Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

Note 1. As regards the present Question, a threefold union can be distinguished: either by apposition, or by composition, or by sustentation. Union by the apposition of one thing to another takes place in three ways, as our Alensis observes, question 1, article 1. For, he says, sometimes one thing is united to another by apposition in such a way that it contracts from it neither denomination nor property; thus stone is applied to stone in a heap, and one thing is made of them by aggregation, and yet one stone draws from the other neither designation nor property. But sometimes one thing is applied to another so that it receives from it a property, but not denomination: thus flowers, and aromatic and odoriferous things impress their odor upon the hand, so that the hand contracts from them a property, namely odor, but not denomination; for the hand is indeed called odoriferous from the flower, but it is not called a flower. Sometimes truly one thing is joined to another so that it receives from that other denomination, but not property: thus when someone puts on a garment he receives denomination from the garment, and is said to be clothed in this or that manner; but he receives from it no property by which he be physically affected. Union by composition takes place chiefly in two ways, by reason of the twofold form, either substantial or accidental, according to which the union occurs. Substantial union is that by which two substances are united to one another after the manner of act and potency, that is, after the manner of matter and form. And this also happens in two ways: for sometimes in that union the nature of each extreme is preserved, and entirely distinct, whether some third thing meanwhile be made from them, as from the union of the rational soul with the human body there is made a third thing, namely man; yet both unities remaining distinct, namely body and soul, which are distinct in man: or whether no third thing results from the united things, as when the grafting of a shoot of a pear with an apple, for example, no third thing results, namely any tree which would be neither pear nor apple: but sometimes the nature of neither is preserved; rather they pass into a third entity, and some third thing is made distinct from the extremes. Accidental union is that by which either an accident is united to a substance, as whiteness to a wall, or an accident to an accident, as the whiteness which inheres in the quantity of the Eucharist, or a substance to another substance after some accidental manner, as form to matter through the union, which is a relation. Finally, union by sustentation is that by which some rational nature is assumed into the unity of a person, or an irrational nature is assumed into the unity of a supposit, or an accidental nature into the unity of a sustaining subject.

NOTANDUM 2. Two extremes unite with one another by unitive action in three ways: In the first mode, by producing the whole composite, and together with it producing each of its parts: such is the creation of the heavens, by which both matter and form are created together and are united to one another. Second, by producing only one extreme, and joining it to the other already pre-existing. Such is the action by which the material form is educed from the potency of matter: for it is at once productive and unitive of such a form with matter. In the third mode the action is merely unitive, and not productive of the extremes: but only of the composite, which results from the conjunction of both; such is the unitive action of the soul with the body in the resurrection. It is certain, however, that the Incarnation is not a productive union of both extremes; since the Word is eternal and subject to no temporal production; nor is it productive even of the humanity, because the action by which the humanity is produced is other than the unitive action of the same with the Word, as will appear within. — The difficulty therefore is, whether that action by which the Word is united to the humanity is productive of some formal term, distinct both from the Word and from the humanity, by means of which that humanity may be united to the Word. Concerning the resolution of this authors vary: for Gregory of Rimini, in book 3, distinction 28, question 2, whom Gregory de Valentia subscribes in part 3, disputation 1, question 2, point 5, and many others, contend that by this unitive action nothing was produced in the humanity distinct from it, by which it might be formally united to the divine Word. — The second opinion is that of Gabriel, in book 3, distinction 30, question 1, who holds that by the action of incarnating there is produced a certain absolute and supernatural quality by which the humanity is united to the Word, and he calls that quality the Grace of union. — The third opinion is that of Suarez, disputation 8, section 2, and Gabriel Vasquez, disputation 18, chapter 3, who assert that the formal term of the aforementioned unitive action is some substantial mode; distinct not really, but only ex natura rei, from the humanity; which mode is the foundation of the relation that intervenes between the humanity and the Word. The fourth opinion finally is that of the Doctor, in book 3, distinction 1, question 1, number 3, who teaches that by the action of incarnating there is produced the formal term, namely union, which is an extrinsic adventitious relation, by reason of which the human nature is said to be formally united to the Word.

