Scotus Academicus, Tomus septimus: De Incarnatione Verbi Divini

That in Christ a triple communication can be distinguished: namely of natures, of properties, and of operations. The first is a certain mutual attribution of the natures to one another, insofar as from the fact that both are united to each other in the same suppositum, they are predicated of one another. The second is a certain mutual attribution of the properties of those distinct natures, insofar as the properties of one nature are attributed to the other by reason of this union, so that they are also predicated in some way of the latter itself. The third, finally, is a mutual attribution of the operations of those distinct natures, insofar as by reason of the union the operations of one nature are attributed to the other, so that they too are predicated in some way of it. Only the second, strictly speaking, is called the communication of idioms: for this is nothing else than a certain participation of the properties of both natures, whereby it comes about that Christ by reason of the divine nature is called omnipotent, immortal, etc., and by reason of the human nature is asserted to be mortal, subject, etc.; indeed even by reason of that consideration God in Christ is called mortal; and man conversely immortal.

This communication, moreover, is called idiomatum from the Greek word ἰδιώματι, which signifies property in Latin. Which communication indeed St. Maximus the Martyr thus defines in his disputation with Pyrrhus, when he says it is made: When those things which naturally belong to either part of Christ are rendered reciprocally proper to the other on account of the ineffable unionition, no change of one into the other being made according to natural reason, nor any confusion.

Note 2. That this communication can be conceived as made in two ways: First indeed in the concrete by reason of personality, which makes both natures subsist: Second, in the abstract, inasmuch as the attributes of the divine nature are communicated to the humanity by themselves and not through any supernatural gifts. For it must be known that predication, or enunciation, of one thing of something arises from identity of the same; but of those things which are the same, some are the same formally, others only by reason of some third thing in which they concur. I call formally the same, not those which have entirely the same reason, but those of which one is of the formal reason of the other. E.g. man is animal, is said to be formal predication, because animal is of the formal reason of man. But from those things which are the same only by reason of a third, there arises not formal predication, but material only and identical and subjective, as in this example, white is sweet, because sweetness is not enunciated of whiteness formally, but only materially and subjectively, namely by reason of milk, which is the matter and subject in which they concur.

Note 3. From the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 8. qu. t. that in divine things not only concretes are predicated of concretes, but also certain abstracts; not indeed formally, but only identically, because, he says, those things which are in divine things are not only the same by reason of that in which they concur, and are quasi-united, but also by reason of infinity: for what furnishes some third thing in creatures, so that some two things are enunciated of one another in the concrete, this infinity furnishes in divine things, so that even some two can be verified of one another in the abstract. Hence these predications are true, Divine wisdom is divinity, because infinity belongs to both extremes: true also is this, Divinity is Paternity, because infinity belongs at least to one extreme, namely divinity, formally: but this is not likewise true in the abstract, Paternity is active spiration; for although in the concrete it is true that the Father actively spirates, because these two, paternity and passive spiration, do not have from elsewhere that they be identified except from a third in which they are quasi-united; yet since, as we said, infinity does not belong formally to both, hence it comes about that that predication is not to be admitted. — From these it follows that in those things which are not purely divine, predication of abstract of abstract is not true through identity, because inasmuch as abstract, they no longer have that third by reason of which they would be enunciated mutually of one another. Therefore however much in the concrete it is true that man is animal; nevertheless in the abstract it is false that humanity is animality. — These things having been premised, two things especially must here be determined: First, whether mutual communication of idioms in Christ is true. Second, how it is made, namely whether through communication of the divine attributes to the humanity, and that properly, really and substantially, so that the human nature could be called formally immense, omnipotent, as certain Lutherans will; or rather only through attribution of the property of one nature, etc.

First conclusion. — Truly the communication of idioms in Christ is to be admitted.

It is proved first by the authority of the Holy Fathers, for Gregory of Nyssa in lib. 5. Contra Eunomium, writes thus: So the suffering of death is referred to him who was partaker of passible nature on account of the conjunction of the man with him, and finally sublime names worthy descend upon the man, so much so that he who was seen on the cross is named Lord of glory, on account of his commixture with him, that which is abject and humble; the names also of grace passing over together into the human nature. Origenes on the Epistle to the Romans: Through the indissoluble unity, he says, of the Word and flesh, all things which are of flesh are ascribed to the Word, just as the things which are of the Word are predicated in the flesh. St. Ambrose lib. 2. De Fide, cap. 1.: Whence that, he says, which is right, should we think the Lord of Majesty crucified? But because the same God, the same man, Christ Jesus the Lord of Majesty is said to be crucified; because partaker of both natures, that is, human and divine, in the nature of man he underwent the passion, so that indiscretely both the Lord of Majesty is said to be he who suffered, and the Son of man, as it is written: who descended from heaven. — The same truth St. John Damascene lucidly expounds lib. 3. cap. 10.: One is Christ, he says, and one his person, namely hypostasis, yet he holds two natures, of divinity and of humanity. Moreover since from divinity glory proceeds naturally, it is common to both, on account of the identity of hypostasis. And when truly lowly things proceed, they are likewise common to both; since one is, and the same, who is this and that, namely God and man, and to him belong alike the things that are of divinity and those that are of humanity.

The Holy Fathers prove this truth from the sacred Scriptures, in which for the most part those things are attributed to the humanity which properly belong to the Divinity; and conversely to the Divinity those which are proper only to the humanity: thus John 3, Christ says: No man ascendeth into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven; for only the Word, properly speaking, descended from heaven, and was in heaven, in that sense in which Christ willed it to be understood while speaking these things. Thus also John 10, Christ said to the Jews: Before Abraham was made, I am … He rejoiced, that he might see my day, namely of the Incarnation; nevertheless Christ as man did not exist before Abraham, but as Word: therefore that priority of existence which was proper to the Word is appropriated to the humanity. — Thus likewise the Apostle writing to the Romans calls the same God and Son of God also Son of David, as St. Cyril observes in the book To the Emperor Theodosius. For when he had said that in the Gospel God had been separated concerning his Son, soon he says that the same was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh, who was predestinated Son of God in power, etc. Therefore one and the same is Son of God and of man; and the man is Son of God, and the Son of God, and God, is man, and Son of man. — Thus likewise in the Epistle to the Hebrews the same whom in chapter one he named Son of God, and brightness of glory, and figure of his substance, who bears all things by the word of his power, in the following he says Jesus a little less than the Angels, crowned with glory and honor for the passion of death, that he might taste death for all. Of which the former words the divinity alone of the Word claims for itself; the latter the humanity alone. — To these the decrees of the Ecumenical Synods accord, and in them the formulas of faith composed, which assert Jesus Christ the unique, or only-begotten Son of God, born of the Father before all ages, God of God, light of light, true God of true God; whom the same, for us men, and for our salvation, they preach incarnate, and born of the Virgin, suffering, dead, and buried. — This St. Leo the Pope declares in the Tenth Epistle to Flavianus; where the most holy Pontiff says: On account of this unity of person to be understood in both natures, and the Son of man, he says, is read to have descended from heaven, when the Son of God took flesh from that Virgin of whom he was born: and again the Son of God crucified, and buried, when he suffered these things not in the divinity itself, in which as Only-begotten he is coeternal and consubstantial with the Father, but in the infirmity of human nature; whence we all confess also in the Symbol the only-begotten Son of God crucified and buried, according to that saying of the Apostle: for if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of Majesty.

They prove secondly from this, that the Word made the humanity his own and proper, and therefore that which is connected with it and naturally belongs to it, he transferred wholly into himself, and accommodated to himself, and willed to be predicated of himself. The reason of this ineffable communication holy Cyril sets forth, Epistola ad Valerianum: To whose, he says, own the body is, to him deservedly all things which are its proper ones are ascribed, sin alone excepted. Holy Athanasius had foreshadowed this, sermon 4. Contra Arianos, where he says: It behoved the Lord clothing human flesh, to clothe himself with this whole with its own affections of itself: so that as we say the body proper to himself to be his, so also the affections of the body should be said to be his alone properly.

