Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Note 1. That since the Incarnation is a union of the Word with human nature, it is necessary that the nature itself be presupposed as existing; for every real union is between extremes actually existing; and since humanity consists of body and soul, hence there can be a twofold difficulty concerning the disposition prerequisite in the humanity itself for the hypostatic union: First indeed on the part of the body, namely whether a perfect organization of the body ought to precede the Incarnation, and that by priority of time or of nature; Second on the part of the soul, whether it ought to be illuminated with some supernatural gift, for instance sanctifying grace, that it might be rendered apt for such a union.

Note 2. From the Doct. Subtilis in 3 d. 2 qu. 2, a twofold extrinsic medium required for union can be distinguished: one medium of necessity; another of congruity. The first is that without which the thing cannot be attained; the second is that without which the thing could absolutely and simply come to pass, yet not so fittingly and congruously. Hence we ask whether habitual grace, or another supernatural gift, was prerequisite in the soul of Christ necessarily or congruously for the hypostatic union: such that the divine Word either would not have assumed human nature absolutely, or at least not so fittingly, without such prior disposition. Around which difficulty there are two extreme conflicting opinions of Theologians, of which the one denies such a disposition to be prerequisite; the other affirms it, and that either necessarily, such that the hypostatic union had a necessary connection with a disposition of this kind, just as the union of the soul with the body has a necessary connection with the ultimate disposition of the body, and necessarily follows upon it. So Gabriel seems to hold in 3 dist. 2. Or as some will have it with Alex. of Hales 3 p. qu. 3, although the incarnation does not follow such a disposition necessarily, such that with that disposition posited the incarnation could fail to follow; nevertheless that disposition seems so necessary that it ought absolutely to be presupposed as some quality rendering nature capable of this union. Others finally will have a disposition of this kind required at least as a becoming ornament of humanity, that through it humanity be fitly prepared for so excellent a union, as St. Bonaventure teaches in 3 dist. 2 art. 3.

Note 3. That in the Incarnation four things must be considered in order: First indeed by reason of matter, namely the blood of the most pure Virgin destined for the place where the body was to be formed. Second, the organization of the body of Christ, which consists in the introduction of an organic form or corporeity, which introduction is preceded by alteration. Third, the animation of the same body, or the union of a rational soul with it. Fourth finally, the union of the whole constituted nature with the Word. It is asked, then, whether and how these preceded one another. Hence a twofold difficulty occurs here to be solved: First, whether the organization of the body of Christ preceded in time, or by nature, its union with the Word. Second, whether the soul of Christ ought to have been illuminated with some supernatural quality, through which as through a medium it might be prepared for the hypostatic union.

First Conclusion. — THE ORGANIZATION DID NOT PRECEDE ANIMATION IN TIME, NOR ITS UNION WITH THE WORD, BUT ONLY BY NATURE.

This Conclusion consists of three parts, of which

The first is evident, because organization consists chiefly in the introduction of a complete organic form, which as such is the ultimate disposition for animation: but ultimate disposition and the infusion of a rational soul, about which we here inquire, are simultaneous in time, as I suppose from the Physics: therefore organization does not precede animation in time.

The second part is proved: If organization and animation of the body had preceded the incarnation by priority of time, the consequence would be that human nature would first have been subsistent through its own subsistence before being subsistent through the subsistence of the Word: but the consequent would be absurd: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is evident: for human nature existing during some real instant of time is also per se subsistent: therefore either through alien subsistence or through its own: but if it had existed first in time before being united to the Word, it would not have subsisted through alien subsistence: therefore through its own.

You will say against the first part: every generable and corruptible substance which is not created is produced through mutation: but the whole nature assumed by the Word is generable and corruptible, nor was it created immediately, and consequently it was changed to form: therefore it was previously in time under privation opposed to that form, because opposites by privation cannot be simultaneously in time in the same subject: and consequently previously in time the body was not animated before it was animated: and subsequently organization preceded animation in time. —

The Doctor answers that the argument holds true when the form is produced after the production of its subject: but otherwise, when the form is produced simultaneously with the subject: for then it is not properly a mutation to that form, because the subject was not previously under privation before being under form; nor was it aptly apt to have the form before it had it. Therefore since a rational soul is induced simultaneously even in us with the perfect esse of the body, the consequence is that there is not properly a mutation to the soul itself, but only to the esse of the organic body, of which mutation the subject is matter, which was previously under the form of blood than under organic forms.

Finally, the third part also stands, namely that organization and animation of the body preceded the assumption at least by nature: for the foundation of relation and union naturally precedes relation and union; because what is nothing in itself is also nothing in order to another: but human nature completely constituted through animation is the foundation of union with the Word: therefore it naturally precedes it.

