Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

That a nature may be capable of assumption can be denominated in two ways: first, indeed, by an extrinsic denomination to be sought from the omnipotence of God, to which on the part of creatures there corresponds only obediential power, or non-repugnance. In the second way a nature can be called assumable by an extrinsic denomination founded in a certain congruence arising from the property of the nature itself, whereby of itself, and according to its natural faculties and operations, it is more capable of fulfilling the offices that serve toward the end of the Incarnation; by which reason human nature seems most especially assumable, not indeed according to natural capacity (for in this way no nature is held to be assumable), but according to congruence for union, which arises from a twofold head: namely, from the dignity of intellectual, or rational, nature, by which it is capable of God himself, and by its operation attains him; then from the necessity and need of redemption; which two concur in human nature alone in such wise as to make it maximally assumable. Of this latter mode of assumption we shall not here speak so much as of the former.

Note 2. That all Theologians agree that human nature has the better right to be assumable by the divine Word, and ought to have been assumed, than angelic nature, on account of the outstanding reasons which we have drawn from the holy Fathers and expounded in Article 1 of the present Disputation. Whether, however, angelic nature can absolutely be assumed by a divine person unto hypostatic union, all do not so agree. For Albertus Magnus, in dist. 3, q. 2 of Book III of his Sentences commentary, seems to deny it, from the fact that in Angels being nature and being person ceases to be the same thing: and consequently that nature cannot be assumed together with the person; therefore he judges angelic nature not to be assumable. Yet the other Theologians rightly defend the contrary.

Note 3. That among substantial parts some are integral, others essential: and that these are either metaphysical or physical. Of the essential and metaphysical parts there is no question here, because since they have no distinct entity in reality, neither among themselves nor from the whole, they can be assumed in no other way than in the whole nature. But the physical parts, such as body and soul in living things, can be regarded either as conjoined in the whole, or as really separate. Moreover, integral parts are some heterogeneous, others homogeneous, that is, either diverse or of the same account. Likewise they can be regarded insofar as they exist in the whole, or as they are actually separated and divided from it. Concerning those parts regarded in both ways we ask whether they are assumable.

First Conclusion. — ANGELIC NATURE CAN BE ASSUMED HYPOSTATICALLY BY A DIVINE PERSON. So nearly all Theologians.

And it is proved first from the words of Paul to the Hebrews 2: For he taketh not hold of angels, but of the seed of Abraham: for since the intent of the Apostle is to commend the charity of God toward men, in that he assumed human nature and not angelic, he must necessarily suppose that the assumption of angelic nature was possible; otherwise his argument would have no force at all, seeing that it could easily be answered that it is no wonder that God, leaving behind the angelic nature, assumed the human one, since angelic nature itself was not assumable.

It is proved secondly: That angelic nature be assumed involves no repugnance either on the part of God or on the part of the Angel: therefore it is simply assumable. The antecedent is evident: first indeed on the part of God, because since the divine supposit is absolutely and per se independent, it can terminate the dependence of whatever nature, and supply the place of any supposit whatsoever. Nor does it conflict on the part of the Angel: since the account is the same for angelic nature as for human; for human nature is capable of assumption for no other reason than that it is really distinguished from its personality, and consequently can be terminated — that personality either destroyed or non-existent — through the subsistence of the Word, in which its own personality is contained eminently: but the same must be said of angelic nature, which is really distinguished from its personality: therefore by the same reason that human nature is assumable, angelic also can be assumed.

Albertus objects: In Angels personality is not really distinguished from nature: but that real distinction removed, nature is not assumable: therefore angelic nature cannot be assumed hypostatically by God. He proves the major from Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 6: In things that are per se, what-it-is and that-of-which-it-is are the same; that is, as he explains, in separate substances nature and person are the same. — I deny the major, and in favor of that opinion I say that Aristotle wishes only that definition and defined be the same in substances, but not in accidents: for in the definition of accidents, since it is made by reference to something extrinsic, namely the subject, what-it-is and that-of-which-it-is are not the same, given that subject and accident are not identical. Therefore if his words be applied to nature and supposit, I say they signify that nature and supposit are of the same predicament; in contrast to accidents taken in the concrete, that is, with their sustaining subject, because they look to diverse predicaments; whereas the subject looks to the predicament of substance, while the accident, by reason of its diversity, institutes a different predicament.

You will object 2. An Angel is incorruptible: but if the Word should assume an angelic nature, it would not be incorruptible, for its personality would perish and be corrupted: therefore it cannot be assumed. — I answer first, that if the Angel were assumed in the first instant of its production, in which its own personality ought to result, that personality would not be corrupted, but would never sprout forth. Secondly I say, that an Angel is indeed incorruptible by reference to a created agent, but not by reference to God: whence God, preserving the angelic nature, could with ease extinguish its personality and supply it with his own, which assuredly would not offend against the dignity and nature of the Angel, but rather would infinitely perfect and complete it.

