Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini
Claude Frassen (1620–1711)
Tractatus I: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini
Quaestio I: Quot, et quae fuerint haereticorum erronea dogmata circa incarnati Verbi mysterium
Disputatio I: De Existentia, Natura, et Causis Incarnationis
Articulus I: De Possibilitate, Convenientia, et Complemento seu Peractione Mysterii Incarnationis
§ I: De Possibilitate Incarnationis
Quaestio I: An unio divinae naturae cum humana in unitate personae sit possibilis
Quaestio II: An, et quo lumine cognosci possit et suaderi
§ II: De Convenientia Incarnationis
Quaestio I: An conveniens fuerit Deum incarnari
Quaestio II: An convenientius fuerit naturam humanam, quam Angelicam, aut aliquam aliam a Verbo assumi
Quaestio III: Utrum convenientius fuerit Filium, quam Patrem, aut Spiritum Sanctum incarnari
Quaestio IV: An convenienti tempore facta fuerit incarnatio
§ III: De Necessitate Incarnationis
Quaestio I: An, et qualiter necessaria fuerit incarnatio
Quaestio II: Utrum purus homo Deo satisfacere potuerit pro hominum offensa, eorumque ruinam restaurare
Quaestio III: Utrum Christus Deo condignam satisfactionem exhibuerit
Quaestio IV: Utrum Christus pro nobis satisfecerit ad iuris apices, seu ex rigore iustitiae
Quaestio V: Utrum revera peractum sit incarnationis mysterium, et Iudaeis promissus Messias advenerit
Articulus II: De Unione Hypostatica
§ I: De Unione Hypostatica secundum se spectata
Quaestio I: Quid sit unio hypostatica
Quaestio II: An unio hypostatica facta fuerit in unitate naturae aut personae, idque per veram et proprie dictam compositionem, an per utriusque commixtionem
Quaestio III: Quis sit terminus unionis hypostaticae
Quaestio IV: Utrum unio hypostatica sit immediata, et omnium unionum maxima
§ II: De Persona Assumente
Quaestio I: Qualiter, et per quid Verbum divinum naturam humanam terminaverit et assumpserit
Quaestio II: Utrum subsistentia Dei absoluta et communis tribus personis possit naturam humanam assumere, illique immediate uniri
Quaestio III: Utrum plures personae divinae possent assumere eandem humanitatem, et eadem persona plures humanitates
Quaestio IV: An persona creata possit alienam naturam terminare et assumere
§ III: De Unione Hypostatica ex parte Naturae Assumptae
Quaestio I: An natura tam Angelica, quam irrationalis, sit assumptibilis a persona divina
Quaestio II: An natura accidentis possit assumi a persona divina
Quaestio III: Qualiter, et quo ordine Verbum divinum humanitatem et eius partes assumpserit
Articulus III: De Causis Incarnationis
§ I: De Causa Efficiente Incarnationis
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Quaestio I: Quae fuerit vel esse potuerit causa efficiens et instrumentaria Incarnationis
Note 1. It is certain that the principal efficient cause of this mystery is God, and the three divine persons operating ad extra. For this was defined in very many Councils, especially the Lateran Council under Martin I, Can. 2, and the other Lateran Council under Innocent III; likewise in Toledan 6 and 11 in their Confessions of faith; which twofold doctrine all the holy Fathers who treated of the divine Incarnation in a particular manner openly teach, especially St. Augustine lib. 1. De Trinitate, chap. 1, and tract. 10 and 11 on John.
This truth is likewise gathered from Sacred Scripture, in which this incarnation is attributed both to the Father and to the Son: to the Father indeed, thus Galatians 1: God sent his Son, made of a woman, etc.; but to the Son, Philippians 2: When he was in the form of God, he thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant. Finally, to the Holy Spirit, who is called the craftsman of this ineffable mystery; for what was born of the Virgin is of the Holy Spirit. To these the theological reason also gives its support, because since works ad extra proceed from the divine omnipotence, which is common indivisibly to the three persons — for there are not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent — therefore all the works of God, among which the most excellent is the work of the Incarnation, proceed from the three divine persons as they are one in unity of nature, will, and power, according to that word of John 10: What things soever the Father doth, these same also the Son doth in like manner. But a difficulty remains, whether God has elevated any creature, or could have elevated it, to that dignity and excellence, that it should be for him an efficacious co-cause, or instrumental cause, in the working and effecting of this mystery.