In Anathematism 4. he teaches that there is a triple genus of words, which are uttered concerning Christ the Lord, both by sacred Scripture or by the Holy Fathers. Some indeed agree to the divinity alone, as this: I am in the Father, and the Father is in me. John 14. Others are wholly human, as that John 8. But now you seek to kill me, a man who have spoken the truth to you, which I have heard from God. Others are medial, agreeing to both natures, as when the Apostle writes to the Hebrews 13. Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things God blessed for ever. — The second rule is, that sometimes the whole Christ is accustomed to be denominated from one nature and its properties, sometimes from two, as St. John Damascene observes cap. 3. lib. 3.: When, he says, we consider the hypostasis composed from natures, sometimes we denominate Christ from both, as God and man at once, and also God incarnate: at other times from only one part, God only, and Son of God: or man only, and son of man. Sometimes from the sublime things alone we denominate, at times indeed from the lowly alone. For one is he, who exists alike this and that. Cyril also has that very rule in the book To Theodosius, and declares it by the similitude of a man, who now by the name of flesh alone, now of soul, is expressed whole: Thus therefore Christ also in the sacred letters is preached, sometimes indeed thus, as if the whole were man, his divinity tacit, which by a certain dispensation is usurped: at other times as God, no mention of humanity made, in which no injury is done to him, on account of the concourse of both in unity. — The third rule is, that of the same person of Christ, on account of the union of natures and unity of person, contraries are sometimes enunciated: thus St. Athanasius in the epistle to Epictetus says: Before all things it is admirable that the same both suffered and did not suffer: for he suffered insofar as his own body suffered, and was present in the suffering one; but he did not suffer, because the Word as nature God is impassible. Which St. Fulgentius indeed elegantly thus expounds lib. 3. Ad Trasimundum, cap. 8, where among other things he says: Hence incomprehensible on the cross; inviolable in wound; impassible in passion; immortal is he preached in death. The Synod of Toledo also 14. says: He himself lives dying, he himself dies living, he himself impassible suffering, he himself not subject to passion. — The fourth rule is, that the predicates which are attributed to Christ ought to be regarded according to the conveniency and propriety which they have with the nature by reason of which they are attributed to him: Now, says St. Leo epist. to Flavianum, although in the Lord Jesus Christ there is one person of God and man, yet one thing is whence the common contumely in both; another whence dignity and glory: for of ours his humanity is lesser than the Father: of the Father his divinity is equal with the Father.

A fifth rule the Subtle Doctor hands down in 3. dist. 7, qu. 2., that whatever natures express union with the person are excepted from the law of communication of idioms: Because, says the Doctor, that communication takes place in predications on account of union, and proceeds from it as from cause and fountain, and thus presupposes union: not therefore does it take place according to those things which express union. Which indeed he sets forth, that he may satisfy the argument which he had proposed to himself, which was of this kind: if God is made man: therefore God is made God. The consequence is proved; because on account of the union of natures there is communication of idioms: and thus as killing the man kills God, so if he has been made man, he has been made God. To this little sophism that rule rightly meets. For this, to have been made, expresses the copulation of nature and person; wherefore it cannot be communicated to the other: consequently it does not follow: if God has been made man, that is, if united to man, he has also been made God, or united to God.

Second conclusion. — The communication of idioms does not take place in this way, that the divine attributes be communicated formally to the humanity, and the human to the divinity. This is common among Theologians against the Lutherans, especially Ubiquitarians.

It is proved. For either the attributes of the divinity are formally in the humanity, and the attributes of the humanity not in the divinity: and the reason of the attributes of each nature to the other joined to it is alike: neither can be said. For it cannot be understood how the attributes of the divine nature inhere in the humanity, because they cannot be in it as informing forms, since the reason of an informing form implies imperfection: nor yet as assisting forms, because assisting forms are not communicated formally to those things which they assist: nor as the unity of the hypostasis of the Word is communicated to the humanity, because otherwise the divine nature ought to be something one with the human in that very thing in which it would be united. Add that it is not possible for the attributes of the divinity to inhere formally in the human nature of Christ the Lord, unless the human nature be denuded of its own attributes, which are opposed to the attributes of the divinity.

It is confirmed from all those places of Councils and Fathers, in which it is held that both natures, and the properties of both natures, are in Christ unconfused, unmixed, distinct.

Finally, if any one of the divine attributes belonged formally to the humanity, especially immensity: but this cannot belong formally to the very humanity of Christ the Lord. The major the Ubiquitarians admit. But the minor they prove: First from those passages of Scripture in which it is said that the humanity of Christ is not everywhere. Matthew, and Mark at the end. The Angel speaking to the women about Christ, whom they were seeking, and who had risen, says: He is not here. John 11. Rejoice on account of you, that you may believe, because I was not there. — Secondly from the Fathers, Basil in the book De Spiritu sancto, cap. 22, concluding the divinity of the Holy Spirit from its immensity. As Didymus also argues, lib. De Spiritu sancto. And St. Ambrose lib. 1. c. 7. and St. Gregory of Nyssa against Eunomius, where he establishes: He who says, I go, signifies a local departure. But he who walks through all things, and exists in all things, and contains all things, has not whence he may depart, since he is not lacking the divine fullness. And St. Augustine epistle 57. to Dardanus: According to this form of flesh he is not, he says, to be thought diffused everywhere. Care must also be taken lest we so give divinity to man as to destroy the truth of body. Nor is it consequent, that what is in God is thus everywhere as God: for we are in God: and yet we are not everywhere: but do not doubt that Christ is everywhere whole present, as God: and in some place on account of the true mode of his body. To these subscribe St. Cyril of Alexandria lib. 6. in John cap. 14. Here it must be observed, that although he thence withdrew the presence of his body, nevertheless by the Majesty of his Divinity he is always present. Theodoretus in dialogue 3. The body of the Lord indeed rose from corruption, alien to destruction, impassible and immortal; and glorified by divine glory, and adored by the celestial powers; yet it is a body, and has the circumscription it had before. St. Maximus in disp. with Pyrrhus: In the holy Gospels it is written: On the morrow Jesus wished to go into Galilee; he wished namely to go, inasmuch as he was not there; he was not however in humanity, but in divinity he is everywhere. — Thirdly from this, which we taught in the first volume, that immensity is thus proper to the divine nature, as to imply being communicated to some creature: because it is that by which a thing is thus in all things, as to imply some thing to be, or to be able to be, in which it is not wholly in the whole, and wholly in every part. And hence it is that the Holy Fathers from the immensity of the divine Word, or of the Holy Spirit, inferred the divinity of those persons, as we said in the Treatise De Trinitate.

You will object. 1. Various passages of Scripture, which seem to signify that Christ the Lord is everywhere by reason of his humanity. Thus Matt. 18. Where two or three are gathered in my name, there I am in the midst of them. Matt. 28. Behold I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world. Ephes. 1. Christ is said to have ascended into heaven, that he might fill all things. —

I answer, the first passage is understood of presence by authority, and not by local indistance: so that the sense is, that nothing in Councils gathered in his name is decreed except by his authority. To the second I say, that Christ the Lord is with us even to the consummation of the world, by protection and help; not truly by local presence. Thus God says Jeremiah 1. Fear not their face, because I am with thee, to deliver thee, that is, I afford thee help whereby thou mayest be delivered. To the third, I answer this sense to be of those words (that he might fill all things), that is, that he might fill every kind of men with spiritual goods, according to that Psal. 61. We shall be filled with the good things of thy house, and Ecclesiasticus 24. Be filled from my generations. Or that he might fulfil all things, that is, that he might bring to effect all things which concerning himself had been written in the Law, the Prophets, and Psalms.

You will insist: The divine Word is everywhere: Christ man is the divine Word: therefore Christ man is everywhere: therefore since Christ is not man without humanity, his humanity also is everywhere. —

I answer, the divine Word to be everywhere by his divinity, and Christ man to be the divine Word by his personality; wherefore it does not follow that Christ man is everywhere, or that Christ is everywhere by his humanity.

You will be pressed: If the person of the Word were somewhere, where the humanity assumed by him is not, now the Word is somewhere man, and somewhere is not man: absurd consequent: therefore also the antecedent. — I answer to the sequel, the Word is somewhere man, and somewhere is not man, that is, the Word exists somewhere, where the humanity of the Word does not exist, I concede: is somewhere man, and somewhere is not man, that is, there the Word incarnate is where the man is not, I deny.