NOTANDUM 3. Or rather, to be repeated from the Logicians, so far as regards the present undertaking: categorical relation is divided into intrinsic and extrinsic adventitious. The former is that which results from the foundation and term being posited, and desires nothing extrinsic for its resulting: as similarity, which arises between two white things; for by the very fact that they are white they are similar. The latter, however, does not arise precisely from the position and existence of the foundation and term, but furthermore desires something extrinsic, without which it would not arise: thus although fire and wood to be burned exist, still no respect arises between the transmutative fire and the transmutable wood unless an approximation of both be made. Moreover, relation is subdivided into mutual and non-mutual. Mutual is that which has a relation corresponding to itself in the term to which it is referred. Thus paternity has filiation corresponding to itself. Non-mutual is that which does not have such correlation in its term. Thus knowledge, inasmuch as it is terminated to the knowable, does not acknowledge in it a correlation. Finally, mutual relation is distributed into relation of equiparance and disquiparance. The first is that which has a relation of the same rationale and name in both extremes. Thus brotherhood has the same name in each brother and the same rationale of foundation, namely origin from the same father. The second, however, does not acknowledge in the other extreme a similar relation.

These things being thus proved, three points especially must now be discussed: First, whether the hypostatic union is something real created, really distinct from the humanity and the Word: Second, whether it is something substantial or accidental, and that either absolute or respective: Third, whether on the hypothesis that it is a relation, that relation be mutual or non-mutual, of equiparance or of disquiparance.

First Conclusion. — The hypostatic union is a real created being, really distinct from the extremes. This Conclusion contains three parts, of which the two former are abundantly evident, and will appear more evidently from the proof of the third.

The first part indeed is most firmly established: for that is a real being by which the humanity assumed by the Word is really distinguished from other humanities not assumed; but by the hypostatic union the assumed humanity is so distinguished from others, since it is united personally to the Divinity, with which the others are not so associated, and it has a personal dependence upon the Word Himself subsisting by it, which the other humanities have not, which subsist by their own proper subsistences and persons: therefore, etc.

The second part also is clear: for that is created which began in time; but the hypostatic union began in time, just as did the assumed humanity itself: therefore it is something created. Further, that is truly created which is an effect of the divine omnipotence; but, as we said above, the hypostatic union is the most excellent effect of the divine omnipotence: therefore it is a created being. Finally, whatever is uncreated is God, either really, or personally, or formally; but this union is not God essentially, nor even personally, because although it is made through the union of the Word with the human nature, nevertheless that human nature thus united is not God but a true creature: therefore on its own part the union is something created.

The third part is proved: To every productive action there ought to be assigned a term which is produced by it; for to produce and to be produced are correlates; but the hypostatic union is an emanation or productive action: therefore it ought to have some term; yet that term can be none other than the union joining the Word with the human nature. For either that term would be the subsistence of the Word, or the assumed humanity; but not the first, since the subsistence of the Word is uncreated and existing from eternity. Nor the second, because, as we shall say below, the humanity was produced by an action distinct from the assumptive or unitive action; since the productive action of the humanity was generation, to which the Virgin Mother of God contributed her concurrence; yet she did not influx precisely into the unitive action of the humanity with the Word: therefore that unitive or productive action in the Incarnation could not have had any other term than the union itself; but the produced term is really distinguished from the unproduced extremes: therefore the produced union is really distinguished from the Word and from the humanity.

The adversaries reply. That there is a twofold action, one indeed productive of a term, the other merely unitive: and that the former always has some term, the latter by no means, as is evident from various natural things, for example the union of the soul to the body, of the form to the matter, etc., which are united to one another by themselves immediately and without any newly produced medial entity. Whence, since this action of which we speak is merely unitive, it requires no newly produced term. — Against this, first, it is false and gratuitously asserted that the soul with the body, and the form with the matter, are united immediately; since they are associated with one another by means of the union itself, which is an adventitious extrinsic relation, such also is the hypostatic union, as we shall soon say. Then, even if these were true, still the parity would not hold; for the extremes of the union of those natural things are of the same order, and have a natural and intrinsic order to one another, and consequently greater affinity and facility for being immediately associated with one another; but truly the extremes of the hypostatic union are of an altogether different order, nor do they by their nature have an intrinsic order to one another; wherefore, that they may be associated with one another, and that from them one thing be made, some formal term must be produced, by which they may be united to one another.

They reply secondly. By the action of the incarnate Word there is produced indeed neither the Word, nor the humanity, nor even the union itself, but only Christ, namely the composite of the humanity and divinity; but Christ, proportionally speaking, is the term produced by the human generation; nor is it the rational soul, since that is made by creation; nor the body, because it is presupposed to the generation, since it imports only matter as the root of quantity; but the term of generation is the human supposit itself. — Against. First, it is less true that by generation no substantial body is produced, for it is truly a partial term of that action, as we proved in the Physics. Second, although Christ the Lord is the terminus qui, or total term, of the unitive action, nevertheless He is not its formal term; but that unitive action ought to have not only a total term newly produced, but also a formal term, namely by which the extremes are associated with one another: for indeed it cannot be understood how the terminus qui, or total term, should be produced except through the production of the formal term: therefore if the unitive action produces the terminus qui, or total term, it will also produce the terminus quo, or formal term: for it could not be understood how anything should be produced by an action unless something have esse of existence which before it did not have; for by production a thing passes from non-esse of existence to that esse; but by the unitive action neither the Word nor the humanity passes from non-esse of existence to existing esse; since the Word pre-existed from eternity, and the human nature existed, at least by a priority of nature, before it was assumed: therefore by that productive action something distinct from the humanity and the Word ought to have been produced, which might receive an esse which before it lacked.

