Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Note 1. That the term of the productive action is customarily distinguished as twofold: one namely total and adequate, the other formal. The total term is nothing other than the whole thing itself which comes to be through the action: thus in human generation the total term is the generated man, in whitening it is the white thing. The formal term, however, is that form by means of which the total term is completed and perfected: or the form which is the reason why the action itself is terminated to the total and adequate term: thus in whitening the whiteness produced is the formal ratio, or form, by which the thing becomes white. The former term is also called the term which, namely that which terminates the action totally and adequately; the latter is called the term whereby; because by means of it the action is terminated: thus in substantial generation the term which, or total term, is the supposit, or the composite of nature and subsistence: but the term whereby, or formal term, is the substantial form itself, by which the composite has being.

Note 2. That no controversy, or at least no weighty one, is found among Theologians concerning the total term of the unitive action, that is, of the assumption of humanity to the Word: for all agree that such a term is Christ, or the person composed of divine and human nature; namely the God-man, that is, the Divine Word subsisting in humanity; for He is the total and adequate term of the Incarnation who has being through the Incarnation: but Christ has being through the Incarnation; and therefore He is its term. But a grave difficulty, and one very intricate, is raised, especially among more recent Theologians, as to what is the formal term whereby, or unto which, of the hypostatic union; in resolving whose controversy Authors vary, and are divided especially into four opinions: The first is that of those who hold the formal term whereby, or unto which, of the Incarnation to be the personality of the Word. So Alvarez disp. 13, conclus. 3. The second opinion says that the formal term unto which of this action is the substantial mode of union, by which the Divine Word is said to be joined to the assumed humanity. So Suarez disp. 8, sect. 2. The third opinion contends that the term itself is the humanity, as united to the Word, so that union is a condition prerequisite to that termination. Thus teaches Vasquez disp. 19, cap. 2. Finally the fourth opinion contends that, since the hypostatic union can be considered in diverse ways — namely, either inasmuch as it is a communication of the divine subsistence, or inasmuch as it is an assumption of human nature, or insofar as it is a union of the divine nature with the human — although the Incarnation be one and the same action in reality, nevertheless according to these diverse considerations it has also diverse terms; which opinion indeed, as the more probable and truer, that it may be shown more evidently

Note 3. That although the Incarnation, or the unitive action of the divine nature with the human into the unity of person, be a simple and undivided action, common equally to the three adorable Persons; nevertheless, according to its diverse habitude and relation to diverse things, it also acquires various appellations, in virtue of which it can be called manifold. For if it be viewed with respect to the principle by which it is effected, it is called unition; if with respect to the divine nature, which is joined to the humanity, it is called communication, or transfusion, whereby the Divinity enters into the assumed humanity in a more intimate and peculiar manner than into other beings, to which it is present only by an infusion of immensity, whereby it fills heaven and earth, but not by the bond of personality, whereby it joins the divine nature with the human: finally, if the Incarnation be considered with respect to the nature assumed, it is called humanation, or incarnation: whereby God, summoning humanity into the fellowship of His Divinity, joined it forever with the closest bond of the same person. These things premised, let

First Conclusion. — The total and adequate term of the unitive and conjoining action of the Word with human nature is Christ, namely the God-man.

So commonly all Theologians, and

Proof: The total and adequate term of the unitive action of two extremes is the composite resulting from them: but Christ, inasmuch as He is God-man subsisting in the unity of person, is the composite resulting from the unitive action of the Divinity with humanity: therefore He is the total and adequate term of that unitive action. The major stands by induction, since the total and adequate term either of generation, or of composition, or of resurrection, is nothing other than the very composite resulting from parts united; for nothing else is intended by the unitive action than the composite resulting from the union of the extremes. The minor likewise stands from what has been said: since Christ is the very Word subsisting in our humanity according to the unity of person, by which the divine and human natures are joined together and subsist.

You will say: The total term of the Incarnation must be something created: but Christ is not something simply created: therefore He is not the total term of the Incarnation. The major appears, because every action performed in time is productive of something temporal: but the Incarnation was wrought in the fullness of time: therefore the term produced by it is temporal: but everything temporal is created, and hence the term of the incarnative action is something created. The minor also is true: since Christ connotes the Divine nature, by which He far excels the human, and the supposit of the Word, which is infinite and uncreated, He must even be called something uncreated; since denomination is taken from the nobler part: and consequently another term must be assigned as the total and adequate term of the incarnative action than Christ.

