Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE SUBSISTENCE OF GOD, COMMON TO THE THREE PERSONS, CAN ASSUME HUMAN NATURE AND UNITE IT TO ITSELF IMMEDIATELY.

Note 1. It is certain that if God were not triune in Persons, but existed in one person only, as the Jews and other unbelievers who deny the mystery of the Trinity suppose, He could assume a nature not His own and unite it to Himself immediately; for in that hypothesis He would have omnipotence, and likewise absolute personality, whereby He would be constituted in the rationality of person: and since this would be infinite in subsisting and terminating, He would have the power of terminating and subsisting all that which is sustainable and terminable, because His power in terminating would not be lesser than it now is in the relative personality and subsistence of the Word, whose infinite terminative virtue proceeds from absolute subsistence as from its first root, which is imbibed into the relative subsistences constitutive of the divine persons. The sole difficulty and controversy, therefore, among Theologians concerns whether the absolute subsistence, by which the individual of the Deity, or this God in number, who subsists in three persons, inasmuch as He prescinds from the relative subsistences, could assume human nature and unite it to Himself immediately. That this may be resolved more evidently,

Note 2. A subsistence of two kinds is admitted in God: one indeed absolute and common; others truly relative and personal; such are the subsistences of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Of the latter subsistences there is no controversy among Theologians, for since it is of faith that the three divine persons are really distinct from one another, it follows that each of them has its own subsistence, by which they are constituted in their personal being and distinguished from another. But some Theologians deny that there is in God any absolute and common subsistence which belongs to the divine nature so as to make it truly subsistent per se, inasmuch as it prescinds from the divine persons. Now the nobler and more common opinion of Theologians is that such absolute subsistence must be admitted, as we proved in the tract. De Trinitate: since by absolute subsistence we understand nothing else than that mode of the divine essence by which, as it prescinds from the persons, it is a complete substance existing per se, that is independently of any subject by which it might be sustained, and of any part by which it might be completed, and likewise incommunicable to any extrinsic complement really distinct from itself: but no one can deny that the divine nature, as it prescinds from the persons, is a complete substance existing per se, and incommunicable to any extrinsic complement really distinct from itself: therefore there should be no doubt that there exists that which we understand by the name of absolute subsistence. Under this very name St. Augustine designates it, lib. 1. De Trinit. cap. 4., when he says that the Divine nature subsists toward itself (that is, subsists by absolute subsistence): For every substance grows toward itself; how much more God? Hence Pope Agatho, in the decretal Epistle which is cited in the 6th Synod, art. 1., says: We confess God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit, not three Gods, but one God: not the substance of three names subsisting, but one substance of three subsistences, — by which words he does not deny the relative and personal subsistence, about which chiefly at that time was the controversy.

Note 3. Two things can be considered and distinguished in created subsistence: one which completes the nature itself, which without personality would be incomplete and imperfect: another which renders it further incommunicable, so that it is the ultimate term of that nature: which two are so joined in created things that nothing created can cause the one without also effecting the other. But it is otherwise in things divine, for the divine essence, as prescinded from the divine persons, since it is infinite, is completely perfect in every way in the rationality of nature, yet it is not incommunicable: indeed it is communicated to the three adorable persons; whence absolute subsistence signifies the divine nature indeed complete and infinitely perfect; but it is rendered personally incommunicable through the relative and personal subsistences: whence the Doctor rightly says, in 3. dist. 5. q. 1. n. 2., that if it belong to the rationale of the assumer to render the nature incommunicable, God cannot, by His absolute subsistence, be the term of human nature, nor assume it immediately, since by that subsistence He cannot render it incommunicable. Therefore there remains only this difficulty to be solved, whether God can, by that absolute subsistence, so immediately assume human nature as to terminate its dependence with respect to sustentation, and make it perfectly complete.

Single Conclusion. — THE DIVINE NATURE, AS IT PRESCINDS FROM THE PERSONS AND SUBSISTS BY ABSOLUTE SUBSISTENCE, CAN TERMINATE THE DEPENDENCE OF A CREATED NATURE: AND RENDER IT SUBSISTENT. So the Doctor, in the place just praised, and dist. 1. q. 2. n. 6., where he says:

But that the essence itself existing per se could be the proximate term of that union seems so, because it has no being from a person, but is naturally prior to the person's existence and gives being to the person: for it is a nature of itself this, and subsistent per se: although not incommunicably. Moreover, it seems that incommunicability is not necessarily the proper rationale of terminating this dependence, but singular subsistence.

By which I prove the Conclusion thus: Proof: A being subsisting per se by absolute subsistence, and altogether independent of another so as to be completed, and consequently having unlimited and infinite power in the rationality of subsisting, has all that is required to assume and unite to itself an alien nature, and to render it subsistent: now the Divine Essence thus regarded is of this kind; for it is infinite in the rationality of existing and subsisting, and altogether independent of another, both that it exist in another as in a subject, and that it be completed by another as by a part; therefore it has infinite power, and altogether independent, to exist and subsist.

