Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

IN WHAT MANNER, AND BY WHAT, THE DIVINE WORD TERMINATED AND ASSUMED THE HUMAN NATURE.

NOTABLE 1. That although all Theologians agree that only the second Person of the most holy Trinity assumed humanity, and that He terminates it hypostatically as the what, nevertheless they dispute among themselves concerning the primary formal reason by which the Word first and formally terminates humanity; whether namely through absolute subsistence, common to the three divine persons, or through a relative, personal, and proper one; for we said in the treatise On the Trinity that in God there are three relative subsistences, whereby the divine persons are constituted in personal esse and really distinguished from each other. We said likewise that besides those relative and incommunicable subsistences there is given in God, considered in itself and as preintelligized for the persons, an absolute subsistence, whereby the divine nature subsists per se — not indeed incommunicably, in the manner in which the persons do, but communicably, as the essence itself: because God, as preintelligized by relations and persons, operates as the what; for it is said: God creates, governs, conserves: whence since operations belong only to subsistents, God, thus considered, must have subsistence.

NOTABLE 2. That the divine nature agrees in some way with the ratio of assuming; for thus teach very many of the holy Fathers. Augustine *lib. 1. De Trinitate: The form, he says, of God took the nature of a servant, where by the name of form he signifies nature. St. Leo in serm. 5, On the Nativity:

Therefore with the property of both substances preserved, and coming together into one person, is taken up by Majesty humility, by power infirmity, by eternity mortality: and to render due what was owed to our condition, the inviolable nature is united to the passible. And true God and true man are tempered into the unity of the Lord, so that what befitted our remedies, one and the same Mediator of God and men could both die from the one and rise again from the other.

St. Damascene book 3, cap. 6: We say the nature of God has become incarnate, according to SS. Athanasius and Cyril. But since the assumption of nature signifies two things, namely the principle of action and its term, the Theologians agree that the divine nature of itself agrees in being the radical and remote principle of the assumption of humanity; since from it, as from a root, arises the whole proximate and immediate force of terminating, which is found in the relative subsistence of the Divine Word, because the divine essence according to its absolute subsistence is the root and principle of the personality of the Word itself. But the difficulty is whether even to the absolute subsistence itself there properly and immediately belongs the terminating of the assumed humanity, for whose difficulty's resolution the Theologians vary.

NOTABLE 3. That especially a threefold capital opinion of Theologians is assigned for the resolution of the present difficulty: The first is Durandus', in dist. 3, 1, q. 2, contending that the hypostatic union was immediately made to the absolute subsistence of God, and the first ratio of terminating the union is the subsistence not relative and personal of the Word, but essential or absolute of the divine nature: to whom subscribe on their part Capreolus in dist. 3, 1, q. 1, Marsilius in q. 1, art. 1, Francis Victoria, and Dominic Soto, teaching that the Word terminates the union of humanity in virtue of the absolute subsistence, not taken precisely, but as modified by the relative property of the Son: so that the absolute subsistence is the formal ratio of terminating, while the relation or personality of the Word is only a condition sine qua non: in that proportional manner in which generative potency in the Father is constituted through the Divine Essence, which nevertheless requires as a condition the relation of Paternity, by which it is modified. But the second opinion denies the ratio of terminating to be a relative or absolute property, but, so to speak, the whole entity of the Word, which includes both ratios. So teaches Ocham in q. 3, 1, art. 2, to whom Gabriel somewhat assents, dist. 1, notable 5. Finally the third is that of all the other princes of Theology, Alexander of Hales, part 3, q. 4, member 1, St. Bonaventure in dist. 3, 1, art. 1, q. 2, St. Thomas part 3, q. 3, art. 2, the Subtle Doctor dist. 1, q. 5, and all their Disciples, to whom let us subscribe. First Conclusion. — THE FIRST AND IMMEDIATE FORMAL RATIO WHEREBY THE DIVINE WORD TERMINATES HUMANITY IS NOT ABSOLUTE AND COMMON SUBSISTENCE, BUT RELATIVE AND PERSONAL.

It is proved first by the authority of the sixth and eleventh Councils of Toledo in the confession of faith in these words: The Incarnation of the Son the whole Trinity wrought, because the works of the Trinity are inseparable: yet the Son alone took the form of a servant in the singularity of person, not in the unity of divine nature, in that which is proper to the Son, not that which is common to the Trinity: but if humanity had first been united to the absolute subsistence, truly the Son would have received humanity in that which is common to the Trinity, since such absolute subsistence, like the Divine Essence, is common to the three persons: therefore according to the definition of the Council it must be asserted that humanity was not immediately united to the absolute and common subsistence, but to the relative and personal one, whereby the Son is constituted in personal esse and distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit. It is confirmed from the sixth general Synod, Act 8, where toward the end it is said that only the Word became incarnate, because the Father and the Holy Spirit have nothing in common in the incarnation except their most benign will: but if humanity had been united immediately to the absolute and common subsistence of God, the Father and the Holy Spirit would have communicated with the Son not only in will and in every operation, but also in the termination of humanity; since that termination would have been common to the three persons: therefore according to the opinion of the Council, humanity was not primarily and immediately united to the common and absolute subsistence, but to the relative and personal subsistence of the Word.

It is proved secondly by the authority of the holy Fathers: and especially of St. Dionysius, book On the Divine Names, chapter 2, whose testimony is praised in the Synod shortly mentioned: for he says:

But it is distinct in the divine works benignly abiding in us, that the supersubstantial Word fully and truly took substance from us and according to us: and wrought and bore those things which are chosen and preeminent in His own assumption of humanity: for neither stone nor spirit communicate in them in any way, unless perhaps one assert that, by benignity and clemency and communication of will, and in every most supereminent and ineffable divine operation, whereby man was made for us immutable, certainly God, and the Word of God, they too were made partakers.

The same opinion, taken from him, St. Damascene sets forth, book 3, On the Faith, cap. 6. But if humanity had been united to the Word of God not only in virtue of His personal property, but also in virtue of the common subsistence, and that primarily, as Durandus opines, not by will alone and efficacy, but also in some manner of real union, the Father and the Holy Spirit would have communicated in the mystery of the Incarnation: which St. Dionysius plainly denies: therefore, etc. To these accedes St. Anselm, book On the Incarnation, cap. 1, where disputing against certain who said that when the Son of God was incarnate, it was necessary that the Father and the Holy Spirit be incarnate too, unless person were distinguished from nature really, says: He who rightly receives His Incarnation believes that He did not assume man into the unity of nature, but into the unity of person: but this man (namely he against whom he was writing) dreams that the man of the Son of God was more assumed into the unity of nature than into the unity of person: for if he held this opinion, he would not say, more is it necessary that the Father be incarnate together with the Son, than possible that He be not incarnate at once, because there are several persons. By these words Anselm plainly concludes that the union of human nature was made in that which is proper to one person, lest we be compelled to assert it was made in nature, and hence with all the persons.

From these authorities I also establish the conclusion by reason, which the Subtle Doctor n. 5 thus weighs: if personal property be not the ratio of terminating immediately the assumed nature, the absolute subsistence of God will perform this: but the consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent. The major stands, since in God there is subsistence of only two kinds: namely absolute and essential, and relative and personal. The minor is proved: if the formal and proximate ratio whereby the Word terminates humanity were the absolute subsistence of God, it would follow that the three Persons of the most holy Trinity terminate the union of human nature, and consequently can be called incarnate: but this conflicts with faith and the definition of Councils and the doctrine of the holy Fathers: therefore, etc. The sequence of the major is proved: that formally terminates in which is the formal ratio of terminating: for the supposit of the Word does not terminate except because it has the formal ratio of terminating: just as it does not create except because the ratio of creating belongs to it formally, etc. But absolute subsistence is formally in the three persons; since each of them is formally God: therefore if that formal and proximate ratio of terminating the union of humanity be the very essential subsistence which is formally in the three persons, then also in them will be the formal ratio of terminating, and consequently they will terminate the assumed humanity; therefore since to become incarnate is nothing else than to terminate the assumed nature, the three persons could truly be called incarnate, which is absurd. — It is confirmed, therefore the person of the Son is immediately united to human nature, because in it is given the ratio of hypostatically terminating immediately human nature: but if that immediate ratio of terminating be absolute subsistence, as Durandus holds, since this belongs equally to all persons — for absolute and essential things are common to the whole Trinity — it follows that no less must the Father and the Holy Spirit be called man than the Word: since the Father and the Holy Spirit have the formal ratio of terminating the assumed nature no less than the Son Himself.