I answer, that the total and adequate term can be considered in a twofold manner: either materially and disjunctively, in virtue of the extremes from which it coalesces; or formally and copulatively, in virtue of the conjunction and union of both extremes. In the former way something uncreated and created, eternal and temporal, can be said, namely in virtue of the human and divine nature, and of the supposit of the Word: in the latter, however, it can be called simply something created, since that union is created — if you use the name creation broadly — not indeed for a thing, which it presupposes nothing of; for in truth union presupposes the divine and human nature; but inasmuch as it signifies the action by which something is made that before was not; for Christ was made in time through the unitive action of the Divinity with humanity in the unity of person: whence, since the composite, or total term of any substantial union, is not denominated from the parts taken in themselves, but from their union together, as is clear from the example of man, who is called mortal although he has an immortal soul, Christ can be said absolutely to be something created and temporal, because the union of Divinity with humanity was made in time; for "uncreated" denotes every negation of beginning and ceasing, and therefore if that adequate term were thus called uncreated in the ratio of term, it would be denied that this hypostatic union was made in time, which is plainly false, as appears from that saying of John: the Word was made flesh, and also from the Creed, wherein Christ is said to be conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, and made man. Nor does it matter that neither the Word nor the divine nature, which hold the chief place in Christ, are something uncreated and eternal: for in order that some composite be said to be made formally, it is not necessary that the extremes have been produced through the action from which it results; but it suffices that they were joined together; for if anyone should unite a preexisting whiteness, separate, to a subject, he would truly produce white, although the extremes existed before the union: therefore although through the union of humanity to the Word neither the Word itself nor the divine nature itself be made, nevertheless Christ, resulting from that union, must no less on that account be called produced and temporal, because those extremes were joined together in time by the unitive action.

Second Conclusion. — The Incarnation considered as a communication of the divine substance has for its term the personality of the Word: as humanation or Incarnation, its term is the humanity: as unition, its formal term is union.

The three parts of this Conclusion are evident. The first indeed, for the formal term unto which of communication is that which is communicated: but the supposit of the Word is that which is formally communicated to the human nature: therefore according to this consideration, the supposit of the Word is the formal term of the Incarnation. The second part likewise becomes clear, for the formal term of the Incarnation, as it is humanation, is that which has in the total term quasi the ratio of form: but that from which Christ formally has it that He is man is the very humanity: therefore it is the formal term. Finally the third part stands likewise, namely that union is the formal term of the production, for the formal term of a productive action, as such, is that which is produced through the action itself, but that which is produced through unition is the union itself: therefore it is the formal term of the Incarnation, insofar as it is the unition of the divine nature with the human.

You will say: That has the ratio of formal term in the Incarnation which especially has the ratio of perfective form: but the Divine Word has the ratio of perfective form, for it is act terminating and perfecting the humanity, which is quasi matter terminated and perfected through the personality of the Word: therefore the formal term is the personality of the Word itself.

I distinguish the major: That which has the ratio of perfective form in the ratio of communication, I concede: in the ratio of unition or humanation, I deny. And similarly distinguishing the minor, I deny the consequence. Indeed I confess that the Divine Word can be called the formal term of the Incarnation, inasmuch as it is called a communication of the divine nature and of the personality of the Word, but not inasmuch as it is humanation or production.

You will urge: The Divine Word performs the same that a created personality would perform if present: but if a created personality were present, it would truly be a form actualizing the humanity, inasmuch as it is humanity: therefore the Word is the formal term of the humanity itself, and consequently of the Incarnation inasmuch as it is humanation.

I answer, that the Incarnation can be viewed either insofar as it tends to personal esse precisely and formally, or absolutely insofar as it tends that God be man. In the former way we can say that personality is the formal term, since that is that whereby personal esse is given: but absolutely, and insofar as God becomes man through the Incarnation, personality cannot precisely be called its formal term, since that of a created action and mutation; the Divine Word, eternal and immutable, cannot be called the formal term.