You will insist again: When two things are united inseparably to one another, wherever one of them is, there the other must also be: but the personality of the Word, and the humanity assumed by the Word, are united inseparably to one another, and the person of the Word is everywhere: therefore the humanity of Christ is everywhere. — I answer distinguishing the major: if those things are adequately and totally united to one another, I concede: otherwise, I deny. Thus our soul is united inseparably to the foot; and yet wherever the soul is, there is not the foot, since the foot is not in other parts of the body, as in the head, in the arms: although where the foot is, there is the soul. In like manner, the humanity of Christ is nowhere except where is the personality of the Word, although the personality of the Word exists somewhere, where the humanity does not exist.

You will object 2. If the humanity of Christ is not everywhere: therefore it can be moved from place to place: therefore when it is so moved, either it carries with itself the person of the Word thus united, and then it follows that the Word is moved locally, because what is so carried is moved locally: or it does not carry it: therefore it ceases to be united to him; which is absurd. — I answer, the humanity of Christ can be moved from place to place, and when it is so moved, it has neither properly carried with itself the person of the Word, nor yet not carried it, but it has always been united to him, into whatever place finally such humanity should be constituted: thus is God intimately present to us through his immensity, and yet when we are moved locally, we do not carry God with us, nor desert him by not carrying.

THE SECOND QUESTION.

Whether those three propositions are true: God is man, and God has been made man, man has been made God.

NOTE 1. From the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 7. qu. 2, that some species of propositions are in natural matter, others in contingent matter, and others in remote matter. Propositions in natural matter are those in which natural things are predicated of the subject of which they are natural things, or at least certain immediate consequents of nature. Propositions of this kind by reason of mode of predicating are called again per se propositions; and the former indeed in the first mode of saying per se: but the latter in the second mode of saying per se. Propositions in natural matter in the first mode of saying per se are those in which the predicate is of the definition of the subject, as this: man is animal: propositions in natural matter in the second mode of saying per se are those in which conversely the subject falls into the definition of the predicate, as the Doctor teaches here. E.g. in this proposition natural in the second mode of saying per se, man is risible, the predicate risible is not of the definition of the subject, namely man, but conversely that subject falls into the definition of such a predicate, as containing its adequate and immediate cause. Propositions in contingent matter are those in which the predicates either are accidents, or at least extrinsic to the subjects of which they are enunciated. Propositions in remote matter are those in which opposites or repugnants are predicated of certain things with respect to which they are repugnant or opposite. — Moreover among propositions in natural or necessary matter there is this order, that some are mediate, others immediate; and the mediate indeed are ordered to the immediate, so that there is no standing until arrival at the first wholly immediate. But this order is also observed among contingent propositions. E.g. this mediate proposition, man runs, is reduced to this immediate one, Peter runs: therefore to run does not belong immediately to man, but first to Peter, or another individual, and through him mediatedly to man. Therefore this proposition, God is man, is not judged immediate: therefore it is recalled to the more immediate, namely to this, the Word is man, to which it belongs first to be man, and by reason of him to God. — Again of propositions some are naturally evident; others believed. Evident propositions are those which have evidence from terms naturally known, as these: the whole is greater than its part: or at least they are knowable from some medium naturally, as this, man is risible, which can become naturally evident through rational animal, as through a medium naturally knowable. Believed propositions are those which can become evident in neither way, as this, God is man, because neither are both extremes known naturally, nor is the union between them even naturally known. — Further, of propositions some are formal properly so called, others in which the predicate is univocal: and others in which not only is the predicate univocal, but also is predicated univocally. Formal propositions are those in which a proper predicate is enunciated of its own subjectable, whether meanwhile it be essential, or only accidental, or subjectable. Proper propositions are those in which a real predicate is enunciated according to its genuine property of a real subject. Propositions in which the predicate is univocal, yet not predicated univocally, are those in which the predicates are denominative, or at least obtain the mode of predicating of denominatives: thus white is predicated of snow, and of wall. Finally, propositions in which the predicate is enunciated univocally are those which verify some superior of inferiors, which is intrinsic to those inferiors. — These things having been premised, it must be resolved whether those three propositions named above in the title of the Question are to be approved as legitimate; or whether any one of them is to be rejected as erroneous or suspect.

NOTE 2. From the same Doctor, for the easier understanding of the second proposition, that the predicate to be made, or to become, is sometimes posited in propositions of the second adjacent, but sometimes in propositions of the third adjacent. When it is posited in propositions of the second adjacent, it denotes the effecting of a thing simply; but when it is in propositions of the third adjacent, it signifies only an effecting, or the becoming of a thing according to that which is specified by the predicate. E.g. in this proposition of the second adjacent, Peter is made, it is signified that Peter is produced simply: but in that which is of the third adjacent, Peter has been made white, it is signified that Peter becomes not simply, but only white: so that that effecting connotes the effecting of whiteness in Peter, not truly the effecting and production of Peter, although it also signifies Peter becoming white: for as it is truly enunciated of him that he becomes simply, when he receives being simply after not being simply, so it is truly enunciated of him that he becomes such, when through the action of an agent he receives being such, which before he did not have.

NOTE 3. Similarly from the same Doctor, ibidem num. 9., that effecting secundum quid does not always import mutation in that which is said to become in such a way: for although a natural agent presupposes the patient which it transmutes, and which is in potency to the term, from which mutation necessarily follows, because what passes from potency to act is necessarily mutated; nevertheless a supernatural agent, such as is the most holy Trinity, while it effects the hypostatic union, does not presuppose the Word, as something potential to the term of that union; nor does it introduce the other term, namely man, or the union of man, as act or form of the Word, whereby it would be in him through inherence, but united man to the Word in the highest manner without any inherence: therefore in that union there was no passage from potency to act. Nevertheless the hypostatic union no less has the true reason of an effecting; for although the Word was not mutated, yet truly he was made man. But that which anew becomes such is sometimes mutated, sometimes not: it is mutated indeed, when what advenes has the reason of a form perfecting the subject, which was in potency to receiving it, as commonly happens in passive effectings, namely when natural agents effect certain subjects to be actually such as they were only in potency. Nor does it matter, that to every effecting some passion ought necessarily to correspond: and consequently when it is said the Word became man, it seems that in him there ought to correspond a passion, which would be the correlative of that effecting. For I say, that the passion corresponding to this action is to be referred not into the Word, but into the human nature united to the Word: wherefore it is judged not so much the term as the subject of that passive effecting, although it be signified after the manner of a term in that proposition, the Word was made man; and thereafter although in this effecting some mutation is found, it is to be referred not into the Word, but into the human nature.

First conclusion. — The proposition, God is man, is true and properly said, yet not in natural matter. The first part is of all Theologians. And the Doctor proves it thus: That this proposition may be true and properly said, it suffices that some one of the divine persons subsist in humanity, and can truly be called suppositum of such a nature: but it is of faith that one of the divine persons, namely the person of the Word, subsists in human nature, and is truly called the suppositum of that human nature: therefore this proposition, God is man, is properly said.

Moreover: If that proposition were not proper, especially either because man cannot be a predicate; or because God cannot be properly the subject of a proposition: or because God and man are not sufficiently one, that the one be properly predicated of the other: yet man can be a properly said predicate with respect to God suppositing for the incarnate Word: for man signifies a suppositum subsisting in human nature, which univocally belongs to Christ and other men: God also can supposit for the Son of God incarnate: since a name signifying nature in the concrete can supposit for any suppositum whatever of that nature: but the name God is concrete signifying the divine nature: therefore it can supposit for the person of the Son of God. Finally these two are sufficiently one between themselves, that the one be enunciated of the other, because they are one by the unity of supposit: therefore that proposition is true and properly said.

