her, partly through her works and merits de condigno, the holy Fathers also signify; for St. Augustine, sermon 2 De Nativitate, says: Such a Virgin is chosen, who would have such merit in herself that she might receive the Son of God within herself. St. Gregory, book 1 of the Kings, chapter 1: Illustrated by incomparable merits, she prepared her sacred womb wherein the Only-begotten of God might repose. Peter Damian, sermon 2 De Assumptione: Her singular holiness and grace merited this, that she was judged singularly worthy of receiving God. Fulgentius, book De Incarnatione et Gratia, chapter 7: But God Himself made man, to conceive and to bear, she did not merit by human merits, but by the favor of the supreme God conceived and born of her, namely the blessed Virgin. To these agrees Prudentius in the hymn before meals, where he says: For to bring forth God, the Virgin renewed gave all merits. And Venantius Fortunatus in the book De aeternis gaudiis sings in this manner:
Happy virginity, which was worthy of the child-bearing of the Thunderer, Which merited to bring forth its own Lord.
The Church also sings in the Antiphon in Paschal time: Queen of heaven, rejoice, alleluia: for He whom you didst merit to bear, has risen, etc. Nor does it matter that the holy Fathers sometimes use the name of merit more broadly; namely for that, not which signifies an action worthy of reward, but only a certain correspondence of one thing to another: in which signification the Church sings in the blessing of the Paschal candle: O happy fault, which merited to have such and so great a Redeemer! This, I say, is no obstacle: both because when merit itself is attributed to the holiness of her life, it must be taken in its proper signification, of which we are now treating; and also because many of the holy Fathers attribute this merit to the good works of that blessed Virgin; whence beautifully St. Bernard, in the sermon on the aqueduct: How, he says, did our aqueduct here touch that fountain so sublime? How do you think, unless by the clemency of desire, unless by the fervor of devotion, unless by the purity of prayer, as it is written: The prayer of the just penetrates the heavens? And who is just, if not Mary the just, from whom the sun of justice arose for us? How then did she touch that inaccessible Majesty, unless by knocking, asking, seeking? Hence likewise St. Jerome, Epistle 22, proposes there Mary, who was of such great purity that she merited to be the Mother of the Lord. And St. Anselm, De Laudibus Virginis, chapter 8: Her most holy purity and most pure sanctity of breast, transcending the purity and health of every creature, incomparably merited this, that she might most fully become the repairer of a lost world.
You will say: The blessed Virgin could not merit de congruo that she might be the Mother of God without also meriting the incarnation itself: but she could not merit the incarnation, as was said in the preceding Question; therefore neither her maternity: therefore etc. The major is proved: for if the blessed Virgin merited de congruo that she might be the Mother of God, she equally merited that from her God-man might come to be; therefore she merited to bring forth and produce Christ God-man, and consequently merited that this composite, God-man, might exist in the nature of things: but this is to merit the incarnation; therefore if she merited de congruo to become Mother of God, she also merited the incarnation.
I answer, that merit de congruo can be understood in two ways: first indeed absolutely and simply, and without any supposition; secondly, this merit can be understood only as it were under a condition, or upon the supposition touched, that God is to become man. Wherefore I distinguish the major: The blessed Virgin could not merit by a merit de congruo maternity without having equally merited the incarnation, by an absolute and simple merit — I concede; by a merit made upon supposition, and with the condition posited that God is to become man — I deny. For thus taken, the merit of the Virgin with respect to maternity can be severed from the merit of the incarnation, because it presupposes that latter as future. Which indeed is declared by this example: if a King should decree to set out to some city, and some citizen on account of his merits obtains that he rather turn aside into his house than into another's; it is rightly understood that he did not merit the coming of the King into the city simply, and nevertheless merited the circumstance, namely his reception into his own house, which presupposes access to the city.
You will say 2: The merits of the Virgin were foreseen, not only as existing but also as future, and present to God in eternity after the merits of Christ were foreseen: therefore Christ Himself was previously foreseen as existing, and consequently as conceived, or as to be conceived of the Virgin, before the merits of the Virgin were preordained; therefore by no means could the blessed Virgin merit that Christ should be born of her.
I answer, that from that argument alone is proved that the merits of the blessed Virgin did not move God to choose her as Mother of His Son according to the order of election and eternal designation; yet it is not proved that she could not have merited that dignity according to the order of execution, because in truth she had grace and good works before the Son of God became incarnate from her; although she had that grace and those good works from the merits of the same her Son foreseen in the divine ordination and predefinition.
You will urge: If before all the merits of the Virgin God preordained the Incarnation: then He also preordained it in this humanity, and consequently formed from this individual matter: but the Virgin did not merit to have that individual matter so joined to herself as was necessary for the conception of the Son; because this pertains rather to the order of effects and natural causes than to the notion of merit; therefore etc.
I answer to the minor, that just as temporal things can fall under merit in order to spiritual things, so the Virgin could merit that that matter, from which Christ was to be formed, should first be a material part of her own body, or blood.