Note 2. That in this matter the efficient cause is distinguished from the instrumental, in that the efficient acts and influences into the effect by its own and intrinsic power; whereas the instrumental only operates and influences into the production of the effect by a power conceded to it from elsewhere, borrowed from the efficient. Moreover, the efficient cause has a certain proportion and analogy with the effect produced: for every productive cause has a determinate sphere of activity in producing its like, toward which it is chiefly ordered and tends; whereas the instrumental, especially that which has only an obediential potency for some work, has no proportion of itself with the effect, but is only ordered toward it and assumed at the nod and good pleasure of the principal agent.
It is asked here, then, whether any creature was assumed, or at least could have been assumed, as an instrument for effecting the hypostatic union. It is certain, however, that no creature distinct from the Virgin was assumed as a physical instrument for effecting this union: for of none can it be suspected that it made Christ man: for Scripture, or the holy Fathers, attribute this virtue and efficacy to none; for even the presence of the Angel Gabriel himself terminated in the annunciation alone, in the proposal of the mystery, and in the petition for the virginal consent; whence there remains only the difficulty to be solved concerning the most blessed Virgin, namely whether she was elevated by God as an instrument for effecting the hypostatic union.
Note 3. The present difficulty is raised about the first effecting of this mystery: for it is certain that a new union could take place, at least partial, of the Word to the parts of substance which were being added to the body of Christ through nutrition throughout the whole time of his life: for on the part of the Word the whole divine subsistence was united to every part of the body; but by whom physically that union would be effected — namely, whether by God immediately, or through humanity as through a physical instrument, which by its own proper power would dispose the matter of the food, and convert it into its own substance, so that before nature, the matter of the food being informed by the soul, through the action of the Trinity alone it would be united hypostatically to the subsistence of the Word, into which Christ would straightway in the same instant introduce his form — in what manner, I say, this was done, nothing can be defined with certainty. Therefore only these two come here chiefly to be resolved: First, whether the Blessed Virgin was assumed as a physical instrument for effecting the hypostatic union. Second, whether the divine Word had any principal physical and real influx into the assumed humanity, to which influx the other two persons would not concur.
First Conclusion. — THE BLESSED VIRGIN WAS NOT ELEVATED BY GOD AS A PHYSICAL INSTRUMENT FOR THE HYPOSTATIC UNION OF THE HUMANITY GENERATED IN HER AND FROM HER WITH THE DIVINE WORD.
Proof 1. From all those texts of Scripture in which the Incarnation is attributed to God alone, and is said to be the singular work of God alone. Thus Habakkuk 3: O Lord, thy work in the midst of the years; which text St. Augustine and other holy Fathers explain in the usual way of the work of the Incarnation: but the hypostatic union would not be perfectly the singular work of God, if the blessed Virgin, or any creature, had been consenting and concausa of its production; therefore the Blessed Virgin had no efficiency, even instrumental, with respect to the hypostatic union.
Next: No creature, as we proved in the Physics, can be assumed as an instrument of creation: therefore much less of this union. The consequence is evident, because just as by creation existence itself is communicated to a thing, so by this union the very esse of divine subsistence is communicated, which certainly is far more excellent and nobler than mere esse of natural existence.
Finally: Only that concurrence should be granted to the Most Blessed Virgin which is chiefly required and suffices, that she truly be and be called Mother of God: but for that it is not necessary that the Blessed Virgin have an instrumental concurrence in order to the hypostatic union: therefore it ought not to be admitted. This is evident; for to what else would such concurrence be asserted? The minor also stands, both because the concurrence of a mother in the generation of a son is not instrumental but principal, whether it be only after the manner of a material cause, or supplier of matter, as some will have it, or after the manner of an efficient cause effectively concurring to the formation and organization of the body, as the others seem to judge more correctly.
You will say 1: Very many of the holy Fathers admit that instrumental concurrence in the B. Virgin with respect to the hypostatic union: therefore it is to be admitted. The antecedent is proved, for Hesychius, Homil. 2, De Beata Virgine, calls her herself the instrument of the Incarnation: similarly St. Ambrose, Epist. 82: Through man and woman flesh was cast out of Paradise: through the Virgin it is joined to God. In the same manner speaks St. Bernard, Hom. 4 super Missus est, while he says that the Blessed Virgin is that woman who so well tempered those three fates of the Gospel, namely flesh, soul, and divinity, that not even upon the separation made of flesh and soul would flesh or soul be divided from God. —
I answer, that the holy Fathers are to be understood only of a dispositive concurrence, and not of an effective one; since the most blessed Virgin is reckoned to have concurred dispositively to the hypostatic union, because she supplied and prepared the purest blood for forming the humanity of Christ, whereby it was united hypostatically to the divine Word: hence when they call her the instrument of the Incarnation, they do not use the name instrument in its proper signification, in which it is wont to be taken by Philosophers, but in a wider sense, in which whatever concurs in any way whatsoever to the production of another thing is wont to be called an instrument.