You will say: That proposition is not true and properly said, whose contrary can be true: but the contrary of that proposition, namely God is not man, can be true, if that subject should supposit indefinitely: for there is not stronger reason why that subject God, as suppositing indefinitely for the individual of Deity, ought to receive this predicate, man, by reason of the Word, who truly has been made man, than not receive it by reason of the Father, or Holy Spirit, for whom it can also supposit, who nevertheless truly have not been made men: therefore that proposition, God is man, seems not absolutely and simply true. — I deny the minor: for it is false simply that God is not man: since truly the Son of God, who is God, is man. Whence to the proof I say, that the subject God does not supposit indefinitely, unless perhaps only by rigor of speech and voice, not truly by the received use of the same word among Christian faithful, among whom it is known and familiar, that in that proposition, God is man, and similar ones, that subject God does not supposit indefinitely, but determinately for the person of the Word.

You will say 2. In ordered dividers, the primary dividers are more diverse, and consequently less predicable of one another: but being is first divided into infinite and finite, before finite being be divided into any others: therefore finite and infinite are more diverse, and less predicable of one another, than any finite beings into which finite being is divided: but some finite beings are so incompossible, that they cannot truly be predicated of one another: therefore much less will infinite being be able to be predicated of finite being, and vice versa: therefore since man is finite being, he cannot be predicated of God. — The Doctor distinguishes the minor: the primary dividers have diversity in respect of this, that they concur in fewer formalities, he concedes: in respect of repugnance, whereby they would exclude one another from conjunction and predication, he denies: for greater repugnance does not arise from greater diversity: since heat and cold are less diverse than heat and substance; and yet heat and cold exclude themselves from one another, and mutually destroy each other: not so heat and substance: therefore, etc.

You will say 3. If man be predicated of God, either he is predicated as relative, or as relation, or as absolute. Not the first, because man is not a relation, nor relative. Not even the second, because thus he could be predicated of three persons, according to St. Augustine lib. 5. De Trinitate, cap. 8. and 10., and consequently the three Divine persons would be man; which is false: therefore man can by no means be predicated of God. — The Doctor denies the minor for the second part, because he is predicated of God, as he is something absolute: and thus he denies also the sequel of the proof. But to St. Augustine he says, that when he teaches that whatever is predicated of God as absolute is predicated also of the whole Trinity, he speaks of intrinsic and essential predicates: not truly of extrinsic absolute predicates, such as is man with respect to God.

You will say 4. If there were true and proper predication of man of God, it ought to be reduced to some one of the five predicables: but it can be reduced to none; not indeed to genus, species, or difference, because the predicate man is not of the essence of God: nor even to property, because then God would look to the definition of man: nor even to accident, because no accident can be predicated of God, just as neither can it inhere in him. — The Doctor answers, that in this predication something is assimilated to predication of species, because through hypostatic union the Word becomes an individual of human nature: something also participates of the reason of accident in habitude to subject: Because, he says, that nature temporally advenes to the Word perfect in himself existing eternally. Whence that predication can be made after the manner of a logical, not truly metaphysical, accident: which certainly is not inconvenient, because neither does it signify man to be an accident in himself, nor denote him to inform the Word accidentally, and inhere in him. He answers secondly, that the major can be denied, since since the union of man with the Word is most singular, nor has any example in created things, therefore it is no wonder if that predication also be special, nor can it be recalled to any genus of predication of created things.

You will say 5. The same is not predicated denominatively of the same: but of God man is predicated denominatively, because God is said humanated: therefore he is not predicated of him in the abstract: therefore that predication, God is man, is not proper. — The Doctor answers denying the minor: because to be humanated is not the proper denominative derived from man, but from becoming man; for to be humanated is the same as to become man; whence if the Word were necessarily man, as he is necessarily God, he would not be called humanated, as he is not called Degodded. But that humanity be said of him in fieri, does not prevent his being said of him in another way than in fieri: for well that which is said to grow warm is also said hot, and what is said to be whitened is said white. But if you ask, what is the proper denominative of man? The Doctor says it is to be human: but this is not said of God, because it would signify that man looked to him in another way than nature looks to supposit, which is false: but humanity, which is the proper abstract of man, is not said of the Word: for it is false that the Word is humanity.

The second part is proved, namely, that that proposition is not in necessary matter; because, says the Doctor, in every necessary and per se proposition the predicate ought to be of the intrinsic reason of the subject, if that predication be in the first mode of saying per se: or if it be in the second mode, the subject ought to contain the cause of the inherence and connexion of the predicate with the subject, as the Logicians commonly teach: but neither is man of the essence of God, nor does God contain the natural and per se cause of the connexion of such a predicate with such a subject: therefore that proposition is not per se.

Next, in every per se proposition, the predicate which is enunciated of a common subject ought also to be enunciated of all contained under the subject: but man, who is enunciated of God, is not enunciated of all persons which are God, namely of the Father and Holy Spirit: therefore, etc.

Finally, in every per se proposition it is required that the subject according to its natural force, or by rigor, be determinate; for if it be indeterminate, and can be determined to suppositing for certain determinates, it can indeed make a true proposition, but not a per se proposition: thus in this proposition, animal is man, that subject animal is indeterminate and indefinite, and can be limited to this, that it supposit either for the whole rational animal, or for Peter and Paul; hence it comes about that that proposition indeed is true, yet it is not a per se proposition. But in this proposition God is man, the subject is of this kind: because it is indeterminate from its strict signification, as to supposit either for the Father, or for the Son, or for the Holy Spirit, and is only determined from common use among the faithful, so as to supposit only for the Son: therefore from itself it is not a per se proposition, and in singular matter.

Second conclusion. — This proposition, God has been made man, is true, and proper.

It is proved 1. from sacred Scripture; for John 1. The Word was made flesh. And Rom. 1. Who was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh. The same is established from the Nicene Symbol in these words: And was made man.

It is proved also by reason from the Subtle Doctor: Effecting, whether simple or secundum quid, says only a double habitude, namely of the thing made to its maker, and also to the not-being of that thing preceding; whether meanwhile that being be simply or secundum quid: but in the Word incarnate that double habitude is found, namely of God, as he has been made man, to the action of the whole Trinity, and also to the not-being of man preceding; since the Word before his Incarnation was not man: therefore that proposition is true and properly said. Next, that which is, and was not always, is truly said made: but God through Incarnation is man, and was not always: therefore through Incarnation he has been made man. Finally, we rightly say something becomes this or that, when already before it was simply, but did not have that entity which afterwards it acquired: thus we say a wall becomes white, because although before it was a wall, nevertheless it did not have whiteness, which afterwards it had through the action of a whitening agent: therefore in like manner it is true that God has been made man, because although before he was simply, nevertheless he did not have humanity, which in Incarnation he assumed.

You will say: If that proposition were true, it would follow that God has been made simply: but the consequent is false: therefore also the antecedent. The sequel of the major is proved, because if it is true that Peter has been made man, it is also true that he has been made simply: therefore by equal reason, if it is true that God has been made man, he will also have been made simply. — The Doctor denies the sequel: and to the proof denies the consequence. For there is disparity, that it does not follow by force of form, but of matter, that if Peter has been made, he has also been made simply. Since indeed the being simply of Peter is to be a man, it is consequent by force of matter that if Peter has been made man, he has been made simply: but God has another being simply than the being of man; whence it does not follow that if he has been made man, he has also been made simply; just as it does not follow that the same Peter has been made white: therefore he has been made simply, because Peter has another being than to be white.

You will say 2. If God had been made man, it would follow him to have been mutated to humanity: but this is false: therefore, etc. The sequel is proved: because all other things which are said to become such are mutated to them by reception of those things to which they are mutated. I deny the sequel: and the reason of disparity is, because namely all other things which become, either simply or secundum quid, cannot terminate union of themselves with a form with respect to which they are said to become without mutation; but God can terminate union of himself with human nature without any mutation of himself. Thence that other things are perfectible through forms which they acquire; but God is not perfectible through humanity.

You will say 3. If God has been made man, it follows that God has been made God: but this is absurd: therefore, etc. The sequel of the major is clear, because through communication of idioms man is God: therefore if he becomes man, he also becomes God. — The Doctor denies the sequel together with the consequence of that proof; because, he says, through communication of idioms there are not predicated mutually of one another the predicates of both natures whose expression is his own very self, as we noted above from himself in assigning the rules of communication of idioms; and thus it must not be said that God assumed the divine nature, as he assumed the human nature; whence although it would be true to say not only that he assumed humanity, but even that he assumed man, of which we shall treat below; nevertheless it is not true to say that he assumed God.

