Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Note 1, that Christ can be understood to have merited hypostatic union in three ways: First namely that it be affirmed prior in time to His humanity being united to the Word, He was for a while a pure man, but afterwards was advanced on account of His merits to the dignity of the natural Son of God, and to hypostatic union; Secondly, that it be asserted that Christ, although from the beginning of His production always possessed of the personality of the Word and united to Him, nevertheless merited that union itself, either through works which would proceed from that humanity prior in nature to its being terminated by the divine personality: or through works subsequent to the Incarnation, so that incarnation according to intention, or predestination, whereby God decreed from eternity His Son to become incarnate, could indeed not fall under merit, because before predestination, which was the first act, and cause of Incarnation, neither could any action of Christ precede nor be foreseen by God, in view of which Incarnation would be decreed: but truly according to execution it could have fallen under merit, because before the execution of the Incarnation itself, the future merits of Christ were already foreseen just as Christ Himself by virtue of that first decree, whereby God willed Incarnation by way of intention: Finally, in the third place, it could be conceived that Christ merited His incarnation through works subsequent. But upon this triple sense difficulty is raised at present.

Note 2, merit is commonly distinguished as twofold, namely de condigno, and de congruo. Merit de condigno is called that which by reason of justifying grace existing in the meriting one, and divine pact, has equality of justice with reward: but merit de congruo is that which on account of the defect of either of those conditions has only proportionality founded in divine friendship toward obtaining reward. The difficulty therefore concerns both merits, whether namely with either, or both together Christ the Lord through works, whether antecedent or subsequent, merited the substance, or certain circumstances of the Incarnation.

Note 3, that the circumstances of the Incarnation are properly called those which accompany the Incarnation: such as, that it come about at such time, such place, such mode, namely the work of the Holy Spirit, and similar things, which adorn this mystery; nevertheless certain things can also be comprehended under the name of circumstances which precede the very Incarnation, as the Angelic annunciation, the consent of the most Blessed Virgin, and her disposition, and cooperation. There are also some things which follow the Incarnation, and can be called circumstances, as the praises and canticles of Angels manifesting that mystery, the adorations of Shepherds and Magi. But chiefly here there is discourse concerning the first circumstances.

First Conclusion. — CHRIST THE LORD COULD NOT MERIT HIS INCARNATION THROUGH ANTECEDENT WORKS, EITHER BY PRIORITY OF TIME OR PRIORITY OF NATURE. This is of faith as to the first part, for against Nestorius and Faustinus it has been determined that it is heretical to affirm Christ to have been a pure man for some time before union with the Word, and in that state to have merited the assumption of His humanity by the Word, as stands evident from all the Councils to be praised in the following Disputation, whose oracles we shall prove that Christ was God and hypostatically united to the divine Word in the first instant of His formation. Hence Augustine confutes and proscribes this error in various places, openly teaching and demonstrating that Christ the Lord did not obtain union with the Word through His own merits: for in sermon 8. De verbis Apostoli he has this: Will anyone then dare to say, that our nature in that Mediator first merited God through free will, and thus deserved to be received, so that he would be man and God, one Christ Jesus? And in Enchir. cap. 36.: For what did human nature in the man Christ merit, that it should be singularly assumed into unity of person of the only Son of God? What good will, what zeal of this good purpose, what good works preceded, whereby that man might merit that he become one person with God? Truly he explains this truth more luminously lib. De correptione et gratia, cap. 11., where after many things he concludes thus: That birth indeed gratuitous joined in unity of person man to God, flesh to Word; good works followed that birth, good works did not merit it. By which words the holy Doctor affirms expressly that Christ did not merit to be made Son of God, but already from the womb, and from conception itself, was God-man, and his humanity elevated unto hypostatic union with the Word. —

The same must be said of actions which could be conceived elicited in the first moment of the Incarnation, whereby it might be said the humanity of Christ had merited that union; for the same St. Augustine tr. 82. in John pronounces absolutely: Neither did any merits precede that assumption of man; but from that assumption of him his merits joined began. And lib. 2. De peccatorum meritis, cap. 7.: For neither did he himself, says he concerning Christ, become so joined to the Word of God, that by that joining itself he became one Son of God, and the same himself one Son of man, with preceding merits of his will. For since it behoved him to be: yet they would be two, and three, and more, if this could happen, not through the proper gift of God, but through free will of man. Therefore this is especially commended, this among the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden in Christ is taught and said chiefly, so far as I dare judge. By which words he teaches most manifestly that all the merits of Christ followed the Incarnation; but none preceded it; for he says Christ stood related to grace of union as we are compared to first actual grace: but actual grace is conferred upon us on account of no merits, but solely out of the pure mercy of God: therefore hypostatic union, which is the most excellent of divine graces, and exemplar of the others, came to Christ out of the pure liberality of God; not truly on account of any merits preceding the Incarnation by priority of time or nature. —

He confirms the same Saint Augustine lib. De praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 11., where he says: The most precious light of predestination and grace is the Savior Himself, Himself Mediator of God and men, man Christ Jesus, who that He might be this, by what merits of His own, whether of works, or of faith, preceding, did the human nature which is in Him procure? Let it be answered, I ask: That man, that he might be Son of God unigenitus, assumed into unity of person by the coeternal Word of the Father, whence did he merit this? Did any good of his whatsoever precede? What did he do before, what did he believe, what did he ask, that he arrive at this incomparable excellence?