You will say 2: God is wont to use his creatures as instruments, especially when the instrument is accommodated to the intended effect, and chiefly when that work redounds to the commendation of his sweet providence, and to the dignity of the creatures which he intends to elevate: but the dignity of the most blessed Virgin would seem to be far greater, and the commendation of the sweet disposition of God far ampler, if the blessed Virgin concur instrumentally in the hypostatic union than if she only effect it dispositively: therefore this is what must be said. —
I distinguish the major: When no contradiction or repugnance thence appears, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But there is a contradiction in that any creature should be elevated to create, much more to effect this union; since God and creature are more distant from one another in the order of unibles than the production of the existence of the creature itself from nothing; for distance is measured by reason of the terms: moreover less distant from the power of a natural agent is to be purely created than to be partly divine and created, such as is that esse which comes about through the Incarnation: therefore, etc.
Second Conclusion. — THE DIVINE WORD HAD NO SPECIAL PHYSICAL INFLUX WITH REGARD TO THE FORMATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE HUMANITY.
Proof: The formal principle of operating ad extra is the same, and holds itself in the same manner with respect to those operations, in all the divine persons; hence whatever one person operates physically, the others also operate: therefore either the Word had no influx into the humanity of Christ which the Father and the Holy Spirit did not have in like manner; or if it had any, the other divine persons equally had the same. The consequence is evident: for this reason we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son indivisibly, because in the Father and the Son there is the same and undistinguished principle of spiration: therefore since the principle of operating ad extra, namely divine omnipotence, is the same in the three divine persons, one of them could not have some influx without the others having the same.
Next: If anything peculiar were bestowed by the Word upon the assumed humanity, all of it should be reduced to its personality; but this is not active, nor productive of any effect; therefore it effects nothing peculiarly. The antecedent is evident: because in the Word there are only two things, namely the divine essence, and the personality of the Word: but the divinity is common to it with the other persons. The consequence is proved: the whole office of the personality of the Word with respect to the assumed nature is only that it bestow upon it what its own proper personality would bestow were it present: but a proper personality has no real effective influx into the humanity whose it is, but only terminates it: therefore also the personality of the Word had no efficiency toward the assumed humanity.
Finally: For every real effecting there must be given some term produced by it; for no productive action is given without a term: but no term can be assigned of the efficiency of the Word with respect to the humanity: therefore it had no peculiar efficiency toward it, either for producing or conserving it.
You will say 1: To assume is to take to oneself: but to take to oneself is to act: therefore since to assume humanity is proper to the Word, the consequence is that it have a peculiar action with respect to the human nature which it assumrit. —
I distinguish the minor: To assume is to act, insofar as assume signifies the formation of the humanity and its union with the divinity, I concede; insofar as it signifies to terminate that nature, and make it existing of itself and incommunicably, I deny. In the first way assumption belongs to the whole Trinity: in the latter it is proper to the Son alone. In the first way assumption is an action: in the latter it is only a termination.
You will say 2: Everything most perfect is active: but whatever is in the Word is most perfect: therefore also active; and consequently its personality will be active, and consequently will have some peculiar efficiency toward its own humanity. —
I distinguish the major: Whatever is most excellent in the genus of real being, I concede; total, I deny. And likewise distinguishing the minor, I deny the consequence: for it is certain that there are many divine attributes which of themselves are not precisely active and productive: since neither eternity nor immensity are of themselves productive of any effect; indeed who would that be? Therefore what is formal in the Word is not active. Hence divine personality can be considered either as it is a relation constituting the divine person, or as it is a subsistence affecting and terminating the divine nature: but in neither of these ways is it operative and productive. Not indeed as it is relation, because relation is not of itself a principle of acting: nor even as it is subsistence, because this of itself is not a physical principle of acting, but only of terminating. Nor does it matter that to act be a certain perfection: for not every perfection ought to belong to the divine personalities as they are something distinct from the divine Essence; for as thus they are not something imperfect or perfect, as we proved in Tract. De Trin.; but it suffices that they include every perfection as they are really identical with the divine Essence: otherwise, since to understand, to will, and to love are the highest perfections, they ought also to belong to the personalities themselves, as from the same essence — nay, as they are distinguished by another intellect and another will; which certainly no Theologian will admit.