Third conclusion. — This proposition, man has been made God, by rigor of speech is simply true; yet it is to be used more sparingly, and not except with caution applied.

The first part is proved by those texts of Scripture in which Christ is said made Son of God. Thus Rom. 1. Concerning his Son, who was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh: but Christ according as man is of the seed of David according to the flesh: therefore according as man he has been made Son of God: therefore that proposition, man has been made God, can be true, by rigor of speech.

It is proved also by the authority of the Holy Fathers, among whom this formula of speaking is frequent and familiar. Thus Greg. Nazianzen in orat. This man, he says, has been made God, after he washed with God. Similarly St. Augustine lib. De Trinitate 13. So great was that union, he says, that it made God man, and man God. Likewise St. Damascene lib. 3. c. 11. The Word, he says, was made flesh, and flesh Word, and God man, and man God. Athanasius lib. De humana natura suscepta: This very God, he says, has been made flesh, that his flesh might become the Word God. And Maximus the Martyr in the First Century of Theologians cap. 62. Sure, he says, is the confidence of hoping for deification, the incarnation of God of men, which made man God so much, as himself has been made man. For he who without sin has been made man, without mutation deified our nature into the Divine nature, and raised him so much on account of himself, as on account of man he humbled himself. By which he signifies alike that God has been made man, and that man is God made. But all these things St. Augustine elegantly confirms, serm. 15. De Vocificatione Gentium, cap. 2., where he defends both, that the Son of God has been made son of man, and son of man made Son of God; and repulsed those thinking otherwise: therefore I say, he says, let there creep upon us a certain opinion of the less attentive into the rule of faith, and into the oracles of the divine Scriptures. For they say: He who is son of man has been made Son of God: but who is Son of God has not been made son of man. That they might say this, they brought what is true, but they were not able to speak truly. What then did they will, unless because human nature could be changed into better, but divine nature could not into worse? This is true, but even thus also, that is, by no means with the Deity changed, nevertheless the Word was made flesh. Soon he opposes to them the true rule of faith: For what Christian denies, that from that woman a son of man was born, but nevertheless God man made, and thus man God made? Therefore also man made God is said, and what is the same, changed into better.

The Doctor proves the Conclusion: That is said simply made which through the action of some agent becomes such: but before it was not such: but man through the action of the Trinity becomes God, on account of his hypostatic union with God: therefore truly and simply it can be said that man has been made God. Next, by reason of union alone, whereby God is united to man, God is said made man: therefore by reason of the same union it ought to be said, man has been made God, because no less is man united to God than God to man. Finally, if there be any reason on account of which a proposition of this kind ought not be admitted, especially because man supposits for supposit: but it is false that the supposit of Christ has been made God: or also, because that participle made does not say effecting simply, but effecting such, which that which is said to become such ought to precede: but those reasons are none: for man here does not supposit for supposit, but only for singular humanity: nor must that which is said to become such necessarily precede in time affection of such, but it suffices if it precede in nature, and have its existence before in nature, than it receive such denomination: but it is certain that the humanity of Christ exists at least before in nature, than it be united to the Word, and consequently before in nature than it become God: therefore nothing hinders that proposition, man has been made God, from being true.

You will object 1. St. Cyril in the book against Anthropomorphites cap. 22., where he says: As one alien, whom they will, man has been made God. Likewise St. Damascene who lib. 3. cap. 2., when he had written that in the same moment and at once the flesh of Christ existed and was proper to the Word, thence concludes thus: Wherefore we do not say man has been made God, but God humanated. And Fulgentius in the book De Incarnatione, cap. 10. Nor did the flesh itself, that is, man himself, receive in itself the form of God receiving, but God, who was in the form of God, received the form of servant. — It can be answered, that these and similar sentences of the holy Fathers repudiate only that sense which pleased Nestorius, namely, that before the humanity of Christ had been assumed by the Word, it was already subsisting, and perfect man. Which sense indeed we repudiate as heretical: whence deservedly Peter Danconus lib. De Incarnatione, cap. 6, used to say: According to man therefore the Prophetic sentence, Christ has been made God, but not Christ has been made God, as heretics have said, who by progress, not by nature, would dare assert Christ God, etc. Therefore the Holy Fathers deny Christ to have been made God in that sense in which the Nestorians affirmed it, as if first man had existed, and then by a certain progression to the fellowship of Divinity had been elevated by merit of his virtues.

Although these things according to rigor of speech can be true, nevertheless since this formula of speaking could smile upon new Nestorians; therefore, as I said in the second part of the Conclusion, it must be used with caution. And I judge it better to say with the Seraphic Doctor in 3. dist. 1. qu. 5. that the aforesaid locution, whereby it is said, man has been made God, »ought to be distinguished after this mode, by which the aforesaid «God «is made man, is distinguished, from this that the thing of this participle made can be posited «about the whole, or about the predicate, or about both extremes. In «the first sense the locution is true, and the sense is: man has been made God, that is, «it has been made, that man should be God: and this indeed is true. But if «it determines the predicate, the sense is: man is God, who has been made: «and this indeed is false. But if it falls about both extremes, «and order of subject to predicate is made, then the sense is: man «has been made God, that is, who before was man, afterwards has been made God:«and this indeed is still false: because to be a man never preceded in that supposit to be God, nor is divine being in any way begun. And so it is clear, that if that locution in any way «could be conceded in the first sense; nevertheless in two other senses it cannot «be conceded, nor ought: man has been made God. Whence this is more im-«proper: man has been made God, than this: God has been made man, «and more rarely is found written. » Yet if somewhere it be read, or found, then according to the first sense it is to be taken.

THE THIRD QUESTION.

Whether this proposition is true, Christ is a creature.

NOTE 1. From the Subtle Doctor in 3. dist. 11. qu. 1. nu. 6., that creation is taken in two ways: First indeed properly and strictly: Second, less properly and more universally. And indeed according to this acception having a double respect: one indeed to the efficient cause, from which it is produced; the other from nothing of itself, which it presupposes. Creation taken properly respects only God as efficient cause, excluding any other whatever: it also respects pure nothing, which it presupposes, and from which it is produced simply. But creation generically and taken less properly says indeed habitude to the first efficient cause, not as immediately and alone producing, nor excluding the consortium of another cause. It says also order to non-being of itself; not indeed simply, but secundum quid, namely to the form to be expelled through advent of that form which is to be produced. And creation taken in this mode, all other entities besides God are said created, because they receive their being from the first efficient; and although they are also produced by secondary causes, nevertheless, says the Doctor, they are not called creatures of other causes; because creature, however it may be taken, never says relation as such to a second cause. But of the prior genus of creation, only Angels, says the Doctor ibidem, and intellectual soul, and grace, and certain things of this kind, which are produced from nothing, are said created by the first efficient. But it is certain, taking creation properly and in its strict acception, that Christ can by no means be called creature, even as man. Of which truth the Doctor sets forth this reason, that creature taken in this mode respects only God as efficient cause, and as principle from which it is produced: but Christ, even as man, does not have only these respects: since he says also habitude to other efficient causes; for the humanity of Christ was not produced immediately in being by the first efficient alone, but also by the blessed Virgin, who had some causality with respect to his production. He had also no respect to pure nothing, from which as from a term he would be produced; for he had prejacent matter, namely matter of body, which was transformed from the form of blood to the form of an animated organic body. But the difficulty is whether Christ in the second mode of creation can be called creature, and that either simply and without addition; or with addition and determination, namely inasmuch as man.

