Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Note 1. That union is called immediate whereby two things are joined to each other without a medium: but by medium I here understand that without whose precedence one extreme would not be conjoined to the other. Now such a medium can be assigned as twofold: one indeed intrinsic, the other extrinsic. The intrinsic medium is that by which a thing is intrinsically coupled with another, namely through a substantial or essential union; and that is for the most part some part, either integral or essential, of one extreme: thus the heart or brain in the human body, since it is the reason of the union of the soul with it, without which the soul would not be united to the body, is called an intrinsic medium. But the extrinsic medium is that whereby the extremes are joined only accidentally: thus a quality disposing one extreme to its union with another — for instance dryness or heat for the introduction of the form of fire into a subject — is called an extrinsic medium. Moreover this extrinsic medium is of two kinds: for one is called of necessity, which is so necessary for the union of two things that, it not being posited, union does not follow, and, it being removed, union dissolves: thus natural heat in the human body is a medium necessary for the union and conservation of soul with body: the other is called a medium of congruity, without which indeed union can absolutely come about; yet it does not befit it to occur without it: such are merits with respect to the beatific union of a rational creature with God through vision and fruition: for God could beatify some adult without merits, yet it would not befit His justice, nor does divine providence prescribe an order whereby it decreed to bestow beatitude either as the inheritance of sons, or as the reward of laborers, or as the crown of victors.

Note 2. From the Seraphic Doctor in dist. 8, q. 6, art. 2, that union can be considered in two ways: either inasmuch as two things concur in nature; or inasmuch as they concur in person:

In the former way we may assert that such unity in Christ is in a certain way none, in a certain way great; in a certain way small, in a certain way supreme. For if we compare the divine nature to the human, so in Christ there is no unity of nature, because these two natures cannot together concur into one nature: but if we speak of the nature of Christ on the part of the body, so the unity is small, because of the multiplicity of parts: but if we speak of unity as regards the soul, so there is in Him a great unity because of the simplicity of the soul: but if we speak of Him as regards the divine nature, so the unity in Him is supreme because of the most excellent simplicity of that nature. — But if the discourse be made concerning the unity whereby certain things are said to be one by concurrence in person, a controversy arises among Authors whether that union be the greatest of all unions.

NOTABLE 3. That some two things are united in some third thing in a twofold way: First, as in a term produced and composed from those extremes; thus matter and form are united in the composite: Second, as by a common nexus and bond: thus two boards are united in glue, and two parts of quantity in a common term. In the former way, the greater the union and unity, the less the extremes differ from each other according to entity or essence. In the latter way, however, the union must be judged greater, the simpler and more indivisible that nexus is; and thus two parts of quantity are more united in an indivisible common term than are two boards in glue.

These things premised, two things are to be determined: first indeed, whether the hypostatic union is immediate: secondly, whether it is the greatest of all unions, both in virtue of the extremes and in virtue of the bond.

First Conclusion. — THE HYPOSTATIC UNION IS IMMEDIATE THROUGH THE EXCLUSION OF EVERY EXTRINSIC MEDIUM. This is gathered from what we said in the preceding Article, wherein we proved that through unition, or the incarnative action, nothing else is produced than a relation adventitious from without, whereby the extremes are said to be united formally.

It is proved moreover: if any medium were present in the union of the divine nature with the human, that medium would especially inhere in the humanity, for this alone is susceptive of accident: but it is not so. I prove it: if any medium had been infused into the humanity before it was assumed by the Word, it would have been either grace or some other accident: but not only was such a medium not infused into the humanity; it could not even have been present: therefore there was none. The major is evident. The minor is proved: that which pertains to the substantial complement of a created nature is prior in it to any accident whatsoever: but the supposit of the Word, as bearing the office of a created supposit, pertains to the substantial complement of the assumed humanity: therefore it is priorly united to it than any accident is received. The major is certain: since it is prior that some subject be complete in the ratio of subject than that it be susceptive of any accident; but a substance is not completed in the ratio of subject unless it has its substantial complement.

You will say 1. Matter and form are not united without prior dispositions, which are extrinsic media: therefore dispositions are likewise required on the part of the humanity, that it be made apt for the hypostatic union. — I deny the parity; since in the humanity to be united with the Word there are no contrary dispositions which must be expelled by contrary qualities; such as exist in matter informed by the form of water or wood, e.g., with respect to the form of fire to be received. For there is no repugnance on the part of humanity, that it be terminated by the personality of the Word: for if there were anything repugnant, it would especially be its own personality, which, since it is absent, cannot stand in the way of this hypostatic union.

You will say 2. For the beatific union of the soul with God some extrinsic medium is prerequisite in the soul; for instance the light of glory in the intellect, and the habit of charity in the consummated will; therefore by equal reason some extrinsic medium is required on the part of the assumed nature for the hypostatic union, whereby it may become capable of that union and assumption. — I deny the parity: because the beatific union comes about through the operation of the faculties of intellect and will, and for that operation it is necessarily prerequisite that those faculties be complete in the ratio of an operator, and proportioned to the supernatural object; and they cannot be so without an accidental medium completing them in first act and elevating them to the supernatural state: but such a medium is not required on the part of the assumed nature; but it suffices that it be in obediential potency with respect to the Word assuming it: for if some supernatural accident were prerequisite, whereby it might be presented in a supernatural state proximately apt for that assumption, a process would go on to infinity; since for the reception of that natural medium it would have to be prepared through another medium, which indeed no one would admit.