Durandus replies that the consequence does not hold. For, he says, in order that persons be called incarnate, or substantially united to humanity, a twofold union of the humanity itself is required: The first indeed to the absolute and common subsistence: The second truly to the personal and relative property: whence since humanity has been united to the Word not only according to the absolute and common subsistence but also according to the relative and personal property, while the other persons are united to it only according to the absolute and common subsistence; hence it is that only the Son can be called incarnate, but not the Father or the Holy Spirit. — On the contrary, that which belongs to the divine nature of itself and by reason of itself belongs also to the three divine persons, and is predicated of them: therefore if it belong to the divine nature primarily and per se to terminate humanity inasmuch as it is common to the three persons, that same will equally belong to those persons. The antecedent stands; for since creating belongs to the divine nature inasmuch as it is this God, it likewise equally belongs to the three persons. Further, the assumption of humanity taken actively, or as the principle of the union of divine nature with human, undividedly belongs to the three persons, because primarily and per se it belongs to God inasmuch as He is this God subsisting with absolute subsistence: therefore if terminating immediately human nature thus competes primarily to the divine nature, it will by like reason belong to the three persons. Finally, it is unheard-of to admit two unions in Christ: one mediated, whereby humanity is united to the personal property of the Divine Word: another immediate, whereby humanity itself is joined to the divine nature: yet from the hypothesis, that union is made immediately in the divine essence or absolute subsistence, there will be a twofold union, one in essence, another in the personality of the divine Word: therefore, etc. The major stands: since of this twofold union, which Durandus gratuitously invents, no mention is made either among the holy Fathers or among Councils: nay rather most constantly does it appear from them that there is only one union in Christ, whereby humanity is joined to the Word and to the divine essence.

You will reply, that the same argument works against us; for if humanity is terminated primarily to the Word and secondarily to the divine nature, a twofold union must be admitted; one primary between humanity and the personality of the Word; another secondary, of the humanity itself to the divine nature: therefore we argue against our own opinion. — I deny the antecedent: for when we posit that humanity is terminated primarily by the personality of the Word, and secondarily by the divine nature, in this we do not distinguish a twofold union, but only a single one. For in saying that the divine nature is the second term, we do not understand that there is some union terminated primarily to the personality of the Word, and another mediated, which secondarily is terminated to nature; but only that the very same union has two terms: one indeed immediate, namely the personality of the Word: the other truly mediated, namely the divine nature: after the manner in which similarity between two white things is primarily terminated to whiteness, or the concrete white thing; secondarily however to the substance wherein whiteness inheres.

Second Conclusion. — THE DIVINE WORD DOES NOT TERMINATE HUMANITY IMMEDIATELY THROUGH ABSOLUTE SUBSISTENCE, AS MODIFIED BY ITS PERSONAL PROPERTY AS THROUGH A CONDITION WITHOUT WHICH NOT. So the Doctor in the place cited num. 6, which truth he thus proves: No supposit can be a condition required so that the divine essence be in it the formal proximate and immediate ratio for performing something, such that it not be such in other supposits, unless because that supposit, in which it has that it be such a formal ratio, precedes the term unto which that formal ratio is ordered to produce or acquire. E.g., the supposit of the Father would not be a condition required so that the divine essence be in Him the formal and actual ratio of generating the Word, except because the supposit of the Father precedes in origin the term of that divine generation, namely the Word: but each divine person precedes the hypostatic union: therefore if the divine essence be in some supposit the formal ratio of terminating, it will be likewise in the other two divine supposits. The major stands, because therefore the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit, and active spiration, which comes about through the will as through the formal principle whereby, proceeds from both, because the will is in both prior in origin than the Father and the Son have relation to the Holy Spirit; and thus in them the formal ratio of spirating precedes in origin the produced term; and conversely although through circumincession the generative power is in the Son, and the spirative in the Holy Spirit, nevertheless neither does the Son generate nor does the Spirit breathe forth, because the formal ratio of generating and breathing forth is not conceived to be in them before the terms of generation and active spiration are conceived as produced. And therefore the three persons create and operate ad extra indivisibly, because namely omnipotence, which is the formal ratio of producing and the principle of acting ad extra, is equally in the three persons before that production is made and the term to be produced exists: therefore similarly, since the formal ratio of divine subsistence is in the three divine persons before the assumption of humanity is made, if that be the immediate ratio of terminating such an assumption, it will equally belong to the three persons.

Further, if the Son were to terminate humanity not through His own proper and personal subsistence, but through the absolute and common one, as appropriated to the Word, the person of the Word, as distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit, could not be said to terminate humanity: but this is erroneous, and condemned in the Third Council of Toledo praised above, where it is said that the Son alone assumed humanity in that which is proper to the Son: therefore, etc. The sequence of the major appears: because since the power of creating, e.g., is common to the three persons, the Son cannot through that power appropriated to Himself, or determined to Himself through the relation of filiation, produce anything without the Father and the Holy Spirit producing the same: therefore since absolute subsistence is common to the three persons, the Son cannot through it specially terminate humanity, however much it be modified toward Himself and determined by personal subsistence.

Finally, if the divine Word were to terminate humanity only through the absolute subsistence, modified by His personal subsistence, it would follow that He communicates to the assumed humanity not His proper personality, but only the common and absolute subsistence. It is proved: therefore the Father, communicating the essence to the Son, does not communicate paternity to Him, because the essence, in which is the primary force of generating, requires Paternity only as a condition sine qua non that the divine generation occur: therefore similarly if the formal and proximate ratio of terminating humanity in the Son be absolute subsistence, and the property or personal relation of the Son intervene only as a condition, the consequence will be that the Son will communicate to humanity only absolute subsistence, not personal.

You will say 1. Through that ratio it agrees with the Word to terminate formally the hypostatic union whereby He virtually contains the perfection of a created supposit, and is capable of terminating the obediential potency of the creature: but these agree with Him in virtue of absolute, not personal subsistence; therefore the Word terminates primarily through absolute, not relative subsistence. — The Doctor denies the major, because, as we have said elsewhere on his authority, the formal terminative ratio in the Word is not sought from virtual containment; but only from independence in the ratio of supposit; since the divine Word does not terminate humanity after the manner of an efficient and producing cause, but only after the manner of a terminating supposit, to whom terminative power belongs precisely because in Himself and of Himself He has the ratio of a wholly independent supposit.

You will say 2. That whereby it agrees with a divine person to be the term of the assumption of human nature is that whereby it agrees with Him to subsist: but it agrees with a divine person to subsist through absolute, not relative subsistence: therefore the Word terminates humanity primarily and immediately through absolute subsistence. — I distinguish the major: That whereby it agrees with Him to subsist essentially, I deny: personally, I concede; for human nature is terminated by that whereby it is lastly constituted in personal esse. Similarly distinguishing the minor, I deny the consequence.

You will say 3. The personality of the Word is something identical with the divine nature: therefore it terminates humanity no more immediately through its proper subsistence than through the common and absolute subsistence. I distinguish the antecedent: Identical really, I concede: formally, I deny: whence the consequence must be denied: for just as the formal distinction, which exists between paternity and the Divine Essence, suffices so that the essence be communicated to the Son, the personality not being communicated; so the formal distinction of filiation from the divine nature suffices so that filiation immediately terminates humanity, although with the same immediacy the Divine Essence does not terminate.

You will say 1. From the immediate union of humanity with divinity does not follow personal union with the three divine persons, nor consequently that the three divine persons are incarnate: therefore there is no ratio whereby especially the two preceding Conclusions are established. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved: because if this followed, it would be especially by reason of the connexion of persons in one essence, or from the habitude of the persons among themselves: but not the first, because the divine persons are united in essence, and yet one is not the other, nor in the other, except by reason of essence: nor even the second, because that habitude is of opposition or distinction, whereby one person is distinguished from another, because relatively opposed to it: but this habitude rather shows that human nature can be united to one person, and not another: therefore, etc.

I deny the antecedent: for thence truly follows that human nature would be substantially united to the three persons, because it would be united to them in the common substantial bond, namely subsistence: whence also it would follow that the three persons are incarnate, because the three persons are one God, since they are united in one essence as in a common bond, although one is not the other, nor in the other except by reason of essence. Wherefore just as the three persons are one God because they are united in one common Divine Essence, so the three persons would be man because they would be united in the humanity assumed to essence and common existence. Nor does the parity of the union of the divine relations with the Divine Essence avail, because therefore the divine persons on account of that union are not the same, since the Divine Essence together with those relations has no opposition, and can be identified with them; but those relations are opposed to each other, and therefore constitute distinct persons. Therefore since humanity has no opposition with the relative properties, it is rightly inferred that if it were immediately united to the absolute and common subsistence, it would also be united at least mediately to the three persons.

You will say finally. When the divine Word assumed humanity, either He bestowed upon it absolute and essential esse, or only relative esse: if the first, therefore through absolute subsistence: for what is absolute and essential cannot be bestowed through the relative: but the latter cannot be said, because a human person is something absolute; and hence it could not be supplied by something relative. — I answer. That the divine Word did not bestow upon humanity His relative subsistence; nor does that stand in the way: since humanity indeed subsists absolutely when it has its own subsistence, not when it has an alien one: for then it puts on the ratio of that subsistence communicated to it: whence the person of Christ could be called relative; because that person is nothing else than filiation, which formally is relative.

WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE SUBSISTENCE OF GOD, COMMON TO THE THREE PERSONS, CAN ASSUME HUMAN NATURE AND UNITE IT TO ITSELF IMMEDIATELY.

