Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Note 1. It is certain that the principal efficient cause of this mystery is God, and the three divine persons operating ad extra. For this was defined in very many Councils, especially the Lateran Council under Martin I, Can. 2, and the other Lateran Council under Innocent III; likewise in Toledan 6 and 11 in their Confessions of faith; which twofold doctrine all the holy Fathers who treated of the divine Incarnation in a particular manner openly teach, especially St. Augustine lib. 1. De Trinitate, chap. 1, and tract. 10 and 11 on John.

This truth is likewise gathered from Sacred Scripture, in which this incarnation is attributed both to the Father and to the Son: to the Father indeed, thus Galatians 1: God sent his Son, made of a woman, etc.; but to the Son, Philippians 2: When he was in the form of God, he thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant. Finally, to the Holy Spirit, who is called the craftsman of this ineffable mystery; for what was born of the Virgin is of the Holy Spirit. To these the theological reason also gives its support, because since works ad extra proceed from the divine omnipotence, which is common indivisibly to the three persons — for there are not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent — therefore all the works of God, among which the most excellent is the work of the Incarnation, proceed from the three divine persons as they are one in unity of nature, will, and power, according to that word of John 10: What things soever the Father doth, these same also the Son doth in like manner. But a difficulty remains, whether God has elevated any creature, or could have elevated it, to that dignity and excellence, that it should be for him an efficacious co-cause, or instrumental cause, in the working and effecting of this mystery.

Note 2. That in this matter the efficient cause is distinguished from the instrumental, in that the efficient acts and influences into the effect by its own and intrinsic power; whereas the instrumental only operates and influences into the production of the effect by a power conceded to it from elsewhere, borrowed from the efficient. Moreover, the efficient cause has a certain proportion and analogy with the effect produced: for every productive cause has a determinate sphere of activity in producing its like, toward which it is chiefly ordered and tends; whereas the instrumental, especially that which has only an obediential potency for some work, has no proportion of itself with the effect, but is only ordered toward it and assumed at the nod and good pleasure of the principal agent.

It is asked here, then, whether any creature was assumed, or at least could have been assumed, as an instrument for effecting the hypostatic union. It is certain, however, that no creature distinct from the Virgin was assumed as a physical instrument for effecting this union: for of none can it be suspected that it made Christ man: for Scripture, or the holy Fathers, attribute this virtue and efficacy to none; for even the presence of the Angel Gabriel himself terminated in the annunciation alone, in the proposal of the mystery, and in the petition for the virginal consent; whence there remains only the difficulty to be solved concerning the most blessed Virgin, namely whether she was elevated by God as an instrument for effecting the hypostatic union.

Note 3. The present difficulty is raised about the first effecting of this mystery: for it is certain that a new union could take place, at least partial, of the Word to the parts of substance which were being added to the body of Christ through nutrition throughout the whole time of his life: for on the part of the Word the whole divine subsistence was united to every part of the body; but by whom physically that union would be effected — namely, whether by God immediately, or through humanity as through a physical instrument, which by its own proper power would dispose the matter of the food, and convert it into its own substance, so that before nature, the matter of the food being informed by the soul, through the action of the Trinity alone it would be united hypostatically to the subsistence of the Word, into which Christ would straightway in the same instant introduce his form — in what manner, I say, this was done, nothing can be defined with certainty. Therefore only these two come here chiefly to be resolved: First, whether the Blessed Virgin was assumed as a physical instrument for effecting the hypostatic union. Second, whether the divine Word had any principal physical and real influx into the assumed humanity, to which influx the other two persons would not concur.

First Conclusion. — THE BLESSED VIRGIN WAS NOT ELEVATED BY GOD AS A PHYSICAL INSTRUMENT FOR THE HYPOSTATIC UNION OF THE HUMANITY GENERATED IN HER AND FROM HER WITH THE DIVINE WORD.

Proof 1. From all those texts of Scripture in which the Incarnation is attributed to God alone, and is said to be the singular work of God alone. Thus Habakkuk 3: O Lord, thy work in the midst of the years; which text St. Augustine and other holy Fathers explain in the usual way of the work of the Incarnation: but the hypostatic union would not be perfectly the singular work of God, if the blessed Virgin, or any creature, had been consenting and concausa of its production; therefore the Blessed Virgin had no efficiency, even instrumental, with respect to the hypostatic union.

Next: No creature, as we proved in the Physics, can be assumed as an instrument of creation: therefore much less of this union. The consequence is evident, because just as by creation existence itself is communicated to a thing, so by this union the very esse of divine subsistence is communicated, which certainly is far more excellent and nobler than mere esse of natural existence.

Finally: Only that concurrence should be granted to the Most Blessed Virgin which is chiefly required and suffices, that she truly be and be called Mother of God: but for that it is not necessary that the Blessed Virgin have an instrumental concurrence in order to the hypostatic union: therefore it ought not to be admitted. This is evident; for to what else would such concurrence be asserted? The minor also stands, both because the concurrence of a mother in the generation of a son is not instrumental but principal, whether it be only after the manner of a material cause, or supplier of matter, as some will have it, or after the manner of an efficient cause effectively concurring to the formation and organization of the body, as the others seem to judge more correctly.

You will say 1: Very many of the holy Fathers admit that instrumental concurrence in the B. Virgin with respect to the hypostatic union: therefore it is to be admitted. The antecedent is proved, for Hesychius, Homil. 2, De Beata Virgine, calls her herself the instrument of the Incarnation: similarly St. Ambrose, Epist. 82: Through man and woman flesh was cast out of Paradise: through the Virgin it is joined to God. In the same manner speaks St. Bernard, Hom. 4 super Missus est, while he says that the Blessed Virgin is that woman who so well tempered those three fates of the Gospel, namely flesh, soul, and divinity, that not even upon the separation made of flesh and soul would flesh or soul be divided from God. —

I answer, that the holy Fathers are to be understood only of a dispositive concurrence, and not of an effective one; since the most blessed Virgin is reckoned to have concurred dispositively to the hypostatic union, because she supplied and prepared the purest blood for forming the humanity of Christ, whereby it was united hypostatically to the divine Word: hence when they call her the instrument of the Incarnation, they do not use the name instrument in its proper signification, in which it is wont to be taken by Philosophers, but in a wider sense, in which whatever concurs in any way whatsoever to the production of another thing is wont to be called an instrument.

You will say 2: God is wont to use his creatures as instruments, especially when the instrument is accommodated to the intended effect, and chiefly when that work redounds to the commendation of his sweet providence, and to the dignity of the creatures which he intends to elevate: but the dignity of the most blessed Virgin would seem to be far greater, and the commendation of the sweet disposition of God far ampler, if the blessed Virgin concur instrumentally in the hypostatic union than if she only effect it dispositively: therefore this is what must be said. —

I distinguish the major: When no contradiction or repugnance thence appears, I concede; otherwise, I deny. But there is a contradiction in that any creature should be elevated to create, much more to effect this union; since God and creature are more distant from one another in the order of unibles than the production of the existence of the creature itself from nothing; for distance is measured by reason of the terms: moreover less distant from the power of a natural agent is to be purely created than to be partly divine and created, such as is that esse which comes about through the Incarnation: therefore, etc.

Second Conclusion. — THE DIVINE WORD HAD NO SPECIAL PHYSICAL INFLUX WITH REGARD TO THE FORMATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE HUMANITY.

Proof: The formal principle of operating ad extra is the same, and holds itself in the same manner with respect to those operations, in all the divine persons; hence whatever one person operates physically, the others also operate: therefore either the Word had no influx into the humanity of Christ which the Father and the Holy Spirit did not have in like manner; or if it had any, the other divine persons equally had the same. The consequence is evident: for this reason we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son indivisibly, because in the Father and the Son there is the same and undistinguished principle of spiration: therefore since the principle of operating ad extra, namely divine omnipotence, is the same in the three divine persons, one of them could not have some influx without the others having the same.

Next: If anything peculiar were bestowed by the Word upon the assumed humanity, all of it should be reduced to its personality; but this is not active, nor productive of any effect; therefore it effects nothing peculiarly. The antecedent is evident: because in the Word there are only two things, namely the divine essence, and the personality of the Word: but the divinity is common to it with the other persons. The consequence is proved: the whole office of the personality of the Word with respect to the assumed nature is only that it bestow upon it what its own proper personality would bestow were it present: but a proper personality has no real effective influx into the humanity whose it is, but only terminates it: therefore also the personality of the Word had no efficiency toward the assumed humanity.

Finally: For every real effecting there must be given some term produced by it; for no productive action is given without a term: but no term can be assigned of the efficiency of the Word with respect to the humanity: therefore it had no peculiar efficiency toward it, either for producing or conserving it.

You will say 1: To assume is to take to oneself: but to take to oneself is to act: therefore since to assume humanity is proper to the Word, the consequence is that it have a peculiar action with respect to the human nature which it assumrit. —

I distinguish the minor: To assume is to act, insofar as assume signifies the formation of the humanity and its union with the divinity, I concede; insofar as it signifies to terminate that nature, and make it existing of itself and incommunicably, I deny. In the first way assumption belongs to the whole Trinity: in the latter it is proper to the Son alone. In the first way assumption is an action: in the latter it is only a termination.

You will say 2: Everything most perfect is active: but whatever is in the Word is most perfect: therefore also active; and consequently its personality will be active, and consequently will have some peculiar efficiency toward its own humanity. —

I distinguish the major: Whatever is most excellent in the genus of real being, I concede; total, I deny. And likewise distinguishing the minor, I deny the consequence: for it is certain that there are many divine attributes which of themselves are not precisely active and productive: since neither eternity nor immensity are of themselves productive of any effect; indeed who would that be? Therefore what is formal in the Word is not active. Hence divine personality can be considered either as it is a relation constituting the divine person, or as it is a subsistence affecting and terminating the divine nature: but in neither of these ways is it operative and productive. Not indeed as it is relation, because relation is not of itself a principle of acting: nor even as it is subsistence, because this of itself is not a physical principle of acting, but only of terminating. Nor does it matter that to act be a certain perfection: for not every perfection ought to belong to the divine personalities as they are something distinct from the divine Essence; for as thus they are not something imperfect or perfect, as we proved in Tract. De Trin.; but it suffices that they include every perfection as they are really identical with the divine Essence: otherwise, since to understand, to will, and to love are the highest perfections, they ought also to belong to the personalities themselves, as from the same essence — nay, as they are distinguished by another intellect and another will; which certainly no Theologian will admit.

Note 1. That since the Incarnation is a union of the Word with human nature, it is necessary that the nature itself be presupposed as existing; for every real union is between extremes actually existing; and since humanity consists of body and soul, hence there can be a twofold difficulty concerning the disposition prerequisite in the humanity itself for the hypostatic union: First indeed on the part of the body, namely whether a perfect organization of the body ought to precede the Incarnation, and that by priority of time or of nature; Second on the part of the soul, whether it ought to be illuminated with some supernatural gift, for instance sanctifying grace, that it might be rendered apt for such a union.

Note 2. From the Doct. Subtilis in 3 d. 2 qu. 2, a twofold extrinsic medium required for union can be distinguished: one medium of necessity; another of congruity. The first is that without which the thing cannot be attained; the second is that without which the thing could absolutely and simply come to pass, yet not so fittingly and congruously. Hence we ask whether habitual grace, or another supernatural gift, was prerequisite in the soul of Christ necessarily or congruously for the hypostatic union: such that the divine Word either would not have assumed human nature absolutely, or at least not so fittingly, without such prior disposition. Around which difficulty there are two extreme conflicting opinions of Theologians, of which the one denies such a disposition to be prerequisite; the other affirms it, and that either necessarily, such that the hypostatic union had a necessary connection with a disposition of this kind, just as the union of the soul with the body has a necessary connection with the ultimate disposition of the body, and necessarily follows upon it. So Gabriel seems to hold in 3 dist. 2. Or as some will have it with Alex. of Hales 3 p. qu. 3, although the incarnation does not follow such a disposition necessarily, such that with that disposition posited the incarnation could fail to follow; nevertheless that disposition seems so necessary that it ought absolutely to be presupposed as some quality rendering nature capable of this union. Others finally will have a disposition of this kind required at least as a becoming ornament of humanity, that through it humanity be fitly prepared for so excellent a union, as St. Bonaventure teaches in 3 dist. 2 art. 3.

Note 3. That in the Incarnation four things must be considered in order: First indeed by reason of matter, namely the blood of the most pure Virgin destined for the place where the body was to be formed. Second, the organization of the body of Christ, which consists in the introduction of an organic form or corporeity, which introduction is preceded by alteration. Third, the animation of the same body, or the union of a rational soul with it. Fourth finally, the union of the whole constituted nature with the Word. It is asked, then, whether and how these preceded one another. Hence a twofold difficulty occurs here to be solved: First, whether the organization of the body of Christ preceded in time, or by nature, its union with the Word. Second, whether the soul of Christ ought to have been illuminated with some supernatural quality, through which as through a medium it might be prepared for the hypostatic union.

First Conclusion. — THE ORGANIZATION DID NOT PRECEDE ANIMATION IN TIME, NOR ITS UNION WITH THE WORD, BUT ONLY BY NATURE.

This Conclusion consists of three parts, of which

The first is evident, because organization consists chiefly in the introduction of a complete organic form, which as such is the ultimate disposition for animation: but ultimate disposition and the infusion of a rational soul, about which we here inquire, are simultaneous in time, as I suppose from the Physics: therefore organization does not precede animation in time.

The second part is proved: If organization and animation of the body had preceded the incarnation by priority of time, the consequence would be that human nature would first have been subsistent through its own subsistence before being subsistent through the subsistence of the Word: but the consequent would be absurd: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is evident: for human nature existing during some real instant of time is also per se subsistent: therefore either through alien subsistence or through its own: but if it had existed first in time before being united to the Word, it would not have subsisted through alien subsistence: therefore through its own.

You will say against the first part: every generable and corruptible substance which is not created is produced through mutation: but the whole nature assumed by the Word is generable and corruptible, nor was it created immediately, and consequently it was changed to form: therefore it was previously in time under privation opposed to that form, because opposites by privation cannot be simultaneously in time in the same subject: and consequently previously in time the body was not animated before it was animated: and subsequently organization preceded animation in time. —

The Doctor answers that the argument holds true when the form is produced after the production of its subject: but otherwise, when the form is produced simultaneously with the subject: for then it is not properly a mutation to that form, because the subject was not previously under privation before being under form; nor was it aptly apt to have the form before it had it. Therefore since a rational soul is induced simultaneously even in us with the perfect esse of the body, the consequence is that there is not properly a mutation to the soul itself, but only to the esse of the organic body, of which mutation the subject is matter, which was previously under the form of blood than under organic forms.

Finally, the third part also stands, namely that organization and animation of the body preceded the assumption at least by nature: for the foundation of relation and union naturally precedes relation and union; because what is nothing in itself is also nothing in order to another: but human nature completely constituted through animation is the foundation of union with the Word: therefore it naturally precedes it.

FROM THESE GATHER: that the organization of the body of Christ was not made through various alterations, as the organization of the bodies of other men takes place over the space of forty-six days; but in an instant, as St. Damascene teaches lib. 3 De Fide orthodoxa, chap. 2, where he says: The most sacred body of Christ was not figured in the womb of the Virgin over a course of three days and formed: just as in our generation the body of a male is said to be formed in the maternal womb over the space of forty days, but in one, so to speak, and the same moment it was straightway conceived from the most blessed Virgin, or rather the true body of Christ was altogether complete. Hence the consequence is that the body of the Lord Christ remained longer in the womb of the Virgin than the bodies of other infants are wont to remain, because it was organized and animated earlier than other bodies are animated.