It is proved secondly: By the Incarnation the humanity becomes dependent upon the supposit of the Word, and by something new it becomes formally dependent; for it cannot be understood how from non-dependent it becomes newly dependent unless some formal rationale of this dependence intervene; but that cannot be other than the union itself, inasmuch as it is distinct from both extremes; for that by which the humanity newly depends upon the Word is either something distinct from the Word itself or not; if it is, we have our intent; if not, how can it come about that those two extremes are said to be united to one another more than they were before? Indeed the same thing remaining always makes the same thing, and obtains the same appellation: therefore it cannot be understood how the humanity, which before was not united, becomes united to the Word unless it receive something in the union which before it did not have.

Then, that actual union of the humanity with the supposit of the divine Word either says only the indistance of the Word from the humanity, or says something else received in it and superadded to it, by reason of which, although it be equally indistant from the other divine persons, it is nevertheless judged rather to be united to the Word than to the Father and the Holy Spirit. The first cannot be said: because the divine Word is no more indistant from His own humanity than from us all; for God fills heaven and earth with the immensity of His divinity; nevertheless such indistance is common to the three divine persons, since it is founded in that attribute of the divine immensity; yet not all the divine persons are hypostatically united to the humanity: therefore the actual union with the Word does not say the indistance of the humanity to the divine Word; therefore it says something else received in the humanity itself and newly produced: therefore, etc. These things being thus laid down, if God were to impede the proper subsistence from issuing forth from some singular human nature, although the Word were indistant from it, it would not on that account be said to subsist by His subsistence: therefore, that it may be so called, it ought to have something newly received which before it did not have.

You will say 1. From the Symbol of St. Athanasius, as the rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ: but body and rational soul are united by themselves immediately, and not through any medium produced in them: therefore the human nature is united to the Word by itself immediately. — I deny the minor: for it is false that the rational soul and the body are mutually united immediately: for such a union stands in the same manner as the other unions which are made by physical composition, for which there is required some extrinsic agent that efficiently joins the extremes: for although matter and form — and the same must be said of body and soul, inasmuch as they are act and potency — are united by themselves in the genus of material and formal cause, nevertheless in the genus of efficient cause they are mutually joined effectively by the productive cause, which causes the very union: hence it is, as we proved in the Physics, that the whole is really distinct from the parts taken together, and from them. The same must be said of the union of the Word with the human nature: nay rather, although the human nature has an obediential potency to subsist by the subsistence of the Word, and there is in the Word the power to render it subsistent: nevertheless, since the subsistence of the Word comes to the human nature of Christ personally, and from without, it requires the action of a supernatural agent, which joins both by some action; which being posited, the personality of the Word supervenes upon the human nature, and inflows into it after the manner of a formal cause, so as to confer upon it the power of subsisting.

You will say 2. If the union were something medium between the human nature and the Word, it would follow that it would be at once created and uncreated, corporeal and spiritual: created indeed by reason of the human nature, uncreated by reason of the

Word: corporeal by reason of the parts of the body, to which the Word is united, and incorporeal by reason of the soul: but this conflicts: therefore, etc. — I answer, that union cannot be called uncreated, since it is not real on the part of the Word, as we shall say presently; but only created, which as such can be spiritual and corporeal, extended and inextended; namely by reason of the united parts: for since that union is a relation, as we shall say at once, it can receive all these appellations not by reason of itself, but by reason of the extremes which are referred: for a relation of itself is neither material nor spiritual, extended or inextended, but only by reason of the extremes which it refers.

You will say 3. If the union between the humanity and the Word were necessary, especially because extremes really distinct cannot be actually united without some real medium really distinct from either extreme: but this reasoning is null: for from it there would follow a process into infinity in unions: for if extremes really distinct cannot be actually united without a real and really distinct medium, the mode of union really distinct from the humanity and the Word could not even be coupled to them without some bond really distinct, concerning which the same difficulty would recur: and again concerning another, and thus one would proceed into infinity. — I deny the minor: for our assertion, whereby we contend that things really distinct cannot be mutually united without something really distinct, is not to be understood universally, of whatever things are really distinct, but only of those which are so really distinct that one of them has not as its essential rationale being conjoined to the other: but the mode of union, since it has as its essential rationale that it be the nexus of two extremes, and thus it is essential to it to be conjoined to the other, does not thence require to be coupled to the extremes through another bond distinct from itself: but immediately through itself; for what is essentially such cannot be made such through something distinct from itself; just as since it is essential to an accident to inhere in a subject, it does not need some medium really distinct in order to inhere.