It is proved also by reason: All merit is founded in operation: but the humanity of Christ, before it be understood as assumed by the Word, could have no operation: therefore neither any merit. The major is evident: for every merit is an act accepted by God, and worthy of remuneration. The minor is proved: there operation cannot be where subsistence is understood to be none, because actions belong to supposites, or things completely subsistent; since operating follows being, a thing must first be substantially complete before being operative: but before hypostatic union no subsistence is understood in the humanity of Christ. For that would be either proper, or the subsistence of the Word. Not the first, because thus human nature would have been prior subsisting by proper subsistence than by the subsistence of the Word, which is erroneous. Nor yet the second, because in that priority that nature is not supposed united to the Word: therefore in that instant it could neither operate nor merit. — Then, for merit is required not only the concourse of will, but also of sanctifying grace: but, as proved in the preceding Question, human nature could have no grace, nor any accident before it was understood united to the Word, because it must first be completed as to substantial being than as to accidental being: therefore in that instant it could emit no meritorious work. — Finally, the principle of merit could not fall under merit: both because otherwise any man could merit first grace to himself through works proceeding from the very first grace: and because otherwise he would be cause of himself in the same genus: for Incarnation in the genus of efficient cause is cause of merit, and merit would be cause of Incarnation: which genus of cause is also recalled to the efficient: but Incarnation, since it is the fount of all grace and justice, is also principle of all meritorious work, both with respect to us and with respect to Christ Himself: therefore it could not fall under merit.

You will object 1. That of Psalm 11. Dilexisti iustitiam, et odisti iniquitatem: propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus oleo laetitiae prae consortibus tuis. But by oil of gladness St. Gregor. Nazian. Orat. 1. understands divinity itself, wherewith the humanity of Christ was anointed through hypostatic union, for he says: The works of his hands are truth and judgment, on account of which it was anointed with divinity. In like manner St. August. explains those words on that Psal., and St. Anselm on cap. 1. to the Hebrews.

I answer 1. The holy Fathers, who interpret the aforesaid passage concerning unction of divinity, do not take the particle propterea in causal sense, but final, so that the sense be, Thou hast loved justice and hated iniquity, and unto this end God hath anointed thee with oil of gladness: whence from this nothing is evinced against our assertion.

I answer 2. That passage is taken otherwise by other holy Fathers; for St. Jerome Epist. 140. by oil of exultation understands the exultation of resurrection and the glory of the rising body; which it is certain Christ the Lord merited, as we shall say presently: St. Ambrose by oil of gladness understands exhilaration of conscience, which Christ had, because He was conscious of no sin.

You will object 2. That of Apoc. 5. Worthy is the Lamb who was slain, to receive power, and divinity, and honour; now He received divinity through union: therefore He was worthy thereof, and consequently merited it.

I answer 1. The particle quia is not written, so that it not be signified as the sense that He was worthy to receive divinity because He was slain. Secondly, I say the death of the Lamb was cause of divinity, not indeed received, but manifested, because through death His divinity especially shone forth, for because He was made obedient unto death, therefore God exalted Him, and gave Him a name which is above every name.

You will object 3. The humanity of Christ existed prior in nature before it was united to the Word, as we proved in the preceding Question: therefore prior in nature it could operate before being united, and consequently merit that union. The consequence is proved: if anything impeded why in that priority nature could not act, chiefly because actions belong to supposites: but this is not absolutely true: for Arist. 1. Metaph. cap. 1., whence that axiom is gathered, has in Greek idiom, Actions belong to singulars. Since therefore individual human nature presupposes assumption, there would seem no reason why in that priority it could not merit its own union with the Word.

I deny the consequence, and to the antecedent I say it is no wonder Aristotle said actions belong to singulars, since he did not yet know subsistence and personality to be really distinguished from singular nature and able to be separated, which truth became manifest only through the Mystery of Incarnation; thence it is no wonder if he usurped singularity of person for subsistence, since he did not know them to be really distinguished from one another. But that true actions ought to be of supposites, that is, of singular natures having supposites, stands openly evident from what was said, since supposite is the last substantial complement of singular nature; but singular nature must be completed substantially before it be judged apt for operating; since to be is prior to operate.

Second Conclusion. — CHRIST THE LORD THROUGH SUBSEQUENT ACTS COULD NOT MERIT HIS INCARNATION, NEITHER DE CONDIGNO NOR DE CONGRUO.

This is against Suarez, who dispur. 20. sect. 1. concedes indeed that Christ could not merit His incarnation according to intention, and inasmuch as it is defined and decreed by God from eternity: but that He could merit it according to execution, and as it was made in time: and that through works subsequent to that incarnation itself, which God foresaw; which he certainly declares by example of a soldier, to whom God would give arms and a horse in reward of those things which he would strenuously perform in war.

It is proved however first: The principle of merit cannot fall under merit of work proceeding from itself: but hypostatic union is principle of all merit of Christ: therefore it cannot fall under meritorious works proceeding from Him. The minor is clear, since the meritorious principle of Christ is not humanity alone; but also the supposite of the divine Word affecting that humanity, both in the rationale of existing, and in the rationale of operating. But this is proven in the final rationale of the preceding Conclusion. It is confirmed moreover, because merit has a certain conciliative and attractive power toward reward, namely by moral influx; because it moves the rewarding one to confer that which is promised in reward of work: but in no way can it come about that the same attract itself: therefore it is impossible that the same be merit of its own principle, from which it has the power of meriting.

I answer, the major to be true of ordinary law, and attentions of natures of things; but otherwise of extraordinary law, and according to absolute power of God. Whence although Incarnation could not be reward of merit of works proceeding from it by ordinary law; well nevertheless could this come about according to extraordinary, and absolute disposition of God. — Against this, although truly moral efficient cause of merit can in some manner fall under merit, for which reason the ancient Fathers, as we shall say below, through grace conceded to them by virtue of merits of Christ to come, could merit certain circumstances of His Incarnation, at least de congruo; nevertheless formal principle of merit cannot, even by absolute power, fall under merit, whose formal principle it is: but the Word, as united to humanity, is formal principle of merit proceeding from humanity hypostatically united to the Word: therefore incarnation, even by absolute power, could not fall under merit. Hence it stands. This is proved: if formal principle of merit could be of the same merit, or its reward, it would follow that such merit merit itself, as merit, because merit of form is also merit of formal effect of the same form; just as efficient cause of form effects also formal effect: therefore if meritorious work can merit the form, or quasi-form, from which it derives its value, namely hypostatic union: also it will be able to merit itself, inasmuch as it is merit: but this conflicts, for the same cannot depend upon itself, nor consequently be caused meritoriously, nor remunerated by itself: therefore principle of merit can in no way fall under merit.