Note 1. It is certain that if God were not triune in Persons, but existed in one person only, as the Jews and other unbelievers who deny the mystery of the Trinity suppose, He could assume a nature not His own and unite it to Himself immediately; for in that hypothesis He would have omnipotence, and likewise absolute personality, whereby He would be constituted in the rationality of person: and since this would be infinite in subsisting and terminating, He would have the power of terminating and subsisting all that which is sustainable and terminable, because His power in terminating would not be lesser than it now is in the relative personality and subsistence of the Word, whose infinite terminative virtue proceeds from absolute subsistence as from its first root, which is imbibed into the relative subsistences constitutive of the divine persons. The sole difficulty and controversy, therefore, among Theologians concerns whether the absolute subsistence, by which the individual of the Deity, or this God in number, who subsists in three persons, inasmuch as He prescinds from the relative subsistences, could assume human nature and unite it to Himself immediately. That this may be resolved more evidently,

Note 2. A subsistence of two kinds is admitted in God: one indeed absolute and common; others truly relative and personal; such are the subsistences of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Of the latter subsistences there is no controversy among Theologians, for since it is of faith that the three divine persons are really distinct from one another, it follows that each of them has its own subsistence, by which they are constituted in their personal being and distinguished from another. But some Theologians deny that there is in God any absolute and common subsistence which belongs to the divine nature so as to make it truly subsistent per se, inasmuch as it prescinds from the divine persons. Now the nobler and more common opinion of Theologians is that such absolute subsistence must be admitted, as we proved in the tract. De Trinitate: since by absolute subsistence we understand nothing else than that mode of the divine essence by which, as it prescinds from the persons, it is a complete substance existing per se, that is independently of any subject by which it might be sustained, and of any part by which it might be completed, and likewise incommunicable to any extrinsic complement really distinct from itself: but no one can deny that the divine nature, as it prescinds from the persons, is a complete substance existing per se, and incommunicable to any extrinsic complement really distinct from itself: therefore there should be no doubt that there exists that which we understand by the name of absolute subsistence. Under this very name St. Augustine designates it, lib. 1. De Trinit. cap. 4., when he says that the Divine nature subsists toward itself (that is, subsists by absolute subsistence): For every substance grows toward itself; how much more God? Hence Pope Agatho, in the decretal Epistle which is cited in the 6th Synod, art. 1., says: We confess God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit, not three Gods, but one God: not the substance of three names subsisting, but one substance of three subsistences, — by which words he does not deny the relative and personal subsistence, about which chiefly at that time was the controversy.

Note 3. Two things can be considered and distinguished in created subsistence: one which completes the nature itself, which without personality would be incomplete and imperfect: another which renders it further incommunicable, so that it is the ultimate term of that nature: which two are so joined in created things that nothing created can cause the one without also effecting the other. But it is otherwise in things divine, for the divine essence, as prescinded from the divine persons, since it is infinite, is completely perfect in every way in the rationality of nature, yet it is not incommunicable: indeed it is communicated to the three adorable persons; whence absolute subsistence signifies the divine nature indeed complete and infinitely perfect; but it is rendered personally incommunicable through the relative and personal subsistences: whence the Doctor rightly says, in 3. dist. 5. q. 1. n. 2., that if it belong to the rationale of the assumer to render the nature incommunicable, God cannot, by His absolute subsistence, be the term of human nature, nor assume it immediately, since by that subsistence He cannot render it incommunicable. Therefore there remains only this difficulty to be solved, whether God can, by that absolute subsistence, so immediately assume human nature as to terminate its dependence with respect to sustentation, and make it perfectly complete.

Single Conclusion. — THE DIVINE NATURE, AS IT PRESCINDS FROM THE PERSONS AND SUBSISTS BY ABSOLUTE SUBSISTENCE, CAN TERMINATE THE DEPENDENCE OF A CREATED NATURE: AND RENDER IT SUBSISTENT. So the Doctor, in the place just praised, and dist. 1. q. 2. n. 6., where he says:

But that the essence itself existing per se could be the proximate term of that union seems so, because it has no being from a person, but is naturally prior to the person's existence and gives being to the person: for it is a nature of itself this, and subsistent per se: although not incommunicably. Moreover, it seems that incommunicability is not necessarily the proper rationale of terminating this dependence, but singular subsistence.

By which I prove the Conclusion thus: Proof: A being subsisting per se by absolute subsistence, and altogether independent of another so as to be completed, and consequently having unlimited and infinite power in the rationality of subsisting, has all that is required to assume and unite to itself an alien nature, and to render it subsistent: now the Divine Essence thus regarded is of this kind; for it is infinite in the rationality of existing and subsisting, and altogether independent of another, both that it exist in another as in a subject, and that it be completed by another as by a part; therefore it has infinite power, and altogether independent, to exist and subsist.

The minor is evident. The major also stands, for on no other account did we say the Divine Word can, by His relative subsistence, assume and unite to Himself human nature, than because He has infinite power and altogether independent in the rationality of subsisting, at least by identical infinity, inasmuch as namely His subsistence is imbued with and identified with the absolute subsistence, by which it is altogether infinite; therefore by equal reason this absolute subsistence will be able to terminate the dependence of human nature, and render it perfectly subsistent.

Proved secondly: If anything stood in the way why that absolute subsistence could not effect a nature absolutely subsistent, it would be chiefly because, since this absolute subsistence is communicable to the three persons, just as the essence is, it could not render the assumed nature incommunicable: but this reason does not obstruct. First, because created subsistence renders a nature incommunicable only with respect to supposites distinct from itself: but that absolute divine subsistence is incommunicable with respect to supposites really distinct from itself; indeed the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, to whom this nature together with absolute subsistence is communicated, are not really distinct from the divine essence and absolute subsistence, for they are one God: therefore that absolute subsistence can render a nature incommunicable to another supposite really distinct from itself; and consequently it will effect it incommunicable with that incommunicability by which it suffices for the rationale of subsistence and supposite. — Then, proper subsistence has this especially peculiar to it, that it renders a nature actually independent of some supposite immediately, and in this immediate independence consists chiefly the rationale of its incommunicability: but by the very fact that human nature would depend totally upon absolute subsistence, it could not depend further immediately upon the divine persons, but only mediately: therefore by this reason it would be no less rendered incommunicable by the absolute subsistence than by the proper one. Add to these, that it is not our opinion that absolute subsistence can of itself supply every effect which a supposite and personality perform; but only that it can perform the primary effect of that, which consists in the complement of the nature; so that the nature is rendered subsistent completely complete and perfect substantially, nor does it need further complement: but this complement the absolute subsistence itself can perform: therefore it can effect a certain nature subsistent; and presently it can assume it.

It is confirmed: For the complement which a singular human nature needs, and which it receives from its own or an alien personality, is a complement prerequisite to actions; whence that common saying: actions belong to supposites: but the divine nature, as it prescinds from personalities, has every complement prerequisite to actions, both ad intra and ad extra: therefore thus considered it can complete a created nature no less than a created personality can.

I prove the minor with respect to actions ad extra: it is certain, for, that God, as one without any multiplication of persons, and consequently without any relative personality of Paternity, Filiation, and active and passive Spiration, could operate by means of absolute subsistence, and produce whatever He produces ad extra: for God acts ad extra not as triune, but as one. The same minor is evident with respect to operations ad intra: for those do not necessarily presuppose personality; for the productive action of the Son, namely the active generation of the Father, and His Paternity, is the very personality of the Father, and presupposes nothing besides the singular Divine Essence as existing per se: therefore the singular Divine Essence has also every complement prerequisite to actions ad intra, nor is it completed through the divine personalities, as created nature is completed through created personality: which is indeed most true in the opinion of the Doctor, teaching that the divine personalities and relations do not import perfection formally; for what does not say formally perfection cannot formally complete, or perfect, the divine nature.

You will object 1. The divine essence, as it prescinds from relations, does not have absolute subsistence: therefore as thus considered it cannot terminate the union of human nature. The antecedent is proved: First, because the divine nature has from its existence all that which it could have from any absolute subsistence superadded to it: therefore that absolute subsistence is admitted in vain and without any foundation. Secondly, if the Divine Essence had absolute subsistence, it would follow that in God there would be given an absolute supposite, and an absolute person, and consequently then there would be four persons in God: which is heretical. Thirdly, subsistence is the ultimate term of the nature which it affects: but the Divine Essence, as prescinded into the personalities, has nothing which may be its ultimate term, otherwise it would be incommunicable to the three persons; therefore it does not have absolute subsistence; and consequently the principal argument of our assertion falls.

I deny the antecedent; and to its first proof I say, that if its antecedent were true, the absolute existence of the Divine Essence would be its very subsistence, which certainly in no way conflicts with us. But as to the truth of the matter, and conformably to the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor, I judge that the absolute subsistence of the Divine Essence is distinguished from its existence in no other way than by name alone, or by a distinction of reason ratiocinative only; for the Doctor, in the places praised above, asserts that the Divine Essence, as existing per se, can terminate the union of human nature; and consequently he uses subsistence for existence.

To the second proof, I deny the sequel of the major: for by supposite and person is commonly understood that which is altogether incommunicable; but since the nature assumed by that absolute subsistence would not be altogether incommunicable, but could further be communicated to the divine persons, and be terminated ultimately by them, therefore properly it could not be called person, but only a singular substance complete substantially.