You will say 4. The divine Word is united actu and formally to the assumed humanity through that by which it exercises in it the role of term and ultimate complement: but it exercises this formally through its personality, without any other intermediary: therefore it is united formally to it through that, without anything even modally distinct. The major is evident: for since the Word is united to the human nature after the manner of an ultimate term and complement, it is necessary that that through which it is united to it be the very actual exercise of terminating. But the minor is proved: nothing created can be the actual exercise, or second act, of the terminative power of the personality of the Word toward the outside: therefore the divine Word exercises formally the role of term of the human nature through its sole personality. — I distinguish the major: the divine Word is united actu through that by which it exercises the role of term quod, I deny: quo, I concede. Similarly I distinguish the minor: through its personality it exercises the role of term quod without any medium, since namely it is itself which terminates the communication of the human nature, I concede: quo, I deny: for it terminates that communication by reason of the union of itself with it: but that union is not formally the term, but the ratio through which as through a medium the Word terminates that communication.

You will say finally. Proper subsistence is united to its own nature by itself, and by no other medium: therefore much more the subsistence of the Word is united immediately to the humanity. — I deny the consequence; and the reason of the disparity is that proper subsistence results necessarily from the very particular nature, unless it be impeded from elsewhere; but the subsistence of the Word comes from without, therefore it requires union in order to be conjoined to the humanity.

Second conclusion. — The hypostatic union is a relation extrinsically adventitious. So the Doctor, in 3. dist. 1. qu. 1. num. 1., where he says:

I say that this union does not signify of itself something absolute: because with whatever absolute understood in one extreme the perfect rationale of union is not understood, since union is not understood with respect to itself; therefore it accompanies the absolute in one extreme, or in two, since it is not nothing, at least union signifies a relation, etc.

By which words the Doctor openly teaches that union is a relation; for a relation is that whose whole esse is to be toward another: but union is wholly toward another: therefore it is a relation. The major stands from the Logical works. The minor is proved: for just as a relation cannot be conceived except through order to that of which it is a relation, so neither can union be conceived except through order to those things of which it is the union. — Further, with whatever absolute concept in the extremes, still the union of the extremes is not conceived: therefore it is not something absolute. The antecedent is plain, because the absolute is conceived through order to itself: but union cannot be conceived except through order to the extremes which are united. — Finally, that entity must be called pure relation which cannot be conceived except after the manner of an actual determination of one extreme toward another, and has no other function: but the entity superadded to the united extremes cannot be conceived except after the manner of an actual determination of one extreme toward another, nor is any other function to be found in that union; therefore utterly it is pure relation. The major stands: since similitude is pure relation, and does not involve formally anything absolute, since it cannot be otherwise understood than after the manner of the determination of one subject, e.g., toward another. The minor also appears: because no other function of union can be thought than that one extreme determine toward another, so that it make one with it: therefore on this account it is pure relation. — It is confirmed: if union is not a relation, especially since it must be either a supernatural quality superadded to the humanity, as Gregory wills; or some substantial mode, as Suarez teaches: but neither can be affirmed. Not indeed the first: both because, as the Doctor presently cited num. 12 teaches, that supernatural quality would be required chiefly after the manner of a disposition, that the human nature might become proximately apt for union with the Word: but this is foreign; because since it is in obediential potency to that union it is unifiable by itself, and therefore requires no dispositive quality; and because union in its formal concept signifies intrinsically order to two: therefore it is either a relation, or intrinsically includes one; for the whole esse of union is in order to another: but that quality neither is a relation, nor intrinsically includes one; therefore it cannot have the rationale of union. The second also cannot be said; because either such a substantial mode is admitted, such that the Word and the human nature are said to be mutually united; or that it be the foundation of the union: but neither of these is rightly affirmed. Not the first, both because the same substantial mode would have to be admitted in the other unions, putatively between matter and form, which is false; for Aristotle did not know such a mode; but in the composite he distinguished only three things, namely matter, form, and the composite; and because such a substantial mode would be something besides the humanity and the Word, and thus it would be either assumed by the Word, or not: if so, then there is something assumed by the Word besides the humanity: if not, then there is something in Christ which is not assumed: but both of these are absurd. Nor yet the second, because the human nature is a sufficient foundation of that relation, and union, of itself with the Word: therefore that substantial mode seems useless.

