Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Note 1. Theologians agree that the three divine persons can together assume and terminate the same humanity with a mediated termination: namely if absolute and common subsistence should assume and terminate that nature immediately: because, as was said in the preceding Question, by the very fact that such common subsistence would terminate that nature and unite it to itself, it would also be terminated by the relative subsistences of the persons, to whom that absolute subsistence would be communicated. They agree moreover that each of the divine persons can assume human nature and unite it hypostatically to itself; since the assumption of nature belongs to person either actively by reason of omnipotence, which is the effective principle of that assumption; or passively by reason of personality, which is the term of that assumption: but each of the divine persons has through omnipotence, and altogether independent personality, infinite power in terminating: therefore each can assume human nature, and become incarnate. Nor would any confusion of persons follow thence, although the Father, were He to become incarnate, would be called Son; for the same person can be called Father and Son under different respects: that divine person would be called Father, inasmuch as He is the principle of the eternal generation of the Word: but He would be called Son, inasmuch as He would be the term of temporal generation from the Virgin: whence He would not be Son of God as the Word is, but only Son of the Virgin.

Note 2. It is certain that the three divine persons reside in the humanity of Christ in a peculiar and nobler manner than in all creatures. Which truth St. Augustine elegantly teaches in Sermon 3. De Tempore, where he says: The Son took flesh, and did not forsake the Father, nor divided Himself from the Father. The Son, I say, took flesh in property: yet the Father and the Holy Spirit were not absent in majesty. In divinity equality, in flesh the property of the Son alone; yet never at any time did divinity depart from the Father or the Holy Spirit. Since therefore there is one Godhead, one divinity, both the Father and the Holy Spirit indeed filled the flesh of Christ: but in majesty, not in assumption, etc. Now this nobler and peculiar residence is gathered from the connection, or rather essential identity, which exists among the divine persons; so that, if per impossibile the three adorable persons did not exist in all creatures, nevertheless on account of the union of one person with humanity, the two others would also reside therein: For just as (says Saint Basil, Epist. 48., in the catena) he who grasps the summit of one ring thereby at once draws along the other inserted into it: so here he who draws the Spirit draws through Him the Son, and with the Father together at once. And if anyone holds he has grasped the Son, he will have Him with both, hence His Father, thence the Holy Spirit compacted on every side. There is therefore no difficulty about the real and personal presence of the three divine persons in the same humanity: but only about their hypostatic union, whether namely all three together could be united hypostatically to the same individual nature.

Note 3. Concerning the present Question there are two principal opinions: The first indeed affirming that the three divine persons can together assume the same nature: which St. Thomas upholds, 3. p. q. 3. art. 6., whom his disciples follow, who to their side summon even from our ranks Alexander, q. 2. memb. 1., St. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 1. art. 1. q. 3., Ockham likewise in 3. dist. 1., and not a few others. But the second opinion the Subtle Doctor upholds in 3. dist. 1. quaest. 2. num. 5., with all his disciples, to whom that we may subscribe, let there be

First Conclusion. — SEVERAL DIVINE PERSONS CANNOT ASSUME THE SAME NATURE IN NUMBER AND TERMINATE IT IMMEDIATELY BY THEIR PROPER SUBSISTENCE.

It is proved first, by the authority of St. Anselm lib. 2. Cur Deus homo, cap. 9., where he says: Several persons cannot assume one and the same man in unity of person: wherefore this must be done in one person only. And in the book De Incarnatione Verbi, cap. 1.: With the Son incarnate, it is not necessary that the other persons also become incarnate, but impossible.

Nor does it avail to reply with St. Thomas, and his disciples, that St. Anselm there takes man for a singular nature personalized by its proper personality; but not for a nature not yet understood as affected by its own personality. — For this response is altogether alien from the mind of St. Anselm: indeed his intent was to investigate in which of the three divine persons the hypostatic union had been made; but he supposes it had not been accomplished in the three divine persons, indeed nor could it have been done, that thence he may gather it was made in one person only, namely the second: and truly indeed, for if by this particle, man, St. Anselm understood human nature affected by its own personality, he would conclude nothing at all; because a hypostasis is equally implied to be assumed by one person as by three. Add that a little later he asserts the Word assumed man, by which word he signifies that nothing else is denoted by the term man than human nature regarded in itself.