NOTE 2. From the same Doctor ibidem q. 2. n. 4., that these words, inasmuch, insofar, secundum quid, and similar ones, can be understood in two ways, namely reduplicatively and specificatively. Reduplicative indeed, when absolutely they signify the predicate to inhere in the whole subject, and assign some cause of such inherence or conjunction of predicate with subject, as in this proposition, man inasmuch as animal is sentient, in which the predicate sentient is signified to be in the whole subject, namely man; the cause also is noted on account of which it is in him, namely because man is animal. They are taken specificatively, when they distract, or at least can distract, the predicate in order to the subject, or the subject in order to the predicate, as in this example: An Ethiopian, inasmuch as he has teeth, is white: in which it is signified that whiteness is not in the whole subject absolutely, indeed that predicate white distracts from the whole subject, and is limited to some part of it, namely to the teeth of the Ethiopian. Nor is Vazquez to say, disp. 66. cap. 10., that these particles, inasmuch and secundum quid, are not taken reduplicatively when the same subject is repeated, and that this is false in every School, and according to all Scholastics: for he himself basely errs in asserting this, since in the present matter St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, and the Subtle Doctor concede this proposition, Christ, inasmuch as man, is creature, to be able to have a reduplicative sense; but those Doctors knew far better than Vazquez which is the reduplicative sense.

NOTE 3. That when a proposition is false from repugnance of terms or extremes, any determination or reduplication posited, which does not remove their repugnance, removes neither the reason of falsity of that proposition, because the cause remaining, effects also remain: but repugnance of extremes is the cause of falsity of the proposition, wherefore the repugnance remaining, its falsity also remains; but reduplication has not the force of removing repugnance of extremes of a proposition false absolutely, because it distracts nothing, nor adds to the extremes: but specification has force of removing repugnance of extremes, and consequently solving the falsity of the proposition, because it either adds, or distracts or diminishes something from the extremes, by reason of which distraction, the proposition which was before false without addition or distraction now becomes true through that addition or distraction.

First conclusion. — It is not improbable that this proposition, Christ is a creature, without any addition, and on account of communication of idioms alone, is true by rigor of speech: notwithstanding it is to be avoided on account of danger of error of the Arians. Thus St. Thomas, as Cajetan expounds him 3. part. quaest. 16. art. 8; and the Subtle Doctor seems to consent qu. 1. n. 7., where when he had exposed the opinion of Varro affirming this very thing, he does not impugn it, as the preceding opinions, but only adds: To whom this opinion pleases not, he can say it to be false on account of these reasons, etc. By which at least tacitly he admits that opinion can be sustained.

But the Conclusion is proved: First indeed by authority of Holy Fathers, as well Greeks as Latins, who call Christ creature and created. Indeed among the Greeks St. Greg. Nazianzen orat. 38., which is on the Nativity of Christ, says: O new mixture! o admirable tempering! he who is, becomes; and he who was not created, is created. The same teaches Greg. Nyssen sermon 13. on the Canticles: Uncreated we call the Word, he says, which existed in the beginning of things, but we call him created, because flesh has been made, etc. Subscribes St. Cyril lib. 10. of the Thesaurus, cap. 1., where he has this: For although himself by nature uncreated, and Lord and creator of all, made creature too, he is found first among men, whom assuming human nature he refashioned. Similarly Sophronius in that epistle which is held in the sixth Synod action 11. often calls Christ created and uncreated. — Among Latins truly St. Hilary lib. 12. De Trinitate, where although he contends against Arians that Christ is not a creature by reason of communication of idioms, openly concedes Christ can be called creature: His Son therefore is he, he says, who is in man, and of man facture, nor only facture, but also creature. Subscribes St. Ambrose on Psal. 118. serm. 3. I fear not, he says, lest anyone say: Therefore you assert Christ created? I shall answer, I say created just as made under the law, that is, made of woman, made under the law. St. Jerome subscribes on 2. cap. to Ephes. We, he says, freely proclaim there is no peril to call him creature, whom worm, and man, and crucified, and curse with whole confidence of our hope we confess. St. Leo sermon 3. Pentecostes: If man, he says, made to the image of God had kept the law of God, the Creator of men would not become creature. Finally, that I pass over others, St. Gregory openly teaches this thing lib. 3. Moral. cap. 29., where he says: Our Redeemer, because the state of his Divinity could not be grasped by human mind, showed himself to us, coming to us, created, born, dead… as passing over. By which he teaches no more danger there is to call Christ created than born and dead.

It is also urged by reason: First indeed, because no greater danger seems to be to call Christ creature than to attribute to him properties which breathe and include the same imperfection, as to be mortal, passible, finite, etc.: but these are attributed to Christ: therefore also the appellation of creature can be attributed to him. Next, it repugns no more to Christ to begin to be after not being, than to cease to be, because both equally repugn eternity: but of Christ properly and by rigor of speech it is said that he has ceased to be, otherwise he would not truly be said dead: therefore similarly it can be said that he has begun to be after not being, and consequently that he is a creature. Moreover, to be a creature is of the essence of man, because man essentially is dependent and finite being: but all things which are of the essence of man are said of Christ: therefore likewise of him it can be said that he is a creature. Finally, if it be denied of Christ that he is a creature, especially because that appellation repugns the Word and the divine nature: but this reason is none, for although it repugn the assumed human nature to be Creator or eternal, nevertheless notwithstanding that repugnance it is truly said of Christ that he is Creator and eternal: therefore by equal reason it ought not to be denied absolutely that he is creature, since on both sides the reason is equal.

Second conclusion. — It is probable and true (even cutting away danger of scandal and error) that Christ ought not simply be called creature. Thus the Subtle Doctor, as can be gathered from places already cited: for although he defines nothing expressly concerning this opinion, nevertheless he judges this last conclusion more probable; since indeed he solves all the foundations of the adverse opinion, not truly of this one: but St. Th. expressly teaches it lib. 4. Contra gentes c. 48.

But the Conclusion is proved by the Doctor qu. 1. n. 9. First because to this end, that something be called creature without any determination, it must have received its first being, whether total or partial after not-being: but Christ received neither after not-being: not indeed total being; since he has no such being properly, otherwise there would follow natures in him mixed, in the mode in which physical parts are mixed mutually into composition of whole: nor did he receive partial first being; because that is the being of the divine Word, which is eternal.

You will reply. That it suffices that creation terminate at some being, although that be not first, for something to be called creature. — Against: because whenever a predicate belongs formally to the minor part, or accident with respect to subject, then it ought not denominate simply the whole whose part it is, or the subject whose accident it is; for although e.g. to be white belongs to the teeth of the Ethiopian, yet from that one may not infer the whole Ethiopian is white: similarly although in Peter there be one whiteness, or several, it behoves not therefore to infer Peter to be one, or several by reason of the unity or plurality of whiteness which he has. Whence since the reason of creature belongs to the minor part, namely only to the humanity itself of Christ, it cannot rightly denominate the whole Christ creature. Next, to be creature is one of the transcendent predicates of human nature: but transcendent predicates belong no less to the supposit in itself than to nature: therefore if that predicate belongs to Christ, it will be attributed no less to his supposit than to his nature: but it is false that the supposit of Christ could be called creature, or created: therefore however much it belonged to human nature, it ought not therefore absolutely be attributed to Christ.

Whence to the foundations of the preceding less probable Conclusion I say first, that the Holy Fathers are to be understood of creation improperly so called, insofar namely creation signifies the same as facture or something made, because truly Christ has been made: or I say that the Holy Fathers speak with determination, so that Christ is called creature by reason of the assumed humanity, which in itself would truly and properly be called creature, if this appellation could square with the suppositum of the Word, whereby it subsists, or if it had its own proper suppositum, because of itself it has whatever is necessary that nature be called created according to the reason of nature. To the first reason I answer with Suarez doubly: first indeed that attributes of creatures truly belong to Christ by reason of created nature, when they do not include a created suppositum which should be produced from nothing; and therefore from those attributes only this can be inferred, that Christ is a creature, not properly, but improperly, taking the name of creation and creature. I answer secondly that certain predicates of creatures are clearly known to belong to Christ by reason only of human nature, as to be mortal and passible, about which there cannot be controversy between Catholics and Nestorians. But others are predicates about which there can be doubt whether they are attributed to Christ by reason of human nature, or truly also by reason of supposit; about which chiefly controversy is held between Catholics and Heretics, as to be mutable, to be finite, etc., which although in propriety and rigor of speech could be said of Christ by reason of human nature; nevertheless since there could be difficulty whether even these belong to him by reason of supposit, therefore more securely and more cautiously is it to abstain from them.