Second Conclusion. — THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION PREREQUISITE ON THE PART OF THE SOUL, THROUGH WHICH AS THROUGH A MEDIUM AND BY ITS POSITING THE WORD WOULD ASSUME THE HUMANITY. So the Doctor in 3 dist. 2 qu. 2, where he

Proves first: If there had been such a medium, especially habitual grace or some supernatural quality affecting the soul and preparing and rendering it capable, that it be assumed by the Word: but this is utterly fictitious and absurd. Which he proves thus: A rational soul subsists by nature prior to being perfected accidentally: therefore the soul of Christ by nature subsisted in the Word prior to receiving any accidental perfection. The antecedent is evident: first, because subsistence is a mode more intrinsic to the subsisting nature than any accidental form can be, since the former pertains to the complement of the substance itself; the latter only to its extrinsic ornament; but it is prior for a thing to be complete intrinsically and substantially than extrinsically and accidentally. But the consequence is proved, both because in that instant human nature was affected by the subsistence of the Word in which its own subsistence ought to have resulted: but its own subsistence would have resulted before every accidental perfection had it not been impeded by the subsistence of the Word: therefore human nature was affected by the subsistence of the Word prior to being adorned with any accidental perfection; and subsequently so far is it that the Incarnation came about through habitual grace as medium, that indeed grace was not conceded except in view of and by benefit of the Incarnation. Which indeed the Doctor proves from that word of John 1: We saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth; by which words St. John signifies that Christ had the fullness of grace because he was the only begotten; therefore Christ must have been by nature only begotten prior to having grace, and consequently habitual grace was not a disposition for the hypostatic union.

Proves secondly: If habitual grace were the medium for the hypostatic union, it would be either the medium formally uniting the extremes, or disposing one extreme, namely humanity, to that union: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because human nature is united formally per se and immediately to the Word, not through some quality or created absolute entity as medium. Nor even the second, because if it were required as a disposition, it would be either as a moral disposition, or as a physical disposition: but neither can be affirmed. Not indeed as a moral disposition, because the entity disproportion of divine nature and subsistence to created nature would be no less with that habitual grace posited than with it removed: for since that grace would be a created quality, it would not remove the infinite distance which is between the divine and human nature. Nor even as a physical disposition, because whatever accident presupposes the existence of its subject: therefore grace presupposes the existence of humanity: but some physical disposition is not prerequisite for personality in a nature besides that which is required for its existence; for by the very fact that it has existence for some instant, it must necessarily have some personality, otherwise a nature could exist existing without any personality.

You will say: Human nature cannot be united to the Word by the beatific union without the habit of sanctifying grace, chiefly from the fact that both the union itself and its term exceed the faculty of created nature: therefore since the hypostatic union is still more excellent, because it is the highest grace, as St. Augustine says, lib. 13 De Trinitate, chap. 19, it cannot be conferred without a prior habit of grace. —

The Doctor answers by denying the antecedent, insofar as he contends that the reason why the beatific vision cannot be conferred on a creature without habitual grace is that the beatific vision exceeds nature; for if this were true, it would follow that habitual grace could not be given to nature without some other grace or supernatural gift; for it exceeds nature: and consequently there would be a process into infinity. That, therefore, is not the reason why grace is presupposed to the beatific vision, but because the beatific vision is a supernatural operation proceeding effectively from the very nature itself; and because nature does not have an adequate virtue for producing that action, therefore it is necessary that there be given to it another supernatural co-principle with which it can produce it: but the hypostatic union is not an operation, nor anything capable of being produced effectively and partially by nature, since nature is in no way capable of producing its own union with the Word, but only of receiving it. Therefore another supernatural principle antecedent in nature ought not be admitted, that the hypostatic union be conferred upon it; but just as nature can immediately receive the habit of grace, although it exceed its virtue, because the habit of grace does not demand of nature to be produced effectively but only received in it; so pari ratione can it immediately receive the hypostatic union.

Note 1, that Christ can be understood to have merited hypostatic union in three ways: First namely that it be affirmed prior in time to His humanity being united to the Word, He was for a while a pure man, but afterwards was advanced on account of His merits to the dignity of the natural Son of God, and to hypostatic union; Secondly, that it be asserted that Christ, although from the beginning of His production always possessed of the personality of the Word and united to Him, nevertheless merited that union itself, either through works which would proceed from that humanity prior in nature to its being terminated by the divine personality: or through works subsequent to the Incarnation, so that incarnation according to intention, or predestination, whereby God decreed from eternity His Son to become incarnate, could indeed not fall under merit, because before predestination, which was the first act, and cause of Incarnation, neither could any action of Christ precede nor be foreseen by God, in view of which Incarnation would be decreed: but truly according to execution it could have fallen under merit, because before the execution of the Incarnation itself, the future merits of Christ were already foreseen just as Christ Himself by virtue of that first decree, whereby God willed Incarnation by way of intention: Finally, in the third place, it could be conceived that Christ merited His incarnation through works subsequent. But upon this triple sense difficulty is raised at present.

Note 2, merit is commonly distinguished as twofold, namely de condigno, and de congruo. Merit de condigno is called that which by reason of justifying grace existing in the meriting one, and divine pact, has equality of justice with reward: but merit de congruo is that which on account of the defect of either of those conditions has only proportionality founded in divine friendship toward obtaining reward. The difficulty therefore concerns both merits, whether namely with either, or both together Christ the Lord through works, whether antecedent or subsequent, merited the substance, or certain circumstances of the Incarnation.

Note 3, that the circumstances of the Incarnation are properly called those which accompany the Incarnation: such as, that it come about at such time, such place, such mode, namely the work of the Holy Spirit, and similar things, which adorn this mystery; nevertheless certain things can also be comprehended under the name of circumstances which precede the very Incarnation, as the Angelic annunciation, the consent of the most Blessed Virgin, and her disposition, and cooperation. There are also some things which follow the Incarnation, and can be called circumstances, as the praises and canticles of Angels manifesting that mystery, the adorations of Shepherds and Magi. But chiefly here there is discourse concerning the first circumstances.

First Conclusion. — CHRIST THE LORD COULD NOT MERIT HIS INCARNATION THROUGH ANTECEDENT WORKS, EITHER BY PRIORITY OF TIME OR PRIORITY OF NATURE. This is of faith as to the first part, for against Nestorius and Faustinus it has been determined that it is heretical to affirm Christ to have been a pure man for some time before union with the Word, and in that state to have merited the assumption of His humanity by the Word, as stands evident from all the Councils to be praised in the following Disputation, whose oracles we shall prove that Christ was God and hypostatically united to the divine Word in the first instant of His formation. Hence Augustine confutes and proscribes this error in various places, openly teaching and demonstrating that Christ the Lord did not obtain union with the Word through His own merits: for in sermon 8. De verbis Apostoli he has this: Will anyone then dare to say, that our nature in that Mediator first merited God through free will, and thus deserved to be received, so that he would be man and God, one Christ Jesus? And in Enchir. cap. 36.: For what did human nature in the man Christ merit, that it should be singularly assumed into unity of person of the only Son of God? What good will, what zeal of this good purpose, what good works preceded, whereby that man might merit that he become one person with God? Truly he explains this truth more luminously lib. De correptione et gratia, cap. 11., where after many things he concludes thus: That birth indeed gratuitous joined in unity of person man to God, flesh to Word; good works followed that birth, good works did not merit it. By which words the holy Doctor affirms expressly that Christ did not merit to be made Son of God, but already from the womb, and from conception itself, was God-man, and his humanity elevated unto hypostatic union with the Word. —

The same must be said of actions which could be conceived elicited in the first moment of the Incarnation, whereby it might be said the humanity of Christ had merited that union; for the same St. Augustine tr. 82. in John pronounces absolutely: Neither did any merits precede that assumption of man; but from that assumption of him his merits joined began. And lib. 2. De peccatorum meritis, cap. 7.: For neither did he himself, says he concerning Christ, become so joined to the Word of God, that by that joining itself he became one Son of God, and the same himself one Son of man, with preceding merits of his will. For since it behoved him to be: yet they would be two, and three, and more, if this could happen, not through the proper gift of God, but through free will of man. Therefore this is especially commended, this among the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden in Christ is taught and said chiefly, so far as I dare judge. By which words he teaches most manifestly that all the merits of Christ followed the Incarnation; but none preceded it; for he says Christ stood related to grace of union as we are compared to first actual grace: but actual grace is conferred upon us on account of no merits, but solely out of the pure mercy of God: therefore hypostatic union, which is the most excellent of divine graces, and exemplar of the others, came to Christ out of the pure liberality of God; not truly on account of any merits preceding the Incarnation by priority of time or nature. —

He confirms the same Saint Augustine lib. De praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 11., where he says: The most precious light of predestination and grace is the Savior Himself, Himself Mediator of God and men, man Christ Jesus, who that He might be this, by what merits of His own, whether of works, or of faith, preceding, did the human nature which is in Him procure? Let it be answered, I ask: That man, that he might be Son of God unigenitus, assumed into unity of person by the coeternal Word of the Father, whence did he merit this? Did any good of his whatsoever precede? What did he do before, what did he believe, what did he ask, that he arrive at this incomparable excellence?

It is proved also by reason: All merit is founded in operation: but the humanity of Christ, before it be understood as assumed by the Word, could have no operation: therefore neither any merit. The major is evident: for every merit is an act accepted by God, and worthy of remuneration. The minor is proved: there operation cannot be where subsistence is understood to be none, because actions belong to supposites, or things completely subsistent; since operating follows being, a thing must first be substantially complete before being operative: but before hypostatic union no subsistence is understood in the humanity of Christ. For that would be either proper, or the subsistence of the Word. Not the first, because thus human nature would have been prior subsisting by proper subsistence than by the subsistence of the Word, which is erroneous. Nor yet the second, because in that priority that nature is not supposed united to the Word: therefore in that instant it could neither operate nor merit. — Then, for merit is required not only the concourse of will, but also of sanctifying grace: but, as proved in the preceding Question, human nature could have no grace, nor any accident before it was understood united to the Word, because it must first be completed as to substantial being than as to accidental being: therefore in that instant it could emit no meritorious work. — Finally, the principle of merit could not fall under merit: both because otherwise any man could merit first grace to himself through works proceeding from the very first grace: and because otherwise he would be cause of himself in the same genus: for Incarnation in the genus of efficient cause is cause of merit, and merit would be cause of Incarnation: which genus of cause is also recalled to the efficient: but Incarnation, since it is the fount of all grace and justice, is also principle of all meritorious work, both with respect to us and with respect to Christ Himself: therefore it could not fall under merit.

You will object 1. That of Psalm 11. Dilexisti iustitiam, et odisti iniquitatem: propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus oleo laetitiae prae consortibus tuis. But by oil of gladness St. Gregor. Nazian. Orat. 1. understands divinity itself, wherewith the humanity of Christ was anointed through hypostatic union, for he says: The works of his hands are truth and judgment, on account of which it was anointed with divinity. In like manner St. August. explains those words on that Psal., and St. Anselm on cap. 1. to the Hebrews.

I answer 1. The holy Fathers, who interpret the aforesaid passage concerning unction of divinity, do not take the particle propterea in causal sense, but final, so that the sense be, Thou hast loved justice and hated iniquity, and unto this end God hath anointed thee with oil of gladness: whence from this nothing is evinced against our assertion.

I answer 2. That passage is taken otherwise by other holy Fathers; for St. Jerome Epist. 140. by oil of exultation understands the exultation of resurrection and the glory of the rising body; which it is certain Christ the Lord merited, as we shall say presently: St. Ambrose by oil of gladness understands exhilaration of conscience, which Christ had, because He was conscious of no sin.

You will object 2. That of Apoc. 5. Worthy is the Lamb who was slain, to receive power, and divinity, and honour; now He received divinity through union: therefore He was worthy thereof, and consequently merited it.

I answer 1. The particle quia is not written, so that it not be signified as the sense that He was worthy to receive divinity because He was slain. Secondly, I say the death of the Lamb was cause of divinity, not indeed received, but manifested, because through death His divinity especially shone forth, for because He was made obedient unto death, therefore God exalted Him, and gave Him a name which is above every name.

You will object 3. The humanity of Christ existed prior in nature before it was united to the Word, as we proved in the preceding Question: therefore prior in nature it could operate before being united, and consequently merit that union. The consequence is proved: if anything impeded why in that priority nature could not act, chiefly because actions belong to supposites: but this is not absolutely true: for Arist. 1. Metaph. cap. 1., whence that axiom is gathered, has in Greek idiom, Actions belong to singulars. Since therefore individual human nature presupposes assumption, there would seem no reason why in that priority it could not merit its own union with the Word.

I deny the consequence, and to the antecedent I say it is no wonder Aristotle said actions belong to singulars, since he did not yet know subsistence and personality to be really distinguished from singular nature and able to be separated, which truth became manifest only through the Mystery of Incarnation; thence it is no wonder if he usurped singularity of person for subsistence, since he did not know them to be really distinguished from one another. But that true actions ought to be of supposites, that is, of singular natures having supposites, stands openly evident from what was said, since supposite is the last substantial complement of singular nature; but singular nature must be completed substantially before it be judged apt for operating; since to be is prior to operate.

Second Conclusion. — CHRIST THE LORD THROUGH SUBSEQUENT ACTS COULD NOT MERIT HIS INCARNATION, NEITHER DE CONDIGNO NOR DE CONGRUO.

This is against Suarez, who dispur. 20. sect. 1. concedes indeed that Christ could not merit His incarnation according to intention, and inasmuch as it is defined and decreed by God from eternity: but that He could merit it according to execution, and as it was made in time: and that through works subsequent to that incarnation itself, which God foresaw; which he certainly declares by example of a soldier, to whom God would give arms and a horse in reward of those things which he would strenuously perform in war.

It is proved however first: The principle of merit cannot fall under merit of work proceeding from itself: but hypostatic union is principle of all merit of Christ: therefore it cannot fall under meritorious works proceeding from Him. The minor is clear, since the meritorious principle of Christ is not humanity alone; but also the supposite of the divine Word affecting that humanity, both in the rationale of existing, and in the rationale of operating. But this is proven in the final rationale of the preceding Conclusion. It is confirmed moreover, because merit has a certain conciliative and attractive power toward reward, namely by moral influx; because it moves the rewarding one to confer that which is promised in reward of work: but in no way can it come about that the same attract itself: therefore it is impossible that the same be merit of its own principle, from which it has the power of meriting.

I answer, the major to be true of ordinary law, and attentions of natures of things; but otherwise of extraordinary law, and according to absolute power of God. Whence although Incarnation could not be reward of merit of works proceeding from it by ordinary law; well nevertheless could this come about according to extraordinary, and absolute disposition of God. — Against this, although truly moral efficient cause of merit can in some manner fall under merit, for which reason the ancient Fathers, as we shall say below, through grace conceded to them by virtue of merits of Christ to come, could merit certain circumstances of His Incarnation, at least de congruo; nevertheless formal principle of merit cannot, even by absolute power, fall under merit, whose formal principle it is: but the Word, as united to humanity, is formal principle of merit proceeding from humanity hypostatically united to the Word: therefore incarnation, even by absolute power, could not fall under merit. Hence it stands. This is proved: if formal principle of merit could be of the same merit, or its reward, it would follow that such merit merit itself, as merit, because merit of form is also merit of formal effect of the same form; just as efficient cause of form effects also formal effect: therefore if meritorious work can merit the form, or quasi-form, from which it derives its value, namely hypostatic union: also it will be able to merit itself, inasmuch as it is merit: but this conflicts, for the same cannot depend upon itself, nor consequently be caused meritoriously, nor remunerated by itself: therefore principle of merit can in no way fall under merit.