You will say 1. What regards the complement of created substance is a substantial and absolute being: but the hypostatic union regards the substantial complement of the humanity assumed by the Word, seeing that it supplies the place of that personality: therefore, etc. — I answer by distinguishing the major: What regards the substantial complement after the manner of something intrinsic is a substantial and absolute being, I concede: that it regards the complement after the manner of something extrinsic is an absolute and essential being, I deny. Similarly I distinguish the minor: the hypostatic union regards the complement of the humanity after the manner of something intrinsic, I deny: extrinsic, I concede: wherefore the hypostatic union indeed can be denominated substantial extrinsically, and by order to the extremes which are said to be united, and of which it is the bond: but not with respect to its own entity, seeing that it is a relation, and equally an accident.

I answer 2. The minor can be denied: since, as we proved in the Metaphysics, a supposit is not some substantial and absolute mode, but only a negation of double communicability, as quid and as quod: therefore it is false that on this account it belongs to the substantial complement of the humanity.

You will say 2. From Aristotle, 5. Physics, no motion is given for a relation: but the hypostatic union is produced as it were through motion: therefore it cannot be a relation. — The Doctor answers in 3. dist. 1. qu. 1. n. 15., that the Philosopher is to be understood of relations arising from the position of the extremes, for which no action is necessary, such as result: but not of relations extrinsically adventitious. For one kind of relation, he says, three genera can be distinguished; for some are identified with the foundation, such are all those without which the foundation cannot exist, such as the dependencies of the creature upon the Creator: others are not indeed identified with the foundation, because this can be without them; but necessarily result from the positing of the term and foundation, and the rationale of founding, such are similitudes between two white things; finally there are certain relations which are neither identified with the foundation, nor follow necessarily from it; but beyond the existence of foundation and term they require still some extrinsic condition: thus approximation of fire to wood is required, that there be made the relation of agent to patient; but the Philosopher speaks of relations taken in the first and second mode; but not of extrinsically adventitious ones; for, says the Doctor, the Philosopher there commits motion to ubi, and yet ubi signifies no absolute form, but only a respect in the circumscribed body toward the circumscribing place.

You will say 3. No thing can be otherwise disposed in order to another, unless it first be otherwise disposed in order to itself: but human nature by the hypostatic union is otherwise disposed in order to the Word by reason of the union, whereby it is referred to him: therefore it ought also to be otherwise disposed in order to itself. Yet it cannot be otherwise disposed in order to itself, unless it receive something absolute which it did not have before: therefore it cannot have the union, through which it is otherwise disposed toward the Word than before, unless it have in itself something absolute which it did not have before. — I distinguish the major: Unless it be first otherwise disposed in order to itself when it is disposed toward another by a relation of the first or second genus, I concede; by a relation of the third genus, or extrinsically adventitious, I deny. For by such a relation someone can very well be otherwise disposed toward another de novo, without being otherwise disposed in order to himself by some form distinct from the relation itself, because the relation itself accrues to him from without, and through an efficient cause.

You will say 4. The hypostatic union is not accidental, but substantial, as was determined in the Council of Ephesus, Canon 2: therefore that union ought to be something substantial, and not an accident: but every relation is an accident: therefore the hypostatic union is not a relation. — I answer, that the hypostatic union is called substantial, not because the union itself is not an accident, but because it is a substantial and intrinsic conjunction of the person of the Word with human nature, so that that union is brought about not merely by affection and sanctifying grace, as Nestorius wished, but is brought about substantially from this, that the personality of the Word makes of itself, substantially, the human nature of Christ subsistent; or insofar as in the personality of the Word, who is substance, human nature is united with the divine; which certainly suffices for resolving the oracles of the Councils; for they intend nothing else than that the Word is substantially united to humanity, and that the substance itself of human nature subsists through that substantial subsistence of the Word; just as the divine nature subsists by the same subsistence of the Word, and by that same medium both natures, divine and human, are substantially joined together.

You ask. To which of the six last predicaments must this relation of the hypostatic union be reduced? — I answer, that it is more probable that it should be reduced to the predicament of Passion: for by the uniting action human nature is, as it were, transmuted, while it receives that union of itself with the Word: therefore the union is in humanity after the manner of the term of a relation of the transmuted toward the transmuting; in which relation consists the rationale of the predicament of passion.

