Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

IN WHAT MANNER, AND BY WHAT, THE DIVINE WORD TERMINATED AND ASSUMED THE HUMAN NATURE.

NOTABLE 1. That although all Theologians agree that only the second Person of the most holy Trinity assumed humanity, and that He terminates it hypostatically as the what, nevertheless they dispute among themselves concerning the primary formal reason by which the Word first and formally terminates humanity; whether namely through absolute subsistence, common to the three divine persons, or through a relative, personal, and proper one; for we said in the treatise On the Trinity that in God there are three relative subsistences, whereby the divine persons are constituted in personal esse and really distinguished from each other. We said likewise that besides those relative and incommunicable subsistences there is given in God, considered in itself and as preintelligized for the persons, an absolute subsistence, whereby the divine nature subsists per se — not indeed incommunicably, in the manner in which the persons do, but communicably, as the essence itself: because God, as preintelligized by relations and persons, operates as the what; for it is said: God creates, governs, conserves: whence since operations belong only to subsistents, God, thus considered, must have subsistence.

NOTABLE 2. That the divine nature agrees in some way with the ratio of assuming; for thus teach very many of the holy Fathers. Augustine *lib. 1. De Trinitate: The form, he says, of God took the nature of a servant, where by the name of form he signifies nature. St. Leo in serm. 5, On the Nativity:

Therefore with the property of both substances preserved, and coming together into one person, is taken up by Majesty humility, by power infirmity, by eternity mortality: and to render due what was owed to our condition, the inviolable nature is united to the passible. And true God and true man are tempered into the unity of the Lord, so that what befitted our remedies, one and the same Mediator of God and men could both die from the one and rise again from the other.

St. Damascene book 3, cap. 6: We say the nature of God has become incarnate, according to SS. Athanasius and Cyril. But since the assumption of nature signifies two things, namely the principle of action and its term, the Theologians agree that the divine nature of itself agrees in being the radical and remote principle of the assumption of humanity; since from it, as from a root, arises the whole proximate and immediate force of terminating, which is found in the relative subsistence of the Divine Word, because the divine essence according to its absolute subsistence is the root and principle of the personality of the Word itself. But the difficulty is whether even to the absolute subsistence itself there properly and immediately belongs the terminating of the assumed humanity, for whose difficulty's resolution the Theologians vary.

NOTABLE 3. That especially a threefold capital opinion of Theologians is assigned for the resolution of the present difficulty: The first is Durandus', in dist. 3, 1, q. 2, contending that the hypostatic union was immediately made to the absolute subsistence of God, and the first ratio of terminating the union is the subsistence not relative and personal of the Word, but essential or absolute of the divine nature: to whom subscribe on their part Capreolus in dist. 3, 1, q. 1, Marsilius in q. 1, art. 1, Francis Victoria, and Dominic Soto, teaching that the Word terminates the union of humanity in virtue of the absolute subsistence, not taken precisely, but as modified by the relative property of the Son: so that the absolute subsistence is the formal ratio of terminating, while the relation or personality of the Word is only a condition sine qua non: in that proportional manner in which generative potency in the Father is constituted through the Divine Essence, which nevertheless requires as a condition the relation of Paternity, by which it is modified. But the second opinion denies the ratio of terminating to be a relative or absolute property, but, so to speak, the whole entity of the Word, which includes both ratios. So teaches Ocham in q. 3, 1, art. 2, to whom Gabriel somewhat assents, dist. 1, notable 5. Finally the third is that of all the other princes of Theology, Alexander of Hales, part 3, q. 4, member 1, St. Bonaventure in dist. 3, 1, art. 1, q. 2, St. Thomas part 3, q. 3, art. 2, the Subtle Doctor dist. 1, q. 5, and all their Disciples, to whom let us subscribe. First Conclusion. — THE FIRST AND IMMEDIATE FORMAL RATIO WHEREBY THE DIVINE WORD TERMINATES HUMANITY IS NOT ABSOLUTE AND COMMON SUBSISTENCE, BUT RELATIVE AND PERSONAL.

