Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Note 1, that Christ can be understood to have merited hypostatic union in three ways: First namely that it be affirmed prior in time to His humanity being united to the Word, He was for a while a pure man, but afterwards was advanced on account of His merits to the dignity of the natural Son of God, and to hypostatic union; Secondly, that it be asserted that Christ, although from the beginning of His production always possessed of the personality of the Word and united to Him, nevertheless merited that union itself, either through works which would proceed from that humanity prior in nature to its being terminated by the divine personality: or through works subsequent to the Incarnation, so that incarnation according to intention, or predestination, whereby God decreed from eternity His Son to become incarnate, could indeed not fall under merit, because before predestination, which was the first act, and cause of Incarnation, neither could any action of Christ precede nor be foreseen by God, in view of which Incarnation would be decreed: but truly according to execution it could have fallen under merit, because before the execution of the Incarnation itself, the future merits of Christ were already foreseen just as Christ Himself by virtue of that first decree, whereby God willed Incarnation by way of intention: Finally, in the third place, it could be conceived that Christ merited His incarnation through works subsequent. But upon this triple sense difficulty is raised at present.

Note 2, merit is commonly distinguished as twofold, namely de condigno, and de congruo. Merit de condigno is called that which by reason of justifying grace existing in the meriting one, and divine pact, has equality of justice with reward: but merit de congruo is that which on account of the defect of either of those conditions has only proportionality founded in divine friendship toward obtaining reward. The difficulty therefore concerns both merits, whether namely with either, or both together Christ the Lord through works, whether antecedent or subsequent, merited the substance, or certain circumstances of the Incarnation.

Note 3, that the circumstances of the Incarnation are properly called those which accompany the Incarnation: such as, that it come about at such time, such place, such mode, namely the work of the Holy Spirit, and similar things, which adorn this mystery; nevertheless certain things can also be comprehended under the name of circumstances which precede the very Incarnation, as the Angelic annunciation, the consent of the most Blessed Virgin, and her disposition, and cooperation. There are also some things which follow the Incarnation, and can be called circumstances, as the praises and canticles of Angels manifesting that mystery, the adorations of Shepherds and Magi. But chiefly here there is discourse concerning the first circumstances.

First Conclusion. — CHRIST THE LORD COULD NOT MERIT HIS INCARNATION THROUGH ANTECEDENT WORKS, EITHER BY PRIORITY OF TIME OR PRIORITY OF NATURE. This is of faith as to the first part, for against Nestorius and Faustinus it has been determined that it is heretical to affirm Christ to have been a pure man for some time before union with the Word, and in that state to have merited the assumption of His humanity by the Word, as stands evident from all the Councils to be praised in the following Disputation, whose oracles we shall prove that Christ was God and hypostatically united to the divine Word in the first instant of His formation. Hence Augustine confutes and proscribes this error in various places, openly teaching and demonstrating that Christ the Lord did not obtain union with the Word through His own merits: for in sermon 8. De verbis Apostoli he has this: Will anyone then dare to say, that our nature in that Mediator first merited God through free will, and thus deserved to be received, so that he would be man and God, one Christ Jesus? And in Enchir. cap. 36.: For what did human nature in the man Christ merit, that it should be singularly assumed into unity of person of the only Son of God? What good will, what zeal of this good purpose, what good works preceded, whereby that man might merit that he become one person with God? Truly he explains this truth more luminously lib. De correptione et gratia, cap. 11., where after many things he concludes thus: That birth indeed gratuitous joined in unity of person man to God, flesh to Word; good works followed that birth, good works did not merit it. By which words the holy Doctor affirms expressly that Christ did not merit to be made Son of God, but already from the womb, and from conception itself, was God-man, and his humanity elevated unto hypostatic union with the Word. —

The same must be said of actions which could be conceived elicited in the first moment of the Incarnation, whereby it might be said the humanity of Christ had merited that union; for the same St. Augustine tr. 82. in John pronounces absolutely: Neither did any merits precede that assumption of man; but from that assumption of him his merits joined began. And lib. 2. De peccatorum meritis, cap. 7.: For neither did he himself, says he concerning Christ, become so joined to the Word of God, that by that joining itself he became one Son of God, and the same himself one Son of man, with preceding merits of his will. For since it behoved him to be: yet they would be two, and three, and more, if this could happen, not through the proper gift of God, but through free will of man. Therefore this is especially commended, this among the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden in Christ is taught and said chiefly, so far as I dare judge. By which words he teaches most manifestly that all the merits of Christ followed the Incarnation; but none preceded it; for he says Christ stood related to grace of union as we are compared to first actual grace: but actual grace is conferred upon us on account of no merits, but solely out of the pure mercy of God: therefore hypostatic union, which is the most excellent of divine graces, and exemplar of the others, came to Christ out of the pure liberality of God; not truly on account of any merits preceding the Incarnation by priority of time or nature. —

