Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

It is certain that an accident can be assumed, indeed in fact has been assumed mediately, that is, by means of a substantial nature assumed by the Word, since indeed the Word by assuming human nature equally assumed its accidents, to be desired for its integrity and natural conservation: for which reason Theologians teach the Word also assumed all natural defects of humanity, except sin and ignorance. Truly the difficulty is whether an accident can immediately and per se be assumed and terminated by a divine person. Our Bassolis denies it in 3. dist. 2. quaest. 1., and with him Suarez and very many of the Recentiores: but our De Rubeis affirms it, in 3. dist. 2. q. 2., to whom Vasquez subscribes, and very many of the moderns.

Note 2. From the Doctor in 3. dist. 1. quaest. 1. num. 3., accident has a twofold relation toward subject: one indeed in the rationale of informing toward informable: the other truly in the rationale of terminated and sustained toward terminating and sustaining. The first relation argues imperfection both in the subject, which requires accident as form requisite for its total integrity and perfection: as in the very accident, which on that account is incomplete being, and outside nature of subject. But the second indeed argues imperfection in the accident, when it cannot exist unless it is sustained by the subject: yet denotes no imperfection in the subject, indeed connotes perfection therein, namely the sustaining power of another being.

Note 3. From the same Doctor, quaest. 10. quodlibeticae art. 2., that an accident on account of its imperfection cannot have per se supposite, and consequently cannot intrinsically be hypostatically terminated: nevertheless it requires an intrinsic supposite of subsistence, toward which its dependence be terminated, as toward its own supposite, to which however it is not identified, nor per se one with it, because the nature of accident, and supposite of substance are of another genus: there is nevertheless between them some substitutive union, which as far as possible performs the office of identity, which union on the part of accident is actual dependence of its nature: but on the part of supposite, it is termination of that dependence, which termination is nothing other than actual sustentation of that accident, by reason of which accident is conserved in its being.

Single Conclusion. — THE NATURE OF AN ACCIDENT CAN BE ASSUMED BY A DIVINE PERSON.

It is proved: That nature is assumable by a divine person whose dependence can be terminated by divine nature: but the dependence of accident can be terminated by divine nature: therefore, etc. The major stands. The minor is proved: if there were any repugnance why the nature of accident could not be terminated by divine nature, it would be sought either from the side of the divine person, or from the side of the very nature of accident: but from neither head does it conflict. Not indeed from the side of the divine person, because since it has infinite and independent power in the rationale of terminator, it can terminate all that is terminable, namely in that mode in which it is terminable. Wherein that actual termination is not of the intrinsic concept of the thing itself which is terminated. Nor yet does it imply conflict from the side of accident, since actual termination of accident by subject is not of the intrinsic concept of it: nor so natural and necessary, as stands evident in Eucharistic species, which are not terminated through subject; since indeed they do not inhere.

Add that the dependence of accident upon sustainer is no less in obediential power with respect to the divine person than the dependence of substantial nature upon that divine person itself, whereby it can be sustained and terminated.

You will say 1: Accident cannot be terminated through subject except inasmuch as this has the rationale of passive potency with respect to accident, which is its informing form: but a divine person cannot have the rationale of passive potency with respect to accident; since indeed it cannot be informed by Him: therefore neither can He terminate and assume accident. — I deny the major: for, as we said in the 2nd Notable, twofold is the relation of accident toward subject in which it inheres; namely in the rationale of informing, and in the rationale of terminated: and hence while these are distinguished in subject, namely to be passive potency with respect to accident, and to terminate its dependence; hence the divine person can perform this last office, although He cannot effect the first.

You will say 2: Nothing is capable of being terminated in a mode opposite to its entity, since what terminates an alien entity performs the offices of its proper term: but subsistent being, and terminated through divine subsistence, is a mode opposite to the connatural mode of accident, which is inherence, for accident is not terminated except through subject in which it inheres: therefore it cannot thus be assumed nor terminated. — I distinguish the minor: mode of subsisting per se, by that rationale whereby subsistence subsists per se, is opposite to the mode of existing of accident — I concede: mode of subsisting not per se, but by reason of sustainer and terminator, is opposite to the existence of accident — I deny. But the divine person would not confer upon accident the mode of existing per se, just as she herself subsists per se, but only the mode of sustained, and terminated; so that accident thus assumed could be conserved without any subject, nor would it demand another subject whereby it be terminated.

You will say 3: If a divine person assumed accident immediately, for instance whiteness, it would follow that accident in the abstract, or in the concrete, could be predicated of the divine person, just as human nature in the concrete is enunciated of the Word, when it is said, God is man: but it is absurd that a divine person could be called whiteness or white: therefore equally it is absurd that accident could be assumed by her. — I deny the sequel of the major: for accident could not be enunciated of the divine person in the abstract because accident ought not otherwise be enunciated of the assuming person than it is enunciated of the subject in which it inheres: but no accident is enunciated of subject in the abstract; for it is not said the wall is whiteness. It could not similarly be enunciated in the concrete: because no accident is enunciated in the concrete, except of the subject in which it inheres by the mode of inhering and informing: but in such hypothesis, whiteness would not inhere in the divine person by the mode of inhering and informing, but only by the mode of informed and terminated: therefore it could not be said, the divine person is white, namely predication of the concrete accidental of subject (although perhaps, as Marsilius says), thus she deserves to be called by reason of union, and could be said, the divine person is white, that is, having whiteness, not by the mode of informed, but by the mode of terminating and sustaining.

But it must be observed that the Conclusion is to be understood only concerning those accidents which are separable from their subjects, and terms: since indeed relations, e.g., cannot exist at all independently of their foundations and terms, so neither can they be sustained by the divine person; similarly since figure cannot exist, and be separated from its subject, since it is essentially term of quantity diversely disposed, I judge even it unassumable.