I answer 2, that although principle of merit, when given absolutely, cannot fall under merit, well nevertheless when not given absolutely, but only under condition of future merit, and dependently upon it, as if a King bestow upon a soldier arms and horse, the remuneration anticipated, as stipend of future contest and victory; through the subsequent victory the soldier will truly merit that donation of arms and horse; whence since God could confer upon the humanity of Christ the benefit of hypostatic union with the Word under condition of merit to be exercised, and future, Christ through works subsequent to incarnation can merit it. — Against this, although that from which the value of merit does not proceed could be conceded to anyone in view of and condition of future merit, and thus can sometimes fall under merit; nevertheless it is otherwise when the value of merit depends absolutely upon it: the rationale of whose difference is, because subsequent merit afterward can have the rationale of price with respect to that from which it does not receive its whole value; for then it does not follow that the same be cause and effect with respect to the same according to the same rationale, and in the same genus and mode of cause; just as it would follow if that which is total principle of merit were given in view of, and under condition of the same principle, as future: but hypostatic union is the principle from which totally is derived the merit of Christ, both in physical being and in being of moral worth, since all works of Christ proceed from His humanity as affected by the subsistence of the Word, from which they chiefly borrow their supreme value, which they have in the rationale of merit and satisfaction. But to the example of the soldier gifted with horse and arms, through anticipated payment of future labor and victory, I say there is no parity, because the value of such labor and merit is not derived from horse, and arms; but from virtue, prudence, and art of the soldier; but meritorious value in the works of Christ proceeds from hypostatic union, and in other pure men from first grace; whence since man through subsequent good works cannot merit first grace itself, so neither could Christ through His own subsequent good works merit His incarnation. Add that when men confer certain gifts, they can give them imperfectly, and by suspended and conditioned donation; whence he who receives those gifts thus, can effect by his good works, and merit, that he possess them no longer imperfectly and conditionally, but absolutely: but hypostatic union cannot be so conceded, only as to use, and by suspended and conditioned donation; but by that very fact it is granted simply and absolutely: and thus God could not confer upon the humanity of Christ the benefit of hypostatic union with the Word under condition of merit to be exercised by it subsisting in the Word.

You will object 1. Principle of merit, by absolute power, can fall under merit of work proceeding from itself: therefore Christ through subsequent works could merit the incarnation itself. The antecedent is proved: for the ancient Fathers merited de congruo certain circumstances of incarnation, as we shall prove below: but their grace was an effect of the merits of Christ, not only in the genus of final cause, but also in the genus of moral efficient cause: therefore principle of merit can fall under merit, at least de congruo. — I distinguish the antecedent: principle of merit purely effective can by absolute power fall under merit of work proceeding from itself — let it pass: principle of merit effective together with formal can so fall under merit — I deny antecedent, and consequence: since grace of union is not only effective principle of Christ's merits, but also formal, since indeed the operations of Christ proceed from the personality of the Word, as from principle from which, as it were from form, they borrow their supreme dignity and supreme value. Hence easily is solved the proof of that antecedent. For the merits of ancient Fathers are not constituted formally by reason of merit through Incarnation of the Word; but only efficiently, morally, or meritoriously were they caused by it. Add that the merits of Christ were foreknown through grace conferred upon ancient Fathers, whereby they merited: since indeed Christ is cause of merits, and predestination of men: but futures are not foreknown before decree of executing incarnation; for merit of execution of Incarnation is only that which morally moves God, either de condigno or de congruo, toward execution of His decree of Incarnation: but the merits of Saints did not move God to execute that Incarnation; since indeed in view of that futurition was granted to the Fathers grace whereby they could well merit, and operate.

You will object 2. Christ could merit the execution of hypostatic union, if His merits, as future, could have been foreseen by God prior by priority of nature than He would will to execute the intention He had of incarnating Himself: but the merits of Christ, as future, could be so foreseen by God: therefore Christ could merit the execution of Incarnation. The major stands: for if God had first seen the merits of Christ as future, before the incarnation would have to be committed to execution, He could have been moved by them toward willing execution of Incarnation. But the minor is proved: the intention which God had of incarnating Himself is prior to the decree concerning Incarnation to be executed: but in that intention, as prior to decree of execution of that Incarnation, the merits of Christ could be foreseen as future: therefore prior by priority of nature, before God willed to commit to execution the intention of His Incarnation, the merits of Christ could be foreseen by God.

I deny the minor, whose proof I distinguish: intention purely speculative, which God had of incarnating Himself, and inasmuch as it abstracts from efficacious intention, is prior to decree of executing it — I concede: intention which God had of incarnating Himself as efficacious, is prior to decree of executing it — I deny the major: for if this regarded imports will of execution, presently it is not prior to that: but the merits of Christ as future could not be foreseen by God except in efficacious intention of Incarnation, which, as such, since it does not precede decree of its execution, God could not, before having efficacious intention of Incarnation, foresee the merits of Christ as future.

Third Conclusion. — CHRIST THE LORD MERITED, OR AT LEAST COULD MERIT, CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES FOLLOWING THE INCARNATION; NOT TRULY PRECEDING, OR CONCOMITANT ONES.

The first part is common: those circumstances do not hold from the side of principle, but follow it: therefore nothing obstructs why they can fall under merit of Christ. Hence all agree He could merit, and did in fact merit, that He be adored by Shepherds and Magi, announced by Angels, manifested by a radiant star, just as also the resurrection of His humanity, manifestation of divinity, and glorification of body: since indeed all these do not follow necessarily, and from nature, upon positing incarnation, but hang from gratuitous and mere liberality of God, and since they have no necessary connection with the primary principle of each merit, namely with incarnation itself, but only are certain appendices and sequels of it, no doubt appears but that Christ the Lord through the exinanition of birth, labors of life, and passion of death could merit those.

You will say: The same hypostatic union of the whole humanity was made in resurrection as that which was made in the womb of the Blessed Virgin at the instant of conception of Christ; for the same in number was humanity, the same subsistence of the Word joined to humanity, without any unitive action intervening anew: therefore if Christ merited not the first union, nor the second. — I distinguish the antecedent: the union continued the same — I deny: interrupted and discontinuated — I concede. Since indeed through death perished the humanity, or junction of soul with body, whereby for three days they were separated from one another, the union of the Divine Word was also discontinuated with that humanity taken totally and formally, although the Word truly remained united to the soul and body of Christ; whence although Christ could not have merited the first union, thence it does not follow that He could not have merited that reunion through works which preceded death.

The second part is against Vasquez and several other moderns, who contend Christ could merit all circumstances of incarnation, not only consequent ones, but concomitant and preceding. It is proved: if He could have merited preceding or concomitant circumstances, and in fact had merited them, chiefly the maternity of His Mother, and nativity from her: but He did not merit that: therefore etc. The major stands: since indeed that is the most excellent among the circumstances which preceded or accompanied flesh, it follows that if He had merited some, chiefly that one. But the minor is proved 1. by authority of St. Aug. lib. De praedest. SS., cap. 15., where speaking of conception of Christ from the Virgin, he says: Neither is that generation retributed, but tributed, that alien from every obligation of sin he be born of Spirit, and Virgin: but if that nativity had been reward of preceding merit of Christ, it would have been retributed, not however merely tributed: therefore according to mind of St. Aug., conception of Christ from Virgin, and consequently maternity of most Blessed Virgin, was not from preceding merits of Christ, as miraculously operating and living. — It is confirmed: for St. Aug. by example of this conception there, proves against Pelagians, first grace is not conferred upon us from merits, but only from gratuitous liberality of God: now first grace in us is not only not from preceding merits, but neither from subsequent ones: therefore nativity of Christ from Virgin was not only pure gratuitous benefit of God with respect to preceding merits: but also by order toward subsequent ones. Then, mediated principle of merit cannot fall under merit of that act whereof it is principle: but most Blessed Virgin was mediated principle of merits of Christ: since indeed she was principle of humanity, which together with subsistence of the Word was immediate principle of all merits of Christ: therefore that maternity could not be reward of any merit.

You will say: Blessed Virgin merited to become Mother of Christ, and conceive Him in herself, as we shall say presently: therefore equally Christ merited the maternity of the Virgin, and His own nativity from her. The antecedent will be proved in the following Question: the consequence is urged: First, because no dignity is to be conceded to Virgin which be not attributed to Christ, if elsewhere it conflict not: but it seems not conflicting that Christ could have merited that Maternity: therefore this must be retributed to Him. Secondly, because grace whereby blessed Virgin merited Maternity of Christ, was effect of merits of Christ: but what is cause of cause is also cause of caused: therefore since grace derived from Christ was cause of merit of blessed Virgin, Christ also is to be believed to have merited Maternity, and nativity from Virgin. — I answer, conceding the antecedent, denying the consequence: to whose first proof I say, not every dignity conceded to Virgin ought to be attributed to Christ the Lord, otherwise dignity of Maternity of God, which is greatest of all, would be attributed to Him: therefore only this can be true, that every dignity which convenes Mother ought to be attributed to Son, when there is no repugnance on side of same Son: but it conflicts, that the Son could merit that Maternity; because that, as said just now, was principle at least mediated of all merits of Christ: but principle cannot merit to be effect of itself. To the second proof I say, that saying to be true only when what is cause of cause infallibly infers effect, is also cause of same effect: false however when not thus does that cause infallibly infer effect: but merits of blessed Virgin were not cause intrinsically infallibly inferring nativity of Christ from Virgin, nor divine Maternity of her: therefore although Christ by His merits were moral cause of grace and merits of Virgin, it does not follow that He merited her Maternity.

Note 1. All scholastic Theologians agree among themselves that certain circumstances of the Incarnation could fall under merit of men; but among such circumstances the Maternity of God, namely that Christ should have such a Mother, and not another, holds first place, as that which infers greater affinity of some pure creature with Christ. Yet there is controversy whether most Blessed Virgin could merit that dignity, and that not only by worthy or congruous merit, but even by merit de condigno: concerning which the opinions of Theologians are various. For there are who judge blessed Virgin to have merited de condigno divine Maternity: which opinion Gabriel judges probable in 3. d. 1. art. 8. dub. 3., and it is upheld by some Recentiores.

But the second opinion teaches, B. Virgin merited indeed by worthy merit, not however condign, to be Mother of God. So St. Bonav. in 3. d. 1. art. 2., for he distinguishes a triple merit, namely condign, worthy and congruous; but he calls worthy merit that work which of itself has no equality, and dignity corresponding to reward; yet obtains it from benignity of God accepting such work for that reward. But the third opinion, which is more common and safer, contends blessed Virgin merited that dignity neither worthily nor condignly, but only congruously.

Note 2. It is one thing to merit de condigno a form, or certain dignity, another truly to merit the disposition requisite in subject, that worthily, decently it receive such form, or dignity; for these two can be separated, chiefly when disposition, and dignity are not necessarily, and quasi physically connected among themselves; but only according to a certain moral proportion; for then it can come about that although someone be worthily disposed toward receiving form or dignity, nevertheless such form is not owed to him from justice, and hence that he does not merit it de condigno. It is asked however whether blessed Virgin was condignly disposed, that she be chosen into Mother of God.

Note 3. Condign disposition of most Blessed Virgin herself toward Maternity of God can be gathered from various gifts wherewith she was illustrious: First indeed from eximious sanctity, and preeminent habitual grace, whereby she was anticipated from the first instant of her conception, together with all gifts and infused habits: Secondly, this disposition illustrated in wondrous manner certain privileges of perpetual innocence, lack of fomes; which although conferred in first sanctification, nevertheless obtained new and multiplied vigor through assiduous exercise of merits, and virtues: Finally in third place contributed most to that disposition increment of graces and virtues, since from the very instant of her conception, according to St. Bernardinus, or at least from that time when infants are wont to be gifted with liberty and use of reason, unto the very instant of conception of Christ, through daily assiduous increment of merits and virtues it advanced her unto the summit of piety and sanctity. These things premised, three things are to be determined: First, whether B. Virgin merited divine Maternity de condigno. Secondly, whether at least she merited it de congruo. Finally, whether truly she was worthy that, before all creatures, she be chosen into Mother of God.

First Conclusion. — BLESSED VIRGIN DID NOT MERIT DE CONDIGNO TO BE MOTHER OF GOD.

It is proved first: Two condign rewards diverse among themselves cannot respond to same merit: but eternal glory, which as wage responds to meritorious works, is reward condign to them, and is distinct from Incarnation: therefore blessed Virgin, who through meritorious works merited eternal glory, could not demand from justice another reward; nor consequently merit divine Maternity through those works. It is confirmed: all merits of blessed Virgin proceeded from grace of adoption, which as thus considered respects and inclines only toward obtaining beatitude; not toward meriting things which are of hypostatic order, to which Maternity of God pertains, since that be intrinsic circumstance of Incarnation.

Then, for merit de condigno beyond excellence and dignity of work, pact and promise are necessarily required on part of rewarding one, which promise excluded, however excellent the work would be, the rewarding one would not be held to concede reward: which is especially true in God, who cannot be moved to confer any benefit unless either by reason of goodness, of justice, or rather of fidelity to be kept in promises: now there is no pact, nor any promise, whereby divine Maternity was promised to blessed Virgin under condition of her good works; therefore she could not obtain that Maternity by merit de condigno.

Finally, if blessed Virgin had condignly merited to be Mother of God, which is circumstance of mystery of Incarnation, also SS. Patriarchs, chiefly Abraham, would in fact have merited that Christ arise from his seed: both because his works made from grace, although they were not so distinguished as works of blessed Virgin, were nevertheless of the same nature, and thus were referred by their own nature to same genus of reward: and because also if promise be required for rationale of condign merit, as we said just now is in fact required, Abraham had that promise made to him, Genes. 8; but we read no similar made to most Blessed Virgin with respect to divine Maternity to be conferred upon her. Moreover now it seems absurd to all Theologians to assert that Abraham condignly merited that circumstance of Incarnation: therefore far less must it be attributed to blessed Virgin with respect to divine maternity, which infers far more sublime dignity on account of her more intimate confederation with Christ than was dignity of Abraham, that Messiah would originate from his seed.

You will say 1: Most Blessed Virgin condignly merited that which is greater and more excellent than Incarnation, namely beatitude, and augmentation of grace or justification: therefore she also merited what is less: but maternity of God is something less than eternal beatitude and augmentation of grace: therefore she could merit even that maternity. The major stands: because who can effect greater can also less. But the minor is proved: both from that of Matthew 12. Whosoever shall do the will of my Father who is in heaven, he is my brother, and sister, and mother. Wherefore Luke 11., a certain woman lifting up voice, after she had said to Christ: Blessed is the womb that bore thee, and the paps that gave thee suck: Christ subjoined: Yea rather, blessed are they who hear the word of God, and keep it; plainly placing sanctity of life to be preferred before dignity of divine maternity. Wherefore St. Augustine expounding those words Tractate tenth on John, says: My mother whom ye have called blessed, blessed for this reason because she kept the Word of God, not because in her the Word was made flesh. And lib. De sancta Virginitate, c. 3.: More blessed was Mary perceiving faith of Christ than conceiving flesh of Christ.

I deny the consequence: for although most Blessed Virgin merited something more excellent than divine maternity, thence however it does not follow that she had merited even that maternity; indeed who can more, can also less, in things which are of same rationale and order; but otherwise in things which are of diverse rationale: for greater is it to reason than to fly; and yet it does not follow: someone can reason: therefore he can also fly, because flying and reasoning are of diverse rationale: well however follows: some agent can produce four degrees of heat: therefore also two. So at present, since reward of eternal life, and augmentation of grace, is of diverse rationale from reward of divine maternity, it is not consequent that if blessed Virgin could merit the former de condigno, she also could merit the latter.