He confirms the same Saint Augustine lib. De praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 11., where he says: The most precious light of predestination and grace is the Savior Himself, Himself Mediator of God and men, man Christ Jesus, who that He might be this, by what merits of His own, whether of works, or of faith, preceding, did the human nature which is in Him procure? Let it be answered, I ask: That man, that he might be Son of God unigenitus, assumed into unity of person by the coeternal Word of the Father, whence did he merit this? Did any good of his whatsoever precede? What did he do before, what did he believe, what did he ask, that he arrive at this incomparable excellence?

It is proved also by reason: All merit is founded in operation: but the humanity of Christ, before it be understood as assumed by the Word, could have no operation: therefore neither any merit. The major is evident: for every merit is an act accepted by God, and worthy of remuneration. The minor is proved: there operation cannot be where subsistence is understood to be none, because actions belong to supposites, or things completely subsistent; since operating follows being, a thing must first be substantially complete before being operative: but before hypostatic union no subsistence is understood in the humanity of Christ. For that would be either proper, or the subsistence of the Word. Not the first, because thus human nature would have been prior subsisting by proper subsistence than by the subsistence of the Word, which is erroneous. Nor yet the second, because in that priority that nature is not supposed united to the Word: therefore in that instant it could neither operate nor merit. — Then, for merit is required not only the concourse of will, but also of sanctifying grace: but, as proved in the preceding Question, human nature could have no grace, nor any accident before it was understood united to the Word, because it must first be completed as to substantial being than as to accidental being: therefore in that instant it could emit no meritorious work. — Finally, the principle of merit could not fall under merit: both because otherwise any man could merit first grace to himself through works proceeding from the very first grace: and because otherwise he would be cause of himself in the same genus: for Incarnation in the genus of efficient cause is cause of merit, and merit would be cause of Incarnation: which genus of cause is also recalled to the efficient: but Incarnation, since it is the fount of all grace and justice, is also principle of all meritorious work, both with respect to us and with respect to Christ Himself: therefore it could not fall under merit.

You will object 1. That of Psalm 11. Dilexisti iustitiam, et odisti iniquitatem: propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus oleo laetitiae prae consortibus tuis. But by oil of gladness St. Gregor. Nazian. Orat. 1. understands divinity itself, wherewith the humanity of Christ was anointed through hypostatic union, for he says: The works of his hands are truth and judgment, on account of which it was anointed with divinity. In like manner St. August. explains those words on that Psal., and St. Anselm on cap. 1. to the Hebrews.

I answer 1. The holy Fathers, who interpret the aforesaid passage concerning unction of divinity, do not take the particle propterea in causal sense, but final, so that the sense be, Thou hast loved justice and hated iniquity, and unto this end God hath anointed thee with oil of gladness: whence from this nothing is evinced against our assertion.

I answer 2. That passage is taken otherwise by other holy Fathers; for St. Jerome Epist. 140. by oil of exultation understands the exultation of resurrection and the glory of the rising body; which it is certain Christ the Lord merited, as we shall say presently: St. Ambrose by oil of gladness understands exhilaration of conscience, which Christ had, because He was conscious of no sin.

You will object 2. That of Apoc. 5. Worthy is the Lamb who was slain, to receive power, and divinity, and honour; now He received divinity through union: therefore He was worthy thereof, and consequently merited it.

I answer 1. The particle quia is not written, so that it not be signified as the sense that He was worthy to receive divinity because He was slain. Secondly, I say the death of the Lamb was cause of divinity, not indeed received, but manifested, because through death His divinity especially shone forth, for because He was made obedient unto death, therefore God exalted Him, and gave Him a name which is above every name.