It is proved secondly: If the three divine persons could together assume the same nature in number, it would follow that that nature is infinite: but it conflicts that any created nature be infinite: therefore equally it conflicts that it be assumed by several persons. The minor stands. The major is proved: on this account divine nature is concluded infinite, because it itself, the same in number, can be undivided in the three divine supposites: therefore by equal reason, if human nature existed in three supposites, it would be judged infinite. The antecedent is evident, because by what rationale that nature can be in the three divine persons without any division of itself, by the same rationale it could be in infinites, and would have infinite power of existing; because it could exist in infinite persons. The consequence is also evident, because singular human nature, such as is assumed by the Divine Word, is not of itself limited rather to three supposites than to a hundred or a thousand, if there were so many in the divinity: therefore as much as pertains to itself, if it could be in three supposites, it could also be in infinites, if they were given.

The Thomists will reply, that sequel is false: for the same, they say, divine nature is judged infinite, not because it is communicated to three supposites, but chiefly because it is communicated to supposites really indistinct from itself, which it connaturally requires and identifies to itself: but it is otherwise with assumed human nature, which neither would be identified with those supposites, but would be adventitious to them: nor would it require them connaturally, but would be determined to them only by obediential power. — Against this, infinity and illimitation do not arise from that identity alone of one thing toward another, but from aptitude alone, whereby some thing can communicate itself infinitely: for if there were given some whiteness, e.g. which could of itself affect and whiten infinite walls, although it were really distinct from them, and merely adventitious, nevertheless it would no less be judged infinite, because it would contain the power and perfection of infinite whitenesses: therefore by equal reason, if human nature could be communicated to infinite supposites, although it would be adventitious to them, and really distinct from them, it would no less be judged infinite.

It is proved thirdly: Human nature affected with its own subsistence and personality cannot be assumed by the Divine Word: therefore where it is affected with the personality of the Word it can no longer be assumed by the Father, nor by the Holy Spirit. The consequence is evident from parity of rationale; for nature affected with its proper personality is no longer assumable hypostatically because it is completely perfect in every way and terminated substantially: but it is also such by the supposite of the Word: therefore, etc.

The Thomists deny the parity, and bring forward this rationale of disparity, that an open contradiction would follow if a subsistent nature terminated by its proper personality were again terminated by another; for it would be required that it subsist in itself and in another: and thus it would subsist in itself and not subsist; which is contradictory: but it is otherwise if it subsisted in three persons, because it would only subsist in another. — Against this, the contradiction that a nature subsists in itself and in another cannot arise from elsewhere than because, as it subsists in itself, it is totally and adequately terminated and substantially completed, whence it comes about that it can no longer be terminated and completed: now the same rationale of contradiction follows from the fact that nature is terminated by the personality of the Word, because the subsistence of the Word terminates and completes substantially that nature no less perfectly, indeed far more perfectly, than a proper supposite could terminate and complete it; therefore equal rationale on both sides. Add that they gratuitously suppose there is contradiction that a nature subsist in itself and that it subsist in another; for every contradiction must lie in one and the same thing with respect to one and the same: and in that case, human nature would not be in itself and in another with respect to one and the same, because it would be in itself with respect to and by reason of its own subsistence; but in another, by reason of alien subsistence: therefore not only is their reply null, but also less rightly spoken.

