Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Note 1. From the Doctor in 3. distinct. 1. qu. 4. num. 2., nature can be conceived to be assumed by a created person in two ways: namely either effectively, or terminatively, or formally. Effectively indeed, namely by uniting that nature itself with a created nature, as the whole Trinity united human nature with the Word, and conserves that union; terminatively however, namely by terminating that union and communication of nature, just as the Divine Word terminates and sustains the human nature united to Himself. But it is certain that no created nature can perform either of these by its own power; both because christinity, or created personality, is limited and determined by its proper nature; and because hypostatic union of one nature with another is a miraculous work; but no creature by its own power can accomplish miracles. Therefore neither assume and terminate an alien nature. Whether however either, or both could be done by divine and extraordinary power of God, the Authors do not agree. For Ockham in 3. dist. 1. qu. 1. ad 13. and 11. teaches that a created person can by divine power assume an alien nature, not indeed effectively, but terminatively: to whom very many of ours subscribe: those chiefly who teach that created personality is formally something positive. But the Thomists embrace for the most part the negative part. The Subtle Doctor judges both opinions probable, wherefore he solves the foundations of each. What we should judge truer, that it may become known more openly,

Note 2. Or to be recalled from those things which we taught in Metaphysics: that a created person is the incommunicable existence of rational nature by which and in what manner. That definition, that it may appear more evidently, it must be known that there is a twofold communicability, insofar as at present concerns: the first is whereby something is communicated to another, as form, or as part: in which manner soul is communicated to body, humanity to Peter, and the arm to the integral whole: and this is called communicability as quo, because what is thus communicated is that whereby something is such, e.g. an animate body, Peter a man. The second is whereby something is communicated to another through identity, for instance common nature toward its inferiors: and this is called communicability as quod, because what is thus communicated is really identical with the other to which it is communicated: thus man is communicated to Peter and Paul, and the divine essence to the three persons. Negation of the first communicability, both actual and aptitudinal, is that whereby person is constituted in the rationale of person: hence a separated soul is not a person, because although it is not actually communicated, it nevertheless has aptitude to be again united and communicated to its body: similarly the humanity of Christ cannot be called a person, although it be actually and aptitudinally incommunicable and uncommunicated as quod, since indeed it cannot be predicated of many: nevertheless it is communicable and communicated as quo, as total form of the supposite and person of the Word.

Note 3. That from those two negations the posterior arises from individuation of the specific nature, because therefore a person is not communicable as quod to several individuals actually and aptitudinally, since it has been determined and contracted by haecceity and individual difference to the being of an individual: whence even if this be personalized by an alien personality, as happens in the humanity of Christ, nevertheless it carries with it this negation. But the other negation of communicability, namely as quo, arises not from any positive entity of the individual, or person, but from the defect of the action of an extrinsic agent not uniting that nature itself with an alien person: for from the fact that some extrinsic agent has not caused a union between the individual nature and some alien personality, the individual nature remains without union with alien personality, whence it remains in itself personalized by its own personality.

These things premised, two things are now to be determined: First indeed, whether by divine power a created person can effectively assume and sustain an alien nature: secondly truly, whether it can at least perform this terminatively.

First Conclusion. — A CREATED PERSON CANNOT OF ITSELF EFFECTIVELY ASSUME AN ALIEN NATURE, NOR UNITE IT TO ITSELF HYPOSTATICALLY. So the Doctor in the praised place, and he proves it thus: Created nature can absolutely be assumed effectively unto hypostatic union, with respect to which it has obediential power: but no nature has obediential power toward any creature: otherwise that power would not be called obediential, but natural, inasmuch as natural power is opposed to obediential: therefore no created person can effectively assume an alien nature. The major is evident: since indeed that assumption of nature far exceeds, as was said in the first Notable, and on that account the mystery of the Incarnation is called the greatest of all miracles, and the work of the right hand of the Most High, it is evident that it cannot come about connaturally, but requires for it a virtue exceeding every effort of nature. The minor also stands, since obediential power in a creature respects taking all its efficiency from the first cause, to which as principle of all efficiency it is subordinated and subjected. — Then, no particular creature can overturn, destroy, or impede that which of itself belongs to the universal order of the term immediately subject to the first cause: but the proper subsistence of some nature, and its flux, or emanation, pertains to said order: therefore no creature can invert it, consequently impede that subsistence from flowing from that individual nature, and presently it will not be able to take it effectively to itself. Finally, a created supposite, according to the more probable opinion, says formal negation: but negation cannot have effective virtue, partial or total, with respect to that positive thing: therefore, etc.