You will say 5. The union is the terminus of the Incarnation effectively, or inasmuch as it is an action: but passion is not the term of action, but of transmutation: therefore the union is not a passion. — I answer, that just as in the hot thing produced by fire there is a twofold relation, one indeed of the producer toward the hot thing produced, which is intrinsically adventitious, because it results from the positing of the foundation and the term; the other of the transmuted subject, e.g. of wood, toward the fire transmuting it, which is an extrinsically adventitious relation, by which formally the subject is said to be united to heat: so in the person of Christ, with two natures remaining, there is a twofold relation: one of the produced toward the producing, which is called Christ; or the union itself by order toward the whole Trinity; and this relation is intrinsically adventitious, which is posterior to the union, and to Christ, namely by a posteriority of nature: the other is of the transmuted toward the transmuting, by which humanity, which is as it were the subject, is referred to the Trinity uniting, and to the Word, as to the term and extreme of the union; by which relation it is extrinsically adventitious, and is the bond by which humanity is denominated united to the Word.

Third conclusion. — The hypostatic union, taken formally and properly, is a relation not mutual, and of disparity. So the Doctor in the place cited above, where he says:

At least the union signifies a relation, but not a common one, which would be of the same rationale in both extremes, such as similarity; nay, it is not a habitude of the same rationale in the assumed nature and the assuming person: moreover the assuming person has no real relation to the created nature, from dist. 30, book 1; and conversely, unless the nature thus assumed had a relation to the assuming one, nothing would be understood per se by that union: nor is that relation in the assumed nature merely a thing of reason, because then the union itself would not be real. Therefore this union is a real relation of disparity in one extreme: to which in the other no relation corresponds, or at least none real. So the Doctor.

By which he plainly teaches, first, that that relation is not mutual, because it does not have a real correlation on the part of the Word: second, that it is a relation of disparity, because if any correlation exist on the part of the Word, it is neither real, nor of the same rationale with the relation by which human nature is referred to the Word.

But the first part is proved, namely that the relation is real on the part of human nature, but not on the part of the Word. It is real, I say, on the part of human nature, because the Word and humanity are really united: therefore by union, and real relation: but the relation cannot be real on the part of the Word, as we shall say presently: therefore it ought at least to be judged real on the part of human nature, to which it is united. Add that human nature in the Incarnation was capable of receiving a new entity, by which it would be really otherwise disposed than before, and the nature previously existed before that union itself: but by no absolute entity could it thus be really changed; indeed no such entity can be devised, which would be a principle of mutation: therefore such mutation, or affection, must be referred back to the real relation itself of union. But that a similar real relation is not to be sought on the part of the Word is evident: both from this, that the Word is God, and hence on account of his immutability is incapable of absolutely every new entity; yet he would receive a new entity if that union were real on his own part: therefore, etc. Then also because every real relative in mutual relations depends upon its correlative; indeed correlatives are together in nature and in cognition: but the Word, since he is God, is also wholly independent: therefore he cannot have the rationale of a depending relation, nor consequently any real correlation. Finally, because God is a being of supreme necessity of existence: but a being of supreme necessity of existence does not require anything other than itself, but is most sufficient unto itself: yet this can in no way belong to a real relation; since it necessarily requires a foundation and a term, both in order to be, and in order to be conserved.

The second part is proved, namely that that relation is of disparity: for that relation is of disparity which is not of the same rationale and denomination in the extremes: but so it is with the relation of the hypostatic union, for in human nature it is called the relation of a depender, and of the personated; but in the Word the relation of an independent, and of the personating; and these denominations and relations are diverse: therefore the relation of the hypostatic union is a relation of disparity. The minor is evident; for human nature depends on the Word as upon its proper sustainer: for since it lacks its own subsistence, it borrows all its force of subsisting from the Word.

You will say against the first part. The Word is said to be united to humanity just as really as humanity to the Word: therefore if the relation of union is real on the part of the human relation, such will equally be on the part of the Word.

Some respond, indeed, that the union is real on the part of the Word, nor on that account is he changed by the Incarnation, since from eternity he prehad that union on account of the eminential containment, whereby God contains all things. But this response introduces a greater difficulty: for it would follow, that if by that eminential containment the Word could be said to be really united, he would be incarnate from eternity; indeed he had from eternity the eminential containment of that real union; which since it is false — because it would have been necessary that there be a passage from eminential containment to formal containment, in order that he be said to be formally united; and thus by this reasoning become subject to mutation — therefore I respond by distinguishing the major: the Word is said to be really united to humanity just as humanity to the Word, in the rationale of terminating, I concede: in the rationale of subject, I deny. For really the Word terminates by his subsistence the communicability of human nature, and renders it personally incommunicable; and by reason of that termination he is said to be personally united to humanity, because he performs the same offices as a proper hypostasis would perform: but he is not said to be really united subjectively, because that real relation of union is not subjected in him, as in human nature.