The minor is evident. The major also stands, for on no other account did we say the Divine Word can, by His relative subsistence, assume and unite to Himself human nature, than because He has infinite power and altogether independent in the rationality of subsisting, at least by identical infinity, inasmuch as namely His subsistence is imbued with and identified with the absolute subsistence, by which it is altogether infinite; therefore by equal reason this absolute subsistence will be able to terminate the dependence of human nature, and render it perfectly subsistent.

Proved secondly: If anything stood in the way why that absolute subsistence could not effect a nature absolutely subsistent, it would be chiefly because, since this absolute subsistence is communicable to the three persons, just as the essence is, it could not render the assumed nature incommunicable: but this reason does not obstruct. First, because created subsistence renders a nature incommunicable only with respect to supposites distinct from itself: but that absolute divine subsistence is incommunicable with respect to supposites really distinct from itself; indeed the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, to whom this nature together with absolute subsistence is communicated, are not really distinct from the divine essence and absolute subsistence, for they are one God: therefore that absolute subsistence can render a nature incommunicable to another supposite really distinct from itself; and consequently it will effect it incommunicable with that incommunicability by which it suffices for the rationale of subsistence and supposite. — Then, proper subsistence has this especially peculiar to it, that it renders a nature actually independent of some supposite immediately, and in this immediate independence consists chiefly the rationale of its incommunicability: but by the very fact that human nature would depend totally upon absolute subsistence, it could not depend further immediately upon the divine persons, but only mediately: therefore by this reason it would be no less rendered incommunicable by the absolute subsistence than by the proper one. Add to these, that it is not our opinion that absolute subsistence can of itself supply every effect which a supposite and personality perform; but only that it can perform the primary effect of that, which consists in the complement of the nature; so that the nature is rendered subsistent completely complete and perfect substantially, nor does it need further complement: but this complement the absolute subsistence itself can perform: therefore it can effect a certain nature subsistent; and presently it can assume it.

It is confirmed: For the complement which a singular human nature needs, and which it receives from its own or an alien personality, is a complement prerequisite to actions; whence that common saying: actions belong to supposites: but the divine nature, as it prescinds from personalities, has every complement prerequisite to actions, both ad intra and ad extra: therefore thus considered it can complete a created nature no less than a created personality can.

I prove the minor with respect to actions ad extra: it is certain, for, that God, as one without any multiplication of persons, and consequently without any relative personality of Paternity, Filiation, and active and passive Spiration, could operate by means of absolute subsistence, and produce whatever He produces ad extra: for God acts ad extra not as triune, but as one. The same minor is evident with respect to operations ad intra: for those do not necessarily presuppose personality; for the productive action of the Son, namely the active generation of the Father, and His Paternity, is the very personality of the Father, and presupposes nothing besides the singular Divine Essence as existing per se: therefore the singular Divine Essence has also every complement prerequisite to actions ad intra, nor is it completed through the divine personalities, as created nature is completed through created personality: which is indeed most true in the opinion of the Doctor, teaching that the divine personalities and relations do not import perfection formally; for what does not say formally perfection cannot formally complete, or perfect, the divine nature.

You will object 1. The divine essence, as it prescinds from relations, does not have absolute subsistence: therefore as thus considered it cannot terminate the union of human nature. The antecedent is proved: First, because the divine nature has from its existence all that which it could have from any absolute subsistence superadded to it: therefore that absolute subsistence is admitted in vain and without any foundation. Secondly, if the Divine Essence had absolute subsistence, it would follow that in God there would be given an absolute supposite, and an absolute person, and consequently then there would be four persons in God: which is heretical. Thirdly, subsistence is the ultimate term of the nature which it affects: but the Divine Essence, as prescinded into the personalities, has nothing which may be its ultimate term, otherwise it would be incommunicable to the three persons; therefore it does not have absolute subsistence; and consequently the principal argument of our assertion falls.

I deny the antecedent; and to its first proof I say, that if its antecedent were true, the absolute existence of the Divine Essence would be its very subsistence, which certainly in no way conflicts with us. But as to the truth of the matter, and conformably to the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor, I judge that the absolute subsistence of the Divine Essence is distinguished from its existence in no other way than by name alone, or by a distinction of reason ratiocinative only; for the Doctor, in the places praised above, asserts that the Divine Essence, as existing per se, can terminate the union of human nature; and consequently he uses subsistence for existence.

To the second proof, I deny the sequel of the major: for by supposite and person is commonly understood that which is altogether incommunicable; but since the nature assumed by that absolute subsistence would not be altogether incommunicable, but could further be communicated to the divine persons, and be terminated ultimately by them, therefore properly it could not be called person, but only a singular substance complete substantially.