To the third proof: I distinguish the major: it belongs to the rationale of subsistence to be the ultimate term, inasmuch as it is created subsistence or divine personal and relative subsistence — I concede: it belongs to the rationale of subsistence as such, or inasmuch as it is absolute divine subsistence — I deny. Therefore I deny that it belongs to the rationale of subsistence as such to be the formal complement of nature, because every subsistence would have to complete the nature substantially, and thus divine personal and relative subsistence would complete the divine nature, which is false, because of itself, and per se, it is completely perfect in every way in the rationality of nature. Nor does it belong to the rationale of that subsistence, as such, to be the ultimate term of the incommunicability of nature, because otherwise absolute subsistence would render a nature altogether incommunicable. Whence I do not judge that there can be given any one determinate concept of subsistence as such, which would belong univocally to every subsistence, both relative and absolute.

You will urge: Doctor Subtilis in 3. dist. 1|ordinatio:liber.3/distinctio.1. qu. 1. teaches that a person can assume because it is incommunicable: but the divine nature cannot, because it is communicable: therefore his opinion is that absolute subsistence cannot be the term of an assumed nature. Then, the same dist. 6. qu. 1. affirms that the assumed nature cannot exist by the existence of the Word: but, as we just said, absolute subsistence and existence are the same thing: therefore if that nature could not exist by absolute existence, neither will it be able to subsist by absolute subsistence. — I answer to the first, that this is not the mind of the Doctor, as Lorca feigns, who judges the Subtle Doctor to be adverse to our assertion: indeed in that place the Doctor contends only that it is not well proved by Varro and St. Thomas that a divine person can supply the defect of proper personality from this, that it contains in itself virtually the perfection of any created person whatsoever. For, says the Doctor, a divine person contains virtually any created person whatever no more than the divine nature contains virtually any created nature whatever: but from the fact that the divine nature contains virtually a created nature it does not follow that it can unite with it in unity of nature, nor effect that in place of human nature it make with human personality one per se: therefore neither from the virtual containment of the divine person does it follow that it can so supply the defect of human personality as to make one per se with human nature in its stead and place. To the second, I say nothing against our opinion is evinced, for from the fact that human nature is said to be assumed by absolute subsistence, it would not follow that it should exist by absolute existence, because previously to that assumption and union whereby it would be united to those absolute subsistences, it would necessarily have to prescind, existing by its own existence: and consequently, although subsistence and absolute existence are one and the same, it would not follow that that nature would exist by absolute existence; just as it would subsist by absolute subsistence.

You will object 2. with Vasquez disp. 27. c. 2., that this our assertion is adverse to the Holy Fathers and Councils: indeed to the Holy Fathers, because the Holy Fathers knew no other union of a created nature with God except either in nature, or in person, which alone they admit; but a union with the divine nature by reason of absolute subsistence is a union neither in nature nor in person: therefore our assertion is adverse to the Holy Fathers. The minor appears: for the union of human nature with divine is not made in unity of nature. Neither would that union be made in unity of person; since absolute subsistence has not the rationale of person. Vasquez proves the minor, First, because they made mention anywhere of no other union. Secondly, because the Eleventh Council of Toledo openly says: Yet the Son alone took the form of a servant in the singularity of person, not in the unity of the divine nature; into that which is proper to the Son, not what is common to the Trinity. Thirdly, St. Anselm, cited by us in the preceding question, teaches expressly that he who rightly receives the Incarnation believes the Word did not assume man into unity of nature, but into unity of person. By which words St. Anselm argues against the heretic, who said that since the divine person was incarnate, it was necessary that three persons together become incarnate: which error, that Anselm may refute it, he infers that the heretic held the union to have been made not in person, but in nature: but if besides union in nature or in person there were possible a union of God with man, as common to the three persons by reason of absolute subsistence, the inference of St. Anselm would not hold: indeed from the union of human nature with absolute and common subsistence, it would be true that if that union were attributed to one person, it would also have to be attributed to the two others: therefore etc.

I deny the major, and to its first proof I say, that although the Holy Fathers and Councils did not remember any other union than that which is made either in unity of nature or in unity of person, it does not follow that they judged another impossible: they spoke indeed of actual union, not truly of the possible: because they were contending against the Eutychian or Nestorian heretics: the former asserted that the union of the Word had been made in unity of nature: the latter denied it had been accomplished in unity either of nature or of person. To the second I say, they teach only that the union of the Word with human nature had been made not in nature, but in person: or into that which is proper to the Son, not what is common to the whole Trinity; yet without denying union in nature, they do not infer necessarily that it must have been made in person, as Varquez contends. Add that they speak of union as actually accomplished, not truly of that by which it could be made. To the third proof I say, Saint Anselm does not necessarily conclude that if the union were not made in unity of person, it must necessarily and absolutely have been made in unity of nature: as though no other mode of union were possible to God; but only, that those two modes, namely in unity of nature and of person, were the only ones in act: namely union in unity of nature in creatures which are composed of diverse parts coalescing into one nature; but the other in unity of person, whereby divine and human nature are joined mutually.

You will insist: If divine nature were united to human nature, as subsistent by absolute subsistence, it would be united either in unity of nature or in unity of person: indeed it would be one singular being: therefore either really identical with the divine nature, by which it would subsist: or completed through a person: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, because otherwise the assuming nature and the assumed nature would be identical: or out of divine and human nature there would be made one certain nature, which is absurd. Not either in unity of person, because the divine nature to which it would be united immediately is not a person: therefore that union is not possible. — I deny the major: for then the assumption or union of human nature would not be made in unity either of nature or of person, but only in unity of the union of divine nature with human nature: from which it would follow that human nature would depend upon divine nature, and be intimately united to it, just as in fact it depends on the Word, because it is intimately united to Him.

You will press: From the fact that a person is the immediate term of the union of nature to the Word, it follows that the nature is united in unity of person: therefore from the fact that divine nature would be the immediate term of the union of human nature, it would follow that that union would be made in unity of nature. — I deny the consequence, because to be joined or assumed in unity of person denotes nothing else than that the nature which is assumed is joined immediately with the person, and is subsistent in that person: but to be united, or assumed in unity of nature signifies, that the assumed nature either be identified with the assuming nature, or make with it a composition, constituting with it some third nature, which certainly utterly conflicts with God. Whence if this consequence holds: Human nature is assumed by a divine person, therefore unto unity of person; yet this would not hold: It is assumed by a nature: therefore unto unity of nature. Because, says the Doctor, dist. 1. qu. 2. toward the end, in the former enthymeme, by the force of the construction of words, it is signified that the subsistence of the divine person is communicated to human nature, without its being identified with it, or making with it any composition: for it is signified only that human nature subsists in the divine person: but in the latter enthymeme, by the force of the construction of words, it is signified that nature is communicated to nature either by identity or by composition; for when it is said that nature is assumed unto unity of nature, it is sufficiently declared that no longer two natures but one single nature from two coalesces: which certainly conflicts with God.

You will object: That absolute subsistence would not impede the resultant of proper personality: therefore this cannot come about. The consequence is evident: for otherwise with the nature a person would at once be assumed. That it is impossible will appear below. But the antecedent is proved: that alone can impede the resultant of created personality which can confer upon it all that which it would have from proper personality: now common subsistence cannot confer upon the assumed nature the incommunicability which proper nature would confer upon it: therefore it cannot impede the resultant of that personality. — I deny the antecedent: for that absolute subsistence may impede proper personality in the assumed nature, it suffices that it confer upon that nature to exist per se, and to be complete essentially, even if it does not confer upon it that incommunicability which is required for the rationale of subsistence; for since the rationale of existing per se is prior in person than incommunicability, which follows only from it, it follows that if the resultant of proper personality is impeded, inasmuch as it is the mode of existing per se and completely essentially, also the resultant thereof will be impeded consequentially, inasmuch as it would be the mode of existing incommunicably. To these add what we said above, either that incommunicability is not of the rationale of subsistence: or that that absolute subsistence would render the assumed nature incommunicable to a supposite really distinct from itself: or finally, that although that assumed nature would not have from its term immediately, namely from absolute subsistence, every manner of incommunicability, nevertheless it would obtain it from mediated terms; for instance from the divine personalities, by which mediately and concomitantly or consequently that nature thus assumed will be terminated, just as the absolute subsistence itself is terminated and becomes incommunicable.

Finally you will object: In that hypothesis, this God is this man: but this man is a person: therefore the nature thus assumed would be assumed in unity of person. — I deny the minor: For just as person is not signified by this term, God; so neither would it be signified by this term, man: whence although this man is ordinarily the name of supposite and of person

You will say: yet it would not be so in the present hypothesis, because namely this man would subsist only by a subsistence which would not be personal, but only such as would effect the nature lastly completed communicably, not truly incommunicably, because this assumed nature, like the subsistence by which it would subsist, would be communicable to the three persons.

You will insist: In that case either each of the divine persons would be man, or not: but both seem absurd: therefore, etc. — I answer, that each would be man, since humanity together with absolute subsistence itself would be communicated to the three persons: nor thence does any inconvenience appear, for if whiteness, e.g. inhering in some surface, existed at once in Peter and Paul, truly Peter and Paul would be white: therefore by equal reason, if the union of divine nature with human were communicated to the three persons together with absolute subsistence itself, without doubt each of those persons would be man, as He is this God subsisting per se.