The Doctor proves thirdly: One and the same cannot depend adequately upon many: but if created nature were united to three divine persons, it would depend totally and adequately upon many: therefore it conflicts that one and the same nature be assumed by several divine persons. The major seems certain, and the Doctor gathers it by induction. First indeed from the example of total efficient cause: for otherwise it would follow that those causes are total and are not total. They are total, as supposed both by us and by adversaries: but they are not total, since among the intrinsic concepts of total cause is that it produce the whole effect and produce it totally, by the very fact that another cause produced it together with itself, it would follow that either it produced that effect partially with itself, and thus would not be its total cause; or produced it totally, and thus the other cause would influence nothing in the effect, since it would presuppose it produced by the prior total cause. He gathers also by induction in other genera of cause, chiefly indeed in accidents, which since they depend essentially upon subject, one and the same cannot depend upon two first subjects in its genus. But the minor is urged; for that depends totally and adequately upon another which exists with it posited, all other things whatsoever excluded: but created nature assumed by whichever of the three divine persons would truly subsist per se, and would be complete substantially, even if it were not assumed by the other persons, just as in fact it is assumed by the Word alone: therefore if it were assumed by the three, it would depend totally and adequately upon each of those persons. — It is confirmed: because two total efficient causes of the same order cannot produce the same effect in number; because, as was said just now, they would at once be total and not total; therefore by similarity, two extrinsic formal causes, such as the aforesaid persons would be with respect to the termination of that human nature, could not terminate it, because each of them would terminate totally and not totally.

To this rationale the Thomists reply in various ways; but their more common solution is that which Cajetan hands down, saying, that although one and the same effect cannot depend upon two by causal dependence, which is strict; nevertheless it can so depend by non-causal dependence, but terminative, which is non-strict dependence: for the distinction between the two dependences is that an effect produced by a total cause depends totally upon it insofar as it has being from one cause, nor is there left in it a capacity by which it be judged to depend on another, because it borrows no being from that, by reason of which it would be judged to depend upon it: but a nature terminated by alien subsistence does not receive its being from it, but only a certain mode of union, by which it is said to be sustained and terminated by it. Since therefore nature is capable of a triple and diverse mode of union, because it can be united to the three persons at least successively; while it has one mode, and by reason of that is united to one person, it does not remain exhausted according to the extension of its capacity, whereby it can be terminated by another: wherefore another person conferring another mode of union can accede: not indeed out of indigence, but out of capacity alone. Hence that nature would be terminated adequately by one subsistence, indeed by intensive, not however extensive adequation: as is evident in created things from the power of the same relation, whereby it is referred to one son, and by him terminated adequately intensively, while another son is generated, it is again terminated to him by extensive adequation. — Truly against this, first: just as an effect produced by a total efficient cause borrows its being from it totally, so some singular nature receives its total sustentation and termination from its total term: with this sole distinction, that the effect receive being simply from the cause: but nature have only modified being from subsistence: therefore just as the reception of total being from one total cause excludes any other whatsoever total cause of the same order, so the reception of modified being, namely of total sustentation, from one total subsistence ought to exclude any other total subsistence whatsoever. Moreover, nature would be adequately terminated and completed extensively by its proper subsistence: therefore also it is such by the subsistence of the Word, which has no lesser power of terminating nature and exhausting its capacity than proper subsistence. To the example about relation, I say it is false: for just as in each individual of a generated man there is a diverse individual difference determining the specific nature variously, so also there is the adequate rationale of terminating a diverse filiation relation: wherefore it is gratuitously asserted that, sons multiplied, relations are not multiplied: since there are diverse rationales of founding, and all conditions desired for multiplication of relations are found there.

You will object 1: In the mystery of the Incarnation the whole rationale of the fact is of the power making it, says St. Augustine, Epistle 3., which is to Volusianus: therefore in this mystery more is to be attended to the power of the assuming person than the condition of the assumed person: but to Divine Omnipotence it does not conflict that three persons assume one nature: therefore they can accomplish this. The major is evident. The minor is proved: divine persons can assume the same nature if they do not exclude themselves from fellowship of the same nature: but so it is; indeed they subsist in the same divine nature: therefore they also can subsist in the same human nature. — I distinguish the major: the power of the maker is rather to be attended to than the rationale of the fact in those things which do not imply contradiction — I concede: those which do — I deny. But, as we said, it implies that the same nature be terminated totally by several total and adequate terms. To the proof of the minor, I say the rationale is not equal concerning the subsistence of divine persons in divine nature and in human; both because divine nature is infinite, and thus it does not conflict for it to be in several; and because the divine personalities do not confer the rationale of subsisting upon the divine nature, because it subsists of itself through its absolute subsistence, but only upon persons, which are really distinct among themselves: but truly personality confers subsistence upon created nature, which cannot be conferred by several total and adequate subsistences.