You will say 2: If anything had stood in the way of the blessed Virgin meriting worthily the maternity of God — either because God had not accepted her works toward so great a dignity, or because He had not promised it to her on account of merits, or finally because she could not have merited that circumstance of the Incarnation, namely divine maternity, without also having merited the principle of merit: yet nothing of these stood in her way. Not indeed the first, because the blessed Virgin was created and ordained for this, that she might be the Mother of God; hence the Church attributes to her those words: From eternity I was ordained; likewise these: God chose her, and pre-elected her; namely, that from her and in her He might prepare a dwelling worthy of His Son. Nor indeed the second, for the promise did not fail her; for in Isaiah 7 it is said: Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son. Finally not the third, for just as the Mystery of the Incarnation is presupposed on the part of the principle of our merits, and those of the blessed Virgin, so too the humanity of Christ is presupposed: not indeed humanity in general, but that singular one composed from this matter and form. But since He took the matter of His body from the Virgin, on the part of the principle the dignity of the Mother is already understood in the Virgin; and therefore such a dignity cannot fall under merit itself, whose principle it is.

I deny the minor, and to the first proof I say that the blessed Virgin was indeed chosen by God and ordained that she might be the Mother of God, either by an ordination preceding her merits, and therefore wholly gratuitous, or following upon merits which were not de condigno but only de congruo. To the second I say that it was indeed promised to the Jewish people that some Virgin would conceive the Messiah; but that promise was not made specifically to the most blessed Virgin, and therefore there was no divine pact concerning the conferral upon her of divine maternity. To the third I say that the blessed Virgin could not have merited that circumstance of the Incarnation without having at the same time merited the Incarnation itself, since that merit would not have been with respect to generated humanity in general, but to that special and individual humanity which was to be assumed by the Word.

You will say 3: The blessed Virgin is said to have been worthy, so that she merited to become the Mother of God; therefore in fact she merited divine maternity. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved: first from what the Church sings of the same blessed Virgin in the prayer after Compline: That she might merit to become a worthy dwelling of Thy Son, Thou didst prepare her, the Holy Spirit cooperating: for what else is it to be a worthy dwelling of the Son of God than a worthy Mother of Him? And if she was made a worthy Mother, surely she was made so by good and meritorious works. Then because the holy Fathers use the same manner of speaking, especially St. Ambrose book 2 De Virginibus, Damascene book 1 De Fide, chapter 15, Bernard sermon 1 De Assumptione.

I answer, that by those or similar formulas of speech is signified indeed that the most blessed Virgin was worthy, so that she might be chosen as Mother of God; yet it does not follow from this that she merited that dignity de condigno by her good works: for that manner of speaking, "worthy of something from someone," does not always denote condign merit, but only that whoever receives a benefit from God seems worthy of that benefit. On this account the Church says in the prayer of Tuesday after the Sunday of the Passion: May our fasts be acceptable to Thee, O Lord, which, while they make us worthy of Thy grace by expiation, may lead us to eternal remedies. But who would say that by fasts we are so prepared that we may merit condignly the grace of God, by which we are expiated from sin?

You will say lastly: Whoever merits de condigno a disposition to some form seems also to merit that form itself: but the blessed Virgin merited de condigno that degree of holiness by which she was ultimately disposed to the maternity of God; therefore she equally merited de condigno her maternity.

I answer first by denying the major, because it can happen that a disposition to some dignity does not exceed the proportion of the meriting power, while the dignity itself well may: as e.g. if for someone to become a Bishop it were required that he be a Doctor, he could indeed acquire that disposition of himself; yet it would not follow that he could likewise of himself be promoted to the episcopate, since to obtain that dignity there would be need of the nomination of the King, and the designation and conferral of power on the part of the supreme Pontiff. I answer second, that the major can indeed be true of those dispositions which necessarily infer the form, but not of those which have only a certain moral connection, or fittingness and congruity with the form to be inferred. Now the holiness of the most blessed Virgin was not a physical disposition, and by the nature of the thing, to divine maternity, but only a moral and congruous one, since it was fitting that she who was purest and most holy of all virgins should be taken up to conceive the Holy of Holies.

Second Conclusion. — THE MOST BLESSED VIRGIN WAS WORTHY, AND MERITED DE CONGRUO, THAT SHE MIGHT BECOME THE MOTHER OF GOD.

This is the more common and truer opinion,

And it is proved from the holy Fathers, who expressly declare that the blessed Virgin was worthy, so that she might bring forth the Son of God and become His Mother. Thus above all St. Ambrose book 2 De Virginibus: Why, he says, do I linger over details? She was worthy from whom the Son of God was to be born. Basil, homily on the human generation of Christ: Worthy, he says, of the divinity of the Only-begotten was her wedlock. Chrysostom, homily 13 on John, expounding those words: How shall this be, since I know not a man? says: For this very reason it came to pass: for if you had known a man, you would not have been held worthy to minister to this mystery. Epiphanius, heresy 7: How dare they touch the unstained Virgin, who was made worthy to become the dwelling of the Son of God? Damascene book 4, chapter 15, calls her a holy, admirable, and temple most worthy of God. Finally Bernard, sermon 1 De Assumptione, says: Neither on earth is there a place more worthy than the virginal womb, in which Mary received the Son of God, nor in heaven the royal throne, on which her Son exalted Mary.

But that she had that dignity partly from divine grace preventing her, partly through her works and merits de condigno, the holy Fathers also signify; for St. Augustine, sermon 2 De Nativitate, says: Such a Virgin is chosen, who would have such merit in herself that she might receive the Son of God within herself. St. Gregory, book 1 of the Kings, chapter 1: Illustrated by incomparable merits, she prepared her sacred womb wherein the Only-begotten of God might repose. Peter Damian, sermon 2 De Assumptione: Her singular holiness and grace merited this, that she was judged singularly worthy of receiving God. Fulgentius, book De Incarnatione et Gratia, chapter 7: But God Himself made man, to conceive and to bear, she did not merit by human merits, but by the favor of the supreme God conceived and born of her, namely the blessed Virgin. To these agrees Prudentius in the hymn before meals, where he says: For to bring forth God, the Virgin renewed gave all merits. And Venantius Fortunatus in the book De aeternis gaudiis sings in this manner:

Happy virginity, which was worthy of the child-bearing of the Thunderer, Which merited to bring forth its own Lord.

The Church also sings in the Antiphon in Paschal time: Queen of heaven, rejoice, alleluia: for He whom you didst merit to bear, has risen, etc. Nor does it matter that the holy Fathers sometimes use the name of merit more broadly; namely for that, not which signifies an action worthy of reward, but only a certain correspondence of one thing to another: in which signification the Church sings in the blessing of the Paschal candle: O happy fault, which merited to have such and so great a Redeemer! This, I say, is no obstacle: both because when merit itself is attributed to the holiness of her life, it must be taken in its proper signification, of which we are now treating; and also because many of the holy Fathers attribute this merit to the good works of that blessed Virgin; whence beautifully St. Bernard, in the sermon on the aqueduct: How, he says, did our aqueduct here touch that fountain so sublime? How do you think, unless by the clemency of desire, unless by the fervor of devotion, unless by the purity of prayer, as it is written: The prayer of the just penetrates the heavens? And who is just, if not Mary the just, from whom the sun of justice arose for us? How then did she touch that inaccessible Majesty, unless by knocking, asking, seeking? Hence likewise St. Jerome, Epistle 22, proposes there Mary, who was of such great purity that she merited to be the Mother of the Lord. And St. Anselm, De Laudibus Virginis, chapter 8: Her most holy purity and most pure sanctity of breast, transcending the purity and health of every creature, incomparably merited this, that she might most fully become the repairer of a lost world.

You will say: The blessed Virgin could not merit de congruo that she might be the Mother of God without also meriting the incarnation itself: but she could not merit the incarnation, as was said in the preceding Question; therefore neither her maternity: therefore etc. The major is proved: for if the blessed Virgin merited de congruo that she might be the Mother of God, she equally merited that from her God-man might come to be; therefore she merited to bring forth and produce Christ God-man, and consequently merited that this composite, God-man, might exist in the nature of things: but this is to merit the incarnation; therefore if she merited de congruo to become Mother of God, she also merited the incarnation.

I answer, that merit de congruo can be understood in two ways: first indeed absolutely and simply, and without any supposition; secondly, this merit can be understood only as it were under a condition, or upon the supposition touched, that God is to become man. Wherefore I distinguish the major: The blessed Virgin could not merit by a merit de congruo maternity without having equally merited the incarnation, by an absolute and simple merit — I concede; by a merit made upon supposition, and with the condition posited that God is to become man — I deny. For thus taken, the merit of the Virgin with respect to maternity can be severed from the merit of the incarnation, because it presupposes that latter as future. Which indeed is declared by this example: if a King should decree to set out to some city, and some citizen on account of his merits obtains that he rather turn aside into his house than into another's; it is rightly understood that he did not merit the coming of the King into the city simply, and nevertheless merited the circumstance, namely his reception into his own house, which presupposes access to the city.

You will say 2: The merits of the Virgin were foreseen, not only as existing but also as future, and present to God in eternity after the merits of Christ were foreseen: therefore Christ Himself was previously foreseen as existing, and consequently as conceived, or as to be conceived of the Virgin, before the merits of the Virgin were preordained; therefore by no means could the blessed Virgin merit that Christ should be born of her.

I answer, that from that argument alone is proved that the merits of the blessed Virgin did not move God to choose her as Mother of His Son according to the order of election and eternal designation; yet it is not proved that she could not have merited that dignity according to the order of execution, because in truth she had grace and good works before the Son of God became incarnate from her; although she had that grace and those good works from the merits of the same her Son foreseen in the divine ordination and predefinition.

You will urge: If before all the merits of the Virgin God preordained the Incarnation: then He also preordained it in this humanity, and consequently formed from this individual matter: but the Virgin did not merit to have that individual matter so joined to herself as was necessary for the conception of the Son; because this pertains rather to the order of effects and natural causes than to the notion of merit; therefore etc.

I answer to the minor, that just as temporal things can fall under merit in order to spiritual things, so the Virgin could merit that that matter, from which Christ was to be formed, should first be a material part of her own body, or blood.

WHETHER THE HOLY FATHERS MERITED, OR AT LEAST COULD HAVE MERITED DE CONGRUO, THE INCARNATION AND ITS CIRCUMSTANCES.

NOTE 1. By the name of the holy Fathers are here understood those most holy men who preceded the coming of Christ, whether of the law of nature or of the written law, to whom a special revelation or promise of the future Messiah had been made by God; concerning whom it is asked whether they merited either the Incarnation itself, or some of its circumstances, for instance its acceleration, or that it took place in their times, or that Christ should be born of their stock and propagation, or finally some of its effects, for instance the justification of souls and the reopening of heaven. Around this difficulty there are especially three opinions of Theologians. The first indeed is that of St. Bonaventure, dist. 3, art. 2, q. 2, where he contends that the holy Fathers merited de congruo the substance of the Incarnation, not as regards its principal effect, which is the justification of souls, but as regards the less principal effect, which is the opening of the kingdom of heaven. The second truly is that of Vasquez, disp. 22, cap. 1, and of other Recentiors, who although they concede merit de congruo with respect to the Incarnation as regards its acceleration and other circumstances, nevertheless deny it with respect to the substance of the Incarnation and all its effects. The third finally does not deny the holy Fathers some merit de congruo both with respect to the substance of the Incarnation and with respect to some of its circumstances; to which opinion very many Thomists subscribe.

NOTE 2. The congruity of a reward can be regarded in two ways: first indeed it can be taken for a congruity founded in the pure mercy of God, without any right or debt on the part of the work; secondly, for a congruity founded in the proportion of friendship, and in a work elicited in the state of grace by a friend: for friendship, since it is a potential part of justice, founds some debt: not indeed strict and rigorous, such as is merit de condigno, but only secundum quid, so that it befits the goodness and wisdom of the one rewarding to bestow that reward upon the friend on account of works elicited pleasing to him. But of this merit we inquire only whether the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation, or some of its circumstances.

NOTE 3. All Theologians agree that none of the holy Fathers merited de condigno the mystery of the Incarnation according to the substance of its effect; which indeed St. Paul demonstrates at length in the Epistle to the Romans, in which he chiefly intends to convince the Jews that their Fathers had not deserved, namely by merit de condigno, that Christ should be born of their stock, but that this was only a benefit of God choosing rather the seed of Abraham than any other man. Hence in Titus 3 he says: The goodness and kindness of our Saviour God appeared, not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us: which is also gathered from other texts of Scripture; for in Psalm 88 it is said: But if his children forsake my law... yet my mercy I will not scatter from him. And Luke 1: He has received Israel His child, being mindful of His mercy; where the mystery of the Incarnation is called a work of mercy; but mercy excludes merits, especially condign ones. To these add that the grace of the Saints is only the principle of meriting condignly that to which it is referred by the ordination of God; but the merits of the holy Fathers were referred by the ordination of God only to eternal life; therefore they were only principles of meriting eternal life condignly, not the mystery of the Incarnation.

Single Conclusion. — THE HOLY FATHERS DID NOT MERIT DE CONGRUO THE INCARNATION, AS REGARDS ITS SUBSTANCE, NOR AS REGARDS ITS INTRINSIC CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT ONLY AS REGARDS ITS EXTRINSIC CIRCUMSTANCES, NAMELY OF TIME, PLACE, AND PROPAGATION FROM THEIR STOCK. This is the opinion of the Doctor in 4, d. 2, q. 1, n. 11, where he says: «In all the works of God there was no work of mere grace except the Incarnation alone of the Son of God, if no merits preceded it». He adds: «Which indeed is true in the divine ordination «of that Incarnation: because if at the time of the conception any merits of Mary preceded, they were not good absolutely with respect to the Incarnation, but perhaps of its acceleration, so that that preordained Incarnation might be fulfilled». Well then, says Augustine 11 De Trinitate, chapter 19: «Among things done in time, that is the supreme grace, such as that man was joined to God in unity of person.» By which the Doctor openly teaches that neither the most blessed Virgin nor the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation itself: but only certain extrinsic circumstances, namely, that the Incarnation should take place at such a time, place, and from such seed.

Both parts are proved: The first indeed, because the principle of congruous merit cannot fall under merit: but the Incarnation as to its substance and intrinsic circumstances is the principle of the merit of the holy Fathers; therefore they could not have merited that principle. The minor is evident: the major likewise; for just as merit de condigno could not meritoriously deserve its own principle, so neither can merit de congruo congruously earn its own principle: because if the principle of merit could fall under merit de congruo, the effect would be the cause of its own cause, as we said above, and first antecedent grace would be given on account of a foreseen good use of it: which however St. Augustine condemns as Pelagianism in the book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, chapter 19. Which he proves from Ephesians 1: Who predestined us in Christ, that we should be holy: for Augustine notes that it is not said because we were going to be holy, but that we should be holy.

Nor does it avail to reply, that the Incarnation was not only the efficient cause of all grace and merit, but also final with respect to the Fathers of the Old Testament, and as such could have fallen under merit: that response, I say, does not break the force of the argument, because those Fathers did not receive grace in order that the Incarnation might come about, but on the contrary the Incarnation was predestined in order that they might receive grace from it. Yet the Incarnation had a certain likeness of a final cause, because it operated when it was still only future; it operated, however, as a meritorious cause, because, as non-existing, it can move the agent to confer a reward, as the Doctor just now praised teaches, n. 10, where he says: That even if the Passion of Christ is not now in effect, it is nevertheless in divine acceptance, and this suffices that it be a meritorious cause: for it is evident that we confer many things on account of some good not present in itself, but present in our memory, if it be past, or in opinion, if it be future.