You will object 3. The humanity of Christ existed prior in nature before it was united to the Word, as we proved in the preceding Question: therefore prior in nature it could operate before being united, and consequently merit that union. The consequence is proved: if anything impeded why in that priority nature could not act, chiefly because actions belong to supposites: but this is not absolutely true: for Arist. 1. Metaph. cap. 1., whence that axiom is gathered, has in Greek idiom, Actions belong to singulars. Since therefore individual human nature presupposes assumption, there would seem no reason why in that priority it could not merit its own union with the Word.

I deny the consequence, and to the antecedent I say it is no wonder Aristotle said actions belong to singulars, since he did not yet know subsistence and personality to be really distinguished from singular nature and able to be separated, which truth became manifest only through the Mystery of Incarnation; thence it is no wonder if he usurped singularity of person for subsistence, since he did not know them to be really distinguished from one another. But that true actions ought to be of supposites, that is, of singular natures having supposites, stands openly evident from what was said, since supposite is the last substantial complement of singular nature; but singular nature must be completed substantially before it be judged apt for operating; since to be is prior to operate.

Second Conclusion. — CHRIST THE LORD THROUGH SUBSEQUENT ACTS COULD NOT MERIT HIS INCARNATION, NEITHER DE CONDIGNO NOR DE CONGRUO.

This is against Suarez, who dispur. 20. sect. 1. concedes indeed that Christ could not merit His incarnation according to intention, and inasmuch as it is defined and decreed by God from eternity: but that He could merit it according to execution, and as it was made in time: and that through works subsequent to that incarnation itself, which God foresaw; which he certainly declares by example of a soldier, to whom God would give arms and a horse in reward of those things which he would strenuously perform in war.

It is proved however first: The principle of merit cannot fall under merit of work proceeding from itself: but hypostatic union is principle of all merit of Christ: therefore it cannot fall under meritorious works proceeding from Him. The minor is clear, since the meritorious principle of Christ is not humanity alone; but also the supposite of the divine Word affecting that humanity, both in the rationale of existing, and in the rationale of operating. But this is proven in the final rationale of the preceding Conclusion. It is confirmed moreover, because merit has a certain conciliative and attractive power toward reward, namely by moral influx; because it moves the rewarding one to confer that which is promised in reward of work: but in no way can it come about that the same attract itself: therefore it is impossible that the same be merit of its own principle, from which it has the power of meriting.

I answer, the major to be true of ordinary law, and attentions of natures of things; but otherwise of extraordinary law, and according to absolute power of God. Whence although Incarnation could not be reward of merit of works proceeding from it by ordinary law; well nevertheless could this come about according to extraordinary, and absolute disposition of God. — Against this, although truly moral efficient cause of merit can in some manner fall under merit, for which reason the ancient Fathers, as we shall say below, through grace conceded to them by virtue of merits of Christ to come, could merit certain circumstances of His Incarnation, at least de congruo; nevertheless formal principle of merit cannot, even by absolute power, fall under merit, whose formal principle it is: but the Word, as united to humanity, is formal principle of merit proceeding from humanity hypostatically united to the Word: therefore incarnation, even by absolute power, could not fall under merit. Hence it stands. This is proved: if formal principle of merit could be of the same merit, or its reward, it would follow that such merit merit itself, as merit, because merit of form is also merit of formal effect of the same form; just as efficient cause of form effects also formal effect: therefore if meritorious work can merit the form, or quasi-form, from which it derives its value, namely hypostatic union: also it will be able to merit itself, inasmuch as it is merit: but this conflicts, for the same cannot depend upon itself, nor consequently be caused meritoriously, nor remunerated by itself: therefore principle of merit can in no way fall under merit.