I answer 2, that although principle of merit, when given absolutely, cannot fall under merit, well nevertheless when not given absolutely, but only under condition of future merit, and dependently upon it, as if a King bestow upon a soldier arms and horse, the remuneration anticipated, as stipend of future contest and victory; through the subsequent victory the soldier will truly merit that donation of arms and horse; whence since God could confer upon the humanity of Christ the benefit of hypostatic union with the Word under condition of merit to be exercised, and future, Christ through works subsequent to incarnation can merit it. — Against this, although that from which the value of merit does not proceed could be conceded to anyone in view of and condition of future merit, and thus can sometimes fall under merit; nevertheless it is otherwise when the value of merit depends absolutely upon it: the rationale of whose difference is, because subsequent merit afterward can have the rationale of price with respect to that from which it does not receive its whole value; for then it does not follow that the same be cause and effect with respect to the same according to the same rationale, and in the same genus and mode of cause; just as it would follow if that which is total principle of merit were given in view of, and under condition of the same principle, as future: but hypostatic union is the principle from which totally is derived the merit of Christ, both in physical being and in being of moral worth, since all works of Christ proceed from His humanity as affected by the subsistence of the Word, from which they chiefly borrow their supreme value, which they have in the rationale of merit and satisfaction. But to the example of the soldier gifted with horse and arms, through anticipated payment of future labor and victory, I say there is no parity, because the value of such labor and merit is not derived from horse, and arms; but from virtue, prudence, and art of the soldier; but meritorious value in the works of Christ proceeds from hypostatic union, and in other pure men from first grace; whence since man through subsequent good works cannot merit first grace itself, so neither could Christ through His own subsequent good works merit His incarnation. Add that when men confer certain gifts, they can give them imperfectly, and by suspended and conditioned donation; whence he who receives those gifts thus, can effect by his good works, and merit, that he possess them no longer imperfectly and conditionally, but absolutely: but hypostatic union cannot be so conceded, only as to use, and by suspended and conditioned donation; but by that very fact it is granted simply and absolutely: and thus God could not confer upon the humanity of Christ the benefit of hypostatic union with the Word under condition of merit to be exercised by it subsisting in the Word.

You will object 1. Principle of merit, by absolute power, can fall under merit of work proceeding from itself: therefore Christ through subsequent works could merit the incarnation itself. The antecedent is proved: for the ancient Fathers merited de congruo certain circumstances of incarnation, as we shall prove below: but their grace was an effect of the merits of Christ, not only in the genus of final cause, but also in the genus of moral efficient cause: therefore principle of merit can fall under merit, at least de congruo. — I distinguish the antecedent: principle of merit purely effective can by absolute power fall under merit of work proceeding from itself — let it pass: principle of merit effective together with formal can so fall under merit — I deny antecedent, and consequence: since grace of union is not only effective principle of Christ's merits, but also formal, since indeed the operations of Christ proceed from the personality of the Word, as from principle from which, as it were from form, they borrow their supreme dignity and supreme value. Hence easily is solved the proof of that antecedent. For the merits of ancient Fathers are not constituted formally by reason of merit through Incarnation of the Word; but only efficiently, morally, or meritoriously were they caused by it. Add that the merits of Christ were foreknown through grace conferred upon ancient Fathers, whereby they merited: since indeed Christ is cause of merits, and predestination of men: but futures are not foreknown before decree of executing incarnation; for merit of execution of Incarnation is only that which morally moves God, either de condigno or de congruo, toward execution of His decree of Incarnation: but the merits of Saints did not move God to execute that Incarnation; since indeed in view of that futurition was granted to the Fathers grace whereby they could well merit, and operate.

You will object 2. Christ could merit the execution of hypostatic union, if His merits, as future, could have been foreseen by God prior by priority of nature than He would will to execute the intention He had of incarnating Himself: but the merits of Christ, as future, could be so foreseen by God: therefore Christ could merit the execution of Incarnation. The major stands: for if God had first seen the merits of Christ as future, before the incarnation would have to be committed to execution, He could have been moved by them toward willing execution of Incarnation. But the minor is proved: the intention which God had of incarnating Himself is prior to the decree concerning Incarnation to be executed: but in that intention, as prior to decree of execution of that Incarnation, the merits of Christ could be foreseen as future: therefore prior by priority of nature, before God willed to commit to execution the intention of His Incarnation, the merits of Christ could be foreseen by God.

I deny the minor, whose proof I distinguish: intention purely speculative, which God had of incarnating Himself, and inasmuch as it abstracts from efficacious intention, is prior to decree of executing it — I concede: intention which God had of incarnating Himself as efficacious, is prior to decree of executing it — I deny the major: for if this regarded imports will of execution, presently it is not prior to that: but the merits of Christ as future could not be foreseen by God except in efficacious intention of Incarnation, which, as such, since it does not precede decree of its execution, God could not, before having efficacious intention of Incarnation, foresee the merits of Christ as future.

Third Conclusion. — CHRIST THE LORD MERITED, OR AT LEAST COULD MERIT, CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES FOLLOWING THE INCARNATION; NOT TRULY PRECEDING, OR CONCOMITANT ONES.

The first part is common: those circumstances do not hold from the side of principle, but follow it: therefore nothing obstructs why they can fall under merit of Christ. Hence all agree He could merit, and did in fact merit, that He be adored by Shepherds and Magi, announced by Angels, manifested by a radiant star, just as also the resurrection of His humanity, manifestation of divinity, and glorification of body: since indeed all these do not follow necessarily, and from nature, upon positing incarnation, but hang from gratuitous and mere liberality of God, and since they have no necessary connection with the primary principle of each merit, namely with incarnation itself, but only are certain appendices and sequels of it, no doubt appears but that Christ the Lord through the exinanition of birth, labors of life, and passion of death could merit those.