You will say 1: As a created person can unite some nature to an alien supposite, so can it unite the same with the proper supposite of that nature: now the latter not only can be done, but is done daily. For while a father produces a son, as he seems to attain union of body with soul, so also he seems to unite the nature of his son with its own supposite, because he produces that nature subsistent and supposited: therefore either he himself, or at least an Angel, could also unite that nature effectively with an alien supposite. — I answer first, denying the minor: for properly speaking it is false that he who produces a singular nature unites it with its proper supposite: just as neither does he properly unite it with its properties, which rather are said to have been produced out of the nature than to be united to it. I answer secondly, denying the major: both because given that the producer of nature unites it with its own supposite, then he would not invert, indeed he follows the universal order of things; but for him to unite it with an alien supposite, the prescribed order of things would have to be inverted, which certainly a second cause cannot accomplish: and because just as a father cannot unite the body of his son with a soul other than that which is proper to the son, so must it be said of nature with respect to its proper supposite.

You will say 2: An agent of superior order which contains the perfection of the inferior can supply its power, and effect: but an angelic person, e.g., is of superior order respectively toward human, and virtually contains every perfection of men: therefore it can supply the human person, and perform its offices, and consequently can unite human nature to itself hypostatically. — The Doctor denies the minor num. 1: for just as an Angel does not contain visual power, so as to be able to supply its defect, although he has powers far superior to the faculty of vision, so although in the rationale of person he be formally more excellent than a human person, it does not necessarily follow that he can supply the defect, and perform the offices, of a human person. Add that it can be denied that the Angelic person in the rationale of person is more excellent than human personality.

Second Conclusion. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT BY THE EXTRAORDINARY POWER OF GOD CREATED PERSONALITY CAN TERMINATE AN ALIEN NATURE, AND BE UNITED TO IT HYPOSTATICALLY.

It is proved first from St. Jerome on chapter 1 of Aggeus: where after he pursues the opinion of certain ones saying Malachy, Aggaeus, and St. John Baptist were Angels in assumed bodies, he adds himself:

It is no wonder if this be believed of Angels: since on account of sins the Son of God Himself took flesh. The same Tertullian had taught before lib. 3. Contra Marcionem cap. 7. Hence it is evidently gathered that the assertion in the Conclusion is at least possible, although perhaps in truth this may never have happened.

It is proved secondly: All that which does not import manifest contradiction, or repugnance, ought to be attributed to extraordinary divine power: but no repugnance appears that created personality terminate beyond its proper nature also an alien nature: therefore, etc. The major stands; the truth of the matter will appear at last from the solution of all the rationales which the Adversaries bring forward for the negative opinion.

You will object first: A supposite terminating an alien nature must be altogether independent: but any created supposite whatever is not independent: therefore it cannot terminate an alien nature. The minor is evident: for whatsoever is a creature, by that very fact is dependent. But the major is proved: both because by this very rationale we proved the divine Word terminates human nature because He be independent in the rationale of person: and because since nature is sustained through supposite, and that only through soul, otherwise per se, so that already the supposite be altogether first, and independent. — The Doctor answers, that it is not so true that a supposite must be altogether independent in order to terminate: for although that be the reason why the Word terminates human nature, nevertheless it could come about that for another reason a created supposite would terminate the dependence of another nature, if it were assumed by God to perform this, just as created substance adequately terminates the dependence of an accident in the rationale of subject, and yet is not simply independent: indeed proper personality itself terminates the dependence of its own nature: although that not be simply independent.

They object 2: Two created natures are not unifiable in the same supposite unless one has the mode of act, the other truly the mode of potency: but in hypostatic union, whereof we now speak, such union of natures would not be given, since the natures must remain unmixed: but natures which are united as act and potency do not remain unmixed, but from them a third entity and composite is made: therefore they cannot mutually convene in one unique created supposite. — The Doctor answers, denying the major: for if on account of the assigned rationale two natures had incompossibility in a created supposite, they would have the same in an uncreated supposite: and consequently they would be incompossible, because those natures subsisting through an uncreated supposite, as is truly so in the Incarnation, do not have the rationale of act and potency: therefore if notwithstanding this a created nature can be terminated through the personality of the Word, also it can be terminated through created personalities: for if two natures, for instance divine and human, can subsist through the supposite of the Word, without one being act, the other truly potency, why would not the very same happen, if two created natures subsisted in the same created personality?

It is objected 3: If two natures could be terminated through a supposite, or created personality, the Incarnation of the Word would be a singular mystery, and without example, nor consequently wonderful: but the consequent is absurd: therefore, etc. — I deny the major: for although perhaps it would not be equally wonderful as now it is, nevertheless no less would it be worthy of all admiration: for what more wonderful can be feigned than that, as the Apostle says, He who is the splendor of glory and the figure of the substance of the eternal Father, coequal to Him in all things, emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men?