You will object 2: Humanity in itself is assumable by any divine person whatever: therefore all together can assume it. The antecedent stands, because, as we said, each of the divine persons can assume human nature. The consequence is proved: in that instant wherein one of the divine persons assumes nature, the other two divine persons can act according to the utmost of their power, that they assume the same nature; in which case, either that nature will be assumed by the three, and thus the intent is had; or by none, which is absurd; since God acting according to every manner of His power cannot be frustrated of effect; or by one only, which cannot be said, since there is no weightier reason why it be assumed by one than by many, since the three divine persons are of equal power, and the assumable nature is in obediential power, to be assumed by any divine person whatever: therefore, etc. — The Doctor answers num. 1. by denying that the three divine persons can expend their power toward the simultaneous assumption of the same nature, on account of their incompossibility in terminating the same nature; for God does not exercise His power about impossibilities and those things which import contradiction, such is that simultaneous assumption. Indeed they can, says the Doctor, the three divine persons together act toward the assumption of that very nature by some person from among them, so that although three act, only one alone assumes and terminates the nature: And if you say, says the Doctor, how each person can at once act toward uniting that nature to itself, I deny: because it is impossible that it be at once united to many: because it is impossible totally to depend with dependence of the same rationale upon several persons, since it is one thing to be terminated toward one person, and persons cannot act at once toward incompossibles.

You will insist: That the three divine persons can accomplish which is in obediential power by order toward any one of them: but created nature is in obediential power, to be assumed by each of the divine persons: therefore the three together can assume it. The major stands. The minor is proved: before nature was assumed by the Son, it could be assumed by the Father: therefore even after it has been assumed by the Son. The consequence is proved: therefore it was assumable by the Father before it was assumed by the Son, because it had obediential power for that assumption: but it has that same power while it is assumed by the Son, for neither could it lose it, since it is really identified with it; therefore it conserves it. It is confirmed: because the obediential power which it had in order toward the Father did not have its act, nor was it fulfilled by its own assumption by the Son; indeed that obediential power was ordered to the union of nature with the Father: but union with the Father is of diverse rationale from union with the Son, as the personality of the Father is of diverse rationale, or at least distinct in number from the personality of the Son: therefore the union which would be made with the Father would be distinguished in number from the union whereby it would be made with the Son; and consequently the power of nature, inasmuch as it respects the personality of the Father, is either of diverse rationale or diverse in number from the power respecting union with the Son; and hence union with the Son does not reduce to act that obediential power of nature, inasmuch as it is ordered toward the Father; therefore notwithstanding the union of that nature with the Son, it still has obediential power, to be united with the Father, and consequently it can still be united. — I distinguish the major: that which is in obediential power, and has no repugnance whatsoever, to be reduced to act — I concede: when it has repugnance for that — I deny. To the minor I say: nature assumed by the Son still has obediential power toward the Father, to be united with Him, in the divided sense — I concede: in the composite sense — I deny: that is, regarded in itself it could indeed be united with the Father; but this it cannot inasmuch as it is assumed and terminated by the Son, because it is now completely perfect in every way substantially, and totally terminated. To the confirmation likewise I deny the final consequence: for although that obediential power did not have act inasmuch as it is ordered toward the Father, it does not follow that it could have it, when already terminated, and reduced to act by the personality of the Son, on account of the incompossibility of total termination, which would be made by the personalities of the Father and of the Son: which truth the Doctor clearly demonstrates answering the aforesaid argument from the example of the wall, which although it has power