You will say: The same hypostatic union of the whole humanity was made in resurrection as that which was made in the womb of the Blessed Virgin at the instant of conception of Christ; for the same in number was humanity, the same subsistence of the Word joined to humanity, without any unitive action intervening anew: therefore if Christ merited not the first union, nor the second. — I distinguish the antecedent: the union continued the same — I deny: interrupted and discontinuated — I concede. Since indeed through death perished the humanity, or junction of soul with body, whereby for three days they were separated from one another, the union of the Divine Word was also discontinuated with that humanity taken totally and formally, although the Word truly remained united to the soul and body of Christ; whence although Christ could not have merited the first union, thence it does not follow that He could not have merited that reunion through works which preceded death.

The second part is against Vasquez and several other moderns, who contend Christ could merit all circumstances of incarnation, not only consequent ones, but concomitant and preceding. It is proved: if He could have merited preceding or concomitant circumstances, and in fact had merited them, chiefly the maternity of His Mother, and nativity from her: but He did not merit that: therefore etc. The major stands: since indeed that is the most excellent among the circumstances which preceded or accompanied flesh, it follows that if He had merited some, chiefly that one. But the minor is proved 1. by authority of St. Aug. lib. De praedest. SS., cap. 15., where speaking of conception of Christ from the Virgin, he says: Neither is that generation retributed, but tributed, that alien from every obligation of sin he be born of Spirit, and Virgin: but if that nativity had been reward of preceding merit of Christ, it would have been retributed, not however merely tributed: therefore according to mind of St. Aug., conception of Christ from Virgin, and consequently maternity of most Blessed Virgin, was not from preceding merits of Christ, as miraculously operating and living. — It is confirmed: for St. Aug. by example of this conception there, proves against Pelagians, first grace is not conferred upon us from merits, but only from gratuitous liberality of God: now first grace in us is not only not from preceding merits, but neither from subsequent ones: therefore nativity of Christ from Virgin was not only pure gratuitous benefit of God with respect to preceding merits: but also by order toward subsequent ones. Then, mediated principle of merit cannot fall under merit of that act whereof it is principle: but most Blessed Virgin was mediated principle of merits of Christ: since indeed she was principle of humanity, which together with subsistence of the Word was immediate principle of all merits of Christ: therefore that maternity could not be reward of any merit.

You will say: Blessed Virgin merited to become Mother of Christ, and conceive Him in herself, as we shall say presently: therefore equally Christ merited the maternity of the Virgin, and His own nativity from her. The antecedent will be proved in the following Question: the consequence is urged: First, because no dignity is to be conceded to Virgin which be not attributed to Christ, if elsewhere it conflict not: but it seems not conflicting that Christ could have merited that Maternity: therefore this must be retributed to Him. Secondly, because grace whereby blessed Virgin merited Maternity of Christ, was effect of merits of Christ: but what is cause of cause is also cause of caused: therefore since grace derived from Christ was cause of merit of blessed Virgin, Christ also is to be believed to have merited Maternity, and nativity from Virgin. — I answer, conceding the antecedent, denying the consequence: to whose first proof I say, not every dignity conceded to Virgin ought to be attributed to Christ the Lord, otherwise dignity of Maternity of God, which is greatest of all, would be attributed to Him: therefore only this can be true, that every dignity which convenes Mother ought to be attributed to Son, when there is no repugnance on side of same Son: but it conflicts, that the Son could merit that Maternity; because that, as said just now, was principle at least mediated of all merits of Christ: but principle cannot merit to be effect of itself. To the second proof I say, that saying to be true only when what is cause of cause infallibly infers effect, is also cause of same effect: false however when not thus does that cause infallibly infer effect: but merits of blessed Virgin were not cause intrinsically infallibly inferring nativity of Christ from Virgin, nor divine Maternity of her: therefore although Christ by His merits were moral cause of grace and merits of Virgin, it does not follow that He merited her Maternity.

Note 1. All scholastic Theologians agree among themselves that certain circumstances of the Incarnation could fall under merit of men; but among such circumstances the Maternity of God, namely that Christ should have such a Mother, and not another, holds first place, as that which infers greater affinity of some pure creature with Christ. Yet there is controversy whether most Blessed Virgin could merit that dignity, and that not only by worthy or congruous merit, but even by merit de condigno: concerning which the opinions of Theologians are various. For there are who judge blessed Virgin to have merited de condigno divine Maternity: which opinion Gabriel judges probable in 3. d. 1. art. 8. dub. 3., and it is upheld by some Recentiores.

But the second opinion teaches, B. Virgin merited indeed by worthy merit, not however condign, to be Mother of God. So St. Bonav. in 3. d. 1. art. 2., for he distinguishes a triple merit, namely condign, worthy and congruous; but he calls worthy merit that work which of itself has no equality, and dignity corresponding to reward; yet obtains it from benignity of God accepting such work for that reward. But the third opinion, which is more common and safer, contends blessed Virgin merited that dignity neither worthily nor condignly, but only congruously.

Note 2. It is one thing to merit de condigno a form, or certain dignity, another truly to merit the disposition requisite in subject, that worthily, decently it receive such form, or dignity; for these two can be separated, chiefly when disposition, and dignity are not necessarily, and quasi physically connected among themselves; but only according to a certain moral proportion; for then it can come about that although someone be worthily disposed toward receiving form or dignity, nevertheless such form is not owed to him from justice, and hence that he does not merit it de condigno. It is asked however whether blessed Virgin was condignly disposed, that she be chosen into Mother of God.

Note 3. Condign disposition of most Blessed Virgin herself toward Maternity of God can be gathered from various gifts wherewith she was illustrious: First indeed from eximious sanctity, and preeminent habitual grace, whereby she was anticipated from the first instant of her conception, together with all gifts and infused habits: Secondly, this disposition illustrated in wondrous manner certain privileges of perpetual innocence, lack of fomes; which although conferred in first sanctification, nevertheless obtained new and multiplied vigor through assiduous exercise of merits, and virtues: Finally in third place contributed most to that disposition increment of graces and virtues, since from the very instant of her conception, according to St. Bernardinus, or at least from that time when infants are wont to be gifted with liberty and use of reason, unto the very instant of conception of Christ, through daily assiduous increment of merits and virtues it advanced her unto the summit of piety and sanctity. These things premised, three things are to be determined: First, whether B. Virgin merited divine Maternity de condigno. Secondly, whether at least she merited it de congruo. Finally, whether truly she was worthy that, before all creatures, she be chosen into Mother of God.