Second Conclusion. — ANY IRRATIONAL NATURE WHATSOEVER, WHETHER ANIMATE OR INANIMATE, CAN BE ASSUMED BY GOD UNTO HYPOSTATIC UNION.

It is proved 1. from Tertullian, book On the Flesh of Christ, ch. 4, where, disputing against Marcion, who denied that Christ had true flesh because it was unworthy to be born of a woman, he says:

if of a she-wolf or a sow, or a lioness, and, clothed with the body of one of these, he had wished to preach the king of beasts; then, I think, censure would prescribe to him that it was unworthy for the Son of God: and it would also prove it foolish: let it be indeed foolish, if we judge God by our sense: yet it is written that the foolish things of this world hath God chosen, that he may confound the wise.

The same is taught by St. Gregory of Nyssa in his Catechetical Oration, ch. 27, where, blunting those who think it base and unseemly that God assumed flesh and an earthly body, he says:

No baseness in taking upon himself the figure of a heavenly body would have been more tolerable than of an earthly one, since every creature stands equally far from him who is the Most High, and is subjected to him equally: by the earth it is more remote from his supreme dignity: nor is it nearer through heaven: nor does God properly look upward or downward, but all things are subjected before him who presides over all: wherefore if earthly natures are judged unworthy to be joined to God, let none ever be held worthy of it: but if absolutely all are unworthy, while it becomes God to do good to the unworthy, we believe nothing therein unworthy, so long as they confess that where death had lain, there he showed forth his healing power.

Some add the opinion of St. Augustine, book Of True Religion, ch. 16, where he teaches that the divine Word could appear visibly to men in some ethereal body: but that doctrine is not our present concern: for he does not speak of an appearance that would come about through hypostatic union, but only of one possible in that mode whereby Angels appeared in the Old Testament.

It is proved secondly by reason: Every created substance complete has all that is required that it be assumable by God: therefore so it can come to pass. The antecedent is proved: for to be such it requires only that it be apt to exist in a supposit really distinct from itself, whose place another supposit supplies on its behalf: but such is every irrational nature, because it is no more determined to its own supposit than intellectual nature. For an irrational supposit does not sustain its nature more perfectly than does a rational supposit. Therefore in irrational nature no reason appears which introduces repugnance or contradiction against being thus assumed.

I answer, that the repugnance of such an assumption is sought from its unseemliness; for it seems unseemly and indecorous toward God that an irrational nature be predicated of him in the concrete, and that he be denominated a beast, a horse, a sow, or an ox. — But I answer, that if any unseemliness there be, it will be only negative and comparative, that is, less fitting than that he assume a rational nature; not however positive and absolute, such as ought to render anything whatsoever so unseemly that it could not divinely be done. Add that if we follow only the lead of natural reason, it appears no less unseemly to the divine majesty that the Son of God assume our flesh and in it be born, labor, suffer crucifixion, and die, than if he should assume any other bodily nature whatever. Whence one must say with Tertullian in the cited book On the Flesh of Christ, ch. 5.

Whatever is unworthy of God, it profits me; I am saved, if I am not ashamed of my Lord: Who, he says, shall be ashamed of me, I also will be ashamed of him. I find no other matter of shame which, through contempt of disgrace, proves me well shameless and felicitously foolish: the Son of God was born; I am not ashamed because it is shameful: and the Son of God died; it is wholly credible because it is absurd, etc.

Therefore by parity, although by human judgment it be deemed unseemly that God assume a bestial nature, still it would not be so absolutely, since God would not lack most weighty reasons why he should be united to such a nature. — All this is confirmed from the fact, that the divine Word in the three days of death was united to the body of Christ: but such a body after death was an irrational and insensible nature: therefore an irrational and insensible nature is capable of hypostatic union.

It is perhaps answered, that there is a disparity, because the body of Christ in the three days of death was in some way rational, namely by participation, because it had an order toward the rational soul, to which it could again be united: and thus it was in potency a part of rational nature, and from this it was capable of hypostatic union: but otherwise with irrational nature, because since it is neither actually nor in potency a part of rational nature, therefore it is incapable of assumption. — Against this, the order of the body toward the rational soul does not constitute it in rational being, but leaves it in irrational being: therefore, since by that order the body is called rational merely extrinsically, it is no more formally and actually constituted rational than a stone or a brute. Then it is false that the dead body of Christ must have order toward the rational soul; for since the reunion of soul with body is supernatural, it cannot be exacted of a body separated from the soul.

You will object 3. It implies a contradiction to be at once person and not person: but if an irrational nature were assumed, it would at once be person and not be person. It would be, because it would have the personality of the Word; but it would not be, because person is the individual substance of rational nature: therefore since this nature is irrational, it cannot be, nor be called, person. — I deny the minor: for that nature would not be reckoned a person: for, as the Doctor teaches, hypostatic union is not apt to be a personating unless what is assumed be capable of being personated: but irrational nature is not capable of the account of person, or at least only of the account of supposit: therefore the divine Word, having assumed that irrational nature, would not constitute it a person, but only a supposit.