You will insist. Not only terminatively, but also formally is the Word united to humanity; therefore he must necessarily have in himself the formal union; for nothing is denominated formally except from an inexisting form: therefore if the Word be formally united, it is necessary that he have in himself the formal union, that is, the relation of union.

I distinguish the antecedent: That is said to be formally united, inasmuch as it formally signifies the substantial and personal union of the human nature with the divine, mediated by the person of the Word, whether meanwhile that union resides subjectively in the Word, or only terminatively: I concede; it is said to be formally united, inasmuch as it is formally required by a form existing subjectively in the Word itself: I deny. Nor should it seem wonderful that sometimes something is denominated formally such from a form existing in another, and terminated only to that other: indeed this is common to relations of the third genus: for thus God is said to be formally Creator by reason of the relation of the creature terminated to Him. Add that this union is singular, and utterly ineffable; nor does nature present any clearest example of it.

You ask: To which genus of cause, whether efficient, formal, or material, ought the relation of dependence and union of the human nature to the Word to be reduced?

The Doctor replies at the place cited that the solution of this question is difficult, because no similar dependence can be assigned in the whole order of nature; nevertheless he says it can fittingly be referred to the efficient cause, because the particular dependence of the human nature assumed by the Word is of distinct reason from every dependence of an effect upon a cause, inasmuch as every dependence of an effect upon a cause is founded in entity received from a cause; but humanity depends not only upon the Word, but upon the Father and the Holy Spirit according to its entity, and even according to its effective union; because the operations of the Trinity ad extra are indivisible. Add that the divine Word sustains the role of the proper supposit of the human nature itself: but a supposit does not terminate the nature of which it is the supposit in the genus of efficient cause: therefore neither will the supposit of the Word terminate the dependence of the human nature in the genus of efficient cause. Nor can it be referred to the genus of formal cause, because the Word cannot have the reason of form with respect to humanity; since form is a part of the composite; but the Word cannot have the reason of a part, inasmuch as a part is an incomplete being implying an order to another part, through whose union it may be completed and perfected. Therefore it remains that the dependence of the human nature upon the Word be assimilated to the dependence of an accident upon a material cause, not inasmuch as that cause is receptive of the accident, but inasmuch as it is sustaining thereof in the reason of subject.

For, says the Doctor,

an accident has a twofold relation to substance, or to its subject: one as to the subject which it informs and perfects, and without which it would not have the complete reason of form: the other truly as to the subject by which it is sustained, and without which it would not exist. The first of these two dependencies argues imperfection not only in the accident, but also in the subject; because it argues potentiality in the subject for receiving the accident by which it is informed and perfected; but the other dependency does not argue imperfection in the subject; because to sustain another, or to terminate its dependency, precisely does not imply imperfection.

Therefore we can assert that the dependence of the nature upon the Word is assimilated to this second dependency of the accident upon its subject, but not to the first: because the latter implies imperfection, since it connotes the necessity which the subject has of being perfected by the accident; but the former not so: rather it signifies that a power inheres in the subject whereby it can terminate and sustain the accident.

You ask: Whether the creation of the soul of Christ, the generation of His humanity, and the union of the same with the Word, are three really distinct actions?

I affirm, against certain Thomists contending that the productive and unitive action of humanity is the same; so that that union would be productive of humanity not in itself, but in the Word; which they assert in order to exclude created existence from the humanity of Christ, and maintain that it exists with the existence of the Word. So especially Cabrera, 3rd part, art. 11, disp. 2.

Proof of our assertion: The real and specific distinction of actions is sought from the real and specific distinction of their terms: but the creation of the soul of Christ, the generation of the humanity, and its union with the Word, have distinct terms: therefore they are really diverse actions. The Thomists admit the major: the minor is proved: the term of creation is the very soul of Christ produced out of nothing: the formal term of generation is the humanity considered in itself: but the term of union, or of the unitive action, is the very union by which those two natures are said to be formally united: but these terms are distinct; for humanity says more than the soul alone: and likewise Christ, inasmuch as He consists of two natures mutually united, says more than those two natures considered severally say: therefore those actions are really diverse. Further, those actions are diverse inasmuch as they are of diverse order: but such are the aforesaid: for the creation of the soul of Christ, and the generation of His humanity, are of natural order, while the union of the same humanity with the Word is of supernatural order: whence the creation of the soul has God alone as principle, as author of nature, while generation has also the blessed Virgin, as cause at least less principal: but the hypostatic union acknowledges God alone as principle, as author of grace and of supernatural order: therefore those actions are diverse. Finally, the creative action is really distinguished from that which is not creation: but the production of the soul of Christ is a creative action: while the generation of the humanity is not creation, but generation: likewise the hypostatic union is neither creation nor generation, but the union of extremes already existent: therefore they are diverse actions.