The second part is proved by all those texts of Scripture in which the future Incarnation is promised to the Fathers of the Old Testament, either from their stock, or in their country, or in a shorter time. Thus Psalm 11: Because of the groaning of the poor, now will I arise. Daniel 9: Seventy weeks are shortened upon thy people, etc. Which testimonies very many Fathers expound of the shortening of the coming of the Messiah. It is likewise evident from the promises made by God to those most holy men that the Messiah would arise from their stock on account of the illustrious works which they had wrought in the service of God. Thus Genesis 22 God promises Abraham a Messiah to be born of his seed in these words: By myself have I sworn: because thou hast done this thing, I will bless thee, and I will multiply thy seed: and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed, that is in Christ, as the Apostle expounds to the Galatians 3.

It stands likewise from all those prayers by which they earnestly besought God to send the Messiah into the world. Thus Isaiah 16:

Send forth, O Lord, the lamb, the ruler of the earth: and 45: Drop down dew, O ye heavens, from above, and let the clouds rain the just: and 64 (61): O that thou wouldst rend the heavens, and wouldst come down! David also, Psalm 85, seems to pray for the Messiah when he says: Give us thy salvation, and Psalm 105: Visit us in thy salvation; by which the holy Patriarchs and Fathers of the Old Testament besought, not indeed that God should decree the Incarnation of His Son, which they had already received through divine revelation; but only that He might fulfill that mystery in a brief time and in their sight; but those prayers and desires had the character of merit de congruo, so that God would hear them, who themselves obeyed Him in all things: then also because prayers for things necessary to salvation merit de congruo the things requested: finally because those urgent prayers and pious desires disposed those holy Fathers to receive Christ: but those moral dispositions had the character of merit de congruo as to the substance of the Incarnation, or the coming of the Son of God into the world; hence in Malachi we read: Behold, suddenly there shall come to His temple the Dominator whom you seek, and the Angel of the Testament whom you desire. By which the Prophet signifies that therefore the Messiah was about to come in a brief time because the most holy men were seeking Him and longing for Him with the highest vows.

You will say: The extrinsic circumstances of the Incarnation were decreed from eternity just as much as the intrinsic ones: but the intrinsic ones were not decreed dependently upon any merit of men; therefore neither the extrinsic ones. The major is evident; for the same reason seems to hold of the extrinsic circumstances as of the intrinsic ones, since they concern the same humanity to be assumed in individuo. The minor also is evident, because the intrinsic circumstances of some work, formally considered as such, are of the same order with it itself: whence the intrinsic circumstances of the Incarnation pertain to the hypostatic union as its substance does; therefore if the holy Fathers could not merit de condigno the substance of the Incarnation, because their works pertained to the order of grace, which is inferior to the hypostatic, by the same reason they could not merit de condigno its intrinsic circumstances.

I deny the major, for it can be said that the divine decree concerned only the substance of the Incarnation, without prevision of the merit of the circumstances, even if those extrinsic circumstances could have been decreed by an absolute decree with a view to the merits of the holy Fathers, since those extrinsic circumstances in no way regard the entity and order of the hypostatic union, but are altogether extrinsic; for the Word could equally have become incarnate from another stock, and been born in another place or at another time, than that He took origin from the seed of Abraham and had His rise in Palestine.

From these gather, that just as the ancient Fathers did not merit the mystery itself of the Incarnation, in the same way they did not deserve the effects of that mystery, namely that the merits and satisfaction of Christ our Lord be applied both for themselves and for the whole human race. The same must be said of the other effects; for if the ancient Fathers had merited that Christ should suffer and satisfy for the whole human race, they would also have merited the salvation of the whole human race, and consequently their own redemption, which is most absurd: both because to assert this is the same as to say that they merited their first grace, which they obtained through the merits of Christ for their redemption, seeing that they merited to have the merits of Christ for themselves; and because if the most holy Fathers had deserved the death of Christ for their own redemption, the work of the Incarnation and death of Christ would already have been for the ancient Fathers not a work of mercy and first grace, but of gratitude and second grace, which is grace for grace: whereas for others, who were after Christ, it would have been a work of mercy alone; for if on account of the merits of the ancient Fathers God had granted Christ and His Passion and its fruits, the merits of Christ themselves, insofar as they would have been benefits of the ancient Fathers, would have had the character of remuneration, and consequently would have been given to them out of gratitude: which is indeed far removed from the doctrine and manner of speaking of the holy Fathers.

WHETHER, IF ADAM HAD NOT SINNED, THE SON OF GOD WOULD HAVE BEEN INCARNATE NO LESS.

Here we do not speak of the possible, since it is certain that even if no sin of man had existed, any of the divine persons could have clothed Himself in human flesh; for the Incarnation has no necessary and essential connection with sin. Nor is the question moved about the other decree which God might have formed concerning a future incarnation upon the hypothesis that man was not going to sin; for whether in that case God would have had the decree of assuming flesh not as a remedy for sin but for other motives, nothing can be defined with certainty, since Sacred Scripture, through which are made known those things that depend on the will of God alone, decides nothing about this. The only difficulty therefore is whether by force of the decree which God had from eternity the Word was to become incarnate, although Adam had not sinned; that this difficulty may be solved with easier labor,

NOTE 2. That even if the divine Word was in fact incarnate on account of the redemption and reparation of the human race, yet this alone was not the principal cause of His incarnation, nor its more excellent motive: since Sacred Scripture discloses other causes of so great a mystery, namely the manifestation of the divine perfections, which shine forth especially (as we said in the first Article) in the revelation and manifestation of this mystery. Likewise the complement and perfection of the whole universe; likewise also the sublimation and complete beatification of human nature are derived from it. Sacred Scripture also commemorates other ends of such a coming of Christ, for instance that He might be the Doctor of truth, as He Himself testifies John 18: For this I was born, and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth. That He might be for us an exemplar of virtues: thus John 13 says: I have given you an example, that as I have done, so you also may do. Whence St. Augustine, sermon 52 De Diversis: A man who could be seen was not to be followed: God, who could not be seen, was to be followed. Therefore, that there might be shown to man one who could be seen by man and whom man might follow, God became man. Therefore the Theologians of both schools admit plainly that the solving and expiation of sin was not the sole motive for making the incarnation. But whether it was the chief, so that with it ceasing the incarnation would not take place on account of other ends — St. Thomas affirms, 3 p., q. 1, art. 3, with his disciples; but the Subtle Doctor denies in 3, dist. 7, q. 3, together with the Alensi 3 p., q. 2, memb. 13, Blessed Albert the Great, dist. 20, n. 4, and very many others, even from among the Thomists.

NOTE 3. That although the act of the divine will is unique and most simple in itself and really regarded, nevertheless it is understood as multiple by virtue, according to our manner of understanding; so that in it is distinguished the order of prior and posterior, whether that be only an order of reason or rather quasi-natural and of supposition of one thing to another; inasmuch namely as that act, which in its entity is infinite, corresponds to very many acts which we would elicit successively in some thing to be decreed and produced; although that order of priority and posteriority which is found in the divine acts ought rather to be referred to the secondary objects about which the divine intellect and will are occupied, than to the very entity of the act, which in itself is truly most simple and indivisible. But in these acts as well as objects certain signs or instants are wont to be assigned by Theologians, by reason of which one act is said prior or posterior to another. Which acts according to those diverse instants, as regards our purpose namely the decree of the Incarnation of Christ, the Doctor thus distinguishes in 3, dist. 39, q. unica, n. 6, where he says:

That the incarnation of Christ was not foreseen occasionally; but just as the end was seen immediately by God from eternity, so Christ in human nature, since He is nearer to the end, was predestined before the others, speaking of those who are predestined. Then this was the order in the divine prevision: For first God understood Himself under the aspect of the highest good: at the second sign He understood all other creatures: at the third He predestined these to glory and grace, and concerning the others had a negative act of not predestining: at the fourth He foresaw those who were going to fall in Adam: at the fifth He preordained, or foresaw the remedy how they would be redeemed through > the Passion of the Son; so that Christ in the flesh, as well as all the Elect, was seen and destined to grace and glory before the Passion of Christ was foreseen: just as the physician first wills the health of a man before he ordains medicine for healing.

Here the Doctor terminates the five signs or instants of reason which he distinguishes, in which the act of the divine will, as it were fivefold, upon diverse subjects, which God decreed concerning Christ and His coming.

NOTE 1. That just as God decrees things to be made before He produces them, since His decree is from eternity, while the making of things is only in time; hence a twofold order of prior and posterior is wont to be distinguished in the divine operation, one namely according to intention, another truly according to execution: so that some things are called prior according to the intention of God decreeing and determining the production of things; others posterior according to the execution and operation of God producing things, as the physician e.g. according to intention has first the health to be restored than the medicine to be prepared: but according to execution he first prepares the drug before he restores health. Now it is certain that Christ our Lord was not destined by God to be produced before the other creatures: since He was only formed and produced in the middle of time. But the difficulty is moved whether He was destined by God prior, according to the order of intention, to the other creatures, and consequently He would no less have been formed whether men sinned or did not sin, because He was destined to be produced independently of the prevision of the future sin of man.

These things thus premised, two things especially come to be determined in this Question: the first indeed, whether Christ in fact came chiefly to redeem men and to wash away their sins. The second however, whether by force of the present decree He would no less have come although there were to be no sins of men.

First Conclusion. — THE WORD IN FACT ASSUMED FLESH CHIEFLY ON ACCOUNT OF MEN TO BE SAVED AND THEIR SINS TO BE EXPIATED.

This is the common opinion, and

It is proved first from Sacred Scripture, which openly signifies that the Son of God had as the principal cause of His coming into the world the redemption of man from the servitude of sin. Thus Matthew 18 and Luke 19 the same adorable Savior testifies: The Son of man came to seek and to save that which was lost. And John 3: God so loved the world as to give His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. And Luke (5)3: They that are whole need not the physician, but they that are sick: I came not to call the just, but sinners to penance. The same the holy Apostle testifies, First to Timothy 1: Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners. Which motive indeed of the coming of Christ is declared in the Nicene Symbol in these words: Who for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven.

The holy Fathers also give their support, above all St. Athanasius, in the book De Humanitate Verbi, where he says: That you may know that our fault gave Him the occasion to descend, and that our transgression elicited the humanity of the Word of God, so that He might hasten to us and appear among men; for we gave the cause of that incarnation for our salvation: so human did He become, that He wished both to be and to appear in a human body. Basil, homily De Humana Christi generatione, c. 27: Learn the mystery: therefore God is in flesh because this cursed flesh had need of being sanctified. Hence it was defined in the Sixth Council of Toledo: We confess that only the Son came forth from the secret mystery of the Father for the redemption of the human race, on account of the debts of sins which we had contracted originally through the disobedience of Adam, and by our own free will. From all which testimonies it plainly appears that Christ the Lord came into the world especially that He might save sinners: wherefore excellently St. Augustine, sermon 9 De Verbis Domini: There was no cause of Christ the Lord's coming except to save sinners: take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no cause for medicine.

Yet I do not deny that the Word had not this alone but several other motives for the incarnation de facto accomplished, for instance the manifestation of omnipotence, wisdom, and divine goodness: the exigency of a head proximately univocal and proportionate with the Church; for, as St. Chrysostom says in sermon 1 De Pentecoste: The Church is dear to God; for the sake of the Church heaven was stretched out, the sea diffused, the air extended, the earth founded, etc. And shortly after: For the Church the sea was divided, the rock was cleft, manna flowed from heaven... for the Church the Prophets, for the Church the Apostles, nay, for the Church the Only-begotten God was made man. By which St. Chrysostom openly teaches that one of the chief motives of the accomplished incarnation was that the Church might obtain a head worthy of herself, namely the Son of God, visible in the flesh.

Second Conclusion. — BY VIRTUE OF THE SIXTH SIGN OF THE PRESENT DECREE THE DIVINE WORD WOULD HAVE ASSUMED HUMAN FLESH EVEN IF ADAM HAD NOT SINNED. This Conclusion rests upon and is confirmed by a fourfold foundation.

FIRST PROOF. — Drawn from the fact that Christ was decreed prior to creatures. — Christ was willed and destined by God before the foreknowledge of the sin of men; therefore although man had not sinned, nevertheless by force of the present decree the divine Word would have put on flesh. The consequence is evident: since the prior does not depend on the posterior, if the coming of Christ is willed and decreed by God before the foreknowledge of the sin of men, it is evident that His coming was decreed independently of such sin; and it would have been committed by God to execution although man had not sinned. The antecedent is proved: The production of Christ was decreed before the production of creatures; but the decree of the production of creatures preceded the decree of permitting sin; therefore Christ was willed and decreed before the permission, and consequently before the foreknowledge of the sin of men. Whence it stands: for God could not previously have had the decree of permitting the sins of men, nor foreknow them as future, before having the will of producing them themselves; since operation follows being, and consequently the foreseen sinful action presupposes the foreseen existence of the man about to sin. But the major is proved by very many texts of Scripture in which Christ is called the first of all creatures. Thus Ecclesiasticus 24: I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn before every creature; where He excludes no creature whatsoever; which text the Council of Sardica expounds at the end of its Epistle to all Bishops concerning Christ: so that those words, I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, signify His eternal generation inasmuch as He is the Son of God; while the rest designate His temporal generation decreed before any creature whatsoever. Which indeed can be confirmed from St. Paul to the Colossians 1, where he says: Who is the image of the invisible God, firstborn of every creature: for in Him were created all things in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible... He is the head of the body, the Church, who is the beginning, firstborn from the dead, that in all things He may hold primacy: but Christ is not firstborn of every creature according to the order of temporal execution; since He was only formed and born in the midst of the years; therefore He is firstborn in divine intention and destination: and consequently His future incarnation precedes the decree of the production of things, and consequently precedes the decree of the permission of sin. — It is confirmed first from Proverbs 8: The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning, I was ordained from eternity, and of old before the earth was made... the depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived. Each of which words of this oracle confirms our opinion in a wondrous manner. Indeed those words are expounded of incarnate Wisdom, namely Christ our Lord, by the holy Fathers, especially St. Clement Romanus book 1 of the Apostolic Constitutions, chapter 20; Basil book 10 contra Eunomium; Athanasius sermon 3 contra Arianos, and Nazianzen in oration 1 Theologica; Cyril book 3 of the Thesaurus, chapter 1; Augustine.

The adversaries reply from St. Jerome, epistle 136, that "the Lord possessed" is better rendered from the Hebrew than "the Lord created." Moreover very many of the holy Fathers expound that passage of uncreated divine Wisdom; the following words of that oracle favor them: When He prepared all things composing them, and I delighted in every day, playing before Him at all times: which certainly can be understood only of an actually existing thing; but Christ did not exist from the beginning of the world; therefore the aforesaid oracle must be understood not of incarnate Wisdom but only of uncreated. — But I answer that this response of the adversaries does not dissolve the force of the aforesaid argument: for first, although "the Lord possessed" is better translated than "the Lord created," nevertheless those words must necessarily be understood of divine Wisdom as incarnate; since it is said that he who possessed that divine Wisdom is its Lord; but the divine Word, as Son of God, acknowledges no lord; but only as son of man; since, as St. Athanasius says in the Symbol: equal to the Father according to Divinity, less than the Father according to humanity. Nor does it stand in the way that some Fathers expound the words adduced of Wisdom as uncreated: for Theologians commonly teach that sometimes there can be several literal senses of one and the same text of Sacred Scripture, especially of those which are uttered concerning Christ our Lord: since Christ has two natures subsisting in the same person of the Word, namely the divine and the human, thence it comes that the same text of Scripture sometimes designates both natures; whence although certain words of the aforesaid oracle are interpreted of Christ as sustained by the divine nature, nothing hinders the rest from coming to be expounded of Him Himself as sustained by the human nature.