First Conclusion. — BLESSED VIRGIN DID NOT MERIT DE CONDIGNO TO BE MOTHER OF GOD.

It is proved first: Two condign rewards diverse among themselves cannot respond to same merit: but eternal glory, which as wage responds to meritorious works, is reward condign to them, and is distinct from Incarnation: therefore blessed Virgin, who through meritorious works merited eternal glory, could not demand from justice another reward; nor consequently merit divine Maternity through those works. It is confirmed: all merits of blessed Virgin proceeded from grace of adoption, which as thus considered respects and inclines only toward obtaining beatitude; not toward meriting things which are of hypostatic order, to which Maternity of God pertains, since that be intrinsic circumstance of Incarnation.

Then, for merit de condigno beyond excellence and dignity of work, pact and promise are necessarily required on part of rewarding one, which promise excluded, however excellent the work would be, the rewarding one would not be held to concede reward: which is especially true in God, who cannot be moved to confer any benefit unless either by reason of goodness, of justice, or rather of fidelity to be kept in promises: now there is no pact, nor any promise, whereby divine Maternity was promised to blessed Virgin under condition of her good works; therefore she could not obtain that Maternity by merit de condigno.

Finally, if blessed Virgin had condignly merited to be Mother of God, which is circumstance of mystery of Incarnation, also SS. Patriarchs, chiefly Abraham, would in fact have merited that Christ arise from his seed: both because his works made from grace, although they were not so distinguished as works of blessed Virgin, were nevertheless of the same nature, and thus were referred by their own nature to same genus of reward: and because also if promise be required for rationale of condign merit, as we said just now is in fact required, Abraham had that promise made to him, Genes. 8; but we read no similar made to most Blessed Virgin with respect to divine Maternity to be conferred upon her. Moreover now it seems absurd to all Theologians to assert that Abraham condignly merited that circumstance of Incarnation: therefore far less must it be attributed to blessed Virgin with respect to divine maternity, which infers far more sublime dignity on account of her more intimate confederation with Christ than was dignity of Abraham, that Messiah would originate from his seed.

You will say 1: Most Blessed Virgin condignly merited that which is greater and more excellent than Incarnation, namely beatitude, and augmentation of grace or justification: therefore she also merited what is less: but maternity of God is something less than eternal beatitude and augmentation of grace: therefore she could merit even that maternity. The major stands: because who can effect greater can also less. But the minor is proved: both from that of Matthew 12. Whosoever shall do the will of my Father who is in heaven, he is my brother, and sister, and mother. Wherefore Luke 11., a certain woman lifting up voice, after she had said to Christ: Blessed is the womb that bore thee, and the paps that gave thee suck: Christ subjoined: Yea rather, blessed are they who hear the word of God, and keep it; plainly placing sanctity of life to be preferred before dignity of divine maternity. Wherefore St. Augustine expounding those words Tractate tenth on John, says: My mother whom ye have called blessed, blessed for this reason because she kept the Word of God, not because in her the Word was made flesh. And lib. De sancta Virginitate, c. 3.: More blessed was Mary perceiving faith of Christ than conceiving flesh of Christ.

I deny the consequence: for although most Blessed Virgin merited something more excellent than divine maternity, thence however it does not follow that she had merited even that maternity; indeed who can more, can also less, in things which are of same rationale and order; but otherwise in things which are of diverse rationale: for greater is it to reason than to fly; and yet it does not follow: someone can reason: therefore he can also fly, because flying and reasoning are of diverse rationale: well however follows: some agent can produce four degrees of heat: therefore also two. So at present, since reward of eternal life, and augmentation of grace, is of diverse rationale from reward of divine maternity, it is not consequent that if blessed Virgin could merit the former de condigno, she also could merit the latter.

You will say 2: If anything had stood in the way of the blessed Virgin meriting worthily the maternity of God — either because God had not accepted her works toward so great a dignity, or because He had not promised it to her on account of merits, or finally because she could not have merited that circumstance of the Incarnation, namely divine maternity, without also having merited the principle of merit: yet nothing of these stood in her way. Not indeed the first, because the blessed Virgin was created and ordained for this, that she might be the Mother of God; hence the Church attributes to her those words: From eternity I was ordained; likewise these: God chose her, and pre-elected her; namely, that from her and in her He might prepare a dwelling worthy of His Son. Nor indeed the second, for the promise did not fail her; for in Isaiah 7 it is said: Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son. Finally not the third, for just as the Mystery of the Incarnation is presupposed on the part of the principle of our merits, and those of the blessed Virgin, so too the humanity of Christ is presupposed: not indeed humanity in general, but that singular one composed from this matter and form. But since He took the matter of His body from the Virgin, on the part of the principle the dignity of the Mother is already understood in the Virgin; and therefore such a dignity cannot fall under merit itself, whose principle it is.

I deny the minor, and to the first proof I say that the blessed Virgin was indeed chosen by God and ordained that she might be the Mother of God, either by an ordination preceding her merits, and therefore wholly gratuitous, or following upon merits which were not de condigno but only de congruo. To the second I say that it was indeed promised to the Jewish people that some Virgin would conceive the Messiah; but that promise was not made specifically to the most blessed Virgin, and therefore there was no divine pact concerning the conferral upon her of divine maternity. To the third I say that the blessed Virgin could not have merited that circumstance of the Incarnation without having at the same time merited the Incarnation itself, since that merit would not have been with respect to generated humanity in general, but to that special and individual humanity which was to be assumed by the Word.

You will say 3: The blessed Virgin is said to have been worthy, so that she merited to become the Mother of God; therefore in fact she merited divine maternity. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved: first from what the Church sings of the same blessed Virgin in the prayer after Compline: That she might merit to become a worthy dwelling of Thy Son, Thou didst prepare her, the Holy Spirit cooperating: for what else is it to be a worthy dwelling of the Son of God than a worthy Mother of Him? And if she was made a worthy Mother, surely she was made so by good and meritorious works. Then because the holy Fathers use the same manner of speaking, especially St. Ambrose book 2 De Virginibus, Damascene book 1 De Fide, chapter 15, Bernard sermon 1 De Assumptione.