I answer 2, that although principle of merit, when given absolutely, cannot fall under merit, well nevertheless when not given absolutely, but only under condition of future merit, and dependently upon it, as if a King bestow upon a soldier arms and horse, the remuneration anticipated, as stipend of future contest and victory; through the subsequent victory the soldier will truly merit that donation of arms and horse; whence since God could confer upon the humanity of Christ the benefit of hypostatic union with the Word under condition of merit to be exercised, and future, Christ through works subsequent to incarnation can merit it. — Against this, although that from which the value of merit does not proceed could be conceded to anyone in view of and condition of future merit, and thus can sometimes fall under merit; nevertheless it is otherwise when the value of merit depends absolutely upon it: the rationale of whose difference is, because subsequent merit afterward can have the rationale of price with respect to that from which it does not receive its whole value; for then it does not follow that the same be cause and effect with respect to the same according to the same rationale, and in the same genus and mode of cause; just as it would follow if that which is total principle of merit were given in view of, and under condition of the same principle, as future: but hypostatic union is the principle from which totally is derived the merit of Christ, both in physical being and in being of moral worth, since all works of Christ proceed from His humanity as affected by the subsistence of the Word, from which they chiefly borrow their supreme value, which they have in the rationale of merit and satisfaction. But to the example of the soldier gifted with horse and arms, through anticipated payment of future labor and victory, I say there is no parity, because the value of such labor and merit is not derived from horse, and arms; but from virtue, prudence, and art of the soldier; but meritorious value in the works of Christ proceeds from hypostatic union, and in other pure men from first grace; whence since man through subsequent good works cannot merit first grace itself, so neither could Christ through His own subsequent good works merit His incarnation. Add that when men confer certain gifts, they can give them imperfectly, and by suspended and conditioned donation; whence he who receives those gifts thus, can effect by his good works, and merit, that he possess them no longer imperfectly and conditionally, but absolutely: but hypostatic union cannot be so conceded, only as to use, and by suspended and conditioned donation; but by that very fact it is granted simply and absolutely: and thus God could not confer upon the humanity of Christ the benefit of hypostatic union with the Word under condition of merit to be exercised by it subsisting in the Word.

You will object 1. Principle of merit, by absolute power, can fall under merit of work proceeding from itself: therefore Christ through subsequent works could merit the incarnation itself. The antecedent is proved: for the ancient Fathers merited de congruo certain circumstances of incarnation, as we shall prove below: but their grace was an effect of the merits of Christ, not only in the genus of final cause, but also in the genus of moral efficient cause: therefore principle of merit can fall under merit, at least de congruo. — I distinguish the antecedent: principle of merit purely effective can by absolute power fall under merit of work proceeding from itself — let it pass: principle of merit effective together with formal can so fall under merit — I deny antecedent, and consequence: since grace of union is not only effective principle of Christ's merits, but also formal, since indeed the operations of Christ proceed from the personality of the Word, as from principle from which, as it were from form, they borrow their supreme dignity and supreme value. Hence easily is solved the proof of that antecedent. For the merits of ancient Fathers are not constituted formally by reason of merit through Incarnation of the Word; but only efficiently, morally, or meritoriously were they caused by it. Add that the merits of Christ were foreknown through grace conferred upon ancient Fathers, whereby they merited: since indeed Christ is cause of merits, and predestination of men: but futures are not foreknown before decree of executing incarnation; for merit of execution of Incarnation is only that which morally moves God, either de condigno or de congruo, toward execution of His decree of Incarnation: but the merits of Saints did not move God to execute that Incarnation; since indeed in view of that futurition was granted to the Fathers grace whereby they could well merit, and operate.

You will object 2. Christ could merit the execution of hypostatic union, if His merits, as future, could have been foreseen by God prior by priority of nature than He would will to execute the intention He had of incarnating Himself: but the merits of Christ, as future, could be so foreseen by God: therefore Christ could merit the execution of Incarnation. The major stands: for if God had first seen the merits of Christ as future, before the incarnation would have to be committed to execution, He could have been moved by them toward willing execution of Incarnation. But the minor is proved: the intention which God had of incarnating Himself is prior to the decree concerning Incarnation to be executed: but in that intention, as prior to decree of execution of that Incarnation, the merits of Christ could be foreseen as future: therefore prior by priority of nature, before God willed to commit to execution the intention of His Incarnation, the merits of Christ could be foreseen by God.

I deny the minor, whose proof I distinguish: intention purely speculative, which God had of incarnating Himself, and inasmuch as it abstracts from efficacious intention, is prior to decree of executing it — I concede: intention which God had of incarnating Himself as efficacious, is prior to decree of executing it — I deny the major: for if this regarded imports will of execution, presently it is not prior to that: but the merits of Christ as future could not be foreseen by God except in efficacious intention of Incarnation, which, as such, since it does not precede decree of its execution, God could not, before having efficacious intention of Incarnation, foresee the merits of Christ as future.

Third Conclusion. — CHRIST THE LORD MERITED, OR AT LEAST COULD MERIT, CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES FOLLOWING THE INCARNATION; NOT TRULY PRECEDING, OR CONCOMITANT ONES.