It is proved first by the authority of the sixth and eleventh Councils of Toledo in the confession of faith in these words: The Incarnation of the Son the whole Trinity wrought, because the works of the Trinity are inseparable: yet the Son alone took the form of a servant in the singularity of person, not in the unity of divine nature, in that which is proper to the Son, not that which is common to the Trinity: but if humanity had first been united to the absolute subsistence, truly the Son would have received humanity in that which is common to the Trinity, since such absolute subsistence, like the Divine Essence, is common to the three persons: therefore according to the definition of the Council it must be asserted that humanity was not immediately united to the absolute and common subsistence, but to the relative and personal one, whereby the Son is constituted in personal esse and distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit. It is confirmed from the sixth general Synod, Act 8, where toward the end it is said that only the Word became incarnate, because the Father and the Holy Spirit have nothing in common in the incarnation except their most benign will: but if humanity had been united immediately to the absolute and common subsistence of God, the Father and the Holy Spirit would have communicated with the Son not only in will and in every operation, but also in the termination of humanity; since that termination would have been common to the three persons: therefore according to the opinion of the Council, humanity was not primarily and immediately united to the common and absolute subsistence, but to the relative and personal subsistence of the Word.

It is proved secondly by the authority of the holy Fathers: and especially of St. Dionysius, book On the Divine Names, chapter 2, whose testimony is praised in the Synod shortly mentioned: for he says:

But it is distinct in the divine works benignly abiding in us, that the supersubstantial Word fully and truly took substance from us and according to us: and wrought and bore those things which are chosen and preeminent in His own assumption of humanity: for neither stone nor spirit communicate in them in any way, unless perhaps one assert that, by benignity and clemency and communication of will, and in every most supereminent and ineffable divine operation, whereby man was made for us immutable, certainly God, and the Word of God, they too were made partakers.

The same opinion, taken from him, St. Damascene sets forth, book 3, On the Faith, cap. 6. But if humanity had been united to the Word of God not only in virtue of His personal property, but also in virtue of the common subsistence, and that primarily, as Durandus opines, not by will alone and efficacy, but also in some manner of real union, the Father and the Holy Spirit would have communicated in the mystery of the Incarnation: which St. Dionysius plainly denies: therefore, etc. To these accedes St. Anselm, book On the Incarnation, cap. 1, where disputing against certain who said that when the Son of God was incarnate, it was necessary that the Father and the Holy Spirit be incarnate too, unless person were distinguished from nature really, says: He who rightly receives His Incarnation believes that He did not assume man into the unity of nature, but into the unity of person: but this man (namely he against whom he was writing) dreams that the man of the Son of God was more assumed into the unity of nature than into the unity of person: for if he held this opinion, he would not say, more is it necessary that the Father be incarnate together with the Son, than possible that He be not incarnate at once, because there are several persons. By these words Anselm plainly concludes that the union of human nature was made in that which is proper to one person, lest we be compelled to assert it was made in nature, and hence with all the persons.

From these authorities I also establish the conclusion by reason, which the Subtle Doctor n. 5 thus weighs: if personal property be not the ratio of terminating immediately the assumed nature, the absolute subsistence of God will perform this: but the consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent. The major stands, since in God there is subsistence of only two kinds: namely absolute and essential, and relative and personal. The minor is proved: if the formal and proximate ratio whereby the Word terminates humanity were the absolute subsistence of God, it would follow that the three Persons of the most holy Trinity terminate the union of human nature, and consequently can be called incarnate: but this conflicts with faith and the definition of Councils and the doctrine of the holy Fathers: therefore, etc. The sequence of the major is proved: that formally terminates in which is the formal ratio of terminating: for the supposit of the Word does not terminate except because it has the formal ratio of terminating: just as it does not create except because the ratio of creating belongs to it formally, etc. But absolute subsistence is formally in the three persons; since each of them is formally God: therefore if that formal and proximate ratio of terminating the union of humanity be the very essential subsistence which is formally in the three persons, then also in them will be the formal ratio of terminating, and consequently they will terminate the assumed humanity; therefore since to become incarnate is nothing else than to terminate the assumed nature, the three persons could truly be called incarnate, which is absurd. — It is confirmed, therefore the person of the Son is immediately united to human nature, because in it is given the ratio of hypostatically terminating immediately human nature: but if that immediate ratio of terminating be absolute subsistence, as Durandus holds, since this belongs equally to all persons — for absolute and essential things are common to the whole Trinity — it follows that no less must the Father and the Holy Spirit be called man than the Word: since the Father and the Holy Spirit have the formal ratio of terminating the assumed nature no less than the Son Himself.