To the third proof: I distinguish the major: it belongs to the rationale of subsistence to be the ultimate term, inasmuch as it is created subsistence or divine personal and relative subsistence — I concede: it belongs to the rationale of subsistence as such, or inasmuch as it is absolute divine subsistence — I deny. Therefore I deny that it belongs to the rationale of subsistence as such to be the formal complement of nature, because every subsistence would have to complete the nature substantially, and thus divine personal and relative subsistence would complete the divine nature, which is false, because of itself, and per se, it is completely perfect in every way in the rationality of nature. Nor does it belong to the rationale of that subsistence, as such, to be the ultimate term of the incommunicability of nature, because otherwise absolute subsistence would render a nature altogether incommunicable. Whence I do not judge that there can be given any one determinate concept of subsistence as such, which would belong univocally to every subsistence, both relative and absolute.

You will urge: Doctor Subtilis in 3. dist. 1|ordinatio:liber.3/distinctio.1. qu. 1. teaches that a person can assume because it is incommunicable: but the divine nature cannot, because it is communicable: therefore his opinion is that absolute subsistence cannot be the term of an assumed nature. Then, the same dist. 6. qu. 1. affirms that the assumed nature cannot exist by the existence of the Word: but, as we just said, absolute subsistence and existence are the same thing: therefore if that nature could not exist by absolute existence, neither will it be able to subsist by absolute subsistence. — I answer to the first, that this is not the mind of the Doctor, as Lorca feigns, who judges the Subtle Doctor to be adverse to our assertion: indeed in that place the Doctor contends only that it is not well proved by Varro and St. Thomas that a divine person can supply the defect of proper personality from this, that it contains in itself virtually the perfection of any created person whatsoever. For, says the Doctor, a divine person contains virtually any created person whatever no more than the divine nature contains virtually any created nature whatever: but from the fact that the divine nature contains virtually a created nature it does not follow that it can unite with it in unity of nature, nor effect that in place of human nature it make with human personality one per se: therefore neither from the virtual containment of the divine person does it follow that it can so supply the defect of human personality as to make one per se with human nature in its stead and place. To the second, I say nothing against our opinion is evinced, for from the fact that human nature is said to be assumed by absolute subsistence, it would not follow that it should exist by absolute existence, because previously to that assumption and union whereby it would be united to those absolute subsistences, it would necessarily have to prescind, existing by its own existence: and consequently, although subsistence and absolute existence are one and the same, it would not follow that that nature would exist by absolute existence; just as it would subsist by absolute subsistence.

You will object 2. with Vasquez disp. 27. c. 2., that this our assertion is adverse to the Holy Fathers and Councils: indeed to the Holy Fathers, because the Holy Fathers knew no other union of a created nature with God except either in nature, or in person, which alone they admit; but a union with the divine nature by reason of absolute subsistence is a union neither in nature nor in person: therefore our assertion is adverse to the Holy Fathers. The minor appears: for the union of human nature with divine is not made in unity of nature. Neither would that union be made in unity of person; since absolute subsistence has not the rationale of person. Vasquez proves the minor, First, because they made mention anywhere of no other union. Secondly, because the Eleventh Council of Toledo openly says: Yet the Son alone took the form of a servant in the singularity of person, not in the unity of the divine nature; into that which is proper to the Son, not what is common to the Trinity. Thirdly, St. Anselm, cited by us in the preceding question, teaches expressly that he who rightly receives the Incarnation believes the Word did not assume man into unity of nature, but into unity of person. By which words St. Anselm argues against the heretic, who said that since the divine person was incarnate, it was necessary that three persons together become incarnate: which error, that Anselm may refute it, he infers that the heretic held the union to have been made not in person, but in nature: but if besides union in nature or in person there were possible a union of God with man, as common to the three persons by reason of absolute subsistence, the inference of St. Anselm would not hold: indeed from the union of human nature with absolute and common subsistence, it would be true that if that union were attributed to one person, it would also have to be attributed to the two others: therefore etc.

I deny the major, and to its first proof I say, that although the Holy Fathers and Councils did not remember any other union than that which is made either in unity of nature or in unity of person, it does not follow that they judged another impossible: they spoke indeed of actual union, not truly of the possible: because they were contending against the Eutychian or Nestorian heretics: the former asserted that the union of the Word had been made in unity of nature: the latter denied it had been accomplished in unity either of nature or of person. To the second I say, they teach only that the union of the Word with human nature had been made not in nature, but in person: or into that which is proper to the Son, not what is common to the whole Trinity; yet without denying union in nature, they do not infer necessarily that it must have been made in person, as Varquez contends. Add that they speak of union as actually accomplished, not truly of that by which it could be made. To the third proof I say, Saint Anselm does not necessarily conclude that if the union were not made in unity of person, it must necessarily and absolutely have been made in unity of nature: as though no other mode of union were possible to God; but only, that those two modes, namely in unity of nature and of person, were the only ones in act: namely union in unity of nature in creatures which are composed of diverse parts coalescing into one nature; but the other in unity of person, whereby divine and human nature are joined mutually.