Second Conclusion. — THE HYPOSTATIC UNION ON THE PART OF THE UNITED EXTREMES IS NOT THE GREATEST OF ALL: BUT SUCH IT CAN BE CALLED IN VIRTUE OF THE BOND, OR OF THE SUPPOSIT OF THE WORD, WHEREBY THOSE NATURES ARE JOINED TO EACH OTHER. This is common as regards both parts. The Doctor teaches both in dist. 3, 6, n. 9, q. 1, where answering the authority of St. Bernard, who teaches the hypostatic union to be the greatest of all, he says first: Here is not the greatest unity: because here is the greatest distinction of natures. In the second way the greatest unity after the unity of the Trinity can be conceded, because one itself, unity in itself is most perfect, because the one is infinite, and the other is a substance perfect in itself, and from the union of it to the remainder it is most perfect through the communication of idioms, because it is God. — By these words the Doctor says first, that union not to be the greatest of all in virtue of the extremes; because any union is the less great on the part of the extremes the more those extremes differ from each other; hence the union of accident and subject is lesser than that of matter and form, because subject and accident differ more and have a less proportion than matter and form: but the divine and human natures have less proportion to each other; since they have no inclination toward the hypostatic union, and differ more from each other than matter and form: therefore on this account the hypostatic union is not the greatest and strictest of all unions. Further, that union is the less great, the more its extremes recede from identity and unity: but the divine and human natures recede more from identity and unity in Christ than matter and form in a physical composite: since those two natures, wholly distinct according to their entity, have distinct faculties and properties in Christ: but not so matter and form, which coalesce into a third entity. Finally, that union is the less great which makes its extremes less united to each other: but this union makes its extremes, namely the divine and human nature, less united to each other than does the union of substance with its own proper subsistence, because in the latter the extremes are quasi the same with each other really; in the former they are wholly really distinct from each other: therefore the hypostatic union in virtue of the extremes is not the greatest of all.

The second part the Seraphic Doctor above praised thus proves, namely, that the hypostatic union in virtue of the person, in whom the two natures, divine and human, concur, is the greatest of all. He proves it, I say, by a fourfold reason: namely on account of the simplicity of that person, because the union is in the person of the Word, which indeed is most simple. 2. On account of the dignity of the unibles, because both the assuming and the assumed nature hold excellence among the rest of things that are. 3. On account of inseparability, because the union of those natures is fortified by so strong a bond that separation never occurs, nor can occur; for that nature among the other natures adhered to the eternal Word, by which everything that is under Him is borne and sustained. 4. Finally on account of singularity, because never was any union like to this. And St. Bernard confirms this book 5, On Consideration, chapter 5, where having enumerated nine modes of union, he concludes that the union of the Trinity is the greatest, and that next to it is joined the union of incarnation: Among all things that are rightly called one, holds the citadel the unity of the Trinity: whereby three persons are one substance: in second place excels that where conversely three substances are one in the person of Christ. Wherefore the same Bernard, subjoining, asserts Divinity to have been stronger in joining flesh to itself than soul to body, because the soul is separated from the body by death, but not so the flesh from the divinity of Christ by the Passion: for what the Word once assumed, He never laid aside. Hence St. Leo, serm. 17, On the Passion: Into so great a unity has the nature of God and man come together, that it could neither be broken by punishment nor sundered by death.

You will say 1. Things most distant are least unible, and things least unible least make one: but divinity and humanity are most distant: therefore they are least unible; and consequently the union which is in Christ is in the lowest grade of all unions. — I distinguish the major: Things most distant, both according to entity and according to influence, will be least unible, I concede: only according to entity, I deny. To the minor I say that God indeed differs infinitely from the creature according to essence; yet not according to influence and the sustentation of the creature; for on this account He is most approximated to it, and therefore the unity between Creator and creature can be greatest, according to the ratio of the sustainer, such as exists in personal union.

You will say 2. The fewer principles something consists of, the more it is one: but in Christ is found a greater plurality of natures than in any other being, whether created or uncreated: therefore in Him is less unity than in other beings. — I distinguish the major: The fewer principles something consists of, the more it is one by a union made through composition and constitution of parts, I concede: otherwise, I deny. But the unity which is in Christ does not result from the composition of natures and the constitution of parts; but only from their sustentation through the same indivisible and most simple supposit of the Word; and hence the unity of Christ is not the least.

You will say 3. That which is one in nature and person is more one than that which is so in person only: but every man has unity in nature and person: Christ however has unity in nature only: therefore a greater perfection of unity is in every man than in Christ. — The Seraphic Doctor distinguishes the major: When the unity of person follows the unity of nature, he concedes: then indeed composition in nature makes also composition in person: otherwise he denies. But in Christ the unity of person precedes the unity of the assumed nature: hence the assumed nature induces no composition with the assuming Word, at least no composition properly so called and perfect, as we said above.