You will object 4. If created subsistence could terminate the dependence of human nature, and render it formally subsistent, it would have from its nature the power to do this: but this is false: because thence it would follow that it could naturally perform so great an effect; for what it can intrinsically perform from its nature, that it performs naturally: it would follow also that connaturally it would require to perform this, and would have all concourse required for doing it. — I deny the major: for if it were true, it would likewise follow that the divine Word would require connaturally to terminate the dependence and hypostatic union of human nature, which is absurd. It would follow also that the soul would naturally demand to receive supernatural habits, and to terminate their inherence, because from its intrinsic nature without anything superadded it can receive those habits. Therefore although every natural power can be reduced to act naturally, nevertheless that is not true of obediential power, such as that would be which a created supposite would have toward terminating the union of another nature.

You will object 5. Subsistence terminating several natures must be infinite: but no created subsistence and personality is infinite: therefore it cannot terminate several natures. The minor is evident: both because everything created is finite: and also because created subsistence is limited by that nature whose complement and term it is. But the major is proved: subsistence terminating several natures performs the offices of subsistences which are proper to those natures: but it cannot perform their offices unless it contain them eminently, and consequently unless it be infinite. Therefore, whereby it could terminate one nature, it could also terminate infinites, if they were given: therefore, etc. — The reader denies the major, since indeed the personality of the Word formally speaking is not infinite, but only really, and yet sustains and terminates an alien nature. And to the proof I answer, that it is manifest petitio principii, while it is said that one created subsistence does not virtually contain the perfection of another, so much as required for completing the nature, and rendering itself apt, that it exercise its operations as easily as if it were affected with proper subsistence. In confirmation I say, truly indeed created subsistence could terminate infinite natures, if they were given, yet it would not on that account be judged infinite, because extrinsic and syncategorematic illimitation, such as that would be which would be sought from termination of natures, does not import infinity, but only intrinsic and categorematic illimitation: hence whiteness, which could terminate infinite similitudes, if they were given, would not on that account be judged intrinsically infinite.

You will object 6. One created nature cannot at once be terminated by several persons: therefore neither can one created person at once assume several natures. — I deny the parity, and the rationale of disparity is open: for on this account one created nature cannot at once be terminated by several persons, because, as we said, each of them is final cause of personating, or terminating, nature: but truly one created person with respect to diverse natures causes not the same termination but diverse, since certainly it does not conflict: just as it does not conflict that one efficient cause produce diverse effects, or that one point, which from its own nature is ordered toward terminating a unique line, could terminate, and in fact terminates all those which are drawn from the circumference toward itself.

You will object 7. Subsistence is a mode of nature: but it implies the mode of one thing modifying another: for it implies that I sit through the sitting of another, and that one accident inhere through the inherence of another accident: therefore it implies created nature to be terminated by the subsistence of another. — I answer first, denying the minor: for divine subsistence, regarded formally, is a mode of the Divine Essence, just as, according to some, created subsistence is a mode of singular created nature; and yet it can terminate the subsistence of created nature, and effect it subsistent: therefore some mode can confer its formal effect upon another thing than that of which it is the mode. I answer secondly, the major to be true of intrinsic modification, which is made through inherence; not truly of extrinsic, which is made through termination, such is modification made through subsistence. Add that the major is perhaps true of positive modes, not truly of negative ones, such is the formal rationale of subsistence.

You will object 8. The formal rationale of terminating the dependence and communication of nature ought to be something real and positive: now according to our opinion, a created person is not constituted through something real and positive, but only through a twofold negation of communication, and communicability: therefore it cannot terminate an alien nature. The major stands: both because the relation of humanity assumed by the Word is terminated toward something real and positive, namely toward His subsistence: and because the term of real and positive relation must be something real and positive. — I answer, that in that case, the relation of the assumed nature would be terminated toward something positive, namely toward the singular nature of that created person, not indeed taken naked, but with the adjunct to it of the twofold negation of communicability, whereby it seems sufficient for sustaining an alien nature, and rendering it incommunicable in the composite sense: and thus that relation of real union would not be terminated toward negation, which is personality, as toward a terminus qui, but as toward a terminus quo. But it is not inconvenient that a real relation should have for formal term quo some negation: because relation only requires positive extremes: it does not require that the formal rationales of the extremes be positive; relations of diversity, which pertain to the first genus of relatives, are founded in lack of identity, which lack and negation is the formal rationale whereby those relations are terminated.