You will press: Nature united to the Word has inclination toward proper personality: therefore also toward whatsoever can supply that personality: but the personality of the Father can supply it: therefore it has inclination toward the personality of the Father. — I distinguish the sequel of the major: it has inclination toward all that which can supply its proper personality, if elsewhere there be no impediment and repugnance — I concede: if there be — I deny. And likewise I distinguish the minor: the personality of the Father can supply it, in the divided sense, and on hypothesis that it were not elsewhere assumed — I concede: in the composite sense, where once it is assumed — I deny. Add that the argument can be retorted, because although the nature assumed by the Word conserves inclination toward its own supposite, as supposed, nevertheless it cannot at once with union to the Word have its own personality: therefore although as united to the Word it would have inclination toward the supposite of the Father, it does not follow that it can with union to the Son have union with the Father.

You will object 3: The same accident can be in two subjects: therefore the same nature in two supposites. The consequence is proved by parity of rationale. Also the antecedent stands, because there can be at once two bodies, one glorious, the other not glorious, in the same place, therefore they can have one ubi: but ubi is an accident of them: therefore one accident can be in diverse subjects. But that the same two bodies have the same ubi is evident, because the same place corresponds to them, and consequently the same active circumscription: therefore they also have the same passive circumscription: but passive circumscription is ubi: therefore those two bodies have the same ubi. — The Doctor answers by denying the antecedent, for whose proof he says those two bodies would not have the same ubi, but diverse. And to the proof he answers, that place, in which two bodies would be contained, has two active circumscriptions on the same surface, and consequently there will be two passive circumscriptions in those bodies, because the surrounding surface is a sufficient foundation for grounding several active circumscriptions in several circumscribed bodies, as one whiteness suffices for grounding several similitudes of white in several whites. Truly, since here the Doctor seems to suppose that one accident cannot be in several subjects, whose opposite we ourselves taught from him in Philosophy, therefore I answer by denying the consequence. And the rationale of disparity is, that no contradiction follows from the fact that one accident be posited in several subjects, because this designates only multiplication of presence, and information, which we taught does not conflict in Physics; but it conflicts that the same nature subsist by several subsistences. To the Doctor saying that she denied an accident can be present to several subjects in that mode in which in fact it is present to one unique subject: for in fact it is thus in one subject, that per se and adequately it depends upon it, in which certain mode it cannot exist in several subjects: but in those it can be, so that it depends only partially upon one: but similar things cannot be said of subsistences: because each subsistence confers the whole complete substantial being, and is its ultimate term.

Finally you will object: If simultaneous termination of the same nature to three divine persons conflicted, that repugnance would be sought either from the side of the terminable nature, or from the side of the terminating persons: but from neither head can this repugnance, or contradiction, be found. Not indeed from the side of the terminating persons, because those do not exclude themselves from convening in and terminating the same created nature. Nor yet from the side of nature, because it has obediential power toward all the divine persons: therefore that simultaneous termination by three divine persons does not conflict. — I deny the minor: for that repugnance is sought both from the side of the assuming persons, which since they are total terms with respect to the nature to be assumed, cannot exercise their power at once about the same nature: it conflicts also from the side of the nature, which since it is completely perfect in every way by one subsistence, has not whence it be completed by another. To the proof saying the rationale of divine termination is not the same as human; both because since divine nature is infinite, it can be in several supposites: and because that nature is not completed in its substantial being through relative subsistences, as human nature would be completed: for relative subsistences do not give substantial being to the divine nature, which is already supposed complete on every side through absolute subsistence, but only determine that divine nature toward constituting persons: whence there is no parity between the termination of either nature.