The first part is common: those circumstances do not hold from the side of principle, but follow it: therefore nothing obstructs why they can fall under merit of Christ. Hence all agree He could merit, and did in fact merit, that He be adored by Shepherds and Magi, announced by Angels, manifested by a radiant star, just as also the resurrection of His humanity, manifestation of divinity, and glorification of body: since indeed all these do not follow necessarily, and from nature, upon positing incarnation, but hang from gratuitous and mere liberality of God, and since they have no necessary connection with the primary principle of each merit, namely with incarnation itself, but only are certain appendices and sequels of it, no doubt appears but that Christ the Lord through the exinanition of birth, labors of life, and passion of death could merit those.

You will say: The same hypostatic union of the whole humanity was made in resurrection as that which was made in the womb of the Blessed Virgin at the instant of conception of Christ; for the same in number was humanity, the same subsistence of the Word joined to humanity, without any unitive action intervening anew: therefore if Christ merited not the first union, nor the second. — I distinguish the antecedent: the union continued the same — I deny: interrupted and discontinuated — I concede. Since indeed through death perished the humanity, or junction of soul with body, whereby for three days they were separated from one another, the union of the Divine Word was also discontinuated with that humanity taken totally and formally, although the Word truly remained united to the soul and body of Christ; whence although Christ could not have merited the first union, thence it does not follow that He could not have merited that reunion through works which preceded death.

The second part is against Vasquez and several other moderns, who contend Christ could merit all circumstances of incarnation, not only consequent ones, but concomitant and preceding. It is proved: if He could have merited preceding or concomitant circumstances, and in fact had merited them, chiefly the maternity of His Mother, and nativity from her: but He did not merit that: therefore etc. The major stands: since indeed that is the most excellent among the circumstances which preceded or accompanied flesh, it follows that if He had merited some, chiefly that one. But the minor is proved 1. by authority of St. Aug. lib. De praedest. SS., cap. 15., where speaking of conception of Christ from the Virgin, he says: Neither is that generation retributed, but tributed, that alien from every obligation of sin he be born of Spirit, and Virgin: but if that nativity had been reward of preceding merit of Christ, it would have been retributed, not however merely tributed: therefore according to mind of St. Aug., conception of Christ from Virgin, and consequently maternity of most Blessed Virgin, was not from preceding merits of Christ, as miraculously operating and living. — It is confirmed: for St. Aug. by example of this conception there, proves against Pelagians, first grace is not conferred upon us from merits, but only from gratuitous liberality of God: now first grace in us is not only not from preceding merits, but neither from subsequent ones: therefore nativity of Christ from Virgin was not only pure gratuitous benefit of God with respect to preceding merits: but also by order toward subsequent ones. Then, mediated principle of merit cannot fall under merit of that act whereof it is principle: but most Blessed Virgin was mediated principle of merits of Christ: since indeed she was principle of humanity, which together with subsistence of the Word was immediate principle of all merits of Christ: therefore that maternity could not be reward of any merit.

You will say: Blessed Virgin merited to become Mother of Christ, and conceive Him in herself, as we shall say presently: therefore equally Christ merited the maternity of the Virgin, and His own nativity from her. The antecedent will be proved in the following Question: the consequence is urged: First, because no dignity is to be conceded to Virgin which be not attributed to Christ, if elsewhere it conflict not: but it seems not conflicting that Christ could have merited that Maternity: therefore this must be retributed to Him. Secondly, because grace whereby blessed Virgin merited Maternity of Christ, was effect of merits of Christ: but what is cause of cause is also cause of caused: therefore since grace derived from Christ was cause of merit of blessed Virgin, Christ also is to be believed to have merited Maternity, and nativity from Virgin. — I answer, conceding the antecedent, denying the consequence: to whose first proof I say, not every dignity conceded to Virgin ought to be attributed to Christ the Lord, otherwise dignity of Maternity of God, which is greatest of all, would be attributed to Him: therefore only this can be true, that every dignity which convenes Mother ought to be attributed to Son, when there is no repugnance on side of same Son: but it conflicts, that the Son could merit that Maternity; because that, as said just now, was principle at least mediated of all merits of Christ: but principle cannot merit to be effect of itself. To the second proof I say, that saying to be true only when what is cause of cause infallibly infers effect, is also cause of same effect: false however when not thus does that cause infallibly infer effect: but merits of blessed Virgin were not cause intrinsically infallibly inferring nativity of Christ from Virgin, nor divine Maternity of her: therefore although Christ by His merits were moral cause of grace and merits of Virgin, it does not follow that He merited her Maternity.