Note 1. Theologians agree that the three divine persons can together assume and terminate the same humanity with a mediated termination: namely if absolute and common subsistence should assume and terminate that nature immediately: because, as was said in the preceding Question, by the very fact that such common subsistence would terminate that nature and unite it to itself, it would also be terminated by the relative subsistences of the persons, to whom that absolute subsistence would be communicated. They agree moreover that each of the divine persons can assume human nature and unite it hypostatically to itself; since the assumption of nature belongs to person either actively by reason of omnipotence, which is the effective principle of that assumption; or passively by reason of personality, which is the term of that assumption: but each of the divine persons has through omnipotence, and altogether independent personality, infinite power in terminating: therefore each can assume human nature, and become incarnate. Nor would any confusion of persons follow thence, although the Father, were He to become incarnate, would be called Son; for the same person can be called Father and Son under different respects: that divine person would be called Father, inasmuch as He is the principle of the eternal generation of the Word: but He would be called Son, inasmuch as He would be the term of temporal generation from the Virgin: whence He would not be Son of God as the Word is, but only Son of the Virgin.

Note 2. It is certain that the three divine persons reside in the humanity of Christ in a peculiar and nobler manner than in all creatures. Which truth St. Augustine elegantly teaches in Sermon 3. De Tempore, where he says: The Son took flesh, and did not forsake the Father, nor divided Himself from the Father. The Son, I say, took flesh in property: yet the Father and the Holy Spirit were not absent in majesty. In divinity equality, in flesh the property of the Son alone; yet never at any time did divinity depart from the Father or the Holy Spirit. Since therefore there is one Godhead, one divinity, both the Father and the Holy Spirit indeed filled the flesh of Christ: but in majesty, not in assumption, etc. Now this nobler and peculiar residence is gathered from the connection, or rather essential identity, which exists among the divine persons; so that, if per impossibile the three adorable persons did not exist in all creatures, nevertheless on account of the union of one person with humanity, the two others would also reside therein: For just as (says Saint Basil, Epist. 48., in the catena) he who grasps the summit of one ring thereby at once draws along the other inserted into it: so here he who draws the Spirit draws through Him the Son, and with the Father together at once. And if anyone holds he has grasped the Son, he will have Him with both, hence His Father, thence the Holy Spirit compacted on every side. There is therefore no difficulty about the real and personal presence of the three divine persons in the same humanity: but only about their hypostatic union, whether namely all three together could be united hypostatically to the same individual nature.

Note 3. Concerning the present Question there are two principal opinions: The first indeed affirming that the three divine persons can together assume the same nature: which St. Thomas upholds, 3. p. q. 3. art. 6., whom his disciples follow, who to their side summon even from our ranks Alexander, q. 2. memb. 1., St. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 1. art. 1. q. 3., Ockham likewise in 3. dist. 1., and not a few others. But the second opinion the Subtle Doctor upholds in 3. dist. 1. quaest. 2. num. 5., with all his disciples, to whom that we may subscribe, let there be

First Conclusion. — SEVERAL DIVINE PERSONS CANNOT ASSUME THE SAME NATURE IN NUMBER AND TERMINATE IT IMMEDIATELY BY THEIR PROPER SUBSISTENCE.

It is proved first, by the authority of St. Anselm lib. 2. Cur Deus homo, cap. 9., where he says: Several persons cannot assume one and the same man in unity of person: wherefore this must be done in one person only. And in the book De Incarnatione Verbi, cap. 1.: With the Son incarnate, it is not necessary that the other persons also become incarnate, but impossible.

Nor does it avail to reply with St. Thomas, and his disciples, that St. Anselm there takes man for a singular nature personalized by its proper personality; but not for a nature not yet understood as affected by its own personality. — For this response is altogether alien from the mind of St. Anselm: indeed his intent was to investigate in which of the three divine persons the hypostatic union had been made; but he supposes it had not been accomplished in the three divine persons, indeed nor could it have been done, that thence he may gather it was made in one person only, namely the second: and truly indeed, for if by this particle, man, St. Anselm understood human nature affected by its own personality, he would conclude nothing at all; because a hypostasis is equally implied to be assumed by one person as by three. Add that a little later he asserts the Word assumed man, by which word he signifies that nothing else is denoted by the term man than human nature regarded in itself.

It is proved secondly: If the three divine persons could together assume the same nature in number, it would follow that that nature is infinite: but it conflicts that any created nature be infinite: therefore equally it conflicts that it be assumed by several persons. The minor stands. The major is proved: on this account divine nature is concluded infinite, because it itself, the same in number, can be undivided in the three divine supposites: therefore by equal reason, if human nature existed in three supposites, it would be judged infinite. The antecedent is evident, because by what rationale that nature can be in the three divine persons without any division of itself, by the same rationale it could be in infinites, and would have infinite power of existing; because it could exist in infinite persons. The consequence is also evident, because singular human nature, such as is assumed by the Divine Word, is not of itself limited rather to three supposites than to a hundred or a thousand, if there were so many in the divinity: therefore as much as pertains to itself, if it could be in three supposites, it could also be in infinites, if they were given.

The Thomists will reply, that sequel is false: for the same, they say, divine nature is judged infinite, not because it is communicated to three supposites, but chiefly because it is communicated to supposites really indistinct from itself, which it connaturally requires and identifies to itself: but it is otherwise with assumed human nature, which neither would be identified with those supposites, but would be adventitious to them: nor would it require them connaturally, but would be determined to them only by obediential power. — Against this, infinity and illimitation do not arise from that identity alone of one thing toward another, but from aptitude alone, whereby some thing can communicate itself infinitely: for if there were given some whiteness, e.g. which could of itself affect and whiten infinite walls, although it were really distinct from them, and merely adventitious, nevertheless it would no less be judged infinite, because it would contain the power and perfection of infinite whitenesses: therefore by equal reason, if human nature could be communicated to infinite supposites, although it would be adventitious to them, and really distinct from them, it would no less be judged infinite.

It is proved thirdly: Human nature affected with its own subsistence and personality cannot be assumed by the Divine Word: therefore where it is affected with the personality of the Word it can no longer be assumed by the Father, nor by the Holy Spirit. The consequence is evident from parity of rationale; for nature affected with its proper personality is no longer assumable hypostatically because it is completely perfect in every way and terminated substantially: but it is also such by the supposite of the Word: therefore, etc.

The Thomists deny the parity, and bring forward this rationale of disparity, that an open contradiction would follow if a subsistent nature terminated by its proper personality were again terminated by another; for it would be required that it subsist in itself and in another: and thus it would subsist in itself and not subsist; which is contradictory: but it is otherwise if it subsisted in three persons, because it would only subsist in another. — Against this, the contradiction that a nature subsists in itself and in another cannot arise from elsewhere than because, as it subsists in itself, it is totally and adequately terminated and substantially completed, whence it comes about that it can no longer be terminated and completed: now the same rationale of contradiction follows from the fact that nature is terminated by the personality of the Word, because the subsistence of the Word terminates and completes substantially that nature no less perfectly, indeed far more perfectly, than a proper supposite could terminate and complete it; therefore equal rationale on both sides. Add that they gratuitously suppose there is contradiction that a nature subsist in itself and that it subsist in another; for every contradiction must lie in one and the same thing with respect to one and the same: and in that case, human nature would not be in itself and in another with respect to one and the same, because it would be in itself with respect to and by reason of its own subsistence; but in another, by reason of alien subsistence: therefore not only is their reply null, but also less rightly spoken.

The Doctor proves thirdly: One and the same cannot depend adequately upon many: but if created nature were united to three divine persons, it would depend totally and adequately upon many: therefore it conflicts that one and the same nature be assumed by several divine persons. The major seems certain, and the Doctor gathers it by induction. First indeed from the example of total efficient cause: for otherwise it would follow that those causes are total and are not total. They are total, as supposed both by us and by adversaries: but they are not total, since among the intrinsic concepts of total cause is that it produce the whole effect and produce it totally, by the very fact that another cause produced it together with itself, it would follow that either it produced that effect partially with itself, and thus would not be its total cause; or produced it totally, and thus the other cause would influence nothing in the effect, since it would presuppose it produced by the prior total cause. He gathers also by induction in other genera of cause, chiefly indeed in accidents, which since they depend essentially upon subject, one and the same cannot depend upon two first subjects in its genus. But the minor is urged; for that depends totally and adequately upon another which exists with it posited, all other things whatsoever excluded: but created nature assumed by whichever of the three divine persons would truly subsist per se, and would be complete substantially, even if it were not assumed by the other persons, just as in fact it is assumed by the Word alone: therefore if it were assumed by the three, it would depend totally and adequately upon each of those persons. — It is confirmed: because two total efficient causes of the same order cannot produce the same effect in number; because, as was said just now, they would at once be total and not total; therefore by similarity, two extrinsic formal causes, such as the aforesaid persons would be with respect to the termination of that human nature, could not terminate it, because each of them would terminate totally and not totally.