You will insist: If divine nature were united to human nature, as subsistent by absolute subsistence, it would be united either in unity of nature or in unity of person: indeed it would be one singular being: therefore either really identical with the divine nature, by which it would subsist: or completed through a person: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because otherwise the assuming nature and the assumed nature would be identical: or out of divine and human nature there would be made one certain nature, which is absurd. Not either in unity of person, because the divine nature to which it would be united immediately is not a person: therefore that union is not possible. — I deny the major: for then the assumption or union of human nature would not be made in unity either of nature or of person, but only in unity of the union of divine nature with human nature: from which it would follow that human nature would depend upon divine nature, and be intimately united to it, just as in fact it depends on the Word, because it is intimately united to Him.

You will press: From the fact that a person is the immediate term of the union of nature to the Word, it follows that the nature is united in unity of person: therefore from the fact that divine nature would be the immediate term of the union of human nature, it would follow that that union would be made in unity of nature. — I deny the consequence, because to be joined or assumed in unity of person denotes nothing else than that the nature which is assumed is joined immediately with the person, and is subsistent in that person: but to be united, or assumed in unity of nature signifies, that the assumed nature either be identified with the assuming nature, or make with it a composition, constituting with it some third nature, which certainly utterly conflicts with God. Whence if this consequence holds: Human nature is assumed by a divine person, therefore unto unity of person; yet this would not hold: It is assumed by a nature: therefore unto unity of nature. Because, says the Doctor, dist. 1. qu. 2. toward the end, in the former enthymeme, by the force of the construction of words, it is signified that the subsistence of the divine person is communicated to human nature, without its being identified with it, or making with it any composition: for it is signified only that human nature subsists in the divine person: but in the latter enthymeme, by the force of the construction of words, it is signified that nature is communicated to nature either by identity or by composition; for when it is said that nature is assumed unto unity of nature, it is sufficiently declared that no longer two natures but one single nature from two coalesces: which certainly conflicts with God.

You will object: That absolute subsistence would not impede the resultant of proper personality: therefore this cannot come about. The consequence is evident: for otherwise with the nature a person would at once be assumed. That it is impossible will appear below. But the antecedent is proved: that alone can impede the resultant of created personality which can confer upon it all that which it would have from proper personality: now common subsistence cannot confer upon the assumed nature the incommunicability which proper nature would confer upon it: therefore it cannot impede the resultant of that personality. — I deny the antecedent: for that absolute subsistence may impede proper personality in the assumed nature, it suffices that it confer upon that nature to exist per se, and to be complete essentially, even if it does not confer upon it that incommunicability which is required for the rationale of subsistence; for since the rationale of existing per se is prior in person than incommunicability, which follows only from it, it follows that if the resultant of proper personality is impeded, inasmuch as it is the mode of existing per se and completely essentially, also the resultant thereof will be impeded consequentially, inasmuch as it would be the mode of existing incommunicably. To these add what we said above, either that incommunicability is not of the rationale of subsistence: or that that absolute subsistence would render the assumed nature incommunicable to a supposite really distinct from itself: or finally, that although that assumed nature would not have from its term immediately, namely from absolute subsistence, every manner of incommunicability, nevertheless it would obtain it from mediated terms; for instance from the divine personalities, by which mediately and concomitantly or consequently that nature thus assumed will be terminated, just as the absolute subsistence itself is terminated and becomes incommunicable.

Finally you will object: In that hypothesis, this God is this man: but this man is a person: therefore the nature thus assumed would be assumed in unity of person. — I deny the minor: For just as person is not signified by this term, God; so neither would it be signified by this term, man: whence although this man is ordinarily the name of supposite and of person

You will say: yet it would not be so in the present hypothesis, because namely this man would subsist only by a subsistence which would not be personal, but only such as would effect the nature lastly completed communicably, not truly incommunicably, because this assumed nature, like the subsistence by which it would subsist, would be communicable to the three persons.

You will insist: In that case either each of the divine persons would be man, or not: but both seem absurd: therefore, etc. — I answer, that each would be man, since humanity together with absolute subsistence itself would be communicated to the three persons: nor thence does any inconvenience appear, for if whiteness, e.g. inhering in some surface, existed at once in Peter and Paul, truly Peter and Paul would be white: therefore by equal reason, if the union of divine nature with human were communicated to the three persons together with absolute subsistence itself, without doubt each of those persons would be man, as He is this God subsisting per se.