Quaestio II: An aliqua fuerit causa media, seu praeparativa ad Incarnationem per modum effectionis et dispositionis
Note 1. That since the Incarnation is a union of the Word with human nature, it is necessary that the nature itself be presupposed as existing; for every real union is between extremes actually existing; and since humanity consists of body and soul, hence there can be a twofold difficulty concerning the disposition prerequisite in the humanity itself for the hypostatic union: First indeed on the part of the body, namely whether a perfect organization of the body ought to precede the Incarnation, and that by priority of time or of nature; Second on the part of the soul, whether it ought to be illuminated with some supernatural gift, for instance sanctifying grace, that it might be rendered apt for such a union.
Note 2. From the Doct. Subtilis in 3 d. 2 qu. 2, a twofold extrinsic medium required for union can be distinguished: one medium of necessity; another of congruity. The first is that without which the thing cannot be attained; the second is that without which the thing could absolutely and simply come to pass, yet not so fittingly and congruously. Hence we ask whether habitual grace, or another supernatural gift, was prerequisite in the soul of Christ necessarily or congruously for the hypostatic union: such that the divine Word either would not have assumed human nature absolutely, or at least not so fittingly, without such prior disposition. Around which difficulty there are two extreme conflicting opinions of Theologians, of which the one denies such a disposition to be prerequisite; the other affirms it, and that either necessarily, such that the hypostatic union had a necessary connection with a disposition of this kind, just as the union of the soul with the body has a necessary connection with the ultimate disposition of the body, and necessarily follows upon it. So Gabriel seems to hold in 3 dist. 2. Or as some will have it with Alex. of Hales 3 p. qu. 3, although the incarnation does not follow such a disposition necessarily, such that with that disposition posited the incarnation could fail to follow; nevertheless that disposition seems so necessary that it ought absolutely to be presupposed as some quality rendering nature capable of this union. Others finally will have a disposition of this kind required at least as a becoming ornament of humanity, that through it humanity be fitly prepared for so excellent a union, as St. Bonaventure teaches in 3 dist. 2 art. 3.
Note 3. That in the Incarnation four things must be considered in order: First indeed by reason of matter, namely the blood of the most pure Virgin destined for the place where the body was to be formed. Second, the organization of the body of Christ, which consists in the introduction of an organic form or corporeity, which introduction is preceded by alteration. Third, the animation of the same body, or the union of a rational soul with it. Fourth finally, the union of the whole constituted nature with the Word. It is asked, then, whether and how these preceded one another. Hence a twofold difficulty occurs here to be solved: First, whether the organization of the body of Christ preceded in time, or by nature, its union with the Word. Second, whether the soul of Christ ought to have been illuminated with some supernatural quality, through which as through a medium it might be prepared for the hypostatic union.
First Conclusion. — THE ORGANIZATION DID NOT PRECEDE ANIMATION IN TIME, NOR ITS UNION WITH THE WORD, BUT ONLY BY NATURE.
This Conclusion consists of three parts, of which
The first is evident, because organization consists chiefly in the introduction of a complete organic form, which as such is the ultimate disposition for animation: but ultimate disposition and the infusion of a rational soul, about which we here inquire, are simultaneous in time, as I suppose from the Physics: therefore organization does not precede animation in time.
The second part is proved: If organization and animation of the body had preceded the incarnation by priority of time, the consequence would be that human nature would first have been subsistent through its own subsistence before being subsistent through the subsistence of the Word: but the consequent would be absurd: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is evident: for human nature existing during some real instant of time is also per se subsistent: therefore either through alien subsistence or through its own: but if it had existed first in time before being united to the Word, it would not have subsisted through alien subsistence: therefore through its own.
You will say against the first part: every generable and corruptible substance which is not created is produced through mutation: but the whole nature assumed by the Word is generable and corruptible, nor was it created immediately, and consequently it was changed to form: therefore it was previously in time under privation opposed to that form, because opposites by privation cannot be simultaneously in time in the same subject: and consequently previously in time the body was not animated before it was animated: and subsequently organization preceded animation in time. —
The Doctor answers that the argument holds true when the form is produced after the production of its subject: but otherwise, when the form is produced simultaneously with the subject: for then it is not properly a mutation to that form, because the subject was not previously under privation before being under form; nor was it aptly apt to have the form before it had it. Therefore since a rational soul is induced simultaneously even in us with the perfect esse of the body, the consequence is that there is not properly a mutation to the soul itself, but only to the esse of the organic body, of which mutation the subject is matter, which was previously under the form of blood than under organic forms.
Finally, the third part also stands, namely that organization and animation of the body preceded the assumption at least by nature: for the foundation of relation and union naturally precedes relation and union; because what is nothing in itself is also nothing in order to another: but human nature completely constituted through animation is the foundation of union with the Word: therefore it naturally precedes it.