I answer, that by those or similar formulas of speech is signified indeed that the most blessed Virgin was worthy, so that she might be chosen as Mother of God; yet it does not follow from this that she merited that dignity de condigno by her good works: for that manner of speaking, "worthy of something from someone," does not always denote condign merit, but only that whoever receives a benefit from God seems worthy of that benefit. On this account the Church says in the prayer of Tuesday after the Sunday of the Passion: May our fasts be acceptable to Thee, O Lord, which, while they make us worthy of Thy grace by expiation, may lead us to eternal remedies. But who would say that by fasts we are so prepared that we may merit condignly the grace of God, by which we are expiated from sin?

You will say lastly: Whoever merits de condigno a disposition to some form seems also to merit that form itself: but the blessed Virgin merited de condigno that degree of holiness by which she was ultimately disposed to the maternity of God; therefore she equally merited de condigno her maternity.

I answer first by denying the major, because it can happen that a disposition to some dignity does not exceed the proportion of the meriting power, while the dignity itself well may: as e.g. if for someone to become a Bishop it were required that he be a Doctor, he could indeed acquire that disposition of himself; yet it would not follow that he could likewise of himself be promoted to the episcopate, since to obtain that dignity there would be need of the nomination of the King, and the designation and conferral of power on the part of the supreme Pontiff. I answer second, that the major can indeed be true of those dispositions which necessarily infer the form, but not of those which have only a certain moral connection, or fittingness and congruity with the form to be inferred. Now the holiness of the most blessed Virgin was not a physical disposition, and by the nature of the thing, to divine maternity, but only a moral and congruous one, since it was fitting that she who was purest and most holy of all virgins should be taken up to conceive the Holy of Holies.

Second Conclusion. — THE MOST BLESSED VIRGIN WAS WORTHY, AND MERITED DE CONGRUO, THAT SHE MIGHT BECOME THE MOTHER OF GOD.

This is the more common and truer opinion,

And it is proved from the holy Fathers, who expressly declare that the blessed Virgin was worthy, so that she might bring forth the Son of God and become His Mother. Thus above all St. Ambrose book 2 De Virginibus: Why, he says, do I linger over details? She was worthy from whom the Son of God was to be born. Basil, homily on the human generation of Christ: Worthy, he says, of the divinity of the Only-begotten was her wedlock. Chrysostom, homily 13 on John, expounding those words: How shall this be, since I know not a man? says: For this very reason it came to pass: for if you had known a man, you would not have been held worthy to minister to this mystery. Epiphanius, heresy 7: How dare they touch the unstained Virgin, who was made worthy to become the dwelling of the Son of God? Damascene book 4, chapter 15, calls her a holy, admirable, and temple most worthy of God. Finally Bernard, sermon 1 De Assumptione, says: Neither on earth is there a place more worthy than the virginal womb, in which Mary received the Son of God, nor in heaven the royal throne, on which her Son exalted Mary.

But that she had that dignity partly from divine grace preventing her, partly through her works and merits de condigno, the holy Fathers also signify; for St. Augustine, sermon 2 De Nativitate, says: Such a Virgin is chosen, who would have such merit in herself that she might receive the Son of God within herself. St. Gregory, book 1 of the Kings, chapter 1: Illustrated by incomparable merits, she prepared her sacred womb wherein the Only-begotten of God might repose. Peter Damian, sermon 2 De Assumptione: Her singular holiness and grace merited this, that she was judged singularly worthy of receiving God. Fulgentius, book De Incarnatione et Gratia, chapter 7: But God Himself made man, to conceive and to bear, she did not merit by human merits, but by the favor of the supreme God conceived and born of her, namely the blessed Virgin. To these agrees Prudentius in the hymn before meals, where he says: For to bring forth God, the Virgin renewed gave all merits. And Venantius Fortunatus in the book De aeternis gaudiis sings in this manner:

Happy virginity, which was worthy of the child-bearing of the Thunderer, Which merited to bring forth its own Lord.

The Church also sings in the Antiphon in Paschal time: Queen of heaven, rejoice, alleluia: for He whom you didst merit to bear, has risen, etc. Nor does it matter that the holy Fathers sometimes use the name of merit more broadly; namely for that, not which signifies an action worthy of reward, but only a certain correspondence of one thing to another: in which signification the Church sings in the blessing of the Paschal candle: O happy fault, which merited to have such and so great a Redeemer! This, I say, is no obstacle: both because when merit itself is attributed to the holiness of her life, it must be taken in its proper signification, of which we are now treating; and also because many of the holy Fathers attribute this merit to the good works of that blessed Virgin; whence beautifully St. Bernard, in the sermon on the aqueduct: How, he says, did our aqueduct here touch that fountain so sublime? How do you think, unless by the clemency of desire, unless by the fervor of devotion, unless by the purity of prayer, as it is written: The prayer of the just penetrates the heavens? And who is just, if not Mary the just, from whom the sun of justice arose for us? How then did she touch that inaccessible Majesty, unless by knocking, asking, seeking? Hence likewise St. Jerome, Epistle 22, proposes there Mary, who was of such great purity that she merited to be the Mother of the Lord. And St. Anselm, De Laudibus Virginis, chapter 8: Her most holy purity and most pure sanctity of breast, transcending the purity and health of every creature, incomparably merited this, that she might most fully become the repairer of a lost world.

You will say: The blessed Virgin could not merit de congruo that she might be the Mother of God without also meriting the incarnation itself: but she could not merit the incarnation, as was said in the preceding Question; therefore neither her maternity: therefore etc. The major is proved: for if the blessed Virgin merited de congruo that she might be the Mother of God, she equally merited that from her God-man might come to be; therefore she merited to bring forth and produce Christ God-man, and consequently merited that this composite, God-man, might exist in the nature of things: but this is to merit the incarnation; therefore if she merited de congruo to become Mother of God, she also merited the incarnation.