FROM THESE GATHER: that the organization of the body of Christ was not made through various alterations, as the organization of the bodies of other men takes place over the space of forty-six days; but in an instant, as St. Damascene teaches lib. 3 De Fide orthodoxa, chap. 2, where he says: The most sacred body of Christ was not figured in the womb of the Virgin over a course of three days and formed: just as in our generation the body of a male is said to be formed in the maternal womb over the space of forty days, but in one, so to speak, and the same moment it was straightway conceived from the most blessed Virgin, or rather the true body of Christ was altogether complete. Hence the consequence is that the body of the Lord Christ remained longer in the womb of the Virgin than the bodies of other infants are wont to remain, because it was organized and animated earlier than other bodies are animated.

Second Conclusion. — THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION PREREQUISITE ON THE PART OF THE SOUL, THROUGH WHICH AS THROUGH A MEDIUM AND BY ITS POSITING THE WORD WOULD ASSUME THE HUMANITY. So the Doctor in 3 dist. 2 qu. 2, where he

Proves first: If there had been such a medium, especially habitual grace or some supernatural quality affecting the soul and preparing and rendering it capable, that it be assumed by the Word: but this is utterly fictitious and absurd. Which he proves thus: A rational soul subsists by nature prior to being perfected accidentally: therefore the soul of Christ by nature subsisted in the Word prior to receiving any accidental perfection. The antecedent is evident: first, because subsistence is a mode more intrinsic to the subsisting nature than any accidental form can be, since the former pertains to the complement of the substance itself; the latter only to its extrinsic ornament; but it is prior for a thing to be complete intrinsically and substantially than extrinsically and accidentally. But the consequence is proved, both because in that instant human nature was affected by the subsistence of the Word in which its own subsistence ought to have resulted: but its own subsistence would have resulted before every accidental perfection had it not been impeded by the subsistence of the Word: therefore human nature was affected by the subsistence of the Word prior to being adorned with any accidental perfection; and subsequently so far is it that the Incarnation came about through habitual grace as medium, that indeed grace was not conceded except in view of and by benefit of the Incarnation. Which indeed the Doctor proves from that word of John 1: We saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth; by which words St. John signifies that Christ had the fullness of grace because he was the only begotten; therefore Christ must have been by nature only begotten prior to having grace, and consequently habitual grace was not a disposition for the hypostatic union.

Proves secondly: If habitual grace were the medium for the hypostatic union, it would be either the medium formally uniting the extremes, or disposing one extreme, namely humanity, to that union: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because human nature is united formally per se and immediately to the Word, not through some quality or created absolute entity as medium. Nor even the second, because if it were required as a disposition, it would be either as a moral disposition, or as a physical disposition: but neither can be affirmed. Not indeed as a moral disposition, because the entity disproportion of divine nature and subsistence to created nature would be no less with that habitual grace posited than with it removed: for since that grace would be a created quality, it would not remove the infinite distance which is between the divine and human nature. Nor even as a physical disposition, because whatever accident presupposes the existence of its subject: therefore grace presupposes the existence of humanity: but some physical disposition is not prerequisite for personality in a nature besides that which is required for its existence; for by the very fact that it has existence for some instant, it must necessarily have some personality, otherwise a nature could exist existing without any personality.

You will say: Human nature cannot be united to the Word by the beatific union without the habit of sanctifying grace, chiefly from the fact that both the union itself and its term exceed the faculty of created nature: therefore since the hypostatic union is still more excellent, because it is the highest grace, as St. Augustine says, lib. 13 De Trinitate, chap. 19, it cannot be conferred without a prior habit of grace. —

The Doctor answers by denying the antecedent, insofar as he contends that the reason why the beatific vision cannot be conferred on a creature without habitual grace is that the beatific vision exceeds nature; for if this were true, it would follow that habitual grace could not be given to nature without some other grace or supernatural gift; for it exceeds nature: and consequently there would be a process into infinity. That, therefore, is not the reason why grace is presupposed to the beatific vision, but because the beatific vision is a supernatural operation proceeding effectively from the very nature itself; and because nature does not have an adequate virtue for producing that action, therefore it is necessary that there be given to it another supernatural co-principle with which it can produce it: but the hypostatic union is not an operation, nor anything capable of being produced effectively and partially by nature, since nature is in no way capable of producing its own union with the Word, but only of receiving it. Therefore another supernatural principle antecedent in nature ought not be admitted, that the hypostatic union be conferred upon it; but just as nature can immediately receive the habit of grace, although it exceed its virtue, because the habit of grace does not demand of nature to be produced effectively but only received in it; so pari ratione can it immediately receive the hypostatic union.