It is confirmed from the fact that that divine Wisdom says there: My delights were to be with the children of men; which if true of fallen men, seems far more true of men to be repaired.

They reply 2: That Christ is called the beginning of the ways of God, yet not of the works of creation, but of reparation. Moreover if He be called the beginning of the ways of God in the order of creation, He is not so called according to priority of intention, as if God intended to produce Christ before other creatures, but only according to priority of dignity and excellence. Thus Job 10 Behemoth is called the beginning of the ways of God. — But neither of these expositions dissolves the aforesaid argument. Not indeed the first, which is altogether absurd and without foundation, and moreover openly contrary to these following words of that oracle: Before the earth was made, before all hills I was brought forth. The second exposition likewise does not obstruct, because Christ is not only called the beginning of the ways of God, which indeed could designate priority of dignity; but He is also called possessed and created by God, that is, decreed in the beginning before external creatures were decreed.

It is confirmed secondly: The exemplar according to which something is made is intended prior by the agent than that which ought to be produced in imitation of it; but Christ our Lord was the exemplar in imitation of which God produced Adam; therefore the formation of Christ ought to have been intended and decreed prior to that of Adam. The major is evident, for every cause precedes its effect with a certain priority; but the exemplar has the character of a cause. But the minor is proved from Tertullian, book De Resurrectione carnis, where pondering those words of Genesis 1: Let us make man to our image and likeness, he says: That clay then putting on the image of the future Christ in the flesh was not only the work of God, but also a pledge. And St. Athanasius, in the sermon on the most holy Mother of God, says: It is rather to be said that God made man according to the image of God: for God made man according to the image and similitude of that kind of Incarnation and assumed humanity.

It is confirmed finally: He is intended first in the order of creation on whose account all things are created and founded; but all things are created and founded on account of Christ; therefore, etc. The major is evident; for the end is intended prior by the agent than those things which are toward and on account of the end;

But the minor is proved: both from the above-praised chapter to the Colossians, where it is said that in Christ Himself, that is, on account of Him, all things were created; and from First Corinthians 3, where the Apostle declares the order of ends to which creatures are ordered: namely that corporeal creatures are for the elect, the elect for Christ, but Christ immediately for God; for he says: All things are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's: but this inference would not be legitimate unless Christ had been intended and decreed by God prior to the other creatures; for just as the creation of men was intended prior by God than the formation of the world on account of that created man, as on account of the primary end, so also the production of Christ ought to have been intended prior before men were decreed to be created on account of Him: which indeed the Apostle confirms to the Hebrews 2, where he says: For it became Him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, who brought many children into glory, etc.

The holy Fathers confirm the aforesaid argument, especially St. Cyril book 5 of the Thesaurus, chapter 3, where disputing against the Arians he says: If, as the heretics say, God produced the Son that He might produce us, He will have been made on account of us, not we on account of Him: why therefore should He not give thanks to us, who exist for our sake? He will also be our glory in such wise as woman is of man; for man was not created on account of woman, but woman on account of man. Rupert favors it too, expounding the just now praised words to the Hebrews, where he thus says: It must be religiously said, and reverently heard, that on account of this Son of Man, namely Christ, to be crowned with glory and honor, God created all things.

SECOND PROOF. — Drawn from the fact that Christ is the Firstborn, Exemplar, and Moral Principle of the Elect and Predestined. — He who is the first exemplar of all the Predestined and Elect, and their moral principle, is intended prior by God as future than the permission of sin be foreseen and decreed: but such is Christ; therefore, etc. The major stands, especially in the opinion of the Thomists, who affirm that Predestination takes place before foreseen merits or demerits according to intention, although according to execution it depends on merits. But the minor is proved: first indeed that Christ was firstborn and exemplary cause of all the predestined; for this the holy Apostle openly teaches to the Romans 8 in these words: Whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be Himself the firstborn amongst many brethren. And First to the Ephesians: He has blessed us with all spiritual blessing in heavenly places in Christ, as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world. And shortly after: He predestined us through Jesus Christ unto Himself: where the particle "through" signifies also that Christ was the meritorious and morally efficient cause of our predestination; but the particle "unto" denotes Him to be the final cause of the same predestination.

These things are confirmed by the authority of the holy Fathers: for Irenaeus book 3 Contra haereses, chapter 11, said thus: The Word, maker of all things, had preformed in Himself the future dispensation of the human race concerning the Son of God, God predestining first the animal man, namely that he might be saved by the spiritual, when the saving one pre-existed; it was fitting that even the carnal be saved, so that the saving one not be in vain. Mark: He had preformed the law in Himself, and the law, since the saving one pre-existed, and finally he predestined first the animal man, that he might be saved by the spiritual, etc. All which manifestly declare that in the divine predestination for the glory of God Himself Christ, as moral head, or according to the dignity of Savior, was predestined before the predestination of man; nay that this man was predestined precisely for this, that salvation should not have been empty, and the office of Christ the Savior already antecedently prefinished. The same teaches St. Cyril book 5 of the Thesaurus, chapter 8, where he says: Christ is laid as foundation before all, and upon Him we are all built up, and this before the beginning of the world in the foreknowledge of God; that with divine order blessing preceded malediction, and damnation into death short of pollution, liberty of divine adoption servitude, and human nature, overcoming the evils which in the meantime befell, could run back into that pristine dignity (through the grace of Christ who founded her in good things) which God indeed established by charity through His Son would come to pass: therefore if blessing preceded malediction, and the grace of Christ founded human nature in good things, it follows that human nature, which in the first Parent was founded in good things and had blessing and life through original justice before malediction and death through the lack thereof, or through original sin, was predestined through Christ, or (as Cyril speaks) built up in Christ, in the foreknowledge of God, or intention of God, and consequently that Christ was predestined before original sin, as moral cause. Whence Cyril concludes: Therefore as regards the foreknowledge and counsel and purpose of the Father, and of the whole Deity, Christ was founded before the ages, and born in due time of the Virgin; in whom we are repaired, who before the beginning of the world had Him Himself as the foundation of our salvation.

The adversaries reply that from these only is gathered that Christ was predestined first, but not that He was predestined before original sin: for, they say, predestination regards the order of grace, while the permission of sin regards the order of nature; but since the order of nature precedes the order of grace, it follows that the decree of the permission of sin precedes the predestination of Christ. — But on the contrary, Christ is called absolutely the first and head of the predestined, and the exemplary and morally efficient cause of the predestination of men; therefore He was predestined before the predestination of Adam; but Adam, according to the mind of the Thomists, was predestined independently of the prevision of merits, and consequently before sin was foreseen; therefore Christ also was predestined before the prevision of sin. But to the argument I say that although nature precedes grace in order of execution, nevertheless it is preceded by it in order of intention: for what is more perfect is intended prior than what is less perfect, because it is ordered to that which is more excellent; but nature is less perfect than grace, to which it is ordered; therefore although in order of execution nature precedes grace, nevertheless in order of intention grace is intended prior by God than nature; for it does not conflict that the subject exist on account of the form, and yet by the intention of the agent the form be prior to the subject; thus we see the substantial form prior to matter in the intention of the material agent; yet in execution matter is presupposed for the form. Therefore although the permission of sin regards the order of nature, thence it does not follow that it was intended prior than the destination to grace and glory. Add that the death of the predestined pertains to nature, for it is naturally a defect; and yet the foreknowledge of his death does not precede his election to grace and glory, especially in the opinion of the Thomists, who will that predestination take place before merits foreseen. Similarly the sin of those crucifying Christ was truly a great sin, and consequently according to the adversaries ought to regard the order of nature; therefore if the order of nature were intended prior than the order of grace and glory, it follows that God saw prior the sin of those crucifying Christ than Christ Himself, which is absurd: since since Christ is the subject about which that sinful action ought to be occupied, this could not be foreknown before such a subject were foreknown.

THIRD PROOF. — Drawn from reason. — One willing in an orderly manner those things which of their nature hold as end and means ought prior to will the end, and among the means those which are nearer to the end, and finally those means which are more remote; but toward the manifestation of the divine goodness, which is the end intended by God in the production of things, nearer stands the incarnation of the Word and the glorification and predestination of Christ than the predestination of all men and their beatification and justification; since the incarnation of the Word, and Christ Himself is nearer to God than all creatures; therefore since God always wills in the most orderly way, He intends prior the manifestation of His goodness, and immediately after willed the incarnation of the Word, then the order of grace, and finally that of nature, to which the permission of sin belongs; and consequently the decree of incarnation preceded the decree of production of things and the decree of permission of sin. The minor stands: since Christ is God-man, He stands more intimately and nearly to God than any creature whatsoever, and contributes more to His glory.

But the Adversaries reply, that the major is true of those means which are nearer to the end in order of causality; false however of those means which are nearer only in order of perfection. For, they say, that one mean is nearer to the end than another can be understood in two ways: first indeed by reason of causality, namely because it conduces immediately to the attainment, other means not immediately but mediately through it. Thus v.g. in the glorification of man, which is the end intended by God predestinating, although in order of execution vocation conduces to it prior than justification; nevertheless in order of intention justification is intended prior by God than vocation, because justification conduces more immediately to glorification than vocation. Secondly, one mean is said nearer to the end than another by reason of greater perfection and affinity with the end; by which reason that which participates more of divine being and of the goodness of God is said nearer to Him than that which participates less. But although Christ is more perfect than the whole order of grace, and by this reason nearer to God, nevertheless He is not nearer to the end intended by God in order of causality, because God could decree simultaneously all things which conduce to His glory, whether they be of the order of nature, of grace, or of hypostatic union; He could also order a less perfect mean to a more perfect, or a more perfect to a less perfect, since this depends on the sole will of God. He could therefore first decree the permission of sin and the redemption of men, then truly the Incarnation of the Word, as a posterior crushing mean toward the glorification of men. — On the contrary, first, although truly God perhaps can without some disorder choose and order a less perfect mean for attaining an end, and afterwards that which is more perfect; nevertheless it appears more fittingly and congruously that He intend and order immediately that mean which by reason of its perfection has greater affinity with the very end being attained; for that befits more the summit of His wisdom and sweet administration of things. Secondly, the adversaries concede that willing in an orderly fashion one wills the end prior than the things toward the end: but Christ is the immediate end of all creatures, both of the order of nature and of the order of grace; therefore He is intended prior by God than the other creatures, of whatever order they may be. The minor stands from what was said, where it was proved from the Apostle 1 Corinthians 3 that just as all things are created on account of the predestined, so all created things and also the predestined themselves are on account of Christ, as He is man, as on account of an end, just as all those things and Christ Himself are on account of God, as on account of the ultimate end; therefore since God, willing in an orderly fashion, wills the end prior than the means, it is necessary that as He intends prior the manifestation of His glory than the incarnation of the Word, because His glory is the ultimate end of all His works, so He intend Christ prior than all those things which are ordered to Him. — Thirdly, to will in an orderly fashion signifies nothing else than to will lovable objects as they are lovable among themselves: but the object which of itself is more perfect and noble is also more lovable; therefore willing orderly the end, one wills prior the more perfect means than the less perfect: but the incarnation of the Word contributes in a more excellent manner to the manifestation of the glory of God, which as end is intended in all His works, than does the redemption of men and the permission of sin contribute; therefore God ought to decree prior the incarnation than the permission of sin. Finally, the permission of the sin of Adam ought of its nature to be the lack of actual grace in Adam, but the lack of grace presupposes its concession; therefore Adam was foreseen prior having grace than lacking grace: but every grace conferred on Adam, whether in the state of innocence or in the state of reparation, was granted him only in view of the merits of Christ to come, for no effect of the predestination of Adam was independent of the merits of Christ; since Christ is the head of all predestined men, and that through the mediating actions by which He merited beatitude for us, it follows that the predestination of Adam, and consequently every effect thereof, depends on the merits of Christ: but the grace which Adam had, even in the state of innocence, was an effect of his own predestination: because since every degree of glory of a predestined man is an effect of his predestination, that grace pertains to the effects of the predestination of Adam, to which corresponds some degree of glory in which Adam himself now exists: but the grace he had in the state of innocence corresponds to some degree of glory which Adam now enjoys; for although that grace was lost through the subsequent sin, and its merit mortified, nevertheless through penance it was restored to him, and the merit vivified for receiving that degree of glory to which he had right in the state of innocence.

The adversaries answer that it is false that to that grace which Adam had in the state of innocence formally as such corresponds some degree of glory which Adam obtains; since, they say, that grace was totally extinguished by sin; nor did the meritorious works done through it retain any right to glory as to a reward, but remained altogether dead and incapable of reviviscence through penance: in which they differ from our merits, which, since they are only mortified by lethal sin, revive through penance unto those same degrees of glory to which they had special right. The reason of this discrimination is that, destroyed in us there remains nevertheless still one of the moral and vital principles of those actions by which before we fell into sin we merited something with God, namely Christ Himself, who is the moral cause of all our merit: but with respect to Adam still innocent, Christ did not yet inflow into his merit, but only contributed to it the grace conferred on him, which was the radical and vital principle of such merit; therefore that principle destroyed, every merit which had proceeded from it totally lost life; and consequently it was not only mortified but altogether dead. — On the contrary, first, they assert without foundation, and not without danger of error, that grace was not conferred on Adam out of the merits of Christ. Indeed the Apostle to the Ephesians 1 expressly pronounces: He has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in heavenly places in Christ: but the grace conferred on innocent Adam was a supreme blessing, not only for himself but also for us his posterity, upon whom he ought to transfuse it; therefore it was conferred in view of the merits of Christ. — Then, they put forward as solution the very thing in controversy: for we are disputing whether Christ was decreed prior than Adam or any other creature; therefore that response does not seem suitable. — Moreover, the Mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to Adam in the state of innocence, as St. Thomas teaches 2 q. 2 art. 1, and St. Augustine book 1 De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia, chapter 2, where he affirms that marriage in the state of innocence was a sign and Sacrament of the conjunction and spiritual union of Christ with the Church; which he proves from that passage of the Apostle to the Ephesians 5, where having related those words which Adam uttered after his wife was formed: Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh, he immediately adds: This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ, and in the Church. By which the Apostle signifies that Adam uttered those words not only to denote the intimate union of spouses but also the union of Christ with the Church; therefore innocent Adam foresaw Christ to come. — Finally, the Adversaries falsely bring forward that the merits of Adam through the subsequent sin were altogether dead, since for that reason our merits do not at all die as long as we are faithful, because through faith we are always united to Christ the head and mediator of our salvation; but Adam did not lose faith, otherwise the Church would have been wholly extinguished at that time; therefore he could have the same union with Christ the head even while he sinned, as sinners now have who have not lost faith.

FOURTH PROOF. — Drawn from the absurdities which arise from the contrary opinion. — If Christ had come only on account of sin, it would follow that He is a merely occasioned good, namely that He would not have had existence unless sin had been committed; but it is absurd that so great a good, such as Christ, should be only occasionally intended by

God, since He is of Himself supremely willed and lovable, no less than redemption itself from sin, nay much more, inasmuch as He is of Himself a more excellent good; therefore, etc.