Second Conclusion. — ONE DIVINE PERSON CAN ASSUME SEVERAL CREATED NATURES. As the Doctor in 3. distinct. 1. qu. 5., where he proves the Conclusion thus. That several natures be assumed at once by the Word does not conflict, neither from the side of the Word, nor from the side of the natures: therefore He can assume them. The antecedent is proved first indeed from the side of the Word, because He has infinite power of terminating, thenceforth it cannot be exhausted by the termination of one nature. Add that by that termination only several relations of reason are posited in the Word itself, or the Word itself terminates by its subsistence several real relations of assumed natures. But whether it conflicts with the Word. Not the first, because multiplication of relations of reason argues no change or real dependence in the Word. Nor yet the second, because God, and the whole Trinity, terminate all relations of creatures: therefore the Word can terminate several of those relations. Nor yet does it conflict from the side of creatures, because all are in obediential power, and depend equally upon the divine assuming person: therefore by what rationale one can be assumed, also the other: for actual dependence of one nature does not conflict with the dependence of another nature, says the Doctor.

You will say 1: If the Word assumed several natures, either He would be one man, or several men: but neither can be said. Not the first, because He would have several humanities, and consequently would be multiple man. Nor yet the second because He would be a unique supposite; where there is a unique supposite, there is a unique man, although there be several forms, for he who has several knowledges on account of the unity of supposite is not said to be several knowing ones, but one knowing one. — Richard answers by denying the sequel, namely saying that in that case he would be neither one man, nor several. This response the Doctor attacks: first because one and many are immediate dividing opposites of being: therefore there is no being of which it cannot be said that it is one being, or many beings: therefore of that being which is man, it will be true to say that he is one man, or many men. Secondly, because of every being necessarily must be said that it is one, or not one: therefore since of every being called man it can be said that he is one man, or not one man: but if it be said that he is not one man, it must be said that he is several men, for where one is denied, many are affirmed: namely in affirmation which is made by position. — St. Thomas answers quaest. 3. art. 7. that He would be one man on account of unity of supposite, just as one knowing one is said, although he has several knowledges. Which response the Doctor attacks, because, he says, if the concrete of man ought not to be multiplied when the supposite remains one, it would follow that upon multiplication of the supposite, the concrete ought to be multiplied: but false consequent, because otherwise the three divine persons would have to be called three gods. — Whence the Doctor answers, plurality of concretes is not to be sought from plurality of supposites alone, as Saint Thomas holds, but also from plurality of forms: so that however many supposites may be plural, plurality of concretes should not follow, if the form is single. E.g. from plurality of divine supposites plurality of Gods does not follow, because in divinity there is only a single divinity. For man is said to be an adjectival term with respect to the divine person, as the Doctor teaches dist. 7. qu. 1., and it itself cannot be numbered unless the supposites are numbered. And if it be held that it is a substantive term, and said substantively of its own supposite, nevertheless it is said adjectivally of the supposite of the Word, at least as to mode of predicating: since however every adjective ultimately depends and is terminated toward a substantive, the adjective itself cannot be the ratio of terminating the signification of another adjective of itself. Wherefore since this word homo is adjectival, it cannot terminate the numeral term, two, of itself, because the adjective is reduced to its substantive, nor is it held to be multiplied unless the substantive itself be multiplied. I pass over a fuller discussion of this matter, more grammatical than theological; and I should rather judge that in this case the Word ought not to be called one man, nor several men, but only one supposite having several humanities.

You will say 2: If natures distinct in species were assumed at once by the Word, it would follow that not only two contraries but even two contradictories could be enunciated of the same: but false consequent: therefore, etc. The major is proved: for if the Word assumed fire and water at once, it would follow that heat and cold, which are contraries, exist at once: similarly if He assumed at once a man and a dove, it would follow that one and the same supposite be at once rational and irrational, which are contradictories. — I deny the major: for if the Word assumed water and fire, it would only follow that fire and water be at once simultaneously by simultaneity of supposite and terminator, but not by simultaneity of existence, and interpenetration of the assumed natures. Similarly, if He assumed the nature of man and of dove, no contradiction would follow, which passes only between negation and affirmation regarding one and the same: wherefore indeed it would follow that one and the same being be rational and irrational, not with respect to the same, but with respect to diverse things.