Durandus replies that the consequence does not hold. For, he says, in order that persons be called incarnate, or substantially united to humanity, a twofold union of the humanity itself is required: The first indeed to the absolute and common subsistence: The second truly to the personal and relative property: whence since humanity has been united to the Word not only according to the absolute and common subsistence but also according to the relative and personal property, while the other persons are united to it only according to the absolute and common subsistence; hence it is that only the Son can be called incarnate, but not the Father or the Holy Spirit. — On the contrary, that which belongs to the divine nature of itself and by reason of itself belongs also to the three divine persons, and is predicated of them: therefore if it belong to the divine nature primarily and per se to terminate humanity inasmuch as it is common to the three persons, that same will equally belong to those persons. The antecedent stands; for since creating belongs to the divine nature inasmuch as it is this God, it likewise equally belongs to the three persons. Further, the assumption of humanity taken actively, or as the principle of the union of divine nature with human, undividedly belongs to the three persons, because primarily and per se it belongs to God inasmuch as He is this God subsisting with absolute subsistence: therefore if terminating immediately human nature thus competes primarily to the divine nature, it will by like reason belong to the three persons. Finally, it is unheard-of to admit two unions in Christ: one mediated, whereby humanity is united to the personal property of the Divine Word: another immediate, whereby humanity itself is joined to the divine nature: yet from the hypothesis, that union is made immediately in the divine essence or absolute subsistence, there will be a twofold union, one in essence, another in the personality of the divine Word: therefore, etc. The major stands: since of this twofold union, which Durandus gratuitously invents, no mention is made either among the holy Fathers or among Councils: nay rather most constantly does it appear from them that there is only one union in Christ, whereby humanity is joined to the Word and to the divine essence.

You will reply, that the same argument works against us; for if humanity is terminated primarily to the Word and secondarily to the divine nature, a twofold union must be admitted; one primary between humanity and the personality of the Word; another secondary, of the humanity itself to the divine nature: therefore we argue against our own opinion. — I deny the antecedent: for when we posit that humanity is terminated primarily by the personality of the Word, and secondarily by the divine nature, in this we do not distinguish a twofold union, but only a single one. For in saying that the divine nature is the second term, we do not understand that there is some union terminated primarily to the personality of the Word, and another mediated, which secondarily is terminated to nature; but only that the very same union has two terms: one indeed immediate, namely the personality of the Word: the other truly mediated, namely the divine nature: after the manner in which similarity between two white things is primarily terminated to whiteness, or the concrete white thing; secondarily however to the substance wherein whiteness inheres.

Second Conclusion. — THE DIVINE WORD DOES NOT TERMINATE HUMANITY IMMEDIATELY THROUGH ABSOLUTE SUBSISTENCE, AS MODIFIED BY ITS PERSONAL PROPERTY AS THROUGH A CONDITION WITHOUT WHICH NOT. So the Doctor in the place cited num. 6, which truth he thus proves: No supposit can be a condition required so that the divine essence be in it the formal proximate and immediate ratio for performing something, such that it not be such in other supposits, unless because that supposit, in which it has that it be such a formal ratio, precedes the term unto which that formal ratio is ordered to produce or acquire. E.g., the supposit of the Father would not be a condition required so that the divine essence be in Him the formal and actual ratio of generating the Word, except because the supposit of the Father precedes in origin the term of that divine generation, namely the Word: but each divine person precedes the hypostatic union: therefore if the divine essence be in some supposit the formal ratio of terminating, it will be likewise in the other two divine supposits. The major stands, because therefore the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit, and active spiration, which comes about through the will as through the formal principle whereby, proceeds from both, because the will is in both prior in origin than the Father and the Son have relation to the Holy Spirit; and thus in them the formal ratio of spirating precedes in origin the produced term; and conversely although through circumincession the generative power is in the Son, and the spirative in the Holy Spirit, nevertheless neither does the Son generate nor does the Spirit breathe forth, because the formal ratio of generating and breathing forth is not conceived to be in them before the terms of generation and active spiration are conceived as produced. And therefore the three persons create and operate ad extra indivisibly, because namely omnipotence, which is the formal ratio of producing and the principle of acting ad extra, is equally in the three persons before that production is made and the term to be produced exists: therefore similarly, since the formal ratio of divine subsistence is in the three divine persons before the assumption of humanity is made, if that be the immediate ratio of terminating such an assumption, it will equally belong to the three persons.

Further, if the Son were to terminate humanity not through His own proper and personal subsistence, but through the absolute and common one, as appropriated to the Word, the person of the Word, as distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit, could not be said to terminate humanity: but this is erroneous, and condemned in the Third Council of Toledo praised above, where it is said that the Son alone assumed humanity in that which is proper to the Son: therefore, etc. The sequence of the major appears: because since the power of creating, e.g., is common to the three persons, the Son cannot through that power appropriated to Himself, or determined to Himself through the relation of filiation, produce anything without the Father and the Holy Spirit producing the same: therefore since absolute subsistence is common to the three persons, the Son cannot through it specially terminate humanity, however much it be modified toward Himself and determined by personal subsistence.