You will object 1. The holy Fathers teach that the humanity of Christ was simultaneously produced and united to the Word. Thus St. Leo, Epistle 11, which is to Julian, Bishop of Cosentia: Our nature, he says, was not so assumed that, being first created, it was afterwards taken up: but that by its assumption itself it might be created. Likewise St. Fulgentius, book On the Incarnation and Grace, chapter 8: The very taking of flesh was a virginal taking.

I answer. The holy Fathers are not treating of the unity or distinction, but only of the coexistence or concomitance of those actions: for they teach against heretics that the soul was not created before, nor the humanity born earlier in time, than it was united to the Word: but that it was formed and united at the same instant of time, as they themselves clearly hand down: for St. Leo treats against Eutyches, whom he judges to renew the dogma of Origen, that the soul of Christ had been placed in heaven before it was born of the Virgin. Hence after the aforesaid words he subjoins:

Whence what in Origen was justly condemned, who asserted that souls, before they were inserted into bodies, had not only various lives, but various actions, it is necessary that Eutyches too lament in himself, unless he prefer to renounce his opinion.

Therefore he does not attack our opinion, but rather defends it, for he subjoins:

For the nature of the Lord in itself, although it has certain properties whereby it transcends the beginnings of the human condition: either because He alone, with the Holy Spirit, was conceived and born of the inviolate Virgin without the concupiscence of the flesh: or because He was brought forth from the womb of His mother in such a way that fecundity gave birth and virginity remained: yet His care was of no other nature than ours, nor was a soul breathed into Him at the beginning other than that breathed into the rest of men.

Therefore the formation of the soul and of the humanity of Christ had the same principle, and consequently the same productive action by which we also are produced, namely true creation and generation. And forthwith the holy Fathers exclude only preexistence of time, not indeed of nature, as Saint Fulgentius clearly signifies in the same place in these words:

This flesh, therefore, the nature of the conceiving Virgin then exhibited from herself, when God, to be conceived, came unto her. There is not, therefore, to be reckoned any other interval of time between the beginning of the flesh conceived and the advent of the majesty to be conceived.

You will urge: If the humanity was not produced in nature before it was united to the Word, then by the same action it was united and produced. The antecedent is proved: if the humanity of Christ were produced before it was united to the Word, the blessed Virgin would not truly have to be named Mother of God: because her generation would be terminated at the humanity before it was assumed by the Word; and thus she would nowise concur toward that union: for if some agent produced heat, for example, and another united that heat to a subject, the prior agent would indeed produce heat, but would not make it truly hot: therefore if the generative and unitive actions of the humanity of Christ are diverse, the Blessed Virgin must indeed be called mother of the man whom she begot; but not Mother of Christ, or of the man-God, since she nowise concurs toward that composite resulting from the union of the divine nature with the human.

I deny the antecedent, and the major of its proof: for that the Blessed Virgin may be said to have begotten God, it suffices that her active conception be terminated at the same instant of time upon the person of the Word, which terminated the communication of her humanity; for then the supposit of the Word is held ultimately to complete and terminate the generative action of the Blessed Virgin: especially since the personality of the Word supplies what His own personality would have supplied, had it resulted. To the example of the agent producing heat I say that there would be parity if that agent were of itself unitive of the heat with the subject: for although by divine power another agent were substituted which would unite such heat, nevertheless the prior agent would no less be said to effect something hot; but otherwise if it did not possess an unitive power over the heat which it produced. But the Blessed Virgin, who possesses a productive power over the humanity, possesses also an unitive power over such humanity with the subsistence which would result from the begotten humanity, unless it were impeded by divine power through the substitution of another subsistence.

You will say 3: When a corporeal form is educed from the potency of matter, and an accidental form from the potency of the subject, the same is the action by which it is educed and united: therefore similarly, even if the substance of the humanity or of the soul be distinct from their union with the Word, nevertheless they can be made by the same action. The antecedent is proved: when a form is educed from the potency of the subject, whether that educive action takes place with the concurrence of the subject, or not: if not, then it takes place independently of the subject, and thus from nothing: and consequently it is creation, which no one has said: if so, then that action depends upon the subject, and the production of the form takes place in it, and consequently is united to it: for a form cannot naturally be in a subject and not be united to the subject: therefore by the same action by which the form is produced, it is also united.

I answer, whatever may be said of the antecedent, denying the consequence. And the reason of the disparity is, that not only are the entities of the soul, of the humanity, and of the hypostatic union distinct ex natura rei, but they are also of different orders: whence between the humanity and the Word there is not a natural conjunction, as there is between a form and the subject from which it is educed; whence there cannot be one action productive and unitive of both.