To this rationale the Thomists reply in various ways; but their more common solution is that which Cajetan hands down, saying, that although one and the same effect cannot depend upon two by causal dependence, which is strict; nevertheless it can so depend by non-causal dependence, but terminative, which is non-strict dependence: for the distinction between the two dependences is that an effect produced by a total cause depends totally upon it insofar as it has being from one cause, nor is there left in it a capacity by which it be judged to depend on another, because it borrows no being from that, by reason of which it would be judged to depend upon it: but a nature terminated by alien subsistence does not receive its being from it, but only a certain mode of union, by which it is said to be sustained and terminated by it. Since therefore nature is capable of a triple and diverse mode of union, because it can be united to the three persons at least successively; while it has one mode, and by reason of that is united to one person, it does not remain exhausted according to the extension of its capacity, whereby it can be terminated by another: wherefore another person conferring another mode of union can accede: not indeed out of indigence, but out of capacity alone. Hence that nature would be terminated adequately by one subsistence, indeed by intensive, not however extensive adequation: as is evident in created things from the power of the same relation, whereby it is referred to one son, and by him terminated adequately intensively, while another son is generated, it is again terminated to him by extensive adequation. — Truly against this, first: just as an effect produced by a total efficient cause borrows its being from it totally, so some singular nature receives its total sustentation and termination from its total term: with this sole distinction, that the effect receive being simply from the cause: but nature have only modified being from subsistence: therefore just as the reception of total being from one total cause excludes any other whatsoever total cause of the same order, so the reception of modified being, namely of total sustentation, from one total subsistence ought to exclude any other total subsistence whatsoever. Moreover, nature would be adequately terminated and completed extensively by its proper subsistence: therefore also it is such by the subsistence of the Word, which has no lesser power of terminating nature and exhausting its capacity than proper subsistence. To the example about relation, I say it is false: for just as in each individual of a generated man there is a diverse individual difference determining the specific nature variously, so also there is the adequate rationale of terminating a diverse filiation relation: wherefore it is gratuitously asserted that, sons multiplied, relations are not multiplied: since there are diverse rationales of founding, and all conditions desired for multiplication of relations are found there.

You will object 1: In the mystery of the Incarnation the whole rationale of the fact is of the power making it, says St. Augustine, Epistle 3., which is to Volusianus: therefore in this mystery more is to be attended to the power of the assuming person than the condition of the assumed person: but to Divine Omnipotence it does not conflict that three persons assume one nature: therefore they can accomplish this. The major is evident. The minor is proved: divine persons can assume the same nature if they do not exclude themselves from fellowship of the same nature: but so it is; indeed they subsist in the same divine nature: therefore they also can subsist in the same human nature. — I distinguish the major: the power of the maker is rather to be attended to than the rationale of the fact in those things which do not imply contradiction — I concede: those which do — I deny. But, as we said, it implies that the same nature be terminated totally by several total and adequate terms. To the proof of the minor, I say the rationale is not equal concerning the subsistence of divine persons in divine nature and in human; both because divine nature is infinite, and thus it does not conflict for it to be in several; and because the divine personalities do not confer the rationale of subsisting upon the divine nature, because it subsists of itself through its absolute subsistence, but only upon persons, which are really distinct among themselves: but truly personality confers subsistence upon created nature, which cannot be conferred by several total and adequate subsistences.

You will object 2: Humanity in itself is assumable by any divine person whatever: therefore all together can assume it. The antecedent stands, because, as we said, each of the divine persons can assume human nature. The consequence is proved: in that instant wherein one of the divine persons assumes nature, the other two divine persons can act according to the utmost of their power, that they assume the same nature; in which case, either that nature will be assumed by the three, and thus the intent is had; or by none, which is absurd; since God acting according to every manner of His power cannot be frustrated of effect; or by one only, which cannot be said, since there is no weightier reason why it be assumed by one than by many, since the three divine persons are of equal power, and the assumable nature is in obediential power, to be assumed by any divine person whatever: therefore, etc. — The Doctor answers num. 1. by denying that the three divine persons can expend their power toward the simultaneous assumption of the same nature, on account of their incompossibility in terminating the same nature; for God does not exercise His power about impossibilities and those things which import contradiction, such is that simultaneous assumption. Indeed they can, says the Doctor, the three divine persons together act toward the assumption of that very nature by some person from among them, so that although three act, only one alone assumes and terminates the nature: And if you say, says the Doctor, how each person can at once act toward uniting that nature to itself, I deny: because it is impossible that it be at once united to many: because it is impossible totally to depend with dependence of the same rationale upon several persons, since it is one thing to be terminated toward one person, and persons cannot act at once toward incompossibles.

You will insist: That the three divine persons can accomplish which is in obediential power by order toward any one of them: but created nature is in obediential power, to be assumed by each of the divine persons: therefore the three together can assume it. The major stands. The minor is proved: before nature was assumed by the Son, it could be assumed by the Father: therefore even after it has been assumed by the Son. The consequence is proved: therefore it was assumable by the Father before it was assumed by the Son, because it had obediential power for that assumption: but it has that same power while it is assumed by the Son, for neither could it lose it, since it is really identified with it; therefore it conserves it. It is confirmed: because the obediential power which it had in order toward the Father did not have its act, nor was it fulfilled by its own assumption by the Son; indeed that obediential power was ordered to the union of nature with the Father: but union with the Father is of diverse rationale from union with the Son, as the personality of the Father is of diverse rationale, or at least distinct in number from the personality of the Son: therefore the union which would be made with the Father would be distinguished in number from the union whereby it would be made with the Son; and consequently the power of nature, inasmuch as it respects the personality of the Father, is either of diverse rationale or diverse in number from the power respecting union with the Son; and hence union with the Son does not reduce to act that obediential power of nature, inasmuch as it is ordered toward the Father; therefore notwithstanding the union of that nature with the Son, it still has obediential power, to be united with the Father, and consequently it can still be united. — I distinguish the major: that which is in obediential power, and has no repugnance whatsoever, to be reduced to act — I concede: when it has repugnance for that — I deny. To the minor I say: nature assumed by the Son still has obediential power toward the Father, to be united with Him, in the divided sense — I concede: in the composite sense — I deny: that is, regarded in itself it could indeed be united with the Father; but this it cannot inasmuch as it is assumed and terminated by the Son, because it is now completely perfect in every way substantially, and totally terminated. To the confirmation likewise I deny the final consequence: for although that obediential power did not have act inasmuch as it is ordered toward the Father, it does not follow that it could have it, when already terminated, and reduced to act by the personality of the Son, on account of the incompossibility of total termination, which would be made by the personalities of the Father and of the Son: which truth the Doctor clearly demonstrates answering the aforesaid argument from the example of the wall, which although it has power

You will press: Nature united to the Word has inclination toward proper personality: therefore also toward whatsoever can supply that personality: but the personality of the Father can supply it: therefore it has inclination toward the personality of the Father. — I distinguish the sequel of the major: it has inclination toward all that which can supply its proper personality, if elsewhere there be no impediment and repugnance — I concede: if there be — I deny. And likewise I distinguish the minor: the personality of the Father can supply it, in the divided sense, and on hypothesis that it were not elsewhere assumed — I concede: in the composite sense, where once it is assumed — I deny. Add that the argument can be retorted, because although the nature assumed by the Word conserves inclination toward its own supposite, as supposed, nevertheless it cannot at once with union to the Word have its own personality: therefore although as united to the Word it would have inclination toward the supposite of the Father, it does not follow that it can with union to the Son have union with the Father.

You will object 3: The same accident can be in two subjects: therefore the same nature in two supposites. The consequence is proved by parity of rationale. Also the antecedent stands, because there can be at once two bodies, one glorious, the other not glorious, in the same place, therefore they can have one ubi: but ubi is an accident of them: therefore one accident can be in diverse subjects. But that the same two bodies have the same ubi is evident, because the same place corresponds to them, and consequently the same active circumscription: therefore they also have the same passive circumscription: but passive circumscription is ubi: therefore those two bodies have the same ubi. — The Doctor answers by denying the antecedent, for whose proof he says those two bodies would not have the same ubi, but diverse. And to the proof he answers, that place, in which two bodies would be contained, has two active circumscriptions on the same surface, and consequently there will be two passive circumscriptions in those bodies, because the surrounding surface is a sufficient foundation for grounding several active circumscriptions in several circumscribed bodies, as one whiteness suffices for grounding several similitudes of white in several whites. Truly, since here the Doctor seems to suppose that one accident cannot be in several subjects, whose opposite we ourselves taught from him in Philosophy, therefore I answer by denying the consequence. And the rationale of disparity is, that no contradiction follows from the fact that one accident be posited in several subjects, because this designates only multiplication of presence, and information, which we taught does not conflict in Physics; but it conflicts that the same nature subsist by several subsistences. To the Doctor saying that she denied an accident can be present to several subjects in that mode in which in fact it is present to one unique subject: for in fact it is thus in one subject, that per se and adequately it depends upon it, in which certain mode it cannot exist in several subjects: but in those it can be, so that it depends only partially upon one: but similar things cannot be said of subsistences: because each subsistence confers the whole complete substantial being, and is its ultimate term.