I answer, that merit de congruo can be understood in two ways: first indeed absolutely and simply, and without any supposition; secondly, this merit can be understood only as it were under a condition, or upon the supposition touched, that God is to become man. Wherefore I distinguish the major: The blessed Virgin could not merit by a merit de congruo maternity without having equally merited the incarnation, by an absolute and simple merit — I concede; by a merit made upon supposition, and with the condition posited that God is to become man — I deny. For thus taken, the merit of the Virgin with respect to maternity can be severed from the merit of the incarnation, because it presupposes that latter as future. Which indeed is declared by this example: if a King should decree to set out to some city, and some citizen on account of his merits obtains that he rather turn aside into his house than into another's; it is rightly understood that he did not merit the coming of the King into the city simply, and nevertheless merited the circumstance, namely his reception into his own house, which presupposes access to the city.

You will say 2: The merits of the Virgin were foreseen, not only as existing but also as future, and present to God in eternity after the merits of Christ were foreseen: therefore Christ Himself was previously foreseen as existing, and consequently as conceived, or as to be conceived of the Virgin, before the merits of the Virgin were preordained; therefore by no means could the blessed Virgin merit that Christ should be born of her.

I answer, that from that argument alone is proved that the merits of the blessed Virgin did not move God to choose her as Mother of His Son according to the order of election and eternal designation; yet it is not proved that she could not have merited that dignity according to the order of execution, because in truth she had grace and good works before the Son of God became incarnate from her; although she had that grace and those good works from the merits of the same her Son foreseen in the divine ordination and predefinition.

You will urge: If before all the merits of the Virgin God preordained the Incarnation: then He also preordained it in this humanity, and consequently formed from this individual matter: but the Virgin did not merit to have that individual matter so joined to herself as was necessary for the conception of the Son; because this pertains rather to the order of effects and natural causes than to the notion of merit; therefore etc.

I answer to the minor, that just as temporal things can fall under merit in order to spiritual things, so the Virgin could merit that that matter, from which Christ was to be formed, should first be a material part of her own body, or blood.

WHETHER THE HOLY FATHERS MERITED, OR AT LEAST COULD HAVE MERITED DE CONGRUO, THE INCARNATION AND ITS CIRCUMSTANCES.

NOTE 1. By the name of the holy Fathers are here understood those most holy men who preceded the coming of Christ, whether of the law of nature or of the written law, to whom a special revelation or promise of the future Messiah had been made by God; concerning whom it is asked whether they merited either the Incarnation itself, or some of its circumstances, for instance its acceleration, or that it took place in their times, or that Christ should be born of their stock and propagation, or finally some of its effects, for instance the justification of souls and the reopening of heaven. Around this difficulty there are especially three opinions of Theologians. The first indeed is that of St. Bonaventure, dist. 3, art. 2, q. 2, where he contends that the holy Fathers merited de congruo the substance of the Incarnation, not as regards its principal effect, which is the justification of souls, but as regards the less principal effect, which is the opening of the kingdom of heaven. The second truly is that of Vasquez, disp. 22, cap. 1, and of other Recentiors, who although they concede merit de congruo with respect to the Incarnation as regards its acceleration and other circumstances, nevertheless deny it with respect to the substance of the Incarnation and all its effects. The third finally does not deny the holy Fathers some merit de congruo both with respect to the substance of the Incarnation and with respect to some of its circumstances; to which opinion very many Thomists subscribe.

NOTE 2. The congruity of a reward can be regarded in two ways: first indeed it can be taken for a congruity founded in the pure mercy of God, without any right or debt on the part of the work; secondly, for a congruity founded in the proportion of friendship, and in a work elicited in the state of grace by a friend: for friendship, since it is a potential part of justice, founds some debt: not indeed strict and rigorous, such as is merit de condigno, but only secundum quid, so that it befits the goodness and wisdom of the one rewarding to bestow that reward upon the friend on account of works elicited pleasing to him. But of this merit we inquire only whether the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation, or some of its circumstances.

NOTE 3. All Theologians agree that none of the holy Fathers merited de condigno the mystery of the Incarnation according to the substance of its effect; which indeed St. Paul demonstrates at length in the Epistle to the Romans, in which he chiefly intends to convince the Jews that their Fathers had not deserved, namely by merit de condigno, that Christ should be born of their stock, but that this was only a benefit of God choosing rather the seed of Abraham than any other man. Hence in Titus 3 he says: The goodness and kindness of our Saviour God appeared, not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us: which is also gathered from other texts of Scripture; for in Psalm 88 it is said: But if his children forsake my law... yet my mercy I will not scatter from him. And Luke 1: He has received Israel His child, being mindful of His mercy; where the mystery of the Incarnation is called a work of mercy; but mercy excludes merits, especially condign ones. To these add that the grace of the Saints is only the principle of meriting condignly that to which it is referred by the ordination of God; but the merits of the holy Fathers were referred by the ordination of God only to eternal life; therefore they were only principles of meriting eternal life condignly, not the mystery of the Incarnation.

Single Conclusion. — THE HOLY FATHERS DID NOT MERIT DE CONGRUO THE INCARNATION, AS REGARDS ITS SUBSTANCE, NOR AS REGARDS ITS INTRINSIC CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT ONLY AS REGARDS ITS EXTRINSIC CIRCUMSTANCES, NAMELY OF TIME, PLACE, AND PROPAGATION FROM THEIR STOCK. This is the opinion of the Doctor in 4, d. 2, q. 1, n. 11, where he says: «In all the works of God there was no work of mere grace except the Incarnation alone of the Son of God, if no merits preceded it». He adds: «Which indeed is true in the divine ordination «of that Incarnation: because if at the time of the conception any merits of Mary preceded, they were not good absolutely with respect to the Incarnation, but perhaps of its acceleration, so that that preordained Incarnation might be fulfilled». Well then, says Augustine 11 De Trinitate, chapter 19: «Among things done in time, that is the supreme grace, such as that man was joined to God in unity of person.» By which the Doctor openly teaches that neither the most blessed Virgin nor the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation itself: but only certain extrinsic circumstances, namely, that the Incarnation should take place at such a time, place, and from such seed.