To the second reason the Doctor says, that it repugns no more to Christ to begin to be after not being, than to cease to be after being, cessation namely opposed to inception, whereof we speak, which is made plainly through annihilation. Whence he concedes that it equally repugns Christ to be annihilated as to be created; yet it does not equally repugn to die as to be created; because to die denotes only cessation of living, not truly cessation of being simply; but to be created signifies inception of being simply. To the third reason I say, that to be creature in its proper and strict acception is not of the essence of man, but only in the wider use of the name of creature, because it is not of the essence of man that he be a created person, but only that he be constituted through a created nature. To the last finally reason the Doctor answers, that it repugns more to Christ to be creature than Creator; because to be Creator belongs to the first and principal constitutive of Christ, namely the suppositum of the Word and the divine nature; but to be creature belongs only to the less principal being of Christ, namely his humanity. But since this predicate, creature, is born and ordered to denominate not only nature but also suppositum: but this denomination of created repugns the suppositum of the Word whereby Christ subsists: therefore to the whole Christ it repugns to be creature.

You will say moreover: Of Christ is predicated in quid that he is man: therefore that which is predicated is something created or uncreated: but it is not uncreated; otherwise saying that Christ is man, would be the same as saying that he is God; which is absurd: therefore it is something created; and consequently to be created or to be creature is predicated of Christ simply. — The Doctor denies the consequence, because although man is predicated of Christ, and man is created and creature, it does not follow that Christ is created or creature: since the argument consists of four terms, because when it is said that Christ is man, then the predicate man is taken in the concrete, as it concerns suppositum: but when it is said that man is creature, man is taken as it prescinds from suppositum: but man in concrete, and man in abstract, are two terms: and moreover Christ is another term, and also creature is another term: therefore there are four terms in that argument, and therefore the consequence cannot hold. I answer secondly distinguishing the subsumpt: that which is predicated is something created, as regards that formal being which man says, I concede: as regards material, I deny. For when it is predicated of Christ that he is man, that predicate man can be considered either according to its formal being, inasmuch as it signifies only our human nature, or as regards material being, namely as regards the being of the divine suppositum: but it does not follow that whatever is said of the formal predicate of some predicate can be said simply of the subject of the same; for rightly would no one say of a wall, which is white, that it is color, or quality; although this could be said of whiteness, which is signified formally by white. Similarly I cannot say of Peter that he is the whole essence of man, although I could say of the humanity signified by ly man, that it can be predicated of Peter: therefore in like manner I cannot say of Christ that he is creature, although it could be predicated of the humanity which ly man formally signifies, which is predicated of Christ.

You will urge: Christ is man: either therefore uncreated man, or created: not uncreated, because otherwise man would be eternal, for every uncreated thing is eternal: therefore he is created; and consequently of him it can be said that he is created, or creature. — The Doctor answers denying the last consequence, because the argument proceeds from a dictum secundum quid to a dictum simpliciter: as one would proceed in this argument: Peter is made white: therefore he is made: for when it is said that Peter is made white, the predicate white distracts the signification which made would have, if simply and without addition it were said, Peter is made: for thus it would signify that Peter were made simply. So also man in this proposition, Christ is created man, distracts the signification which ly created would have, if simply it were said of Christ, and effects that it signify only that Christ received being of man; not truly that he received being of creature simply, as truly it would be signified, if it were said that he was created without addition. I answer secondly distinguishing the major assumed: therefore uncreated man, or created: as regards formal, or material, which man says, I concede: as regards both together truly, I deny. For the material of that predicate, namely suppositum, is uncreated; but the formal, namely humanity, is a created thing; whence as regards both together, neither is he created only, nor uncreated only.

You will say finally: Christ by reason of body is conceived, or is called conceived, from this that his body is conceived: therefore by equal reason he will be called created, from this that his soul is created. The consequence is clear: because the whole ought no less be denominated from the property of the more imperfect part than of the more perfect: therefore since the soul surpasses body, Christ ought more be denominated from the properties of soul than of body. — The Doctor denies the consequence, and distinguishes its proof: that the whole ought no more be denominated from the property of the more imperfect part than of the more perfect, when nothing hinders, he concedes: when something impedes, he denies. But in the present case something hinders; partly because to be conceived does not signify that the first being of the thing which is called conceived is received after not being simply of itself, as to be created signifies this; partly because to be conceived is said of the supposit by reason of nature only, nor ought it be predicated per se and immediately of the suppositum; but to be created belongs to the suppositum by reason of itself immediately, no less than it belongs to nature; whence it ought not be said of the suppositum unless that suppositum be truly created; which certainly do not belong to the suppositum of Christ.

Third conclusion. — If this proposition, Christ inasmuch as man is creature, be taken reduplicatively, it is openly false: but otherwise if taken specificatively. This Conclusion has two parts, of which

The first is proved: Reduplication never removes repugnance of extremes, because it neither adds nor takes anything from the extremes, but its proper office is to denote the cause of conjunction of extremes, or adhaesion of predicate with subject: therefore that proposition, which before reduplication was false, as we said in the preceding Conclusion, through that reduplication cannot become true. This St. Epiphanius openly teaches impugning the heresy of Arians, which is 59., where he disputes most broadly against Arians that the Son of God ought not be called creature: for although he contends chiefly about him qua God; nevertheless he uses those arguments which seem to pertain wholly to Christ, and universally he demonstrates nothing created found in Christ, even qua he is man. What, he says, could profit us a creature, or contribute to salvation of men, or even to glory of the incarnate divine Word, and perfect divinity? What, I say, will it profit us, if we call him creature? What is it, in which anything created could profit creatures, or bring utility? To this how did God create God, and propose him adorable, since he himself said: thou shalt not make thyself any likeness, neither in earth, neither in heaven, neither shalt adore it: how therefore did he create to himself a son, and command him adored? especially since the Apostle says: and they served the creature rather than the Creator, and were made fools. For it is foolish to attribute Divinity to a creature, and violate commandment of the first law: The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve. Therefore the holy Church of God adores not creature, but the begotten Son, Father in Son, power of Father in Holy Spirit. — Here Epiphanius seems to admit, says Petavius, by no reason ought the Son of God be called creature, not even as man. For the arguments which he brings prove this generically, and he contends the name of creature alien from glory of Incarnate Word. Then he says nothing created profits creatures, or operates in them: but Christ man very much both conferred on human kind, and operated in it. Also while he denies creature to be adored, he indicates Christ man is not creature: since whom it is lawful adore indivisibly, God at once and man; as we shall say in its place.

The second part is proved: Specification has force of making true a proposition which before was false. The reason is, because by adding or diminishing something from the extremes, it now removes their repugnance, as in this example, that proposition, An Ethiopian is white, absolutely is in itself false: but it becomes true through this specification, An Ethiopian, inasmuch as he has teeth, is white, because such specification restricts the subject, or assigns some part of it in which whiteness be, or distracts this predicate from the whole subject, and limits it to that part of the subject capable of receiving whiteness, namely to the teeth: so in the present case, this proposition, Christ is creature, in itself absolutely is false; but it is rendered true through this specification: Christ inasmuch as man is creature, because that specification denotes a part, or quasi part of this subject, that is Christ according to humanity, to which it limits the predicate creature: which certainly Vazquez said not sufficiently maturely in 3. par. d. 66. cap. 2., that the Subtle Doctor had not weighed; for he does not advert that Scotus weighed that particle taken specificatively, namely inasmuch, to make the proposition true: although taken reduplicatively he leaves it false, if before from repugnance of terms it was false.