Finally, if the divine Word were to terminate humanity only through the absolute subsistence, modified by His personal subsistence, it would follow that He communicates to the assumed humanity not His proper personality, but only the common and absolute subsistence. It is proved: therefore the Father, communicating the essence to the Son, does not communicate paternity to Him, because the essence, in which is the primary force of generating, requires Paternity only as a condition sine qua non that the divine generation occur: therefore similarly if the formal and proximate ratio of terminating humanity in the Son be absolute subsistence, and the property or personal relation of the Son intervene only as a condition, the consequence will be that the Son will communicate to humanity only absolute subsistence, not personal.

You will say 1. Through that ratio it agrees with the Word to terminate formally the hypostatic union whereby He virtually contains the perfection of a created supposit, and is capable of terminating the obediential potency of the creature: but these agree with Him in virtue of absolute, not personal subsistence; therefore the Word terminates primarily through absolute, not relative subsistence. — The Doctor denies the major, because, as we have said elsewhere on his authority, the formal terminative ratio in the Word is not sought from virtual containment; but only from independence in the ratio of supposit; since the divine Word does not terminate humanity after the manner of an efficient and producing cause, but only after the manner of a terminating supposit, to whom terminative power belongs precisely because in Himself and of Himself He has the ratio of a wholly independent supposit.

You will say 2. That whereby it agrees with a divine person to be the term of the assumption of human nature is that whereby it agrees with Him to subsist: but it agrees with a divine person to subsist through absolute, not relative subsistence: therefore the Word terminates humanity primarily and immediately through absolute subsistence. — I distinguish the major: That whereby it agrees with Him to subsist essentially, I deny: personally, I concede; for human nature is terminated by that whereby it is lastly constituted in personal esse. Similarly distinguishing the minor, I deny the consequence.

You will say 3. The personality of the Word is something identical with the divine nature: therefore it terminates humanity no more immediately through its proper subsistence than through the common and absolute subsistence. I distinguish the antecedent: Identical really, I concede: formally, I deny: whence the consequence must be denied: for just as the formal distinction, which exists between paternity and the Divine Essence, suffices so that the essence be communicated to the Son, the personality not being communicated; so the formal distinction of filiation from the divine nature suffices so that filiation immediately terminates humanity, although with the same immediacy the Divine Essence does not terminate.

You will say 1. From the immediate union of humanity with divinity does not follow personal union with the three divine persons, nor consequently that the three divine persons are incarnate: therefore there is no ratio whereby especially the two preceding Conclusions are established. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved: because if this followed, it would be especially by reason of the connexion of persons in one essence, or from the habitude of the persons among themselves: but not the first, because the divine persons are united in essence, and yet one is not the other, nor in the other, except by reason of essence: nor even the second, because that habitude is of opposition or distinction, whereby one person is distinguished from another, because relatively opposed to it: but this habitude rather shows that human nature can be united to one person, and not another: therefore, etc.

I deny the antecedent: for thence truly follows that human nature would be substantially united to the three persons, because it would be united to them in the common substantial bond, namely subsistence: whence also it would follow that the three persons are incarnate, because the three persons are one God, since they are united in one essence as in a common bond, although one is not the other, nor in the other except by reason of essence. Wherefore just as the three persons are one God because they are united in one common Divine Essence, so the three persons would be man because they would be united in the humanity assumed to essence and common existence. Nor does the parity of the union of the divine relations with the Divine Essence avail, because therefore the divine persons on account of that union are not the same, since the Divine Essence together with those relations has no opposition, and can be identified with them; but those relations are opposed to each other, and therefore constitute distinct persons. Therefore since humanity has no opposition with the relative properties, it is rightly inferred that if it were immediately united to the absolute and common subsistence, it would also be united at least mediately to the three persons.

You will say finally. When the divine Word assumed humanity, either He bestowed upon it absolute and essential esse, or only relative esse: if the first, therefore through absolute subsistence: for what is absolute and essential cannot be bestowed through the relative: but the latter cannot be said, because a human person is something absolute; and hence it could not be supplied by something relative. — I answer. That the divine Word did not bestow upon humanity His relative subsistence; nor does that stand in the way: since humanity indeed subsists absolutely when it has its own subsistence, not when it has an alien one: for then it puts on the ratio of that subsistence communicated to it: whence the person of Christ could be called relative; because that person is nothing else than filiation, which formally is relative.