Both parts are proved: The first indeed, because the principle of congruous merit cannot fall under merit: but the Incarnation as to its substance and intrinsic circumstances is the principle of the merit of the holy Fathers; therefore they could not have merited that principle. The minor is evident: the major likewise; for just as merit de condigno could not meritoriously deserve its own principle, so neither can merit de congruo congruously earn its own principle: because if the principle of merit could fall under merit de congruo, the effect would be the cause of its own cause, as we said above, and first antecedent grace would be given on account of a foreseen good use of it: which however St. Augustine condemns as Pelagianism in the book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, chapter 19. Which he proves from Ephesians 1: Who predestined us in Christ, that we should be holy: for Augustine notes that it is not said because we were going to be holy, but that we should be holy.

Nor does it avail to reply, that the Incarnation was not only the efficient cause of all grace and merit, but also final with respect to the Fathers of the Old Testament, and as such could have fallen under merit: that response, I say, does not break the force of the argument, because those Fathers did not receive grace in order that the Incarnation might come about, but on the contrary the Incarnation was predestined in order that they might receive grace from it. Yet the Incarnation had a certain likeness of a final cause, because it operated when it was still only future; it operated, however, as a meritorious cause, because, as non-existing, it can move the agent to confer a reward, as the Doctor just now praised teaches, n. 10, where he says: That even if the Passion of Christ is not now in effect, it is nevertheless in divine acceptance, and this suffices that it be a meritorious cause: for it is evident that we confer many things on account of some good not present in itself, but present in our memory, if it be past, or in opinion, if it be future.

The second part is proved by all those texts of Scripture in which the future Incarnation is promised to the Fathers of the Old Testament, either from their stock, or in their country, or in a shorter time. Thus Psalm 11: Because of the groaning of the poor, now will I arise. Daniel 9: Seventy weeks are shortened upon thy people, etc. Which testimonies very many Fathers expound of the shortening of the coming of the Messiah. It is likewise evident from the promises made by God to those most holy men that the Messiah would arise from their stock on account of the illustrious works which they had wrought in the service of God. Thus Genesis 22 God promises Abraham a Messiah to be born of his seed in these words: By myself have I sworn: because thou hast done this thing, I will bless thee, and I will multiply thy seed: and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed, that is in Christ, as the Apostle expounds to the Galatians 3.

It stands likewise from all those prayers by which they earnestly besought God to send the Messiah into the world. Thus Isaiah 16:

Send forth, O Lord, the lamb, the ruler of the earth: and 45: Drop down dew, O ye heavens, from above, and let the clouds rain the just: and 64 (61): O that thou wouldst rend the heavens, and wouldst come down! David also, Psalm 85, seems to pray for the Messiah when he says: Give us thy salvation, and Psalm 105: Visit us in thy salvation; by which the holy Patriarchs and Fathers of the Old Testament besought, not indeed that God should decree the Incarnation of His Son, which they had already received through divine revelation; but only that He might fulfill that mystery in a brief time and in their sight; but those prayers and desires had the character of merit de congruo, so that God would hear them, who themselves obeyed Him in all things: then also because prayers for things necessary to salvation merit de congruo the things requested: finally because those urgent prayers and pious desires disposed those holy Fathers to receive Christ: but those moral dispositions had the character of merit de congruo as to the substance of the Incarnation, or the coming of the Son of God into the world; hence in Malachi we read: Behold, suddenly there shall come to His temple the Dominator whom you seek, and the Angel of the Testament whom you desire. By which the Prophet signifies that therefore the Messiah was about to come in a brief time because the most holy men were seeking Him and longing for Him with the highest vows.

You will say: The extrinsic circumstances of the Incarnation were decreed from eternity just as much as the intrinsic ones: but the intrinsic ones were not decreed dependently upon any merit of men; therefore neither the extrinsic ones. The major is evident; for the same reason seems to hold of the extrinsic circumstances as of the intrinsic ones, since they concern the same humanity to be assumed in individuo. The minor also is evident, because the intrinsic circumstances of some work, formally considered as such, are of the same order with it itself: whence the intrinsic circumstances of the Incarnation pertain to the hypostatic union as its substance does; therefore if the holy Fathers could not merit de condigno the substance of the Incarnation, because their works pertained to the order of grace, which is inferior to the hypostatic, by the same reason they could not merit de condigno its intrinsic circumstances.

I deny the major, for it can be said that the divine decree concerned only the substance of the Incarnation, without prevision of the merit of the circumstances, even if those extrinsic circumstances could have been decreed by an absolute decree with a view to the merits of the holy Fathers, since those extrinsic circumstances in no way regard the entity and order of the hypostatic union, but are altogether extrinsic; for the Word could equally have become incarnate from another stock, and been born in another place or at another time, than that He took origin from the seed of Abraham and had His rise in Palestine.

From these gather, that just as the ancient Fathers did not merit the mystery itself of the Incarnation, in the same way they did not deserve the effects of that mystery, namely that the merits and satisfaction of Christ our Lord be applied both for themselves and for the whole human race. The same must be said of the other effects; for if the ancient Fathers had merited that Christ should suffer and satisfy for the whole human race, they would also have merited the salvation of the whole human race, and consequently their own redemption, which is most absurd: both because to assert this is the same as to say that they merited their first grace, which they obtained through the merits of Christ for their redemption, seeing that they merited to have the merits of Christ for themselves; and because if the most holy Fathers had deserved the death of Christ for their own redemption, the work of the Incarnation and death of Christ would already have been for the ancient Fathers not a work of mercy and first grace, but of gratitude and second grace, which is grace for grace: whereas for others, who were after Christ, it would have been a work of mercy alone; for if on account of the merits of the ancient Fathers God had granted Christ and His Passion and its fruits, the merits of Christ themselves, insofar as they would have been benefits of the ancient Fathers, would have had the character of remuneration, and consequently would have been given to them out of gratitude: which is indeed far removed from the doctrine and manner of speaking of the holy Fathers.