You will object 1. At least from what has been said there follows this proposition to be absolutely true: Christ is creature. It is proved because from Aristotle 5. Physicorum text comm. 1. What belongs to the whole according to part, that is said of the whole, thus e.g. the whole man is healed, because the thorax is healed: therefore since it belongs to human nature to be creature, thus it will be said of Christ, and especially with determination of that nature, or inasmuch as he is man: therefore simply it is said that Christ is creature according as man, just as simply it is true to say that man is healed according to thorax. — The Doctor answers denying the consequence, and to the proof I say, that when opposites can be inherent in some whole through diverse parts, neither of the opposites denominates the whole, by force of speech. The example of the shield is clear, of which if one part be white, and another half black, it will be false to say the shield is either white or black simply: but when some predicate is born to be inherent in the whole through some determined part, because namely it inheres precisely in that part, then from this that it denominates the part, it follows that it denominates the whole; as vision e.g. is born to be inherent in animal according to eyes, and therefore if according to eyes it inhere, by virtue of speech it inheres in the whole. Thus Aristotle must be understood, because indeed the thorax or heart is that to which health first belongs, therefore if man be called healthy according to thorax, simply he will be able to be called healthy. Applying these to the present case he says to-be-creature cannot be denominated of the whole, not because only the opposite can equally be inherent in Christ, and this predicate, namely to be Creator; but because, as was said, neither to the more principal part, nor to the first being of the whole, does this predicate belong.

You will ask 1. Whether truly and properly it can be said that Christ D. began to be. — I answer, that although according to rigor of speech this can be true simply, nevertheless in the reduplicative sense it appears false, since it signifies Christ to have had beginning of duration, which absolutely is false; for he who is said to have had beginning of duration simply, is conceived also to have had that beginning according to his suppositum, which is false. Nor does it stand in the way, that to begin to be belongs to human nature, which is signified by this name man; because the term posited in the subject through reduplication does not supposit formally for human nature, which began, but rather materially for suppositum, unless it be taken in the specificative sense, whereby the predicate began to be distracts from the suppositum, and is enunciated only of humanity taken separately, in which sense the Holy Fathers are to be understood, who with St. Augustine Epist. 105. confess Christ to have had a beginning; for that holy Doctor says: Before the world was made, neither were we, nor himself Mediator Christ.

You will ask 2: Whether this proposition be Catholic, Christ is Deiferous man? — I answer first, it is approved by very many Fathers; chiefly indeed by St. Basil, who on Psal. 45. on these words, The Most High hath sanctified his own tabernacle, expounds thus: Perhaps he speaks of the Deiferous flesh, which has been sanctified through conjunction with God; and on Psal. 49. expounding these words, I will extend my shoe into Idumea, says: the shoe of Deity is Deiferous flesh, through which he came among men. Similarly St. Maximus Martyr in exposition of cap. 7. of the book On celestial Hierarchy, where St. Dionysius calls Thrones Deiferous power, disputes in what way holy Fathers name the flesh of Savior Deiferous: And flesh, he says, according to substance and hypostasis is united to God the Word; therefore himself is said by Fathers to bear flesh, and to have put on flesh: what then is absurd, if also his flesh be named Deiferous, as bearing God the Word in indissoluble unionition, so much so that his flesh is said, and is properly, and according to truth of thing? — I answer 2. this proposition as heretical is repudiated and condemned by certain Holy Fathers. Thus St. Cyril proscribes it, as impure and impious saying of Nestorius lib. 1. Against him, and in the Decretory Epistle, which with anathematisms he wrote to the same Nestorius, which was approved in the Synod of Ephesus, of that heretic, in bringing forth that word Deiferous he opens his mind thus: But neither do we say that the Word dwelt, which proceeded from him, in him who was begotten of the holy Virgin, as in common man, lest Deiferous man be understood to be Christ. Similarly St. John Damascene lib. 3. cap. 12. harasses the same heretic in these words: Nestorius hateful to God, proudly dared to call him whom the Virgin bore Deiferous; but far be it from us that we call him Deiferous, or think him, but rather God incarnate. — But not only Catholic Doctors, but even heretics, namely Apollinarians, rejected that word; for St. Greg. Nazianzen reports Epistle 52., which is the second to Cledonius, that Apollinaris prohibited Christ to be called Deiferous man, but rather carniferous God, or hominiferous God: but in a sense far different from Catholic Doctors he disapproved that word, as one who denied Christ to be man; but thought nothing assumed besides flesh. Therefore that word must wholly be repudiated in that sense in which Nestorians usurped it: nevertheless without any detriment of Catholic piety it was used by Holy Fathers before arising of heresy of Nestorians, to signify that humanity of Christ was Deiferous, not that it bore God, as some burden and extraneous one, but its own and proper, that is, intimately and personally conjoined, and made with itself hypostatically the same, as above explains Saint Maximus.

You will ask 3: Whether Christ rightly can be called Dominic man? — I answer 1. that appellation pleased very many Holy Fathers: for St. Athanasius in exposition of faith twice calls Christ Dominic man. Similarly St. Epiphanius in Ancorato: Thus, he says, in flesh suffered Christ, in that, I say, Dominic man, whom himself coming from heaven fashioned, holy, God, and Word. Also St. Augustine used the same appellation in several places, chiefly lib. 83. quaestionum, quaest. 36., where he says: Here that most excellent and unique example of Dominic man is to be proposed. Memorable also on this formula of locution is the place in Rufinus in appendix of apology for Origen, which he edited in the name of Pamphilus Martyr, where he narrates:

Damasus, he says, Bishop, when deliberation was being held about receiving Apollinarists, commanded to be composed an edition of Ecclesiastical faith, to which same edition they ought subscribe if they wish to join the Church, entrusting it to a certain friend of his, a Presbyter, a most eloquent man, who after custom managed for him this business. It seemed necessary to him dictating that in that very edition on Incarnation of Lord, Dominic man should be said. In this discourse Apollinarists took offense, they began to attack novelty of the discourse: he wishes to be present who dictated, and from authority of true writers, Catholic men, refute those who impugned. It happened, that to one of them, who alleged novelty of discourse, he showed written in little book of Athanasius Bishop the discourse about which question was raised. As if persuaded already, he to whom it was proven asked that codex be given to him, whereby he might satisfy others ignorant and contradicting. Having accepted the codex, unheard-of kind of adulteration he devised, he erased the place itself in which that discourse was written, and rewrote again the very discourse which he had erased, the codex returned was received simply. Again question is moved about the same discourse: to proof the codex is brought: found is the discourse about which was question, placed in the codex from erasure: faith of him producing such codex is derogated, since that erasure seemed indication of corruption and falsity. But since (that I may say again the same things) these things were done by a living man against one living, at once he acted all things that fraud of committed crime be laid bare, and stain of wickedness adhere not to innocent man, who had done nothing such, but redound to author of deed, and to his more abundant infamy.

— But St. Jerome, who in lib. 2. Apologetic against Rufinus laughing rejects that narration, also disapproves that saying, which previously St. Gregory Nazianzen had also disapproved, who calling Apollinarists Christ Dominic man, thus rebukes them in epistle 51., which is the first to Cledonius: Lest men, he says, these deceive, nor moreover be deceived, asserting mindless Dominic man, as they call, or rather our Lord and God; for we do not separate man from Deity, but profess one and the same. But chief weight for repudiating that diction seems to be authority of St. Augustine, who in 1. lib. Retractationum, cap. 19., chastising himself and amending prior discourse, says: I see not whether rightly is said Dominic man, who is mediator of God and of men, the man Christ Jesus, since certainly he is Lord. But Dominic man, who in his holy family cannot be called? And this indeed, that I might say, I read among certain Tractators Catholics of divine eloquences, but wherever I have said this, I would not have wished to have said it; for afterwards I saw it ought not be said, although by some reason it could be defended. By which words St. Augustine brings forth the unique reason why that locution is to be condemned, that Jesus Christ is not Dominic man, because regarded whole and entire he truly is Dominic man, for thus he signifies both natures, whether God and man. Yet that locution could be defended in this sense, that Dominic would be said from humanity considered in abstracto, which so regarded is not Lord, but pertaining to Lord. Nor is it rare among Holy Fathers humanity of Christ to be called man, and for simple or abstract names complex names to be brought into use. Nor escapes me that St. Thomas in 3. part. q. 16. art. 3. disapproves that locution Dominic man by this argument: Because, he says, when it is said man Christ Jesus, the eternal suppositum is designated, and what is person of Son of God. But of person of Son of God Lord also is predicated essentially, and therefore it ought not be predicated denominatively, because this derogates truth of union. But they who said Dominic man, under term of man did not understand some person; rather rather nature itself assumed by Lord, and in common custom of speaking so polished and exact propriety of words is wont to be observed, as to be demanded to trutina of Dialecticians or Philosophers.