You will object 2. A nature which cannot be elevated to seeing God and loving him is not capable of hypostatic union, because operation follows being, and being itself is for the sake of operation: but no irrational nature can be elevated to seeing and loving God, as is evident: therefore neither unto hypostatic union. — I deny the major: whose contrary appears in the body of Christ, which was united to the Godhead in the three days of death, although both per se, and through the soul separated from it at that time, it was incapable of the love and knowledge of God. In proof I say that that axiom, operation follows being, is true indeed of the being of essence or of potency, because such as is the formal or radical principle of an action, such is the action: but essence is the radical principle, and potency the formal principle, of action: yet it is not true of the being of the last terminus of a substance, such as supposit: otherwise all the operations of Christ would have been supernatural and divine, like his supposit; which no one has said.

You will urge: To whom the less cannot be communicated, to him the greater cannot be communicated: but the beatific vision is something less than hypostatic union: therefore since this cannot be communicated to irrational nature, neither can hypostatic union be communicated. — I answer, that the major is true when the greater and lesser are of the same order, but not when they are of diverse orders; thus knowledge can be communicated to man, but not pleasure; and reason can be communicated to the soul, not whiteness: and man can produce man, but not a wolf.

You will object 3. Only that creature can be assumed hypostatically which is capable of sanctity, because hypostatic union is sanctifying: but irrational nature is incapable of all sanctity: therefore also incapable of assumption. — I answer, that the major is true generally of personal sanctity, which consists in an intimate and singularly unique union, presence, or relation to some divine person; but not of accidental sanctity, which comes about through habitual grace; which sort of sanctity is communicated only to rational nature insofar as it is rational; thus the body of Christ in the three days of death had personal sanctity, but not accidental, because the soul, in which habitual and accidental sanctity resided, was separated from it. In form I distinguish the major: that which is capable of sanctity either personal, or accidental, or both, I concede: that which is only capable of habitual and accidental sanctity, I deny.

Third Conclusion. — REAL PARTS, BOTH PHYSICAL ESSENTIAL PARTS AND INTEGRANT PARTS, COULD BE ASSUMED SEPARATELY, WHETHER THEY EXIST IN THE WHOLE OR OUTSIDE THE WHOLE, AND SUBSIST THROUGH DIVINE SUBSISTENCE.

It is proved: What has proper subsistence can be terminated by divine subsistence and subsist: but those parts have proper subsistence, at least partial, as was proved in the Metaphysics: therefore whether those parts exist in the whole or outside the whole, they can separately be terminated by divine subsistence and subsist.

It is confirmed: In the three days of death body and soul of Christ subsisted separately through the subsistence of the Word: therefore by parity other parts could also be assumed separately: for no greater difficulty appears for the divine Word to assume one part without the other being assumed than to terminate both even while they are separated from each other.

You will say: That although it may appear true that severed parts can be terminated and subsist through divine subsistence, still this seems false of conjoined parts, both because parts seem to pass over into the entity of the whole, and consequently their partial subsistences likewise pass into the subsistence of the whole, and because form, at least that which is educed from the potency of matter, does not seem to have proper subsistence, but only to subsist through the subsistence of matter, and therefore cannot subsist through divine subsistence; for indeed what is not capable of subsisting per se, or of its own subsistence, is not capable of another's subsistence either: therefore the Conclusion is not absolutely true of all physical parts. — I deny the consequence, and to the antecedent I say that parts actually remain parts in the whole, although they are actually constituting the whole. I say further that they have their own proper partial subsistences, as is most evident of matter, which since it is the subject of transformation and eduction of forms requires this mode of existing per se: nor can this be denied of a form not educible from the bosom of matter, such as the rational soul; for just as it can exist outside the body, so also can it subsist independently of it and be terminated. The same finally holds of educible forms: since they subsist at least through the subsistence of matter: but God can supply that mode of subsisting by preserving those forms independently of matter, especially since they have distinct existence, as we proved in the Physics: therefore, etc.

You will say 2: That which cannot be person or supposit cannot be assumed hypostatically: but parts can be neither: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: nothing can be assumed hypostatically which cannot be person or supposit, by an assumption made through the account of personating and suppositing, I concede: by one made through the account of terminating and sustaining, I deny: those parts indeed would be neither persons nor suppositated, but merely terminated and sustained.

You will say 3: Divine personality cannot supply the place of partial subsistence: therefore those parts are not assumable. The antecedent is evident; for God cannot supply the place of a part, since it belongs to the account of a part to be something incomplete and imperfect; but God cannot be reckoned an incomplete, imperfect being. — I deny the antecedent, and its proof I distinguish: divine personality cannot discharge the office of partial subsistence with respect to the account of part, I concede: with respect to the account of subsistence, all imperfection and account of part removed, I deny: for as God could be united to the rational soul separated from the body, as in fact the divine Word was united in the three days of death, so also he can terminate any part whatsoever.