Finally you will object: If simultaneous termination of the same nature to three divine persons conflicted, that repugnance would be sought either from the side of the terminable nature, or from the side of the terminating persons: but from neither head can this repugnance, or contradiction, be found. Not indeed from the side of the terminating persons, because those do not exclude themselves from convening in and terminating the same created nature. Nor yet from the side of nature, because it has obediential power toward all the divine persons: therefore that simultaneous termination by three divine persons does not conflict. — I deny the minor: for that repugnance is sought both from the side of the assuming persons, which since they are total terms with respect to the nature to be assumed, cannot exercise their power at once about the same nature: it conflicts also from the side of the nature, which since it is completely perfect in every way by one subsistence, has not whence it be completed by another. To the proof saying the rationale of divine termination is not the same as human; both because since divine nature is infinite, it can be in several supposites: and because that nature is not completed in its substantial being through relative subsistences, as human nature would be completed: for relative subsistences do not give substantial being to the divine nature, which is already supposed complete on every side through absolute subsistence, but only determine that divine nature toward constituting persons: whence there is no parity between the termination of either nature.

Second Conclusion. — ONE DIVINE PERSON CAN ASSUME SEVERAL CREATED NATURES. As the Doctor in 3. distinct. 1. qu. 5., where he proves the Conclusion thus. That several natures be assumed at once by the Word does not conflict, neither from the side of the Word, nor from the side of the natures: therefore He can assume them. The antecedent is proved first indeed from the side of the Word, because He has infinite power of terminating, thenceforth it cannot be exhausted by the termination of one nature. Add that by that termination only several relations of reason are posited in the Word itself, or the Word itself terminates by its subsistence several real relations of assumed natures. But whether it conflicts with the Word. Not the first, because multiplication of relations of reason argues no change or real dependence in the Word. Nor yet the second, because God, and the whole Trinity, terminate all relations of creatures: therefore the Word can terminate several of those relations. Nor yet does it conflict from the side of creatures, because all are in obediential power, and depend equally upon the divine assuming person: therefore by what rationale one can be assumed, also the other: for actual dependence of one nature does not conflict with the dependence of another nature, says the Doctor.

You will say 1: If the Word assumed several natures, either He would be one man, or several men: but neither can be said. Not the first, because He would have several humanities, and consequently would be multiple man. Nor yet the second because He would be a unique supposite; where there is a unique supposite, there is a unique man, although there be several forms, for he who has several knowledges on account of the unity of supposite is not said to be several knowing ones, but one knowing one. — Richard answers by denying the sequel, namely saying that in that case he would be neither one man, nor several. This response the Doctor attacks: first because one and many are immediate dividing opposites of being: therefore there is no being of which it cannot be said that it is one being, or many beings: therefore of that being which is man, it will be true to say that he is one man, or many men. Secondly, because of every being necessarily must be said that it is one, or not one: therefore since of every being called man it can be said that he is one man, or not one man: but if it be said that he is not one man, it must be said that he is several men, for where one is denied, many are affirmed: namely in affirmation which is made by position. — St. Thomas answers quaest. 3. art. 7. that He would be one man on account of unity of supposite, just as one knowing one is said, although he has several knowledges. Which response the Doctor attacks, because, he says, if the concrete of man ought not to be multiplied when the supposite remains one, it would follow that upon multiplication of the supposite, the concrete ought to be multiplied: but false consequent, because otherwise the three divine persons would have to be called three gods. — Whence the Doctor answers, plurality of concretes is not to be sought from plurality of supposites alone, as Saint Thomas holds, but also from plurality of forms: so that however many supposites may be plural, plurality of concretes should not follow, if the form is single. E.g. from plurality of divine supposites plurality of Gods does not follow, because in divinity there is only a single divinity. For man is said to be an adjectival term with respect to the divine person, as the Doctor teaches dist. 7. qu. 1., and it itself cannot be numbered unless the supposites are numbered. And if it be held that it is a substantive term, and said substantively of its own supposite, nevertheless it is said adjectivally of the supposite of the Word, at least as to mode of predicating: since however every adjective ultimately depends and is terminated toward a substantive, the adjective itself cannot be the ratio of terminating the signification of another adjective of itself. Wherefore since this word homo is adjectival, it cannot terminate the numeral term, two, of itself, because the adjective is reduced to its substantive, nor is it held to be multiplied unless the substantive itself be multiplied. I pass over a fuller discussion of this matter, more grammatical than theological; and I should rather judge that in this case the Word ought not to be called one man, nor several men, but only one supposite having several humanities.

You will say 2: If natures distinct in species were assumed at once by the Word, it would follow that not only two contraries but even two contradictories could be enunciated of the same: but false consequent: therefore, etc. The major is proved: for if the Word assumed fire and water at once, it would follow that heat and cold, which are contraries, exist at once: similarly if He assumed at once a man and a dove, it would follow that one and the same supposite be at once rational and irrational, which are contradictories. — I deny the major: for if the Word assumed water and fire, it would only follow that fire and water be at once simultaneously by simultaneity of supposite and terminator, but not by simultaneity of existence, and interpenetration of the assumed natures. Similarly, if He assumed the nature of man and of dove, no contradiction would follow, which passes only between negation and affirmation regarding one and the same: wherefore indeed it would follow that one and the same being be rational and irrational, not with respect to the same, but with respect to diverse things.

Note 1. From the Doctor in 3. distinct. 1. qu. 4. num. 2., nature can be conceived to be assumed by a created person in two ways: namely either effectively, or terminatively, or formally. Effectively indeed, namely by uniting that nature itself with a created nature, as the whole Trinity united human nature with the Word, and conserves that union; terminatively however, namely by terminating that union and communication of nature, just as the Divine Word terminates and sustains the human nature united to Himself. But it is certain that no created nature can perform either of these by its own power; both because christinity, or created personality, is limited and determined by its proper nature; and because hypostatic union of one nature with another is a miraculous work; but no creature by its own power can accomplish miracles. Therefore neither assume and terminate an alien nature. Whether however either, or both could be done by divine and extraordinary power of God, the Authors do not agree. For Ockham in 3. dist. 1. qu. 1. ad 13. and 11. teaches that a created person can by divine power assume an alien nature, not indeed effectively, but terminatively: to whom very many of ours subscribe: those chiefly who teach that created personality is formally something positive. But the Thomists embrace for the most part the negative part. The Subtle Doctor judges both opinions probable, wherefore he solves the foundations of each. What we should judge truer, that it may become known more openly,

Note 2. Or to be recalled from those things which we taught in Metaphysics: that a created person is the incommunicable existence of rational nature by which and in what manner. That definition, that it may appear more evidently, it must be known that there is a twofold communicability, insofar as at present concerns: the first is whereby something is communicated to another, as form, or as part: in which manner soul is communicated to body, humanity to Peter, and the arm to the integral whole: and this is called communicability as quo, because what is thus communicated is that whereby something is such, e.g. an animate body, Peter a man. The second is whereby something is communicated to another through identity, for instance common nature toward its inferiors: and this is called communicability as quod, because what is thus communicated is really identical with the other to which it is communicated: thus man is communicated to Peter and Paul, and the divine essence to the three persons. Negation of the first communicability, both actual and aptitudinal, is that whereby person is constituted in the rationale of person: hence a separated soul is not a person, because although it is not actually communicated, it nevertheless has aptitude to be again united and communicated to its body: similarly the humanity of Christ cannot be called a person, although it be actually and aptitudinally incommunicable and uncommunicated as quod, since indeed it cannot be predicated of many: nevertheless it is communicable and communicated as quo, as total form of the supposite and person of the Word.

Note 3. That from those two negations the posterior arises from individuation of the specific nature, because therefore a person is not communicable as quod to several individuals actually and aptitudinally, since it has been determined and contracted by haecceity and individual difference to the being of an individual: whence even if this be personalized by an alien personality, as happens in the humanity of Christ, nevertheless it carries with it this negation. But the other negation of communicability, namely as quo, arises not from any positive entity of the individual, or person, but from the defect of the action of an extrinsic agent not uniting that nature itself with an alien person: for from the fact that some extrinsic agent has not caused a union between the individual nature and some alien personality, the individual nature remains without union with alien personality, whence it remains in itself personalized by its own personality.

These things premised, two things are now to be determined: First indeed, whether by divine power a created person can effectively assume and sustain an alien nature: secondly truly, whether it can at least perform this terminatively.

First Conclusion. — A CREATED PERSON CANNOT OF ITSELF EFFECTIVELY ASSUME AN ALIEN NATURE, NOR UNITE IT TO ITSELF HYPOSTATICALLY. So the Doctor in the praised place, and he proves it thus: Created nature can absolutely be assumed effectively unto hypostatic union, with respect to which it has obediential power: but no nature has obediential power toward any creature: otherwise that power would not be called obediential, but natural, inasmuch as natural power is opposed to obediential: therefore no created person can effectively assume an alien nature. The major is evident: since indeed that assumption of nature far exceeds, as was said in the first Notable, and on that account the mystery of the Incarnation is called the greatest of all miracles, and the work of the right hand of the Most High, it is evident that it cannot come about connaturally, but requires for it a virtue exceeding every effort of nature. The minor also stands, since obediential power in a creature respects taking all its efficiency from the first cause, to which as principle of all efficiency it is subordinated and subjected. — Then, no particular creature can overturn, destroy, or impede that which of itself belongs to the universal order of the term immediately subject to the first cause: but the proper subsistence of some nature, and its flux, or emanation, pertains to said order: therefore no creature can invert it, consequently impede that subsistence from flowing from that individual nature, and presently it will not be able to take it effectively to itself. Finally, a created supposite, according to the more probable opinion, says formal negation: but negation cannot have effective virtue, partial or total, with respect to that positive thing: therefore, etc.