THE ADVERSARIES REPLY 1: That it is not inconvenient that Christ was decreed only occasioned by sin; because, they say, a far greater benefit was bestowed on men by the fact that God became incarnate for the remedy of sin alone, than if He became incarnate for other motives in the order to justification and glorification which men would have had if they had persevered in the state of innocence, because the less worthy the recipient, other things equal, the greater the benefit: but an incarnation made on account of the sole remedy of sin would be a benefit made to a sinner and unworthy one; whereas if it took place for those motives, this benefit would not be conferred on an unworthy one; therefore nothing hinders the Incarnation of the Word from being an occasioned good. — But, I say, this response neither meets the point of the difficulty nor contains true doctrine. It is not indeed to the point of the present difficulty, because it is not asked whether the incarnation of the Word would be a greater or lesser benefit if it took place on account of the sole redemption from sin: but whether of itself it is a greater good than redemption, so that that good would not exist unless redemption were to be made. Nor does it contain true doctrine, because doubtless it would be a greater benefit that the incarnation take place for the justification and glorification of men, and also for the dignity of human nature, than if it took place for the sole redemption: for it is more excellent to give a hand to a man lest he fall into captivity and guard and keep his liberty, than if he be rescued from chains.

THEY REPLY 2: That "occasioned" is taken in two ways: first, as identical with "beside the intention of the agent," and accidental; in which sense they admit the incarnation is not an occasioned good, especially with respect to God, since all things are subjected to His governance: secondly, a good is said to be occasioned because it depends on some occasion, although intended by God from elsewhere; and in this sense they concede the incarnation to be an occasioned good. — But from this response it follows either that the incarnation of itself would be a lesser good than the remission of sin, or that God orders a greater good, namely Christ, to a lesser good, namely the remedy of sin: but both are absurd. For Christ, as God-man, is a far more excellent good than the salvation of all men: since God receives greater glory through Christ alone than He would receive through the salvation of all men. Similarly God would act disorderly if He ordered a greater good to a lesser: for beings less perfect are ordered, according to the just ordination of divine Providence, to more excellent ones: thus the elements serve living things, plants serve brutes, brutes truly men.

THEY REPLY AGAIN, that it would indeed proceed disorderly if a greater good were ordered to a lesser as to an end qui, that is for whose sake something is done: not however if it were ordered as to an end cui, that is to which; for Angels in Scripture are said to be produced and sent in ministry to men: and the salvation of the rustic is said to be the end cui of royal providence; because the good of the rustic results from the best administration of the king. - On the contrary, if the incarnation were decreed only on account of the sole remission of sin, it would follow that it would not be unless sin existed, and consequently that it would have existence only on the occasion of remitting sin, and thus of itself and absolutely be ordered to sin; but that which of itself and absolutely is ordered to another, so that it has existence only on account of that ordination, is ordered not only to an end cui but also to an end cuius gratia. Therefore if it were a disorderly disposition that a greater good be referred to a lesser as to an end qui, it would follow that the incarnation would be less rightly ordered to the sole remission of sin. The minor stands: for that is said to be ordered to another as to an end qui, at least immediate, when it is produced only on account of another and would have no existence if it were not so ordered to another: thus creatures are said to be ordered to the glory of God as to an end qui, because they are created only for the glory of God. These responses will be confirmed from the following absurdities.

The second absurdity, which arises from the adverse opinion, is that if Christ were decreed only for our redemption, it would follow that the sin of Adam would have been useful to Him, because He would not have His existence, nor grace and glory, unless Adam had sinned; nay He could rejoice over the sin of Adam; for someone can rightly rejoice over that without which he would not receive his being nor have his perfections: but this consequence is altogether absurd. The major is proved by a like authority of St. Anselm book 1 Cur Deus Homo, c. 18, where he reproves the opinion of those asserting that men were made and predestined only that they might fill the empty seats of the Angels; for if it were so, it would follow that men ought to congratulate themselves on the perdition and fall of the Angels. And he says:

If men could in no wise have been made except for the restoration of the lost Angels, it is a fine thing, that unless those Angels had fallen from that beatitude, men would not ascend to it: if anyone therefore should say that the elect men will rejoice as much at the perdition of the Angels as they will rejoice at their own assumption, since doubtless this would not be unless that had been, how can they be defended from this perverse congratulation?

But the same would have to be said of Christ, if He had been decreed to come only for repairing lost men.

THE ADVERSARIES REPLY: That it is false that Christ would rejoice at the fall of men, but that He would rejoice only at the goodness and mercy of God, who produced so great a good out of so great an evil as out of an occasion: for neither, they say, did we give the occasion of the being of Christ of Himself, and by our intention, but only per accidens, and by the intention of God, who willed out of the sin of Adam as out of an occasion to decree the incarnation of the divine Word. To the authority of St. Anselm they deny parity; because, they say, therefore men ought to rejoice at the fall of the Angels if they were ordained to fill their seats, because, upon supposition of the Angelic fall, men would be predestined without a new benefit, as Anselm supposes in the opinion of those whom he impugns: for they said God had chosen a certain number of Angels to glory with this condition, that if some should defect, so many should be assumed from among men; and therefore by force of that pact they would be predestined without a new benefit; and therefore they ought to rejoice at the fall, from which without a new benefit their predestination would follow; but the incarnation of Christ did not proceed from the fall of men without a particular benefit; whence Christ ought not to rejoice at the sin of Adam. - But these responses do not satisfy.

Not indeed the first: although indeed Christ ought to rejoice in the mercy of God, from which principally and for its own sake His production proceeds, nevertheless it seemed wholly to follow that He ought also to rejoice in that without which God would not be moved by mercy to decree the coming of Christ Himself, just as He would not be moved to predestine so many men unless, as those whom Anselm impugns will, so many Angels had fallen. Nor does the disparity satisfy which they bring forward between their proposal made by Anselm and ours, because it is entirely the same thing whether the predestination of men takes place from the fall without a new benefit, or does not so take place, in order that men might have ground for joy over the fall of the Angels: for the motive of joy would not be the lack of a new decree, or that they not be destined by a new decree to glory: but the motive of that joy would be the conservation of their predestination, which would take place upon the supposed fall of the Angels: but it would not take place if the Angels had not fallen. Whence their joy would arise only from their predestination, whereby it would infallibly follow from the ruin of the Angels. But the same would have to be said of Christ our Lord, if His coming had been decreed only to free men from sin.

The third absurdity, which arises from the opposite opinion, is that if Christ were decreed only for men to be redeemed, there would follow first, that He would owe thanks to us to repay, not we to Him. Secondly, that we would be far more excellent than Christ. Thirdly, that sin would have been necessary in order that Christ exist. But these three consequences are absurd, and repugnant to the doctrine of the holy Fathers. The first indeed, because St. Athanasius infers it and impugns it in book 3 Contra Arianos, with these words:

If God, he says, willing to produce creaturely nature, begot the Son for use unto them according to your opinion, that through Him He might build us up: consider how bold is the impiety in your words. First, because it will appear that the Son was created for us, and not we for the Son: for we would not have been created for His sake, but He for ours, and so that He Himself should owe grace to us, not we to Him. And immediately he infers: If that is conceded, it plainly follows, that the Father did not will the Son for Himself, for not willing to create Him He created Him, but, when He willed to save us, for our sake He instituted Him.

— The second consequence St. Cyril impugns in book 2 of the Thesaurus, chapter 3, where he says: If the Son was made for us, and not we for the Son; we shall be far more excellent than He Himself. Which is confirmed also by St. Basil book 4 Contra Eunomium, where he says: That which was made on account of another, and not for itself, either is part of that for which it was made, or is less than it. — Finally the third consequence is impugned by the authority of St. Augustine, who lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, c. 23, denies that sin was necessary in order that Saints be born and the generation of men take place. And he says: Whoever said that Adam and Eve were not going to come unless they had sinned — what did he say except that on account of the numerosity of Saints the sin of man was necessary? For if by not sinning they alone would remain, because as they think, unless they had sinned they could not generate, certainly in order that not only two but many just men could exist, sin was necessary, which it is absurd to believe. Therefore much more absurd, that sin was necessary in order that Christ, the head of men and Holy of Holies, come into this world. Which inference Rupert draws in these words: *According to Augustine, he says, it would be absurd to say that on account of sin the generations of men were not going to happen. If therefore on account of men, that they be born, sin had been necessary, what must be thought concerning the Head and King of all the Elect, Angels and men, except that He Himself most of all had no need of sin, in order that He become man from men, about to dwell with them the delights of His charity?

THE OBJECTIONS ARE SOLVED. — THEY OBJECT 1. THE ADVERSARIES: The decree of the Incarnation, since it is above nature's due, can become known only through revelation: but whenever Sacred Scripture, Councils, or the holy Fathers, from whom the divine will must be gathered, speak of such a decree, they assign no other cause or motive of it than liberation from sin, or the redemption of man from the servitude of sin; therefore by force of the decree which God de facto had, the Word would not have assumed flesh, Adam not sinning. They suppose the major as true: but prove the minor: First, by all those passages of Sacred Scripture by which in the preceding Conclusion we proved that Christ truly came chiefly to redeem men from sin. Secondly, from the Councils, especially Nicaea, and from its Symbol of faith, where it is said: Who for us men, and for our salvation came down from heaven. Thirdly, finally they confirm it by very many authorities of the holy Fathers, chief among which are St. Irenaeus book 3 chapter 14 saying: If flesh did not have ⟦original sin?⟧, the Word of God would by no means have become flesh, and if the blood of the just did not have ⟦to be impiously shed?⟧, the Lord would never have had blood. St. Cyril of Alexandria dialogue 1 De Trinitate, where he says: If we had not sinned, neither would the Son of God have been made like unto us, nor would He have suffered: and if He had not died, He would not have been assumed, that He might be adored by us and by the Saints, that is the Angels. St. Ambrose book De Incarnationis Dominicae sacramento, chapter ⟦4?⟧: What was the cause of the Incarnation, except that the flesh which had sinned might be redeemed? Augustine, sermon De Verbis Domini: If man had not perished, the Son of man would not have come. St. Leo sermon 3 In Pentecosten: If man, he says, made to the image and similitude of God, had remained in honor of his nature, nor deceived by diabolical fraud had declined from the law laid upon him through concupiscence, the creation of heaven and world would not take place: nor would the Eternal undergo temporality: nor would He who is equal to God the Father, and Son of God, assume the similitude of the flesh of sin. Gregory the Great on 1 Kings chapter 1: If Adam had not sinned, our Redeemer would not have needed to take our flesh: for He was sent to call the just, but sinners to penance: if therefore He came for sinners, if sins were absent, He would not need to come. — I answer with the Doctor, granting the major, distinguishing the minor: No other motive of the Incarnation is assigned as it de facto happened and truly was accomplished — I concede: as it would have to be fulfilled upon the hypothesis that there was no sin — I deny. For it stands both from Sacred Scripture and from the holy Fathers praised for our opinion, that even if Adam had not sinned, nevertheless Christ would have come. Whence, if those texts of Scripture and oracles of the Fathers praised for our opinion may be interpreted by the adversaries, why may not also the sentences objected by them be expounded in a like manner by benign interpretation, lest the Fathers and Scripture appear to conflict mutually? Add that the holy Fathers themselves lay the foundation of our exposition: since when they deny Christ would come if sin were not, they either signify that He would not have come in the similitude of the flesh of sin, as stands from St. Leo; or that He would not be subject to death and other miseries to which He subjected Himself, that He might satisfy for sinners; or that He would not come as Redeemer, Savior, and Physician: in which sense St. Augustine sermon 90 De verbis Apostoli, expounding these words 1 Timothy 1: Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners, says: There was no cause of redeeming for Christ the Lord except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no cause of medicine: if a physician should come from heaven, the sick would lie wondering throughout the whole circle of the earth: the sick one himself is mankind.

They press: That the holy Fathers expressly pronounce simply and without any addition that Christ would not come if sin were absent: but this speech would be false if Christ came, sin not intervening, in impassible flesh; for of him who is to come in impassible flesh it is true to say that He is to come; therefore it is false to assert that He is not to come; therefore when the holy Fathers pronounce absolutely that Christ is not to come if sin were absent, they judge that by no means would there be incarnation if Adam had not sinned.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I deny the consequence. For the holy Fathers do not say simply that He would by no means come, but that He would not come in that passible and mortal state in which He appeared; whence they speak of the Incarnation as it was made, wherefore some use this interrogatory mode, as Nazianzen and Ambrose: What cause of the Incarnation, except to save sinners? By which formula of speech they signify that the principal cause of the accomplished Incarnation was the salvation of sinners; yet they do not deny that there are other causes for making the Incarnation if there were no sin. Nor does their mode of speaking therefore present falsity; for someone can be said not to come, although he comes; not indeed in that way in which he was expected, but in another: thus John 7 Christ our Lord said to His kinsmen: Go you up to this festival day, but I will not go up to this festival day: and yet the Evangelist adds: And when his brethren went up, then He also went up to the festival day, not manifestly, but as it were in secret: whence Christ our Lord saying absolutely that He would not go up is to be understood, not publicly but secretly.

They insist: Christ could not come by force of that decree de facto existing except in passible flesh; therefore if Adam had not sinned, either He would by no means have come, or He would have had to come in passible flesh. The consequence is evident, for there is no other possible mode of Incarnation except in passible or impassible flesh. Therefore if Christ had not come in impassible flesh, He would have had to come in passible flesh. The antecedent is proved: since God first decreed the Incarnation efficaciously, either the Word was to become incarnate in impassible flesh or in passible flesh, or He decreed only His coming in common and as to the substance of humanity: but the first cannot be said, because if God had first willed efficaciously that the Word assume impassible flesh, de facto He would have assumed it when He became incarnate; otherwise either that decree would not have been efficacious, and thus with Adam not sinning would not have attained its effect, nor consequently in this hypothesis would the Word have become incarnate; or it would have been changed at a subsequent sign of reason, upon supposition of the permission and prevision of sin, by another decree, whereby God, having previously destined the Incarnation in impassible flesh, afterwards willed that it take place in passible flesh, that it might be a remedy for sin: but this cannot be said, because it conflicts with the immutability of God and the perfection of divine Providence, which is not uncertain and changeable as ours, on account of the limitation of our intellect and will. The second also cannot be said, because in two ways God can be feigned to have willed first the Incarnation, or hypostatic union, in common, abstracting from passible or impassible flesh: first indeed so that He decreed only in common, and as it were confusedly, to assume some individual of human nature, not determining whether He would assume this or that one; secondly, so that He willed to unite this humanity hypostatically to Himself in individuo, yet not determining whether He would assume it in passible or impassible flesh: but neither mode of speaking is true. Not indeed the first, because an efficacious act of the divine will is terminated to the thing in particular, with all its accidents, circumstances, and modes with which it ought to exist: otherwise that act of the divine will would not have been efficacious, because it would not have been terminated to the thing under that state under which it is not possible in act; therefore God did not will efficaciously the Incarnation of the Word only in common and as to its substance, abstracting from passible or impassible flesh. Add that to will something in common, and afterwards in particular with all its accidents, circumstances, and modes, denotes an imperfection of our intellect and will; therefore it could not have place in God.