FROM THESE GATHER: that the organization of the body of Christ was not made through various alterations, as the organization of the bodies of other men takes place over the space of forty-six days; but in an instant, as St. Damascene teaches lib. 3 De Fide orthodoxa, chap. 2, where he says: The most sacred body of Christ was not figured in the womb of the Virgin over a course of three days and formed: just as in our generation the body of a male is said to be formed in the maternal womb over the space of forty days, but in one, so to speak, and the same moment it was straightway conceived from the most blessed Virgin, or rather the true body of Christ was altogether complete. Hence the consequence is that the body of the Lord Christ remained longer in the womb of the Virgin than the bodies of other infants are wont to remain, because it was organized and animated earlier than other bodies are animated.
Second Conclusion. — THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION PREREQUISITE ON THE PART OF THE SOUL, THROUGH WHICH AS THROUGH A MEDIUM AND BY ITS POSITING THE WORD WOULD ASSUME THE HUMANITY. So the Doctor in 3 dist. 2 qu. 2, where he
Proves first: If there had been such a medium, especially habitual grace or some supernatural quality affecting the soul and preparing and rendering it capable, that it be assumed by the Word: but this is utterly fictitious and absurd. Which he proves thus: A rational soul subsists by nature prior to being perfected accidentally: therefore the soul of Christ by nature subsisted in the Word prior to receiving any accidental perfection. The antecedent is evident: first, because subsistence is a mode more intrinsic to the subsisting nature than any accidental form can be, since the former pertains to the complement of the substance itself; the latter only to its extrinsic ornament; but it is prior for a thing to be complete intrinsically and substantially than extrinsically and accidentally. But the consequence is proved, both because in that instant human nature was affected by the subsistence of the Word in which its own subsistence ought to have resulted: but its own subsistence would have resulted before every accidental perfection had it not been impeded by the subsistence of the Word: therefore human nature was affected by the subsistence of the Word prior to being adorned with any accidental perfection; and subsequently so far is it that the Incarnation came about through habitual grace as medium, that indeed grace was not conceded except in view of and by benefit of the Incarnation. Which indeed the Doctor proves from that word of John 1: We saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth; by which words St. John signifies that Christ had the fullness of grace because he was the only begotten; therefore Christ must have been by nature only begotten prior to having grace, and consequently habitual grace was not a disposition for the hypostatic union.
Proves secondly: If habitual grace were the medium for the hypostatic union, it would be either the medium formally uniting the extremes, or disposing one extreme, namely humanity, to that union: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because human nature is united formally per se and immediately to the Word, not through some quality or created absolute entity as medium. Nor even the second, because if it were required as a disposition, it would be either as a moral disposition, or as a physical disposition: but neither can be affirmed. Not indeed as a moral disposition, because the entity disproportion of divine nature and subsistence to created nature would be no less with that habitual grace posited than with it removed: for since that grace would be a created quality, it would not remove the infinite distance which is between the divine and human nature. Nor even as a physical disposition, because whatever accident presupposes the existence of its subject: therefore grace presupposes the existence of humanity: but some physical disposition is not prerequisite for personality in a nature besides that which is required for its existence; for by the very fact that it has existence for some instant, it must necessarily have some personality, otherwise a nature could exist existing without any personality.
You will say: Human nature cannot be united to the Word by the beatific union without the habit of sanctifying grace, chiefly from the fact that both the union itself and its term exceed the faculty of created nature: therefore since the hypostatic union is still more excellent, because it is the highest grace, as St. Augustine says, lib. 13 De Trinitate, chap. 19, it cannot be conferred without a prior habit of grace. —
The Doctor answers by denying the antecedent, insofar as he contends that the reason why the beatific vision cannot be conferred on a creature without habitual grace is that the beatific vision exceeds nature; for if this were true, it would follow that habitual grace could not be given to nature without some other grace or supernatural gift; for it exceeds nature: and consequently there would be a process into infinity. That, therefore, is not the reason why grace is presupposed to the beatific vision, but because the beatific vision is a supernatural operation proceeding effectively from the very nature itself; and because nature does not have an adequate virtue for producing that action, therefore it is necessary that there be given to it another supernatural co-principle with which it can produce it: but the hypostatic union is not an operation, nor anything capable of being produced effectively and partially by nature, since nature is in no way capable of producing its own union with the Word, but only of receiving it. Therefore another supernatural principle antecedent in nature ought not be admitted, that the hypostatic union be conferred upon it; but just as nature can immediately receive the habit of grace, although it exceed its virtue, because the habit of grace does not demand of nature to be produced effectively but only received in it; so pari ratione can it immediately receive the hypostatic union.