You will say 1: As a created person can unite some nature to an alien supposite, so can it unite the same with the proper supposite of that nature: now the latter not only can be done, but is done daily. For while a father produces a son, as he seems to attain union of body with soul, so also he seems to unite the nature of his son with its own supposite, because he produces that nature subsistent and supposited: therefore either he himself, or at least an Angel, could also unite that nature effectively with an alien supposite. — I answer first, denying the minor: for properly speaking it is false that he who produces a singular nature unites it with its proper supposite: just as neither does he properly unite it with its properties, which rather are said to have been produced out of the nature than to be united to it. I answer secondly, denying the major: both because given that the producer of nature unites it with its own supposite, then he would not invert, indeed he follows the universal order of things; but for him to unite it with an alien supposite, the prescribed order of things would have to be inverted, which certainly a second cause cannot accomplish: and because just as a father cannot unite the body of his son with a soul other than that which is proper to the son, so must it be said of nature with respect to its proper supposite.

You will say 2: An agent of superior order which contains the perfection of the inferior can supply its power, and effect: but an angelic person, e.g., is of superior order respectively toward human, and virtually contains every perfection of men: therefore it can supply the human person, and perform its offices, and consequently can unite human nature to itself hypostatically. — The Doctor denies the minor num. 1: for just as an Angel does not contain visual power, so as to be able to supply its defect, although he has powers far superior to the faculty of vision, so although in the rationale of person he be formally more excellent than a human person, it does not necessarily follow that he can supply the defect, and perform the offices, of a human person. Add that it can be denied that the Angelic person in the rationale of person is more excellent than human personality.

Second Conclusion. — IT IS PROBABLE THAT BY THE EXTRAORDINARY POWER OF GOD CREATED PERSONALITY CAN TERMINATE AN ALIEN NATURE, AND BE UNITED TO IT HYPOSTATICALLY.

It is proved first from St. Jerome on chapter 1 of Aggeus: where after he pursues the opinion of certain ones saying Malachy, Aggaeus, and St. John Baptist were Angels in assumed bodies, he adds himself:

It is no wonder if this be believed of Angels: since on account of sins the Son of God Himself took flesh. The same Tertullian had taught before lib. 3. Contra Marcionem cap. 7. Hence it is evidently gathered that the assertion in the Conclusion is at least possible, although perhaps in truth this may never have happened.

It is proved secondly: All that which does not import manifest contradiction, or repugnance, ought to be attributed to extraordinary divine power: but no repugnance appears that created personality terminate beyond its proper nature also an alien nature: therefore, etc. The major stands; the truth of the matter will appear at last from the solution of all the rationales which the Adversaries bring forward for the negative opinion.

You will object first: A supposite terminating an alien nature must be altogether independent: but any created supposite whatever is not independent: therefore it cannot terminate an alien nature. The minor is evident: for whatsoever is a creature, by that very fact is dependent. But the major is proved: both because by this very rationale we proved the divine Word terminates human nature because He be independent in the rationale of person: and because since nature is sustained through supposite, and that only through soul, otherwise per se, so that already the supposite be altogether first, and independent. — The Doctor answers, that it is not so true that a supposite must be altogether independent in order to terminate: for although that be the reason why the Word terminates human nature, nevertheless it could come about that for another reason a created supposite would terminate the dependence of another nature, if it were assumed by God to perform this, just as created substance adequately terminates the dependence of an accident in the rationale of subject, and yet is not simply independent: indeed proper personality itself terminates the dependence of its own nature: although that not be simply independent.

They object 2: Two created natures are not unifiable in the same supposite unless one has the mode of act, the other truly the mode of potency: but in hypostatic union, whereof we now speak, such union of natures would not be given, since the natures must remain unmixed: but natures which are united as act and potency do not remain unmixed, but from them a third entity and composite is made: therefore they cannot mutually convene in one unique created supposite. — The Doctor answers, denying the major: for if on account of the assigned rationale two natures had incompossibility in a created supposite, they would have the same in an uncreated supposite: and consequently they would be incompossible, because those natures subsisting through an uncreated supposite, as is truly so in the Incarnation, do not have the rationale of act and potency: therefore if notwithstanding this a created nature can be terminated through the personality of the Word, also it can be terminated through created personalities: for if two natures, for instance divine and human, can subsist through the supposite of the Word, without one being act, the other truly potency, why would not the very same happen, if two created natures subsisted in the same created personality?

It is objected 3: If two natures could be terminated through a supposite, or created personality, the Incarnation of the Word would be a singular mystery, and without example, nor consequently wonderful: but the consequent is absurd: therefore, etc. — I deny the major: for although perhaps it would not be equally wonderful as now it is, nevertheless no less would it be worthy of all admiration: for what more wonderful can be feigned than that, as the Apostle says, He who is the splendor of glory and the figure of the substance of the eternal Father, coequal to Him in all things, emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men?

You will object 4. If created subsistence could terminate the dependence of human nature, and render it formally subsistent, it would have from its nature the power to do this: but this is false: because thence it would follow that it could naturally perform so great an effect; for what it can intrinsically perform from its nature, that it performs naturally: it would follow also that connaturally it would require to perform this, and would have all concourse required for doing it. — I deny the major: for if it were true, it would likewise follow that the divine Word would require connaturally to terminate the dependence and hypostatic union of human nature, which is absurd. It would follow also that the soul would naturally demand to receive supernatural habits, and to terminate their inherence, because from its intrinsic nature without anything superadded it can receive those habits. Therefore although every natural power can be reduced to act naturally, nevertheless that is not true of obediential power, such as that would be which a created supposite would have toward terminating the union of another nature.

You will object 5. Subsistence terminating several natures must be infinite: but no created subsistence and personality is infinite: therefore it cannot terminate several natures. The minor is evident: both because everything created is finite: and also because created subsistence is limited by that nature whose complement and term it is. But the major is proved: subsistence terminating several natures performs the offices of subsistences which are proper to those natures: but it cannot perform their offices unless it contain them eminently, and consequently unless it be infinite. Therefore, whereby it could terminate one nature, it could also terminate infinites, if they were given: therefore, etc. — The reader denies the major, since indeed the personality of the Word formally speaking is not infinite, but only really, and yet sustains and terminates an alien nature. And to the proof I answer, that it is manifest petitio principii, while it is said that one created subsistence does not virtually contain the perfection of another, so much as required for completing the nature, and rendering itself apt, that it exercise its operations as easily as if it were affected with proper subsistence. In confirmation I say, truly indeed created subsistence could terminate infinite natures, if they were given, yet it would not on that account be judged infinite, because extrinsic and syncategorematic illimitation, such as that would be which would be sought from termination of natures, does not import infinity, but only intrinsic and categorematic illimitation: hence whiteness, which could terminate infinite similitudes, if they were given, would not on that account be judged intrinsically infinite.

You will object 6. One created nature cannot at once be terminated by several persons: therefore neither can one created person at once assume several natures. — I deny the parity, and the rationale of disparity is open: for on this account one created nature cannot at once be terminated by several persons, because, as we said, each of them is final cause of personating, or terminating, nature: but truly one created person with respect to diverse natures causes not the same termination but diverse, since certainly it does not conflict: just as it does not conflict that one efficient cause produce diverse effects, or that one point, which from its own nature is ordered toward terminating a unique line, could terminate, and in fact terminates all those which are drawn from the circumference toward itself.

You will object 7. Subsistence is a mode of nature: but it implies the mode of one thing modifying another: for it implies that I sit through the sitting of another, and that one accident inhere through the inherence of another accident: therefore it implies created nature to be terminated by the subsistence of another. — I answer first, denying the minor: for divine subsistence, regarded formally, is a mode of the Divine Essence, just as, according to some, created subsistence is a mode of singular created nature; and yet it can terminate the subsistence of created nature, and effect it subsistent: therefore some mode can confer its formal effect upon another thing than that of which it is the mode. I answer secondly, the major to be true of intrinsic modification, which is made through inherence; not truly of extrinsic, which is made through termination, such is modification made through subsistence. Add that the major is perhaps true of positive modes, not truly of negative ones, such is the formal rationale of subsistence.

You will object 8. The formal rationale of terminating the dependence and communication of nature ought to be something real and positive: now according to our opinion, a created person is not constituted through something real and positive, but only through a twofold negation of communication, and communicability: therefore it cannot terminate an alien nature. The major stands: both because the relation of humanity assumed by the Word is terminated toward something real and positive, namely toward His subsistence: and because the term of real and positive relation must be something real and positive. — I answer, that in that case, the relation of the assumed nature would be terminated toward something positive, namely toward the singular nature of that created person, not indeed taken naked, but with the adjunct to it of the twofold negation of communicability, whereby it seems sufficient for sustaining an alien nature, and rendering it incommunicable in the composite sense: and thus that relation of real union would not be terminated toward negation, which is personality, as toward a terminus qui, but as toward a terminus quo. But it is not inconvenient that a real relation should have for formal term quo some negation: because relation only requires positive extremes: it does not require that the formal rationales of the extremes be positive; relations of diversity, which pertain to the first genus of relatives, are founded in lack of identity, which lack and negation is the formal rationale whereby those relations are terminated.