I answer, that God decreed first the Incarnation only as to its substance, abstracting from the state of passibility or impassibility; since He had reasons why He should determine prior the substance of the Incarnation than its circumstances; namely, that Christ could merit for the Angels, and the first parent, grace and other gifts, which were conferred on them independently of sin: for neither could the foreseen merits of Christ move God to confer that grace unless the substance of the Incarnation had been decreed before sin was foreseen. Therefore God, seeing it possible that Christ could merit those gifts for Angels and men, or that those benefits be given them in view of His merit, provided His coming were decreed before the prevision of sin, decreed the incarnation to be made absolutely, not yet decreeing the mode nor the state, impassible or passible, taking impassibility for subjection and liability to death and miseries. For a twofold passibility can be distinguished: one indeed arising from the four qualities and contrary elements of which bodies consist, and this is intrinsic to nature, and Adam had it in the state of innocence, but bound through original justice, and the draw of the tree of life, whereby all natural defects were kept from his body. But the other is passibility inflicted on account of sin, which is the very actual subjection to death and miseries. Christ would have had the former passibility even if there had been no sin, because He would come composed of four qualities and contrary elements; and thus by force of the first decree He would equally be passible; but by virtue of the other decree He would come impassible in the second manner, because it was not fitting that, the cause of the redemption of sinners failing, Christ de facto lie subject to death and miseries, but He would have been prevented by God constituting His humanity in a state altogether glorious and impassible. Whence to the argument in form: I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say, that God decreed by His first decree the substance of the Incarnation; and that Christ was to come in passible flesh, taking passibility in the first manner, inasmuch as it is something intrinsic to human nature — I concede; that He decreed Him to come passible, with passibility taken in the second manner — I deny: because upon the hypothesis that there would have been no sin, God by the other decree would have established that coming of Christ take place in impassible flesh, that is not liable to death and hardships; just as de facto He decreed that He come passible, by a decree following that one whereby He had decreed the substance of the Incarnation before the prevision of sin.

They insist likewise: That no foundation can be brought forward for this twofold decree, and all the sentences of Scripture and the holy Fathers concerning the futurition of the Incarnation signify only that there is a single decree, both as to the substance and as to the circumstances of the Incarnation itself; therefore the solution touched upon is null.

I deny the antecedent: for upon the hypothesis that the Word is to become incarnate before the prevision of sin, as we proved, it is necessary that another decree follow, whereby namely it is determined that He is to come in the impassible state, upon the hypothesis that there is no sin: because it was fitting that He not lie subject to death and hardships if no sin existed. Therefore there would be need that the decree de facto existing about the substance of incarnation be followed by another decree about the mode of passibility; but since that supposition of not committing sin was not true, therefore to the decree about the substance of the Incarnation it was necessary that another follow, whereby the coming of Christ in passible flesh was established. Whence two decrees are rightly distinguished in God: one about the Incarnation as to substance, the other about the same according to its circumstances: the prior precedes every prevision of sin: the posterior truly follows it; namely so that God first willed to send His Son into the earth as leader, head, and lawgiver of the human race; secondly foresaw original sin and others which flowed from it; thirdly decreed to send Him in passible flesh, so that He who would have been Leader, head, and lawgiver only, if no sin had existed, that same One would be our redeemer suffering death for the guilty. These things are confirmed by the example of one who efficaciously wills some end without determining the means. V.g. if someone wished to go from Marseilles to Rome, since he could not get there except by sea or land; he, by force of that intention, upon the hypothesis that there were an impediment of going by sea on account of dangers, ought to resolve upon departure by land; not indeed precisely by force of the prior decree, but through another subsequent decree intervening, whereby he decrees to go by land, because he cannot set out to Rome by sea; therefore similarly, since God decreed the substance of the Incarnation independently of the circumstances, because, as proved, the Son of God would have become incarnate even if there were no sin; the same need was of a new decree, whereby out of the prevision of sin the coming of Christ in passible flesh would be decreed.

It subsists: If there is need of a new decree, that the coming of Christ in passible flesh be decreed, it follows that Christ would not come by force of the present decree whereby His Incarnation is predestined as to substance: and consequently if Adam had not sinned, Christ would not have come by force of the present decree, as the Conclusion affirmed.

I deny what is subsumed: for although Christ would not come as passible by force of the present decree whereby His passibility is destined, because sin failing, such a decree would not exist; nevertheless He would come by force of the present decree whereby His incarnation is predestined as to substance; not indeed precisely, and without another decree, but mediated by a decree about His future coming in impassible flesh. For just as v.g. he who would proceed to Rome would be said to go there by land by force of the prior decree, inasmuch as to the prior decree necessarily followed another about going by land, upon the hypothesis that there were an impediment to going by sea, and vice versa: so since God de facto decreed the substance of the Incarnation independently of the circumstances, and that decree determined no more toward establishing a future Incarnation in passible flesh, upon the hypothesis that there would be sin, than it determined that it be in impassible flesh if there were no sin, truly it can be said that by force of that decree about the substance of the Incarnation the circumstance of impassibility would be decreed, upon the hypothesis that there would be no sin: and thus Christ would come in impassible flesh by virtue of that prior decree, because the last decree would necessarily have followed upon the decree about the substance of the Incarnation.

He objects 2: All the merits of Christ our Lord are merits of the Redeemer, and consequently presuppose captivity contracted through sin, from which He redeems us: but in the case that the first man did not sin, there would not be such captivity; indeed nature would have remained intact in that state in which she had been created; therefore in that case Christ would not have come.

I distinguish the major: They are merits of the Redeemer, either preservative or relieving — I concede; relieving only — I deny. For there is a twofold office of the Redeemer: one whereby He preserves lest anyone incur captivity: the other whereby He redeems and relieves from that very captivity. The former Christ would have exercised if He had come in impassible flesh: the latter however He exercised while de facto He came in passible flesh.

He objects 3: The Incarnation is a certain humiliation and emptying of a divine person, according to that passage of the Apostle to the Philippians 2: He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant: which emptying occurs not only through death and passion, but especially in the very fact that the Son of God assumed human nature; for man by the condition of his nature is a servant comparatively to God, because God is his Lord, as Lord of all creation: but the Son of God had no other cause of humbling Himself thus than because Adam unduly willed himself raised above his condition; therefore if Adam had not so sinned, the Son of God would have had no occasion to humble Himself thus through the Incarnation.

I deny the minor: for besides the expiation of sin, very many other reasons underlie the making of the Incarnation: namely that Christ be the head of the Church, Lawgiver of men, and that He commend His divine power, goodness, and wisdom, and also that He converse with men; for as that divine Wisdom says, Proverbs 8: My delights were to be with the children of men.

That sins, as far as concerns the present, can be regarded under a fourfold difference: The first is original sin, insofar as it is considered in the first parent Adam, namely inasmuch as by his sinning we all sinned as in the head of the whole of humanity. Secondly original sin can be considered as it is in each of us, namely inasmuch as at that instant when we are men and posterity of Adam, straightway we are infected by its guilt and sin. The third is actual mortal sin, whereby one loses sanctifying grace: which sin indeed could exist in the state of innocence: since innocent Adam sinned actually, and that sin, which with respect to us was original, with respect to Adam was actual. Finally the fourth is venial sin, whereby indeed sanctifying habit of grace is not lost, but its splendor is diminished and the fervor of charity relaxed.

Note 2. It is certain that Christ our Lord came into this world to destroy all sins both original and actual, or to exhibit a sufficient remedy for the expiation of all sins. Which indeed stands from clear texts of Scripture; for Isaiah 53: He has laid on Him the iniquities of us all. 1 John 1: The blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanses us from all sin: and chapter 2: He is a propitiation for our sins: not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world. And 1 (4): He sent His Son a propitiation for our sins. With these agrees St. Paul 1 Timothy 1: Jesus came to save sinners. And to Titus 2: Who gave redemption, that He came forth by the secret decree of the Father. Hence St. Ambrose on Psalm 35: Good, he says, is the blood of Christ, rich in price, flowing forth to wash away every sin. Reason also gives support. Since indeed the end of the Incarnation is to lead men to eternal life, to which nothing defiled is admitted, it follows that not only original but also actual sins ought to have been expiated through Christ. Whence there only remains the difficulty to be solved, which of these sins, whether original or actual, was the chief motive of the Incarnation, so that its expiation was the cause why Christ came, which had it been absent He would not have come.

Note 3. All Doctors agree that if only venial sins had existed, there would have been no need of Christ coming as Redeemer: both because Christ came to reconcile us to God, while venial sin does not break off friendship and union with God; and because a pure man enlightened by sanctifying grace could have paid God due satisfaction for venial sin; hence for its expiation the coming of Christ would not have been necessary. But as to the other sins, authors do not so agree: for there is a threefold principal opinion concerning their resolution: The first is that of Valencia q. 1 puncto 5 and of some Recentiors, asserting that with only original sin existing, or conversely with only actual ones existing, Christ our Lord would have come by force of the present decree. The second is that of Nazarius and others affirming that with only original sin existing, or only actual ones existing, the Incarnation, by force of the present decree, would not have been future. The third truly, which is now more common in both schools, the Angelic and the Subtle, teaches that Christ comes by force of the present decree with only original sin existing: but not with only actual ones existing. Therefore two things especially are here to be determined: the first indeed, that Christ came principally to destroy original rather than actual sin. The second, that He so came to destroy original sin that if only actual ones had existed, He would not have come in passible flesh nor as Redeemer.

First Conclusion. — CHRIST OUR LORD CAME MORE CHIEFLY TO DESTROY ORIGINAL SIN THAN ACTUAL.

It is proved: Christ came principally to destroy that sin which is the origin and root of the others, and which is greater and more pernicious than the others; but original sin is the root of the others, and far graver and more pernicious than they; therefore, etc. The major stands; for the graver a sin is, the more it opposes human salvation, for whose working God was made man. But the minor is proved: the sin which of itself infects the whole human nature is absolutely greater than that which of itself infects only a singular person; but original sin infects the whole human nature; actual truly only the person committing it; therefore this is graver than that. The minor is certain: but the major is proved: something can be said greater than another either intensively: thus whiter is that which is more intense and has more degrees; or extensively: thus whiteness which is in a larger surface is said to be the other greater: but original sin although it is not intensively greater than actual sin, because it is less voluntary; nevertheless extensively it is greater, because through it the whole human race is infected. Therefore since Christ came principally to destroy that sin which more opposes the salvation of men, it follows that He came principally to destroy original sin.

You will say: Actual sin is simply graver than original sin both intensively and extensively; therefore if Christ came principally on account of some special one, He ought especially to have come to destroy actual sin. The consequence stands. The antecedent is proved: for all concede that a sin is the graver intensively, the more voluntary it is; but actual sin is more voluntary than original, because the latter only interpretatively voluntary; the former formally voluntary. Extensively too it seems not less grave, because it extends to as many as original sin does; therefore, etc.

I answer, that original sin indeed is less grave intensively since it is less voluntary than actual: but, as we said just now, original is graver extensively: both because actual sin does not infect infants before the use of reason, whom however original stains and makes guilty; and because it is per accidens that actual sin extends itself to all adults, since since it depends on the singular will of each man, of itself it does not demand to infect the whole nature: but original sin of itself from its nature is universal, infecting the whole nature; therefore Christ came principally to expiate it.

Second Conclusion. — CHRIST OUR LORD WOULD HAVE COME BY FORCE OF THE PRESENT DECREE WITH ONLY ORIGINAL SIN EXISTING: BUT OTHERWISE IF ONLY ACTUAL SINS EXISTED. This is the more common opinion as to both parts.

The first part is proved: First from the common manner of speaking of the holy Fathers, who conformably to the mind of St. Paul call Christ the second Adam, who came to restore all those things which the first had lost by his hostility. Whence St. Gregory book 1 on Kings, c. 1: If Adam had not sinned, our Redeemer would not have needed to take our flesh. Hence the Church sings in the blessing of the Paschal candle: O truly necessary sin of Adam, which was blotted out by the death of Christ! O happy fault, which merited to have such and so great a Redeemer! Wherefore Christ is called John 1 the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world. Expounding which, the glossa ordinaria taken from Bede says: The sin of the world is called original sin, which is common to the whole world. Nor does it stand in the way that the Vulgate has "sins" of the world: for besides that the Greek and Complutensian have "sin" in the singular, and so read the holy Fathers Irenaeus book 3 Contra haereses, chapter 11, and Augustine book 22 Contra Faustum, chapter 3 — sin can be said plurally as several sins, because it virtually contains all sins, since there is none which does not take origin from it as from a virulent fountain; wherefore David Psalm 50 calls original sin, in which he had been conceived, sins and iniquities; for he says: Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins my mother conceived me.

It is proved also by reason: Christ especially clothed Himself in human flesh that He might repair the whole collapsed human nature: but if there had been no other sin besides original, the whole nature had perished even if other actual sins were absent; therefore no less with only original sin existing ought He to have become incarnate. Then, Christ therefore for us men and for our salvation descended from Heaven, namely that He might open and unlock for us the closed Heaven: but through original sin Heaven was so closed to each man that none, however just, could be received into it unless prior due satisfaction had been shown to God, to be paid only through the merits and Passion of Christ; therefore although there had been only original sin, Christ would no less have needed to come, that He might unlock Heaven for us and pay due satisfaction to God the Father. Finally, Christ was to come that He might dissolve the works of the devil and free men from his captivity: but through original sin men are especially subjected to the empire of the demon and are held his captives. Therefore, etc.

You will say: The total motive of the Incarnation was that what recalled man from God might be solved; for this reason the Son of God was made man, that men might become sons of God and be constituted heirs of His perpetual inheritance: but not only original sin but all actual ones recalled men from God; therefore He did not come primarily and principally on account of original sin.

I distinguish the major: The total motive of the Incarnation was that which removed men from God especially and principally, and as it were as head, to which the other removers are reduced — I concede: that which removes less principally, and only secondarily — I deny. And in like manner I distinguish the minor, I deny the consequence. But it is certain, since original sin is the fountain and root of the others, that it keeps men far more from God than any actual one whatsoever; whence Christ comes more principally to destroy it than the others: although He also consequently came to remove them. And thus original sin was indeed the principal motive of the coming of Christ: but actual sins were only impulsive. This will be made clear by this example: For instance someone decreed to visit a friend, that with him he may transact certain business: but when about to undertake the journey he hears the wife of his friend gravely ill. Having heard which with a more prompt mind he proceeds to the friend, both that he may complete the business and heal the sick woman: but his motivating causes why he goes to the friend, without which he would not go, are the business to be transacted: but impulsive is the curing of the sick wife of the friend, without which he would indeed visit the friend, but not with equal promptitude of mind.

The second part follows from the preceding: for if original sin is the primary motive of the Incarnation, it follows that it not existing Christ would not have come by force of the present decree: for the primary and principal cause of any operation ceasing, it is necessary that that operation also cease.

You will say: Christ would have come even if only one man had sinned; therefore much more He would have come to destroy the sins of many men even if no original sin existed. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved, both from that passage of St. Paul to the Galatians 2 where he says of Christ: He loved me, and delivered Himself for me, by which He signifies that Christ died for individual sinners, and consequently He would come dying for any sinner whatever, although others did not sin; and from chapter 2 to the Hebrews, where each sinner is said to crucify Christ in himself: that is each sinner offers sufficient occasion that Christ be crucified again; finally from St. Chrysostom Homily 3 on Acts of the Apostles, where expounding those words they gave lots, he says: For whose loss is so great that no reason could estimate it: for if the salvation of one soul is of such worth that on its account the Son of God became man, and suffered so much, etc. — I answer by denying the antecedent, and to all its proofs I say that by these is manifested only the supreme love of Christ our Lord toward men to be saved, by reason of which He was so disposed that although one man alone were a sinner, nevertheless if God so decreed, He most willingly would clothe Himself in human flesh and suffer death for saving him. But thence it does not follow that by force of the present decree He would have come into the world if only a single man among the posterity of Adam had sinned.